The Paths of Genealogy. The Use of History for Life in Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben.

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The Paths of Genealogy

The Use of History for Life in Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben

Masterthesis at the University for Humanistic Studies

Author: Bram van Boxtel

Tutor: dr. Fernando Suárez Müller

Second Reader: prof.dr. Gert Biesta

Examiner: prof.dr. Laurens ten Kate

Date: 1st of August 2019

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Synopsis

Genealogy is a form of philosophical investigation, that reconstructs the formation of concepts and practices and makes visible the power struggles that shaped them but have become obscured. The genealogical method is mostly associated with Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault but has become common throughout the field of philosophy and beyond. It often functions as a form of ‘negative critique’: it unmasks and problematizes certain notions, without itself making a normative commitment or formulating alternatives. Genealogy as negative critique runs the risk of becoming formulaic and superfluous: once one recognizes that history is filled with struggles for power and concepts have hidden beginnings, there seems little point in further genealogical research. I argue that the

genealogical method has to become affirmative; which is to say, it has to offer some potential solutions rather than merely remaining descriptive. An affirmative genealogy would need some explicit normative orientation, which I argue could be found in the concept of life as developed by Giorgio Agamben.

This thesis attempts to find the uses and limits of genealogy for life, by reconstructing the genealogical path through Nietzsche, Foucault and Agamben, and connecting it to their concepts of life. The concept of life as a normative orientation is present but underdeveloped in Nietzsche; seemingly absent in Foucault and at the centre of Agamben’s genealogy. Each chapter focuses upon one author; within each chapter, I ask what type of genealogy the respective author stands for. In the last chapter, I synthesize the findings in order to further conceptualize affirmative genealogy, one that in the final instant has an ethical orientation. I characterize Nietzsche’s genealogy as ‘agonistic’, Foucault’s as ‘critically descriptive’, and Agamben’s as ‘affirmative’. Further affirmative genealogies need to find a balance between their critical origins and affirmativity: the discovery of life as a normative orientation is a crucial step in this regard.

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Foreword

This thesis is the culmination of my time at the University of Humanistic Studies. As I’m writing the last words within my career as a student, I am overcome by a sense of wonder. I came to this university, having decided not to study philosophy in Nijmegen because I had been told studying philosophy would only lead to loneliness and isolation; I am happy I followed the direction this advice steered me in, but this notion itself couldn’t have been more wrong. I have found like-minded thinkers at the University of Humanistic Studies; I’ve been challenged, inspired, proven wrong. Over the last years, I have been more focused upon working within the university than with finishing my own studies. I am deeply thankful for the chance to simultaneously develop myself as a teacher and avoid the ending of my time as a student. Very little in this world is as satisfying as having a meaningful influence on the development of a student. Before thanking some of those that have touched and influenced me, I have to excuse myself to two significant parties. Firstly to the incredible philosophy faculty at the University of Amsterdam: it was a wonderful experience studying there, but time and money have restricted me in finishing my studies. Secondly, Walter Benjamin: a thinker whose provocative and enigmatic texts have managed to capture my fascination. His reflection upon the Angelus Novus by Paul Klee captures some of the things I never quite managed to express myself. I have included this artwork on the front page. There was no room for Benjamin within this thesis; his absence will be felt throughout the work.

The very first person I would like to thank is Fernando Suárez Müller, who told me in my second year of studying that “all philosophers are angels trying to discover themselves”. Over the years I have had the pleasure of studying with and working for him, he has become more than a teacher, tutor or even inspirational figure; I regard him as my philosophical father. Secondly, Gert Biesta, whose acute comments and insight inspired more confidence than I had dared to hope for. Seldom have I been so impressed by an academic lecture: insightful, critical yet so incredibly friendly and humane. I’ve had the pleasure of being introduced into the academic world by Laurens ten Kate; it seems fitting that he’s the last one to read the culmination of all these years. He has taken up a permanent place in my mind, the voice of critical concern. I’d like to thank Caroline Suransky, who typifies what our university should stand for: the balance between theory and practice, provocative warmth.

Speaking of incredible warmth, I’d like to thank Gerard Linde for the friendship we developed over the years and opening up the airconditioned lecture room when the

temperatures reached 40 degrees. My family, who have always challenged and inspired me to go above and beyond: Lisette and Michel, you have made me who I am, and I am proud to call myself your son. Stefanie de Cuba and Diether Scholten, the friends I made on my very first days at the university and that have remained my closest friends for the entirety of my academic career. What a strange, long trip it has been.

And finally, I’d like to thank my partner Loes Jussen. She has managed to breathe new life into every aspect of my life she has touched. It seems like she has, without once touching a key, managed to write this thesis for me. I trust in the path we have set out upon;

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Chapter 1:

Introduction

1.1 Philosophy and life

Philosophy has always had a strange relation to life. Within Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates urges his students to offer a chicken to Asclepius, suggesting that life is a sickness he was soon to be cured of. His intellectual descendants, like Plato, frame philosophy as opposed to

unexamined living; as a preparation for dying. Kierkegaard famously stated that life could only be understood backwards and lived forwards, reaffirming the contrast between life and thought. What is this strange leitmotif? What is this life of the philosopher, what is life in philosophy? Is this strange relationship the heritage of Socrates’s meditations on death, passed on to his descendants?

This thesis, written at the University for Humanistic Studies, is inspired by the investigation into familial descendance and combines it with an examination of the concept of life. It does this by focusing on the philosophical method of genealogy: a method that does not concretely investigate familial lineage but draws inspiration from it.

In the following paragraphs, I further introduce the concept of genealogy and the way it has been used in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault. This leads to the problem of genealogy as negative critique. I introduce Giorgio Agamben as a philosopher that

exemplifies the possibility for affirmative genealogy, one that goes beyond negative critique. Having done this, I reflect upon the relevance of this research, the methodological approach and guiding questions.

1.1.1 Introduction to Genealogy

Commonly thought of as having found its first clear articulation in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887), genealogy has become an approach shared by a diverse spectrum of academics. It is, at its most minimalistic and blunt definition, a form of

historical-philosophical critique (Saar, 2008). Furthermore, it takes as its object of research that which has commonly been thought of as without history- as natural, necessarily so (Bevir, 2008). This approach is commonly associated with Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, whose debt is explicitly noted in the famous essay Nietzsche, Genealogy and History

(Foucault, 1971). These two philosophers are often characterized as being critical of western humanism and modern subjectivity.

We should, however, be wary to limit genealogy to Foucault and Nietzsche exclusively. Much has been written about the genealogical method; even more genealogical works have been written. Works that focus on genealogy as a method or form of philosophical research emphasize its critical dimension, the ability to dissolute self-evident concepts (Geuss, 2002). It traces the history of concepts and practices, showing the contingencies and crossroads that led up to our present. Genealogical works are characterized by opening up the future by laying bare the multitude of struggles that have marked our past (Given, 2008, p.370). In

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showing the multiplicity in supposed historical unity, it emphasizes contingency; this contingency means things could have very well turned out differently and encourages us to change our institutions, morals, practices and concepts (Krupp, 2008, p.319). Genealogies are opposed to teleological concepts of history, thought of as making epistemic commitments to historical nominalism and anti-foundationalism (Flynn, 2009, p.31; Bevir, 2010 p.17). They reject the idea that history progressed in a linear fashion, leading to objective development; the genealogist does not recognize the existence of ahistorical, universal concepts; their research is not based upon some fundamental criterium for objective knowledge. Instead, genealogy operates in the margins of knowledge, unmasking the pretence to universality wherever it sees fit: it disrupts, muddies the waters (Kretsedemas, 2017, p.4).

Genealogies attempt to undermine the stability of concepts and practices taken for granted, showing the “trans-categorical (or hybrid) relations in which all things are already

embedded” (Kretsedemas, 2017, p.1). It should come as no surprise that genealogy has been adopted by a wide variety of scholars outside the philosophical discipline. Most obvious is the influence on anthropology: Knauft describes it as the field most profoundly influenced by genealogy (2017, p.2). Perhaps the most well-known example of genealogy within

anthropology is Talal Asad’s Genealogies of Religion (1993), which shows how the concept of religion is born within Western modernity and is far from a neutral descriptor. Examples outside of anthropology range from sociology, legal studies, media studies to management studies and the field of international relations (Delacroix, 2006; Monea & Packer, 2007; Mukerji, 2007; Jørgensen, 2007; Vucetic, 2011). Some of these genealogies seem to lack the philosophical commitments described earlier, mostly interpreting genealogy as any type of investigation that elucidates historical development: see for example Stout & Buddenbaum (2009, p.7) or Delacroix (2006, p.xvi). Genealogy seems to have regained a renewed impulse within philosophy, as contemporary authors take up the method with vigour. Hans Joas (2013) published a work on the genealogy of human rights; Philip Kitcher (2011) offers a genealogy of ethics. Perhaps most renown is Giorgio Agamben, whose genealogical Homo

Sacer series was recently concluded (2016). 1.2.2.1 Problematization of Genealogy

This widespread use of genealogy and the idea that genealogies are historical studies of power into concepts or practices brings to light two substantial problems. Genealogies seem to be focused on writing a past filled with the struggle for power relations for concepts that have been accepted, neutral or ahistorical. But are further genealogies needed, once we understand this general message (Krupp, 2008)? If the scholar understands that concepts are not neutral or natural, and their past is filled with a hidden history of struggles for power, isn’t the method itself superfluous? If the genealogy method is just this uncovering, its underlying claims could be surely be understood without further genealogical research. The second problem has to do with the critical aspect of genealogy, and it’s potential for relativism: if genealogy grasps everything in terms of power-relations, it risks becoming indifferent to its object of investigation (Visker, 1995). Why would one situation be preferable to another, if they are all just an expression of power? If genealogy reduces

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everything to power-relations, it cannot discern between preferable situations - something that seems unlikely, considering the profound passionate engagement emanating from both Nietzsche and Foucault.

This thesis is a reconstruction of the genealogical method as typified by Nietzsche, Foucault and Agamben, and attempts to address the previously discussed problems. The choice for those three authors is twofold. Firstly because any analysis of genealogy has to include reflection upon Nietzsche and Foucault, as they are the philosophical fathers of the method. Much of the literature surrounding genealogy refers back to these philosophers. Any

investigation into genealogy has to account for the influence they had upon the field.

But there is another reason for focusing on these authors, that has less to do with their status. During the thesis, I argue that the problems described earlier originate with the use of

genealogy within Nietzsche and Foucault.

The third author discussed in this thesis, Giorgio Agamben, continues the path set out by Nietzsche and Agamben but also modifies it somewhat, offering a solution. Agamben opens the future for further genealogies. He does so by introducing the concept of life as a

normative orientation; a notion that has been implicit but unconceptualized within Nietzsche, and is only referred to descriptively within Foucault.

1.2.2.2 Nietzsche

Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality is a piece of polemic critique, railing against the English ‘genealogists’ for their lack of historical acumen and reinforcing the dominant ideas of the time, most notably the teleological development of morality (Schacht, 1994).1_{Not only did}

they presuppose that contemporary morality is more logical, natural and superior to that what came before, but they also believe that morality has developed through linear progression. Nietzsche’s critique is twofold: uncovering the “hidden, shameful” origins of morality, he introduces the dynamic of power relations (1974, p.15). Good and bad, he claims, are not absolute or natural categories but are influenced by the struggle between the powerful and the weak. But his claim goes further than that: the development of moral ideas is shown to be partly contingent, subject to change. Things might very well have turned out differently. This, in turn, opens up the field of morality to a host of new questions and possibilities: what exactly is the value of our own modern morality? What lies beyond the current ideas of good and evil? Nietzsche gives little substantial direction in his genealogy, placing the value of morality within the larger project of the value of values (1974, p.99). His work seems mostly a passionate outburst, opening up the field of morality: but he does seem to value the notion of a healthy life, and most of his critique seems to be aimed at the dominance of ‘unhealthy ascetic ideals’ (GM, 1:6; 1:9; 2:16; 3:13). Some notions of alternative ways of living can be found in Nietzsche, but the concept of life remains mostly implicit and conceptually

underdeveloped (Osborne, 2016).

1 With ‘genealogist’, he seems to mean those who write a history of moral ideas, and trace it back to pragmatic origins. See GM 1:2, for example.

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1.2.2.3 Foucault

Foucault’s work is often divided into two distinct periods: his earlier archaeological work, and his later genealogical (Delissen, 2016).2_{His archaeologies focus on the way discourses}

and systems of thought are informed by specific, unexamined rules.3_{The genealogical works}

focus more on how power forms specific subjectivities within specific discourses and how these relations develop through time (Kendall, 1998, p.31). Foucault’s genealogies,

Discipline and Punish (1976) and The History of Sexuality: Introduction (1978), concern

themselves with the historical development of disciplinary power in relation to the prison, and with sexuality in relation to biopolitical power.4

The theme of normative commitments is frequently commented upon when it comes to Foucault’s genealogies. His genealogies are often seen as problematizations: which is to say they describe a situation that seems problematic, but do not articulate why it is wrong or what should be done (Koopman, 2013). This would make genealogy only a tool in a larger

normative framework, and only from this overarching framework could one articulate what is precisely problematic, and offer potential alternatives (May, 2014). Without being embedded in a larger normative structure, genealogy risks becoming relativist and being apathetic in the face of power (Suárez Müller, 2008). Foucault offers seemingly little to no alternatives to the problem encountered in his genealogies. He only mentions life as the object of forms of power, no implicit notion of the healthy life found in Nietzsche; the most concrete alternative offered seems to be hope for a “new economy of bodies and pleasures” (Foucault, 1978, p.157).

The critical use of genealogy remains mainly negative; they seem to be unable or unwilling to constructively articulate visions on what the subject could be.5_{Their genealogies aren’t, in}

the terms of Joas, affirmative – that is to say, they remain on the level of negation, never making the argumentative step towards constructing desirable outcomes or affirming some ideal situation (2009). This step towards an affirmative genealogy is necessary to secure the future for the genealogical method, saving its critical function by developing the capacity to formulate alternative ways of living. In order for genealogy to become affirmative, it needs a normative orientation; a guiding concept that is reconstructed genealogically, and helps it articulate what it sees as desirable. I will show that this normative orientation also addresses the problem of relativism to power. Giorgio Agamben makes this turn into affirmative genealogy and further develops the concept of life found in Nietzsche and Foucault.6

2 This characterization is problematic: should we understand the shift within his work as a break (Thompson, 2003)? Is the genealogical method an extension of the archaeological (Saar, 2002)? While the focus of this thesis is on genealogy, I will relate it to archaeology in paragraph 3.1.1.

3 Foucault defines archaeology as 'describing discourses as practices specified in the element of the archive' (1972, p.131). The archive is "the general system of the formation and transformation of statements' (1972, p.130). The focus of these works is thus of an epistemic nature.

4 Some of his lectures at College de France might very well be considered preliminary genealogies, although they lack some of the depth and rigor of his written works.

5 We can find Foucault's most clear enunciation on these topics within his last (unfinished, mostly contained in lectures and interviews) project concerning the care of the self. Needless to say, these few sketches contain little actual genealogy, but were inspired by his genealogy of sexuality.

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1.2.2.4 Agamben

Whilst some criticize him for diverging too liberally from Foucault’s methods, Agamben recognizes him as his primary influence (Snoek, 2010, p.3). Taking up Foucault’s

methodological apparatus, he deploys both archaeology and genealogy: starting off with a genealogical approach in his earlier work on Homo Sacer, and moving towards archaeology in his later Homo Sacer books.7_{He reflects upon this methodological approach in The} Signature of All Things (2009).

Contrary to Foucault and Nietzsche, Agamben does seem to imply an affirmative genealogy, and clearly articulates his views on both alternative ways of living and on the concept of life itself. Most of the original Homo Sacer is concerned with the embeddedness of life within the realm of politics, an original act which constitutes both the start of politics and the division of

bare life and the good life, zoe and bios (1998, p.1). His later works sketch out the future of

politics and the need for a poetic use of language (2016, p.260-275).

It is this genealogical approach to life that enables Agamben to develop an affirmative genealogy. By discovering the notion of life, simultaneously reconstructing it and using it as an orientation, he manages to conceptualize alternative ways of living whilst escaping the pitfall of uncritically taking life as an ahistorical concept.

1.3 Humanist, academic and social relevance

This thesis is relevant for humanistic studies for two main reasons. Firstly, it places Nietzsche and Foucault - two authors that are often considered anti-humanists - within a new light. Their critique of morality or the ‘humane’ method of penalization can enrich humanist theory, rather than diminish it. I will show that their approach can be developed into affirmative genealogy, which can critically analyse concepts without just attacking them. And secondly, because it has profound implications for the two dominant pillars within the field of humanistic studies: meaning-making and humanization. Not only is meaning-making in life conceptually related to a notions of life, but I argue that the notion of form-of-life will change the process of meaning-making. Agamben’s genealogy has some profound

implications for the notion of humanization, possible societal forms of organization and the notions of humanity they are based upon.

In the previous pages, I have linked genealogy to the concept of life. Whilst there has been a great deal of research done on genealogy within Nietzsche and Foucault, the conceptual link with life - one I argue is crucial to see the limits of their project, in order to think beyond it- has been limited. Little research has been done on Agamben’s use of genealogy, with his

Homo Sacer series only recently being concluded.8_{Seeing Agamben in a broader context}

6 Life and its affirmation play a central focus in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, whilst the exact meaning of the concept remains opaque, it is intimately connected to critique (GS: 307). Foucault does delve into the concept of life in insofar as it became the object of biopolitical or governmental power. Yet here too do we lack a clearly delineated concept we can use as a constructive normative orientation - Agamben will criticize Foucault for seeing the category of life only emerge in the ‘classical period’ (1998, p.4).

7 Examples of genealogy are Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995) and Kingdom and the Glory:

for a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (2007). An example of archeology is The Sacrament of Language: an Archeology of the Oath (2013).

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shows a larger development on a methodological and thematic level, which will allow for a better understanding of the implications of his larger project. And lastly, it will, considering the prominence of genealogical research, help secure the future of genealogy by sketching out its limits and possibilities.

This thesis will, perhaps most importantly, also shed some light on the importance of historical critique as it relates to our collective living together. Our work of freedom is constantly threatened by forms of subjectivity imposed on it: be it by neoliberalism,

authoritarian nationalism or other coercive powers. Could the genealogical approach help us discover new potential ways of living? Perhaps philosophy and history can show us new ways to be free.

1.4 Research Goal

The goal of this philosophical research is to design a broader concept of philosophical genealogy that is oriented on life, by reconstruction of three important and diverging genealogical approaches: typified by Nietzsche, Foucault and Agamben. It then attempts to synthesize the findings in order to conceptualize the limits and possibilities of genealogy for life.

The results have implications on both the field of philosophical research, its methodology and the social, cultural and existential level of society as a whole.

1.5 Guiding question

To guide the current investigation, I will centre the research around the following question: ‘What are the limits and possibilities of the use of genealogy for life in the works of

Nietzsche, Foucault and Agamben?’

This question will be addressed in four different chapters, in which the first three deal with their respective authors. The central question within each of these chapters is ‘What type of

genealogy does the author stand for?’. Each chapter builds upon the argumentative steps the

previous author contributed, and discuss the development. The last chapter asks the question ‘How can these types be combined in the light of an affirmative use of genealogy?’, and summarizes the findings, and synthesize them in order to sketch out the conditions for an affirmative genealogy.

1.6 Methodological Approach

As this journey unfolds amongst two different (yet parallel) paths, some intellectual

flexibility is required. The two levels of methodological and conceptual analysis will not be strictly separated, nor can all authors be analyzed on the same concepts. I reconstruct the paths their genealogies take them and the argumentative and conceptual commitments they make. Strictly speaking, this research consists of a philosophical comparative literature study, and will employ a comparative hermeneutic methodology.

In the next chapter, I focus on Nietzsche’s genealogy within The Genealogy of Morality, its relation to the rest of his work and specifically earlier investigations into life and historical

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critique.9_{The third chapter aims to reconstruct Foucault’s genealogical approach as a}

continuation of Nietzsche’s and its specific functioning within Discipline and Punish (1976) and The History of Sexuality (1978). I open this chapter with a brief reflection upon the difference between genealogy and archaeology by referring to On the Order of Discourse (1970). While reconstructing his method, I also aim to connect genealogy with Foucault’s conception of life.

Within the fourth chapter, Agamben is introduced. I start off by exploring his relation to Foucault and the methodological debt, drawing from The Signature of all Things (2008). Having done a preliminary exploration of his methodological approach, I then focus on the application of this method within Homo Sacer (1998) and The Use of Bodies (2016), in which Agamben delves further into concepts first explored in Foucault’s work. Limiting the scope of research within Agamben has proven difficult, as many of his work feature genealogies. I have finally focused on the previously mentioned two, but draw elements from other works, most notably The Highest Poverty (2013). The fifth chapter synthesizes the findings of the previous chapters, combining them for further affirmative genealogies oriented towards life. The results of this thesis are summarized in the sixth and final chapter, that places affirmative genealogy within a larger context.

Chapter 2:

Nietzsche’s Agonistic Genealogy

2.1 Structure

In order to reconstruct the development of the genealogical approach, I first characterize Nietzsche’s genealogy. I do so by first positioning his views on philosophy and history within a larger debate in nineteenth-century philosophy. After this, I trace the beginning of

Nietzsche’s genealogy through his earlier work on life and history, The Use and Abuse of

History for Life. Having done that, I summarize some of the claims made within The Genealogy of Morality. This leads into an analysis of some of the characteristics of his

genealogical approach; specifically his conception of history, its psychological focus, the relation between language, power and engaging the reader, before concluding by examining the role of life and relation to the body. The chapter closes with a reflection upon the type of genealogy Nietzsche stands for.

9 Specifically On The Use and Abuse of History for Life (2010), but I will also draw from selected passages from The Gay Science (2012).

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2.1.1 Genealogy within Nietzsche’s oeuvre

The relationship between philosophy and history is and has always been an uneasy one. Whilst historians tend to be sceptical of the generalizations and the speculative character of philosophy, philosophers have a tendency to see historians as being too focused on the specifics and lacking an understanding of bigger structures. Philosophers can bypass the problematic relationship between the disciplines by assuming an ahistorical subject, as some modern philosophy has done.10_{Another approach is to integrate historical development into}

philosophy: by conceiving history as ultimately progressing towards the realization of a certain telos.11_{We can see both schools of thought appear in eighteenth and}

nineteenth-century philosophy, but both are not without their flaws. The former rejects the domain of history as having a fundamental role to play in philosophical reflection and has to reject the influence of history on the formation of the subject - the subject which is, in the last instance, the foundation of the philosophical endeavour. The latter usurps history, integrating it and reducing it to grand movements, whilst ignoring historical specificity and contingency. In doing so, it also fixates the future.

Within Nietzsche’s work, we do not only see an attempt to make philosophy historically grounded, but to make thought, history and life commensurable. This thread runs throughout his oeuvre: from his first work The Birth of Tragedy (1872), where grand cultural

developments are linked to primordial forces of life, to the Use of Abuse of History (1873) and the Genealogy of Morality (1877). Before analysing Nietzsche’s genealogy within the

Genealogy of Morality, it needs to be situated within the larger context of Nietzsche’s oeuvre.

I do so by making a few remarks on The Use and Abuse of History.

2.1.2 On the Use and Abuse of History for Life

While On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (2010) is a part of Nietzsche’s earlier work, reading it can still add to the understanding of the Genealogy of Moral, as it explicitly deals with some of the themes returning in the genealogy - it gives some much-needed context. In this essay Nietzsche makes the link between history and life. The core claim is that man needs a different way of thinking about history than the forms that are currently dominant: one that serves life.

At the very start of his essay, Nietzsche makes a distinction between animal life and human life. Animals live unhistorically, that is to say, they live without a past: they dissolve into the present. Mankind, however, is always potentially burdened with its past. In order to live, Nietzsche argues, man has to learn to forget. To act means to construct some sort of

temporary boundary, and to exclude the past world from one's mind: to partly forget it exists. Nietzsche claims that there “is a degree of insomnia, of rumination, of the historical sense, through which living comes to harm and finally is destroyed, whether it is a person or a

10 Think for example of the works of Descartes and Kant.

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people or a culture.” (p.5). There is a point at which history harms life and historical science seems to have reached this point.

Engaging with history brings a real risk, according to Nietzsche. History belongs to human life in three distinct ways: in its capacity to act and aspire, conserve and admire, and in its suffering. These three relations between history and life are related to three specific tasks of historical science: monumental history, antiquary history and critical history.

Monumental history focuses on the great men of times that came before; whilst they can be inspirational figures, we run the risk of underestimating the historical specificity that created the possibility of these figures to emerge. Antiquary history can enrich life by preserving culture, teaching us where we came from: but this attitude of learning easily slips into learning for its own sake. The past should be preserved, but not because this is inherently valuable - it should be done to stimulate our creativity. Critical history takes an opposite position: it rejects the past and attempts to create something new. There is, however,

something that can be learned from the past: in explaining our origins, it helps us understand ourselves. This in turns enables us to create more freely, feeding life’s vital forces.

2.1.3 Life

Whilst being the driving force behind the text, Nietzsche does not offer the reader a concrete definition of life. The closest he comes to doing so is when he calls “life alone, that dark, driving, insatiable self-desiring force” (p.9). Far from being a mere biological fact, life is seen as a force in itself, which drives living things to create and manifest themselves. It is the unseen power behind all things that strives to further itself, but it has somehow found a contradiction in human life, where it created forces that try to deny it. Life isn't merely a qualifier, it is a fundamental “drive to live” (p.11).

The type of life Nietzsche does seem to find preferable is one in good health, focused not on introspective truth but on the exterior world, one of generative creativity. He doesn't

outrightly reject reflexive thought or history but does not see them as goals in themselves. The conception of a healthy life is directly connected to an alternative idea and practice of science, specifically history (p.44). Nietzsche seems to be less concerned with knowledge than with creating the possibility for life to flourish and develop. When given the choice between the knowledge of the suprahistorical thinkers and life, he gladly chooses life (p.7). The theme of the problematic relationship between life and knowledge emerges constantly in Nietzsche’s oeuvre but develops more nuance as his writing matures.

History can be both a threat to life, or a step in making it flourish. History needs to be used in a different way than it is currently used. This theme is developed further in the genealogy in a more nuanced sense: where the denial of life becomes a specific part of knowledge, in its searching for truth.

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2.2 Genealogy of Morals: three essays

2.2.1 Introduction to Genealogy

The genealogy is, according to Nietzsche, an investigation into the origins of moral

judgement, the context of its development and the value of morality (GM, Preface: 1). The value of morality is intimately linked to its potential for making life flourish. While previous works like Dawn (1881) and Human, all too Human (1878) were concerned with the origins of morality, Nietzsche claims that his actual project was always concerned with the value of morality. He sees in a multitude of philosophers but especially Schopenhauer figures in which a morality of self-sacrifice and compassion has turned against life, an illness of thought. Their type of moral enquiry holds little value for Nietzsche, as it seems

self-defeating; they should be serving life, but they end up depriving its strength. His aim is to ask the question of the value of moral values; but before doing that, an investigation into the conditions and circumstances in which those values themselves developed is needed. The aim of Nietzsche’s work here is to take the problem of morality and the value of values seriously. The work consists of three different essays: the first concerns the distinction between ‘good and evil’ and ‘good and bad’; the second concerns guilt and bad conscience; and the final essay reflects upon the meaning of ascetic ideals. I critically summarize the main arguments found in the three essays and describe their thematic contents, before reflecting upon what typifies Nietzsche’s genealogy

2.2.2 First Essay

Nietzsche starts off his first essay by reflecting on the genealogists that came before him: he claims that the authors of the previous genealogies were themselves more interesting than their works. Nietzsche claims that one of their flaws, which is common to philosophy, is their inability to think historically (1974, p.6). According to them, the good originated when selfless acts were called good by those who profited from them. Forgetting the origins of the praise, the good became anything that was selfless - and the pragmatic origins were forgotten. The focus of Nietzsche’s first essay is mostly on the struggle between two distinct groups, which Nietzsche calls the masters and the slaves. Nietzsche presents the group of masters as the dominant group, that lives a life focused around physical prowess and on pleasures in the here and now. They call their own way of life ‘good’ – in the sense that they excel at what they do. The word ‘bad’ is reserved for the subservient group in society. The concepts of good and bad don't have a pragmatic origin, but were created through power relations: language itself is a display of power by the rulers (p.12). Nietzsche concludes that the

development of a pure clerical caste is already present at a very early stage, as a subset of the masters. They are characterized by a somewhat unhealthy disposition within this social hierarchy – they are ascetic, anti-sensual and passive. It is here that the concept of purity is given a new connotation: one of rejection of the world, rather than cleanliness. Nietzsche does conceit that the priestly class has made man an interesting animal, giving him depth.

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The two different forms of value within the dominant class – that of the aristocrat and that of the priest – eventually oppose each other. The aristocratic values are created spontaneously and are centred around prosperity, health, freedom, gaiety and expressions of power; the priestly class turns around this value system and introduces distance from the physical life, valuing the importance of the intellect (p.17). This all is born out of ressentiment, the psychological state of the weak that fantasize about taking revenge upon the powerful. They condemn what is valued by the masters, and start praising what makes them less powerful: their lack of health, strength, or the ability to enjoy physical pleasures. Unhappiness, powerlessness and illness thus become good. Their ressentiment of the

powerful, which started as negation, becomes creative in making its own value system (p.20). The aristocratic value system had a more direct connection to the body and the outside world, and didn't need opponents to construct happiness – it happened spontaneously, by itself. (p.22). The value system created by ressentiment, and the culture associated with it, is essentially one of reaction and negation. The psychological state of ressentiment eventually created a culture in which mediocrity and safety are valued above all else.

Nietzsche quickly diverges the attention of the reader to the seductive powers of language, which finds its origin in the errors of reason itself. In speech, a difference is made between the act and the actor: it presupposes a subject behind each movement. Nietzsche claims that there is “no Being behind the deed”, and that the presumption of freedom behind the actions of the strong is faulty (p.26). By assuming there is a subject behind the actions that could act differently, the weak have found a way to force the stronger to act against their own nature. Following the same logic, the weak have legitimized their own impotence as something they freely chose - turning their weak nature into a moral act.

This battle between the concepts of ‘good and bad’ and ‘good and evil’ has been fought for thousands of years, and is still raging. It has become deeper, more intellectual and refined. Nietzsche ends his first essay by asking his reader whether or not this struggle has been decided once and for all. He notes that he thinks that the study of morality would progress greatly by researching the link between linguistics and the evolution of moral concepts. This relation should be investigated by philologists, historians and philosophers – but the question of the value of values should first and foremost be confronted by physiologists and doctors (p.37). It is the task of all science to prepare the future work of philosophy, the solving of the problem of values, but the physiological perspective has to take the lead.

2.2.3 Second Essay

The second essay starts off with an examination of responsibility. Before becoming

responsible, man has to be made homogenous, equal and calculable. His memory had to be learned, trained (p.39). The end result of this process of disciplined memory is the

autonomous individual. His conscience has become his innermost instinct. This origin of conscience is linked to memory - and Nietzsche holds the most ancient psychological insight to be that consistent pain is what grifts itself into our memory most. This is what lays at the

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basis of religious ceremonies - and even asceticism: some pain that shaped the memory. It is physical pain that is memorized and made man a reasonable animal.

How about the origin of bad conscience, Nietzsche asks himself? He links the concept of guilt to debt - one that is apparent in the German language (p.44). Nietzsche argues we should separate punishment from the concept of responsibility. Punishment arose as a way of satisfying the victim of the crime; its corrective function was of a later origin. The idea that there is a relationship between suffering from crime and inflicting pain as a retaliation actually stems from the contractual relationship between creditor and debtor. The creditor was owed something - and if he wasn't repaid, he was allowed to not just repossess something for the damages he suffered, but was also owed some sort of pleasure from the punishment he inflicted upon the debtor. He was owed compensation in warranted cruelty. Guilt and

conscience thus find their origin in the domain of legal transaction, specifically in its consequences.

Nietzsche traces the word man back to manas, and thus proposes man might be defined as the animal that measures, values. This aspect of man is one of the things that has fundamentally defined him. The idea that goods could objectively be appraised, that things could equal each other in value eventually transformed into moral ideas concerning justice. It is the

transactional logic that created laws regulating collective living and societal stability. The law is essentially a constricting of some forces of life in favour of other life-preserving forces (p.49). One must recognize it as an instrument within the battle for power, not as the pacification of power struggle.

Nietzsche calls bad conscience a consequence of man’s enchantment by society, seduced by peace (p.56). Man had to do away with its impulsive and warlike instincts, as they no longer served their purpose in surviving. These impulses, Nietzsche hypothesizes, turn inward if they cannot be released outwards, creating the depth of the soul. It is in this reversal of instinct against itself that man became interesting, a battleground, a multiplicity of forces within his interior life. The change didn't happen organically but was rather a sudden break with the past (p.58). It was enforced by a new state, new structures of domination ruled by the ascetic masters introduced in the first essay.

Nietzsche’s ends his second essay by reflecting upon the costs that come with constructing any ideal. It is the coming man that will have to save us from the dominant ideals and their consequences: the sickly rejection of life.

2.2.4 Third Essay

The third essay of GM focuses on the meaning of ascetic values - and more specifically, what its value is. Nietzsche notes that the many meanings given to the ascetic ideal are significant. The fact that an ideal focused on the minimization of desire and the will has known such diverse manifestations, seems to signify that the human will must have an object - it would rather will nothing than not will. The ascetic ideal is also common to the life of many

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philosophers. Nietzsche argues that “every animal, including the bête philosophe,

instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions in which to fully release his power” (p.75). This ascetic mentality is thus one which creates the circumstances that favour the specific characteristic philosophers embody. Their living according to ascetic ideals does not come from a detachment or objective grounds, but because it allows them to flourish. The ideals that are held high within the ascetic life reject existence in the here and now, in favour of some high existence. It seems to enjoy the degeneration of physical life, sees the weakening of strength as feasible. Nietzsche sees the ascetic ideal as an illness life suffers from: in order to legitimize itself, this ideal attempts to critique “that which is experienced most certainly to be true and real: it will look for error precisely where the actual instinct of life most unconditionally judges there to be truth (...) it will demote physicality to the status of illusion” (p.86). The task of a healthy philosophy has to be able to use “the difference in perspectives and affective interpretations for knowledge” (p.86).

Asceticism cannot be merely explained as a form of life opposed to life itself: “The ascetic ideal springs from the protective and healing instincts of a degenerating life, which uses every means to maintain itself and struggles for its existence” (p.88). Man is more

experimental than other types of animal, more creative: and therefore more prone to failure, to disease. The priest manages to redirect the sickly animal's ressentiment over their ill health. It is no longer aimed outward but turns inward. Whilst their suffering could have physiological reasons, the ascetic priest locates its origin at some internal moral deficit. It turns into a feeling of guilt, a bad conscience. The bad conscience caused internal pain – a pain, which through a series of psychological techniques was deemed deserved. The experience of pain, and the realization of one's own sinfulness and inadequacy, became something to strive towards (p.104). This form of the ascetic ideal and the psychological change it caused was an attempt by the healing instincts of life to contain the damage the sickly could do to the healthy (p.94). In giving meaning to suffering, it stopped the disease from interfering with other healthy life too much. This is the paradox of asceticism: while fundamentally turned away from physical life, its aim is in some way to preserve it. In his closing pages of the third essay, Nietzsche focuses on the relationship between the ascetic ideal and science. Far from creating a different value system, science partly embodies the ascetic ideal. There's some physical conformity to the ascetic ideal, as scientists tend to devalue their own physical life in favour of the intellectual, and are not interested in their affective life. Yet the ascetic ideal is more intimately woven into the fabric of science. Even the most radical atheists partly answer to the ascetic ideal, in their unquestionable faith in truth itself. Valuing truth as objective expresses some belief in its metaphysical status - the will to truth has never been questioned, even within philosophy. This belief in the ontological status of truth that transcends every context is seen by Nietzsche as stemming from the ascetic ideal. With the rejection of the ascetic ideal, the role of truth needs to be re-evaluated. The ascetic ideal has driven man away from his most human qualities, and to see the animal and physical world as inferior. If we acknowledge that truth was connected to a rejection of specific aspects of human life, what is the value of the further pursuit of truth?

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Nietzsche closes the third essay by concluding that saying that the ascetic ideal was a way of life preserving itself - because man would rather will nothing than not will. The ascetic ideal focusses on rejecting the physical world in favour of some ideal; in doing so, it preserves the human will in some minimalist sense.

2.3 Characteristics of Nietzsche’s Genealogy

2.3.1 History

Whereas Nietzsche seems to strive towards a balance between living historically and ahistorically in his Use and Abuse of History, he starts off his Genealogy of Morals by claiming that one of the main flaws of philosophers before him is that they were unable to think historically. Thought needs a degree of historical awareness in order to grasp moral concepts; yet it shouldn't attempt to strive towards a complete or objective understanding of history. Doing so would end up letting history dominate life; it would be another expression of conformity to the ascetic ideal. In drawing focus on the complicated relationship between history and philosophy, he once more focuses the attention on the divide between knowledge and life - one he attempts to make further commensurable in his Gay Science.

One of the first things that can be said about Nietzsche’s genealogy, is that it a method that values the importance of history, especially when analyzing concepts that are assumed to be ahistorical. It is interested in the development of concepts, as man’s limited perspective tends to be blind to larger processes. The historical point of view is needed because it makes visible some struggles that are otherwise hidden as: “all long things are difficult to see, to see

round” (GM, 1:8).

The fact that we need history to understand the present, is partly so because of the dominance of a specific value system. The value system that was created by the ascetic ideal and the type of man that came from it “loves dark corners, secret paths and back-doors, everything

secretive appeals to him as being his world, his security, his comfort; he knows all about keeping quiet, not forgetting, waiting, temporarily humbling and abasing himself” (GM, 1:10). It is a value system that creates objective truths, that implies some external value outside the reach of the physical domain. Philosophy that conforms to this ascetic ideal sees moral values as some sort of secret essence that is waiting to be discovered, whilst the genealogist sees that there is no determined essence, that the attributed essence is contested. This is related to the two different words used for origin in the original German text:

Ursprung and Herkunft. This differentiation is hard to make in English: in Foucault's

translation, the distinction between origins and beginnings is offered (1971). The word

Ursprung is used throughout Nietzsche’s oeuvre when it comes to the moment a concept

came into this world – as perhaps most evident in his Birth of Tragedy, where he is interested in the Ursprung of Greek Tragedy. Origin as Ursprung implies that one can find an exact essence of things, a clearly demarcated identity. This would be a search for some

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Morality is that when it comes to moral concepts, there is no essence; nothing outside of

historical processes. Nietzsche remarks that we shouldn't confuse the reason why a concept came into being with its current goal (GM, 2:12). Pure objectivity presumes a stable world, without any room for contingency and struggle. In fact, the entire idea of objectivity is the result of a contested history, of ressentiment turned creative.

On the other hand, we have the word Herkunft, which can be roughly translated as descent. It has connotations of family, of stock: these connotations are meaningful, especially when we consider the importance of biological life, as explored in a later paragraph. Herkunft means relation by affiliation to a group; it is a history marked by random encounters, families of meaning. Following a descent, however, does not mean one attempts to trace a common lineage; but means taking stock of multiple paths and dead ends, contingencies and accidents. The search for origins seems to imply that the meaning of a certain concept can be found it their moment of birth, that there is a certain essence to it that became obscured. Nietzsche seems to be more interested in the way in which circumstances a concept began, in what way its meaning was appropriated, contested, forgotten; in the role of accidents and discontinuity (GM, 2:7).

Genealogy engages with history in a specific way. In his earlier work on the Use and Abuse

of History, Nietzsche criticized the suprahistorical perspective that is common to historical

science. Not only did it not serve life, but its presuppositions were flawed: think of the way it presumes some objective truth that can be discovered or the detached perspective the

historian must take. Nietzsche sees genealogy as an attempt to create an alternative history of morality, one that is endowed with a historical spirit (GM, Preface: 7; GM, 1:2). Nothing is taken for granted if looked at with historical spirit: it presumes that everything is subject to change and that there is no logical continuity in history. There is no objective perspective one can engage it through; its focus is on direct engagement with the subjects that are closest to the writer, on the writing of its forgotten histories (GM, 2:4).

2.3.2 Language, Power and the Reader

One of the immediate things that can be taken away from Nietzsche’s genealogy, is that his analysis is focused on language, and often features etymology.

He insists that specific moral concepts within language were a result of characteristics the masters attributed to themselves: their origin had little to do with usefulness but were rather a product of power relations (GM, 1:4). These moral concepts did not originate within a

normative moral system, but rather functioned on a more descriptive level. What was deemed good was what functioned effectively, that what was in some way associated with

dominance. The turn from the descriptive pair good/bad to the moral good/evil is the result of the ascetic class’s ascendency. Most of the linguistic analysis concerning good and bad stems from Greek and Latin, and one concept is analyzed through etymological analysis of German: in his analysis of guilt and debt. The words themselves show a hidden history of struggle.

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The exact meaning of power remains unclear throughout the genealogy. Power seems to be inherently connected to life, as shown in the following passage: “that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation” (GM, 2:12). This seems to imply that struggle is a fundamental phenomenon concerning all life.

All living things are engaged in a struggle: it can be expressed through power, or the struggle for dominance – but it has other manifestations. Nietzsche notes that domination means re-interpretation: this would mean power isn’t concerned with making others directly

subservient, but with presenting things in a different light. The philosopher expresses his power not through direct physical means, but by creating knowledge, by changing the perception of concepts (GM, 3:10). In this sense, power could also be seen as an attempt to express the strength inherent in one’s nature, of convincing others of their perspective – whilst this can imply the direct domination of others, it does not need to.12_{The relation}

between power and domination is further questioned by characterizing power as “instinct for freedom” (GM, 2:18). This would imply that power is concerned with being free from domination, doing away the obstacles that impede expression. The metaphysical status of the will to power is unclear – whilst Nietzsche attempts to do away with metaphysics, his

conception of power does potentially contain some metaphysical elements.13_{Power could be}

seen as a force present in living things, which seeks to express itself.

Language isn't just the place where the results of the struggle between opposing forces are shown, it is itself a contested domain. The meaning of words is subject to change: “all concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated defy definition; only something which has no history can be defined” (GM, 2:13). There can be no definitive definition when it comes to moral concepts. Any meaningful analysis would have to recognize this dynamic character of language while presenting a new interpretation. Recognizing the inherently contested nature of language means that the philosopher has to walk a tightrope: between reducing all concepts to merely the result of a struggle for power, and forgetting that one’s interpretation is subject to power relations just as well as any other. It doesn't seem to be the aim of the genealogy to conclusively define the meaning of certain concepts. More than anything, it aims to open up space for the creation of new values. This goal of Nietzsche’s genealogy be derived from the polemic style the book takes. The genealogy itself demonstrates the way power is linked to language: its main strength is its rhetorical genius. Nietzsche claims that knowledge of a concept should be understood in terms of encompassing different perspectives, not in reaching one definitive, overarching and objective truth (GM, 3:12). The genealogy itself is an example of a different, convincing

12 This interpretation is affirmed in Beyond Good and Evil, where Nietzsche claims that “a living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength…” (2010, I:13).

13 I understand these metaphysics as the field that concerns itself with fundamental essences of things and concepts, and being itself: in this case, some one could argue that Nietzsche makes an ontological claim about power being a fundamental characteristic of reality. Elements appear in The Gay Science, where all movement is centered around the principle of the will to power, which is equated to the will to life: “The great and small struggle always revolves around superiority around growth and expansion, around power - in accordance with the will to power which is the will of life” (2012, V:349).

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perspective. It doesn’t make a claim to final objective truth but encourages the reader to take a different perspective. Nietzsche explicitly claims that reading his genealogy is hard work, something that forces the reader to patiently consider the aphorisms (GM, Prelude:8). Throughout the work, Nietzsche explicitly addresses the reader and poses him questions, provoking him with ironic remarks (GM, 1:14). Humour and hyperbole play a big role in this work: the reader is often left baffled at a seemingly offhanded comment and is forced to reflect upon possible interpretations of the text.

The genealogy not only presumes reflective engagement on the part of the reader, but the work is actively reflecting upon its own premises. The last aphorisms of the third part put into question the traditional motivations of philosophy, its will to truth (GM, 3:24).

The genealogy is in this sense not so much a new positing of truth, and more a breaking open of the field of philosophy, of creating room for a plurality of truths.

It does this by openly playing with language, by exercising power in a transparent way, drawing the reader's attention to what is happening in front of their eyes. While Nietzsche frames the question behind the genealogy as ‘what is the value of values?’, the reader has to consider the value of genealogy too.

2.3.3 Psychology

A third component of Nietzsche’s genealogy is his reliance on psychological insights. The entire slave revolt is founded on group psychology; the power of the ascetic priest is based upon the effectivity of his psychological techniques. His focus within psychology is diverse, ranging from insights into group dynamics (GM, 1:11), the workings of affective components of the psyche (GM, 2:22) to the effects the physical constitution has on psychological life, especially when it concerns nerves (GM, 3:15).

It should be noted that the relationship between psychological life and moral concepts is of a dynamic nature: on the one hand, it is the psychology of the herd animal that gave rise to the ascetic ideal. This ascetic ideal then influences the psychological constitution of the herd animal. While the ascetic ideal started off as a survival strategy by the powerless, it becomes dominant and threatens the will to live of the entire species.

This dynamic and its transformative effects are perhaps articulated most clearly in the

creation of the soul and the modification of instincts that went along with it (GM, 2:16). With the rise of societal rules by the ascetic priest, man had to do away with their natural instincts: they were deemed evil. Those instincts did not disappear but were not allowed to be

manifested outwards anymore. Their impulse remained but was redirected inwards. This, in turn, caused the creation of a soul, dominated by destructive and cruel impulses, an instinct to conquer. Those instincts caused man to be a sickly animal, one whose governance needed adaptation, lest his life-denial cause him to do away with life altogether. The ascetic priest thus needed a different idea of God, one that would partly affirm ascetic ideals, but that would keep them from complete self-destruction. One owes God a life of asceticism (GM, 2:22). The psychological transformation was caused by the dominance of the ruling class, which caused a change in psychology, causing a need to adapt moral concepts.

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The cornerstone of his argumentation seems to be a psychological insight, namely that “all instincts which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards” (GM, 2:16). Whilst his analysis does sound convincing, the psychological approach Nietzsche uses is mostly speculative, and mostly founded upon his own psychological insights and etymological analysis, and lack a structured anthropological foundation. This could partly be explained by the dominance of the ascetic ideal, and the way it obfuscates its own working; but it could also be seen as fitting Nietzsche’s reflections upon epistemology. He is attempting to construct a different face to the dominant historical narrative in order to create the room for new values (GM, 2:4). Objectivity or factual accuracy isn't his aim, argumentative effectivity is.

2.3.4 The Body and Life

Physical processes and the trajectory different lifeforms take, are placed forefront and centre within the genealogy. Nietzsche’s approach explicitly draws inspiration from physicians, saying that this perspective is crucial in his larger project in creating the hierarchy of values (GM, 1:17). Physical health plays a large role in his analysis of both the individual and society. Nietzsche’s focus on life isn't just limited to physical health, however: at points he seems more interested in man’s biology and anthropological roots.

One of the recurring themes within genealogy is that of illness. Ascetic ideals are seen as a survival strategy for those suffering from bad health, and it is those ideals that further cause a degeneration of vital functions (GM, 1:6). They do not remain with just those sickly animals but spread throughout the entire body of mankind (GM, 1:9). The illness had protective origins, as it attempted to let the weaker survive domination by the strong yet has created a dynamic that ends up harming both (GM, 2:16). It created the depth of the soul, but is at risk of fatally poisoning mankind. The illness is foremost linked to bad physical health, but it is also applied to mental health. Man is fundamentally vulnerable to disease, because of his experimental nature. He is a dangerous animal, one that is open to the future (GM, 3:13). Man isn't fixated to a certain essence: his vulnerability to disease is directly related to his ability to become stronger and healthier.

Nietzsche’s argumentation throughout the genealogy is illustrated through the use of

metaphors involving animals. One of the most poignant metaphors he uses is concerned with the revolt of slave morality, in which he describes the conflict through the lens of hawks eating lambs (GM, 1:13). These lambs then reverse the order of good and bad into good and evil, deeming their own impotence good, and the strength of the hawk bad. The ascetic priest is concerned with herding his flock of sheep (GM, 3:15); the English genealogists are frogs (GM,1:2); modern mankind is “first and foremost a teeming mass of worms” (GM, 1:11). This stylistic choice does not seem to be mere coincidence. It might be an attempt to

introduce the idea that there isn't an inherent biological difference between man and animal; as evidenced in his calling the German barbarian the blonde beast or man the interesting animal. (GM, 1:11; 2:6). The entire task of culture is to breed an animal that can make

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promises (GM, 2:1). This is consistent with his emphasis on shame man feels towards his lowly origins – man sees the animal as inferior and tries to forget that he is an animal himself. Nietzsche also claims that man is in some regard superior to the animal: it is the ascetic priest that made man superior to animals, by giving him depth of soul (GM, 2:6). In his closing statements, Nietzsche criticizes the ascetic ideal: “this hatred of the human, and even more of the animalistic” (GM, 3:27). But he also emphasizes that “man, the animal man, had no meaning up to now” (GM, 3:27). This seems to imply that man and animal are a part of the same spectrum and that any substantial and hierarchical differences have a cultural origin, as hinted in the first essay (GM, 1:6).

Nietzsche wants to remind us of our biological roots, and the origins of our instincts. It is civilization and the state that redirected our instincts; they haven't completely disappeared, merely turned inward or directed elsewhere (GM, 2:16).

While there are not any inherent biological differences between man and animal, or at least not to the extent that would merit calling man something different altogether, there does seem to be some sort of basis for hierarchical differences between animals and man. This hierarchy could perhaps be founded upon some Darwinian basis: some animals are more suited to their environment, more effective at what they do. This does not seem to be the case for the human, where Nietzsche much prefers the healthy to the ill – even while unhealthy culture seems to favour the ill.

2.3.5 A Genealogy of life?

Throughout the text, Nietzsche argues that philosophy needs to engage with life sciences more: as exemplified in the closing statements of his second essay (GM, 1:17). While he does not give a concrete definition of life, he does seem to be hinting that we need a more

profound understanding of biology. I have shown that genealogy is intimately concerned with the body and that the category of life seems to be a driving force within the text. It seems like the genealogy could conceptualize alternative ways of living – it’s main focus is currently the unhealthy and the sick, but Nietzsche does discuss some aspects of a healthy life.

Life itself seems a neutral category, one that is not given much substantial comment upon. If philosophy can learn from biology, and all sciences need to prepare for the work of re-evaluating all values, and if our current value system is shaped by ascetic values that are life-denying - wouldn't it make sense to start off with an analysis of life, and what the concept entails? The genealogy could become affirmative if it were to elaborate more upon what defines healthy and strong living. But in order to do so, it cannot call upon a common-sense definition of a healthy life, lest it falls subject to the power of the ascetic ideal. For the genealogy to become affirmative, it would need to extend its analysis to life.

2.4 What type of genealogy does Nietzsche stand for?

When it comes to defining Nietzsche’s genealogy, a few key elements cannot be missed. The genealogy is first and foremost a historical approach, one that relies upon a specific

The Paths of Genealogy. The Use of History for Life in Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben.