Sustainability of relief care : NGOs in the Syrian region

Sustainability of relief care:

NGOs in the Syrian Region

August 2015 Rosa Elmara Douw University of Amsterdam

Supervisor: mw. dr. Anja van Heelsum Second reader: mw. dr. Nel Vandekerckhove Master Thesis Conflict Resolution and Governance

Table of Content

Abstract……… 5

1. Introduction………..………. 6

2. Background……… 9

2.1. Defining Refugees……….. 9

2.2. Migration and Refugee flows over time…………...……….. 11

2.3. Refugee camps and humanitarian action………... 13

2.4. The Syrian Region……….. 15

2.4.1. Syria………... 16 2.4.2. Turkey……… 17 2.4.3. Lebanon……….. 18 2.4.4. Jordan………. 19 2.4.5. Conclusion………. 20

3. Theoretical Framework……… 21

3.1. Role of NGOs in refugee situations………. 21

3.2. Durability of Refugee Camps………... 22

3.3. Structural changes on host/home country……… 25

4. Method………. 28

4.1. Design……….. 28

4.2. Operationalization………. 29

4.3. Interviewees……… 30

5. NGOs strategies on sustainability in camps………. 32

5.1. Freedom of movement……….. 32

5.2. Secondary – post secondary education………... 34

5.4. Right to immovable properties……… 38

5.5. Nationality acquisition……….. 40

5.6. Chapter Conclusion………... 41

6. NGOs take on structural changes in

host/home countries……….. 42

7. Conclusion………. 48

8. Acknowledgements………... 52

9. Bibliography………. 53

          Abstract:  

Rosa  Elmara  Douw    

With the amount of refugees ever growing and 80% of refugees residing in the region of their home country, this research tries to find out how NGOs create more sustainable strategies in refugee relief care. Syria, currently being the largest contributor to the increasing number of refugees, is the focus of this research. The question central to this research is: how do NGOs support a transition to a more sustainable strategy in the Syrian region? This question is divided into two subquestions to address both the refugee camps as well as more structural changes: (How) do NGOs cope with the durability of refugee camps in the Syrian region? And (how) do NGOs facilitate structural changes in both home and host societies of victims of the Syrian conflict? Semi- structured interviews with various Dutch NGOs form the basis of the data conceived. The first subquestion is answered using five indicators: Freedom of movement, secondary – post secondary education, right to work, right to immovable properties and nationality acquisition. Education turned out to be the focus of most of the NGOs leaving space in the other indicators for sustainability improvement. The second subquestion is answered through 3 indicators: capacity building, resettlement and durable repatriation. Capacity building is by far the most promising in the realm of sustainable and structural change. Resettlement and sustainable repatriation are not yet addressed structurally and therefore leave room for improvement.

Keywords: refugee relief care, sustainability, refugee camps, Syria refugee crisis.

1. Introduction

The number of displaced people in the world is ever growing. In the ‘Global Trends 2013”, published by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), an estimated 51.2 million individuals were said to be forcibly displaced worldwide in 2013 alone (UNHCR, 2014). This vast number includes both internally displaced people (within their own country) as well as those who flee across borders. The war in Syria is said to be the largest contributor to this recent outburst of refugees. The war has also resulted in an increase in the number of asylum seekers globally, as over 1.2 million people were seeking asylum in 2013 worldwide, of which a considerable amount within the European Union (EU).

These increases in refugees and asylum seekers have resulted in growing tensions in both home and host countries. Across the EU, immigration and refugee policies and practices have been becoming more restrictive for some time now. Countries try, and are allowed to, control migration into their country but at the same time are bound by international human rights and refugee legal instruments (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 595). The lines between migrants and refugees blur in the public mind and more and more people feel that refugees might threaten social and cultural cohesion or even form a threat to the national security (Bakker & Obbema, 2015).

This leads to political responses not only on the international level but also on national level, as recently shown in the Netherlands. In a plan proposed in March 2015 by the liberal senior coalition party VVD they recommended a new way of dealing with the substantial amount of refugees that currently try to enter the EU (Migration Nota VVD 2015). They feel that the borders of the EU should be completely closed for refugees and more money should be spent on helping refugees in their neighbouring countries (Migration Nota VVD, March 2015). Money can be spent a lot more efficiently in those neighbouring countries than here in the Netherlands, the VVD argues. Additionally, they claim it is safer to keep the borders closed in order to keep possible terrorists out of the EU (Migration Nota VVD, March 2015). This is perceived as quite an extreme measure with no sufficient political support but it does raise interesting questions. Local settlement is of course not a new concept and in fact 86% of the refugees in the world are hosted by developing countries surrounding the areas of crises (UNHCR, 2014).

Reacting to these proposed measures, critics have argued that local settlement may not actually be more cost efficient because many costs made by neighbouring countries are hidden or cannot be expressed in monetary form (Bartels & Visser, 2015).

Some argue that these measures demonstrate a Western-bias and undermine the principles of burden-sharing and international solidarity (Loescher & Milner, 2003:603). It could also mean violating various international human rights, leaving the refugees in countries where asylum processes are a lot less organised. Local settlement is very often something that is set up as a temporary solution to offer immediate help to refugees but does not provide for a more durable solution. This leaves refugees trapped in a protracted limbo “unable to return home, and without the prospect either of a solution the country where they have sought asylum or of resettlement abroad.” (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 597). Seeing local settlement as a replacement of the current asylum processes in the EU is thus an unachievable idea if executed without any other accompanying measures closer to home.

As easy as this sounds in theory the refugee situation is so pressing that there is hardly time to think about long term measures thoroughly. The escalating humanitarian crisis on the Mediterranean with the rising influx of refugees trying to enter the EU on boats in life-threatening circumstances demands direct measures. Parties had very opposite views as to what should be done in this regard. EU Ministers have now agreed to launch a sea and air mission that, in a later phase, aims to destroy boats used by human traffickers to smuggle people (Neslen, 2015). Critics argue that militarisation of the refugee issue does more harm than good (Neslen, 2015). Relevant to this thesis in that debate is that even opposing parties agree that to prevent such tragic events as are happening every day now on the Mediterranean Sea one of the partial solutions would be to create a safer environment in the areas surrounding conflict so less people will decide to migrate in such dangerous circumstances as they do now.

So, local settlement is definitely a subject where a lot more thought can be put into. The durability of the solutions that are currently in place is debatable and thus research into more durable solutions is highly needed.

In this thesis I want to examine what NGOs, and more specifically Dutch NGOs, do in the Syrian region in order to help refugees. When the conflict started, the obvious first priority was to provide people with their basic needs. The UNHCR provided this first emergency response with its partners (UNHCR, 2015c). But as conflict continues in the region NGOs face the challenge of transforming this initial response to more durable strategies. It is this dynamic I would like to focus on by asking my main research question: how do NGOs support a transition to a more sustainable strategy in the Syrian region? I believe there are two aspects that make a sustainable strategy, firstly, the durability of policies of NGOs and secondly, the facilitation of structural changes in the society NGOs work in. Therefore, I formulated two subquestions: (How) do NGOs cope with the durability of refugee camps in the Syrian region? And (how) do NGOs facilitate structural changes in both home and host societies of victims of the Syrian conflict? I will look at Dutch NGOs working in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey specifically for Syrian refugees. Sustainability of a refugee camp is hard to operationalize in concrete ways but the goal of this research is merely to indicate what efforts Dutch NGOs make and what they find important, not to pinpoint exactly what the precise impact of their measures is. Therefore this can still provide for interesting insights.

2. Background

In this chapter I will try to create a thorough understanding of the way refugee situations have been dealt with over the years and how this applies to the Syrian region specifically. In each paragraph I will give a more general account on the matter as well as go into the specifics of the Syrian region. Firstly, I will define the term refugee and give examples of what the difficulties can be when labelling people as refugees. Hereafter I will give an account on how migration has changed and how this change influences the way refugees are dealt with today. Then I will go into the different kinds of refugee camps and humanitarian aid that is given to refugees and how this has become more complicated. Lastly I will give a short account on the historical background of the Syrian region in order to understand the specifics of this particular refugee situation. These paragraphs will provide for a thorough background for the theory chapter, which will set the theoretical framework for this research.

2.1 Defining refugees

Before elaborating on the circumstances within refugee camps and their purpose, it is crucial to know who are considered refugees and what that means. The definition used in this research is the official definition as stated in the 1951 Refugee Convention: “[a refugee is someone] owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country."(UN General Assembly, 1951: 15). This definition seems clear at first but when implemented can cause ambiguous situations.

The term refugee can become a term used in a political sense. People who have to flee their country because they are unsafe are very often joined by larger groups of people who migrate to seek better job or education opportunities or have other reasons to migrate such as family reunion (Zetter, 1991: 41). Different policies apply for these different categories. Someone with a refugee status in the Netherlands can acquire a residence permit whereas someone not labelled as refugee might have a harder time and different process to get this. In some cases this means that acquiring the label of refugee

can be very beneficial for a migrant. Even though these labels seem straightforward on paper, in practice it is often incredibly difficult to distinguish between them. For example, is someone who is afraid war might break out soon in its country and migrates to Canada because his brother lives there and there are better job opportunities an economic migrant, a refugee or someone looking for family reunification? Refugees are thus not as easily identified as it might initially seem. This makes it tough for countries to have a fair policy of dealing with refugees and other migrants.

Making the distinction between who is a refugee and who is a migrant is incredibly tough, but within the term refugees there are also a couple of distinctions that can be made in order to get a more proper understanding of what a refugee is and can be. Generally speaking there are three categories that can be made when the situation around a war area is studied: camp refugees, urban refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Camp refugees is what most people think of when they think of refugees, these are refugees that live in refugee camps. However, a majority of the refugees around the world do not live in camps. In fact only one third of refugees do so (UNHCR, 2015e). About half of the worldwide refugees registered by the UNHCR now live in urban areas and these refugees need a completely different approach and have different needs than refugees that do live in camps. On the one hand, refugees that live in urban areas can have more possibilities; they might be able to build a living for themselves, at the same time it also poses dangers, as they are more anonymous, they might not have legal documents and they thus might be exploited or arrested, they also might compete with the poorest local population in terms of work. These situations can cause social tension in urban areas (UNHCR, 2015e). A smaller group of refugees also reside in more rural areas making them even less visible and making it more difficult for NGOs to reach them to provide care and support. IDPs are a relatively recent focus of the UNHCR. These are people that have fled their homes but have not been able to find refuge across an international border. Even though they fled for the same reasons as refugees do they are often harder to locate. In 2011 it was estimated that there were around 26 million IDPs worldwide, of which 15.5 million were helped by the UNHCR.

All these different groups and types of refugees make it incredibly tough for both NGOs and the UNHCR to provide care and identify where people have fled. The amount of IDPs and urban refugees has increased over the last couple of years and it is especially true that in the Syrian region a lot of people do not live in the ‘traditional’ refugee camps. This complicates the situation and requires adjustments to the way refugee situations are tackled but at the same time it has the potential to allow refugees to live a more normal life than accommodation in a camp would allow.

2.2 Migration and refugee flows over the years

The nature of migration has changed over the past decades and has become more complex; this has also impacted on the role of refugees. In order to research how NGOs deal with protracted refugee situations today it is important to look at how these situations were handled before. I will therefore give an overview of how forced migration and a changing world order altered responses with regards migrants and refugees. Firstly, I will elaborate on what is called ‘ the age of migration’, to give an outline of the role of migration in the world and how this has changed over time. Thereafter I will elaborate on the impact migration has on nation-states and how this influences the position of refugees. Lastly, I will set out the dilemmas governments face when it comes to refugees.

We live in a time often referred to as the age of migration. Not because migration is new but because it now involves practically the whole world and moves in all directions (Castles et al, 2013: 2). Even in this age of migration, migration is still the exception not the rule. The vast majority of people stay in their country of birth. Nobody knows exactly how many international migrants there are in the world, but is estimated at about 2 to 3 per cent of the world population (Castells et al, 2013: 5). Important to note is that many of those who move are in fact forced to do so, ‘forced migrants’: people who had to flee their country of residence because political or ethnic violence or natural disasters forced them to do so.

Migration has also become more complicated in recent years. Complicated in the sense that there used to be ‘typical’ emigration countries and ‘typical’ immigration countries, migration streams were reasonably easy to follow and its impact was relatively predictable (Castells et al, 2013: 12).

This is now constantly changing; countries that used to be emigration countries are now immigration countries (for example: Spain, Italy, Portugal, Poland) and vice versa. This makes tracking migration chains a lot harder (Castells et al, 2013: 11). Another change is that countries no longer have to deal with one type of immigration to their country such as either labour migration or refugees or permanent settlement, but all of these at the same time. Castells calls this the differentiation of migration, “Typically, migration chains which start with one type of movement often continue with other forms, despite (or often just because of) governments efforts to stop or control the movement. This differentiation presents a major obstacle to national and international policy measures.

The growing impact migration has on nations has created opportunities as well as challenges, the most apparent of which is the clash between the (also modern) understanding of the sovereign state and global migration. This sovereignty means that states have the ability to regulate movements across their borders, which evidently clashes with the enormous amounts of people migrating all over the world. Irregular migration has never been greater than it is today, while at the same time policies to regulate migration have never been more extensive. This paradox causes very difficult situations when it comes to migrants and especially refugees.

Because many modern states experience an increase in (irregular) immigration they have become increasingly restrictive in whom they allow within their borders. However, many (currently 145 countries worldwide such as: Great Brittain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain) did agree to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention or its protocol of 1967, with which they obligated themselves to not send refugees back to their country if they are likely to face persecution, the principle of non refoulement. The influx in immigration in many European states has lead to policies virtually ending all programs to enter. For many immigrants there are thus limited ways to migrate to a European state other than by claiming refugee protection. Because the lines between economic migrants and refugees are so blurred it is hard to translate this into policy. “No state has yet succeeded in developing deterrent strategies for undocumented immigrants that manage to differentiate fairly and effectively between people with well-founded fears of persecution and those with economic or other motivations for seeking entry.”

(Boutroue, 2000: 281). Because of this, the measures that are supposed to make it hard for an illegal migrant to find a job in a country of opportunity also make it incredibly difficult for the refugee to navigate asylum procedures. Therefore many refugees end up in the hands of human traffickers and pursue very dangerous journeys in order to find safety (Boutroue, 2000: 281).

These developments have lead to yet another challenge, balancing the humanitarian aspect with a country’s sovereignty. This challenge is most visible in the current Mediterranean crisis. Thousands of people try to cross the Mediterranean in dangerous circumstances every year and this fact requires action. But whether the measures should take a humanitarian approach or focus on defending the borders is much debated. As it seems, looking at the measures and military mandate that are taken by the European Union, defending the border of the EU from irregular migration is seen as more important by the governments than the humanitarian aspect. But at the same time it is recognised that finding a balance in this issue is not easy, otherwise a solution would have been found already. At the moment it comes down to the reality that either people have to be prevented from leaving in the first place or they have to be rescued at sea. In order to prevent them from leaving something has to change in the regions of origin. These regions of origin are therefore the areas of interests in this research. In the next paragraph I will more thoroughly examine the role of refugee camps and humanitarian action in the refugee issue.

2.3 Refugee camps and humanitarian action

In this paragraph I will elaborate on the role of refugee camps in conflict regions and the approaches to humanitarian action that are taken in this realm. Again it should be noted in this respect that a majority of the refugees around the world do not live in refugee camps, in fact only one third of the refugees do so (UNHCR, 2015e). Many either find family members to stay with or live in urban areas, often without any legal status. In the Syrian case this means that of the 1.6 million Syrians that fled to Turkey only 220.000 live in the relatively well-equipped UNHCR camps. This means that 1.3 million either live with family members, in regional camps, or in cities (Bartels & Visser, 2015). This is excluding the internally displaced people (IDP), people that have fled their homes but have not been able to cross an international

border. I will firstly explain the different kinds of refugee camps that exist after which I will look at how humanitarian action considering refugees has changed over the years and what the role of the UNHCR is.

Regional camps are an important factor in the realm of refugee protection. Very often camps are set up by local governments and are not supported by international funds or even the national government (Bartels & Visser, 2015). This gives another dynamic to the reception of refugees and is a factor that should be considered when researching refugee camps. In this thesis both the internationally funded camps as well as the smaller regional camps will be considered as part of the research.

The most well-known refugee camps are those supported and set up by the UNHCR. These camps often grow to host a vast amount of people. The biggest camp in the Syrian region is the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, which hosts more than 80.000 people (UNHCR, 2015d). In these camps multiple NGOs work in their areas of expertise in order to meet the needs of refugees. The UNHCR now stresses on their website that refugee camps are a last resort and aimed to be temporary solutions (UNHCR, 2015a). The past however, has shown that this goal is not always met. Refugee camps such as the Dadaab camps in Kenya were set up in the early 1990s and still host over 300.000 people today (UNHCR, 2015b)

Humanitarian action to help refugees has become increasingly complex and costly over the last 50 years (Boutroue, 2000: 282). The array of organisations working in the field has grown and become diverse. Both large international NGOs as well as small local NGOs, religious organisations, United Nations agencies, military forces and private contractors work together during humanitarian crises. Nowadays, armed conflict is one of the main causes of migration flows (Boutroue, 2000: 282). Refugee movements are now not just a consequence of violent conflict but also very often an actual objective of war. Driving out certain ethnic or religious groups from a country has become a powerful dynamic in conflict, as seen in conflicts in Rwanda and Myanmar (BBC News, 2011; South, 2008). This means that assisting refugees is not seen as a neutral act anymore. This puts huge pressure on organisations working in this field of practice.

Critics have also drawn attention to the counterproductive effects humanitarian action can have. “Humanitarian assistance can inadvertently

prolong conflict, sustain the perpetrators of human rights violations, and undermine local institutions of self-reliance”(Boutroue, 2000: 283). At the same time, not providing humanitarian relief can result in suffering and the death of innocent people. Making the consideration whether or not to proceed in projects like these is thus a very delicate and demanding matter.

The UNCHR is expected to take a leading role in making these fine judgements. This, together with the visibility of (some) humanitarian disasters in the information age, increases the pressure on agencies to act. Inadequate responses are noticed and widely shared very easily, thus organisations often reconsider their actions and become very self-aware. At the same time media are selective in what they show to the public, which creates a slightly unhealthy competiveness between organisations (Boutroue, 2000: 283). Working with the media and using it in the right way has consequently become a very important part of humanitarian action.

With the changing nature of humanitarian action and the growing demands on organisations to work with refugees it is interesting to see how NGOs form their strategies. In this research I want to see how NGOs work within the Syrian region and how they deal with the changing nature of the conflict. Do they change the way they work from short-term relief to more long-term solutions?

2.4 The Syrian Region

In order to get a more profound understanding of the Syrian region, Syria and its neighbouring countries will be discussed in the next paragraph. Firstly, the recent developments in Syria will be discussed after which a more detailed account will be given on Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. These are the three countries taking in the most Syrian refugees in the region, which means that there are almost 4 million registered refugees largely divided between Turkey (1.8 million), Lebanon (1.1 million) and Jordan (600.000) (UNHCR, 2015d)

2.4.1 Syria

Knowing Syria’s recent history is necessary to understand the dynamics of the current conflict. Starting from just after World War II this paragraph will provide a brief background.

Syria gained independence from the French rule in 1946 after which an unstable decade led to a union with Egypt in 1958 (Kawakibi, 2013:5). After a coup d’etat in 1963, bringing the Ba’th party to power, a new authoritarian regime and a totalitarian era followed. In 1970 Hafez al-Assad came to power and promised economic reforms and a softening of the restrictive policies; these promises were never met. Uprisings and resistance in the 1980 were violently suppressed (Ibid, 2013:5).

When Hafez died in 2000 and his son Bachar succeeded him, Syrians hoped for a more liberal regime. While this initially seemed possible, the regime quickly became even more suppressing then before. When the ‘Arab Spring’ influenced many countries in Northern-Africa and the Middle East in 2010 it seemed as if Syria was the exception. “Analysts, in fact, were almost unanimous in claiming that the regime benefited from advantages that

^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ ^ _ EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LEBANON SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TURKEY Amman Beirut Baghdad Cairo Ankara

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Sources: http://data.unhcr.org/

Printing date:11 Dec 2013 Sources:http://data.unhcr.org/ Feedback: mapping@unhcr.org 10km

Syrian Refugee Population Density

Less than 500 500- 5,000 5,000- 15,000 15,000 - 45,000 45,000 - 135,000 135,000 - 415,000 Refugee Camp Refugees and those awaiting registration. Total includes 24,055 in North Africa. As at 18th Mar 2015 3,934,213 133,516 1,187,407 1,718,147 244,731 626,357

The  boundaries  and  names  shown  and  the  designations  used  on  this  map  do  not  imply  official   endorsement  or  acceptance  by  the  United  Nations.  (UNHCR,  2015d)  

protected it from these kinds of crises. Its geographical position as well as its management of different portfolios at the regional and international levels gave it an advantage, according to certain observers ”(Ibid, 2013:5). These advantages only lead to a short delay in the end; underground protests and small-scale uprisings very soon became massive movements. The regime responded with violent repressive action. What began as a peaceful protest turned into a violent military uprising within 5 months (Ibid, 2013:7). This is when the first refugees started to flee the country and Syria became the stage of violent conflict.

The conflict escalated and soon the international community became concerned about the measures that were taken by the government. Chemical weapons were used and, even though it was never specified by which party, the Assad regime allowed the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons under pressure of the UN (BBC News, 2015). During this time the fighting continued and more and more people felt the need to seek refuge somewhere else.

In the summer of 2014 a militant group already active in Iraq quickly gained power in Syria, Islamic State (IS), and declared a caliphate. Following this development the US and several Arab countries started air strikes in Syria against Islamic State (BBC News, 25 June 2015). In the first half of 2015 IS continued to loose and gain territory in Syria forcing people to continue fleeing into surrounding countries. The current situation in Syria is extremely chaotic, with Assad’s army, several militia, Kurdish freedom fighters and IS fighting against and with each other. This means that there are still people crossing the borders everyday and the pressing refugee situation deteriorates.

2.4.2 Turkey

Turkey has taken in almost 1.8 million Syrian refugees since the start of the conflict. About 80% of these refugees are from Syria’s northern provinces (Özden, 2013: 3). Many of these refugees have family and relations in Turkey that they call upon but there is also a large group living in ‘guest camps’. Due to Turkey’s asylum seekers policy Syrian refugees are not given the official refugee status but are seen as guests; the camps are therefore also referred to as “guest camps” (Özden, 2013: 5). This means that people residing in these camps do not receive the same protection as those who do have refugee

status, making them more vulnerable. The Turkish government does not allow any NGOs in their camps apart from the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation (Özden, 2013: 9). This foundation is criticized because of its closeness to the government. At the same time many Syrians admit that the situation for refugees in Turkey is a lot better than in Jordan or Lebanon.

Another issue that influences the situation for refugees in Turkey is that many of them are Kurdish. Many Kurds do not recognise the Turkish-Syrian border and therefore have a lot of family and friends across the border. The Turkish government is in constant conflict with the Turkish Kurds within their country, particularly the PKK, and now fears that the Syrian Kurds might lessen their control over the situation. In June/July 2015 a war between the Kurds and the Turkish government even threatened to emerge (Alaaldin, 2015). Kurds in Syria have been able to not only keep IS at distance but have even regained certain cities and territories, gaining so much power that Turkey might not be able to contain them (Alaaldin, 2015). Bombings in July 2015 in Turkey near the Syrian border, claimed by IS, might indicate that the conflict is spreading over another international border (Mortimer, 2015).

2.4.3 Lebanon

There are over 1.1 million refugees registered by the UNHCR in Lebanon currently, this means that 1 in 5 people in Lebanon is a refugee. This enormous number makes Lebanon a special case in the region, particularly because of the lack of formal refugee camps. From the beginning of the conflict the Lebanese government has refused to set up camps. This is largely due to the experience Lebanon has with UN refugee camps. The camps set up in the fifties for Palestinian refugees are to a large extent still in place. Over 500.000 Palestinian refugees still live in Lebanon to this day (Rainey, 2015). The government is afraid that setting up formal camps would encourage the Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon permanently.

Because of this most Syrians either live in informal tent settlements (ITS) or they rent apartments in cities. Rents are increasing enormously due to the growing demands so only relatively well off Syrians are able to do so. Even though some argue that the lack of camps might give them more opportunity to participate in the economy and society, it also makes them a lot more vulnerable and harder for agencies to reach (Rainey,

2015). Many local government officials also do not allow structural improvements for refugees in fear that they might stay. This makes it harder for NGOs to provide care for the refugees and results in disadvantage for the poor refugees in particular, as they rely most on this help.

Tensions between the Syrians and the Lebanese are growing due to the large proportion of refugees compared to local civilians. This causes an even more difficult environment for the refugees to live in. At the same time there is a very active civil society trying to fill the gap that the government leaves (Naufal, 2012: 17).

2.4.4 Jordan

Just like Turkey and Lebanon, Jordan is hosting a large amount of Syrian refugees, estimated around 600.000 tot 650.000 people. Even though there are five formal refugee camps set up in Jordan they only host about 16% of the refugees (Achilli, 2015: 5). Most of the refugees live in urban areas or in ITS causing the same kind of tensions as in Lebanon.

At the beginning of the conflict Jordan was very concerned with the humanitarian aspect of the Syrian conflict and was praised for its open border policy. Many Syrians had family or kinship in Jordan and thus it was a logical place of refuge for many Syrians (Achilli, 2015: 3). By society as well the government, Syrians were seen and referred to as guests. But, as the situation in Syria deteriorated and more and more people crossed the border, the initial hospitality expired. Housing became a serious problem, not only for the Syrians but for Jordanians as well. Rents increased dramatically due to the rising demand and even though Syrians pay higher rents than Jordanians, the problem remains significant (Achilli, 2015: 2). This also led to a more hostile approach by the locals; Syrians are no longer referred to as guests but as refugees.

Government policies have also changed over the last year. As of summer 2014 the freedom of movement of Syrians in urban areas has been limited. In order to be able to register as a refugee with the UNHCR they now need proper bailout papers of the refugee camps in order to get Asylum Seekers Certificates (ASCs). These papers are not only important in order to get assistance from the UNHCR but also to get access to the Jordanian public services such as education and healthcare. This causes many refugees, who

are still living in camps, to feel trapped, as they are virtually unable to leave the camp without the bailout papers and these papers are not readily provided (Achilli, 2015: 5). These restrictive policies make it harder for NGOs to work in the area as the Jordanian government only lets them help people with proper papers. The most vulnerable are therefore left out even more than they already were.

2.4.5 Conclusion

With the country profiles provided in these paragraphs I hope to have pointed out the specifics of each country in the region. This will be useful in the result chapters later on as NGOs have to deal with the local sentiments as much as with the actual relief pursuits. These background profiles are intentionally relatively concise as I tried to only lay out the most unique aspects of the country with regards to the research question. There are of course similarities between the countries as well; for example the growing tensions between local and refugee communities. But all these tensions have different backgrounds and I tried to make sure that these become clear in order to get a more profound understanding of how NGOs deal with these issues.

3. Theory

Now that the background of this conflict is outlined, this chapter will provide a more hands on theoretical framework to tackle the research question. Focussing on the role of NGOs, the durability of refugee camps and the structural changes in the host and home country I will specify a solid framework with which we can later operationalize research. Firstly I will focus on the role that NGOs play in the refugee situation and different strategies they can adopt. Thereafter I will examine the durability of refugee camps and the characteristics we can use to research this. Lastly, I will look into indicators we can distinguish to evidence structural changes in host and home countries. These three insights together will provide for the theoretical framework of this research.

3.1 Role of NGOs in refugee situations

The research I want to conduct will built on two main pillars. Firstly, the transition to more durable and long term solutions for the refugee problem by NGOs and secondly the way different kinds of NGOs work towards this transition. These two main theories will allow me to not only look at how transition works in refugee protection but also within NGOs.

Kibreab makes an important distinction between local settlement and local integration (1989:470). Local integration is aimed at a more permanent solution where refugees integrate into their host society and stay there. Local settlement on the other hand is aimed at keeping refugees in a segregated area where they do not integrate with their host society and are supported by international refugee support systems. It is important to make this distinction because the goals of these two methods of refugee protection are incompatible. In the case of local settlement the aim is to create a self-supporting segregated site where refugees can live until they can go back to their home countries after the reason for their fleeing no longer a threat (Kibreab, 1989:470). Local settlement seems to be the dominant strategy when it comes to hosting refugees in the region, with the exception of Lebanon. This is not particularly surprising as these sites are often taken care of by the international community (often coordinated by the UNHCR), something that can be a very important factor for governments of host countries that are developing countries themselves and thus cannot face the challenge of

integrating a large amount of foreigners. Even though this thesis is not concerned with the reasons why governments choose either strategy it is important to keep in mind when researching NGOs in the region. When looking at the durability of the strategies NGOs choose it is thus key to look at what kind of support they provide and to what extend that contributes to local integration or local settlement and whether this changes over time. Is it possible and desirable to move from local settlement to local integration and if so how NGOs go about that? The UNHCR has stated that it is not very likely that a political solution to the Syrian conflict will be found in 2015 and that it is therefore probable that even more people will get affected by the conflict further exacerbating the problem (UNHCR, 2015c). The need for transition is thus evident; the interesting question is how this is to be done. Important in this is to note that in the long term it is not a desirable solution to have so many people live in refugee camps (semi-) permanently, at the same time this is the reality at the moment, NGOs might therefore feel compelled to pragmatically work with this and make the most out of it.

“Can countries be able or be expected to establish policies, legal frameworks and institutions which could allow the absorption of hundreds of thousands of refugees living within their territories?” (Loescher & Millner, 2003:473). This is an interesting rhetorical question, to which the answer is: probably not, especially since a lot of the countries surrounding conflict areas are developing countries themselves. So a large proportion of the solution might have to come from within the camps. On the other hand, refugees cannot be kept in camps indefinitely (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 612). This means creating durability is a twofold realm in the case of local settlements; what happens to make local settlements more focused on the long term and refugees more self-sufficient while at the same time working towards more structural changes in host and home countries.

3.2 Durability of refugee camps

The next question that arises is how to operationalise the durability of a refugee camp. Or to put it differently, which characteristics of refugee camps indicate durability? With these indicators we can then later examine what NGOs do to change these characteristics so the camp becomes a more sustainable solution. Kibreab provides very clear and useful indicators for

durability of camps: education, work, property and nationality acquisition, (1989). I have complemented this list with an indicator by Kaiser (2006) and her research on the right of freedom within refugee camps (see: figure 1). I believe that these five indicators will provide for a solid and systematic study into the durability of camps. The structural changes in host and home country are based largely on the research of Loescher and Millner (2003) because their three indicators for these structural changes will help me categorise the measures that are taken by NGOs.

Durability of camps

A) Freedom of movement

B) Secondary – post secondary education C) Right to work

D) Right to immovable properties E) Nationality acquisition

Figure 1: characteristics of sustainability in refugee camps

A) The right to Freedom of Movement, as portrayed in article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 45 of the Charter of Fundamental Fights of the European Union is an important characteristic in this research (UN general assembly, 1948; European Union, 2012), as often refugees are legally not allowed to leave the settlement (Kibreab: 471). This makes the camps in essence an untenable solution. “Its absence [of freedom of movement, RD] undermines refugees’ economic and social rights, and the livelihoods of refugees in camps are thus severely limited” (Kaiser, 2006:604). So the extent to which NGOs working in a camp try to deal with this right to freedom of movement is the first characteristic that I will examine to establish if and how NGOs are working towards a more sustainable solution within camps.

B) A second characteristic that I will focus on in is the right to education. Often camps are provided with primary education, a minimal but important start. But when focusing on the long term sustainability of the

camp it is important to note that secondary (let alone post-secondary) education is something refugees hardly ever have access to (Kibreab, 1989:471). This may seem like something that is not of primary concern for refugees but it does add to the segregation and keeps refugees from pursuing a more self-reliant life that would provide for a more durable solution. This is therefore another indicator for the sustainability of camps.

C) Following up on this is the right to work that very often is not granted in refugee camps. People cannot pursue their own profession, as the possibilities of employment within a camp are limited. Refugees are kept from their host society and not allowed to participate, perhaps because this would lead to unwanted cultural and social integration that would stand in the way of repatriation (Kibreab, 1989:471). This does, however, mean that refugees cannot build a sustainable life for themselves, at least not in a legal way. Black markets thrive in refugee camps, seriously threatening the safety of those residing in the camps (Werker, 2007).

D) The possibility to own immovable property is another issue that is very often not allowed and another confirmation of the temporary nature of refugee camps. Reality does catch up at some point and now that the camps around Syria have been in place for a couple of years it would be interesting to see how NGOs handle these issues.

E) Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the issue of acquiring nationality is an indicator for the sustainability of a camp. For most refugees in local settlements it is impossible to acquire the nationality of the host country irrespective of how many years they have been living in that country (Kibreab, 1989). This means that obtaining the rights that come with acquiring nationality is out of the question for people living in the camps, seriously depriving them of opportunities to integrate. All these indicators together contribute to the sustainable or unsustainable nature of how a refugee camp works. There are of course other indicators that I could have chosen but I opted to focus on the above five because NGOs might be able to work with these and they can provide assistance in transitioning camps to become more long term oriented. Focusing on these characteristics when talking to NGOs will allow me to form a clear image of transition. Important to note is that these indicators are all variables rather than simple yes/no dichotomies. It is,

however, possible to see the efforts of NGOs to move in a certain direction and that is what I will be evaluating in the interviews.

3.3 Structural changes in host/home country

Structural changes in host/home countries

A) Capacity building B) Resettlement

C) Durable repatriation

Figure 2: structural changes in host/home countries

while  local  settlements  have  to  proceed  on  the  basis  that  they  may  be  in   existence   for   some   time,   they   are   ultimately   an   untenable   solution.   Actual structural change in both host and home countries of refugees is needed in order to do something about the refugee situation. “Ultimately, it must be recognized that the most efficient, effective and humane approach to refugee situations is their prevention, and that by engaging the failing and failed states of today, the international community will be preventing the refugee movements of tomorrow.” (Loescher & Milner, 2003:607). This seems like a very obvious statement but at the same time can be very useful when we add what kind of things can actually be done to do this. Loescher and Milner provide us with three useful tools: capacity building, resettlement and durable repatriation (see: figure 1)(Loescher & Milner, 2003).

A) Capacity building is an urgent need in the case of the refugee problem. This means capacity building for both the host states in the region as well as the NGOs and UNHCR working there (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 607). Capacity building is important for two reasons; firstly, because currently there are still a lot of people that cannot be sufficiently protected and taken care of in the region of origin and secondly, because increasing the capacity in the region would ensure that less people will feel the need to engage in irregular migration and risk their lives (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 607). NGOs can play a big part in this capacity building but at the same time are mostly undermined, especially when they are not working with the government of a

society (Loescher & Milner, 2003:608). This is in contrast to how NGOs work for asylum seekers in the EU, where they very often fulfil the role of watchdog of the asylum process. These kinds of NGOs are practically non-existent in regions of refugee origin. Together with the collaboration of international NGOs with local NGOs working on integration programmes, creating such watchdog NGOs would help increase the capacity of those countries as is has done in many European states (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 608). The UNHCR is another factor in capacity building that demands attention. “UNHCR would need to play a vital role in any increased engagement in regions of refugee origin, but, shortfalls in funding have resulted in a dramatic reduction in its ability to exercise its protection and assistance functions in these regions.” (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 608). This is however not something NGOs themselves can do a great deal about so in this research it will not play a major role but it is still important to note.

B) Resettlement is another aspect of a comprehensive solution for protracted refugee situations (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 613). It could not only help the refugees who are resettled but also enhance the chances of those not resettled if used strategically. There are, however, a number of significant constraints on global resettlement. These constraints can be categorised in three groups: programme constraints, resource constraints and procedural constraints. “The overwhelming majority of refugees in protracted refugee situations could be eligible for resettlement, but a lack of resettlement opportunities and of resettlement staff to prepare submissions, and inefficiencies in the process of preparing and submitting a resettlement case, have resulted in the underuse of this durable solution” (Loescher & Milner, 2003: 613). With both the programme constraints and procedural constraints NGOs could play a big role. By contrast, with resource constraints NGOs cannot do as much because it is ultimately up to states to decide the quota of resettlement refugees they can take in. Considering the issue of burden sharing amongst the EU it is argued that a EU-wide resettlement programme could account for 100,000 resettlement places a year (Loescher & Milner, 2003:614). This is, however, very far from reality as the EU in their recent emergency summit crisis package only agreed to a resettlement of 5000 refugees a year (Travis, 2015). I would be very interested to see what NGOs think about resettlement and how they work to help increase the capacity.

C) A last solution that needs mentioning is repatriation. This is the solution that is preferred by many states and ultimately, if safely, by many refugees as well. Voluntary repatriation as well as involuntary repatriation has been the focus of both states and the UNHCR in finding durable solutions to the refugee problem. However in some cases this lead to repatriating too soon, which only increases the trauma for refugees as well as the costs. Repatriation thus also needs to be a durable process for which a lot of support is needed that is not always given by the international community (Loescher & Milner: 2003: 614).

Even though in the case of Syria it is unlikely that repatriation could be seriously considered in the immediate future it is important to understand the different kind of steps that can be taken in order to create a solution to the refugee problem worldwide. All the steps discussed in the previous section do not stand on their own and could even prove counterproductive if implemented in isolation. Therefore I wanted to emphasise both the measures within a camp as well as the structural changes in order to stress that a holistic approach for the refugee problem is needed in order to tackle it. It would be interesting to see whether NGOs work in different ways at the same time or whether they leave different aspects up to other organisations and focus on one facet. If they specialise in one aspect I would be interested to see whether they collaborate with one another, and if so, how. In order to research both aspects I will focus on two sub research questions:

1. (How) do NGOs cope with the durability of refugee camps in the Syrian region?

2. (How) do NGOs facilitate structural changes in both home and host societies of victims of the Syrian conflict?

These are the two questions that I will focus on during the research. In the next chapter I will more thoroughly explain what methods I will use in order to get answers to these questions.

4. Method

In this chapter I will elaborate on the methodological choices made in this research and the methods used. Firstly, I will elaborate on the design used in this research. I will then discuss the operationalization of the research and sub-questions. Lastly I will justify the choice of interviewees and on methods used to obtain the interviews.

4.1 Design

For this research I chose to do an indicative study of how NGOs deal with the conflict in Syria. In many previous conflicts and current conflicts there are NGOs actively providing relief, in some occasions with unsatisfactory results, refugee camps that are in place for decades, money spent in ways that helps the corrupt regimes rather than the victims, sometimes overshadowing the results that they do accomplish. In order to research whether organisations learn from these experiences and how they deal with changing circumstances I found Syria an appropriate case because the situation there changed from immediate relief to a lingering war which grows more complicated every day. The need for more sustainable care has become apparent.

In order to gain an insight into what NGOs do to find more sustainable solutions for refugees living in camps as well as to try and limit the amount of people having to live in a camp through more structural measures, I interviewed the people responsible for the policies implemented in Syria and the surrounding countries.

For this research I will try to gain an insight into what NGOs strategies are when it comes to the sustainability of refugee camps. Because the rationale behind their policies is very important to understand, I chose interviews as my primary research method. I believe that in order to find out why organisations make certain choices and have certain policies in place it is vital to speak to them. As I said earlier it is not the goal of this research to create a representative overview of the outcomes of policies but merely to get an insight into what NGOs do, in their view, to contribute to a more sustainable solution regarding refugee camps and structural changes in the countries they work in. Combining all these different views and separating them into different indicators might help for future reference in refugee camps but this is not the first ambition of this thesis.

The reason I chose semi-structured interviews over narrative or structured interviews is because it provides me with the structure to ask questions on all the indicators I specified but at the same time gives freedom to the interviewee to elaborate on certain areas more than others. Because the field is so widespread and NGOs may have very different strategies on the same indicators I feel that allowing the interview to go ‘off-topic’ is of great importance. Even allowing my interviewees to disagree with me as to what indicators are important in pursuing sustainability in a camp might give interesting new insights for further research and because the research is set up reasonably small gives me the time to pursue the interviews in a relatively unstructured way allowing it to be more detailed.

4.2 Operationalization

In order to answer the research question and sub-questions I will use the indicators provided in the theoretical framework. The five indicators for the durability of camps: freedom of movement, secondary – post secondary education, right to work, right to immovable properties and nationality acquisition, will allow me to research the first sub-question. The indicators on structural changes: capacity building, resettlement and durable repatriation, will give me the tools to answer the second research question. In the semi-structured interviews I will touch upon each of these topics, some more directly than others.

With the first five indicators I can ask questions more directly because they are quite specific and straight forward, questions such as: does your organisation provide or assist with secondary education? Why or why not? These would be the kind of questions I would ask after more general questions on what their focus is in Syria and what kind of care they provide.

Other important questions in order to find out whether a shift took place would be questions like: did your focus of relief change over the last years? Have your policies changed? These questions would also naturally lead into the indicators on structural changes, as these are often issues that are not dealt with straight from the beginning. Capacity building is also a very broad subject that can be done in various different ways. To come around to this topic I will ask questions such as: Does your organisation work with (local) governments or communities? These are more specific questions

relating to the topic of capacity building. Resettlement and repatriation are a little bit easier to operationalize, as these again are narrower topics, less open to interpretation. It is important to note with these more structural changes that many of the capacity building measures will also have to do with the large groups of urban refugees living in the region.

With a loosely structured interview I will make sure to touch upon each of the topics. I do hope that the more open questions at the beginning of the interview will lead automatically to many of the indicators and I will not have to be to explicitly raise them. I would rather hear their opinions on things that they feel matter than go straight into the topics that are important in my theory because this also says a lot about their policy choices.

4.3 Interviewees

In order to get a reasonable overview of what NGOs work in the region and what they do I used both annual reports and interviewees themselves to indicate which other organisations I should speak to.

Firstly, I had to make a selection of the most prominent NGOs that work in the area from the Netherlands. The Database provided by Radboud University proved to be a huge help (Habrakan, 2015). This database outlines how much money Dutch NGOs spent in certain countries. Through further research on the websites of these NGOs and their annual reports I determined what that money was spent on. The NGOs I want to research had to work in refugee camps surrounding Syria and/or with refugees from Syria. At the end of an interview I made sure to ask what other organisations they saw as important in dealing with refugees from Syria in the region, this provided me with a network of organisations that covers at least a large proportion of the field. Many of these NGOs are not solely work in Syria but have experience in working in refugee camps in other areas that provide insights for their strategies in the Syrian conflicts. The NGOs I interviewed have very different focus points, some work more on healthcare while others specifically deal with children in refugee camps. Therefore not every organisation has ideas on all the indicators I specified but the organisations combined will hopefully provide me with enough information on each indicator.

NGO Function

Artsen zonder Grenzen Communication Advisor

Dorcas Disaster management Coordinator Kerk in Actie Disaster response coordinator Psychiaters zonder grenzen Advisor

Save the Children Junior Humanitarian Officer Terre Des Hommes Communication Officer War Child Child Protection Specialist

ZOA Director Middle-East

Figure 3: organisation and function of interviewees

In figure 3 I have outlined all the organisations and the function of the interviewees in the organisation. With this selection of interviews I believe I have covered both the larger NGOs that are part of the ‘Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties (SHO)’ as well as smaller NGOs that work on a smaller scale but therefore have more direct control over the direction that is taken within the organisation. With this variety I feel my results will be able to say something about both the field as a whole as well as the more specific differences between organisations.

5. NGOs strategies on sustainability in camps

In this chapter I will lay out the results regarding the first subquestion: (How) do NGOs cope with the durability of refugee camps in the Syrian region? This also includes the Informal Tent Settlements (ITS) in mainly Lebanon. I will follow the structure of the indicators as laid out in the theoretical framework. With regards the sustainability of camps this means freedom of movement, secondary – post secondary education, right to work, right to immovable properties, and nationality acquisition. In the next chapter I will lay out the results on structural changes in the host/home county. The data I collected was extracted from the interviews I conducted, I will use quotes from some of the interviews if it helps to clarify an issue but for the larger part I will paraphrase and extract the common sentiments or interesting outliers. In each paragraph I will firstly focus on the difficulties organisations face tackling the issues after which I will elaborate on specific plans, solutions, and policies they have or are developing.

5.1 Freedom of movement

Freedom of movement is the first aspect of sustainable refugee camps mentioned in the theory, in this paragraph I will elaborate on practical problems and solutions on this aspect. Firstly, I will focus on the problems in formal refugee camps and after that on those in the ITS, because the situation is quite different in the latter. Lastly I will lay out the solutions to these problems.

An issue that was laid out by nearly all the interviewees I spoke with is the fact that Syrian refugees are very hesitant to go to a camp in the first place, It is so different from the living conditions they are used to that they would rather live in urban areas and rent apartments (ZOA, DORCAS, WARCHILD). So even when people are in the camps they would rather not stay there and want to move on:

“People are, and that is not the right word, but they are fortune-hunters, if they hear that the grass is greener on the next mountain than they’ll go, the situation is so critical. They often call each other if there is space somewhere or cheap apartments and then they’re gone

to the next village, but that makes it difficult for NGOs and the UN to help” (ZOA).

The mobility of the refugees in this sense is thus quite high which makes it hard for organisations to track and help them.

When refugees enter a camp they have to register themselves with the UNHCR and this causes problems as well:

“You have to give a lot of personal data when you register with the UNHCR. People are afraid for the intelligence that goes from Lebanon back to Syria. Some people really do not want to be traceable, that depends obviously on the role they had before the conflict” (DORCAS).

Because they fear prosecution a lot of people do not want to be found. As such, living in a refugee camp makes them feel imprisoned and too easy to trace.

Another issue in the camps is that many of them have grown substantially and safety is hard to ensure. Female harassment is a serious problem in many camps. In the Za’atari camp in Jordan, hosting over 80.000 refugees, the situation became untenable and people felt incredibly unsafe (ZOA). Too many people in too little space without the ability to move in and out freely caused a lot of tension.

The situation in the ITS is slightly different as they do not have fences surrounding the area and thus you would expect more freedom of movement for the refugees. To a certain extent this is the case but at the same time there are other circumstances which limit their freedom. A child protection specialist for Warchild in Lebanon stated:

“Some local governments and municipalities in Lebanon installed a curfew that people from the camp were not allowed on the streets after 7 because Syrian youngsters would cause trouble. Another issue was that many children and women stated that they hardly dared to leave the ITS because they were discriminated and stigmatised by

the local population, they did not feel welcome. So there was no fence, in principle they could go wherever they wanted but they were limited” (Warchild).

The difficulty here is that it is harder for NGOs to act on these problems as it is harder to gain control over these ITS. They also frequently move to another area when the rent of the field they built their tents on gets too high.

A specific problem organisations face in Lebanon is the fact that the government is very strict in not allowing infrastructure that is too permanent (Warchild). In trying to create a safer environment where people can move more freely, these limitations can be very problematic (Warchild).

A solution which organisations came up with in order to allow refugees to move more freely is the creation of urban planning in the Za’atari camp in Jordan

“At a certain point they [UNHCR] realised they had to set out an urban planning, really simple things, dividing the lot in districts en than per district a health centre, school, and a committee so they can keep an eye on each other and the units are smaller” (ZOA).

These changes turned out to be very important for safety inside the camps. Moving in and out of the camp was simplified so that people felt less locked in. These are developments that really contribute to more durable solutions.

Freedom of movement is thus an aspect of sustainability that a lot can be gained in. It is important to note that freedom of movement in the literal sense does not necessarily mean that people feel free to move. Organisations try to deal with these different realities through the creation of ‘safe spaces’ for children or by reorganising the infrastructure of a camp. At the same time they have to cope with the local and national governments that do not necessarily want the situation to become more durable.

5.2 Secondary – post secondary education

Education is the second indicator of sustainability that was mentioned in the theory. The necessity and importance of education is very clear to all the organisations I spoke with regardless of whether this was their main focus: