Between Nazism and Opportunism: Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS

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Between

Nazism

and Opportunism

Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS

Master Thesis Holocaust and Genocide Studies University of Amsterdam

June 2014

Name: Sarah Weber 10418636

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate Second Reader: Dr. Karel C. Berkhoff

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Abbreviations

AfZ Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich

BAR Bundesarchiv Bern

BArch Bundesarchiv Berlin

BNSE Bund Nationalsozialistischer Eidgenossen

BRB Bundesratsbeschluss

BTE Bund Treuer Eidgenossen nationalsozialistischer Weltanschaung BSG Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland

DSchV Datenschutzverordnung

EF Eidgenössische Front

ES Eidgenössische Sammlung

ESAP Eidgenössische Soziale Arbeiter Partei Grekos Grenzpolizei Kommissariate

GL Germanische Leitstelle

MStGB Militärstrafgesetzbuch

NBS Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz

NF Nationale Front

NJ Nationale Jugend

NS National Sozialismus

NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter Partei RS-HA Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt

RuSHA Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt SBA Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft

SGAD Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer Autoritären Demokratie StGB Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch

SS Schutzstaffel

SS-HA SS-Hauptamt

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List of Figures

Image Cover Page Photo of Swiss volunteers taken in Sennheim 1942 (BAR E4320 B 1993/214 2576, C.29/A116/42.1192)

Image 1 Portrait of Franz Riedweg 54

(Swiss.info Online:

http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/culture/A_Swiss_in_the_service_of_the_SS.html?cid=2941 9904 [19.11.2013])

Image 2 Portrait of Heinrich Johann Hersche 62

(BAR E2200.156-02 1000/241 131)

Image 3 Hersche as Cavalry Major in Bern 63

(BAR E4320 B 1970/25 670, C.02-1562.)

Image 4 Portrait of Johann Eugen Corrodi 67

(The Axis Powers Online:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=38&t=28101&start=0 [19.11.2013])

Image 5 Portrait of Alfred Nikles 69

(BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511)

Image 6 Portrait of Benno Schaeppi 71

(BAR E4320B 1970/25 419, C.02-713)

Image 7 Wipf Eugen leaving the Court in 1948 114

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1. Introduction

“An meine Eltern. Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurück kehren, meine Lieben, so nehmt dies als letzten Gruss. Sorgt euch nicht, mein Tod sei umsonst gewesen oder verfrüht. Was sind wir als Blätter am Baum – was tut es, wenn eins welkt oder fällt? Wenn nur der Baum wächst. Wenn das Blatt ihm nur Wurzeln schlagen und blühen half. Denkt nicht, ich hätte das Schicksal herausgefordert, ich hätte kühn oder aussergewöhnlich gehandelt. Ich tat nur, was alle tun. Dass es nicht falsch war, nicht sinnlos, ist mein heiligster Glaube.“1

These words were expressed in a letter by a young Swiss volunteer to his parents written from the Eastern Front. This young man had taken the decision to participate in the war on the side of Germany and he must have felt sure that his sacrifice served a greater interest. However, Germany lost the war and what was idealized before was punished thereafter. So, his and many other volunteer’s story were forgotten and suppressed, as Switzerland did not want to be associated with Nazi Germany in any way. Hans-Rudolf Lehmann, a radio moderator, read his words for the public in a show dedicated to the history of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS in 1977. Yet, the topic did not attract attention, so it disappeared again from society and was only taken up recently by academic research.

1.1. Swiss Volunteers in the Waffen-SS

1.1.1. Current State of Research

The Holocaust and the Second World War is for the collective memory in Switzerland not of much relevance. In continuation of a long-standing national self-image, Switzerland saw itself after 1945 as a small neutral state, which because of its will to resist and a clever policy managed not to be drawn into the war. The notion, that Switzerland succeeded in preserving its institutional independence as a constitutional, democratic and federal state in midst of the Nazi sphere seems to prevail. The Bergier

1_{Brief des Schweizer Kriegsfreiwilligen Johannes Mettler an seine Eltern kurz vor seinem Tod, gelesen}

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10 report concluded in 2002 that today, Switzerland is faced with a past that has never been incorporated into the prevailing view of history.2

Switzerland’s role in World War II has been the subject of an increasingly heated debate since the 1970’s. Historians and publicists have published a whole series of economic, social and political analysis of various aspects of the period from 1939-1945. Nevertheless, in general, historical interest and enquiry in Switzerland on World War II has concentrated much more on the war and the war economy than on the Holocaust.3

In late 1996, the debate on the gold transactions between the Swiss National Bank and National Socialist Germany and the dormant assets of Jews in Swiss banks attracted global attention. That is why the Swiss Parliament and the Federal Council decided to investigate the accusations around the gold transactions. An Independent Commission of Experts (ICE), under the direction of Jacques Bergier, was mandated to conduct a historical investigation, bringing important, previously forgotten and suppressed issues but also unknown aspects to light. The Bergier report, however, did not include or mention Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS.

Research on Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS remains a research gap. So far there is not much literature on the Swiss volunteers and the source basis remains unorganized. A standard reference with reliable numbers and conclusions is still missing. A Federal Assembly report to the Federal Convention in 1945, regarding antidemocratic activities of Swiss citizens in the Reich, approached the matters of Swiss volunteers. It recorded the numbers of Swiss in the Waffen-SS until the year 1944 as following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 86 died in combat or missing, 52 dismissed, and 617 in the Wehrmacht.4

The German lawyer and historian Hans Werner Neulen published a standard reference on international volunteers in the Waffen-SS and dedicated one chapter to the Swiss volunteers. He estimated that a number of 1500 Swiss and Liechtensteiner passed the Panoramaheim5_{in total, whereby the majority arrived between summer and autumn}

2_{Bergier, J. (2002) (ed) “Switzerland, National Socialism and the Second World War. Final Report“. In:}

Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World War. Pendo Verlag: Zürich, pp. 10-25.

3_{Ibid., pp. 40-45.}

4_{Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern}

und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.

5_{The Panoramaheim was a collection point for Swiss and Liechtenstein volunteers. Every Swiss man who}

crossed the border was eventually picked up by the border control and questioned by the Gestapo. The Gestapo in turn had orders to send the potential volunteers to the Panoramaheim, where they were either

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11 1941. Neulen assessed that a number of 800 Swiss conscribed to Waffen-SS duty and 70 for the Wehrmacht, whereby an estimated number of 40 achieved the rank of an officer.

He furthermore estimated that 300 Swiss died in combat.6_{The Swiss military}

historian Vincenz Oertle published a voluminous source study on the Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS in 1997 with the long title “Sollte ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren.”

Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite 1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche.7_{Oertle agreed on}

Neulen’s numbers, stating that around 800 Swiss were serving in the Waffen SS-alone. Yet, he claimed that the number of the Swiss expats joining the Wehrmacht were even higher.8_{More precise Oertle recorded the numbers from a SS-Hauptamt, SS-HA report in}

1944 as following: 755 in the Waffen-SS, thereof 33 in leading position, 86 killed in action and 52 dismissed.9

The Swiss historian Peter Mertens published an article on the Swiss volunteers in a book about the history of Swiss as mercenary soldiers. According his research, there are no exact numbers on the amount of Swiss volunteers within the Waffen-SS, since the sources seem to be deficient and not clear enough in order to establish an exact picture. Yet, he similarly estimated a number of 870 volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereof 52 or 6.8% achieved the rank of an officer. Then again, this number only concerned Swiss men who were living in Switzerland and left the country illegally and did not include men with the Swiss citizenship living in Germany at that time. Furthermore, he estimated another 1100 Swiss citizens in the Wehrmacht, whereas their degree of gratuitousness was not clear, because of the matter of dual citizenship. The numbers did not include Swiss who were working in civil departments or healthcare.10_{Martin Gutmann from the}

University of Lucerne estimated in his comparison of Danish, Swedish and Swiss Waffen-SS volunteers a number of 1300 Swiss volunteers but remarked that these numbers are hard to establish with certainty, since the estimates in various works and among the

conscribed to work service or Waffen-SS duty. The function of the Panoramaheim will be explained in chapter 1.2.2. Organization and administration of the Swiss volunteers

6_{Neulen H. W. (1985) An deutscher Seite. Internationale Freiwillige von Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS.}

Universitas: München, pp. 175f.

7_{Oertle, V. (1997) Sollte Ich aus Russland nicht zurückkehren. Schweizer Freiwillige an deutscher Seite}

1939-1945. Eine Quellensuche. Documenta Militaria Thesis Verlag: Zürich.

8_{Ibid., pp. 12.} 9_{Ibid., pp. 557.}

10_{Mertens, P. (2006) „Schweizerische Freiwillige in der deutschen Wehrmacht und Waffen-SS}

1938-1945.“ In: Fuhrer, H.R & Eyer, R. P. (Eds) Schweizer in Fremden Diensten. Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Zürich, Pages 291-311, here pp. 295.

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12 statistics of the SS vary widely. He pointed out that there may have in fact been many hundreds more than hitherto account for.11

The numbers of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS seems to be relatively small compared to other countries. Yet, relativizing these absolute numbers it is evident that there were less volunteers coming from France or Sweden, which was neutral as well and that the Swiss numbers therefore were quite high. Mertens explained the high rate with the cultural and linguistic proximity of Switzerland to Germany.12_Gutmann

similarly concluded that the influence of the geographical factor was decisive, since the border between Switzerland and Germany was flat and densely populated which facilitated the illegal crossing.13_{Another reason according to him was the political}

prosecution of right wing extremism in Switzerland in 1940, in which course many left Switzerland to Germany.

Gutmann explained the lack of basic research on the topic with the fact that after the war, Switzerland developed a myth of resistance which he described as militarization of the popular memory. That memory highlighted the wartime experience to the preparedness to repel a German attack. Therefore, the Swiss soldiers who had guarded the borders became patriots and anti-Nazis, whilst the Waffen-SS volunteers were considered unrepresentative of their society.14_{Mertens stated that the subject of}

Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS long was seen as a taboo issue in Switzerland and it has attracted little interest in the writing of the historiography of Germanic volunteers in Germany itself.15

Oertle was the first Swiss historian who researched the history of Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS extensively. In his standard reference, he chose an anecdotal approach, focusing on the motives of the broad group of Swiss men who joined the Waffen-SS, the Wehrmacht and the “Organisation Todt”. His study intended to encompass the entire history of the Swiss volunteers in the Waffen-SS, whereby his collection of source material offered an insight into the topic in general. Since there was no research done on that topic beforehand, his diligent work certainly laid the foundation for further research. Yet, Oertle’s analysis remained limited on a descriptive approach that

11_{Gutmann, M. (2013) „Debunking the Myth of the Volunteers: Transnational Volunteering in the Nazi}

Waffen-SS Officer Corps during the Second World War,” In: Contemporary European History, 22(4), Pages 585-923, here pp. 590.

12_{Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 301.} 13_{Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 590.} 14_{Ibid., pp. 587.}

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13 unfortunately did not link the single stories of the volunteers together. Oertle’s aim was to study the accounts objectively in order to contribute to a sophisticated perception of Switzerland during the Second World War. Unfortunately, his study is exactly lacking that objectivity. For instance, he excused the participation of Swiss soldiers with their sense for duty and long the standing tradition of the mercenary army, rather than ideological commitment. He did not assess his cases with the necessary thoughtfulness and trivialized their participation. Statements like: “Zunächst spielt der natürliche Drang

des Schweizers mit, einmal ins Ausland zu gehen (…)“ only underline this judgment.16

Also, he did not treat the archive findings critically, since he accepted the volunteers’ excuses in the police interrogation protocols of not being politically engaged without relativizing it. He stated that “Gestandene Soldaten mit Prinzipien und Lebenserfahrung

machten sich eben, ganz im Gegensatz zu den Verrätertypen, zwielichtige Figuren und der grossen Zahl jugendlich-grüner Kriegsfreiwilliger, schon Gedanken über die Konsequenzen (…)“17_{His justifications for the Swiss volunteers could originate from his personal}

background, coming from a family with far reaching military background. Also, one of his ancestor was a volunteer in the Waffen-SS.

Oertle concluded that ideological commitment or the enthusiasm to join Hitler in the fight against Stalin was not decisive. Overall, he stated that the Swiss Waffen-SS volunteers were mostly looking for working possibilities or adventure.18_{The volunteers}

rather left because of personal reasons, such as unsuccessful marriages, liabilities, personal resentments against the Swiss army and government, as well as adventurism.19

Mertens did not entirely agree with Oertle. Admittedly, he stated the range of motivation was manifold but he assessed that Oertle underestimated the role of ideological commitment. Mertens concluded that the motivation reached from National Socialist and anti-Communist motives, private or professional problems, escape from federal justice, war fever, or mere thirst for adventure and that in many cases, it was the combination of these motivation sets that enabled participation.20

16_{Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 52.} 17_{Ibid., pp. 325.}

18_{Oertle, V. ( 2010) Ein Appenzeller in der Waffen-SS. Heinrich Johann Herrsche von Appenzell, Major der}

Schweizer Kavallerie und SS-Standartenführer, die Légion des Volontaires Français contre le bolchevisme und die 33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS „Charlemagne“ (franz. Nr. 1). Druckerei Appenzeller

Volksfreund: Appenzell, pp. 10f.

19_{Oertle 1997, Russland, pp. 12-20.} 20_{Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 304.}

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14 Oertle and Mertens’ research included all the Swiss volunteers and they did hardly distinguish between higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers. Also, they did not put their findings into perspective by including a comparative approach. That is why Gutmann intended to offer a more nuanced assessment on the Germanic volunteers, by comparing the Swiss volunteers with Swedish and Danish volunteers in combat formations of the Waffen-SS. His main focus was not motivation per se, but he rather intended to challenge the long standing scholarly interpretation that the volunteers were of lower-class, social outsiders of criminal inclined or mentally unstable nature. He concluded that the research of neutral volunteers can help to formulate a more nuanced and demythologized history of the Waffen-SS. Switzerland was not occupied so there was no forced conscription into the Waffen-SS. Therefore, classical, pragmatic collaboration as motive can be ruled out as motif for joining. Also, recruitment and propaganda differed, since National Socialist organizations were more and more restricted and forbidden.21

Whilst the complexity of the Swiss volunteers as a collective received astonishingly little attention from the academic world, there are three bibliographies published. Oertle wrote a bibliography on the SS-Standartenführer Heinrich Johann Hersche, wherein he concentrated more on the battle history of the “33. Waffen-Grenadier-Divison der SS Charlemagne”.22_{Another bibliography on one of the highest ranking Swiss volunteers}

was published by Marco Wyss on the person of Franz Riedweg. Wyss’s book Un Suisse au

Service de la SS – Franz Riedweg 1907-2005, described his career by assessing his role

within the “Germanische Leitstelle” (Germanic Guidance Office), GL.23_{The historian}

François Wisard recounted in his book Un Major Biennois dans l’ordre Noir the biography of Johann Eugen Corrodi, who was the highest ranking Swiss volunteer.24_{The two books}

are pleasant to read and offer background information on the history of the Waffen-SS, the organization of the Waffen-SS and the role of volunteers therein as well as on the NS organizations in Switzerland. However, they do not address the motivation at large, nor do they include lower ranking volunteers in their assessment. Yet, their references to archive material certainly are invaluable for further research. Lastly, Linus Reichlin, a Swiss journalist, published a book on the Swiss volunteers. The book Kriegsverbrecher

21_{Gutmann 2013, Myth, pp. 585.} 22_{Oertle 2010, Appenzeller.}

23_{Wyss, M. (2010) Un Suisse au Service de la SS. Franz Riedweg (1907-2005). Éditions Alphil-Presses}

Universitaires Suisses: Neuchâtel.

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Wipf Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in Deutschen Fabriken und hinter den Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, cannot be considered academic research, since

neither footnotes nor detailed references to the archive documents are indicated. However, the book is written in a narrative way and therefore certainly had the capacity to the open up the topic to a wider public.25

1.1.2. Research Questions

No single assessment approached the question on motivation satisfyingly, by incorporating higher ranking and lower ranking volunteers equally, as well as giving ideological commitment the necessary attention. This thesis principal aim is to assess the motivation of the Swiss volunteers to leave Switzerland illegally and to join in the Waffen-SS. Motivation is defined as forces acting either on or within a person to initiate behavior. The term refers to the activating properties of the process involved in psychological motivation.26_{Hence, motivation is a personal matter, influenced by the}

own situation which in turn is characterized by the personal background. That said it has to be clear that motivation is a multifaceted characteristic that is not equally applicable for a whole group of men. In contrary, it has to be assessed individually and by doing so, it is possible to work out similarities or divergences. Therefore, a biographical approach was chosen. The thesis also focuses on the personal background, socialization, socioeconomic factors as well as the Swiss volunteers’ admission and careers within the Waffen-SS and the role of ideological commitment as a motivation. Moreover, the post war punishment will receive consideration. However, this thesis does not include the military history or military actions at the front. The following research questions will be addressed:

 Who were the Swiss volunteers and under what conditions were they socialized? Where did they come from, how old where they when they left Switzerland and what was their family situation and educational background?

25_{Reichlin, L. (1994) Kriegsverbrecher Wipf, Eugen. Schweizer in der Waffen-SS, in deutschen Fabriken und}

an den Schreibtischen des Dritten Reiches, Weltwoche ABC Verlag: Zürich.

26_{Petri, L. H. (2008) „Definition Motivation“, In: Encyclopaedia Britannica. Online:}

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16  What careers and ranks did the higher ranking volunteers achieve? What were their qualifications that enabled their careers and to what positions where they assigned?

 What different values of National Socialism were expressed by the ideological committed volunteers?

 How did the Swiss authorities judged on the returning volunteers and what legal bases were applied in their conviction? Which courts were dealing with the returnees and where there differences in their jurisdiction? Did the Swiss courts impose severe punishment on the returnees and how did the society at large perceive the Swiss volunteers?

1.1.3. Source Discussion

To acquire the source basis for this research, various archives were visited. For the most part, the source basis was collected in the Bundesarchiv Bern (BAR). Since Switzerland remained independent during the war, the national police and military intelligence was able to keep records on the Swiss volunteers. These documents from the “Schweizerische Bundesanwaltschaft”, SBA (Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland), the “Eidgenössisches Justiz- und Polizeidepartement” (Federal Justice and Police Department) and the “Departement für Justiz und Polizeiwesen” (Departement for Justice and Law Enforcement) delivered the foundation for my research. The interrogation protocols from the various police stations or from the SBA contained personal statements on their motivation to leave Switzerland. Mostly, in the following of their prosecution after they returned to Switzerland, the volunteers had to write down their curriculum vitae, which in turn gave information on their personal background. Also, the SBA collected personal letters from the volunteers to their families and friends. The higher ranking, committed volunteers generally already engaged in NS organizations in Switzerland, whereby their mail and correspondence often were monitored by the authorities.

Furthermore, a visit to the former US-Document Center in Berlin, which is now renamed Bundesarchiv Berlin (BArch) was instructive. The personal files of the Swiss volunteers gave insight on their date of admission, ranks and career advances within the Waffen-SS. Also, Himmler issued the “Heiratsbefehl” in 1931, which ordered a screening

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17 of the SS men and their fiancées by the the “Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt”, RuSHA.27_As

a result, the SS members had to apply for a permission to get married. Next to physical examination, the applicant had to write curriculum vitae which had to prove their “einwandfreie Weltanschauung” (proper ideology). In the case of the Swiss volunteers, they mostly indicated why they left Switzerland, in order to prove their ideological commitment. Luckily, most of the files were accessible. However, there are still files that are not accessible and therefore could not be used for this research. Article 5 paragraph 2 of the “Bundesarchivgesetz” stated that personal archive files can only be viewed 30 years after that person has died.28_{That is why Vincenz Oertle was not able to have}

insight in all those files. Some of the files are still kept under lock and key. However, the accessibility was already facilitated. Unfortunately, the volunteers can only be searched by their full name and the volunteers are not classified by nationality. That complicates the archive search considerably, since it requires previous knowledge about the volunteers.

Lastly, further documents on three higher ranking Swiss volunteers were collected in the “Archiv für Zeitgeschichte/ETH Zürich” (AfZ). The archive material on Franz Riedweg, Benno Schaeppi, and Heinrich Büeler contained personal letters, newspaper articles as well as court files. These documents were used to write their biographies and assess their postwar punishment. Also, the archive offered extensive information on the administration of the Swiss volunteers in the “Germanische Leitstelle” in the “SS- Hauptamt”, as well as the Panoramaheim in Stuttgart, which was the collection point for the Swiss who were picked up at the border.

In this thesis a total amount of seventeen Swiss volunteers was analyzed, whereof ten were higher ranking and one was said to have committed war crimes. Twelve out of seventeen were ideologically committed. In the assessment on motivation there is always a risk of oversimplification, since it tends to freezes the motives of the perpetrators. To find evidence on motives is problematic since it has to be relied on interpretations. It has to be pointed out that it is of substantial importance to treat the

27_{SS-Befehl-A-Nr.65 Verlobungs- und Heiratsbefehl durch den Reichsführer-SS, München 31. Dezember}

1931, In: Schlüsseldokumente zur Deutschen Geschichte im 20. Jahrhundert. Online:

http://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_de&dokument=0127_hei&object=context&l=de

[18.12.2013].

28_{§5 Abs. 2 Bundesarchivgesetzes: „Archivgut des Bundes, das sich auf natürliche Personen bezieht, darf}

erst 30 Jahre nach dem Tode der Betroffenen durch Dritte benutzt werden. Ist das Todesjahr nicht oder nur mit unvertretbarem Aufwand festzustellen, endet die Schutzfrist 110 Jahre nach der Geburt des Betroffenen.“

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18 documents critically, because of the problematic involved in the objectivity of the material. The personal statements have to be taken literally, however it has to be kept in mind that those statements were given with the knowledge that their deeds where crimes. Therefore the accused denied or downplayed the ideological commitment in order to reject the accusation of treason and the interrogations by authorities created an incentive to exonerate oneself. So, it is likely that the men were not completely honest about the feelings and motivation they actually had. Judging on motivation and emotions in retrospect leaves a lot of room for interpretation, since the memory on feelings is influenced by a contemporary self understanding. This certainly altered the picture the men had of themselves. So, the personal statements taken from interrogation protocols are not sufficient to explain their motivation for collaboration. As a matter of fact, they have to be complemented with additional statements originating from letters to friends and family. These statements indicate more about the true nature of their motivation or ideological commitment.

Records of the “Bundesstrafgericht” (Federal Criminal Court) could have given more detailed insight. Unfortunately, these records were still under a blocking period during Oertle’s research. The files would have been available for the research of this thesis. However, its existence was only discovered later on in the research period and therefore not consulted.

1.1.4. Approach and Structure

This thesis can be seen as a collection of individual cases attempting to create an overall picture. However, the main focus is the assessment of the volunteers’ motivation to leave Switzerland illegally and join the Waffen-SS. Special attention will be given to the ideological committed volunteers, since previous research underestimated the role thereof. National Socialism and Nazism have a unique usage of language and wording. That is why the personal statements remain untranslated. The choice of words can indicate a certain ideological commitment and give additional information on the person.

Motivation is a personal matter an in order to understand the Swiss volunteers’ decision, it is important to introduce the individuals used this case study. Each of these men was influenced by a different context. That is why chapter two assesses their background, socioeconomic properties, family situation, as well as age by reference to a

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19 biographical approach. In assessing the various backgrounds of the Swiss volunteers in the interrogation protocols by the SBA or in letters, it turned out there were basically two main motivation traits that served as guidelines in this chapter, namely work hunt and National Socialism. Oertle and Neulen divided the volunteers’ motivation into different groups according percentage. However, it is clear that a person did not only belong to one category and that the division is an oversimplification, since they possessed various aspects that overlapped. This chapter proves that the men possessed additional motivational aspects from other categories used by Neulen and Oertle. Also, Oertle and Neulen did not include dual citizens, because according to them, their motivation was not clear. That is why two double citizens will be incorporated in the study.

Chapter two shows that there are differences distinguishable between the group National Socialist and the other ones. It seems that the ideological committed volunteers were able to have a certain career within the Waffen-SS. That is why in chapter three a special attention will be given to the career development of six Swiss volunteers. In this chapter, I will argue that the possibility for these Swiss volunteers to gain a career within the Waffen-SS was thanks to their ideological commitment to National Socialism and their engagement in NS organizations in Switzerland. Another factor is that most of them were already militarily educated in Switzerland. Additionally, their language abilities, made them well respected and desired manpower. However, there were certain types of careers and each man selected for this chapter represents a different career type. Two of them were able to have a career within the bureaucracy of the GL, whilst two others had an impressive career within the army. One person was engaged as an instructor and leader of the Panoramaheim and the one other was involved in the creation of propaganda material, as war correspondent.

Chapter two and three indicate that there was a difference between lower ranking volunteers and higher ranking volunteers and that their motivation varied. However, the assessment of the various career types in chapter three additionally indicates that motivation also varied amongst the ideologically committed volunteers. That is why chapter four further distinguishes ideological commitment as a motivation. Race struggle and anti-Semitism are crucial aspects of German Nazism. Therefore, it will be assessed if these matters were equally important for the Swiss volunteers. Consequently, anti-bolshevism has to be included in the assessment as it was perceived

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20 as National Socialism’s enemy ideology. Additionally, Hitler aspired a Greater Germanic Reich in which all Germanic people would live together. Did that vision for a greater Reich excite and influence the Swiss volunteers? Lastly, chapter three established that the higher ranking volunteers were driven by opportunistic considerations. This is an aspect that was not discussed by academic research so far. That is why special attention will be given to that aspect of motivation.

The last chapter’s intention of this chapter is to assess how the Swiss authorities judged on the returnees and on what legal base they convicted the volunteers. To understand the sentences imposed on the volunteers, the different legal violations will be addressed. As will be established, the Swiss volunteers were not all judged on the same base or in the same court, since the authorities’ distinguished between the sole violation of military law or criminal law. Therefore the various trials will be assessed. The “common” Waffen-SS soldiers were mostly tried on the base of military law, whilst, the higher ranking Swiss were tried separately in criminal trials for endangerment of the Swiss neutrality and treason. Both trials will be elucidated with specific accounts from the case studies. The question whether the Swiss authorities imposed severe punishment is of crucial interest. Thus, it is necessary to put the findings into perspective. Hence, in the conclusion a comparison will be drawn to the punishment practice of other Germanic countries. Also, the criminal trials in Switzerland did not address the question of war crimes or criminal activities of the volunteers in the Waffen-SS. That is why one specific account of a potential Swiss war criminal will be given. Chapter five furthermore intends to assess the post war perception of the returned Swiss volunteers and how the society reacted on these men. This will be examined through various newsletter articles.

1.2. History of the Waffen-SS

1.2.1. Establishment of the Waffen-SS

The Waffen-SS was an armed and specialized unit which emerged from the Allgemeine SS. Bernd Wegner, a German historian and author of a standard reference on the SS, stated that the Waffen-SS cannot be considered in isolation from the history of the SS as a whole.29_{The “Schutzstaffel” (Protection Squad) evolved within the National Socialist}

29_{Wegner, B. (1982) Hitlers Politische Soldaten. Die Waffen-SS, 1933-1945. Ferdinand Schöningh:}

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21 movement in the Third Reich as one of the most powerful instruments of the leadership. It was created in the early 1920s as a small unit to serve as a bodyguard for Hitler and other important Nazi members.30_{In 1927, it became highly centralized by the SS leader}

Heinrich Himmler and from 1930 on, specialized divisions of the SS were formed.31

On December 14, 1934, Himmler ordered the consolidation of the “Politische Bereitschaften” of the SS with the Leibesstandarte Adolf Hitler” into the “SS-Verfügungstruppe”, which can be seen as the ancestor of the Waffen-SS.32_The

“SS-Verfügungstruppe” was to become a fully militarized formation, intended to serve as the nucleus of an SS division.33_{It now looked increasingly like an alternative army with a}

program based on rigorous military training, physical fitness, and political indoctrination. These values later became the corner stone of the Waffen-SS and determined recruitment standards.34_{In 1939, Himmler persuaded Hitler to establish a}

new type of elite SS formation – the Waffen-SS. In fact, Hitler created a separate military force alongside the regular state security organs, detached from the Wehrmacht and the police that was allowed to use heavy weaponry.35

The mobilization for the Waffen-SS started in August 1939. In the beginning of the war, the conception of the Waffen-SS was not based on the recruitment of new SS men but on the consolidation of the various SS units and police battalions. Himmler’s idea was to unite the various SS with different origin, equipment and standard of education into an efficient military elite troop.36_{In June 1940, the title Waffen-SS became official}

and it applied to the “SS-Leibestandarte Adolf Hitler”, the “SS-Verfügungsdivision” and the “SS-Totenkopfdivision”, which were responsible for the concentration camp guards, the “SS-Polizeidivision”, the “SS-Junkerschulen” and all their replacement and training units.37

30_{Pollmar, N. & Allen, T. B. (1996) World War II. The Encyclopedia of the War Years 1941-1945”.}

Randomhouse: New York, pp. 759.

31_{Speer, A. (2002). “SS Schutzstaffel”. In: Benz, W. (ed) Lexikon des Holocaust. C.H. Beck: München, pp.}

222f.

32_{Dingel, F. (2007) „Waffen-SS“. In: Benz, W. & Graml, H. & Weiss, H. (eds) Enzyklopädie des National}

Sozialismus. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag: München, pp. 862.

33_{Stein, G.H. (1966) The Waffen SS. Hitler’s Elite Guard at War, 1933-1945. Cornell University Press: Ithaca,}

New York, pp. 8.

34_{Holmes, R. (2001) (ed) The Oxford Companion of Military History. Oxford University Press: New York pp.}

867.

35_{Ibid. pp. xxxi. Cf. Knopp, G. (2003) (ed) Die SS. Eine Warnung der Geschichte. Goldmann Verlag: München,}

pp. 266.

36_{Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 127.}

37_{Höhne H. (1967) Der Orden unter dem Totenkopf. Die Geschichte der SS. Sigbert Mohn Verlag: Gütersloh,}

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22 The members of the Waffen-SS joined on voluntary basis, but recruitment standards were strict.38_{The draft boards of the SS had to make sure that the racial}

quality of the recruits remained guaranteed. Only tall, “racially excellent”, young volunteers were accepted. They had to undergo extensive medical examination, whereas the racial quality of the applicant was judged on a five-point scale.39_{The scale reached}

from “pure Nordic” to “presumption of non-European blood line influence” (Vermutung aussereuropäischen Bluteinschlags).40_{The restrictions on the physical standard were}

even more rigorous. The applicants had to be younger than 23 years old, having a body size of at least 1.74 meters and were not allowed to carry classes. Moreover, they had to complete extensive athletic tests.41_{A nine point scale was used to evaluate the physical}

conditions. This scale was supplemented with additional exercises, judging the force, endurance, nimbleness, velocity, and courage. Additionally, the recruits had to pass an intelligence test, which however was not very demanding in content. Also, it was important that the applicant was not married and that he did not have a criminal record.42

The Waffen-SS man was not just a simple soldier, but rather a political soldier and representative of the National Socialist world view.43_{The SS ideology was rooted in the}

racist ideal known in Hitler’s Germany as “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil). The SS was seen as the living embodiment of the National Socialist doctrine of the superiority of Nordic blood. So, the Waffen-SS was intended to be a fighting force, bound by ideological oaths, whose fighters were selected from the best Aryan stock. However, according to Stein, for the Waffen-SS soldier the racial struggle did not take the form it did for the SS men who ran the extermination camps or who staffed the execution squads of the Einsatzgruppen.44_{Then again, Cüppers assessed in his analysis on the German}

volunteers that the younger age groups of the Waffen-SS, who composed half of his sample, were mostly accustomed to NS educational institutions and therefore used to anti-Semitic propaganda, as well as the aggressive state measures against the Jews. He

38_{Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862.} 39_{Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270.}

40_{Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f.} 41_{Knopp 2003, Die SS, pp. 270.}

42_{Wegner 1982, Politische Soldaten, pp. 135f.} 43_{Dingel 2007, Waffen SS, pp. 862.}

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23 concluded that the German Waffen-SS soldiers indeed were highly ideologically motivated45

Given time and progression of the war, the Waffen-SS was increasingly experiencing a lack of man power.46_{Therefore, recruitment was more and more}

disseminated to the occupied Germanic countries, applying an active style of conscription. .47_{In the early summer of 1940, the SS started a recruitment campaign in}

the conquered Germanic countries which initiated the transformation of the Waffen-SS into an international military organization.48_{As a result, chief of the “Hauptamt”,}

SS-HA49_{Gottlob Berger,}50_{founded the GL in March 1940. The GL was a department of the}

“SS-Hauptamt”, SS-HA or also called “Ergänzungsamt”, which was one of twelve central offices of the “Gesamt-SS”.51_{The SS-HA was responsible for the recruitment and}

acquisition of SS personnel and ideological training for both German SS and Germanic SS.52_{However, with the progression of the war, the tasks for the SS-HA grew}

considerably, so that new offices were created in order to disburden the SS-HA. The goal of the GL was to turn the Waffen-SS into a truly Germanic and European order, by finding new recruits, first amongst the youthful generations of rural Germany, secondly amongst the ethnic Germans and lastly among the Germanic countries.53_{Finally, about}

half of the Waffen-SS divisions were made up of foreign volunteers, meeting Himmler’s

45_{Cüppers, M. (2005) Wegbereiter der Shoa. Die Waffen-SS, der Kommandostab Reichsführer SS und die}

Judenvernichtung 1939-1945. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, pp. 77.

46_{Koehl, R. L. (1983) The Black Corps. The Structure and Power Struggles of the Nazi SS. The University of}

Wisconsin Press: Wisconsin, pp. 193f.

47_{Hein, B. (2011) „Himmlers Orden. Das Auslese- und Beitrittsverfahren der Allgemeinen SS.“ In:}

Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 59(2), Pages 263-280, here pp. 270, 276.

48_{Gingerich, M. P. (2007) “Waffen SS Recruitment in the „Germanic Lands“, 1940-1941.” In: Historian,}

59(4), Pages 815-830, here 6ff.

49_{The SS-HA was also called “Ergänzungsstelle” and was the central command office of the SS until 1940.}

It served as headquarter for the administration of staff. However, with progression of the war the duties became too numerous. Therefore, it was split in twelve departments. Yet, it remained the central office for administrative matters such as recruitment and promotions. Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen

Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

50_{Gottlob Berger was chief of the SS-HA since 1941 and was promoted general of the Waffen-SS in 1943.}

Berger also functioned as personal representative of the Reichsführer-SS Himmler in the Ostministerium. Berger’s career started early. He joined the NSDAP in 1922 and from 1930 on he was active in the SA. After he left the SA in 1933 he joined the SS in 1936, starting immediately with the rank of an SS-Oberführer. Preradovich, N. (1985) Die Generäle der Waffen-SS. Kurt Vowinckel-Verlag: Berg am See, pp. 19f.

51_{Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 300.}

52_{Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15.1.1947, In:}

BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

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24 desire for an international organization composed of Nordic blood. The Germanic countries were identified by special color insignia while others had national insignia.54

The Waffen-SS sought to work with indigenous and national socialist groups, in order to incorporate the conquered lands into the Greater Germanic Reich.55_{Thus, the}

voluntary duty of foreign volunteers in the Waffen-SS can be seen as collaboration, according to Neulen. He defined collaboration as cooperative work with the enemy, whereas the actions of the volunteers were against the interests of the own country. Neulen remarked that the collaborators were convinced that they were not acting against their nation’s interest but in contrary that they served their country with good intentions.56_{He concluded that around 60% of the volunteers were members of National}

Socialist parties in their own countries before joining the Waffen-SS. Only 38% were not member before and only one person stated that adventurism or material considerations played a role in his decision to join the Waffen-SS.57

The deterioration of the war situation on the eastern front and the high losses there demanded a dissemination of recruitment even outside of the Germanic lands. Therefore, the Waffen-SS was forced to create military formations from races that were decidedly non Aryan and accept recruits without Nazi leanings or any understanding of the SS mystique.58_{As a consequence, the Waffen-SS was even allowed to draft recruits}

under duress from 1943 on.59

1.2.2. Admission and Administration of Swiss Volunteers

The occupation of France in 1940 manifested the potential of a German supremacy in a new European order. It was with this background that the Federal Council of Switzerland, Marcel Pitet-Golaz,60_{announced that the Swiss people might have to}

become comfortable with the thought of certain assimilation with Germany. At the same time, the first Swiss “Schwarzgänger” (illegal border crossers) arrived at the border. Those first individuals did not precisely know what to expect in Germany and the

54_{Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f.} 55_{Gingerich 2007, Recruitment, 6ff.}

56_{Neulen 1985, deutscher Seite, pp. 39.} 57_{Ibid., pp. 379-382.}

58_{Pollmar & Allen 1996, Encyclopedia, pp. 870f.} 59_{Hein 2011, Himmlers Orden, 270, 276.}

60_{Marcel Pilet-Golaz was a Swiss FDP (Free Democratic Party) politician and elected as Swiss Federal}

Council in 1928 until 1944. Pilet-Golaz became well known in the World War II context, because he met with a NSB delegation whilst he was Swiss Federal President in 1940. Favez, J. C. (2010) „Marcel Pilet-Golaz“, In: Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D4641.php

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25 “Grenzpolizei Kommisariate, Grekos left it to them, whether they wanted to apply for work or join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base.61_{Thus, as early as 1940, there was}

already a small number of Swiss volunteers serving in the Waffen-SS.62_Therefore,

Himmler commanded the SS-HA to verify the matters, as soon as the reports of Swiss border crossers increased. Thereupon, the responsibility was transferred to the GL.63

GL Chief of office was Franz Riedweg, a Swiss SS-Obersturmführer, who will be introduced in chapter three in this thesis. The main task of the GL was the recruitment of additional man power within the Germanic countries and the deployment of a Germanic “Sturmbanne”. It also encompassed the volunteers’ ideological training and it was structured by education, political connections, as well as press and propaganda. Since Switzerland was perceived as a Germanic country, its volunteers logically fell under the responsibility of the GL. The “Referat Schweiz” (department Switzerland) was responsible for the administration of the Swiss volunteers.64

The main task concerning Switzerland was to facilitate recruitment conditions and prepare for a time when Switzerland would have been incorporated into the Reich. However, since Switzerland was not occupied yet, a collection point had to be established in Germany.65_{The “Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt”, RS-HA (Reich Security}

Head Office) was mainly dealing with refugees, whereas the “Leitabschnitt” Stuttgart, as part of the RS-HA was tasked with the supervision of the Swiss NS movement. Therefore, the collection point for the Swiss border crossers was founded in Stuttgart in January 1941. Also, Stuttgart is in proximity of the Swiss and Liechtenstein’s border, and was therefore easy reachable for the volunteers. The city of Stuttgart allocated a property on the Panoramastrasse 11. Hence, the collection point was named “Panoramaheim”. As soon as the Panoramaheim was prepared, the Grekos and the Gestapo had order to transfer all the border crossers from Switzerland and Lichtenstein to the new collection

61_{Bericht das Panoramaheim, Auffangstelle für Schweizer Flüchtlinge in Stuttgart-Strassburg-Bregenz,}

März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leitstelle.

62_{Williamson, G. (1994) The SS. Hitler’s Instrument of Terror. The full Story from Street fighters to the}

Waffen-SS. Sidgwick & Jackson: London. pp. 108.

März 1941-Mai 1945, Ort und Datum unbekannt, In: AfZ Panoramaheim, Nachlass Franz Riedweg, 4. Germanische Leistelle.

64_{Anklageschrift der Schweizerischen Bundesanwaltschaft im Landesverräterprozess, Bern 15. Januar}

1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

65_{Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg an den SS-Oberabschnitt Süd-West betreffend der}

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26 point.66_{Alfred Nikles, who will be introduced in chapter three of this thesis, was the first}

Panoramaheim leader.67_{The Panoramaheim was located in Stuttgart until 1943 and}

thereafter transferred to Strasbourg. Because of heaving bombing it was once more relocated to Bregenz until 1945.68

The Panoramaheim had the following purposes: on one hand it functioned as collection point including acquisition of data, consulting of the volunteers in regard of a possible accession into the Waffen-SS, representation of the Swiss in front of authorities also after they left the home, and lastly support of ex- volunteers in regard of applications for leave.69_{The Swiss authorities assumed that the Panoramaheim}

additionally functioned as espionage center, since all the newcomers were questioned about their knowledge on military facilities in Switzerland, as well as their personal political stance and opinion on the army in general.70

In case that the Swiss volunteers displayed leadership qualities, they were transferred to the SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz, where they received a special education for leadership positions.71_{The SS-Junkerschule Bad Tölz was only attended by Germanic}

volunteers, who were holding the rank of an officer. The education lasted four months and was more or less an infantry education with intense training on machine guns and shells, as well as tactics. The course intended to retrain the foreigners to German military standards and prepare them for ideological and political education of volunteers.72_{Ultimately, the trained officer corps originating from the special training}

would have been installed as district leaders of their countries in the new Reich. This was considered important for the future political tasks within these countries. So the GL

Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237.

70_{Eidgenössisches Justiz und Polizeidepartement an die Polizeidirektion des Kantons Bern, Bern 1.}

Oktober 1946, In: BAR E4320 B 1970/25 314, C.02-511.

71_{Bericht von SS-Obersturmbannführer Franz Riedweg betreffend Germanische Führerausbildung in Bad}

Tölz, SS-Hauptamt, Amt IV an den Reichsführer—SS, Berlin 24. August 1942, In: BArch NS 31/375.

72_{Abhörungsprotokoll von Kurt Brüderlin durch den Polizeidienst der Schweizerischen}

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27 already made plans for the administration of the Germanic lands after the war.73_The

plans also encompassed Switzerland, whereas an altering of the Swiss border was intended. The canton Wallis for example would have been integrated to the “Gau Savoyen” and just like in the Netherlands, a Reichskommissar would have been appointed.74_{Moreover, there were already lists available, annotating the desirables and}

undesirables, Jews and unionists.75_{The GL also already made plans for an establishment}

of a “Germanische SS Schweiz”. These plans had the codename “Aktion S”.76

The Regulations for admission concerning the Swiss volunteers did not differ from other Germanic countries. The conditions for admission were the same ones as for all the SS members. However, there were two phases within the mustering process. The first Swiss, who arrived between 1940 and 1941, still had the choice whether they wanted to join the Waffen-SS on a voluntary base, or if they wanted to apply for work. This, however, changed from 1942 on. As soon as the war on the Eastern Front did not go in Germanys’ favor, it became more and more difficult to find new recruits. The Swiss volunteers arriving in those years many times did not have the choice anymore but were persuaded in the Panoramaheim to join the Waffen-SS.77_{From 1943 on the numbers of}

volunteers were declining whilst attempts of desertion were augmenting.78

The Swiss did not have an own division, probably because their number was too small. Neulen assumed that another reason was that the Swiss neutrality was essential to Germany and that therefore political provocations were avoided.79_{In the first war}

years, the Swiss were mainly allocated in the motorized infantry regiments “Der Führer” and “Deutschland” as part of the Verfügungsdivision”. By the end of 1940, the “SS-Verfügungsdivision” was renamed in “2. SS-Division Das Reich” and was mainly appointed to the eastern front. In 1943, this division was transformed into a Panzer grenadier division that became the elite formation of the Waffen-SS. Another division composing a higher number of Swiss volunteers was the “6. SS -mountain division

Schweizerischen Auffangstelle, Berlin 1. April 1941, In: BArch NS 31/237.

74_{Zeitungsartikel, Die Germanische Leitstelle der SS. Die Urteilsverkündung des Bundesstrafgerichts, In:}

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 2511, 12 Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

75_{Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim. Eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter}

Zeitung, 31. Dezember 1947, In: BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

76_{Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über antidemokratische Tätigkeit von Schweizern}

und Ausländern im Zusammenhang mit dem Kriegsgeschehen 1939-1945 (Motion Boerlin), 28. Dezember 1945, In: Berichte des Bundesrates über die Tätigkeit ausländischer Organisationen 1933-1945.

77_{Reichlin 1994, Kriegsverbrecher, pp. 144.}

78_{Zeitungsartikel, Das Panoramaheim, eine Schweizerische SS Zentrale in Stuttgart, In: Stuttgarter}

Zeitung, 31 Dezember 1947, In BAR E2001 E 1967/113 1281, A.44.10.1.Uch.

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28 Nord”, mainly stationed in Finland. An estimated number of 290 Swiss men were fighting in that division. Since the Swiss were highly experienced with mountain areas, it is no surprise that they were chosen for that division.80

1.3. “Swiss Renewal Movement” and Frontismus

Peter Gilg and Erich Gruner, both Swiss historians and political scientists, claimed in their essay, that the Swiss by nature do not tend to extremism, so that extreme left as well as right wing movements admittedly do exist, however, are only temporarily of influence and only affect limited layers of society. According to them, this is also true for the time of Fascism and National Socialism in Switzerland.81

The emergence of nationalistic organizations in the prewar years in Switzerland is generally called “Schweizerische Erneuerungsbewegung” (Swiss renewal movement), since these groups aspired a restructuring of the political, economical and social conditions in Switzerland and Europe.82_{The movement is also named “Frontismus”,}

because the word front, meaning border, appeared in most of these organization’s names. Gilg and Gruner observed four common postulates: enforcement of governmental authority, corporate structure of the economy, emphasis on nationalism and the reinvigoration of the federalist principle.83_{However, there was not one uniform}

nationwide right extremist party but a variety of parties and movements; at points collaborating at other points standing in concurrence with each other.84_The

“Frontismus” in Switzerland was initially mostly an academic movement and in its first stage rather insignificant.85_{Hence, from 1933 onward, the “Schweizerische}

Erneuerungsbewegung” was booming. The phenomenon of sudden intensification of this movement in Switzerland is called “Frontenfrühling” (Front Spring).86

Walter Wolf, Swiss historian and author of a standard reference on Fascism in Switzerland, named four motives for the emergence of the movement, namely a foreign

80_{Mertens 2006, Freiwillige, pp. 302ff.}

81_{Gilg, P. & Gruner, E. (1966) „Nationale Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1925-1940.“ In:}

Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 14(1), Pages 1-25, here 1.

82_{Arber, C. (2003) “Frontismus und Nationalsozialismus in der Stadt Bern. Viel Lärm, aber wenig Erfolg.“}

In: Berner Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Heimatkunde, 65(1), Pages 1-57, here 3.

83_{Gilg/Gruner 1966, Erneuerungsbewegung, pp. 3.} 84_{Arber 2003, Frontismus, pp. 6.}

85_{Zöberlein, K.L. (1970) Die Anfänge des deutsch schweizerischen Frontismus. Die Entwicklung der}

politischen Vereinigungen NEUE FRONT und NATIONALE FRONT bis zu ihrem Zusammenschluss im Frühjahr 1933. Verlag Anton Hein: Meisenheim am Glan, pp. 9

86_{Glaus, B. (1969) Die Nationale Front. Eine Schweizer faschistische Bewegung 1930-1940. Benziger Verlag:}

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29 political, a domestic political, an economical and a psychological dimension.87_{1. The}

happenings in Germany in the year 1933 and Hitler becoming Chancellor had its impact on the development. The Swiss politics with its readiness to compromise appeared lax in comparison to the impressive dynamic, discipline and order in Italy and Germany. The turnaround in Germany seemed electrifying and had its impact on the already existing “Kampfgemeinschaften” (action groups) and fronts, so that new formations were dashing forward like mushrooms from the ground.88_{2. The domestic policy was}

characterized by opposition between the left and right wing of the political spectrum. There was a constant struggle between bourgeoisie and socialism.89_{3. The economical}

crisis in the thirties, the altered social structure of society, and the events in Germany were main factors that underlined the growth of the movement. The economical crisis resulted in a weakening of the banking system, and export economy, as well as more unemployment, which in turn created an atmosphere of mental protectionism, fear of foreign infiltration and a general doubt on the system. Therefore, the conservative bourgeoisie was able to gain influence with their party stances, by holding the Bolshevism to account. It was mainly the younger generation of Switzerland that assembled in either independent or party-relied organizations to unite their common values of anti modernism and anti-bolshevism.90_{4. The Frontists were primarily}

recruiting from the younger generations, men between twenty and forty. The younger generation was frustrated that the politicians who decided over the country’s fate were mostly old. They demanded more opportunities for political participation, since they felt that they did more for the country than the older generations, as they were working and serving in the army. To put it in Wolf’s words: this younger generation was rebelling against the “supremacy of the senile indolence”.91

The landscape of the right wing organizations in Switzerland was very fragmented, as there were a lot of different groups with own organizations. Ideologically however, they were similar. In order to gain more political influence it was necessary to create a

87_{Wolf, W. (1969) Faschismus in der Schweiz. Die Geschichte der Frontenbewegung in der deutschen}

Schweiz 1930-1945. Flamberg Verlag: Zürich, pp. 16.

88_{Rüthemann, W. (1979) Volksbund und SGAD. Nationalsozialistische Schweizerische Arbeiter Partei,}

Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Erneuerungsbewegung in der Schweiz 1933-1944. Juris Druck + Verlag: Zürich, pp. 5

89_{Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 18.}

90_{Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 96-98.} 91_{Wolf 1969, Faschismus, pp. 21f.}

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30 bigger movement. That is why some groups had the desire to unite under one major party.

1.3.1. Nationale Front, 1933-1940

The party “Nationale Front”, henceforth NF was created in 1933, by consolidation of two smaller organizations; the “Neue Front” (New Front) and a previous “Nationale Front”. Both organizations were based on nationalistic principles and anti-Semitic ideals. The party was first called “Kampfbund Neue und Nationale Front” (Battle League New and National Front), which was more an interim solution and therefore renamed Nationale Front in the spring of 1933. National Socialism, anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism remained the corner stone of the party program. The party grew enormously in its previous stage after the consolidation.92_{However, the growth stagnated between 1935}

until 1938, with little exceptions of rare growth moments. The war furthermore influenced the disbanding, so that the party dissolved in 1940. Hence, it was replaced by the “Eidgenössische Sammlung”, ES (Confederate Collection) which in turn was forbidden by the Swiss authorities in 1943.93

The party relied ideologically on the German NSDAP. From 1936 onward, they identified openly with the National Socialistic world view of Nazi Germany. Yet, the party proclaimed a separate path for Switzerland. Beat Glaus, a Swiss historian and author of a standard work on the NF described their ideology as a “fascistic world view in a distinct Swiss form”.94_{Furthermore, the party had a military stance in its style of}

organization and behavior. The NF believed in a racial superiority of the Aryan race and blamed the Jews for the economical crisis. The party depicted itself as savior in the apocalyptical struggle against Jewish world conspiracy and proclaimed their messianism.95_{The intention was to fight against bolshevism and the class struggle,}

which according the movement threatened the national economy.96

In contrast to the German National Socialism, the Swiss NF emphasized the Christian believes and values. Additionally, the party popularized the confederate

92_{Zöberlein 1970, Anfänge, pp. 241f, 246.} 93_{Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 107f.} 94_{Ibid. pp. 201.}

95_{Ibid. pp. 203ff.}

96_{Tobler, R. (1933) “Wesen und Ziele der Nationalen Bewegung.” In: Schriften der Nationalen Front.}

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31 history of Switzerland, working with pictures and tales of the Rütli oath,97_{to define}

Swiss identity and redefine the heroic and unique conception of Swiss history.98

However, their most important message was that Germany will win the war in any case. Insisting on an “organic solution”, the party expected that Switzerland would receive a special position in the new Reich, in which they could help refashion Europe in an independent, federalist manner.99_{The party was not only relying on the German NSDAP}

considering ideology and visions but were fashioning themselves in the same style. They were using a battle cry “Harrus” whilst simultaneously lifting the right arm in Nazi fashion.100_{Also, the use of national socialistic terminologies was common. The party}

leaders of a certain regional branches for instance were also called Gauleiter.

The NF had an own newspaper “Eiserner Besen” (iron broom), later renamed in “die Front”, in which the political and ideological ideals were proclaimed for propaganda means. The newspaper was published for the first time in November 1931. Initially, the newspaper was published every two weeks, soon however on a weekly base. In the first three years of its existence, the edition increased from 4.000 pieces to 25.000. Propaganda tools formed the content of the newspaper and their way of writing was characterized by fascist terminology. According to Glaus, the newspaper was clearly comparable with the German national socialist newspaper “Stürmer”.101

1.3.2. Volksbund und SGAD (Schweizerische Gesellschaft der Freunde einer autoritären Demokratie, 1933-1944

The “Volksbund,” henceforth VB, was a dissociation of the organization Nationale Front. The VB was detached from the NF, because of ideological differences.102_{It distanced}

itself from the NF as of differences in perception in the Jewish and Freemason matters, but also as of a disagreement on the participation of political elections, since the VB did not want to participate in it. Another reason was the contention between the NF leader

97_{The Rütli oath is a legendary oath of the old Swiss Confederacy, taken on the Rütli meadow above the}

Lake Lucerne. It took place in 1291 when the leaders of the three regions Uri, Schwyz and Niedwalden united under the term Eidgenossen against the German landlords. Kaiser, P. (2009) “Befreiungstradition”, In: Historisches Lexikon Schweiz. Online: http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D17474.php [23.08.2013].

98_{Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 203ff.}

99_{Meyer, A. (2010) Anpassung oder Widerstand. Die Schweiz zur Zeit des deutschen Nationalsozialismus.}

Verlag Huber: Frauenfeld, Stuttgart, Wien, pp.155f

100_{Feldmann, M. (1933) Nationale Bewegungen der Schweiz. Eine Vorläufige Übersicht. Verbandsdruckerei}

A.-G.: Bern, pp. 42.

101_{Glaus 1969, Nationale Front, pp. 82-85.} 102_{Ibid., pp. 108.}