Neither Flemish nor Walloon, but Belgian…Again? The Role of Multiculturalism in Upending the Discussion on Belgian National Identity

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Neither Flemish nor Walloon, but Belgian…again? The

Role of Multiculturalism in Upending the Discussion on

Belgian National Identity

Master's Thesis Fedi Mejri 12653551

Graduate School of Social sciences Political Science: International Relations University of Amsterdam

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Mike Medeiros Second Reader: Dr. Floris Vermeulen June 2020

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Abstract:

The successive political impasses which characterize political life in Belgium serve as a constant reminder of the intricacies surrounding the country’s national identity and the continued specter of the end of Belgium as a national entity. The transformation of language-based regional identities in Flanders and Wallonia into sub-state nationalist movements has been a dynamic process, subject to various political and cultural forces and informed by shifting goals that range from outright secessionism to confederation. Language, being the single most important marker of regional identity in Belgium, has long been regarded as the sole raison d’être for Belgian sub-nationalist movements. This began to change by the 1960s with the advent of immigration as a new element in the discussion about national identities in the country. Despite the increasing relevance of immigration-related social change to the discussion of sub-national identity in Belgium, the literatures on both topics have largely tended to ignore each other. This thesis attempts to bring the relationship between these two topics into perspective by asking the question how has sub-state nationalism evolved in Belgium. To answer this question, this paper performed a qualitative content analysis on a collection of Flemish and Walloon political party programs from five key electoral years to see whether the status of language as the main theme of discussion to both sub-nationalist movements declined in favor of the topic of immigration and the policy of multiculturalism. Further, the analysis attempted to test the hypothesis that as a result of the focus on immigration and multiculturalism issues, the Flemish and Walloon sub-nationalist movements are converging around the same discourse and the same goals after a long period of political and ideological differentiation. The process of coding, in combination with insight from the framework of political discourse analysis (PDA), indicate that while the issues of multiculturalism are indeed rising in relevance within political discourse in both regions, language has not been rendered irrelevant; rather, the theme of language has been incorporated into the discussion about immigration and integration. Besides, the analysis also shows that discourse in both regions is indeed converging around a harder line regarding immigration and the focus on promoting integration.

Key words: Nationalism, sub-state nationalism, identity, Immigration, Multiculturalism, language,

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Chapter one: Introduction

On May 3rd, 2018, during a debate in the EU parliament in Brussels, the leader of UKIP Nigel Farage gave a short speech that contained the following:

"Belgium is not a nation.

It is an artificial creation… the truth is there are two different parts of Belgium. They speak two different languages, they dislike each other intensely, there is no national TV station, there is no national newspaper.

Belgium is not a nation! And maybe that is why you are happy to sign up to a higher European level."

Beyond the immediate dismissal of this statement by many MEP's present that day as nothing but another publicity stunt by the staunchly Euro-sceptic and Brexit-supporting UKIP leader, Nigel Farage's verdict on Belgian nationhood is not entirely unusual. Ever since 1830, the year in which the modern Belgian state was established, similar statements that

highlighted the lack of Belgian nationhood and cast doubts about the future unity of the country have been commonplace. Even more significant is the fact that some of these statements have come from key Belgian figures sometimes. Jules Destrée, a prominent French-speaking politician and cultural critic in Belgium, once famously penned a letter to the King of the Belgians Albert I, in 1912. Bluntly titled "Letter to the King on the

Separation of Wallonia and Flanders", the letter is remembered for unequivocally declaring that "in Belgium, there are Walloons and Flemings. There are no Belgians." (van de Craen 2002: 25).

Fast forward more than a century later, Destrée's words seem to be ever more relevant. Amid the successive constitutional crises Belgium has witnessed, the most intense of which was in 2007-2011 when the country set a world record with the most prolonged government formation period in modern times, Belgium earned the label of "the most successful failed state" by international media (The New York Times 2008), (Der Spiegel 2008). The fractious nature of Belgian politics was also visible following the most recent federal elections in 2019 when the government formation process was on course to beat Belgium's own record of 541 days, had the Coronavirus spread not urged Belgian politicians to get behind the minority government of Sophie Wilmès.

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The persistent gridlock that has marked Belgium's political life to such an extent that came to be synonymous to it, is widely explained by the nature of Belgium itself as a political entity built on a compromise between disparate identities steeped in mainly two different languages and the associated cultural traditions that come with them (Dujardin 2015: 26). Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia were brought together as the result of a diplomatic maneuver from the great powers in the 19th century to maintain the balance of power in Europe and create a buffer state to contain then France's expansionist plans (Deprez and Vos 1998: 6). This compromise has existed ever since in the form of a state without nationhood. Notwithstanding the early efforts of forging nationhood for the newly established Belgian state, and the successive political reforms that incrementally transformed Belgium from a unitary state to a federal state with significant devolution of power to the constituent regions, the wedge between the two linguistic communities proved to be difficult to bridge, resulting in a country plagued by a so-called "problème communautaire" (Dunn 1974: 163).

The tensions between the regions in Belgium finds its roots in the linguistic difference between Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia, with the city of Brussels caught in between the interests of both regions (Dunn 1974:144). The end of the Second World War in Belgium marked the start of an ongoing change in Belgian society that added a new dimension to the "older" conflict, which has up to that moment mostly followed

linguistic lines. The advent of an era of post-war reconstruction and economic boom necessitated labor, which was recruited from outside of Europe in a series of labor-treaties. The arrival of guest workers from countries like Turkey and Morocco, although initially perceived as a temporary event aimed at aiding the efforts of post-war reconstruction and filling in labor shortages, eventually became a permanent process of social change and migration that left its mark on Belgian society (Castles 1986:786). Starting from the 1960s onwards, guest workers settled permanently in Belgium, and although politics initially struggled to make sense of the change towards a multi-ethnic, multicultural, and highly diverse society, the reality of multiculturalism was largely accepted by the 1990s.

Thus, by the turn of the 21st century, Belgium has accumulated a plethora of elements that continue to influence its politics and feed the discussion about Belgian identity. The question of forging a national identity for the Belgian state is, as a result, far from being settled.

In this context, a significant number of studies attempted to make sense of the vicissitudes of Belgian nationhood (Deprez and Vos 1998; Grosaru 2018), cultural identity (

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Erk 2005; Lecours 2001; Béland and Lecours 2007) and linguistic situation (Blommaert 1996; Blommaert 2011) on the one hand, and to understand Belgium's transition towards a multiculturalist society and the history of immigration in the country on the other hand (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002; Jacobs 2004; O'Neill 1998; Loobuyck and Franken 2009; Martiniello 2012).

However, the number of studies that that focus on the interaction between the two themes of (sub-state) nationalism and immigration in Belgian politics has remained surprisingly limited, and even the few that did address the topic (Xhardez 2019; Xhardez 2020), did so from the perspective of studying the effects of sub-state nationalism on immigration and integration policies. This thesis aims to explore the relatively understudied relationship between sub-state nationalism and immigration in Belgium by approaching the topic from a different perspective. Instead of studying the effects of nationalism on the integration of immigrants and policy choices regarding multiculturalism, the other side of the discussion will be highlighted. Namely, the effects of immigration-related social change on sub-state nationalism will be studied. To do so, the following research question will guide this study: How has sub-state nationalism evolved in Belgium?

This research question is further broken down into the following sub-questions:

Has the change in Belgian society resulting from multiculturalism led to a shift in the priorities and goals of the sub-nationalist movements, from focusing on language to broader identarian issues?

This first sub-question raises the topic of policy strategy within Belgium's regionalist and sub-nationalist movements. For long, the linguistic divide between French and Dutch speakers galvanized the respective communities and shaped their political demands, defining, in the process, the nature of sub-state nationalisms in Belgium.

However, with the advent of multicultural society, new policy issues like integration, identity, religion, and asylum emerged to challenge the dominance of the theme of linguistic conflict on Belgium's political discussion. This question thus aims to explore whether this development has led to a decline in the status of the linguistic conflict in favor of

immigration-related themes within sub-nationalist political discourse.

The second sub-question addressed in this thesis will be what role does the context of

immigration and integration play in the inter-Belgian identitarian divide?

As such, it follows from the main research question and the first sub-question, and looks at whether the ongoing social change resulting from immigration and the transition

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towards a multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual society offers a way out of Belgium's Flemish-Walloon language conflict, or if it reinforces these sub-nationalist attitudes?

By trying to answer the questions mentioned above, this thesis hopes to contribute to the study of nationalism and multiculturalism. Using Belgium as a case study, the thesis will investigate the effects of multicultural society on sub-state nationalism, to arrive at

conclusions possibly applicable to other western countries presenting the same circumstances and facing the same social challenges. To this end, this thesis will draw on the qualitative content analysis in the form of coding to study the messages, trends, and changes in political discourse across parties in Flanders and Wallonia.

The method of coding, which according to Will Lowe et al., consists of "estimating policy positions from political texts [by coding] words and sentences and then build[ing] policy scales based on the relative frequencies of coded text units" (Lowe et al. 2011: 123), lends itself particularly well to the topic at hand. Studying a topic such as the changing nature of Belgium's sub-state nationalism requires a closer look at the political attitudes of these sub-nationalist movements, and that can best be captured by analyzing their discourse with the help of coding.

In this analysis, qualitative data was sourced from the electoral programs of various political parties in Flanders and Wallonia, and selected based on five electoral years that were particularly significant to the discussion on Belgium's national identity and the topic of immigration accordingly:

1968, just after the establishment of dual bilingualism through the adoption of language legislation in 1963, and around the start of labor migration to Belgium.

1981, in the aftermath of the oil shock and the socio-economic transformation in Belgium.

1991, in the lead up to the adoption of official federalism as the significant step in the process of state reform and the emergence of issues around multiculturalism, Islam, and integration in the west.

2007, following the government formation crisis, which was the most serious in Belgium's modern history, and the intensifying discussion about immigration and multiculturalism in the west triggered by the 9/11 attacks.

And lastly, from the 2019 election, following the most recent political impasse and the ramifications of the 2015-2016 European "refugee crisis".

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The results of the qualitative analysis indicate that despite the increasing relevance of the themes of multiculturalism and immigration to the sub-nationalist movements, the

concern with language issues remains important. Language has been re-integrated in political discourse about multiculturalism, being drawn upon by parties from Flanders in Wallonia in various ways to inform their approach to multiculturalism and integration.

Further, the analysis reveals that following a period of policy and ideological divergence between the two sub-state nationalist movements in Belgium, Flanders and Wallonia are incrementally coalescing again around the same discourse on immigration, with Wallonia adopting various elements of the harder line on immigration long associated with Flanders. It appears that multiculturalism has presented both linguistic entities with a new, common challenge that they set out to face with the same approach and in the same way.

This thesis is divided into six chapters. After this introductory chapter, chapter two provides a literature review that will lay the theoretical framework for key concepts necessary to understand the research question like theories of nationalism and language-based

nationalism. Once the key concepts are explained, the literature review presents the case study, with a political and historical background about the evolution of Belgian nationhood. The second chapter culminates in presenting the effects of immigration and multiculturalism on sub-state nationalism as the gap in the literature this thesis seeks to fill.

The third chapter is devoted to laying out the theoretical framework, namely the sociological theories of migration, and the research design of content analysis and coding. The fourth chapter contains a presentation of the findings. Chapter five will present a discussion of these findings by putting them in context with the help of political discourse analysis. Finally, chapter six will serve as a conclusion by reflecting on the limitations of this thesis and postulating future directions for research in the field.

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Chapter two: Literature review

Theories of nationalism:

Sub-state nationalism is a compound term. It cannot be understood without explaining the concept of nationalism. Despite the omnipresence of this concept within the broader framework of political theory, nationalism as a distinct field of study remained relatively understudied until the mid-1980s, when the writings of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, among others, began to cast a new light on the ideology of nationalism that has exerted a more substantial impact on political theory than is previously acknowledged (Hall 1993: 3).

The only consensus that could so far be concluded from the writings on the topic of nationalism is the fact that no single universal theory of nationalism exists (Hall 1993: 2). The study of nationalism is a complex task, within which competing theories have vied for a place.

Ernest Gellner advanced one of the most influential theories of nationalism. In it he postulated that nationalism is a byproduct of modernity, that is to say, that any deterministic ideas about nationalism do not hold much water in the face of the fact that the awakening of some form a national sentiment was only made possible due to industrialization, economic progress and the advent of modernity. And that this has been the case even in the core

societies of northwestern Europe. Based on this statement, Gellner's definition of nationalism is that "nationalism is a primarily political principle that holds that the political and the national should be congruent." (Gellner 1983: 1). Gellner explains the advent of nationalism as an outcome of industrialization and the rise of modern society. He argues that industrial society necessitated an increase in the scale of communication, which in turn facilitated the homogenization of culture and language (Gellner 1983: 2).

Modernity, in itself, is a context in which the evolution of nationalism takes place. More importantly, Gellner considers nationalism to be a reaction to specific forces that violate the nationalist principle that the political and national should be congruent. The forces that can elicit a national sentiment are mainly three: the first is when the political boundary of a state fails to include all the members of a designated nation. The second is when this

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these cases, the unsettled question of minorities raises issues with the conceptualization of nationalism. The third and perhaps most significant factor that could enable the expression of national sentiment is when the rulers of a political unit and the majority of the ruled do not belong to the same nation. This raises the crucial question of political legitimacy, upon which Max Weber's definition of the state crucially rests, namely that only a state retains the

monopoly of the use of legitimate violence, and only a nation-state can exercise that right on its nationals (Weber 1919: 2).

Writing almost simultaneously to Gellner, and in his seminal work on nationalism, widely considered one of the most comprehensive accounts on the nature and evolution of nationalism, Benedict Anderson stresses that "nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time" (Anderson 2006: 3). By putting forward this idea, both Gellner and Anderson agree on the Weberian conception of nationalism: that legitimacy occurs when the rulers and the ruled belong to the same nationality. However, this is hardly an exhaustive definition of nationalism. Such definition remains challenging to arrive at and has primarily depended on auxiliary concepts: the state and the nation. Eric Hobsbawm defines the state as a coherent territorial unit, bounded by clear frontiers and exercising sovereign, exclusive rule over its citizens, While the definition of the state rests on the concept of legitimacy in the writings of Max Weber (Hobsbawm 1996: 1065). The question of what constitutes a "nation" is much more debated. Gellner argues that both "nations" and "states" are a contingency, resting on each other to gain theoretical traction. However, Gellner treads carefully by emphasizing that by being contingent upon each other, that does not deny the fact that the two concepts emerge separately, to the extent that states emerge without a nation and nations exist without a state (Gellner 1983: 4). The concept of “nation” itself is hotly debated. Nevertheless, the literature has broadly established two ways of defining nationalism: the civic and the ethnic.

Ethnic and civic nationalisms:

Ernst Gellner advances two major ideas about nationalism: the first postulates that people belong to the same nation when they share a "system of ideas, signs, and ways of behaving and communicating", that is to say-a culture. This culture-based conception of nationalism is primordial and rests on ethnicity and language as cornerstones for the nation-state.

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The second view takes a more voluntarist approach, contending that people are of the same nation in so far as they recognize each other as belonging to the same nation (Gellner 1983: 5). The cultural and voluntarist aspects of the concept of "nation" came to be

considered as the groundwork for the distinction between two types of nationalism: ethnic and civic. This distinction is further elaborated in the writings of John Myhill. He built on Gellner's theoretical embedding to distinguish ethnic nationalism, which has a deterministic nature, anchoring it in culture and ethnicity, both pre-determined categories, from civic-based nationalism. For the latter, the voluntary subscription to a set of norms, values, and beliefs is what binds individuals together within a state (Myhill 2006:21).

John A. Hall also corroborates the importance of the dichotomy of ethnic versus civic within the concept of nationalism. He does, however, take issue with the deterministic nature of Myhill's ethnic nationalism. Hall refutes the culturally deterministic interpretations of ethnic nationalism because the influence of nationalist thought, namely that "people should share a culture and be ruled only by someone co-cultural with themselves", seems like a historically established given, while it is not. He finds the force of nationalism, even in its most rigid ethnic form, to be a relatively novel political invention. In reaching this

conclusion, Hall agrees with Anderson's conception of the nation as an "imagined community". In fact, Hall's statement that "there is no firm sociological mooring to the nation, not in language, not in religion and not in ethnicity" (Hall 1993: 4) refutes the major theoretical underpinnings of ethnic nationalism. Both Hall and Anderson are joined in their dismissal of ethnic nationalism by Hobsbawm, who argues that "humans are

multi-dimensional" and that national identity cannot be essentialized according to one category as ethnicity or language (Hobbsbawn 1996: 1067).

André Lecours provides an alternative distinction between the two variants of nationalism. Building on Gellner's argument that nationalism is the outcome of modernity, Lecours develops the premise that the transition from ethnic to civic nationalism occurs as a consequence of the change in socio-economic structure from pre-industrialism to post-industrialism. However, Lecours departs from Gellner's idea by emphasizing that the socio-economic context is not the only determinant of the nature of nationalism, but that the goals of nationalism also play a role in explaining its nature. And so, it follows that nationalist movements with a secessionist orientation often resort to a definition of nationalism based more on cultural markers, as opposed to autonomist movements that often do not (Lecours 2012: 273).

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Sue Wright approaches the dichotomy of ethnic and civic nationalism differently. According to her, there exist two political models of nationalism. The first model could be designated as the "state nation" model. The state as a bureaucratic and institutional apparatus "moulds the population into a cohesive national group." The second model is the nation-state model, which Wright defines as a group whose elites saw themselves as a "cultural and linguistic entity" with a fixed territory (Wright 2004:19).

Despite the differences in the theoretical approaches to the concept of nationalism, the literature agrees that nationalism does not exist in a conceptual vacuum, and that it is always predicated on other elements. Language is one the strongest defining elements of nationalist movements.

Linguistic nationalism and language based-conflict:

The concept of nationalism is always predicated on identity markers, most notably language (Gellner 1983: 74). As the advent of modernity in the form of industrialization and capitalist economy brought about the rapid process of communication and travel, this, in turn, facilitated the reduction of linguistic and dialectal differences between various communities, easing the way for language-based nationalism to take hold in Europe first. In fact, language was taken to be the crucial constitutive element of nationhood (Wright 2004: 8). It has even been argued that "language is not just a marker of identity; it is the marker of identity" (H. Liu 2011: 126). The premise that nation-states that are built on principles other than linguistic and ethnic unity were bound to suffer from structural weakness (Greene 1978 :183), has been the guiding premise in linguistic nationalism theory. John Myhill argues that linguistic nationalist theory mostly follows two models that have dominated the discussion: The first model stresses the idea of "big" language groups, also defined as the "dachsprachen" model of linguistic nationalism. This model is the driving force behind the efforts to standardize various related dialects into one standard language that is conceived to help create a sense of broader national identity. The most prominent example of this form of linguistic nationalism based on "big" languages is the standardization of the German language, which brought together various dialects that were often unintelligible, in order to create a uniform German language and hence lend credence to the idea of a unified German nation (Myhill 2006 :3).

Myhill argues that the model of Dachsprachen of linguistic nationalism and the associated belief in "big" national identities have been historically less successful, as the attempt to impose uniformity and deny linguistic-and, by extension, cultural, difference

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results in stronger sub-nationalist feelings. He considers the relationship between the "constituent groups" of a nationalist project the single most crucial factor in the success or lack thereof of that project. As such, the suppression of minority languages or dialects within the big language, "dachsprachen" model often results in the emergence of communitarian tensions and sub-state nationalism (Myhill 2006 :3). As an alternative, Myhill pushes forward the model of "small" linguistic nationalism, which he calls "Ausbausprachen". This

alternative model, first formulated in the writings of the linguist Heinz Kloss, seeks to replace the homogenizing nature of "big" linguistic nationalism with a smaller scale project of

linguistic, national consolidation, more in connection with a much smaller national aspiration. A prominent example of this model is the various Scandinavian nationalist movements, which, despite the mutual intelligibility between the Scandinavian languages, focused on fostering a smaller sense of national identity in each of the Scandinavian countries rather than promoting a "big" language-based Scandinavian nationality. Myhill stresses that the model of "Ausbausprachen", by virtue of historical records, have had relatively more success in informing projects of national consolidation than other models of language-based nationalism (Myhill 2006: 3).

The discussion about nationalism and the significant role language plays in theoretical conceptions of nationalism is complicated by the question of minorities. The process of immigration has contributed to a renewed debate within the theory of nationalism about belonging and national identification.

Nationalism, migration, and the policies of multiculturalism:

The discussion of nationalist theories is further complicated by the realities of modern societies, where migration has gained an increasing role within the debate on identity and nationalism, particularly in western societies. While the phenomenon of international migration itself is far from being novel, the scale of human movement brought forth by modernity and the fundamental changes in the form of globalization has made international migration weigh heavily on nationalist theory, in as far as it accentuated the problematic aspect of minorities, diasporas and belonging within the nation-state theory. As such, migration presents challenges to nationalist theories on the one hand, and creates new conceptual frameworks for dealing with these unresolved challenges, on the other hand (Swain 2019: 1). Two of the most critical conceptual frames derived from modern international migration are the policy of multiculturalism and integration policies.

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Vijay Mishra defines multiculturalism as a portmanteau term initially referring to the response to changes in migration patterns in former settler-colonial societies, which then evolved into a conscious policy choice in western countries based on promoting the integration of new arrivals while persevering cultural diversity (Mishra 2012: 226). The literature on the topic has established a significant premise on the relationship between multiculturalist policies and nationalism, namely that nationalism is the result of a defensive and restrictive reaction against migration and the associated multiculturalist policies

(Loobuyck and Jacobs 2010: 29). This premise feeds the assumption that nationalists are against multicultural societies and insist instead on cultural assimilation to bypass the

challenges posed by minorities and diversity to the fundamental beliefs of nationalist theory. It becomes evident from this assumption that there exists a strong tension between

nationalism and the model of multiculturalist society, which poses several challenges to the homogenizing forces of nationalism.

Factoring in Sue Wright's argument about the role of elites in constructing national consciousness and her concept of the "state nation" (Wright 2004: 19), the relationship between nationalism and immigration still offers ample space for investigation, particularly in countries where immigration combines with already existing cleavages in national identity like Belgium. The following section presents Belgium as an illustrative case study of the intersection of the questions of sub-state national identity, language and immigration.

Case Study: Belgium:

The genesis of Belgium's national identity: an abortive project?

The development of Belgian national sentiments during the short-lived United Kingdom of the Netherlands was a gradual yet accelerating process. Kas Deprez and Louis Vos explain that up until 1817, demands for Belgian autonomy came mostly from the Belgian clergy, which was preoccupied with reforming the union between Holland and the southern Netherlands to create a looser, personal union instead of a unitary state (Deprez and Vos 1998: 83). The demands of the clergy sought the recognition of the individuality of the Catholic southern provinces in the face of the Dutch protestant tradition of staatskirchentum. Initially, they did not go as far as calling for a break with the north, given the economic interest of the southern provinces in maintaining access to the markets in the Dutch colonies (Deprez and Vos 1998: 36). This economic interest, and however influential, did not prevent

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the continuation of sperate identity formation in the two parts of the United Netherlands. In fact, by this stage, the Dutch and Belgians were politically and culturally living apart, and Belgium had all the hallmarks of a proto-nation (Deprez and Vos 1998: 36). The schism between Belgium and the Netherlands bore all the markings of a religious conflict of interests and seems to be in line with Myhill's view on the evolution of national identity in Europe (Myhill 2006: 183). Myhill stresses that despite the promotion of language as the single most marker of national identity in 19th century Europe, the role of religious affiliation and the older ancestral ideas persisted. He explains that during that era, various national

consolidation projects sought to overcome the denominational difference by promoting a common language as a factor of unity. He compares the United Kingdom of the Netherlands with the German confederation, which also included protestant and Catholic populations and yet managed to maintain its unity through promoting a common German language. The same rationale was hoped to be successful in the Low Countries.

Nevertheless, the union collapsed by 1830 with the start of the Belgian revolution, which resulted in the secession of Belgium and left the Netherlands a rump state. Myhill argues that the Belgian revolution was not only the result of religious tensions that plagued the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, but also the result of the intersection of class interests with language ideology. He explains that the Flemish elite, which thoroughly absorbed French culture and language, used the French language as means to maintain their privileged position vis-à-vis the rest of society, and as such, they resisted the Dutch-led attempts to impose Dutch against the "gallicization of public life", which they perceived as a threat to their status. Accordingly, class interests joined with religious affiliation to lay the groundwork for Belgian nationhood (Myhill 2006: 184).

By the mid-nineteenth century, the establishment of Belgium as a nation-state seemed to be accomplished. The period from the start of the Belgian revolution in 1830, to the late nineteenth century, was marked by cooperation between the two major linguistic

communities, Dutch and French speakers, to establish Belgium as an independent nation, gain its recognition from other countries and consolidate its political, social, economic and cultural institutions. This relatively brief period came to be known as the "unionist" era and was marked by the significant progress in nation-building efforts, to the extent that Belgium's liberal democracy came to be perceived as a model for other European countries to follow (Deprez and Vos 1998: 36).

This period came to a gradual end by the turn of the 20th century, when significant issues surrounding the essence of Belgian nationhood began to emerge. These issues initially

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stemmed from the linguistic situation of the country, yet they gradually morphed into regionalist and sub-nationalist movements due to a variety of factors.

The vicissitudes of Belgium's political system:

Understanding the effects of social change and multiculturalism on Belgium's

regionalist and sub-state nationalist movements starts with a discussion of its political system, which sets it apart from other western nations that are witnessing the same process. Belgium's modern political system is often qualified as a multilayered, complex, federal system

(Beaufays 1988: 63) whereby the country is mainly divided along linguistic lines into various regions and communities which oversee different areas of policy. Regions possess the

Figure one: a map of the ethnic and linguistic composition of Belgium. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica 2020

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legislative and executive power, represented in regional parliaments, while communities have competences in the area of culture, language, and social services (website of the Belgian government 2020).

The vicissitudes of modern Belgium's identity and political evolution could be traced back to the time of the country's independence. The country initially adopted a unitary system marked by the centralization of power in Brussels.

The development of Belgium's complex, multilayered federal system is the

culmination of a long process of state reform and decentralization, and this process is still far from being complete, as discussions about further devolution, confederalization, and looser ties still inform the country's politics.

Accordingly, there exists a Flemish region and community that have been merged, a Brussels-capital region, and a Walloon region. Within the Walloon region, there exists a French-speaking community and a small community for Belgium's German-speaking minority. Brussels-capital falls within the French-speaking community.

Figure two: Administrative divisions in Belgium (Federal, Regions and Communities).

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The emergence of sub-state nationalism in Belgium: The Consolidation of different Flemish and Walloon identities:

The bifurcation of Belgian "nationhood" along linguistic lines was established through the codification of language legislation and a process of state reform, which made sub-state nationalism and regionalism in Belgium almost irrevocable forces (Stephenson 1972: 508).

This was the result of language-based nationalism, particularly the advent of the Flemish movement. The Flemish movement traces back to the cultural awakening of some Flemish nationalists by the late 19th century, who were pejoratively referred to as the "flamingants' by the Francophone elites. These Flemish activists decried the perceived second-class citizenship of Dutch speakers in Belgium, promoted literary and artistic Dutch language production, and pushed for representation in academic and social life, to foster a culturally aware middle class upon which the nationalist cause can rest. Deprez and Vos explain that the Flemish movement had a foundational role for Flemish nationalism, claiming that Belgium's Dutch speakers formed a cohesive "volk" not just with a cultural identity but also with political aspirations (Deprez and Vos 1998: 212).

Karen Shelby argues that the country's period of linguistic peace came to an end by the end of World War One, as the result of the intensification of the Flemish movement and its increased role in Belgian politics (Shelby 2014: 83). The advent of the Flemish movement was to usher in the start of the state reform process, albeit slowly. By the end of World War One, the demands of the Flemish movement crystallized from demanding more language rights towards greater political autonomy for the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium, and the first step towards the dismantling of the unitary system was taken by the limited recognition of Dutch language use in Flanders in certain public domains like the lower courts and education (Nielsen 1980: 80).

Belgium's linguistic divide was exacerbated during both world wars by the

German Flamenpolitik, which sought to exploit the existing cultural and linguistic divide and win Flemish support. Despite the failure of Flamenpolitik and its determinantal effect on the more activist, collaborationist radical wing of the Flemish movement, the end of WWI was a turning point for the Flemish movement and Belgium's political system at large. The front

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movement (frontbeweging) was a Flemish grassroots political movement led by WWI veterans who demanded greater recognition of the Dutch language in Belgium, not only in the army but also in other sectors of public life (Deprez and Vos 1998: 216).The movement quickly became the nucleus of a new Flemish political party, the National Front, whose central message was that the unitary, French-dominated political system in Belgium was untenable and that reform was necessary (Shelby 2014: 84).

Although the process of regional autonomy was set in motion mainly as the result of Flemish activism, the French-speaking community also played a role in state reform. Initially reluctant to accept greater autonomy, the Walloon regional movement focused on economic autonomy, combining socialism with regionalism to gain popular support (van Ginderachter and Leerssen 2012: 238).

Both regionalist movements in Belgium stemmed initially from concerns about language. Prior to the Great War in 1914, Wallonia and Flanders drifted in different directions in the way they dealt with language policy. Wallonia's linguistic situation witnessed the gradual decline of its various romance dialects and convergence around standard French as a marker of Belgian national identity, and by extension, a marker of Belgium's belonging to the influential, international Francophone sphere. The adoption of standard French by Walloons and Francophone Brussels residents was not so much an expression of regional identity or a sign of a Walloon linguistic nationalism, as much as a reflection of a variety of the big language Dachsprachen theory of nationalism (Myhill 2006 :3), whereby a Francophone-led Belgium subscribes to a broader, more influential French-led cultural and political sphere, without adopting an ethnic nationalist element, in keeping with the French civic-based nationalism.

The situation in Flanders was more complicated, as the debate about Flemish identity and the associated linguistic situation was more intense. The Flemish movement's push to assert Dutch language rights in Belgium was accompanied by the task of choosing between "big" or "small" linguistic nationalism. The leaders of the Flemish movements initially could not agree on the question whether Dutch, as spoken in Belgium, should be fostered separately from Dutch spoken in the Netherlands as the primary marker of a distinct Flemish identity, a form of "small," ausbausprachen language nationalism, or whether a unified language should be maintained with the Netherlands. The debate was eventually settled in favor of a linguistic unity with the Netherlands, a form of "big" language nationalism. But just as in Wallonia, the choice for this course of linguistic nationalism was not reflective of collective ethnic identity

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with the Dutch as much as a choice motivated by the need to counterbalance the influence of Francophone speakers in Belgium who have an extended cultural sphere against which a distinct, Flemish language would be able to resist (Deprez and Vos 1998: 212).

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State reform in Belgium and its implications for national identity:

The discussion which ensued highlighted Belgium's cultural and linguistic tensions. Through a process of incremental language legislation, Belgium sought to solve these linguistic tensions. A major step in this direction was taken in 1921 with the adoption of the most radical piece of language legislation: the law on official bilingualism, which effectively transformed Belgium into a bilingual country based on the concept of territoriality, whereby each language would be recognized as the official language in the territory where it is spoken as the majority language. This created a so-called taalgrens (language boundary) between the Dutch-speaking Flanders and French-speaking Wallonia. The taalgrens established the cultural regions but did not solve issues relating to the status of Brussels, a predominantly French-speaking city within Flanders, or some municipalities across this new language boundary which contain significant linguistic minorities. The process of resolving linguistic and cultural tension through language policy continued, with the adoption of provisions on language facilities in the early 1960s, which guaranteed language rights in municipalities where a significant minority is present (Stephenson 1972: 501).

Hence, Linguistic difference in Belgium was dealt with by instituting dual

bilingualism instead of nation-wide bilingualism. This system cannot be divorced from the simultaneous process of state reform, which transformed Belgium from a unitary state to a federal entity with an increasing degree of autonomy for the cultural-linguistic regions. Historians thus consider Belgium's political development a direct result of the language legislation which necessitated political instruments to ensure the effective management of Belgium's complex, language-based issues. The literature points out that the decline in national cohesion is an outcome of the incremental yet steady rise of regional identity thanks to language legislation (Stephenson 1972: 501).

In this context, Stephenson explains that the state initially fostered Belgian identity at a time when cultural difference based on language was secondary to other identity markers such as religion, which was the case not just in Belgium but in Europe as a whole. However, the situation in Belgium during the unitary state period was not just marked by Francophone

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hegemony in language matters only. In fact, and in keeping in line with Wright's theory that language is not merely a marker of identity but is also the single most important instrument in social life, the French-speaking elites in Belgium attempted to ensure that French would remain the social prestige variety. This would guarantee economic, social, and political advantage for French speakers over the majority Dutch-speaking population (Deprez and Vos 1998: 64).

The link between language and socio-economic and political dimensions became evident when the language legislation of the early 1960s was followed by political reform in the 1970s. This reform officially recognized cultural communities based on language,

fulfilling the demand of the Flemish movement for more cultural autonomy, and provided for the establishment of regions, in order to satisfy the demands of the Francophone communities of Wallonia and Brussels and ensure they maintained a form of control over economic

affairs.

One of the major ramifications of the process of state reform is the absence of nation-wide political parties in Belgium. The older parties ceased to exist, and the party system split into two unilingual party systems with the first state reform in the 1970s. The dissolution of nation-wide parties has de-facto rendered all political parties in Belgium regionalist parties catering to territorially and linguistically determined electorate (Deschouwer 2009: 562). In their capacity as representatives of two separate linguistic and cultural communities, political parties in Flanders and Wallonia formulate policies that stem from the regional context, yet at the same time, they are tasked with cooperation at the Federal level.

This situation provides for a complex system of governance, as reconciling different regional interests to form coherent Federal policy is often a challenging task. Policies relating to immigration and multiculturalism are an example of the complexity of policymaking in Belgium.

As of the latest federal elections in 2019, the major political parties in Belgium can be classified according to the linguistic affiliation and political orientation as follows:

On the Flemish side, the Christian Democratic and Flemish party (CD&V) is matched by the Christian Humanist center in Wallonia.

On the leftist side of the spectrum, there are two socialist parties: the Sp.a in Flanders and the SP in Wallonia, and two environmentally inclined parties in the form of Groen in Flanders and Ecolo in Wallonia.

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Two liberal parties represent both regions: Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Ovl) and the Reformist Movement (MR) in Wallonia.

The two regions are equally represented by conservative, and autonomous, right-wing parties in the form of the conservative N-VA (New Flemish Alliance) and the secessionist, far-right Vlaams Belang (VB) on the Flemish side, and the far-right Front National in Wallonia.

From the Flemish-Walloon duality to the centrifugal effects of modern multiculturalism: a new model for Belgian identity?

The complexity of the question of Belgian identity, which is split along linguistic community lines, is further accentuated by social change that has taken place in Europe since the end of World War Two. Belgium, just like several western European countries, witnessed an increase in foreign immigration that has gradually left its mark on Belgian society and the divisions that already exist within it. The study of the impact of immigration on Belgian society must take into account the multi-level aspect of policymaking in Belgium (Adam 2013, Xhardez 2019, Xhardez 2020). The literature establishes the view that in Belgium,

Figure three: The outcome of the Belgian Federal election of 2019. Source: Website of the Belgian government

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Flanders and Wallonia have both pursued different approaches to the question of immigrant integration, resulting in two different conceptions of multiculturalism (Adam 2013). The literature on the impact of immigration since the 1960s on European societies is rife (Ackleson 2005), (Bertossi 2011), (Burgoon 2014), (Feld 2005), (Sandovici et al.

2012). Nevertheless, similar studies are bound to factor in additional aspects when it comes to the case of Belgium (Xhardez 2016: 2). Due to its linguistic division, the debate about immigration in Belgium cannot be studied in single terms, instead, it should be studied in aggregate terms to reflect the separate policy choices and public debates in the Flemish and Walloon regions, and the Brussels capital region (Vangoidsenhoven and Pilet 2015). Hence, the link between immigration and sub-state identity in Belgium is evident.

To understand the workings of the immigration debate on sub-state nationalisms, a discussion of the history of immigration to Belgium is first in due order. It is worth noting that this process of immigration was tightly linked to the trajectory of economic development of the country's regions: already by the end of the 19th century, Wallonia was the economic heartland and suffered labor shortages, which were solved by attracting Italian workers (Barker 2015: 85). By the turn of the 20th century, Wallonia was home to a plethora of migrant organizations like the Italian Societa Dante Alghieri which was founded in 1905 as an interest group defending the right of migrant miners (Barker 2015: 86). By 1946, the signing of the Migration Protocol between Belgium and Italy was achieved mainly by building on the experience of migration from Italy to Wallonia and Brussels. Thus, Wallonia became a host region to an increasing number of migrants much earlier than Flanders.

Historians distinguish between two significant waves of foreign migration to

Belgium: "old" pre-World War two migration which had been almost exclusively European and Catholic, and concentrated mainly in Wallonia, in contrast to the "new" post-War immigration which has been much more diverse, including migrants from Morocco and Turkey (Phalet and Swyngdouw 2003: 2).

In addition to the general shift in the composition of immigrant flows, the reversal of economic fortunes since the 1960s resulted in a change in migration patterns inter-regionally. Phalet and Swyngdouw argue that between the late 1960s and the early 1980s, a brutal transition to a post-industrial economy occurred in Belgium. With the closure of coal mines, the mining and heavy-industry regions of Wallonia declined, precipitating a wave of socio-economic restructuring that was most felt among immigrant communities (Phalet and

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Swyngdouw 2003: 5). Owing to the far-reaching consequences of economic change in Belgium, the settlement of immigrants spread north from the old industrial belt to urban industrial regions in Brussels and Flanders. Moreover, the loss of former heavy industry jobs in Wallonia conditioned the start of immigrant integration in new employment sectors and industries. The authors conclude that the preceding transition from predominantly European immigration to more diverse, non-western flows, combined with the abrupt economic restructuring which resulted in the economic decline of Wallonia and the loss of jobs in the heavy industry sector, resulted in the overall slowing down of the process of integration (Phalet and Swyngdouw 2003: 5).

From the late 1990s onward, the debate on Belgian identity has gained the added dimension of immigration and integration issues, as part of the transition from a national to multicultural state. The fact that the demographics of major cities have changed radically since the 1960s, with Antwerp's population being 38% of foreign background and that of Brussels being of around 62% of foreign background, demonstrated to Belgian politicians, on both sides of the linguistic divide, that Belgium's new reality is no longer one of regional dualism but also of permanent diversity (Petrovic 2012: 6 ).

Immigration policy is further complicated in Belgium by the multi-level character of Belgian politics, which reserves competence on migration policy to the federal level despite immigration and integration being inextricably linked to the broader questions of the local language and sub-national/regional identities within Belgium, and Belgium's two-tier political system.

Régis Danody argues that Belgium's fractured political system, which provides for two separate party systems instead of nation-wide parties, and the absence of a national political culture due to the local nature of media, have led to general inertia in policymaking. The consequences of this inertia are most felt in the topic of immigration and integration. Since the 1980s, the rise of far-right parties like Vlaams Belang in Flanders and the Front National in Wallonia, has come as a radical reaction to the perceived failure of federal politics, not just in the field of immigration but also in questions of decentralization and language issues (Danody 2014: 202).

What sets Belgium apart from several European countries is that pre-existing issues of sub-state nationalism have exacerbated the debate on immigration. Régis Danody sees that far-right regionalist parties combine hard ideology towards immigration with party interests on decentralization and cultural autonomy (Danody 2014: 202).

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The literature concurs that the divided nature of Belgian politics has had the effect of rendering immigration and integration policies responsive rather than proactive (Petrovic 2012: 6 ) and this ad-hoc immigration approach (Petrovic 2012: 7 ) has, in turn, fueled the rise of far-right nationalist parties which adopted identarian and negative standpoints towards minorities and the federal system. This represents the negative effect of Belgium's linguistic and cultural divide on its migration policy.

The literature has established that Belgium's sub-state nationalism and its cultural and linguistic tensions have negatively impacted the integration of immigrants and the creation of a successful multiculturalist model. However, there remains another side to this conclusion that has received much less attention. The effects of immigration and the advent of the policy of multiculturalism on Belgian sub-nationalist identity remains relatively understudied. Therefore, to remedy this gap in the literature, this thesis will investigate the impact of multiculturalism on the classic Flemish and Walloon sub-nationalist movements in order to reach a different perspective on the ongoing discussion of Belgian identity. In this regard, the central research question of "how has sub-state nationalism evolved in Belgium?" will take into consideration the role of increasing social diversity in making Belgium redefine its (sub)national identities.

Chapter Three: Theoretical framework and methodology

Theoretical framework: The sociological theories of immigration

The literature yields several major arguments on the relationship between (sub-state) nationalism and immigration in Belgium. The first and most crucial argument is the absence of a single Belgian model of integration (Martiniello 2003: 230). The codification of

federalism in the Belgian constitution of 1993 has created a devolved, multi-level policymaking process in Belgium, whereby the communities, regions, and federal

government share tasks that often overlap. In the area of immigration and integration policy, this has led to an ad-hoc approach and the absence of coordination between Belgium's constitutive parts (Martiniello 2003: 231). A second premise that relates to the topic of nationalism and immigration in Belgium is that the fractious nature of immigration and integration policy is also a reflection of more profound division between Flanders and

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Wallonia that is not only administrative but also ideological in nature. Building on the discussion as mentioned earlier of the strands of ethnic and civic nationalism, the narrative that Flanders subscribes to culturalist, ethnic nationalism while Wallonia adopts a voluntarist, civic nationalism has become a leitmotiv in studies of immigration and nationalism in a Belgian context. Flanders and Wallonia represent divergent "philosophies of immigration and integration" (Favell 2011: 3). The discourse of Kulturnation in Flanders departs from the focus on linguistic homogeneity to become an expression of the rejection of multiculturalist policy and ethnic diversity as threats to Flemish nationalism. The equivalent discourse of staatsnation in Wallonia is largely a reaction to the Flemish viewpoint and portrays the relationship between immigration and nationalism as one of ideological difference in the conception of national identity across Flanders and Wallonia (Blomaert and Verscheuren 1991, 2).

The ideological difference translates to a policy differentiation in the area of integration policy, between the Flemish insistence on language, culture, norms and values versus the Walloon interest in "social cohesion, inclusion, and the welcoming character of the region." (Xhardez 2019: 9). Scholars have argued that the difference in policy positions between the Francophone and Flemish political parties can be classified under a "liberal-restrictive" binary, whereby, Francophone parties, not involved in a nation-building project, are generally more receptive towards immigration and immigrant integration compared to the restrictive Flemish attitudes (Adam and Jacobs 2014:72 ). These statements contribute to a widely accepted premise in the literature that the difference between Flanders and Wallonia transcends the linguistic difference to include a difference in the sub-national character.

The different conceptions of national identity and immigrant inclusion between Flanders and Wallonia could be explained within the framework of the sociological theories of immigration (Lee 2009: 730).

These theories were elaborated to provide an explanatory niche for the rapid social change resulting from immigration, especially in western countries. In this context, one of the earliest sociological theories of immigration is the assimilation theory, which conceives of immigration as a linear process, irrespective of immigrant group characteristics. Within this theory, the responsibility of adjustment and assimilation falls squarely on the immigrants themselves as they choose to join and participate in a new nation (Lee 2009: 731). In this sense, the theory of assimilation conceives of the nation in terms of a homogenous,

ethnolinguistic kulturnation. This theory has shaped the official discourse of immigration and integration in Flanders since the start of Flemish nation-building efforts. The Flemish

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discourse of assimilation stemmed initially from concerns about the linguistic situation. Immigration, particularly from francophone countries, was seen as a threat to the delicate balance between Flemish and French-speaking communities in Belgium, and not necessarily as a threat on ethnic grounds. However, the adoption of the theory of assimilation in Flemish political discourse is still one of the major arguments used to advance the idea that Flemings are more right-wing and xenophobic compared to French-speakers in Belgium (Billiet et al. 2006: 913).

The conception of national identity in Wallonia has fostered a different outlook on immigrant integration, shaped most notably by the social capital theory. Walloon

"nationalism" has existed in as far as it is a reaction to Flemish nationalism (Brett-Crowther 2013: 168). By this token, it has come to be defined not by what it is, but by what it is not. Michael Brett-Crowther contends that "Walloon identity has never been anything other than work in progress, even in the eyes of those who sought to champion it." (Brett-Crowther 2013: 168). Wallonia's tradition of social democratic governance equally has a bearing on how the region conceives of the place of immigrants in society (van Ginderachter and

Leerssen 2012: 239). The social capital theory of migration, which predominates in Wallonia, postulates that immigrants are to be seen as an added value to the host society, which can make use of their skills to replenish its workforce, and that would reflect positively on society as a whole. Within this theory, cultural assimilation is not the goal; rather, the gradual

integration of immigrants to the values of the host communities occurs with the help of work and social solidarity (Lee 2009: 740).

The adoption of these two different sociological theories of immigration in Flanders and Wallonia is in line with the consensus in the literature that both regions are representative of two variants of nationalist theory (Blommaert and Martiniello 1996: 52).The

assimilationist Flemish approach is reflective of a "closed, ethnic-based definition of belonging, whereas the "open," value-based Walloon approach fits within the tradition of civic nationalism, which largely dismisses language and ethnicity as fixed markers of national identity in favor of shared values and voluntary participation. This opposition has become a "heuristic device" commonly used to understand immigrant integration policies in Belgium (Adam 2013: 521).

Nevertheless, there are indications that the salience of this opposition is coming under increasing pressure with the advent of a new discourse on nationalism and immigration in Belgium. The most recent scholarship on the topic uncovers that Belgian entities, which "have traditionally taken opposing views on immigrant integration policy converged over a

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similar instrument." (Xhardez 2019: 1). This lays the groundwork for the analysis, which will be conducted in this thesis. In order to answer the research question of how has sub-state nationalism evolved in Belgium, as a result of social change brought forth by immigration and multiculturalist policies, two main hypotheses will be put forward and tested. The first

hypothesis is that the advent of multiculturalism led sub-state nationalisms in Belgium to focus more on immigration issues and less on language conflict. This hypothesis draws into

scrutiny the change in the concerns and goals of sub-state nationalist movements in Flanders and Wallonia from purely linguistic issues to broader, identarian, and social concerns. The second hypothesis follows from the first one and postulates that immigration and the

associated social change has led to the convergence of nationalist discourse in Flanders and Wallonia and the reduction of differences between the two movements.

A closer inspection of the data at hand will help establish whether this hypothesis is

correct and, if so, establish the direction of convergence. A particular area of focus will be to check whether increasing multiculturalism is helping Belgium redefine its national identity beyond the classic linguistic divide and the preoccupation with language issues, or if it is entrenching the older divisions and increasing the scale of Belgium's existing problème communautaire.

The methodology of content analysis:

In order to study the effects of multiculturalism on nationalism and regional identity in Belgium, the thesis will focus on how this topic is reflected in political discourse.

Deconstructing electoral programs into codes and matching them with a codebook is the first step towards studying the meaning of these codes and the context of their production. That can be done with the help of Political discourse analysis (PDA) theory, which builds on the belief that meaning production is classified, organized, and interpreted by individuals using pre-existing "schemata of interpretation." In this view, individuals possess frames of

reference as devices of interpretation towards which the production of political discourse is addressed. Therefore, Public policy discourse, and in the case of Belgium discourse about nationalism and multiculturalism, is carefully constructed to amplify whatever existing frames of reference and thus inform public opinion (Zhongdang and Kosicki 2010: 56).

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Political discourse, especially in democratic societies, is generally taken as a good representation of public opinion and the relevant social themes. This is because political activity and the political process involves not just politicians but also citizens as voters, forces of pressure, demonstrators, and dissidents. This results in political discourse being a reflection of the various participants in the political process and the issues highlighted in this discourse being salient social issues (van Dijk 1998: 19 ). However, it remains important to point out that political discourse is equally a significant vehicle for the reproduction of policy issues and not just a reflection of them. With this caveat in mind, the theoretical underpinning of this thesis will be in the field of framing analysis, namely, how politicians frame the topics of migration, multiculturalism, nationalism, and identity in Belgium order to influence citizens and inform their attitudes and voting behavior.

Political discourse theory is generally defined by the belief that any political issue is open to interpretation from a variety of perspectives, all dependent on the way the issue is represented. According to the form of representation, individuals can reorient their

understanding of the topic at hand and form their opinion (Chong and Drukman 2007: 105). In the context of political science, discourse rests on several key concepts, one of these concepts is "frames."

Holli A. Semetko and Patti M. Valkenburg define "frames" as "conceptual tools which individuals rely on to convey, interpret, and evaluate information." Their definition focuses mainly on the processes of "selection, emphasis and exclusion" of concepts and ideas so as to generate issues, and direct public opinion(Semetko and Valkenburg 2000: 96).

The social science scholarship has established two primary uses for the concept of "frames" in political contexts: the first is referred to as the "frames in communication," which refer to words, phrases, and representations that politicians use to relay information about policy issues to their audience.

The second is described as the "frames of thought," or the "individual frames" whereby the audience develops its own understanding of policy issues. This understanding serves as the basis for public attitudes towards policy.

Having established political discourse analysis as the theoretical framework to study the evolution of sub-state nationalism in relation to multiculturalism in Belgium, the next step is to study the political party programs at hand in order to establish the link between theory and data. That will be done using the method of coding.

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In order to study the possible effects of the shift towards multiculturalism on the sub-state nationalist and regionalist movements in Belgium, this thesis relies on the method of content analysis. For this purpose, Election programs from a selection of political parties in Flanders and Wallonia will be coded, focusing on key electoral years, in order to gauge out possible trends in the political goals, discourse, and positions regarding the topic of

multiculturalism and stub-state nationalism of the aforementioned parties.

Content analysis as a method of social science research descends initially from a tradition of journalistic analysis that traces back to the 1930s and 1940s, especially in the United States. At the time, the shifting socio-political climate birthed new forms of mass media, and that, in turn, laid the groundwork for the emergence of new frameworks of inquiry to capture both the ongoing social change and its portrayal in the mass media. In this regard, content analysis was described by Berelson in the 1950s as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of

communication." (Berelson 1952: 18)

The focus on communication in content analysis is paramount, given its early links to journalism and mass media in general. Over the subsequent decades, the method of content analysis was elaborated, and its use further expanded to include other areas of social research. Klaus Krippendorff describes content analysis as a repertoire of methods of research that seek to collect inferences from various forms of communication data, be it verbal, visual, or

symbolic. He defines the method as "a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff 2006: 16). This definition is reflective of the essence of content analysis which is two-fold:

Connect the data/text/matter that is subject to analysis to its context of production, to understand the matter at first stage better, and then extrapolate this understanding to wider settings and social phenomena to reach a bigger picture.

According to Krippendorff, the scientific method of content analysis is preoccupied with five key concepts:

Understanding messages and the predictable effects of (verbal) discourse, surveying the channels of communications and the constraints they may impose on messages, studying the nature of communication itself in as far as the relationship between the sender and receiver is concerned, understanding the nature of systems of communication and moving beyond the limited system of mass media to the interactive systems of internet and social media and lastly, documenting the ongoing shift towards computation which has

Neither Flemish nor Walloon, but Belgian…Again? The Role of Multiculturalism in Upending the Discussion on Belgian National Identity