BURDENSOME
DISCOURSE:
ON THE INCLUSION OF RELIGIOUS
PARTICIPANTS IN HABERMAS’S NEW
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Jan J. Werkman 1027425
Supervisor: prof. dr. J.P. Wils Date: 29-06-2020
Thesis for obtaining a “Master of arts” degree in philosophy Radboud University Nijmegen
I hereby declare and assure that I, Jan Werkman, have drafted this thesis independently, that no other sources and/or means other than those mentioned have been used and that the passages of which the text content or meaning originates in other works – including electronic media – have been identified and the sources clearly stated. Place: Beekbergen, Netherlands. Date: 29-06-2020.
ABSTRACT
In this paper, the author discusses Jürgen Habermas’s new thought experiment about the place of religion in the public sphere. The thought experiment is placed in the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere. Thorough analysis shows the valuable insights offered by Habermas in the thought experiment, as well as several issues with the burdens placed on the shoulders of religious participants. The author argues that proper inclusion of religious participants is still lacking, even though the translation proviso is shown to hold much potential. The author also gives several suggestions for further research.
I
How would you react when a politician held a Bible in hand in political discussion, and proclaimed that some policy has to be endorsed because God says so? And what if it is a Koran instead of a Bible? What if a strong lobby was pushing policies based solely on religious convictions? Such examples will probably make you uneasy. Perhaps you think such reasoning is unsuited for politics. Perhaps you think that this manner of argumentation does not suit a society consisting of individuals who disagree on important things such as God, the good and the good life. In recent decades, the amount of straightforward religious contributions to political debate has declined.1 The place of religion in
the public sphere is questioned, both in political practice and in political philosophical theory. The main task of philosophy regarding this ‘problem’ is to think of how the presence of religion in the public sphere can be combined with liberal democracy. Many philosophers, therefore, have tried to find the requirements living together in a pluralistic, democratic society poses on citizens.2
Even though these requirements cannot be easily determined, it is vital that philosophers try to find ideas that bring us closer to an answer. Properly giving religion a place in the public sphere requires an idea of what these requirements 1 For an extensive overview of this development in the Netherlands, see Meijering (2012). 2 Just to name a few philosophers who have: Wolterstorff (1997), Lafont (2009), Geertsema (2010), Carson (2012), and March (2015). In the remainder of this paper these and others will be discussed in more detail.
entail. The complexity of the problem is causes by the fact that there is not a solution that maximizes all desired values: “This conflict is the dilemma, and it is a genuine one. Various theorist respond to it in various ways; every proposal sacrifices something of value” (Greenawalt, 1994, 670). The complexity of the debate supports the need for thorough analysis of new contributions, which is what I do in this paper. In his most recent contribution to the debate, Auch eine
Geschichte der Philosophie (2019), Jürgen Habermas introduces a thought
experiment to determine the burdens of secular reason upon participants in public discourse. With the thought experiment, Habermas tries to improve his earlier ideas, such as the translation proviso, as well as critique Rawls’s Political
Liberalism (1993). Many philosophers agree that there should be some limitation
to religion in the public sphere, even though most agree that there should still be room for religious citizens to participate. Habermas tries to provide ample room for religious participants to contribute, but the question remains to what extent he manages to do so in this thought experiment. For that reason, this paper answers the following question: How does Habermas manage to include religious citizens
in public discourse in his new thought experiment?
Answering this question requires thorough analysis of the thought experiment, and the ideas that are expressed in it. Focus is put on the burdens placed on (non-)religious participants. However, I first give a short overview of the current debate in which Habermas places this thought experiment, with therein special attention for Rawls, Habermas main opponent, and Habermas’s own earlier contributions. Section IV is a thorough analysis of the thought experiment, highlighting the different elements and ideas present in this text. Followingly, I discuss six questions related to the position of religion in the public sphere. These six questions structure the discussion of the thought experiment. Based on these questions, the main question is answered in the conclusion.
This paper is relevant to more than just philosophical debates. The evaluation of Habermas’s ideas provides valuable insight on how to, in political practice, place religion in the public sphere. For instance, how limited should politicians be in expressing themselves using religious arguments? How do we
understand the common language we use to deliberate? Moreover, this paper also places Habermas’s thought experiment in the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere, thereby providing handles for further research.
Before we begin, it must be noted that Auch eine Geschichte der
Philosophie (2019) has not been translated at the moment of writing this paper.
That means that any translation of the original German text is my own. For that reason, the footnotes will include the original German. Another point to mention is the disagreement about the meaning of the concepts Habermas uses. Habermas is not entirely clear about the meaning of certain concepts himself. Therefore, when using terms like ‘religious’, ‘secular’, ‘reason’, ‘discourse’, and so on, I refer to the same meaning Habermas uses, unless I mention explicitly that I use the concept differently (such as in question 1 of section V).
II
The debate about the place of religion in the public sphere has lasted for several centuries, and can, for instance, already be found in the writings of John Locke (2004 [1789]). Locke argues for a separation of church and state, for the benefit of both. Locke has inspired many since to find a similar way of keeping the (unresolvable) conflicts of religion out of the public sphere. Key notions in these attempts are tolerance, neutrality and inclusion. However, there is always the danger that a so-called ‘tolerant’ solution is not actually tolerant, and that a supposedly ‘neutral’ attempt is not entirely neutral. This is argued by D.A. Carson, who claims that too much tolerance can become intolerant, and promoting neutrality can become repression of difference. Ideas and thoughts should not be repressed before coming into discussion, whatever religious nature they may have (2012, 43). This statement stands as a clear warning against an overly excessive confidence in the power of tolerance and neutrality. Let’s take a closer look at the debate and how it has developed in recent years.
There are several key concepts in this discussion, each of which brings their own complexity to the problem. For instance, there is significant disagreement about what ‘religious reasons’ precisely are, and when a reason is
religious and when it is not. Taylor states that there is no clear difference between religious and nonreligious reasons in political matters (2011, 37). Talisse (2015, 64-5) qualifies religious reasons as external reasons3, while Ben-Zvi (2018, 711-2)
argues that religious reasons are not subjectable to debate. Cooke (2006, 200-1) and March (2015, 100-1) point to the variation there is within religious reasons. It is clear that there is no consensus about what religious reasons exactly are.
Another example is ‘secularisation’. Where some, such as Weber4,
consider secularisation to be a process of declining religion, Habermas clearly states that it is not a zero-sum game, but a process in which religious and secular views are reconciled in common sense (2009, 132-6). Taylor, on the other hand, states that secularisation means a change of framework rather than a decline of religion: there is not less religion, it is just considered less normal (2016[2007], 42-57; 675).
Deliberative democracy is another key concept about which there is continuous debate. Rawls’s and Habermas’s views have been considered parts of the tradition of deliberative democracy in one sense or another (Bächtiger et al., 2018, 15; Floridia, 2018, 48; Rummens, 2018, 140). Deliberative democracy is considered desirable since it guarantees inclusion and deliberation within a pluralistic community, something Habermas is particularly striving for (Moon, 1995, 159). Special attention is given to minorities and their inclusion in the deliberative processes (Deveaux, 2018, 160; March & Steinmetz, 2018, 208). Even though religious participants are majorities in some Western countries, they can still be considered minorities sometimes due to the prominence of secular reason in the public sphere. Therefore, the goal of an inclusive deliberative democracy is closely connected to the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere.
In addition to these concepts, the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere overlaps at various points with the debate about the neutrality of the state. To explore this entire debate here would take up too much space, but there 3 Talisse based this idea on Williams (1981, 103-113).
are three considerations I wish to highlight which are relevant for the discussion of Habermas’s thought experiment. The first is that state neutrality is an important value for the stability and legitimacy of the state. Stability is guaranteed by not favouring one or another community over another, which would create unnecessary tensions and possibilities for unrest or revolution. This point is made by many, such as Habermas (2009, 201) and Taylor (2011, 51). Legitimacy is a result of the fact that in a neutral state, all citizens can be equally considered co-authors of the laws that govern them. Neutrality in that sense can be considered the normative foundation of the constitutional state (Wils, 2011, 225). The second consideration is that neutrality does not equal secularity. Above, I already stated that Habermas is not entirely clear in his usage of these terms. I will discuss this in more detail later (section V, question 1). For now it suffices to point to Wils (2011, 202), who states that even though secularisation has aided the development of the principle of neutrality, it concerns both religious and secular convictions. Neutrality is a characteristic of a state that gives due regard to all relevant and legitimate perspectives (Al-Na’im, 2015, 254). The third consideration about neutrality is the fact that absolute neutrality is contrary to liberal ideals. As Huster (2004, 27) rightly points out, absolute state neutrality causes a state to be relativistic and without content, leaving citizens subject to the whims of a majority. There is always a normative core required to secure the freedom of individuals. Huster calls this type of neutrality selective (2004, 27) 5. The fact that
liberal democracy needs a non-neutral or selectively neutral normative core is also pointed out by Trigg (2007, 164), who argues for a Christian core, and Neal (2015, 147), who points to reasonableness and reciprocity. The relation of neutrality to the debate about the place of religion in the public sphere becomes clear in the disagreement about whether allowing religion in the public sphere is beneficial to neutrality or not. Limiting the role of religion in public discourse is considered to be beneficial to state neutrality by Habermas (2009, 199; 2011, 23-5 His exact wordings are: “Selbstverständlich ist staatliche Neutralität immer eine selektive Neutralität, die sich nicht auf die Regeln des friedlichen und gerechten Zusammenlebens bezieht, sondern allein auf die Lebensformen, die die Bürger innerhalb dieses Rahmens verwirklichen.” (Huster, 2004, 27)
4), while it is considered harmful by others (Wolterstorff, 1997, 70; Taylor, 2011, 50; Al-Na’im, 2015).
III
The ‘problem’ at hand is a pluralism of (religious) worldviews in modern societies. People who disagree on God, the good and the good life, are meant to live together. In democracy, living together also means making decisions about justice and right. Differences in worldviews challenge the possibility of consensus in such matters. Reconciling democracy and deliberation with inclusion and freedom of religion has proven to be a difficult task. There are several solutions offered by political philosophy, of which I will discuss the four most prominent. Focus lies on the contributions by Rawls and Habermas, since they have been most influential on the thought experiment.
First, one could claim that religion is the foundation of democracy. Several authors have argued as such. Pope Benedict XVI states that religion is needed to check reason in order to secure morality (García, 2010, 93). Overlooking the necessity of a pre-political, moral foundation endangers equality, democracy and freedom (Jonkers, 2015, 222). Roger Trigg states that denying Christianity its place in the public sphere is to kill democracy itself (2007, 6; 87). Religious traditions hold too much wisdom to be excluded from political discussion (Trigg, 2007, 36; Jonkers, 2015, 225). The main problem with this approach is that it neglects the major differences that exist between religions: both Trigg and pope Benedict argue for a Christian foundation of democracy, not necessarily a
religious one. Even though they consider Christianity inclusive (Jonkers, 2015,
235; Ratzinger, 2004, 80-1), exclusion is present even before democracy itself is founded. It is good that they argue that religious voices should be heard, but the exclusive nature of this view threatens the same values it is said to support.
Other philosophers argue for convergence or conjecture in the public sphere. This means that all involved agree on the policies themselves, rather than the reasons for that policy. Discarding an ideal of a universal language, deliberation is opened up for arguments based on people’s own convictions. There
are several variations of this idea. Lafont proposes an ‘accountability proviso’, which states that people must be willing to explain to fellow citizens how their deepest convictions are compatible with the democratic commitments of equality and freedom (Lafont, 2009, 132; 2014, 54). Jakobsen and Fjørtoft (2018, 147) state that participants only have to provide proper political reasons when asked to do so. Eberle (2015, 41-2) shows that convergence is possible when policies can be justified to religious participants as religious participants, while Schwartzmann (2015, 159) states that convergence requires arguing based on the presuppositions of the other. Vallier (2016, 7-8) takes yet another stance, claiming that reasons need not be accepted by all, but should be recognizable by all to be accepted by the one proposing the reason. However, there are several problems with such approaches. The problem with all of these solutions of convergence or conjecture is that none of them really solve the problem of religion in the public sphere: rather, they reject the standard of general acceptability (Schwartzmann, Vallier), still impose significant restrictions (Lafont, Jakobsen & Fjørtoft), or end up with possible lasting disagreement (Eberle6).
In A Theory of Justice (1999a [1971]), Rawls introduces the original position and the veil of ignorance to support his concept of a just society. The first implies a free and open debate based on equality and inclusion, the second secures the absence of self-favouritism. In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls adjust this idea to account for the significant differences between citizens that exist in modern societies. In a just society that is stable for the right reasons, participants cannot use conflict-ridden comprehensive doctrines in debates about basic political principles: public reason does not include arguments based on comprehensive doctrines (1999b, 140). As Cohen states: “Advancing claims about truth is, then, needlessly divisive: it undermines public reason and conflicts with the equal standing in public, political argument that democracy promises” (2009, 11). Public reason implies that we can reasonable expect others to accept the arguments we use, which is not the case with arguments based on sectarian 6 Eberle recognized this point himself: “[L]iberalism cannot survive the convergence conception of justified coercion. Judged before the bar of that conception, all manner of commitments that are crucial to a liberal democracy lack legitimacy” (2015, 45).
presuppositions. The use of public reason will lead to an overlapping consensus. Religious participants are allowed to contribute arguments based on their comprehensive doctrine, provided that, in due course, they provide proper public reasons (Rawls, 1999b, 152).
There are, however, still significant limitations upon religious participants, perhaps even more than secular participants. Even though the limitation to public reason is a consequence of the duty of civility (Rawls, 1993, 253), it is often criticized. Lafont (2007, 242-5) argues that Rawls asks of religious citizens to split themselves in a religious and a secular part. Talisse (2015, 54) argues that Rawls never considers religious reasons as viable admissions to the public sphere, even with the proviso. According to Wolterstorff (1997, 79), Rawls is outright arbitrary in excluding religious reasons, since he offers little support in his statement that religious reasons are incompatible with a society stable for the right reasons. Vallier (2012, 162) agrees that the restraints on religious contributions are unnecessary for political liberalism. Ebels-Duggan (2010, 67) argues that the obligation to use public reason is unfounded, especially in matters involving great values. In other words, there are limits to the demands public reason can place upon citizens. A major point of critique, as well, is offered by Habermas7, which
we will discuss now.
Habermas states that there is value in allowing religious reasons in the public sphere because of the truths they hold (2009, 154). For Habermas, it is important that citizens consider themselves co-authors of the laws by which they are governed. Discourse serves as the means through which to reach understanding and consensus, since it is built upon a rational, communicative use of language (Finlayson, 2005, 34; Love, 1995, 53; 121). Discourse supports legitimacy and democratic decision-making, since it rationalizes and democratizes public reason (Warren, 1995, 171; 235-7). Democratic discourse thereby becomes the means by which the conflicts of religious and cultural pluralism are resolved (Habermas, 2008[2005], 257) by securing private authority and social rights 7 See for a more extensive discussion of the debate between Rawls and Habermas: Finlayson (2019).
(Habermas, 1989[1962], 229). Habermas, therefore, tries to include as many participants in public discourse as possible. However, at the same time, not all reasons can be allowed in public discourse since some would make deliberation impossible. Therefore, he proposes the translation proviso: it is the responsibility of both religious and non-religious participants to translate religious reasons into secular reasons, before using them in the public sphere. This requires reflection on one’s own religious reasons and the commitment one makes to a secular, democratic society (Habermas, 2009, 153-4; Moon, 1995, 158). Habermas recognizes that there might not be consensus on all matters (2009, 203), yet states clearly that secular reason is the most viable opportunity for consensus.
The problem with the translation proviso, is that religious reasons are only valued as upstarts for secular reasons: they are not valued in themselves. Moreover, religious reasons that cannot be translated are not allowed in public discourse. The possibility of translation is important, but many, such as Butler (in Mendieta & Vanantwerpen, 2011, 112), Lafont (2009, 134-5) and Ben-Zvi (2018), doubt this possibility. Another point of critique is that Habermas uses the, quite problematic, distinction between religious and non-religious participants.8
The translation proviso and the religious/non-religious distinction are discussed in further detail in section V.
IV
The thought experiment: Habermas’s introduction
Habermas’s thought experiment is designed to identify the demands a universal, secular way of thinking places on citizens in society (1259). As introduction to the
thought experiment, Habermas identifies three developments that define the context of intercultural discourse (127). The first is an individualising and rationalising pressure emanating from capitalist economy and bureaucratic state systems: people increasingly understand themselves as rational individuals rather 8 Rawls, for instance, uses the distinctions of comprehensive doctrines/public reason and reasonable/unreasonable. Both are less problematic than Habermas’s religious/non-religious distinction.
than as participants in cultural or religious traditions10. The second development is
a fallible, mundane knowing (fehlbares mundanes Wissen, 127) becoming dominant through political, economic and scientific discourses. The third development is a growing realization of an enduring pluralism of worldviews, creating alternatives for even the most closed-off communities.
Habermas uses these three developments to place intercultural discourse in a situation in which worldviews are challenged by individuals and rival worldviews. For intercultural discourse to succeed, which means that it must provide fertile ground for a constitution of right, there is need for a reformation of civilizations through which they lose their cultural-religious ‘stamp’
(religiös-kulturelle Prägung, 128). The cognitive potential of civilizations needs to be used
in such a way that the civilization is open to a secular, free-standing legitimation of right. This secular and free-standing legitimation of right places demands upon religious and secular citizens, and at the same time it makes it possible to make a universal claim to right, rather than a particular claim embedded in a certain worldview.
The thought experiment: the first stage
Habermas, after placing the experiment in its context, creates two stages in the thought experiment. In the first stage, only religious parties participate in intercultural discourse: non-religious parties are added in the second stage. Note that Habermas uses parties, or representatives of communities, as subjects in the intercultural discourse. This is because, as he stated earlier, cultural groups form the background for morality (Finlayson, 2005, 97): it is as members of a community that we come to learn, understand and practice morality. By using two stages in the thought experiment, Habermas tries to identify more sharply the differences between secularity in the weak sense (weak-secularity) and in the strong sense (strong-secularity). The first stage is focussed on this weak-secularity and the burden it places upon religious participants.
Properly participating in discourse in this first stage requires that one is capable of hypothetically letting go of one’s background convictions (Hintergrundüberzeugungen, 128). This means that one must be capable to discern between arguments based on particular beliefs and arguments that can be supported by multiple belief systems. The latter extend across cultural communities and enable a legitimation of right based on different worldviews. These reasons are assigned a different status: the first cannot be used in public intercultural discourse, the second can11. As Habermas (128-9) quotes McCarthy
(2006, 96):
All participants (…) naturally consider the possibility to question their proposed considerations and values, to take a critical distance towards inherited traditions and roles, and to challenge ascribed individual or group identities.12
Participants are asked to use only arguments that have a viable equivalent in other religions. Moreover, all participants are required to accept the possibility of questioning their own deepest convictions. These demands are often met without too much effort: when talking with others, we know we cannot convince them of something unless we use arguments they can understand and relate to.
When this demand is met, there arises a possibility of reaching a legitimation of right based on an intersection (Schnittmenge, 129) of various religious worldviews. Without focussing on religious dissensus, participants look over the walls of their own religious community to engage in discourse with others. An agreement based on common denominators is possible only in the first stage of the thought experiment. Weak-secularity, then, means that used arguments are supported by various worldviews, each for their own particular reasons. Weak-secularity demands parties to be open to the possibility of questioning their own convictions, to discern arguments that can be used in
11 See for a further exploration of this requirement of intellectual modesty Leland & Van Wietmarschen (2012).
12 The following quote is stated in Habermas’s tekst: “[S]ämtliche Teilnehmer (…) nehmen ganz selbstverständlich die Möglichkeit in Anspruch, vorgetragene Überzeugungen und Werte argumentativ in Frage zu stellen, eine kritische Distanz zu geerbten Traditionen und Rollen einzunehmen und die zugeschriebenen individuellen oder gruppenbezogenen Identitäten anzufechten.”
intercultural discourse from arguments that cannot, and to limit themselves to the former when engaged in public discourse.
According to Habermas, Rawls proposes weak-secularity with his idea of an overlapping consensus. In Habermas’s reading of Political Liberalism Rawls proposed to forego a strong-secularity and limit ourselves, when presented with ‘reasonable pluralism’13, to weak-secularity. This is not enough for Habermas: it is
solely a possibility when there are only religious participants. In the next stage, Habermas tries to identify why strong-secularity is needed and what its demands are; thereby inherently criticizing Rawls for failing to properly address the significant differences which exist between religious and secular participants.
The thought experiment: the second stage
The second stage of the thought experiment introduces atheists and agnostics, posing additional challenges for intercultural discourse. In the first stage, there was no disagreement about the validity of religious claims as such, since they were used by all participants. The criterion for proper argumentation was the ability to relate to other worldviews (Anschlussfähigkeit, 131), but now a free-standing, autonomous reason is required (einer Vernunft, die sich als autonom
versteht, 131). This burdens participants additionally with grounding the
legitimation of right on an independent reason rather than their own worldview. It is the acceptance of this fact that poses the real challenge: “The recognition of secular grounds as a self-supporting justification of the foundations of political justice poses a challenge for the religious side”14 (131). Strong-secularity is not
just differentiated from religious thinking, but disconnected from it (132). Strong-secularity places several burdens upon participants. Religious participants are required to evaluate and reconstruct their own background beliefs
13 As Rawls (1993, xxxvi, note 3) describes it: “[T]he fact that a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal condition of democratic culture given its free institutions.”
14 Original German: “Die Anerkennung säkularer Gründe als einer selbsttragenden Rechtfertigung für Grundsätze der politischen Gerechtigkeit stellt für die religiöse Seite eine Herausforderung dar.”
if they are incompatible with autonomous, secular reason.15 Non-religious citizens
are required to consider religions and religious participants not as remnants of an archaic past.16 In other words, secular participants should not dismiss the
contribution of religious participants simply because they are religious. The complementary burdens of secular reason can be summarized as the need for mutual recognition of ‘the other’ as reasonable subject (vernünftige Subjekte, 132). Mutual recognition is a prerequisite of a learning attitude: we must be willing to discern the values and truths in the contributions of others.17
This leads to the translation proviso: participation of religious participants in intercultural discourse requires translation of their religiously embedded contributions. Religious citizens should not be refused access to the public sphere, and all participants have a responsibility to make this possible.18 ‘Translation’ of
religious ideas refers to the examination of religious contributions for truths that can be expressed in secular language as well. Such statements meet the requirements of strong-secularity. Even though it is a vital element of Habermas’s thought experiment, his discussion of the process of translation is inexplicit. For strong-secularity to have any chance as an independent foundation of right there cannot be too high restrictions on the participation of religious citizens. The translation proviso should secure that the restrictions are not too high.
Although there is sparse clarification on translation in this text, Habermas does mention the important role of theologians, religious experts and philosophers to explain and reconstruct religious background beliefs to enable religious citizens to participate in secular discourse without cognitive dissonance. At the same time the participants themselves have a task to adapt to the ‘new’ discursive context: it is the practice of individuals that shows whether the reconstruction has succeeded.19 Non-religious citizens have a task to understand ‘their’ secular 15 A point Habermas made earlier as well, see Habermas (2008, 262).
16 The same point can be found in Habermas (2009, 161).
17 For an earlier statement of this same idea, see Habermas (2009, 211-2). See also Greenawalt (1994, 688) for how such a learning attitude can overcome doctrinal differences in political practice.
18 See also Habermas (2009, 203-4). 19 See also Habermas (2009, 160).
reason not as exclusive, and to allow religious participants to contribute to the discourse. In that sense, both religious participants and secular participants have a responsibility to try and work towards each other. This is what makes discourse possible.
The thought experiment: Habermas’s conclusion
Habermas ends the thought experiment with a short reflection on the possibility of an intercultural discourse and its culture-specificness. Considering the first, Habermas refers to extensive research by himself and by others that show how people from various religious and secular backgrounds have, over long periods of time, already made the constraints of public discourse their own. In earlier texts, Habermas already explained the transformation of religions into common sense (see for instance 2009, 140). Such developments provide hope that the demands of strong-secularity can be met.20 Considering the second point, Habermas states that
there are significant similarities in the cognitive learning processes of different civilizations which can be seen as evidence of a similar ‘modern’ way of thinking. In an earlier text, Habermas has already argued for a recognition of the various sources of modernity that exist worldwide (2009, 116). Of course, there still remain differences, but according to Habermas, these differences are to be worked away at the stage of discourse: “It are these cultural differences that have to be worked away in intercultural discourse”21 (135).
V
The analysis of the previous section makes it possible to further discuss the thought experiment. Answering all possible questions goes beyond the scope of this paper, and therefore I have limited myself to six questions. These are the following:
20 Habermas was more doubtful earlier (2009, 165-7). This suggest that further research into the possibilities of intercultural discourse have changed his views on this topic.
21 Original German: “Es sind diese kulturellen Differenzen, die in interkulturellen Diskursen abgearbeitet werden müssten.”
1) How does the religious/secular distinction affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
2) How does the translation proviso affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
3) To what extent is the thought experiment counter-factual?
4) What are the implications of the complementary burdens of discursive reason?
5) How does the requirement to reconstruct background beliefs affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
6) What is added to the thought experiment by the inclusion of the first stage?
I will discuss these questions in order.
1) How does the religious/secular distinction affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
The religious/secular distinction is an important premise of the thought experiment. Since modern societies contain both religious and non-religious citizens, Habermas seems to align the thought experiment with empirical evidence using this terminology. Moreover, this distinction highlights the differences present in society by showing the greatest difference regarding worldviews. However, other categorizations are possible, such as Rawls’s public reason/comprehensive doctrine distinction. Since Habermas identifies secular reason as a vital element of discourse, the difference in familiarity with secular reason supports the use of the religious/secular distinction. This familiarity with secularity affects the demands of strong-secularity, and using this distinction will show how.
It is understandable that Habermas does not mention the vast differences between religious citizens in the scope of this thought experiment, since precise differences are to be worked out at a later stage. Non-religious citizens, however, are all considered to be using secular reason, even though the vast differences between non-religious citizens might suggest otherwise. An utilitarian, for
instance, might be inclined to use some of his utilitarian presuppositions in public discourse, even though doing so neglects the boundaries of that discourse. Wils (2011, 225) states that Habermas uses ‘secular’ to mean worldview-neutral, while he also uses ‘secular’ to mean religion-free, even though worldview-neutral and religion-free are different things. Perhaps some non-religious participants should experience a similar threshold to enter public discourse as religious participants.
Habermas’s thought experiment offers room for improvement, such as transforming secular reason into neutral reason. This would give the thought experiment better empirical support. The idea of possible neutral reason has been stated by many, among whom Geertsema (2010, 146). However, Geertsema and likewise authors often do not explain what this neutral language would look like. Therefore, additional research is needed to explore the possibilities of neutral reason.
The fact that Habermas uses secular reason creates another problem that is less easily solved. The specific mentioning of atheists and agnostics does not eliminate the suggestion that Habermas is defending a secular society. And despite the many statements Habermas made about the value of religion, a society governed by secular (i.e religion-free) reason indicates a special status for religion: it is the only type of worldview to be initially eliminated from public discourse. The consequence is that religious participants always have to meet requirements to be allowed into public discourse, while non-religious participants do not share this burden. No matter how equally demanding you make the burdens of discursive reason, no matter how much you would wish to ‘include’ religious citizens, religious participants are not naturally allowed into public discourse. Religious parties become foreigners that require integration, unlike inherent parts of society. A democratic theory that values equality and inclusion challenges itself greatly by starting off on unequal footing. Replacing ‘secular’ with ‘neutral’ does not fully eliminate this problem, since the demands of reason stay mostly similar. Habermas uses ‘secular’ because this eliminates the presence of religion in public reason. The moments that religious participants may participate as religious
participants are when secular reason is suspended, rather than extended. Naming
it neutral reason does not change the secular nature of this reason.
A solution towards this problem would be to eliminate the crucial difference between religious and non-religious participants altogether. This eliminates the differences between various categories of participants, thereby making the thought experiment less functional in showing the different demands of intercultural discourse. However, this would also avoid giving some participants ‘home advantage’. Moreover, it creates opportunities to consider similarities between religious and non-religious participants, for instance with regard to the requirement to bracket (parts of) their background beliefs.
2) How does the translation proviso affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
Habermas also revisited his idea of translation of religious contributions in the thought experiment:
Not a trivial consequence of the mutual respect offered in discourse is the openness for themes and contributions, that should not be excluded as irrational from further discussion simply because of their religious language and origin. These must also be tested for a possible heuristic value and for potential contents of truth; possibly they can be translated and grounded in a secular language22 (132).
I have already pointed out the shortage of further remarks on this process of translation. There are, however, several elements that can be discerned from these few lines.
The first thing that one notices in these few lines, is that Habermas is inexplicit about on whose shoulders the responsibility for translation rests. Without a doubt, religious participants have a responsibility to evaluate their own beliefs in light of secular reason, which would probably include some sort of translation. However, the introduction of the translation proviso is preceded by sentences dedicated to the burdens of secular participants. According to Habermas 22 Original German: “Eine nichttriviale Folge des in Diskurs gebotenen gegenseitigen Respekts ist die Offenheit für Themen und Beiträge, die nicht schon aufgrund ihrer religiösen Sprache und Herkunft als irrational von der weiteren Diskussion ausgeschlossen werden dürfen. Auch diese müssen auf einen möglichen heuristischen Wert und potentiellen Wahrheitsgehalt geprüft werden; gegebenenfalls können sie dann in eine säkulare Sprache übersetzt und begründet werden.”
it is the responsibility of secular citizens to recognize the possibility of truth in religious contributions and to try to learn from these contributions. Therefore, it would be safe to assume that both religious participants and secular participants have a responsibility to attempt to translate religious contributions.
Habermas does not give much clarification on the process of translation. He states that religious contributions need to be tested (geprüft) on their heuristic value and truth-content (132). In other words, religious contributions are analysed to discern ideas that are constructive to the discourse. There is little insight how this truth-content is found. How do we know we have found possible, constructive truth in a religious contribution? Habermas might be unspecific for a reason: proper introduction of religious contributions in discourse remains a constant search for truth, which can only succeed if all parties involved have an open, learning attitude towards each other. The idea of translation rests on sufficient respect between participants of discourse.
The possibility of translation, however, should not be left open to doubt. If translation is not possible, the translation proviso becomes futile, eliminating a significant possibility for religious citizens to participate in public discourse. The possibility of translation is, therefore, not something to be decided later in the deliberative process.
There are several philosophers who doubt the possibility of translation of religious ideas directly or indirectly. Taylor, for instance, doubts the possibility of translation towards a neutral or secular language, however valuable the act of trying to translate in itself may be (in Mendieta & Vanantwerpen, 2011, 116-7). Walhof (2013), Talisse (2015) and Ben-Zvi (2018) all argue that religious reasons are too unique to be fully translated, either because religion is itself inherently political (Walhof), because religious reasons are often external reasons whose structure is unsuited for admittance to public discourse (Talisse), or because religious reasons are not open to debate and discussion (Ben-Zvi).
There are also those that state that translation might be possible. Cooke (2006), for instance, states that, although there are limitations to translation, some types of religious reasons are more open to translation than others. March (2015)
states that religious reasons can be translated or perhaps completely allowed when they do not rely on authority or are not exclusive. Translation might be possible, thus, for some religious reasons, while others are too ‘remote’ from secular discourse to be properly translated. Given the disagreement that exist between academics about the possibility of translation, Habermas should provide additional arguments on why he believes translation to be possible.
Conclusively, the translation proviso is a strong addition to Habermas’s thought experiment, giving opportunities for religious participants to engage in discourse, and enlightening discourse with religious truths in the process. However, translation might not always work. There is a minimum requirement of respect between participants, and a widespread willingness to learn is needed. Moreover, only by understanding the diffuseness of religious reasons can the limits to translation be identified. Finally, all parties involved need to be aware that foregoing translation, either by not allowing religious arguments access to public discourse, or by allowing them access untranslated, might damage the inclusiveness of the deliberative process. Therefore, all parties also need to be aware that they must strive for the highest possible level of translation for the sake of justice. Given these prerequisites, however, translation should be pursued as a powerful mechanism for inclusion of religious participants in public discourse.
3) To what extent is the thought experiment counter-factual? Every additional requirement for proper discourse decreases its plausibility. A learning attitude is already a heavier burden than mutual respect. Trying to convince others comes more naturally than trying to learn from them. This poses a problem for Habermas’s thought experiment, since it should be applicable in modern societies: the thought experiment is not created as a free-standing philosophical exercise. Without proper discourse, there is no possibility within Habermas’s political philosophy to reach legitimacy.
Habermas uses empirical evidence at various points in the thought experiment. Examples are the developments in the introduction to the thought experiment, and the similarities in worldview development in the conclusion (127;
134). However, Habermas also mentions obstacles to the realization of discourse. For instance, Habermas states freedom of religion and recognition of pluralism are not supported by all religions. Religious communities are, therefore, still in need of reflexive reconstruction (127). The greatest obstacle to reflection is an unmoving collective self-understanding (unbewegliches kollektives
Selbstverständnis, 128). This obstacle forms a warning: many people
(unconsciously) have an unmoving collective self-understanding, which causes the realization of proper discourse to be a challenging task.
Habermas elaborates on this when he talks about the development of forming multiple modernities through widespread reflection on our worldviews. This development enables a free-standing and secular legitimation of right, but Habermas calls it a counter-factual assumption (kontrafaktischen Annahme, 128). This does not mean it is impossible, but it directs our attention to the many instances where this development does not occur. Braeckman (2009, 292) argues that the rise of militant nationalism and religious fundamentalism in Western democracies is partly caused by religion’s power of symbolic community institution, a power Habermas has overlooked. Other examples are racism, sexism, homophobia and political polarization: realization of discourse faces vast obstacles. The presence of such obstacles challenges the feasibility of Habermas’s thought experiment.
This critique does overlook an important aspect of Habermas’s political philosophy: answers to questions of justice can be found only through discourse. This suggests that the thought experiment, despite its mild idealism, might be the most realistic concept we have to conceive of proper discourse. Habermas’s political philosophy leads to that conclusion. And if the thought experiment is our best option, there is plenty of potential, however high the obstacles may be. Even without Habermas’s premises the thought experiment can serve as a spot on the horizon. Further research might give additional insight on the next steps to take. Such research includes searching for ways to organize discourse. Habermas does not propose a clear-cut philosophical theory ready for implementation, but a theory that requires much effort in its development and realization. And
remember, democratic legitimacy is derived from the degree of deliberation and inclusion in the discourse, which suggests gradual progress.
There are two ways in which the thought experiment improves upon earlier texts with regards to feasibility. Habermas is clearer about the status of his ideas, marking them as a thought experiment (Gedankenexperiment, 126), rather than a description of a factual situation. This difference points to the progress that is needed for realization. Habermas also supports his claims that discourse is possible with a more elaborate reference to empirical data and historical research. Especially the final part of the thought experiment gives us an insight into the developments of different worldviews, something Habermas works out in tremendous detail in the rest of Auch Eine Geschichte der Philosophie.
4) What are the implications of the complementary burdens of discursive reason?
The thought experiment is aimed at discerning the complementary burdens of discursive reason. In the first lines of the thought experiment Habermas states:
With that we exchange the level of descriptive questions about a fitting image of global modernity, in which the position of world religions is suitable, for philosophical questions to the cognitive requirements, that have to be fulfilled for the success of an intercultural understanding about the norms of living together in a multicultural world community23
(125-6).
These cognitive requirements are the burdens of discursive reason. In earlier writings, whether one considers the burdens upon religious participants unfair or not, there is clear dissimilarity between the burdens of religious and secular participants. Habermas is wary that the burdens are not too heavy, and rightly so.
In this text, Habermas qualifies the burdens of discursive reason as
complementary (133), which means they are different yet form the totality of the
burden (singl.) together. The burden of discursive reason is reflecting on one’s 23 Original German: “Damit wechseln wir von der Ebene der deskriptiven Frage nach einem angemessenen Bild der globalen Moderne, das der Rolle der Weltreligionen gerecht wird, zur philosophischen Frage nach den kognitiven Voraussetzungen, die für das Gelingen einer interkulturellen Verständigung über Normen des Zusammenlebens in einer multikulturellen Weltgesellschaft erfüllt sein müssten.”
worldview and background convictions (129), respecting other participants in the discourse (132), having a learning attitude toward each other (132), being willing to hold discourse open and free (132), and being willing to search for answers to the questions of justice (128). These are not strange requests to make in a philosophical theory that values equality, inclusion and deliberation.
Because the burden is split, there are slight differences to be found. I have already discussed the effort of translation of religious contributions to discourse. Secular participants have to consider ‘their’ secular reason open to contributions from religious participants, and they have to recognize the possible truth value of these religious contributions. Religious participants need to reflect on their worldview and correct it in order to make it compatible with a free-standing, secular legitimation of right. Secular participants hold this responsibility as well, but Habermas considers this burden for them less severe than for religious participants. The burden of reflection will be discussed later. So far, it seems that the burdens of discursive reason are divided somewhat equally and fair.
A closer look at the burdens of translation and reflection changes this image, since these burdens are not equally distributed. This can be most easily illustrated using a thought experiment.
A: Ronda, a religious participant in discourse, wants to contribute using religious
language. So does secular participant Stephen. Stephen, after some personal reflection, makes his contribution to discourse. Ronda and Stephen translate Ronda’s contribution into secular reason, and this contribution is made to the discourse.
This is the ideal outcome of Habermas’s thought experiment. Both Ronda and Stephen can make their contributions to discourse, even though Ronda’s is translated first. The responsibility of translation is carried by both Ronda and Stephen. However, Ronda cannot contribute to discourse the way she wanted to in the first place. Stephen can. To Ronda, it might seem that her contribution is stripped of the most important elements: the religious aspects. This, however, might be something we simply have to accept as a consequence of secular reason. Let’s consider another example.
B: Ronda and Stephen both want to make another contribution to discourse. Stephen,
try to translate Ronda’s contribution into secular reason, but fail to do so. Only very small elements can be properly translated. Only these very small elements are contributed to discourse.
We could call this a sub-optimal outcome of the thought experiment. While Stephen can contribute to discourse, Ronda cannot fully do so. There is no opportunity for sustainable, long-term religious contributions. Short-term contribution is only possible with the prospect of translation, which is not possible in our example. The consequence for Ronda is that she cannot fully contribute to public discourse.
The fairness of this consequence is doubtful, considering the foreignness of religious participants in public discourse. I have already discussed this fact (question 1), but it is even more present here. Habermas’s discourse places religious participants behind a filter: they can speak, but their voice is never completely their own. Secular participants do not share this burden, showing the lack of equality of the burdens. But unequal is not yet unfair.
The burdens are unfair when there is an alternative that places more equal burdens on participants. Two possibilities are worth further researching. For the first possibility, I would like to refer to Cooke (2006): exclusion of religious contributions from public discourse might be unnecessary. Public discourse could survive a more complete inclusion of religious contributions. This implies a revision of other elements of Habermas’s thought experiment. Further research must show whether this is a viable option. The second possibility is using neutral reason instead of secular reason. Even though it does not solve all problems with the thought experiment, neutral reason does place the burden of translation on all participants. Moreover, common sense suggests that neutral reason requires less translation, since neutral reason can be a middle ground between religious and secular language. Therefore, even though Habermas considers the burdens of discursive reason to be unequal but fair, there is sufficient reason to doubt the fairness of the great burden placed upon religious participants.
5) How does the requirement to reconstruct background beliefs affect the place of religion in the public sphere?
In Habermas’s thought experiment participants are required to reconstruct their background convictions to make them compatible with secular reason. Habermas’s early introduction of this aspect shows its importance to discourse:
At best, civilizations can, in the progress of global modernity, transform their original religious-cultural stamp in such a way, that new cognitive potentials are developed and that ‘secular’ convictions are decoupled from worldview-impregnated descriptions and arguments (127-8)24.
Considering the fact that the religious/secular distinction by Habermas is problematic, we should consider ‘religious-cultural stamp’ to include those secular worldviews that are not fully compatible with secular reason. Habermas recognizes that this transformation is not easily done: it is a best case scenario. Empirical evidence shows the lack of such transformations in various cultural groups, suggesting the reconstruction to be a major step to take. Habermas states about this reconstruction:
From now on religious parties are confronted with the truth of statements and reasons, that possibly require a different theological reconstruction of each own background convictions, to prevent the occurrence of cognitive dissonance. With this the path is opened towards a ‘modernisation of religious consciousness’, which is far from self-evident25 (132).
In these lines, Habermas limits reconstruction to religions. Although correction to include all worldviews is possible, keeping it limited to religious participants shows the scope of the demand placed upon their shoulders. Habermas states that the reason for reconstruction is incompatibility between theological background convictions and the truths of secular reason. This means that reconstruction is not
always necessary. Most of the work in the process of reconstruction is done by
24 Original German: “Günstigenfalls können Zivilisationen auf dem Wege in die globale Moderne ihre ursprüngsliche religiös-kulturelle Prägung so transformieren, dass neue kognitive Potentiale entbunden und die >>säkularen<< Überzeugungen von weltanschaulich imprägnierten
Beschreibungen und Argumenten entkoppelt werden.”
25 Original German: “Fortan werden die Religionsparteien mit der Wahrheit van Aussagen und Begründungen konfrontiert, die gegebenenfalls eine andere theologische Rekonstruktion der jeweils eigenen Hintergrundüberzeugungen nötig machen, um das Auftreten kognitiver
Dissonanzen zu vermeiden. Damit öffnet sich der Weg zu einer >>Modernisierung des religiösen Bewusstseins<<, die alles andere als selbstverständlich ist.”
theologians and other religious experts, but only in the practice of individuals true reconstruction can be shown (133). Therefore, reconstruction of one’s background convictions is a task for all religious participants.
The question at hand is whether accepting the possibility of such a reconstruction can be asked of religious participants in a deliberative, radical democracy. To be clear, the possibility of reconstruction goes beyond the responsibility to hypothetically question background convictions, since hypothetical questioning does not mean that when dissonance occurs between one’s beliefs and other beliefs, one has preference over the other. A true learning attitude takes them both in consideration.
Habermas’s requirement goes beyond this. When confronted with a dissonance between the truths of secular reason and one’s background convictions, religious participants have to question only their background convictions. To avoid cognitive dissonance there might be need to reconstruct one’s own background convictions, but not to reconstruct the ‘other’ truths that one is confronted with. Habermas defends this stating that the outcomes of public discourse are also our own because we were included in discourse from the start. And to a certain extent, this claim is supported by the fact that cognitive dissonance requires the other truths to be (partly) ours as well.
However, Habermas states that to recognize secular reason as free-standing and as sufficient to serve as legitimation of right also requires some form of belief-reconstructing. Before discourse can even begin, religious participants have to question only their own background convictions. From the very start of the thought experiment religious participants are asked to put their beliefs subordinate to secular reason. This is not solving cognitive dissonance, but rather eliminating that type of pluralism that could be destructive to discourse itself. However, this also means that the requirements of discourse do not yet apply to this pre-discourse requirement. Where is the respect towards religious participants, when they are asked to consider their own beliefs subordinate? Where is the recognition that there might be truths in religious traditions?
Habermas tries to provide a solution to possible cognitive dissonance, but in doing so, he places an immense demand upon religious participants.
We should realize the fact that solving this problem might not be possible. This places severe problems on the possibility of discourse. It is unclear whether the absence of a dominant form of reason solves this problem; further research is needed to explore this option. All and all, Habermas places an immense burden on religious participants in the thought experiment: they are to subordinate their religious beliefs.
6) What are the implications of the inclusion of the first stage in the thought experiment?
The two-stage structure of the thought experiment raises questions. Habermas introduces the first stage to contrast his ideas with those of John Rawls, equalizing Rawls’s overlapping consensus with the consensus of the first stage. The second stage should be considered a critique of Rawls’s ideas, since it claims to better account for modern societies. The second stage introduces the difference between religious and non-religious participants, which Habermas considers too large to be resolved in the overlapping consensus.
There is a second reason Habermas introduces the first stage of the thought experiment, namely to identify the demands strong-secularity places on (religious) participants. He argues against the notion that the demands of secularity are limited to a learning attitude towards others and the willingness to find answers to the questions of justice based on the largest common denominator. In societies that are divided on matters as important as the value of religion, the demands of secular reason are higher. The first stage serves as a stepping stone to show which additional demands are made in the second stage. It is, therefore, limited to the thought experiment and not necessarily an initial step in eventual realization.
However, there might be considerable problems with the demands placed upon religious participants in the second stage of the thought experiment. For instance, they are asked to subordinate their religious background convictions to the principles of secular reason. Moreover, religious participants receive almost a status of ‘foreignness’ in public discourse. These problems might suggest to
remain at the first stage of the thought experiment. However, the question is whether such a ‘first-stage solution’ is even viable.
The consensus in the first stage of the thought experiment is based on intersecting beliefs that form the common denominator between different religions. This requires that one respects others participants as equal, and does not force one’s beliefs upon others. In that sense, the overlapping consensus requires one to take on the very minimum level of a co-operational attitude. However, when atheists and agnostics are introduced, disagreement about the validity of religious contributions prohibits consensus based on a common denominator. Disagreement about the validity of types of reasons forms an obstacle to discourse even at the level of an ‘overlapping consensus’.
Of course, one may question Habermas’s categorization of religious and non-religious worldviews, and state that there is enough similarity between religious and non-religious participants to build an overlapping consensus on. But this claim requires extensive research to support. At face value, Habermas’s statement that the differences are too great seem supported by empirical data. Since the first stage seems insufficient, we should focus on the second stage and alter the demands of strong-secularity to lighten the burden on religious participants.
VI
All things considering, Habermas’s thought experiment tries to solve the problem of religion in the public sphere in a constructive and realistic manner. The thought experiment urges us to realize that an open, respectful attitude is not self-evident, yet also not enough to sustain proper discourse. Habermas does not go into excruciating detail about the further demands of intercultural discourse, leaving practicalities up to practice. The clearest example of this is the principle of translation, which is mentioned as a responsibility, rather than a complete instruction manual. By using a two-stage structure, Habermas puts the thought experiment in the middle of the debate about religion in the public sphere, criticizing Rawls’s overlapping consensus in the process. The second stage holds
strong demands, but is at the same time best able to account for a society split severely on almost every major issue.
The thought experiment is no final, all-satisfying answer. Unfairness in the burdens of discursive reason is ever present, which shows itself most clearly in the ‘foreignness’ of religious participants. The ambiguous use of ‘secular’ by Habermas is partly accountable for this. Continuous with Habermas’s previous texts, there are considerable demands placed on the shoulders of religious participants. Prioritizing secular reason over one’s own religious convictions is such a demand. As we have seen, this is too much to ask.
The fact that religious participants are overburdened calls for additional research into the possibilities of a neutral reason (as opposed to secular reason). Additional research is also needed to explore the possibilities of introducing religion further in the public sphere, decreasing the threshold for religious participants in the process. However, this research must try to preserve Habermas’s basic structure, since it stands as the current most viable solution for living together despite convictional differences. This additional research is a task for political philosophy, and should be aimed at improving political practice. Habermas’s contribution, for instance, shows the importance of recognizing the non-exclusiveness of secular reason, something that lacks proper realization in political practice in many situations today.
The main question of this paper is: How does Habermas manage to
include religious citizens in public discourse in his new thought experiment? The
answer consists of three elements. Firstly, Habermas clearly states that the degree of inclusiveness of deliberative processes is a sing of the strength of democracy. Inclusion of religious participants is vital, and there are no reasonable grounds for exclusion of religion from public discourse. Secondly, Habermas’s thought experiment is a continuation of his earlier ideas regarding the position of religion in the public sphere. This includes the idea that the better argument should prevail in free and open discourse, even though this idea is not explicitly mentioned in the thought experiment. Thirdly, Habermas’s problematic use of the term ‘secular’ also continues in the thought experiment. This problem causes significant
consequences for the inclusion of religious participants, giving them a status of foreignness. Since inclusion is vital for democracy, democracy itself is damaged by this problematic use of the term secular. This remains a point of attention, and it is a task of political philosophy to try and adjust Habermas’s ideas in such a way that this problem is resolved.
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