Faculty of Social and Behavioral Sciences
Graduate School of Child Development and Education
What is student autonomy and can it be
meaningfully quantified?
Research Master Child Development and Education Master Thesis
Chevy van Dorresteijn (11041064)
Supervised by: Prof. Dr. L. Andries van der Ark and Prof Dr. Michael S. Merry June 2020
Voorwoord
Veel onderwijsdoelen die als vanzelfsprekend worden gezien zijn bij nadere beschouwing helemaal niet zo evident. Eén van deze onderwijsdoelen is autonomie. In plaats van een van de quasi-arbitraire definities van autonomie te hanteren, heb ik geprobeerd het idee van autonomie als onderwijsdoel te ontdoen van alle dubbelzinnige, verwarrende ballast, zodat uiteindelijk alleen de kern overbleef. Het resultaat is deze masterthesis, welke het eindproduct is van een persoonlijke strijd die ik de afgelopen maanden gevoerd heb. Geen strijd die mijn progressie belemmerde, maar het soort strijd waarvan ik het idee heb dat het onderwijsveld deze te vaak over het hoofd ziet, of al dan niet bewust uit de weg gaat. Fundamentele onderwijsvragen stellen is als het bevragen van je eigen morele kompas: het kan angstig zijn, en soms zelfs alarmerend, maar het is wel noodzakelijk.
Al vragend vond ik mezelf veelal op twee gedachtes hinken. Zou ik mijn romantische geest moeten volgen, welke (in de woorden van socioloog Max Weber) de ‘onttovering’ van het onderwijsproces schuwt, omdat alles gereduceerd wordt tot een weinig verheffende beoordeling op een schaal van 1 tot 10. Of moet ik luisteren naar de pragmatische statisticus in mij, welke erkent dat een betrouwbare beoordeling van studenten onontbeerlijk is in het hedendaagse onderwijs, omdat je links- of rechtsom toch ergens moet monitoren hoe studenten (en docenten!) presteren. Als er al een winnaar aangewezen moet worden, zou ik niet kunnen zeggen welke kant het kwartje op gevallen is. Ik heb getracht recht te doen aan beide kampen.
Ik had deze zoektocht niet alleen kunnen ondernemen. Ondanks dat dit document een bewijs van mijn autonomie zou moeten voorstellen (in ieder geval volgens de officiële standaarden in het hoger onderwijs), ben ik ontzettend dankbaar voor de wijze woorden van de mensen om mij heen. Allereerst waren daar mijn twee begeleiders: Andries van der Ark en Michael Merry. Een complementair duo dat bereid was mij te begeleiden op deze ietwat eigenzinnige reis. Onze vele (digitale) overleggen waren zeer inspirerend en tilden deze thesis naar een niveau welke ik zelfstandig nooit had kunnen bereiken. Ook ben ik dankbaar voor alle anonieme reviewers die besloten hebben een deel van hun kostbare tijd te besteden aan het geven van zeer welkome feedback.
Tegelijkertijd wil ik mijn medestudenten bedanken. Toen ik in 2011 in Utrecht aan mijn eerste bachelor begon—ik herinner me nog steeds de eerste barbecue—had ik niet kunnen vermoeden dat het
hier zou eindigen. Noch voorzag ik de grote groep van interessante mensen die ik in de loop der jaren heb mogen ontmoeten. Ik heb van ieder jaar intens genoten. Specifiek de laatste twee jaren waren intens, maar intellectueel zeer stimulerend. Wat dat betreft wil ik er één persoon in het bijzonder uitlichten: Steven, al was het maar omdat je dezelfde eigenzinnige humor deelt als ik. Maar in het bijzonder vanwege de vele inspirerende loopjes naar, en praatjes bij de koffieautomaat.
Tenslotte wil ik nog alle vrienden en familie bedanken die, al dan niet tegen wil en dank, menig (filosofische) discussie heeft gevoerd met mij. Met name mijn ouders kunnen ongetwijfeld getuigen van mijn eindeloze voorliefde voor zelfs de meest triviale discussies. Het zou een te lange lijst worden om iedereen op te noemen die mij gemaakt hebben wat ik nu ben, maar jullie weten (hopelijk) wie jullie zijn. Zonder jullie allemaal zou Symphilosophieren erg lastig zijn.
Ik wil dit voorwoord eindigen met een persoonlijke boodschap. Ik denk dat we in onze zoektocht naar controle nooit de middelen het doel mogen laten worden. Uiteindelijk draait het niet om de vraag of we een betrouwbaar cijfer kunnen hangen aan het (semi)kunstmatig opgewekte gedrag van een student, maar om de vraag of de student goed opgeleid is, ongeacht of we dat kunnen en willen meten. Deze thesis is hoofdzakelijk geschreven gegeven de huidige beoordelingspraktijk, maar misschien had Labaree gelijk wanneer hij zei dat de kwantitatieve school de ecologie van het leerklimaat potentieel bedreigd.1 Iets wat Dostojevski ruim anderhalve eeuw geleden al zag:
Want inderdaad, tja, als ze ooit de formule van al onze keuzes en grillen zullen vinden, dat wil zeggen waar die van afhangen, volgens welke wetten ze ontstaan, hoe ze zich verbreiden, waarnaar ze streven in dit en dat geval, enzovoort, dat wil zeggen, een echte wiskundige formule, dan zal de mens misschien wel onmiddellijk ophouden met willen; vast wel.2
En toch, de statisticus in mij zegt dat we het in ieder geval moeten proberen.
1 Labaree, D. F. (2011). The lure of statistics for educational researchers. Educational Theory, 61(6), 621-632.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.2011.00424.x
2 Dostojevski, F. (2020). Ondergrondse notities (G. Cruys, Trans.). Van Oorschot, p. 29. (Original work
Abstract
Student autonomy (i.e., autonomy in an educational setting) is a main aim of modern Western higher education, but it is an ambiguous concept. Current educational practices require educational aims to be quantifiable in a reliable and valid way, yet, existing instruments that have attempted to measure student autonomy have not been able to fully capture the multidimensional nature of the construct. Not being able to adequately measure student autonomy, however, would compromise its practical
usability as an educational aim. In this paper, I held the idea of student autonomy as an aim in higher education up to critical scrutiny concerning whether it can be quantified in a way that is conducive to a meaningful assessment of student autonomy. As of yet no research has directly integrated a
philosophical examination of student autonomy with psychometric questions concerning whether it can be meaningfully quantified. Through an extensive literature review, three conditions were identified—the circumstantial, the epistemological, and the authenticity condition—that reflect the conceptual core of student autonomy. Next, using the principles of facet theory, a tentative
conceptualization was created of student autonomy that comprehended the three conditions. Recommendations were given for future research to empirically test this tentative attempt. The concept of student autonomy should be explored further before a definitive answer can be given to the question whether autonomy can be meaningfully quantified.
Keywords: Student autonomy, educational aims, educational philosophy, facet theory, higher education, psychometric assessment
What is student autonomy and can it be meaningfully quantified?
Autonomy is a versatile concept that colloquially refers to the idea of individuals establishing themselves as authentic, self-governing persons (Feinberg, 1989; Taylor, 2005). To be autonomous implies to remain true to one’s self and to be able to direct one’s life in a way that oneself endorses. In other words, to live a life that is not imposed upon by others. Autonomy as seen from this (liberal) perspective seems like an indisputable—Western—value, if only because the alternative is a totalitarian state where all humans dissolve into a collective mass like heteronomous cogs in a machine. However, the value of autonomy has sparked more controversy when a more concrete interpretation has been given to the conditions of autonomy and how one it can and should developed. It is beyond the scope of this article to conduct a lengthy analysis on the genealogical roots ofautonomy (for such analyses, see for example Feinberg, 1989; Schneewind, 1998), but I will highlight some relevant qualifications concerning what autonomy is, whether autonomy is a valuable feature, and how autonomy can be developed.
First, ontologically, autonomy has been interpreted as, amongst others, an innate personality trait, an instilled skill, and a competence (Benson & Voller, 1997). Moreover, dozens of terms (e.g., independent learning, self-regulated learning, self-directed learning, and self-teaching) have been interchangeably used to refer to autonomy but assume fundamentally different interpretations of autonomy (Candy, 1991). Dworkin (1988) noted that “about the only features held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have” (p. 6). Further, there is a difference between autonomy as a characterization of one’s entire personhood (i.e., to have an autonomous character) and as a local notion that pertains only to a single aspect of one’s life (i.e., being autonomously able to, say, fix a car or grow vegetables).
Second, critics (e.g., Hand, 2006; Schinkel, 2010; Swaine, 2012) have questioned the intrinsic value of autonomy. For example—echoing Dewey’s illustrious question of whether one can ‘grow’ as a criminal (Dewey, 1938)—being autonomous does not guarantee that a person chooses the preferable moral option, nor can any ingenious conception of autonomy rule out the possibility of an autonomous pursuit of a morally dubious career (Double, 1992). Moreover, being autonomous does not guarantee a happy life and there may be many who, in Millean terms, would prefer the satisfied heteronomous pig
over the dissatisfied autonomous human. Thus, more autonomy is not intrinsically desirable and can therefore only serve as a partial ideal at best (Feinberg, 1989).
Yet, the arguments put forward in this article do not rest upon an intrinsically valuable conception of autonomy. Rachels and Ruddick (1989) argued that the value of autonomy should be viewed in light of its constitutive role in giving shape to one’s life. As such, many liberal philosophers (e.g., Aviram & Assor, 2010; Morgan, 1996; Winch, 1999) have championed the importance of autonomy for its instrumental value: “without autonomy-related skills we are easily lost in the moral (and economic) complexity of modernity” (Brighouse, 1998, p. 729). In other words, to thrive in a modern liberal society—as a self-governing individual that is—requires a certain level of autonomy (Raz, 1986). And while being autonomous may not guarantee a happy life, it is a necessary feature for individuals to pursue a life they deem valuable (Taylor, 2017), and it is society’s responsibility to prevent individuals from going morally adrift.
Third, there is divided opinion concerning whether and how autonomy can be developed (Aviram, 1995; Conly, 2013). Autonomy in its literal (Kantian) interpretation means to lay down one’s own law, but the world is not populated by millions of sovereign entities that each independently lay down their own laws (Feinberg, 1989). Individuals can only be seen as parts of interdependent communities and any pragmatic interpretation of autonomy must be in line with this conception. Any development of autonomy can only occur through social interaction with others. The idea of the autonomous person as “the unchosen chooser, the uninfluenced influencer” (Dworkin, 1988, p. 12) is simply an unattainable ideal. Taylor (2005) referred to this as the ab initio problem, where each autonomous state,
paradoxically, can only have originated from an initial heteronomous state.
Consequently, heteronomy and autonomy are no dichotomy, but interlocking concepts. The gist of it is to find an optimum on the continuum between the two extreme states of complete autonomy and complete heteronomy. The optimal degree of autonomy is highly context-dependent and differs per individual. For example, to be completely dependent upon others is a perfectly natural position for a newborn, but generally not for the average adult. All autonomous individuals, ab initio, were once heteronomous beings and developed their autonomy in heteronomous contexts, where educational settings are one of the central places where individuals ought to develop a sense of autonomy.
Autonomy as an aim in (higher) education
About fifty years ago, Dearden (1972a) signaled “a new aim in education” (p. 333) that has since become one of the central aims in modern liberal education (Hand, 2006), and which from this point on shall be referred to as student autonomy (cf. Boud, 1988; Greenbank & Penketh, 2009) to prevent confusion with other types of autonomy (e.g., moral and judicial autonomy). Fundamentally, student autonomy concerns students making decisions and how they support these decisions (Ceylan, 2015; Double, 1992). As such, autonomy in an educational setting pertains to a local aspect of students, viz., to which extent are students able to perform a specific task without external guidance. Put differently, students are autonomous to the degree—and it is very much a degree—to which students are able to make self-supporting decisions in order to complete said task (Garcia & Pintrich, 1996).
Yet, other than that it concerns making decisions, it is far from clear how student autonomy should be interpreted as an aim in higher education (Warnick, 2012). There are questions concerning whether an educational system that values autonomy should be formalized through autonomy-promoting curricula (Callann, 2000) or if autonomy-facilitating curricula suffice (Brighouse, 1998); whether student autonomy actually contains a trans-situational component that could be transferred through education (Candy, 1988; Vermunt & Van Rijswijk, 1988); and if this is the case, whether pedagogical approaches can be developed that effectively guide students towards becoming autonomous. Further, Dearden (1972a) argued that “many do not become so [autonomous] in any significant degree” (p. 345). The first objective is therefore to hold the idea of student autonomy up to critical scrutiny concerning what it actually is that educators should supposedly aim for.
I shall limit myself to the European (liberal) higher education context for three reasons. First, student autonomy is explicitly incorporated in European higher education policies as a prominent aim. For example, it can be found among the Dublin descriptors, where European students who obtain a bachelor degree should “have the learning skills to allow them to continue to study in a manner that may be largely self-directed or autonomous” (Bologna Working Group, 2005, p. 196, emphasis added)3. Second, there is a paradoxical tension where most higher education students are considered
autonomous by law (i.e., are allowed to vote, are legally responsible for their actions etc.) but are not considered autonomous in regard to their institutional learning objectives, which further illustrates that an assessment of student autonomy should always target a specific topic for which the student is expected to meet a prescribed ‘autonomy threshold’. Third, higher education students are close to a phase in life where society expects them to be autonomous, self-governing individuals.
For practical reasons I have not extensively addressed the question whether student autonomy ought to be an aim from a conceptual perspective. Notwithstanding forceful critiques on the use of student autonomy as an aim (e.g., Hand, 2006; Schinkel, 2010; Swaine, 2012), such an exploration is worthy of an independent discussion. Therefore, in the following I assume there to be prima facie reasons that student autonomy ought to be an aim in education, if only because current higher educational policies already treat student autonomy as such. I mainly addressed the desirability of student autonomy as an aim through the issue of whether it can be meaningfully quantified.
And while the quantification of educational aims has been critiqued (e.g., Davis, 1999; Labaree, 2011), current educational practices, for better or for worse, still require aims to be quantified. My aim here was to assess whether autonomy can be meaningfully quantified (i.e., in a way that is conducive to a reliable and valid assessment whether students meet their institutions’ learning objectives). The multidimensional, ambiguous nature of student autonomy challenges a pragmatic assessment of the concept (Barrow & Foreman‐Peck, 2005), perhaps to the extent that the construct defies any form of meaningful measurement at all.
As of yet there has been no valid and reliable instrument that measures student autonomy, which strongly limits the possibility to monitor the development of students (Fazey & Fazey, 2001;
Macaskill & Taylor, 2010). Existing instruments can arguably be labelled as having measured only a limited interpretation of student autonomy, because they only focused on students’ perception of their autonomy. For example, the Needs Assessment Questionnaire (Heckert, et al., 2000) measures the need for autonomy with a strong focus on a lack of (perceived) interference, using items such as ‘I like a career with little supervision’ and ‘I like to be my own boss’. Likewise, the Distance Education Learning Environments Survey (Walker & Fraser, 2005) measures student autonomy only through students’ self-perception of control over their learning process. As a final example, despite
acknowledging the absence of an adequate instrument for measuring autonomy, Fazey and Fazey (2001) used students’ self-perceived motivation, control, and competence only as a proxy for measuring student autonomy. In this regard, the ‘naming fallacy’ is a real concern for existing instruments, because taking the results of a psychometric instrument and calling it student autonomy does not necessarily equate to actually measuring student autonomy (cf. Sijtsma, 2009). The point here is that solely assessing student autonomy upon students’ self-perceived autonomy is likely not a credible source because self-perception may imply self-deception (Callann, 2000; Colburn, 2011).
In an attempt to overcome these difficulties, I have used the approach of facet theory (Guttman, 1954), which was specifically designed to adequately research any behavioral phenomenon (Canter, 1985). Facet theorists attempt to structurally categorize observations of human behavior in a way that a multidimensional construct—such as student autonomy—becomes more tangible, which makes the construct easier to capture in psychometric tests (Hackett, 2014a). Constructs are conceptualized into distinct facets, which are “any set of mutually exclusive categories” (Canter, 1985, p. vi), like gender or modes of expression (e.g., whether a test was taken orally or on paper). The aim of a facet design is to create a reliable and valid assessment that covers the entire range of behavioral expressions that belong to that particular construct.
The development of such an instrument should always start out with getting an accurate conceptual understanding of the behavioral concept one attempts to measure (De Ayala, 2013; Oosterveld et al., 2019). Yet, to my knowledge there is no academic precedent where researchers have attempted to structurally analyze autonomy as an educational aim in a way that was directly related to the question whether student autonomy can be reliably and validly quantified. To address this question, I have used an integrative approach where student autonomy has been reviewed from an abstract philosophical perspective as well as from a more practical psychometric perspective. Few researchers have created such a direct cross-fertilization between educational philosophy and practical psychometric issues (for an exception, see Current & Koetzee, 2014). In short, I identified a conceptual core of student
autonomy, analyzed the potential of the basic features of the conceptual core to be quantified in a meaningful way, and provided recommendations for future research to further explore whether student autonomy can be quantified meaningfully.
As a final remark, I want to emphasize from the outset that some concepts that have been used to outline student autonomy may be considered equally ambiguous. I have attempted to minimize the use of other ambiguous concepts, but was unable to avoid them altogether whilst keeping my arguments clear and apprehensible. It was not helpful either that some concepts have multiple meanings. For example, authenticity can be interpreted as both ‘resembling future practice’ (Gulikers et al., 2008) and ‘being true to one’s self’ (Kreber, 2013). If anything, the inevitability of having to rely on other contested, disparate concepts to interpret student autonomy highlighted how deeply embedded these are in our educational lexicon. Therefore, many practical educational examples are given in order to get a more vivid understanding of what student autonomy is all about. My aim here was not to lay down carefully confined perimeters of the notion of student autonomy; rather, by reasoning through analogy I aimed to instill an incisive, more intuitive understanding of student autonomy, which, in turn, may serve as a start for future researchers who are interested in further exploring the universe of student autonomy.
Three conditions of student autonomy
For the conceptual analysis, based on an extensive literature review, I identified three recurring main themes, which were then converted into conditions that have to be met before students’ behavior can be characterized as (sufficiently) autonomous: (1) a circumstantial condition concerning the degree to which the circumstances have allowed for students to exhibit their autonomy through decision-making; (2) an epistemological condition concerning the degree of knowledge students possessed to ground their decisions; and (3) an authenticity condition concerning the degree to which these decisions can be considered authentic (i.e., the degree to which these decisions were made without internal or external pressure and students have independently reflected on these decisions). In this section, these conditions are described one by one, after which the conceptual relation between these conditions is described in the next section.
Circumstantial condition
The circumstantial condition of student autonomy is the only condition that is external to the student, because it refers to the extent to which the environment allows for a student to make decisions (Hand, 2006). Student autonomy is essentially about making decisions and lacking the possibilities to
actually make decisions renders one’s theoretical autonomy effectively useless because it cannot be effectuated. The circumstantial condition has to be met in order for a student to be able to express its autonomy, but does not suffice for student autonomy because it only pertains to the environment. Hand (2006) rightfully noted that, “it should be quite clear that it is a state of being one cannot confer on a person by educating her” (p. 537, emphasis in original). Creating favorable circumstances is still important, but it is not an educational aim. It may be a pedagogical mean towards an educational end, but never the aim itself. As it is not an assessment of students’ own features, students should not be held responsible for their environment, but it should be taken into account when assessing student autonomy (i.e., it is a covariate).
Some philosophers dismissed the circumstantial condition as a necessary condition for developing autonomy (e.g., Dworkin, 1988). Dworkin considered the case of Odysseus, who ordered his men to tie him to the ship’s mast in order to survive the Sirens’ call. Likewise, any educational setting inevitably limits the possibilities of students to be self-governing: Students are expected to be in class at a specific time, have to meet imposed deadlines, and must stick to the institutional rules. It is an elemental feature of education that students partly lay their faith in their educators’ hands, thereby giving up the freedom the students would otherwise have enjoyed had they not gone to school. Thus, it is argued that a lack of freedom does not necessarily prevent students from becoming autonomous.
Two things are important here. First, I have not aimed to put forward a conception of student autonomy that requires complete freedom; this Kantian conception was dismissed earlier. The conception I intended to put forward requires only a basic level of freedom—and how much freedom suffices is still a point of debate—in order for students to be able to develop and express their autonomy. There is no generic answer what constitutes as the ideal circumstances for students to develop their autonomy for this is highly context-dependent. However, those at the end of the
educational ladder generally are in need of less guidance (i.e., should enjoy more freedom) than those at the beginning of the ladder (Candy, 1988). In short, complete freedom is not necessary, but at least some freedom is.
Second, students, like Odysseus, voluntarily choose to give up their short-term possibilities in order to enjoy the long-term benefits that students expect to gain from higher education (e.g., well-paid jobs
and better career opportunities). Overseeing their options, students relinquish to their institutional policies because they expect it to be conducive to their development. In a way, students voluntarily had the restricting circumstances imposed on themselves (a topic that will be discussed at length in the authenticity condition). Students start off in a very restricted, controlled educational environment and are steadily granted the opportunities to make more self-supportive decisions. Preferably, up to the point where students can kick away the proverbial ladder and stand on their own.
Further, it has to be noted that having less restrictions is not necessarily preferable. A pedagogical approach that educates isolated autodidacts may be just as undesirable as an approach that rests upon students simply doing what they are told. Having too much options can have the paradoxical effect of choice overload (Scheibehenne et al., 2010), which means that some students are reluctant to choose when faced with an overabundance of options, thus in the end possibly compromising their sense of student autonomy. Students should feel they possess the tools needed to make a well-considered decision (Evans & Boucher, 2015). Therefore, like most amorphous concepts, the optimum degree of room for students’ self-initiative is somewhere on a quadratic line.
Epistemological condition
The epistemological condition is another necessary but not sufficient condition and refers to the knowledge students have with respect to the subject for which the student has to proof its autonomy. Students without a basic level of knowledge are ill-equipped to make self-supporting decisions, both outside and within their educational environment (Candy, 1988). Full epistemological independence, on the other hand, is an impossible aim (Chene, 1983); even the greatest of minds will never reach such a state because all humans are inevitably confronted by their limited cognitive capacities and at some point have to rely on others’ knowledge. Equivalent to the level of freedom, there is no obvious answer to the question how much students have to know before the epistemological condition is met. For example, how much knowledge on biological mechanisms should an autonomous psychology student possess (without having to rely on, say, neuroscientists)? Or when do students have sufficient knowledge to autonomously pick a suiting career path after graduation?
Assessing students’ knowledge, however, is a core process in modern education. By no means am I asserting that quantifying knowledge is easy, but educational policy makers already determine which
methods and subjects are essential and specify these in program requirements and course outlines. Subsequently, educators monitor students’ learning process through examinations that are intended to reflect how well students progress with respect to their institutional learning objectives. Therefore, notwithstanding the critique on such educational assessment practices (e.g., Davis, 1999; Labaree, 2011), there does not appear to be an a priori objection to whether an assessment of students’ knowledge could be done, irrespective of whether it should be done. Further, though a discussion on the desirability of current assessment practices is valuable, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, only establishing that students’ knowledge can be assessed still does not offer any practical considerations regarding how to design such an assessment other than that more knowledge is preferable. And although setting ‘knowledge thresholds’ is mainly of practical concern, some generic guidelines can be offered on how to differentiate between levels of knowledge. For example, there is a difference between ready knowledge and knowing where to find information. In the digital era where much information can be found within seconds it may suffice for the autonomous student to only know where and how to obtain certain information, but ready knowledge results in a higher degree of epistemological independence than, ceteris paribus, knowing where to get information. Knowing where to get information is merely a potential capacity to acquire information rather than an actual capacity when having the information readily available.
Further, there is a hierarchical difference between students who are able to learn, apply, or infer a series of decisions (Guttman & Greenbaum, 1998), where a capability for rule-inference renders students, ceteris paribus, more epistemologically autonomous than a capability for rule-appliance. To illustrate this, consider three students who all conduct a statistical analysis. Student A can replicate the steps of the analysis effectively but has no accurate understanding of what these steps entail; student B also understands the steps taken but lacks the ability to apply it to alternative situations; whilst student C is able to infer from the analysis and apply it to other analyses as well. Epistemologically, there is a hierarchy among these three students, where student A is least and student C is most autonomous. In this regard, the three students do not differ in the width, but in the depth of their knowledge.
favorable circumstances to make decisions still do not suffice for student autonomy. For a student’s behavior to be characterized as autonomous, in addition to the observed behavior, the student’s underlying motives should also be taken into account (Dworkin, 1988). Currently, as Dearden (1975) put it, “we may possibly have autos, but without any nomos” (p. 5, emphasis in original).
Authenticity condition
The authenticity condition refers to the degree in which students’ decisions are uninfluenced by others, and to the extent that these decisions can be considered their own (Dworkin, 1976). The general argument is as follows: Let the circumstances be what they are, but I am only autonomous to the extent that I possess “the capacity to raise the question of whether I will identify with or reject the reasons for which I now act” (Dworkin, 1988, p. 15). Not only the actions matter but also the degree to which students endorse these actions. On one end of the spectrum is the authentic student, who “can and does subject his opinions and tastes to rational scrutiny” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 32). On the other end is the inauthentic student, “a habitual and uncritical conformist” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 32). This notion of ‘autonomy as self-determination’ is usually described within self-determination theory (Chirkov, 2009; Ryan & Deci, 2002), where the importance of student autonomy has been emphasized because of the ostensible positive relation between students’ degree of intrinsic motivation and their
educational performances (Froiland & Worrell, 2016; Robbins, et al., 2004).
Closely related to authenticity is the ‘Dworkin-Frankfurt model’ of first-order (‘I desire X’) desires and second-order (‘I desire to desire X’) desires (Dworkin, 1988; Frankfurt, 1971). For example, students who are limited by their educational environment—thus compromising their first-order desire to be self-governing—may still be considered autonomous to the extent that these students voluntarily decided to adhere to the institution’s policy through their second-order desire to be educated. In short, according to this perspective, students are authentic to the degree that their behavior originated from the “deepest, most significant goals, concerns, commitments, and values” (Noggle, 2005, p. 100) the students have come to identify themselves with through second-order reflection.
The idea of first-order and second-order authentic desires separates student autonomy from other dispositions, but is also one of the most contested features of autonomy (Anderson, 2008; Cuypers, 1992; Merry, 2020a). First, the idea of first-order and second-order desires illustrates why autonomy
might be a debatable aim. For example, it can be argued that addictive behavior may still qualify as autonomous if it originated from an authentic endorsement of the addiction (Scoccia, 1990). It is authentic insofar as the addict “could have done otherwise if there had been good and sufficient reason” (Wolf, 1980, p. 159). Yet, an addiction usually hampers one’s ability to make such a
behavioral change, which makes it questionable whether such behavior is truly authentic. In addition, being authentic does not prevent students from making counterproductive decisions, such as not to read the assigned texts when they see no reason to. Consequently, like autonomy, authenticity can also only serve as a partial ideal.
Second, authenticity also suffers from the ab initio problem (Taylor, 2005), where authentication of first-order desires by second-order desires merely shifts the problem to the question how authentic these second-order beliefs are. These second-order beliefs have to be authenticated by third-order beliefs and one quickly sees how this turns into an infinite regression where nth-order desires have to
be authenticated by (n+1)th-order desires. This problem of infinite regression has become a central
critique on the ‘Dworkin-Frankfurt model’ of first-order and second-order desires (Noggle, 2005). Now, irrespective of whether the ab initio problem should be dismissed—and Noggle (2005) provided cogent arguments why maybe it should—it is not an insurmountable problem for the
argument made here. While there may be some truth that all education is self-education to some extent (Dearden, 1972b), students are not educated in a vacuum and it is pointless to envision students developing their authenticity independently of a strongly influential educational context. Once again the question is not whether students can reach an unattainable ideal of being completely authentic, but whether more nuanced differences between students’ authenticity can be reliably detected.
Moreover, authenticity has a strong normative connotation in an educational context. Recognizing that students may authentically pursue a morally dubious career, educators try to socialize—and some might even go as far as to call it indoctrinate—students into a very specific core belief system that educators deem virtuous. In this view, “the concept of authenticity is simply a proxy for the kinds of choices the theorist thinks people should make” (Yuracko, 2003, p. 85). Transcending moral
relativism, educators value certain student characteristics (e.g. critical self-reflection) more than others and the goal of education is for students to endorse the value of these characteristics; students should
‘care about’ them (Frankfurt, 1988).
To be clear, this does not imply that I endorse or promote indoctrinating pedagogical approaches. I am merely implying that when assessing students’ authenticity, it is not relevant how students came to develop their core beliefs. Still, it is an open-ended question whether the mean (i.e., inculcation of a supposedly virtuous belief system) is justified by the end (i.e., endorsement of said belief system). To summarize, in my view a student’s behavior is authentic to the degree that it coincides with the student’s core beliefs and preferences, whilst acknowledging that these beliefs and preferences have most likely been inauthentically inculcated by their (educational) environment.4
Some may still find it a far cry to speak of authenticity when the so-called authenticity is instilled rather than self-generated. Peters (1981) referred to this as the ‘paradox of moral education’, where morality can only be taught by others and “the critical reflection necessary for meaningful assent is possible only after the inculcation has taken place” (Merry, 2020b, p. 115). I am inclined to agree with these critics, but only if we were to maintain the impossibly demanding interpretation of full
authenticity, which I believe we should not. Any interpretation of authenticity should be in line with the acknowledgement that anyone’s core belief system can only have evolved out of interaction with one’s environment. In this view, authenticity is a contingent state that is, and can only be, developed in a social context and should not be interpreted as a construct that in any meaningful way exists outside of students’ social spheres; authenticity is not cultivated, or prevented from cultivation, by external interference. In fact, one’s authentic self is what it is precisely because of the external interference (cf. White, 1972).
Consequently, the central question when assessing students’ authenticity should be whether their behavior is in line with their core belief system, and to which degree. This could prove to be onerous, because students may, knowing that they are assessed on it, feign being autonomous. Standardized tests may suffer from the social desirability bias if students know what answers are expected of them in order to pass the test. In other words, rather than actually being autonomous, students may have
4 Perhaps this is overstretching the meaning of authenticity—also a lurking risk for any conception of
autonomy—and the educational field is in need new terms. However, as of yet there are no well-established alternative terms for the concept of authenticity.
simply predicted the ‘correct’ answers. The fundamental idea of student autonomy breaks apart if students would deliberately act—or pretend to act—in a certain way for the sole reason that they are assessed on it. Therefore, any meaningful assessment of student autonomy should somehow be able to distinguish authentic autonomous behavior from socially desirable behavior in order to judge whether the authenticity condition was truly met.
Mapping student autonomy with a faceted approach
Next, having laid down the conditions of student autonomy, the question arises whether students’ progress towards meeting these conditions can be meaningfully quantified; in a valid and reliable way, that is (cf. Mellenbergh, 2011; Messick, 1994). Facet theory (Guttman, 1954) helped to link these conditions because it “offers a recipe to establish not only the list of ingredients but also the manner in which they go together for any area of research” (Canter, 1985, p. 18). Developing instruments using a faceted approach improves the construct validity by ensuring that the items of an instrument are representative of the construct one attempts to measure (Oosterveld et al., 2019).
The faceted behavioral law of student autonomy
The aim of a facet design is to discern patterns of behavior that, ideally, are consistent to the extent that said behavior could be described as adhering to a behavioral law (Guttman & Greenbaum, 1998; Levy, 1985). Such a behavioral law is different than physical laws like Newton’s laws of motion because not all persons will exhibit the exact same behavior under equal circumstances. Yet, despite human behavior being inherently contradictory to a certain extent, the main aim of a facet design is to define a range of behavioral expressions that are relevant to quantify one’s level of the construct in question. For example, searching for law-like behavioral patterns led to modern-day assessments of complex constructs like intelligence (Guttman & Levy, 1991; Schlesinger & Guttman, 1969).
To systematically search for these law-like patterns, a behavioral construct has to be defined in terms of mutually discriminatory facets, which are variables that divide a construct into distinct classes (Borg, 2005). For example, Guttman & Greenbaum (1998) created a facet design of intelligence that contained facets for modes of expression (e.g., oral or paper-and-pencil tests) and rule tasks (e.g., rule inference or rule application), where oral expression and rule inference are facet elements. Levy (1985, p. 59) summarized the main principle by stating that the task of a facet theorist comprises of assessing
the relevance of the observed behavior in light of measuring a construct, and testing the empirical structure of these observations. Taken together, all facets and their elements should encompass the entire construct’s domain and a facet design should cover all relevant empirical data. Facet designs are the result of many iterative processes during which researchers evaluate whether the defined facets are supported by the empirical data or whether the facet design should be adjusted to better align with the construct’s behavioral domain (Canter, 1985).
Facets generally target a specific class of behavior (see the aforementioned facets of intelligence). As such, I have referred to the conditions of student autonomy rather than the facets of student autonomy, because it may have confused those familiar with the general terminology of facet theory. Yet, researchers are able to adapt a facet design to their own specific needs, however abstract or specific, which gives facet theory its potential to be widely applied in behavioral sciences (Canter, 1983; 1985). Student autonomy is the main construct but the conditions can themselves also be viewed as (complex) constructs. For example, depending on the level of analysis, students’ knowledge can be seen both as a facet (i.e., as constituent of the construct student autonomy) and as a construct in itself (i.e., with different types of knowledge as constituents). The fact that one still ends up with constituent facet elements that need further specification highlights the complexity and multidimensionality of student autonomy.
Four stages of test construction and the mapping sentence
In their taxonomy of test construction5, Oosterveld et al. (2019) distinguished four stages of test
construction: concept analysis, item production, scale construction, and evaluation, where up to this point I have been mainly concerned with the first stage of concept analysis. The next step is to link these conditions via a mapping sentence, which
states a research domain’s contents in terms of its important facets, elements of these facets and connects these facets using everyday language in order to suggest how facets are related to the research domain. (Hackett, 2014b, p. 168)
A mapping sentence is very insightful because it describes a concept’s core and does so in an accessible manner by directly translating the concept to everyday situations. Moreover, a mapping
5 Their taxonomy specifically focused on designing questionnaires but the article contains helpful insights that
sentence forces researchers to consider the construct from a faceted perspective as well as it forces researchers to think of the observations that are needed to assess the comprehensiveness of the facet design (Guttman & Greenbaum, 1998). Canter (1985) noted that a mapping sentence usually is “both the start and the conclusion of a research project” (p. 266) and hence the mapping sentence in Figure 1 should be viewed as no more than an exploratory definitional hypothesis of student autonomy that awaits eventual falsification (cf. Guttman, 1982). Moreover, the facet elements are merely meant as illustrations and not as an exhaustive list. For example, it is unlikely that the degree of reflection (Facet 𝐷𝐷) can be adequately measured using only a single facet element.
Figure 1
Mapping sentence of student autonomy
The extent to which student (𝑥𝑥) has � little
⋮ much�
𝑨𝑨. 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝑎𝑎1 Number of alternatives
𝑎𝑎2 Room for self-initative
to C ir cu ms ta n ti al condi tion
make a choice based on �little⋮ much� 𝑩𝑩. 𝑲𝑲𝑬𝑬𝒆𝒆𝑲𝑲𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑲𝑬𝑬 𝑏𝑏1 Content knowledge 𝑏𝑏2 Methodological knowledge E p is te mo lo g ic al condi tion whilst experiencing � little ⋮ much� 𝑪𝑪. 𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 𝑐𝑐1 Internal pressure 𝑐𝑐2 External pressure
to make this choice and
A u th en tic ity condi tion where (x) has � subserviently ⋮
indepently � 𝑫𝑫. 𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑬𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑬𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬𝑑𝑑1 Reflected upon the desires of (x)
�⎯⎯⎯⎯�
�very low⋮very high� degree of student autonomy
The mapping sentence in Figure 1 spells out that the degree of student autonomy of student (𝑥𝑥) depends on the student’s external environment (𝐴𝐴), knowledge (𝐵𝐵), experienced pressure (𝐶𝐶), and degree of reflection (𝐷𝐷), where each facet is categorized by constituent facet elements (e.g., 𝑎𝑎1 is the first constituent for Facet 𝐴𝐴). Neither the facets nor the constituent elements are in any particular hierarchical order. The facets were put in an order so that mapping sentence is correct semantically and the underlying structure for the facet elements is yet to be established empirically. All facet elements have a response range (e.g., little–much) that corresponds to a score on the continuum of behavioral responses with respect to the facet element one is trying to quantify. For example, the circumstantial condition (Facet 𝐴𝐴) has a range where having more room for self-initiative (𝑎𝑎2) increases the favorability of the circumstances. However, follow-up research should determine how such an element is most adequately measured, be it on a continuous 10-point scale or as a dichotomous pass/fail decision.
As facet designs require positive intercorrelations between asssessments (Guttman & Greenbaum, 1998), an increase in any assessment score coincides with an increase in the construct score. For example, having more alternatives increases the score on student autonomy. Unfortunately, in itself the mapping sentence does not offer much in terms of how these facets are empirically related. There is no a priori way to determine how facets or facet elements are (numerically) related (e.g., is external pressure equally important as internal pressure?), and to my knowledge there is no academic precedent on this topic when it concerns student autonomy. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, having more
autonomy is not necessarily preferable, which makes an assessment of student autonomy a bit different than common assessments where a higher score usually represents a better performance of the student. Consequently, the optimal scores are also yet to be determined.
A mapping sentence also serves as the starting point of the second stage of test construction: item production (Oosterveld et al., 2019). In a facet design, each test item is produced by targeting a combination of one facet element per facet. Cross-multiplying the number of facet elements per facet in Figure 1 yields a total of (2x2x2x1 =) eight combinations, where each unique combination is called a structuple (Canter, 1985). A good test item should focus on one—and only one—structuple. For example, an item may concern a methodological decision, where the degree of student autonomy
depends on: the degree to which the student possessed methodological knowledge (𝑏𝑏2); the degree of external pressure the student felt when making the decision (𝑐𝑐2); the degree to which the student reflected on the decision (𝑑𝑑1); and whilst taking into account the number of alternatives the student had (𝑎𝑎1). The structuple of this example can be written as 𝑎𝑎1𝑏𝑏2𝑐𝑐2𝑑𝑑1. Further, in this illustration, any test that covers the full behavioral range consists of at least eight items, one for each combination6.
Further specification of facet elements is needed beyond what is done in this article in order to cover the entire behavioral range of student autonomy. Both empirical and conceptual follow-up analyses should provide better substantiated insights regarding whether (elements of) facets should be added, removed, or joined; and whether the underlying empirical structure is hierarchical, categorical, or a combination of both. After which the mapping sentence should be modified accordingly in order to create items that better represent the construct of student autonomy.
Discussion
Current practices require an assessment of higher education students’ autonomy, but the wide array of available instruments (e.g., Haerens et al., 2015; Heckert et al., 2000; Walker & Fraser, 2005; Vansteenkiste et al., 2005) highlighted that there is little consensus on what a meaningful assessment of student autonomy should encompass (Fazey & Fazey, 2001). Moreover, philosophical literature on student autonomy has only contained allusive references to the question whether student autonomy can be assessed in a reliable and valid way (Macaskill & Taylor, 2010). However, if no adequate assessment of student autonomy is possible, it would seriously compromise its usefulness as an educational aim (Boud, 1988).
In this article, I initiated a fundamental approach where student autonomy has been methodically examined and construed from the ground up. To assess whether student autonomy is susceptible to meaningful quantification, I have united a philosophical and a psychometric perspective on student autonomy. Only by jointly taking these perspectives into account can an interplay evolve where both conceptual and empirical considerations can be used to meaningfully quantify any multidimensional construct. Such an approach is more fruitful than using instruments that lack the construct validity to
draw substantive inferences (Guttman, 1985). A line of research is envisioned that acknowledges that assessments do not have to be perfect to be useful, whilst also acknowledging that pragmatism does not equate to picking a definition of student autonomy that seems plausible at face value but is easily discarded upon closer inspection.
Consequently, the conceptual analysis of student autonomy as presented in this article has only been the start of many necessary steps in order to create a cross-validated, reliable instrument (Oosterveld et al., 2019), a phase that may never be reached if student autonomy turned out to be too elusive to be meaningfully quantified. The usefulness of this article’s conceptualization of student autonomy in terms of the three conditions should be assessed in future research, and adjusted accordingly. Rather than laying down one particular characterization of student autonomy as
definitive, a facet theorist acknowledges that every attempt to describe a construct in a faceted way is essentially work in progress, even more so in the early (conceptual) stages.
Therefore, to conclude, I have to disappoint readers who at last hoped for a definitive answer to the central question of whether student autonomy can be meaningfully quantified. There were some signs that it may be possible to meaningfully quantify student autonomy (e.g., the epistemological condition seemed already quite aligned with current educational practices), and there are some signs that it will be challenging (e.g., especially the authentic condition may prove to be difficult to operationalize). I can only end—perhaps unsatisfactorily—by stating that more research is needed. This article has been but the start of the disentanglement of the complex construct that is student autonomy; time will tell whether it turned out to be a Gordian knot.
Limitations and recommendations
There has been little consensus on what does and does not constitute as autonomous behavior (Dworkin, 1988; Feinberg, 1989). I have tried to conscientiously synthesize the most eminent (liberal) conceptions of student autonomy, but others may espouse another conceptualization than as put forward in this article. There was bound to be a level of arbitrariness given the tentative nature of this endeavor. I do not see this a weakness, however. A cumulative science requires all research to be conducted in a way that allows for an accumulation of knowledge, and researchers need to align their methods in line with this greater goal, beyond a retrospective amalgamation of studies as is usually
done in meta-analyses (Guttman, 1985). Further, it requires that researchers acknowledge that their results are always based on a specific set of circumstances and hence these results should not be presented as definitive. Instead, results should be left open for other researchers to build upon, as this conceptualization of student autonomy now awaits improvement through the next iteration.
As a recommendation for follow-up research, Oosterveld et al. (2019) provided a good summary of the general process of test construction and how to proceed after the stage of a conceptual analysis. Likewise, Curren and Koetzee (2014) gave an informative overview of both theoretical and empirical considerations when they explored whether virtue—another multidimensional educational aim—can be measured. Further, Canter (1985) provided many practical suggestions how to proceed with the work on a facet design after the initial stages, such as adjusting the mapping sentence, (re)developing psychometric instruments, and conducting empirical data analyses (e.g., smallest space analyses). In my view, these are but a few sensible next steps.
Subsequently, if—and this is still a big if—all of the aforementioned issues can be overcome with respect to meaningful quantification of student autonomy, other questions emerge regarding the use of student autonomy as an aim. For example, pedagogical experts and curriculum developers should concern themselves with the issue how student autonomy measurements ought to be incorporated within school curricula that aspire to deliver autonomous students and whether in fact students can be educated to become autonomous (Candy, 1988). And if this turned out to be the case, morally feasible pedagogical approaches have to be developed that are effective in cultivating student autonomy (e.g., Gurr, 2001).
Further, as a final note, when assessing student autonomy there is an underlying dilemma between relying on professional judgment and using standardized measurements. It resembles the tenacious conflict in education between a desire for control and the need for personal, customized education; between reproducing best practices and recognizing that no students are identical; and between high reproducibility and external validity. For student autonomy, or any of its conditions, it is not at all clear how large the trade-off is between some of these dilemmas and to which end the scale will eventually tip. However, I conjecture that researchers and educational policy makers should remain open to the possibility that the most meaningful assessment may be that of the autonomous judgement
of the educator. Despite the inevitable influence of human bias, in all, it might provide more favorable results than reducing student autonomy to a (battery) of standardized test(s) that fails to fathom the essence of student autonomy.
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