• No results found

The European Union's approach to reforming Ukraine through the perspective of governmentality

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "The European Union's approach to reforming Ukraine through the perspective of governmentality"

Copied!
83
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

The European Union’s Approach to Reforming Ukraine

through the Perspective of Governmentality

Tsvetelina Sandeva

Student ID: 12249386

Master Thesis Political Science: European Politics and External Relations

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris

Second Reader: Dr. Beste İşleyen

June 2019

(2)

I

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my family for their love and constant support throughout my university career, my friends for making me smile even when times were difficult, and my supervisor, Dr. Dimitris Bouris, for inspiring me and providing invaluable guidance and advice for the realisation of this project. This would not have been possible without you.

(3)

II

Abstract

This thesis presents an analysis of the European Union’s engagement in Ukraine along post-structuralist lines. It conceptualises the EU’s state-building initiatives through the lens of governmentality and examines how the use of seemingly technical instruments for introducing reforms in the country can entail a significant measure of power. Specifically, it asks: ‘What

are the implications of the EU’s approach to reforming Ukraine?’. To do this, the thesis relies

on two cases, namely the reforms of the civilian security sector, with a particular focus on the activities of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine, and the legal approximation and reform implementation under the terms of the Association Agreement with a focus on trade aspects. Through its methodological approach centered around the ways in which discursive practices produce meanings, understandings and acceptable behaviours, this study discovers that the dissemination and internalisation by different actors of dominant EU-centered narratives is underpinned by an exercise of power, which operates indirectly to promote specific understandings of ‘proper conduct’. Thus, this thesis’s main contribution is that it directs attention towards important micro-aspects of the EU’s power in the context of Ukraine, and thus allows viewing the EU’s normatively-based external action through a critical light.

Key Words: Ukraine; EU; governmentality; power; state-building; AA; EUAM

(4)

III List of Abbreviations AA AP CFSP CIS CPE CSDP DCFTA EaP EC EEAS EAEU ENP EPE ESS EU EUAM EUGS GOEEI IPE LPE MPE MS NABU NPE PCA SGUA Association Agreement Action Plan

Common Foreign and Security Policy Commonwealth of Independent States Civilian Power Europe

Common Security and Defence Policy Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Eastern Partnership

European Community

European External Action Service Eurasian Economic Union

European Neighbourhood Policy Ethical Power Europe

European Security Strategy European Union

EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine

Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy Government Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine Ideal Power Europe

Liberal Power Europe Market Power Europe Member State

National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine Normative Power Europe

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement Support Group for Ukraine

(5)

IV SSR

UfM UN

Security Sector Reform Union for the Mediterranean United Nations

(6)

V Table of Contents Acknowledgements……….I Abstract………..II List of Abbreviations………III Introduction………1 Chapter 1: Methodology……….3

1.1. Research Problem and Research Question………3

1.2. Methodological Approach……….5

1.3. Data Collection and Approach to Data Analysis………...6

1.4. Limitations and Considerations………...10

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and Literature Review………...12

2.1. Coneptualisations of the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor………...12

2.1.1. Identity of a Normatively Different Actor?...12

2.1.2. Mixed Motivations in the EU’s Ambitions………14

2.1.3. The Hidden Face of a ‘Model’ Power………15

2.2. The EU’s Role as a State-builder……….17

2.2.1. Components of State-Building………...17

2.2.2. The EU as a State-Building Institution Par Excellence?...20

2.2.3. Critique of the ‘Civilising Mission’………21

2.3. Governmentality and the EU………23

2.3.1. Governing Beyond the State………..23

2.3.2. Elements of Governmentality………24

2.3.3. Governmentality and the EU’s Practice of State-Building………26

2.4. Operationalisation of Framework………28

Chapter 3: The EU’s Role in Ukraine………...30

3.1. Overview of the EU’s Engagement with the ‘Neighbourhood’………...30

3.2. The Beginning of an EU-Ukraine Relationship………...33

3.3. Towards Deeper Political Association and Economic Integration………..35

3.4. The Ukraine Crisis………...37

3.5. EU Support for Ukraine’s Reform Programme………...38

3.6. Concluding Remarks………40

Chapter 4: Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Reforming Ukraine: Legal Approximation and Institutional Capacity-Building with a Focus on Trade Aspects………..43

(7)

VI

4.1. Towards Economic Integration and Modernisation ………43

4.2. Mechanisms for Implementation of AA/DCFTA………44

4.3. Results of Alignment with EU Standards………46

4.4. Transforming a State – between Aspirations for Integration and Projection of Power...47

4.5. Chapter Conclusions...50

Chapter 5: Analysis of the EU’s Approach to Reforming Ukraine: Reform of the Civilian Security Sector – the Case of EUAM...51

5.1. Security Sector Reform for a ‘Successful’ State...51

5.2. Possibilities and Limits for the EUAM...52

5.3. ‘Reform-mindedness’ for Progress...54

5.4. Changing Mindsets and Fixing a ‘Dysfunctional’ Security System...55

5.5. Chapter Conclusions...57

Conclusions...59

Empirical Conclusions: Overall Power Implications...59

Conceptual Conclusions: A De Facto Asymmetrical Relationship...60

(8)

1

Introduction

Nearly two decades ago Ukraine for the first time declared its aspirations towards the path of European integration. Whereas prior to 2014 it maintained a multivector foreign policy of balancing between the West and Russia, after the events of the so-called Ukraine Crisis, the country solidified its EU-leaning stance. In a response to Ukrainian demands, the European Union (EU) has become actively engaged in state-building efforts in the country by supporting comprehensive reforms and providing technical assistance on the ground for the purpose of developing closer political and economic ties. Furthermore, the EU’s engagement in Ukraine has been guided by the broader, ‘enlightened self-interest’ logic of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to promote peace and stability on the Union’s borders, as well as of upgrading the bilateral relations under the Eastern Partnership (EaP).

The EU has envisaged the implementation of reforms as a way of stabilising the country and maintained a preference for advisory and technical means, not assuming a direct role regarding the conflict with Russia. However, the supposedly ‘soft’ instruments favoured by the EU cannot be considered power-free. In fact, through the promotion of a particular understanding of ‘proper conduct’, and the export of ‘best practices’ and ready-made policies for the betterment of structural conditions in Ukraine, the seemingly apolitical approach can be seen to entail an important measure of political power. When observed through the post-structuralist perspective of governmentality, this approach can be identified as a subtle exercise of power and regulation of social conduct, achieved through the internalisation and normalisation of particular ‘acceptable’ behaviours that are in line with EU norms and standards. Such initiatives are usually grounded upon an image of the EU as a ‘force for good’ and a discourse of normative intentions and ‘universal values’, thus not only necessitating and authorising EU action in external contexts, but also morally justifying it.

The technical instruments can be seen as presenting issues considered political by the target population with standardised solutions, and also generating power imbalances and marginalisation of local agency through furthering ‘widely desired goals’, shaping understandings, behaviours and practices, and producing subjects of governance, compliant with the order promoted by the EU. This thesis adopts such a critical perspective to examine the power implications of the EU’s approach to reforming Ukraine, problematising the notion that politically detached efforts to export ‘universal values’ do not entail elements of power exercise, which works in favour of the EU. In studying the cases of the regulatory

(9)

2

approximation under the terms of the Association Agreement (AA) and the reform of the civilian security sector by the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM), this thesis attempts to demonstrate how power can operate in indirect ways towards the goals of stabilising and modernising Ukraine.

(10)

3

Chapter 1 Methodology

1.1. Research Problem and Research Question

The EU’s rapprochement with Ukraine has largely developed as a functional outcome of enlargement and realised through the framework of the ENP (Jeandesboz, 2015: 443). Furthermore, the EU’s active involvement in the country is often presented as a response to the pro-European aspirations of the Ukrainian government and population, which have been upheld for nearly two decades (ibid.). The EU has also expressed interest in advancing a closer relationship, which would ensure Ukraine’s European integration and contribute to the EU’s strategy for regional stabilisation through cooperation. The advanced relationship has been institutionalised through the AA in 2014, whose provisions envisage a comprehensive reform path for Ukraine, as to bring it closer to EU norms and regulations, and for this purpose allows for a growing presence of EU bodies on the ground to guide and assist Ukrainian authorities in the process (EEAS, 2016b: 2).

The EU has displayed a particular preference for employing technical and advisory instruments for the realisation of the reforms, and also affirmed its position that comprehensive institution- and capacity-building have the potential to stabilise and modernise the country. However, Ukraine faces important context-specific challenges, which have negatively impacted the implementation of reforms and the steady approximation of EU acquis – firstly, there is a lack of capacity and efficiency at the government level, and in some sectors, unwillingness and resistance to change (Maass, 2019: 14); and secondly, there is the complex regional geo-strategic dynamics, which ‘have drawn Russia, Ukraine and the EU into a triangular set of conflicting relationships’ (Jayasundara-Smits, 2018: 457).

Being an integral part of the ENP and the EaP, the EU-sponsored reforms in the region have triggered adverse responses from Russia, and particularly in the case of Ukraine, supposedly brought about the annexation of Crimea, the backing of rebel groups in the Donbas region, and more generally, the deliberate destabilisation of the country (ibid.). Against this background, the ‘soft’ or technical approach favoured by the EU resulted in the Union not assuming a direct state-building role (Maass, 2019: 16). Moreover, due to a desire among the majority of the Member States (MSs) to prevent ‘an all-out confrontation with Russia over the fate of common neighbours’, which in turn dictates avoiding any involvement in the settlement of the conflict (Dandashly & Noutcheva, 2019: 111), the EU’s engagement in

(11)

4

Ukraine can be deemed ‘apolitical’ and presenting a technical solution to a political problem. In transferring its own model and ‘best practices’, the EU appears to engage in a process of setting particular standards towards ‘desirable’ outcomes (typically associated with the notion of ‘good governance’ and constructing a ‘modern state’), which presents issues considered political by the target populations with technical and standardised solutions (Cebeci, 2018: 14).

The EU’s ambition to effectively externalise its norms and prompt comprehensive reforms in the countries of its vicinity can be considered a central part of its ‘normative’ agenda. It is grounded upon the EU’s self-perception as a ‘normative power’ and assumptions that the export of ‘best practices’ and ready-made policies will ultimately lead to ‘good life’ (Pogodda et al., 2014: 227). In reality, however, the EU’s normatively justified external action can technologise local politics, undermine local ownership of reforms and create patterns of power asymmetry (Merlingen, 2007: 449). Furthermore, in the case of Ukraine, the EU’s decision to distance itself from the conflict with Russia raises the question of whether its political choices truly reflect its self-assumed normative mission. These elements of the EU’s engagement in Ukraine draw a complex picture, which reveals a specific approach to state-building. This approach appears to be underpinned by an exercise of power, which operates through subtle, technical and rather indirect practices that promote EU-centered understandings of ‘proper conduct’ and guide societies towards behaviours backing up this vision, in a depoliticised manner. Consequently, sectoral cooperation and regulatory approximation through technical and advisory tools, even without the presence of an overt political agenda, have the potential to produce significant political results, establishing a power dynamics which advances a social and economic order favoured by the EU.

Therefore, the problem this thesis will seek to address concerns the EU’s preference for technical and advisory mechanisms in carrying out its role as a state-builder in Ukraine. It will problematise the EU’s seemingly neutral efforts to export ‘universal values’ for the purpose of stabilising and modernising the country, and will inquire of the impact which these efforts produce in terms of projection and exercise of power. The research question is therefore formulated as follows: ‘What are the implications of the EU’s approach to reforming Ukraine?’.

(12)

5 1.2. Methodological Approach

This thesis will attempt to answer this question by employing concepts from the state-building literature, dealing with external construction of capacities and state institutions on the basis of ‘good governance’ norms. Furthermore, it will engage with the literature on governmentality, which allows for problematising the EU’s self-styled normative mission through post-structuralist lens. Such an approach can help unpack important power dynamics, which affect the target society, and thus uncover elements of EU external action that are central in processes of (self-)reflection. Through critically investigating the EU’s approach to reforming Ukraine, light could be shed on the EU’s capacity and techniques to exert ‘normative’ influence. Such entry points are essential for developing a critical perspective on the EU’s workings and could contribute to expanding the debate on its role at the international stage. Towards this, the thesis will apply qualitative research methods. Most broadly, qualitative methods concentrate on social meanings and processes in order to enhance researchers’ understandings of the social and political world (Lamont, 2015). They rely on non-numeric data, inductive reasoning and in-depth scrutiny of particular settings (Maxwell, 2012). Because of the emphasis not only on the physical events and behaviour taking place, but also on different understandings and their influence on behaviour, qualitative research methods are well-suited to explaining social phenomena, unpacking meanings ascribed to activities or events, and building detailed understandings of the studied aspects of social or political life (ibid.). Furthermore, qualitative methods are useful in studying relations of power manifested through discourses and representations (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 15). As such, qualitative data collection and analysis are deemed the appropriate strategies that will best serve the purposes of this study.

The design of inquiry is based on case studies. They allow for developing an in-depth analysis of a case and making sense of different data through observing how it works in the particular case (Richards, 2005: 187). This thesis will rely on a comparison between two cases (i.e. civilian security sector reform, and legal approximation and reform implementation under the terms of the AA), instead of a single-case focus, because this will make possible highlighting common issues and central themes. Although employing a bigger number of cases is certainly useful for addressing the concerned problematic more thoroughly and producing more definitive results, the scope of this project limits the current number to two.

(13)

6

The selected data collection procedures are textual analysis and semi-structured interviews. On the one hand, textual analysis of documentary records, such as texts of policy documents and papers, reports, and official statements and speeches allows exploring the ways in which politics is formally phrased and practiced (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 18). Precisely this is an integral part towards approaching the research problem at hand. Furthermore, this type of data collection has the advantage of being non-intrusive and providing access to rich sources of information, without the problem of influencing the data (ibid.). On the other hand, the interviews as a type of data collection can be employed to assess the ways in which politics is understood and discursively justified through the perspective of the participants. Moreover, interviews are well-suited for ascertaining specialised knowledge and delving into attached meanings (ibid.: 17). Thus, they are a useful method for complementing the data acquired through textual analysis and have the potential to uncover viewpoints beyond official accounts. In general, the data collected mainly relies on primary sources, but secondary ones, which consist of existing academic knowledge, will also be utilised for developing more comprehensive analysis.

Finally, the chosen approach to data analysis is qualitative discourse analysis. This method will serve best the purpose of investigating the discursive practices through which the EU’s projection of power in the context of Ukraine is talked about, justified and carried out in practice. With its focus on production and reproduction of knowledge, and the relationship between particular discourses and the settings in which they operate, qualitative discourse analysis enables exploring how meanings are constructed and interpreting how these meanings relate to visions and actions (ibid.: 309-311). Delving into these interrelations is essential to answering the research question and elucidating the concerned relations of power. 1.3. Data Collection and Approach to Data Analysis

In order to explore the power implications of the EU’s approach in Ukraine, this thesis focuses on two cases – the reforms of the civilian security sector, with a particular focus on the activities of the EU Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM), and the legal approximation and reform implementation under the terms of the AA with a focus on trade aspects, whereby the European Commission’s Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA) plays an important role. These cases have been selected, because they to a significant extent epitomise the EU’s involvement in the country and because in them the EU puts emphasis on building or

(14)

7

reforming state capacities through the provision of practical support, advice and expertise, and guides Ukrainian authorities through the process.

Specifically, the EUAM is a civilian capacity-building mission, which is a prominent example of the EU’s continuous state-building efforts in Ukraine (Maass, 2019: 13-14). Working towards improving the security of the citizen, reforming law enforcement and battling corruption is a main task of the mission and also an essential aspect of state-building and of ensuring sustainable development in post-conflict contexts, according to international standards (Zarembo, 2015: 3). Regulatory approximation and reform of the trade sector, on the other hand, are key to achieving the goals of the AA and developing a closer relationship between the EU and Ukraine. Furthermore, implementing market reforms and increasing trade cooperation are often seen as a first step towards creating jobs, improving business climate and living standards, and increasing prosperity (e.g. European Commission, 2018b). In this regard, the SGUA has played a central role in coordinating financial resources and practical support for Ukraine.

The activities of EUAM and SGUA are especially relevant for this thesis as they do not engage politically or militarily with the settlement of the conflict with Russia, but whose activities serve to testify for the EU’s commitments to the country with a stated objective of understanding the local circumstances and institutional context, thus laying the foundations of ‘local ownership’ of the reforms. Moreover, through their presence the EU’s influence in the country is exemplified in terms of norm projection, mentoring activities, practical trainings and ‘best practice’ solutions.

As previously stated, for the purpose of data collection the methods of textual analysis of documentary records and interviews have been employed. The information regarding the EU-Ukraine relationship found in primary sources, which will include texts of agreements, action plans, association agendas, activity reports, institutions’ websites, speeches and statements, provides the basis for analysing official accounts and acquiring insights for the studied sectors. Furthermore, accounts from the Ukrainian side present in governmental websites are indispensable to the analysis, because they allow for observing the cooperative dynamics in the bilateral relationship and following the particular discourse dissemination. This material permits obtaining data directly and relatively easily, and importantly, they are reliable sources for accessing official positions. The chosen timeframe is from 2014, when the AA was signed, until most recent accounts in 2018/2019.

(15)

8

For this study, the documentary records have been selected not least due to their online accessibility, but also according to their authoritativeness and representativeness of official rhetoric, and with special attention to their relevance for the studied sectors, even though they often include more general accounts of the bilateral relationship. It is important to mention that the document analysis here has no claim of being exhaustive in scope, but instead focuses on finding evidence for particular patterns in official discourse. Additionally, secondary sources such as scholarly and media articles, which have critically processed the existing information, are used in order to enrich the analysis.

Furthermore, the method of interviewing is particularly valuable for this study. Employing interviews allows for delving more deeply into the problem at hand and going beyond formal positions in written texts. Interviews not only have the potential to provide first-hand insights into the specialised matter, and elicit opinions and attitudes, but also to ascertain the knowledge acquired through the documentary textual analysis and to explore meanings attached to concepts and activities (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 17). What is more, having interviews as an additional method of data collection can be expected to increase the credibility of the conclusions of this thesis (Maxwell, 2012).

In this regard, to address the studied cases two interviews have been conducted during a study trip to Brussels on 11th April 2019. The participants selected include a member of the EUAM Ukraine and two members of the SGUA. For ethical reasons their names and exact positions will be kept anonymous, and they will be referred to in the following way – EUAM Official and SGUA Members. These individuals have been approached due to their experience in the relevant fields, which can contribute to the knowledge of the studied sectors. Additionally, the fact that they are based in Brussels has been an advantage, since the author of this thesis did not get the opportunity to travel to Ukraine.

The interviews have been conducted face-to-face, allowing for direct, unobstructed interaction with the respondents. They have been comprised of semi-structured and open-ended questions, which are generally beneficial for in-depth exploration of opinions by giving the interviewer the opportunity to ask more detailed questions and probing, which in turn can ensure the provision of detailed answers and greater insight into the meanings of the interviewees’ experiences (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 258). For the task at hand, the semi-structured format of the interviews has been central, as it enables exploring how the EU workings in Ukraine are talked about, represented and justified by the selected practitioners.

(16)

9

For the purposes of this study, qualitative discourse analysis has been selected as a method of data analysis. Since this thesis seeks to understand how EU power is exerted through carrying out reforms in the Ukrainian context, it is essential to delve into the role of language in having an informative, as well as performative function. In this sense, discourse analysis is principally useful in exploring ‘how and why particular discourses emerge, become dominant, and are used by actors’ (Lamont, 2015). Furthermore, discourse analysis can be operationalised not only as a technique to understand the content of texts or speeches, but also as a way of explaining how the world is constructed through and affected by language (Hardy et al., 2004: 19, cited in ibid.). The discourse analysis here relies on a delimited number of representative texts, which reflect upon official discourses, as well as on the interview responses, and attempts to understand why and how these are adopted. Discerning how particular discourses create or limit choices of actors, and therefore shape the social and political world, is central for investigating the EU’s influence in Ukraine.

The EU’s practice of state- and institution-building in Ukraine can be argued to be accomplished via projecting ‘universal values’, advancing ‘widely desired goals’, and affecting understandings and behaviours through specific discourse frameworks. It is thus essential to examine how these frameworks render the particular visions and activities meaningful, and therefore how political power is exercised. Foucault suggests that for exploring the construction of social reality through discourse, attention should be focused on the ways in which discourses ‘systematically form the objects of which they speak’ (1972: 49, cited in Halperin & Heath, 2012: 312). In line with this, employing post-structuralist lens for the purpose of data analysis is helpful in elucidating how ways of talking about an object are embedded in power relations (ibid.). Specifically, the Foucault-inspired governmentality as a style of analysis is useful for seeking to capture power dynamics in practicing state-building and implementing reforms in the context of Ukraine, and for attempting to investigate the political effects brought about with the use of a particular type of discourse. In doing this, this thesis aims at providing a critical account for the posed research question and studying the implications of the EU’s power exertion in the case of Ukraine.

(17)

10 1.4. Limitations and Considerations

The outlined methodological approach presents several limitations, which need to be clarified. Firstly, a general limitation of employing qualitative research methods is the fact that the findings might not have wider relevance outside the concerned context (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 15). Whereas qualitative research allows for working with hard-to-define concepts and reaching greater depth of analysis, the ability to make generalisations is rather restricted (ibid.). For example, the findings of this study, although potentially compelling for the Ukrainian context, might not be subject to comparison with different EU neighbours or other third countries, due to the specific setting and circumstances.

The second limitation is linked to this, but with regard to generalisations within the internal context of Ukraine, and concerns the specificity and number of case studies. Working with two particular cases and therefore a limited number of central themes and between-case similarities or differences, constrains the ability to produce more definitive results and go significantly beyond the scrutinised sectors. However, the chosen number allows for illustrating and analysing the cases in greater detail.

Thirdly, textual analysis as a data collection procedure does not pose the problem of influencing the data sources themselves, but at the same time engaging with documentary records directly subjects them to the authors’ own preconceptions, beliefs and value bias. This is an inherent problem of interpretation, which inevitably makes the findings of a study more or less subjective (Nagel, 1994, cited in ibid.: 57). With regard to the method of interviewing, it is important to be aware of social desirability bias, meaning that respondents are typically driven by a desire to present themselves in a good light (ibid.: 237). Particularly in this study, the views provided by the officials in Brussels are susceptible to supporting rather than criticising EU activities, and thus generally prone to reproducing the positions found in official texts.

Additionally, the fact that the author of this thesis does not speak the Ukrainian language restricts the scope of the data collected, limiting the number of sources which can be used for exploring Ukrainian viewpoints. This confines the analysis to data in English that is likely to be produced specifically for EU readers, and thus might potentially suffer from different bias. Furthermore, translations from Ukrainian to English might omit important nuances in meaning, and are prone to adopting the type of rhetoric that is usually employed by EU actors.

(18)

11

A further limitation to this study has been the inability of the author to visit Ukraine and engage more closely with activities on the ground. The lack of such data restricts the possibility to produce more informed and conclusive results. However, it has to be mentioned that the interviewees contacted have been regularly travelling to Ukraine, and therefore their replies to a great extent reflect their experiences with the local circumstances and institutional and social environment, which is beneficial for this study.

An important consideration with regard to the approach to data analysis concerns the use of governmentality. Governmentality as a critical stance has distinct limitations – its analytical focus is narrower than the one of conventional approaches to EU studies; it is not suited to examining ‘how non-discursive conditions and contexts interact with and shape discursive practices’; and its epistemology is not appropriate for developing conventional causal explanations (Merlingen, 2010: 164-165). While it is important to be aware of these specificities, governmentality as a style of analysis is deemed appropriate for approaching the matter studied here, due to being well-equipped to studying the role of discursive means for the exercise of power, and to bringing attention to important micro-aspects of governance. The final limitation and a general weakness of the chosen methodological approach is that by talking about the particular EU-centered discourse, this study inevitably reproduces it, although in trying to view it critically. Simply by analytically engaging with the linguistic repertoires which produce meanings, understandings and acceptable behaviours, this thesis practices this same language’s dissemination. Furthermore, in reflecting upon official discourses, this study is confined to engaging with only those standpoints presented in or implied by them. Future research is this area could benefit from widening the scope of data collection, and thus bring forth more conclusive and unambiguous results.

(19)

12

Chapter 2

Conceptual Framework and Literature Review

In the following chapter, three distinct, but nonetheless interrelated kinds of literature will be presented – firstly, the literature, which conceptualises the EU’s role as a foreign policy actor, secondly, the literature on state-building with a focus on the EU’s activities in this regard, and thirdly, the governmentality literature, which provides a critical post-structuralist account of EU governance. In the last section, attention will be devoted to the operationalisation of the conceptual framework, explaining how the three strands of literature come together and will be employed to address the current analysis.

2.1. Coneptualisations of the EU as a Foreign Policy Actor 2.1.1. Identity of a Normatively Different Actor?

In order to shed light on the EU’s role in the foreign policy realm, for decades scholars have developed a variety of conceptualisations of its international standing. The earliest such conceptualisation is Duchêne’s notion of civilian power Europe (CPE), which reflects the discourse on ‘the decline of power politics’ (1972: 47). The Europeans’ notion of ‘civilised politics’ through non-violent forms of power came to the fore, opening a possibility for Western Europe to emerge as ‘the first civilian centre’ (ibid.: 43, 47). Duchêne envisaged that by being ‘a massive market no one can ignore’ and ‘free of a load of military power’, Western Europe could acquire substantial influence, which would allow it to exert worldwide its ‘civilian power’ (ibid.: 45, 47). The CPE conceptualisation serves to indicate the growing significance of ‘soft’ instruments of power that have been previously rather neglected. In this sense, the EC came to represent a distinctive regional system, which prioritises economic, diplomatic and cultural exchanges in sharp contrast to the other ‘major nations of the current world’ (ibid.: 35, 47).

This perspective has not gone without criticism. Hedley Bull’s article ‘Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (1982)represents ‘the return of power politics’ and argues for the need of the EC to make itself more self-sufficient in defence and security in order to assert European interests independently. Bull saw the ability to provide for its own security and reliance on its own military potential as indispensable for Europe’s independent international standing (ibid.: 153-154, 156). Although this would not necessarily entail a departure from the

(20)

13

Community’s ‘civilian’ character, the elements of ‘soft’ power are not seen as sufficient for the assertion of Europe as a fully-fledged player in international affairs.

Twenty years later Ian Manners published his seminal work on ‘normative power Europe’ (NPE). He argues that notions of civilian and military power concentrate excessively on how much like a state the EU looks and leave out a crucial dimension –‘the ideational impact of the EU’s international identity/role as representing normative power’ (2002: 238). The EU’s distinctive normative identity is grounded upon its ‘power over opinion’ and ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ (ibid.: 239). The claim of distinctiveness is derived from the specific historical context, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution of the EU, but also from the commitment to placing universal norms and principles at the heart of its relations with the MSs (ibid.: 241).

The ‘normative’ basis of the EU has given it the ability to legitimately export these universal norms, which in turn has made the instrumental use of military force redundant (ibid.: 242). But perhaps most importantly, the NPE conceptualisation serves not only to describe the ontology of the EU as having uniquely normative foundations, but also offers a specific understanding, which ‘predisposes it to act in a normative way’ – an imperative to represent itself and behave as a ‘force for good’ (ibid.: 252). Hence, the NPE perspective suggests that the EU is a sui generis actor, who possesses the capacity of redefining what is ‘normal’ in international relations through ‘the different existence, the different norms, and the different policies which [it] pursues’ (ibid.: 253, emphasis added).

The NPE conceptualisation appears to downplay the material forms of power as opposed to ideational ones, as pointed out by more recent studies, which concentrate on how both of these forms come to play when seeking to explain the EU’s external behaviour. Damro’s idea of ‘market power Europe’ (MPE) sustains that because the EU is essentially a market with substantial economic weight, it can effectively externalise internal policies and regulatory standards (2012: 682-683). These featureshelp the EU determine the roles and interactions of various actors and also become an active shaper of globalisation (ibid.: 683, 685). This view attributes the EU’s exercise of power to the fact that it affects both the material incentives for other actors, and their perceptions over possible outcomes (ibid.: 687). Although the MPE conceptualisation gives some credit to the EU’s ‘normative identity’, it gives greater importance to the structural and institutional features of the EU in driving externalisation of norms and exercise of power.

(21)

14 2.1.2. Mixed Motivations in the EU’s Ambitions

Huski Haukkala (2008) chooses a different approach, which posits that both material and ideational forms of power come together in explaining the EU’s role as an international actor. He offers the conceptualisation of the EU as a ‘regional normative hegemon that is using its economic and normative clout to build a set of highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help facilitate an active transference of its norms and values’ (ibid.: 1602). In this view, the EU relies on both coercion and perceived legitimacy in the eyes of its partners to exercise its normative reach (ibid.: 1602-1603). The most salient instrument at the EU’s disposal for doing this is the enlargement policy, which involves a certain degree of coercion (conditionality), downplayed by the NPE conceptualisation. On the other hand, through the ENP the EU presents an alternative to further enlargements, which however constrains its ability to drive change in third countries, and diminishes its legitimacy and justification, because it does not answer calls for belonging (ibid.: 1611). Nonetheless, the ‘hegemonic’ nature of the EU, which characterises it as seeking ‘a monopoly on defining what […] norms entail and thus [creating] the boundaries of normality and European-ness’ (ibid.: 1606), is a central element of Haukkala’s conceptualisation and points to the EU’s dubious character. Zielonka goes a step further in describing the EU’s efforts to externalise its norms and standards as ‘truly imperial’ (2008: 471). In his view, the EU ‘looks and acts like an empire’ because it attempts to exert political and economic influence over different actors through various forms of economic and political domination (ibid.: 475). The context of structural asymmetry, in which the EU is claimed to be promoting ‘the most efficient model of economic and political integration’, places actors ‘peripheral’ to the EU in a position of compliance and constrains their sovereignty, as they want to be considered for EU help or accession (ibid.). Towards this, the instruments employed are mainly economic and bureaucratic, and are intended to make these countries look more like the EU through aligning them towards EU legislation and administrative practices (ibid.: 475, 476). In other words, Zielonka claims that the EU’s power works through the assumption that ‘the EU acquis offers a universal model for the establishment of functioning markets and common standards’ and the ambition to effectively shape countries in its own image (ibid.: 478).

Similarly, Rafaella del Sarto formulates her idea of the EU as a ‘normative empire’ (2016). According to this view, the EU acts as an ‘empire of sorts’, whose transfer of rules and practices beyond its borders serves to ensure its own security and economic interests (ibid.:

(22)

15

215). Furthermore, this self-centered pursuit is presented in a normative discourse as a sort of a ‘civilizing mission’ and thus contributes to the construction of a ‘normative’ identity for the Union (ibid.: 216). Importantly, when describing the EU’s rationality in its external behaviour, del Sarto does not negate its ‘normative’ identity, and thus reconciles ‘an artificial divide’ between norms and interests (ibid.: 217). The EU indeed possesses ‘normative’ features as it exports norms and promotes regulatory convergence, but it can also be considered an ‘empire’ with ‘formidable’ power, which pursues its ends in ‘not-so-benevolent’ ways (ibid.: 227-228).

Lisbeth Aggestam’s notion of ‘ethical power Europe’ (EPE) (2008) also underscores the EU’s mixed motivations in foreign and security policy in terms of material interests and normative/ethical considerations. Her idea is underpinned by ‘a conceptual shift in the EU’s role and aspirations from what it ‘is’ to what it ‘does’’ (ibid.: 1). In this view, the EU’s aspirations to become a ‘power for good’, which are articulated in a discourse of universal ethics, imply an acquisition of military capability, which would complement its role in development aid and humanitarian assistance (ibid.). The EU’s more assertive role in international politics has been assumed and legitimised as a result of the distinctive European experience in achieving peace and reconciliation, which has enabled it to be viewed as a model and created an imperative to export its conception of ‘good life’ elsewhere (ibid.: 4). Wagner (2017) introduces a further conceptualisation to capture the international character of the EU – namely ‘liberal power Europe’ (LPE). With this concept it is emphasised that ‘ideas (norms and values) as well as material interests influence policy’, thus pointing to the complex circumstances under which particular decisions are taken and outcomes achieved (ibid.: 1401). While the LPE agrees with the NPE conceptualisation that ‘core liberal values’ to a considerable extent drive EU external policy, it makes a distinct claim that norms can also act as constraints on foreign policy and that they are often subject to political contestation (ibid.: 1405-1406). Therefore, the LPE implies letting go of conceiving of the EU as a sui

generis actor, but viewing it as ‘a quintessentially liberal-democratic organization’, motivated

and constrained by liberal ideas and interests (ibid.: 1410). 2.1.3. The Hidden Face of a ‘Model’ Power

Although these recent conceptualisations turn more attentively to the EU’s complex character, they simultaneously reproduce the NPE discourse by acknowledging or partly affirming the EU’s ‘normative identity’. Thomas Diez (2005) argues that there are important power

(23)

16

implications in the representation of the EU a unique kind of normative power. These are twofold: firstly, the success of this representation is ‘a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU’, and secondly, it ‘constructs an identity of the EU against an image of others in the ‘outside world’’ (ibid.: 614). Diez thus suggests that the NPE discourse as propagated by both academics and politicians has significant political effects in legitimating EU action and allowing EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings (ibid.: 615, 627).

Michael Merlingen (2007) makes a similar critique of the NPE concept along post-structuralist lines. According to him, the normative conceptualisation only exposes the ‘celebrated face’ of EU foreign policy through the promotion of fundamental rights, while leaving out its hidden face whereby ‘the EU’s self-styled mission […] inscribes the very agency of those it seeks to empower in relations characterized by epistemic violence, the technologization of politics and administrative arbitrariness’ (ibid.: 436). In diffusing universal values and norms ‘by virtue of its international presence and value-rational conduct in foreign policy’, the EU overlooks its own ‘less than perfect’ record of norm compliance and others international actors (ibid.: 437-438).

Furthermore, the articulation of NPE involves a mechanics of power, whereby its exercise does indeed limit the ‘degradation and humiliation’ of individuals, but at the same time subjects target societies to the EU’s ‘normativising universalist pretensions’ (ibid.: 449). This is due to two factors – firstly, while norms can serve as a means of emancipation from tyranny, poverty or insecurity, they can also act as a means of control which imposes constraints on local agency; and secondly, the fact that the EU’s norm diffusion operates within the legal domain, provides it with both justification and implied consent of local actors to further ‘widely desired goals’ (ibid.: 441-442). In other words, the discourse and practice of NPE have considerable implications that Manners appears to have omitted – namely that norms are contingent and ambiguous, and thus can also ‘contain and entail arbitrary constraints […] that limit the expression of difference’ (ibid.).

Münevver Cebeci (2012) also takes a post-structuralist stance to explain why presenting the EU in ‘ideal’ ways is problematic. She argues that both practitioners and foreign policy researchers engage in the construction of an ‘ideal power Europe’ (IPE) meta-narrative, which maintains that the EU is both structurally and normatively different from other political entities, that its normative basis predisposes it to ‘lead by example’ and that the claim to

(24)

17

represent ‘universal values’ and the ‘best practices’ justifies and legitimates the aspirations to spread them outside its borders (ibid.: 564). The construction of the self in ‘ideal’ ways happens not only at the expense of the ‘other’ (Diez, 2005), but is also constitutively and performatively linked to policies (Hansen, 2006, cited in ibid.: 565). In this sense, the discourse of policy-makers and researchers feed into each other, constructing the EU as a ‘positive force’ in world politics, thus legitimising certain acts and disguising failures through a speech of normative intentions (ibid.: 564). The production of knowledge therefore helps the EU draw lines of ‘normality’ and at the same time legitimises the Union’s ‘disciplining function’ at the international level (ibid.: 574). Notably, the fact that the EU aspires to act in ‘ideal’ ways in itself makes it a ‘model’ power, although it may refer to coercive or disciplining means (ibid.: 577).

What concerns the current analysis is that normatively charged discourses present ‘names and narratives that permit [Europeans] to identify with an ‘ideal’ polity and justify their actions on those lines’ (ibid.). The ‘force for good’ image (re-)produces knowledge, which inevitably affects the EU’s foreign action. The EU establishes asymmetrical relationships with its ‘others’ in the form of membership prospects, association agreements or trade benefits (ibid.: 579). This is not to claim that the EU pursues a kind of neo-imperialist agenda, but to point to a rather subtle form of power dynamics hidden behind a discourse of normative intentions. The normative narrative supports a certain perspective on the world and therefore a certain model of power distribution, which allows the domination of some by others and constrains the possibilities for the expression of difference in public life (Merlingen, 2007: 450). Although the EU is not always perceived in terms of the image it aims to convey, the link between self-identity and policy makes the two appear consistent with each other, and justifies external action on ‘normative’ grounds. This issue largely concerns the EU’s state-building activities.

2.2. The EU’s Role as a State-Builder 2.2.1. Components of State-Building

In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlined the concept of ‘post-conflict peace-building’ as intended ‘to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ in societies emerging out of ‘civil strife’ (cited in Duke and Courtier, 2010: 18). The task of stabilising post-conflict societies initially relied on short-term engagement, holding a successful election and exiting with the

(25)

18

hope that lasting peace would be ensured through democracy and functioning market economy (Paris & Sisk, 2009: 6). After the first generation of peace-building operations, it was realised that ‘[r]elatively little attention was paid to the longer-term tasks of constructing or strengthening the institutional structures necessary for democratic governance and market reforms – and, arguably, a durable peace – to take root’ (ibid.).

As a result, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, major peace-building actors undertook an important shift in their strategies towards an approach of ‘state-building’. The concept of state-building can be seen as a particular approach to and a sub-component of peace-building, whereby the operations aimed at stabilising countries emerging from conflict are more narrowly concerned with the construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions, and imply a rather long-term engagement (ibid.: 1). This approach positions the existence of ‘capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions’ as a precondition to achieving security and development in counties emerging from civil war (ibid.: 1-2). The post-conflict environment is usually characterised by the existence of a ‘dual crisis of security and legitimacy’, whereby the state is not trusted to be an impartial provider of credible security guarantees (Barnett & Zürcher, 2009: 28). The state-building process thus entails a social engineering of a ‘modern state’ whose legitimacy and effectiveness depend on the rule of law, democratic institutions, and market-driven development (ibid.). Consequently, by presupposing what a state ‘should’ be like and delivering support for particular state capacities, state-building efforts can be thought of as ‘constituting a new form of political rule manifesting as a transformation of intervened states’ (Hameiri, 2013: 57).

The highly ambitious goal of political and social transformation is grounded on resolving problems, which are assumed to be typical for ‘pre-modern’ societies, deemed to be less capable of acting in a rational or autonomous manner (Chandler, 2013: 83). According to Chandler (2007a: 71), nowadays the international state-building approaches insist on the centrality of the regulatory role of external players and maintain that locally-derived political solutions are likely to be problematic. In such context, interventionist state-building projects are aimed at not simply reconstructing a state through ‘frameworks of ‘good governance’, but also at transforming the mindset of its inhabitants through a set of ‘correct practices’ of external regulation (ibid.: 75).

The ‘good governance’ approach thus appears to depoliticise problems of politics or move them outside the realm of the political, so that they can be resolved in the realms of law,

(26)

19

social policy and administration (ibid.). This lays on ‘deep ideological presumptions which purport to offer technical solution to what in essence are political problems’ (Bendaňa, cited in ibid.). Thus, processes assumed to lead to capacity building become incipient of greater external regulatory controls by international institutions and weakened state-society links. Furthermore, external control is legitimated through a discourse on ‘cosmopolitan’ norms and laws, which are deemed to be lacking in the local contexts.

A key concept, which contributes to the transformation and stabilisation of post-conflict societies, is the one of security sector reform (SSR). The SSR is intended to affect ‘all the structures, institutions, and personnel responsible for security provision’, and presents a holistic approach, which concerns not only the security of the state, but also the one of its population (Chappuis & Hänggi, 2013: 168). The effective provision of security through a framework of democratic governance and respect for human rights thus refers to a process whereby a state seeks to enhance its security institutions (ibid.: 169). It also represents a normative agenda, as it ‘aspires to subject the security sector to certain standards of good governance that are based on a specific vision of legitimacy of the state and its relationship to the population’ (ibid.). Chappuis and Hänggi thus argue that the SSR represents a kind of a governance agenda, in which the focus is to make the use of force legitimate and accountable in accordance with the liberal state-building paradigm (ibid.: 170-171).

The legitimacy of state-building efforts hinges upon local participation, local ownership and bottom-up approaches. Thus, providing opportunities and space for local actors to connect with the state-building process is a necessary condition for its success (Richmond, 2013: 394). However, approaches to state-building envisage the possibility of creating a prosperous state as long as its institutions are sufficiently well-designed and operate within the rule of law in accordance with principles of good governance (ibid.: 381). Richmond (ibid.) therefore deems state-building as an approach to making peace ‘inherently unstable because the state rests on international support and elite compromise, and it often lacks local legitimacy’. This results in a failure of state-building projects to connect with the local target populations, who often ‘have their own understandings […] according to their own socio-historical and cultural traditions and context’ (ibid.: 379).

(27)

20

2.2.2. The EU as a State-Building Institution Par Excellence?

Despite the criticisms and flawed design of state-building, there is a consensus that it is crucial for the achievement of broader peace and security. The EU is an actor, which identifies the promotion of peace as a priority area of its foreign policy (Tocci, 2010: 55). The EU’s experience of ‘dealing peacefully with disputes and […] co-operating through common institutions’ has made it ‘a more credible and effective actor’, which ‘should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world’ (Council of the EU, 2003: 2). The European Security Strategy (ESS) suggests that in order to ensure its own security, the EU has to contribute to tackling sources of insecurity around the globe. This normative imperative is most strongly emphasised with regard to the EU’s so-called ‘neighbourhood’, which brings the EU closer to ‘troubled areas’ (ibid.: 5).

The ‘strong sense of responsibility’ is also present in the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), where the EU reinstates its intention to invest in the ‘resilience’ of societies to the East and South, and engage in ‘a practical and principled way in peacebuilding’ to ensure its ‘vital interests are [not] threatened’ (EEAS, 2016a: 9). The Union’s ‘enduring power of attraction’ is seen to have made people from both the East and South wishing to build closer relationships and therefore the EU has expressed a willingness to support them through long-term engagement, advancing human rights protection, locally owned rights-based approaches to the reform of the justice, security and defence sectors, and support in building capacities (ibid.: 25-26).

The EU aims at creating the conditions for durable peace through a wide array of policy action meant for the long-term transformation of conflict (Tocci, 2010: 55). As such, the EU’s policy actions are aimed at state-building, and political, social and economic development (ibid.). The EU does this in a variety of forms – through engagement in short to medium-term actions in conflict zones within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (e.g. diplomatic mediation efforts, and military and civilian operations), and through longer-term actions, such as aid and technical assistance programmes, and contractual arrangements with third parties grounded mainly upon trade (ibid.: 56). The long-term engagements attempt to achieve sustainable structural change in third countries, which in turn is hoped to ensure conflict transformation and resolution (ibid.: 57).

(28)

21

A unique case of EU foreign policy is the enlargement policy, which incentivises candidate countries to conform to a set of political, economic, legal and technical requirements in order to be admitted to the Union (ibid.). As these requirements dictate the acceptance of EU norms and rules, they imply a transformation of the domestic environment as to uphold the principles of liberty, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, as stipulated by the Treaty of the EU (ibid.). Furthermore, in order to move the accession process forward, the potential candidates are obliged to fulfill certain reforms on the basis of the EU’s recommendations, including in the sphere of peace-building (ibid.: 58). Although the exchange of appropriate reform implementation for assistance and credits seems reasonable, it has a crucial drawback – it marginalises domestic political process, distances ‘empowered’ actors from their own societies and creates rather weakened and unstable states (Chandler, 2007b: 606-607). According to Chandler (ibid.), the rhetoric on partnership, local ownership, good governance, and civil society building, merely serves for ‘the internal need for the European Union to deny its power to itself’.

When it comes to the countries to the EU’s East and South, or the so-called ‘neighbours’, the EU has developed the ENP to promote a deeper political and economic relationship (Whitman & Wolff, 2010: 3). The ENP has been designed in a response to the change of the Union’s external borders after the 2004 enlargement, which ‘will enable neighbouring countries to share the benefits of EU enlargement in terms of stability, security and well-being’ (European Commission, 2004: 2, 6). The ENP relies on bilaterally agreed Action Plans (AP) through which different areas that need reform are identified (Tocci, 2010: 60). In exchange for progress, the neighbours are given the offer of deeper political and economic integration (Whitman & Wolff, 2010: 6). In short, the policy appears to be designed by the so-called ‘enlightened self-interest’ (ibid.). In building asymmetrical bilateral relationships intended to facilitate the transference of norms and values, the policy relies on the EU being perceived as legitimate by the partners (Haukkala, 2008). However, by refusing to give a membership prospect and thus respond to calls for belonging of some of the countries, the EU is risking to lose its legitimacy and credibility, and also create a sense of exclusion (ibid.).

2.2.3. Critique of the ‘Civilising Mission’

According to Chandler (2010: 94), the positive image of the EU as a state-building institution

par excellence has served to reproduce a post-liberal discourse of the ‘civilising mission’ of

(29)

22

have problematised ‘autonomy and self-government, inverting the liberal paradigm through establishing administrative and regulative frameworks as necessarily prior to democratic choices’ (ibid.: 95). The post-liberal discourse of governance concentrates on (re-)building technical and administrative capacity in which the EU possesses legitimate authority of exporting ‘good governance’ (Chandler, 2010: 95-96). In this way, the EU claims, and is recognised, to be exercising ‘normative’ power which positively influences state capacities, as opposed to the ‘neo-colonial’ or ‘hard power’ typically employed by other actors (ibid.: 96). Cebeci (2018) argues that through the discourse of the EU as a successful peace project and the discourse on the EU’s normative aspirations, the EU is constructing an identity of itself as ‘representing peace’, which renders it both capable and responsible for state-building in other geographies, and thus legitimises its state-building efforts. This identity construction also demarcates the space outside the EU as different, dangerous and conflictual, and therefore in need of the EU’s help to achieve peace (ibid.: 2). The EU’s own historical experience serves to construct it as an ‘embodiment of universal progress’ and a ‘model’ representing universal values, which should be exported to the rest of the world (ibid., emphasis added). This is a process of ‘normalisation’, which works through identifying and correcting abnormalities in order to bring about a type of ‘proper’ conduct, underpinned by the norms of the EU (İşleyen, 2018: 324-325).

Furthermore, the normalisation of the EU’s role as a state-builder establishes an unequal power relationship whereby the EU’s others are constructed as incapable of building democratic structures or achieving peace on their own (Cebeci, 2018: 9). Moreover, the EU’s failures are often excused with reference to its originally benign intentions (ibid.: 11). As argued by Chandler (2008: 519), the EU views itself ‘as an actor without a political agenda of self-interest, merely exporting frameworks of governance which are technically and administratively in the best interests of the region’. Moreover, when providing support, ‘the rhetoric of “local ownership” is only used to pay lip service to the EU’s statebuilding’ and the EU’s solutions are ‘mostly imposed’ as they are seen to represent the ‘best practices’ (Cebeci, 2018: 11). Thus, the EU is problematising local capacities and setting the boundaries of what is ‘normal’ in target societies, depoliticising them, and encouraging mimicry, instead of contextually sensitive solutions (ibid.: 12-13). The ‘civilising ethos’ of the EU, which legitimates its state-building activities and assigns understandings of normality, points to an particular exercise of power, which deserves more attention.

(30)

23 2.3. Governmentality and the EU

2.3.1. Governing Beyond the State

So far it has been discussed how state-building activities can be seen as aimed at transforming domestic governance by determining the political choices available to target societies; how asymmetrical relationships are established through technocratic interventions, which seek to reshape domestic governance; and how institutional capacity building and ‘good governance’ frameworks provide little room for tackling political problems, bringing forth local visions and developing state-society relations. The so-called ‘critique of the liberal peace’, in short, explains failures in peace-/state-building with the flawed approach of attempting to change administrative and technical practices within the governance institutions of target countries (Richmond, 2011; 2013). The ‘administrative’ and ‘technical’, however, can be deemed to have a much greater role in state-building – ‘the supposedly neutral technical instruments […] are not free of power but produce significant political effects in terms of making particular understandings of peace visible, while concealing alternative visions, as well as empowering certain actors, forces and relationships at the expense of others’ (Munro, 2012, cited in İşleyen, 2015a: 259). This view is highlighted through the perspective of governmentality. Governmentality cannot be regarded as a particular school of thought, but rather as a style of analysis or a critical stance, which concentrates on ‘tensions, inequalities, discriminatory tendencies, illiberal techniques, and ‘normative biases’ in international and transnational governance’ (İşleyen, 2015a: 258). Governmentality is rather suspicious of viewing the transfer of norms, regulations and institutions as a ‘benevolent projection of acquired civilian virtues’ (ibid.; Lavenex, 2004: 685). Instead, it poses the following question: ‘[B]y what means, mechanisms, procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques, technologies and vocabularies is authority constituted and rule accomplished?’ (Dean, 1999, cited in Walters, 2012: 61). Studies of governmentality take societies as complex and interdependent, which makes the exercise of political authority polycentric and multilevelled – i.e. operating not over, but through networks of public and private actors (ibid.: 65).

The growing role of networks and non-state actors ‘is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors but rather an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government’ (Sending & Newmann, 2006: 651). Governmentality seeks to investigate how more subtle methods of power are utilised for the purpose of regulating social conduct (Joseph, 2010: 223). It is thus concerned not only with certain behaviours, but also with the

(31)

24

discursive framework which renders them meaningful through the construction of particular objects or subjects of governance (ibid.). In the words of Foucault (cited in Hindess, 2005: 392), ‘[t]o govern […] is to structure the possible field of action of others’. He defines ‘government’ as ‘the conduct of conduct’ or a form of activity that aims to shape or guide the relations in the personal, interpersonal, societal and political domain (Gordon, 1991: 2-3). While government often refers to acting directly in order to determine behaviour, it also ‘aims to influence […] actions indirectly, by acting on the manner in which they regulate their own behavior and the behavior of others’ (Hindess, 2005: 392). In other words, governmentality suggests that governing is performed ‘from a distance’ (Joseph, 2009: 415) and refers to both ‘the conduct of individual action and aspects of managing the wider society’ (Foucault, cited in İşleyen, 2015b: 675).

2.3.2. Elements of Governmentality

Governmentality is interested in the ways in which authorities think about, talk about and justify rule through a particular type of discourse – i.e. ‘political rationality’ (Merlingen, 2010: 152). The political rationality functions through defining in practical detail a field of governance and determining the ‘right’ means by which governance is to be achieved (ibid.). Consequently, certain ‘problematisations’ emerge, which set out ‘the threats and challenges to good governance […] that can be expected from any failures’ (ibid.: 153). By following the ways in which political rationalities and problematisations operate, it is possible to identify certain types of acceptable agency and meaningful action in a particular regime of governance (Foucault, cited in ibid.).

Political rationalities are implemented in governance programmes through practices and devices known as ‘political technology’ (ibid.). These devices serve in guiding action upon reality and can take form in mentoring and training processes, aimed at (re-)constituting social identities, interests and relations (ibid.). What is more, political technologies exemplify how discourse practices materialise and make the exercise of power that shapes governance visible (ibid.). Notably, an important role is played by experts, who are considered the main contributors to shaping political rationalities, problematising issues, and devising political technologies (ibid.: 155). Their expertise and relevant knowledge categorise and order the world, segregate and exclude, and authorise and legitimise the exercise of power over subjects (ibid.).

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

In this part of the chapter, I will assess the disintegration process surrounding the suspension of the Schengen zone, and the reaction of member states to prevent further

The gravity model of trade was applied and estimated using the OLS and the PPML estimators with fixed effects to account for multilateral resistance terms and

Explicit posts disseminating information about the company and products could be more popular in individualistic societies, where ambiguous messages are less commonly used (Men

In de Nederlandse en Europese melkveehouderij zijn lokale rundveerassen voor groot deel vervangen door het hoogproductieve Holstein Friesian melkveeras. Het Centrum voor

In- dien na 2000 geen verdere maatregelen genomen worden (zoals in pakket be- staand), zullen de meeste doelstellingen in 2010 niet gerealiseerd worden hoe-.. wel op bepaalde

De ammoniak- emissie wordt bij intermitterend beluchten (temperatuur drooglucht minimaal 20°C en na vijf dagen afdraaien) geschat op 9 g/dierplaats/jaar voor de Groen

In deze proef is nagegaan of en in hoeverre spoorelementen gebrek- en overmaat- verschijnselen aan het blad van Epipremnum kunnen oproepen.. De planten stonden op

De Verenigde Staten zouden juist meer over Bin Laden en zijn organisatie weten dan over welke andere terrorist dan ook.’ 177 De Islamitische dreiging werd zeer serieus genomen en