Explaining the Influence of Domestic Level Variables on Doctrinal
Adaptation and the Procurement of Military Means in the United
Kingdom and Germany
Reacting Against Non-Traditional Threats after the
Balkan Wars
University of Amsterdam
Graduate School of Social Sciences Master Thesis Political Science Track: International Relations Student: Niek Lobé
Student Number: 10708316 Supervisor: Dr. P.A. van Hooft Second Reader: Dr. S. Krapohl
Abstract
After the Wall fell, new threats emerged. These threats can harm a state’s interest (e.g. refugee flows as a result of internal conflicts in other states) but do not affect its sovereignty or position within the international structure, and are therefore called non-traditional. To react against these threats, it is important to adapt military doctrine and procure new or additional military means to eliminate the soil. The United Kingdom and Germany both endorse the importance to react against non-traditional threats in their foreign policy documents. However, they show significant differences in the intensity and quality of doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of means: the UK adapted its armed forces, while Germany is primarily focusing on territorial defence. The goal of this research was to determine in what ways domestic level variables influenced these differences. In this thesis it is found that the differences can be explained by the degree of consensus among the political elite and the extent to which their decision is influenced by public debate.
Inhoud
ABSTRACT ... 1
1. INTRODUCTION ... 3
2. LITERATURE, THEORY & RESEARCH DESIGN ... 6
2.1.LITERATURE REVIEW ... 6
Reacting against Threats: Structural Realism ... 6
Reacting against Threats: Domestic Level Variables ... 6
Neoclassical Realism ... 9
Military Doctrine: Causes of Change and the Role of Technology ... 9
Connecting the Dots and Identifying Gaps. ...12
2.2.THEORY ... 13
Schweller’s Traditional Theory ...13
Schweller’s Theory Adapted to Non-traditional Threats ...15
2.3.RESEARCH DESIGN ... 16
Explanation of the Variables ...16
Case Selection ...21
Collection of Empirics ...23
3. THE UNITED KINGDOM: REACTING AGAINST NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS ... 25
3.1.UKFOREIGN POLICY:GOALS AND THREATS. ... 25
The Blair Doctrine ...26
From Speech to Policy Documents ...27
3.2.DOCTRINAL ADAPTATION ... 29
Doctrinal Adaptation: From the Cold War Until the Beginning of the 21st Century ...29
Doctrinal adaptation: the 21st century and beyond ...30
The Views of the Political Elite Regarding the Reshape of Foreign Policy and Military Doctrine ...32
Public Opinion and Debate on Doctrinal Adaptation: Influencing Decision-making of the Political Elite? ...34
3.3.PROCUREMENT OF NECESSARY MEANS ... 35
The Availability of Necessary Means ...36
The Views of the Political Elite Regarding the Procurement of Necessary Means ...38
Public Opinion and Debate on the Procurement of Necessary Means: Influencing Decision-making of the Political Elite? ...41
3.4.CONCLUSION ... 42
4. GERMANY: REACTING AGAINST NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS ... 45
4.1.CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ... 45
4.2.DOCTRINAL ADAPTATION ... 47
The Views of the Political Elite Regarding the Reshape of Foreign Policy and Military Doctrine ...49
Public Opinion and Debate on Doctrinal Adaptation: Influencing the Decision-making of the Political Elite? ...51
4.3.PROCUREMENT OF NECESSARY MEANS ... 53
The Availability of Necessary Means ...53
The Views of the Political Elite Regarding the Procurement of Necessary Means ...55
Public Debate and Opinion on the Procurement of Necessary Means: Influencing Decision-making of the Political Elite? ...58
4.4.CONCLUSION ... 59
5. CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION ... 62
1. Introduction
In the post- Cold War period the nature of the military, especially in Europe and the US, changed. Territorial defence no longer needed the same amount of attention as in the past. At the same time new threats emerged. Several conflicts brook out and directly influenced the interests and security of other countries. As stated by Blair in 1999:
“Many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world. Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and London. Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US.” Globalization
is considered as a keyword. Focusing on defending national interests, troops (mainly Western) were deployed all over the world to bring peace and security in conflict areas. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcing operations for instance, are concepts that became increasingly important after the wall fell. After 9/11 new responsibilities for the military arose: fighting terrorism and restore stability in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War Western states felt themselves increasingly responsible for promoting international liberalism and defending fundamental human rights. This has even led to the establishment of the Responsibility to Protect principle. Here, deploying troops plays an important role too. In sum, before the Cold War ended, militaries primarily focused on defending their own territory. In structural realist terms, they were used to balance. This period was about threats that could influence the position of state within the international structure, if not survival. These are traditional threats. Threats that emerged at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century
are called non-traditional threats. It simply means they do not endanger the sovereignty of a state, but they can harm its interests. Whether something is a threat or not, will not be discussed in this research. Reacting against non-traditional threats should be taken as a face value, because it is written in the foreign policy documents and military doctrines of most Western countries.
To react according to the identified threats, it is important to adapt military doctrines and to procure military means that are considered necessary to conduct another way of military operations. Instead of primarily focusing on winning battles, all military and non-military capabilities should be integrated to obtain the desired outcome: stability
and peace. This is also known as Effect Based Operations. Although conventional military means are still critical enablers (fighting can be necessary to create conditions for the desired outcome) other capabilities have become increasingly important to face non-traditional threats. First of all there must be transport capabilities because these sorts of operations are generally known for its expeditionary character. Other essential capabilities are Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and technologies. The term C4ISR is used to describe all the enabling activities that provide the knowledge to manage operations more efficient and to react properly. It contributes for instance to a better understanding of the social, political and physical environment of the mission area. The UK and Germany show strong similarities in their foreign policy documents. Both endorse the importance to react against non-traditional threats. This implies also similarities in the adaptations of their military doctrines and the procurement of military means. Moreover, they are one of the few countries within Europe with the material potential to innovate and develop doctrine and capabilities. It appears from the literature that the UK has made significant changes. They adapted their doctrine by focusing on Effect Based Operations and have a sufficient amount of aerial transport & tanker capabilities, as well as C4ISR capabilities. Germany on the other hand, has not made significant changes in their doctrines and is still primarily focusing on territorial defence. Also in terms of military capabilities, the focus is on conventional means.
Different theoretical approaches can be used to explain these differences. First of all one could think of structural realism. Non-traditional threats however, are not systemic. Moreover, it is unlikely that systemic requirements vary for Germany and the UK. Therefore the focus in this research is on domestic level variables, in which the consensus of the political elite and the influence of public opinion on the actual decision form the main thread. This leads to the following research question:
“What is the influence of domestic level variables on doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of military means, regarding non-traditional threats, in the UK and
To answer this question, an adapted version of Schweller’s framework for explaining underbalancing and the influence of domestic level variables will be used as main theory. For both the UK and Germany, it will be tested in what ways they adapted their doctrines and procured military means. After this has been determined, it will be assessed in what ways the outcome has been influenced by domestic level variables. This research ends with a general conclusion and discussion.
2. Literature, Theory & Research Design
This chapter contains the literature review, the theory and research design.
2.1. Literature Review
The literature review has been written around the dependent variables of this research. It starts with general explanations regarding a state’s reaction against threats. The focus here is on domestic level variables. Then, the causes of structural changes of military strategy & doctrine and the role of technology will be discussed. The main goal of this literature review is to identify the major debates and theories in order to identify gaps that can be “filled” within this thesis.
Reacting against Threats: Structural Realism
Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) Neorealism, or structural realism, is one of the most well known theories within the field of international relations. His theory holds that the nature of the international system is defined by anarchy and by the distribution of capabilities. Because of the absence of a central authority, states act according to the logic of self-help: it is about survival within the international structure. From this point other goals can be achieved. Military capabilities play a central role within this theory. On the one hand, a state needs military capabilities in order to defence its position, on the other hand these capabilities can be used to attack other states or alliances in order to increase relative power (Baylis et al, 2013). The principle of survival explains why states react against threats by using military means against other players within the international system. However, structural realism is not the theory that makes most sense in this research because the threats that are at the heart of the thesis are not related to systematic pressures or survival.
Reacting against Threats: Domestic Level Variables
The focus of this research is on variables at the domestic level that explain the reaction of a state against non-traditional threats. It appears from the literature there are two main elements playing an important role whether a state decides to react or not: strategic culture and the type of political system.
Strategic Culture
A frequently mentioned concept that is used to explain state behaviour is strategic culture. Gray (1986) describes strategic culture as “referring to modes of thought and
action with respect to force, which derives from perception of the national historical experience, from aspirations for responsible behaviour in national terms”. Regarding
environmental adaptation of states, it is believed that strategic preferences, formed by historical experiences, constraint responses to the objective environment. As a result, strategic choices are affected in a unique way (Johnston, 1995). Moreover, the political elite will make different choices in similar situations because they are socialized in different strategic cultures. This is seen as a possible explanation whether a state decides to react or not (Sondhaus, 2006). Korteweg (2008) tries to explain the influence of strategic cultural factors shaping transformation of defence strategy. He concludes that constitutional constraint, the traditional role of the military, and the role of politicians to lead strategic culture, rather than being led by it, are explanations for strategy transformation. Yet, strategic culture is also considered as a ‘vague’ concept that does not necessarily explain why states make different choices in terms of reacting against threats. Not only because there are different definitions, but also because it is hard to measure (Johnston, 1995). For these reasons, strategic culture will be left out of the analysis.
Domestic Political System
The relationship between regime type and military reaction is a common topic of discussion in the field of international relations. Many of the debates are about the democratic peace principle. As stated by Kant, the main idea is that democracies are inherently peaceful, while other non-democratic political systems are more likely to wage war. Focusing on domestic-level variables, the basic argument is that the separation of power, a constitution and a representative Government have led to a system in which the population rules. In order to prevent all the negative consequences, people will hesitate in waging wars (Layne, 1994). Non-democratic systems are more likely to go to war because they are not constrained by checks and balances or electoral damage. Kennan (1977) and Morgenthau (1948) argue that, despite the ‘benefits’ of democratic systems, it not always works in terms of reacting according to the identified threats or conducting foreign policy. Democracies for instance face difficulties in
adapting to their environment because all the different actors and their participation in the decision-making process. Public opinion and its influence on the decision-making of the elite regarding foreign policy and waging war is a frequently mentioned aspect here and inherent to democracies (Levy, 1988). Also when it comes to troop withdrawal, public opinion plays an important role. There are different examples of political leaders who decided to withdraw troops in order to prevent (further) electoral damage (Muellers, 1973) Although the above-mentioned theories are about traditional wars, they do show a relationship between the population and the decision of the political elite to wage war/conduct foreign policies, or not.
When it comes to explaining the reaction of a state against a particular threat and the interaction between domestic-level variables, Schweller (2004) presents an interesting framework. His main argument holds that whether a state is balancing against threats is not primarily determined by systematic factors, but rather by the domestic political process. When a state is underbalancing, it either misperceives the intentions of the other state, or (if it correctly perceives the threat) it does not prudent policies to protect itself for reasons of domestic politics. Because the probability whether a state will balance is a function of the preferences of political elites and social groups, underreacting to dangerous shifts in relative power within the international system may arise for one or two reasons: (1) The actor’s preferences (probably more influenced by domestic than international concerns) do not create incentives to adapt a balancing policy (saying something about the willingness of a state to balance), or (2) the potential domestic political costs of balancing are too high (saying something about the ability to balance). These points emphasize the argument that statecraft is not simply a function of the particular geostrategic risks and opportunities presented by a given systemic environment. Schweller presents 4 unit-level variables that are comprehensive to explain variation across time and space in state responses to threats. The first variable is about elite consensus or disagreement: when the elite agrees to balance, the state will do so. The second variable is Government vulnerability. The third variable is social cohesion or fragmentation, and describes the relative strength of ties that bind individuals and groups to the core of society. The final variable presented by Schweller is elite cohesion, and is about the degree to which a central Government’s political leadership is polarized by internal divisions. Because Schweller framework is
specifically about the interaction between the political elite and the public concerning reacting against threats, it will be used as the main theory in this thesis. However, it should be adapted on several parts to create a post-Cold War framework. This will be done in the theory section of this chapter.
Neoclassical Realism
Neoclassical Realism is a deductive theory and combines both system and domestic-level variables in order to explain a state’s foreign policymaking process or reaction against a particular threat: the interaction between the above-mentioned levels of analysis is central to this theoretical approach. When there is indistinctness over the distribution of power, Neoclassical Realism has added value to the original principles of Realism, as stated by Lobell et al (2009). This is because in times of uncertainty states are dependant of their own interpretations of system level changes that may be imminent. Where the distribution of power at the system level is “responsible” for setting the broad parameters of foreign policy, variables at the domestic-level are “responsible” how these parameters are translated into policy (Korteweg, 2008). As Waltz (2000) concludes in one of his articles: “ The causes of war lie not simply in states
or the state system; they are found in both.” The role of neoclassical realism in terms of
doctrinal adaptation is presented in the next paragraph. Military Doctrine: Causes of Change and the Role of Technology
Broad explanations for state behaviour regarding its reaction against threats, in terms of waging war and conducting foreign policy, have been presented. The focus in this research however, is on explaining differences of intensity and quality of doctrinal adaptation and procurement of military means to non-traditional threats in the UK and Germany (= reaction). The relation between the political elite and the public, as presented by Schweller, will be used as theoretical framework. Before doing so, it is important to determine what the theories and debates are around the causes of doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of means, as well is the influence of domestic level variables on these processes.
Barry Posen’s (1984) book The Sources of Military Doctrine is considered as one of the most influential books on military doctrine and doctrinal adaptation. It specifically focuses on explaining the establishment and adaptation of the German, French and
British doctrine between the World Wars. Regarding doctrinal adaptation, Posen presents his findings around hypotheses of organizational theory and the balance of power theory. Regarding organization theories, Posen expects that militaries will have a doctrine that focuses on the offensive. This is because offensive strategies generally will lead to success in a relatively short timeframe. At the same time offensive strategies are more complex than other forms of doctrines and strategies. It is also believed that civilians find it difficult to understand this complexity and therefore stand aloof from interfering when decisions regarding strategy and doctrines have to be made. Moreover, the theory suggests that doctrines will not be adapted to changes because innovation will lead to uncertainty within the organization. He has also found that new technologies are mostly implemented in existing doctrines, rather than changing it. For these reasons doctrines remain static and are military operations not adapted to national interests. The balance of power theory on the other hand, has different implications regarding doctrinal adaptation. Based upon the theory and the empirics, Posen concludes doctrines are more innovative and vary between different strategies because the strategic environment is constantly moving. Posen has found that civilian interference is greater under these circumstances. As a result, the autonomy of the military leadership will be undermined and greater innovation and adaptation is expected. Looking at the influence of domestic-level variables, this study shows that when it comes to survival within the system, the civilians are more involved in military decisions. To reach synergy between national goals and deployment of the armed forces, doctrines are most likely to be adapted to the strategic environment. Posen’s book shows the relationship between system level explanations and domestic level variables regarding the explanation of doctrinal adaptation. Neoclassical realism in general is considered as a valuable tool for analyzing these sorts of adaptations. As stated by Rose (1998) doctrinal adaptation can be analyzed best when structural changes have been translated through intervening variables at the domestic level.
When it comes to implementing changes in the military regarding doctrines and means, Biddle (2004) argues that the main cause of change has its origin in the end of the Great War. Because the opposing parties wanted to end the static character of warfare, the French, British and German forces started to integrate all of the available tactics and means. According to Biddle, this is the most significant example of doctrinal adaptation
and is still the defining revolution of military affairs nowadays: those who are able to integrate the available capabilities are far more likely to win battles. When it comes to technological revolutions and its influence on doctrinal changes, Biddle states that new capabilities reinforce the efficacy of the integration of military means, but are not an incentive for doctrinal adaptation on its own. Bousquet (2008) also endorses the idea of not overestimating the relation technological development-doctrinal adaptation. On the contrary Boot (2006) claims that technology is one of the most important parameters for structural changes in strategy and military doctrine. However, changes will only take place when the organization has the will to adapt structure and doctrine. The extend to which these processes succeed depends on aspects like military culture and interference of politics. Cohen for instance (1996) argues that military culture, generally known for aversion to big structural changes, has led to implementing new technologies within existing doctrinal frameworks. Cohen also mentions that technologies sometimes only change in intensity, meaning doctrinal adaptation is not always necessary. The doctrine on using air power for instance does not have to change because of an increase of precision in terms of targeting and ammunition.
There is also literature available that specifically focuses on explaining doctrinal adaptation after the wall fell. Dyson (2008) examines patterns of convergence and divergence in the post-Cold War period of Britain, French, and Germany in their military reforms. He notes that there are increasing levels of convergence in instruments, objectives, and institutional forums of defence policy. At the same time, however, there is divergence in the temporality of these processes. According to Dyson, domestic-level variables play an important role in explaining those differences. He concludes that executive autonomy, or specific constructions of policy leadership, is the main variable that explains differences in the temporality of military reform. Another article published by Dyson (2011) is specifically about the influence of domestic political factors on the adaptation of military doctrine and the procurement of capabilities that are necessary to react against threats that arose after the wall fell. Dyson notes significant differences in the level and temporality of adaptation between the UK and Germany, in which the latter faces large difficulties with the implementation of the changes. Low executive autonomy deriving from restrictive domestic political material power relations, have led to excessive interference of civilian policymakers and politicians in the process of doctrinal
changes. Moreover, the organization of political elections influence the “windows of opportunity” that are necessary to implement doctrinal changes. This is mainly due to the frequency of elections and the interconnection of the different political levels, meaning constitutional issues also play a role in explaining convergence. These political structures and processes also influence the procurement of new capabilities. Moreover, the German industry (mainly producing traditional weapons) is economically dependent of its own Government. This has also led to a lack of political will to buy military capabilities abroad. In his 2006 article, Dyson focuses specifically on the role of political leadership on German military reform. He finds that they are bound to economic and financial restrictions. Moreover, military reform is hampered by personal incentives: unpopular decisions can endanger future political career steps. It appears elite cohesion plays an important role in the arguments presented by Dyson, making it a relevant article to connect to Schweller’s framework. Although the empirics of his thesis are related to Germany, the analysis can be a valuable tool for researching the UK case. Connecting the Dots and Identifying Gaps.
This literature review started with general explanations of a state’s reaction against threats. Focusing on domestic level variables, it appears there is a relationship between the population and decisions being made by the political elite. Schweller has presented an interesting framework regarding this interaction, and will therefore be used as the main theory in this research. Regarding causes of strategic and doctrinal change, the most important theories are written around the neoclassical realism approach. Within these theories and explanations, new technologies and means generally do not have major impacts on doctrinal adaptation. Moreover, there is gap in the existing literature concerning the direct relationship between the influence of domestic-level variables and the procurement of means that are considered necessary by military experts. This research can partly close this gap. When it comes to the influence of domestic level variables on doctrinal adaptation after the wall fell, Dyson presents some interesting concepts that can be connected to the interaction of the political elite and the population. This is also the case for the procurement of military capabilities. What has not been done is comparing two countries, regarding domestic level variables, with great similarities in their foreign policies but with big divergences in the way they adapted their doctrinal adaptation and procured means.
2.2. Theory
Schweller’s theory of balancing and underbalancing offers an interesting framework to analyse the influence of domestic level variables on a state’s reaction against a particular threat. However, the threats Schweller describes have influence on the sovereignty of a state. This is not the case for non-traditional threats. Therefore, Schweller’s theory has to be adapted to the post Cold-War strategic environment. The adapted theory will be presented after the original idea of Schweller’s theory of underbalancing has been described briefly.
Schweller’s Traditional Theory
The main goal of Schweller was to develop a theory that helps to understand the influence of domestic level variables on the balancing behaviour of a state. Four variables are at the heart of his theory. The first variable is elite consensus, or elite disagreement, saying something about the willingness of the elite to balance. Schweller (2004: 13) defines elite consensus as follows: “The degree of shared perception about
some facts in the world as being problems (versus not) of a particular nature (versus some other nature) requiring certain remedies (versus others)”. This makes clear that the
construction of a problem is mostly a subjective process. Elite consensus is the most important variable of necessary causes for balancing behaviour. When there is no consensus among the elite, the prediction is either underbalancing, or some other non-balancing policy option. An interesting fact is that democracies are particularly slow in balancing against threats. This is because non-balancing behaviour is the status-quo policy prior to the emergence of a dangerous threat. Moreover, there are generally many veto players in a democratic policy making process. In the case of elite consensus or disagreement, there are only two questions:
1. Against whom will the state balance; and
2. Will mobilization hurdles created by social fragmentation and regime vulnerability limit the state’s ability to meet the threat?
The second variable is government or regime vulnerability, and is about the ability to extract resources. The central question rising from this variable is about the likelihood
the leadership will be removed from its position. The following questions, related to elite-mass linkages, must also be taken into account when analysing state behaviour:
1. Is the government’s authority based on coercion, or are they self-legitimizing in the eyes of the public?
2. Does the government meet the expectations of the public? 3. Does the government receive broad support from society?
4. Can the government minimize domestic interference in its policy decisions? At the same time government leaders should consider the domestic costs attached to the policy options.
The third variable is social cohesion or social fragmentation, and is also about the ability to extract resources. Social cohesion is the relative strength of ties that bind individuals and groups to the core of a given society. The key to cohesion is that “all players accept
the same rules of the game” (Schweller, 2004: 18).
The fourth and final variable is elite cohesion, saying also something about willingness of the elite to balance. This variable is about the degree to which the central government leadership is fragmented by persistent internal divisions (polarization may arise from ideological, cultural, or religious divisions, party factions etc.). According to Schweller, there are five relevant questions regarding elite cohesion and balancing behaviour:
1. Is there a struggle among elites for domestic political power?
2. If so, are there opportunistic elites within the threatened state who are willing to collaborate with the enemy to advance their own personal power or gain office? 3. If there are multiple threats, do elites agree on their rankings of external threats
from most to least dangerous to the state’s survival and interest?
4. Are there deep disagreements among elites regarding with whom should the state align?
5. Are elites divided over the issue of whether to devote scare resources to defend interests in the periphery or in the core?
When the elite is fragmented, it is unlikely a state is able to construct a coherent and effective balancing strategy. Moreover, the political costs and risks of balancing increase when elites are fragmented.
Schweller’s Theory Adapted to Non-traditional Threats
Non-traditional threats do not harm the sovereignty of a state. Therefore Schweller’s balancing should be replaced by reacting. When a state reacts properly it simply means the elite had the willingness to do so and was able to extract resources. In fact, this is the equivalent of the traditional theory. Looking at four unit-level variables, replacing ‘balancing’ by ‘reacting’ is not enough to use Schweller’s framework for threats that are considered as non-traditional. Therefore the variables should be adapted to this phenomenon. Because the UK and Germany are the cases that will be analysed in this thesis, the adaptation is based upon Western/democratic values.
The elite consensus, or elite disagreement variable does not need to be adapted. Question like: against whom will the state react and will mobilization hurdles created by social fragmentation and regime vulnerability limit the state’s ability to meet the threat, are still valid in a changed security context. Especially Schweller’s remark on democracies is relevant; when there are different interests it has hard to reach consensus. The government vulnerability variable must be adapted to the post-Cold War strategic environment. This means a government that based its authority on coercion is non-issue. The other questions at the heart of this variable can be connected to nowadays-political systems in Western democracies. The third variable about social cohesion or fragmentation does not need to be adapted to non-traditional threats or taking international responsibility. The fourth variable about elite cohesion should be adjusted on several aspects. Firstly, the struggle among elites for political power should only be discussed in a democratic perspective. Moreover, collaborating with the enemy is considered a non-issue, and should be left out of the analysis. The ranking of threats should be placed in a different context. Looking at the demarcation of this research, structural changes are out of question. However, there are other threats that can be prioritized by the elite. One could think of dissolving the economic crisis for instance, and is therefore also related to the division of the elite whether to devote scare resources. The question about whom to align with must be seen in a different context. Instead of balancing one should speak of the formation of coalitions who are willing to react against a non-traditional threat.
As it appears, Schweller’s theory of explaining underbalancing only needs limited adaptation to use it for the analysis of a state’s reaction. The problem however, is the allowed amount of words for this thesis project. Implementing all four unit-level variables and the related questions in the analysis will lead to exceeding the requirements. Therefore, it is decided to combine them into two questions that will be at the heart of this research:
1. In what ways and why was there (no) consensus among the political elite regarding the reaction against non-traditional threats; and
2. Did the public view/opinion, academic debates included, on the reaction influence the actual decision of the political elite?
As it will be further explained in the next paragraph, the focus in this research is on two conditions to react properly: doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of necessary means. The political elite decides in what ways doctrines are adapted and military means are procured. The above-mentioned questions are therefore applicable to these two conditions to react according to the identified threats.
2.3. Research Design
As it has been mentioned in the introduction chapter, the research question of this thesis is: “What is the influence of domestic level variables on doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of military means, regarding non-traditional threats, in the UK and Germany?” In this paragraph the different variables, hypotheses, concepts, case selection and indicators for measurement will be presented.
Explanation of the Variables
The independent variables of this study are the non-traditional threats as mentioned in defence related foreign policy documents of the UK and Germany. Whether particular movements and events are actual threats, is a debate on its own and therefore left out of the analysis. The existence of these threats, mentioning them in policy documents, and the endorsement of taking international responsibility imply a similar reaction of the UK and Germany. Instead of the decision to initiate or to take part in military operations, the focus in this research is on the adaptation of military doctrine and the procurement &
availability of means that are considered necessary to challenge non-traditional threats. These are the dependent variables of the research. As it will be described in the empirical chapters, there is a difference in the reaction of the UK and Germany. While the first seems to react according to the identified threats, the latter faces a lack of doctrinal adaptation and availability of necessary means. It is expected that these differences can be explained by the influence of domestic level variables as mentioned in the theory section. These are the intervening variables of this research. Based upon the different variables, the following hypotheses have been identified:
H0: The differences in the reaction of the UK and Germany cannot be explained
by domestic level variables;
H1: The UK reacts according to the identified threats because there was
consensus among the political elite;
H2: The UK reacts according to the identified threats because the political elite
was not influenced by public debates and/or opinion;
H3: Germany did not react according to the identified threats because there was
no consensus among the political elite;
H4: Germany did not react according to the identified threats because the
political elite was influenced by public debates and/or opinion.
Figure 1: Visualisation of the argument
Independent Variables Non-traditional threats as mentioned in foreign policy documents between 1998 and 2011 Intervening Variables Elite consensus & Public debate/opnion influencing decison of political elite Dependent Variables State's reaction against
threat: Doctrinal Adaptation & Procurement & Availability of Necessary Means
Because non-traditional threats, doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of military means are abstract and complex aspects, they will be explained more detailed in the subparagraphs below.
Non-traditional Threats
Non-traditional threats do not influence the sovereignty of a state but they can harm its interests and security. Globalization is considered as a keyword here. One could think for instance of how internal or regional conflicts swiftly become internationalised when people flee to other countries and affect the global economy when import and export are under pressure. Moreover, it is plausible that non-reacting will lead to an increase of instability affecting other countries even more in terms of economy and security. Other concrete examples that are in line with this reasoning are terrorism and piracy. For these reasons it is crucial to react against it by deploying military capabilities in the right way. As it is stated by Tony Blair in his 1999 speech in Chicago on how the world has been changed: We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not we cannot refuse to participate in global markets if we want to prosper. We cannot ignore new political ideas in other counties if we want to innovate. We cannot turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of human rights within other countries if we want still to be secure.” This
makes clear once again in what ways the world is globalized. Besides the necessity to react according to the identified threats, the UK and Germany also subscribe in their foreign policy documents the importance to intervene when human rights are trampled.
Military Doctrine & Adaptation
There are many definitions of military doctrine. The research corporation Rand (2015) describes military doctrines as “a fundamental set of principles that guides military forces
as they peruse national security objectives.” According to NATO (2010) doctrines provide
“fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of
objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.” Simply put, military
doctrine provides guidance on how operations should be conducted. These definitions should be complemented with a general note that is included in the Dutch Defence Doctrine (2013) on the validity of doctrines: at time, doctrines have to be adapted to changes in the strategic environment. The importance of adaptation is endorsed by De Goede & De Weger (2008). They argue that militaries can only react properly against
identified threats if doctrines are continually evaluated and, if necessary, adapted to changes in the operational and strategic environment.
Several concepts that serve as indicators for doctrinal adaptation should be explained briefly. These concepts are derived from academic literature on reacting against non-traditional threats. The concepts below are indicators for change because they emphasize the use of force only as a partial element for success; it appears from operational analyses that it is all about integration of military and non-military means to eliminate the soil of non-traditional threats. Mentioning the concepts in doctrines means the organization is using them for training and planning & execution of operations. After all, doctrines provide guidance in how the military should conduct its operations.
Effect Based Operations (EBO): EBO is concept that does not primarily focus on
the physical destruction of opposing forces, but starts with emphasizing the strategic end-goal (Smith, 2006). In term of non-traditional threats, this is mainly about ensuring stability and creating conditions for development. From this end-goal it is determined what ways and capabilities, both military and non-military, are necessary to reach it (Batschelet, 2002). The causality between the actions and its effects are at the heart of this concept of military thinking.
Comprehensive approach: It appeared from military operations in the Balkans,
Iraq and Afghanistan that focusing on combat operations did not create the right conditions for stability (Drent, 2011). In order to achieve the optimum result, military operations should be integrated with political and civilian instruments (NATO, 2014). The comprehensive approach fits within the framework of Effect Based Operations.
Counterinsurgency (COIN): In general, the main goal of COIN operations is to
regain political control of a region. To do so, the irregular enemy, that is using violence to remain in power, must be separated from the population. From here, the conditions are created to restore a legitimate form of government, ‘rebuild’ the region and to establish stability and peace (Kilcullen, 2010). To achieve the strategic end-goal, it is important to work from the Clear-Hold-Build principle. This means that the military clears an area of insurgents by using force, keeps the
enemy out of the area while winning support of the population, and starts with rebuilding activities. Also in the case of COIN it is important that military operations are integrated with political and civilian instruments (Ucko, 2009).
Endorsement of the Relation between Technology and Conducting Operations: It is argued in military literature that mainly C4ISR related
technology would lead to a better understanding of the operational environment (Holley, 2005). Because of this understanding, commanders are able to adjust their way of conducting operations (Bousquet, 2008). Speed plays a central role here, because it means that the military is one step further than the irregular opponent that generally does not dispose of these technologies. Therefore, it is important that commanders understand the added value of these technologies in conducting operations. Because doctrines play an important role in guiding operations, the role of technology should be endorsed.
Necessary Means for Reacting against Non-traditional Threats
Aerial Transport & Tanker capabilities: Reactions against non-traditional
threats are generally known for its expeditionary character. To transport goods and personnel in a short timeframe, it is important to have capabilities that make this possible. It is also important that militaries dispose over aerial tanker capabilities for several reasons. Firstly, they can refuel transport aircraft that are flying to a mission area. This means that stopovers are not necessary, making it easier to plan such operations and to save time in general. Moreover, air operations generally play an important role in reacting against non-traditional threats: planes are used to map the environment, gather information and to conduct precision bombardments (Olsen, 2010). To keep planes in the air as long as possible, it is important that they can be refuelled during missions.
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities (C4ISR): The term C4ISR is used to describe all the enabling activities and systems (air, land and sea) that provide
information and intelligence to manage operations more efficient and to react according to the identified threats. The main goal is to operate at a tempo that will outpace adversaries (Ministry of Defence, 2003). See also the subparagraph on the relation between technology and conducting operations. Other terms that fit within the framework of C4ISR:
o Network Enabled Capabilities (NEC): NEC is focused on optimizing the
integration of command elements, effectors and sensors (TNO, 2004).
o Command and Control (C2): C2 is the simplified description of the whole
C4ISR concept.
o Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISTAR): ISTAR is the
term for capabilities that collect, process and disseminates information and intelligence (Best, 2005).
o Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV): UAV’s are just one out of many
examples of a C4ISR system. It is specifically mentioned in this research because UAV’s are dynamic, are easier to deploy than regular planes, and it is a system that politicians understand which makes it a ‘touchable’ topic for debate. Moreover, the value of UAV’s is shown by military operations on both Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of the collection of intelligence and target acquisition. (Grant, 2009 & Security Weekly, 2012) Case Selection
As it is written in the introduction chapter, the UK and Germany will be used as the cases for explaining the influence of domestic level variables on a state’s reaction against non-traditional threats. Both countries are, together with France, the major powers in Europe and have the material potential to innovate and to adapt their military doctrines and procure new capabilities (Lehne, 2012). Moreover the UK and Germany show strong similarities in their defence related foreign policy documents: they underline the danger of non-traditional threats, the need to react against them, and mention the responsibility to intervene when the main principles of international liberalism are under pressure.
Yet, there are big differences between the UK and Germany regarding doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of the means that are considered necessary, which makes them interesting cases to analyse.
The policy documents that will be analysed are from the timeframe 1998-2011. This is because the end of the 20st century is considered as the aftermath of the failures that have been made in the Balkans. These failures served as an incentive for (thinking about) structural changes of Western militaries. In 1998 for instance, the UK presented the Strategic Defence Review in which it is recognized that the world has changed after the Cold War and that the military should therefore be adapted to the new strategic environment. 2011 is the year in which large-scale operations against non-traditional threats (Afghanistan and Iraq) have been downscaled or ended. It is plausible that adjustments can be observed in this timeframe.
Collection of Empirics
The charts below show how the different variables are measured, and where the information can be found.
Table 1: Indicators for measurement- Domestic level variables
Indicators Sources
Elite.consensus/disagree-ment among political elite
Government: agrees/disagrees Parliament: agrees/disagrees Result: doctrinal adaptation & necessary means (limited/not)
UK Hansard- House.of Commons debates Defence Papers Defence Committee Website News Articles Germany Bundestag debates White Papers Defence Committee website News Articles Public Opinion/Debate influencing decision of the political elite
Public.opinion &debate: negative/positive
Result: government adapts decision to public debate & opinion (limited/not) Academic reports Opinion.polls on the relevance.of defence.in general.and.on spending
Indicators Sources Doctrinal adaptation
Mentioning and explanation of the following concepts: Comprehensive approach COIN EBO Integration of technologies Policy documents White Papers (Joint) Doctrines News Articles Procurement necessary
means Mentioning of: C4ISR C2 ISTAR NEC UAV Reaper (UAV) Tanker aircraft Aerial Refuelling Air-air capability
Air transport capability
Policy documents White Papers Doctrines Operational Assessments Accounting Reports News Articles
3. The United Kingdom: Reacting against Non-traditional Threats
In this chapter the influence of domestic level variables on the reaction of the United Kingdom against non-traditional threats will be tested. It starts by showing the stated policy goals and threats. These aspects imply doctrinal adaptation and the procurement of means that are considered necessary. Secondly, distinctive doctrinal adaptations will be described, as well as the influence of the political elite on this process & the influence of the public debate on the decision-making of the elite. The same will be done for the analysis of the procurement of necessary means. The following questions are at the heart of this chapter:1. In what ways and why was there (no) consensus among the political elite concerning doctrinal adaptation and procurement of the necessary means, and
2. What was the public view/opinion concerning the abovementioned aspects, and has this led to changes in the actual decision of the political elite?
3.1. UK Foreign Policy: Goals and Threats.
As it is written in the previous chapters, new threats and responsibilities emerged after the end of the Cold War. In the 90’s, the UK Government was exploring its position and role within the international system. Given its history, and relative capabilities & resources in political, economic and military terms, it is not inconceivable the UK was one of the initiators of the establishment of new ways of thinking on countering non-traditional threats. This has led to the establishment of an active foreign policy (Brown, 2010). In 1998 the Ministry of Defence presented the Strategic Defence Review. In this document it was recognized that the world has changed since the end of the Cold War and that the military should therefore be adapted to a new strategic environment. The main focus was on restructuring conventional units into rapid reaction forces that were prepared for overseas deployments. However, new ways on how to conduct operations were not mentioned. Investments in new capabilities were not concretely mentioned either; the paragraph on defence procurement was only about efficient forms of investing (Secretary of State for Defence, 1998). The publication of the 1998 White
Paper should be considered as the beginning of a period full of changes for the military.
The Blair Speech in 1999 served as a catalyst for this process. The Blair Doctrine
Partly driven by the Balkan War, Prime-Minister Tony Blair presented in 1999, while addressing the Economic Club in Chicago, the so-called Blair Doctrine. This speech is considered the fundament of an active British foreign policy. The quotes below show Blair’s vision on how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War and what the role of West, and thus the UK, must be: reacting against threats that can harm a state’s (or Western) interests, but also taking international responsibility. Both elements arose from a far-reaching form of globalization.
“I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalization has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalization is not just economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon.”
“Many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world. Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and London. Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US.”
“This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand.”
The Blair Doctrine contains five circumstances that can be seen as an assessment framework, in which the international community should intervene in other states. The first one is that a state, or coalition, must be sure about the reason of intervention. Secondly, all non-military options should be fulfilled first; military means are considered as a last resort. Thirdly, the undertaken military operation must be prudent and sensible. Fourthly, intervening countries must be prepared to conduct long-term operations and presence. The fifth and final circumstance is whether there are national interests at stake. As it is explicitly mentioned on the UK Government website, the Blair
Doctrine has the protection of humanity at its heart: sometimes the decision of not
Blair Doctrine is considered an eye-opener for many (Western) countries on how to
shape foreign policy and how to react against mass atrocity crimes in a changing world. One could think for example of the Responsibility to Protect Principle, in which the international community has the responsibility to intervene in other countries in case of mass atrocity crimes by using coercive means (Bellamy, 2013).
From Speech to Policy Documents
Many elements of the Blair Doctrine are translated into UK policy documents concerning security and defence issues. All these documents subscribe the importance of defending national interests all over the world. Sometimes this is about sending troops or conducting other forms of military operations when national security is at stake. Moreover, the military can be used to prevent negative consequences that arise from conflicts abroad (e.g. refugee flows and trade barriers). This is fully in line with the Blair
Doctrine, and the use of the military against non-traditional threats as described in the
previous chapters. Below, some examples from the 2003 Defence White Paper Delivering
Security in a changing World and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review that
partly arose from the Blair Doctrine are presented. By doing this, the independent variable of this research must be clear now.
2003: Delivering Security in a Changing World – Defence White Paper
The first notable aspect in the introduction chapter is the main policy goal for the UK Government regarding security issues. Instead of primarily mentioning conventional threats, it also recognizes the danger of non-traditional threats and its responsibility to react against them: “The Government’s security priorities, set out in the SDR and the New Chapter are summarised in our Defence Aim: To deliver security for the people of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories by defending them, including against terrorism; and to act as a force for good by strengthening international peace and stability” (p.4). Moreover, the Government recognizes the negative effects of globalization: overseas conflicts can directly affect UK interests. Therefore reacting against them is essential: “…Internal conflict, poverty, human rights abuse and famine can all create the conditions for mass population movements, adding to pressures on neighbouring countries or emerging as a surge in migration to Europe… The UK may not remain immune from such developments; regional disputes can swiftly become
internationalised, and may have a major impact on the global economy, energy security, and our allies and partners… Potentially destabilising social, political, and economic problems demand proactive engagement in conflict prevention, as well as the capacity to respond quickly to emerging crises.” (p. 9)
2010: Strategic Defence and Security Review
Seven years after the publication of the Defence White Paper, the UK Government presented a new foreign policy document regarding security and defence issues. The Government emphasized again the need to react against (non-traditional) threats to defend UK interests, which implies an active foreign policy: “The National Security
Strategy sets out two clear objectives: (i) to ensure a secure and resilient UK by protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, territory and ways of life from all major risks that can affect us directly; and (ii) to shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source” (p.11). The
Government is also more concrete on how to tackle non-traditional threats: it endorses the importance of both military and non-military capabilities to react properly: “Tackle
at root the causes of instability. To deliver this we require: an effective international development programme making the optimal contribution to national security within its overall objective of poverty reduction, with the Department for International Development focussing significantly more effort on priority national security and fragile states; civilian and military stabilisation capabilities that can be deployed early together to help countries avoid crisis or deal with conflict, and targeted programmes in the UK, and in countries posing the greatest threat to the UK, to stop people becoming terrorists” (p.13). Moreover,
the Government has implemented a risk assessment in which the security risks that needs most attention are identified: “The Risk Assessment identified wider security risks
we should give greatest priority to, based upon their relative likelihood and impact. These include three of the four Tier One risks (terrorism, cyber security and civil emergencies in the form of natural hazards or accidents) as well as other important issues: Terrorism, Instability and conflict overseas, Cyber security, Civil emergencies, Energy security, Organised crime, and Border security” (p.41).
3.2. Doctrinal Adaptation
The analysis below will show that UK military doctrines are adapted to non-traditional threats. In the UK, developing military doctrines and concepts is a process in which the political elite is not directly involved. However, they do determine which documents serve as a basis for developing new doctrines. This means that they have a large degree of influence. The Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), connected to the Single Services and the Permanent Joint Headquarters, is responsible for translating foreign policy concerning security and defence, as well as operational experience and military trends, into doctrine and concepts (UK Government, 2014). The 2003 Defence White
Paper and the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review function as a guideline for the
JDCC in order to develop and adapt military doctrine. Knowing this, the role of the political elite and that of the population, on the development of the abovementioned policy documents must be analysed. Before doing so, the British history of doctrinal adaptation will be described briefly.
Doctrinal Adaptation: From the Cold War until the Beginning of the 21st Century
During the Cold War, UK military doctrine consisted of two elements: conventional deterrence and collective defence. In the post-Cold War period, the military experienced difficulties in translating the new strategic environment into doctrine. This was partly due to the lack of guidance from the Government, and the Ministry of Defence in particular, who were also trying to understand this context and its implications for the armed forces (Mäder, 2004).
In British Military Doctrine between 1989-1996, the military presented a new concept to counter post-Cold War period threats: The Manoeuvrist Approach, which emphasizes the importance of operational speed and dominance in the domain of military technologies. This new approach could be used as a way to start all sorts of operations; after the enemy was beaten, the military could focus for instance on reconstruction and stabilization. The main focus, however, was still on defeating the enemy instead of creating conditions for stabilization; concepts like peacekeeping were not mentioned in doctrines (Thornton, 2007). In 1996, The Peace Support Operations Doctrine was determined. Within this doctrine, the military paid attention to all domains of conducting operations in the post Cold-War period, including diplomatic and
humanitarian aspects (Bloemendaal & De Bruine, 2007). Besides mentioning Counterinsurgency (COIN) and state building as a way to react against non-traditional threats, this doctrine emphasises the importance of advanced technological means. Although the military was on the right track regarding the adaptation of their doctrines, there was still one problem: a lack, or absence, of synergy between the different services and with foreign policy documents (Mäder, 2004).
Doctrinal adaptation: the 21st century and beyond
To achieve synergy, which was seen as a critical condition for success, the Ministry of Defence decided in 2000 to establish the JDCC (UK Government, 2014). In 2001 the first Joint Doctrine (JDP) was published, but it did not show many connections to new sorts of conducting operations. Although it is mentioned in the chapters on the strategic environment that military and non-military capabilities should be integrated to achieve end-goals, the focus of conducting operations was still on winning battles. Indeed, the Manoeuvrist Approach was at the heart of the doctrine (Ministry of Defence, 2001). After 9/11, an additional chapter for the Security and Defence Review was published. In this chapter, more emphasis had been put on conducting various operations simultaneously, like combat activities against terrorists and state building (Boyce, 2002).
Since the publication of the 2003 White Paper significant changes in doctrinal adaptation have been made. In the 2004 JDP (Ministry of Defence) the importance of Effect Based operations is endorsed, in which all operations must be planned around the strategic effects. The strategic effects that are mentioned regarding non-traditional threats are preventing and stabilization of conflicts all over the world. In order to achieve these effects, it is stated in the JDP that military, economic and political elements should be integrated in every operation. All these aspects show strong similarities with the indicators for doctrinal adaptation. The role of technological superiority, however, is not endorsed within the 2004 JDP. In 2008 (Ministry of Defence) the JDCC published a revised version of the JDP. This document shows that the armed forces have made significant progress in conceptualizing EBO’s and how they are connected to the comprehensive approach. It also offers frameworks for planning operations in which military and non-military components are combined. As opposed to the 2004 JDP, the importance of technological superiority is highlighted in the 2008 version. Moreover, an
additional JDP was published in 2008 in which the enabling role of C4ISR in reacting against both traditional and non-traditional threats was emphasized: the JDP 6-00 Communications and Information Systems Support to Joint Operations (Ministry of
Defence, 2008). In this doctrine frameworks are offered that shows how commanders can integrate C4ISR technologies in the planning and conducting of operations in order to achieve the strategic end-goal. Based upon the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and establishment of the American FM 3-24 COIN Field Manual, the JDCC was also involved in the publication of a COIN doctrine for the UK armed forces: The British Army
Field Manual Volume 1, part 10, Counterinsurgency. In this doctrine the Clear-Hold-Build
principle is endorsed as main framework for conducting COIN operations. The role of civil-military interactions lies at the heart of this doctrine. Also the enabling role of C4ISR is mentioned as a key element for commanders in their planning framework. Based op on the analysis and the indicators mentioned in chapter two, it can be stated that UK military doctrines are adapted to non-traditional threats. The updated version of the 2008 JDP has been published in 2014 and largely corresponds with the previous version. Because 2014 fits not within the timeframe of this research, it will be left outside of the analysis.
EBO Comprehensive Approach Importance Technology JDP 2001 + - - JDP 2004 + + - JDP 2008 + 600 + + + (Additional doctrine for COIN) AFM 1-10 + + +
Figure 2: Adaptation of UK military doctrine1
1 ‘+’ means aspect is integrated into doctrine, ‘-‘ means aspect is not integrated into doctrine.
The Views of the Political Elite Regarding the Reshape of Foreign Policy and Military Doctrine
To determine if, and in what ways the political elite reached consensus on the establishment of the 2003 Whitepaper, as well as the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security
Review, the Governmental debates about these documents must be analysed. After all,
both documents served as the basis for doctrinal development. The debates of the British Parliament (House of Commons) must also be included in the analysis to get a complete insight into the role of the political elite. The emphasize will be on meetings and reports of the Defence Committee, because they are appointed by the House of Commons to examine policy issues (UK Parliament, 2014).
Before the analysis will be presented, a few words must be spent on describing the different players in the establishment of the abovementioned policy documents, as well as their responsibilities. Defence issues are of the concern of the whole Government, with a leading role for the Prime-Minister and the Defence Secretary. As a general remark, it must be emphasized that most of the decisions regarding defence policy are made under the “umbrella of national security” in which there seems to be a general form of consensus among the political elite: they endorse the necessity to conduct an active foreign policy with forces that are adapted to the strategic environment (Smith, 2013). Moreover, the role of the House of Commons is limited in influencing defence policy. They do have the right to evaluate the documents, ask the Government for elucidation and can offer suggestions for improvement, but the parliamentarians are not involved in establishing policy and cannot disapprove it (UK Parliament, 2014).
2003: Delivering Security in a Changing World – Defence White Paper
With the 9/11 attacks in mind, the 2003 Defence White Paper was written. Within the establishing process, little to no debate took place within the British Government. From political analyses, based upon interviews, it appears that Tony Blair, then Prime-Minster, worked closely with a small group of intimates in the creation of the policy document. Although a large part of the members of the Government were involved, they shared the opinion the UK should pursue an active foreign policy in which the armed forces must play a dominant role. In other words, the geostrategic context led to the
