Are double standards required? A case study in evaluating ethics East and West: Mencius, Mozi and Peter Singer

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ARE DOUBLE STANDARDS REQUIRED?

A case study in evaluating ethics East and West:

Mencius, Mozi and Peter Singer

José C. van Mechelen

Studentno. 0477001

Defence: 30

th

of August 2018

Universiteit van Amsterdam

Faculteit Wijsbegeerte

First examiner: Dr. M.M. Leezenberg

Second examiner: Dr. E.C. Brouwer

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3 The Master said:

“From fifteen, my heart and mind (xin) was set upon learning;

from thirty I took my stance;

from forty I was no longer doubtful;

from fifty I realised the propensities of tian (tian ming); from sixty my ear was attuned;

from seventy I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the boundaries.

Lunyu 2.4 (The Analects of Confucius, translated by Ames and Rosemont 1998)

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When it appeared in 2004 that I would be made redundant from my job as a teacher any time in the future, I took up academic studies again. My partner Paula, suggested Philosophy, which turned out to have been an excellent choice. At the onset, my aim was learning from as many philosophical disciplines as I could. However, a year later, Chinese philosophy got me into its grip. My teacher, Karel L. van der Leeuw, a true master himself, used to warn his students at the first lecture that the subject is a ‘mer à boire’ and could take over your whole life. I discovered that it is an ocean in which you can easily drown indeed, but that it is possible to learn how to ride the waves. For that I am very grateful to master Karel and his lectures which I attended for a great number of years. He passed away in 2015 -not having found the means to reach immortality- but his books are still here and his wisdom will be passed on.

It took more than eight years longer than expected to finish my studies, due to ill-health of my partner and myself. I promised Paula, who died in 2012, that one day I would end up with a degree. Now this day is here to enjoy with my family and friends who are such a great support.

I would like to thank Michiel Leezenberg for his guidance in writing this thesis; he kept me going into the right direction. Special thanks to Elsbeth Brouwer, who has known me as a student for many years, for agreeing to be the second examiner.

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INTRODUCTION

This case study is about Philosophy East and West. It is rather common nowadays to use this phrasing when indicating a comparison made between philosophical works of Eastern

(Chinese in this thesis) authors and those with a formal Western education in philosophy. It is also the name of an influential magazine in the field, published by the University of Hawaii.1

This thesis has as its aim to compare the ‘leitmotiv’ of ‘Effective Altruism’ in the philosophy of Peter Singer, a contemporary utilitarian philosopher, born and bred in

Australia, who currently holds positions as a professor of philosophy in Melbourne, Australia and as a professor of bioethics at Princeton, U.S.A., with the most striking ‘philosophical’ thoughts of two masters of the Period of the Warring States (471-221 BCE) in what we now call China: Mencius and Mozi. They travelled from court to court to advise the rulers and in Mozi’s case spoke to the common people as well. All three thinkers give suggestions how to make society a better place to live for all people. Peter Singer tries to make the world one, advocating his utilitarian impartial philosophy and lifestyle and uses as many channels as possible to do so. He is often in the news and on television with his ideas. He employs the ‘principle of marginal utility’, derived from economic theory, that says that when you have already enough money to live a good life, you could spare anything extra to donate to others in need. Mencius advocates a traditional Ru (Confucian) ideal of how a society should be organised, namely through xiao, filial piety, as the building block, with the ruler as connection between tian, heaven and di, earth, at the top of civilisation. Mozi proposes a new radical theory: ‘love for all/inclusive love/impartial love’, an impartial egalitarian view that

challenges the traditional values of the Ru (Confucians). In Mozi’s view tian, heaven, is there for all and communicates directly with ruler and common people alike.

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Philosophy East and West: a quarterly journal of oriental and comparative thought. University of Hawaii, Honolulu

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10 When I got acquainted with Singer’s theory I could not escape the thought that it was very similar to Mozi’s and in Singer’s way of getting his ideas across, the examples given by Mencius resonated. That is why I decided on a comparison of these three thinkers for the subject of this thesis.

First I will shed some light on a few ‘key’ concepts in Chinese ‘Philosophy’, starting with the concept of ancient Chinese ‘Philosophy’ itself in chapter 1. To understand the view of the world as unfolded to us in the Mencius and the Mozi (the books have got the names of the masters that provided the inspiration for them) some acquaintance with the following concepts is necessary in my view. They are: Dao ,道. mostly translated into English as the Way (spelled in capital W), tian ming, 天命, the ‘mandate of heaven’ as used in Ru, 儒2

(Confucian) worldview and tian zhi, 天志, heaven’s intention/will’ as used in the Mozi. Furthermore the concepts of xiao(孝), filial piety and xin (心), the ‘heart-mind’, which have the same meaning today as they had 2500 years ago. I will give some background information on the period in which Mencius and Mozi lived and worked as far as is necessary to

understand their thoughts on how to make the world of the Middle Kingdom, zhong guo,中國 a better place to live.

In Chapter 2, I will give a very brief introduction on the Mencius, 孟子, and will then discuss his view on emotions and the heart (心) - or rather the various hearts-, in particular. I will use one special example from Mencius 2A6 to illustrate what compassion is and through that, what makes a person humane/benevolent. It is the famous: ‘Child due to fall into a well’ example. Anybody would be touched and would rescue the child as a matter of course and

2_{Whom we in the West know as Confucian scholars, used (and still use) the name of Ru}_儒_for

themselves. See: Dr Bin Song (Ruist scholar) on Confucianism:

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dr-bin-song-on-the-meaning-of-ru-%E5%84%92-for-confucianism_us_59793cf7e4b09982b7376212

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11 this emotional state leads us to the reason behind such behaviour: we simply cannot bear to see another person suffer. The question is raised whether Mencius’ ‘exposé ’would be ‘philosophy’ seen through the eyes of Peter Singer or not.

Chapter 3 is on Mozi 墨子 and the Mohists. I discuss the Mozi in more detail than I do with the Mencius. The reason is that there is a most striking resemblance between the

philosophy and philosophical movement of two of the philosophers compared in this thesis: Peter Singer and Mozi. Mozi is often depicted by his fellow masters (Mengzi (Mencius) 孟, Xunzi荀子and Zhuangzi 莊子) as the Chinese master that was against everything. Mohism is a radical movement that would like to change its contemporary society by doing away with the overspending on luxury that went with how Ru (Confucian) scholars executed ritual.

Furthermore the Mozi argues against waging war, which was rampant in the Period of the Warring States. Frugality is advocated in the Mozi and this rings a bell: Peter Singer and his movement of Effective Altruism favour a simple lifestyle as well, so that benefits can be shared with the rest of the world. A lofty ideal the Mohist movement would have agreed to wholeheartedly.

In Chapter 4 the discussion is on benefit or profit (li 利) in the Mencius and the Mozi. This is done rather extensively because it shows the position of the individual within Chinese society and the role of the government both from a Mencian (Ru or Confucian) and from a Mohist perspective.

Chapter 5 is about Peter Singer and his theory and movement of ‘Effective Altruism’. I wonder at the fact that he argued against scientific fMRI3 ‘proof’ that altruism may be

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fMRI: functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. The MRI scan apparatus is used to scan the brains of healthy people while they are given cognitive tasks. The images that are saved show to which part ofthe brain extra blood flows at a certain moment, indicating action in a specific area of the brain, connected with specific

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12 wired’ in the human brain. After all, Singer claims that altruism is a product of biology and evolution through expanding circles of kinship and tribal communities. It appears from his books that, as a Western trained philosopher, he cannot rely on emotions alone; he needs a firmer guide for ethical behaviour. He finds this in Henry Sidgwick’s Practical Ethics, the ‘standpoint of the universe’, and he applies this throughout in his philosophical thinking. Singer started a philosophical movement: Effective Altruism. He gets more and more people into his camp, advocating donating ‘surplus’ money to the needy in the world. Our standard of living in the modern Western industrialised countries is high enough to economise a little bit and then we will still have enough to live a good life is Singer’s crede. I attended a lecture by him in June 2018 and report from what I experienced there. Singer is an amiable,

compelling figure and has an amazing rhetoric. It is hard not to get convinced by his rendering of ‘his’ practical ethics.

In Chapter 6 there is a discussion of the various philosophical positions of the three philosophers under consideration in this thesis. The helpful –or sometimes adverse - role of the government for a well-ordered society in which it is pleasant to live, is considered in somewhat more detail, as it is part and parcel of their philosophies. In Mencius’ case it is even the force his philosophical theory is built on.

I will then end by concluding that this case study, that I started, thinking that for Philosophy East and West double standards were required, since they seemed incompatible, has a result differently from what I had expected. For me it turned out that Peter Singer’s philosophy and that of the Mohists are a match. They are both of utilitarian character and carry forth a ‘lofty standpoint of the universe’ (Singer 1979, 219): Singer by taking Sidgwick

functions e.g. frontal lobe with planning, judgment and problem solving. The RT, response time is always measured which gives an indication of the difficulty of performing the task.

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13 as his master of impartiality (he does not allow for a God in his theories), and Mozi by

alluring to tian zhi, heaven’s intention, as an impartial guiding principle, not a God either. A comparison between Singer and Mencius is complicated. They use the same kind of examples to arouse emotions in people. Their aim is for the audience to see the reason within. For Singer reason alone is not enough to create a solid philosophical concept. Following

Slingerland’s theories4 that xin, the heart, evolved during the Period of the Warring States in philosophical writing from consisting of pure emotion to a more and more cognition-laden concept, the ‘heart-mind’ or even the mind, it is easier to compare Mencian virtues and emotions with Singer’s Western philosophical values. Yet there is no match there, so the Mencius should be considered differently from how we see Singer’s theories, unless we regard this specific use of emotion-arousing examples as a rhetorical device. Then we do not compare the two philosophies but the philosophers’ ways of going about their philosophy, their methods of conveying ideas and concepts. Anyway, it is certain that both Mencius and Peter Singer have a compelling style to win over the hearts of the people for their good cause: a better world.

4_{Slingerland, Edward (2013) “Body and Mind in Early China: An integrated humanities-science}

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Translations used

When not indicated otherwise I used the following translations:

for the Mencius D.C. Lau’s and for the: Mozi that of Ian Johnston’s and for the The Analects

of Confucius (Lunyu) also D.C. Lau’s translation:

Mencius, Mencius (1970, 2003/4) Translated into English by D.C. Lau. Penguin Classics Mozi, The Mozi. A Complete Translation (2010) Translated by Ian Johnston. New York: Columbia University Press

Confucius, The Analects (Lun yü), translated with an introduction by D.C. Lau, Harmondsworth [etc.]: Penguin Books 1979

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Chapter 1 Chinese ‘Philosophy’ and some of its key concepts

1.1 Philosophy East and West: In which sense is Chinese

‘Philosophy’ philosophy?

1.1.1. History

The term ‘philosophy’ has only been applied to the Chinese tradition of the thinking of the Masters (zhuzi, 諸子) since the beginning of the twentieth century of the Christian era. China started sending scholars abroad only after Japan had opened up to the West. The Japanese scholar, Nishi Amane (1829-1887), invented a term for philosophy in his own language ‘the ‘study’ of ‘wisdom’, tetsugaku (tetsu, wisdom and gaku, learning) which was adopted into Chinese as zhexue with the same characters: 哲学. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century the Chinese Masters had already been labelled ‘philosophy.’ by the learned men of the day and by Jesuit missionaries from Belgium, e.g. Ferdinand Verbiest,5 Italy ,e.g. Matteo Ricci6, France7 and Portugal8. This may be concluded from the titles of e.g. Philosophica Sinica, etc.9 by François Noël S.J. of 1711 and Nicolas Malebranche’s small treatise Entretien d’un

philosophe chrétien et d’un philosophe chinois sur l’existence et la nature de Dieu of 1708.

5

See e.g. Blondeau, Roger A. (1970) Mandarijn en Astronoom. Ferdinand Verbiest S. J. (1623-1688)

aan het hof van de Chinese Keizer. Brugge-Utrecht 6

See e.g. Wiest, J.P. (2012) “Ricci: Pioneer of Chinese-Western Dialogue and Cultural Exchanges”.

International Bulletin of Mission Research

7_{Baldini, Ugo (2012). “French Jesuit Missionaries in China in the seventeenth and eighteenth}

centuries.” Metascience March 2012, Volume 21, Issue 1, 227-230

8

See e.g. Brockey, Liam (2000). "A Vinha do Senhor": The Portuguese Jesuits in China in the Seventeenth Century” Portuguese Studies,Vol. 16 (2000), pp. 125-147

9_{Noël, François S.J. (1711) Philosophia Sinica, tribus tractatibus, primo cognitionem primi entis,}

secondo ceremonias erga defunctos, tertio ethicam juxta Sinarum mentem complectans. Prague , J.J.

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16 Defoort (2001, 395) writes:

The difference was that in that age [17th JvM] there was still reciprocity, e.g. Aristotle’s work was described in Chinese terms (qionli gewu, ‘the investigation of things and exploration of principles’)10.

European learned men of the seventeenth century, among others Leibniz and Voltaire were very much interested in the East. As Voltaire put it:

“If, as a philosopher, one wishes to instruct oneself about what has taken place on the globe, one must first of all turn one’s eyes towards the East, the cradle of all arts, to which the West owes everything”.— Voltaire. 11

1.1.2 Opinions

Feng Youlan (1895-1990) who studied at Columbia University is a representative of the thought that Chinese Philosophy exists and that Chinese and Western thinkers alike participated in the universal human project of philosophy (in Defoort 2001: 397).

There is an implicit presence of a structured philosophy in their texts, but it is up to us to make it explicit; philosophical progress and originality lie hidden in inconspicuous commentaries, and it is up to us do discover them; weak points in Chinese philosophy, in particular epistemology, metaphysics, or logic, are often the result of the masters’ selective attention and conscious decision, and it is up to us to appreciate this.

Defoort (2001, 396) further discusses whether Chinese ‘philosophy’ is philosophy in the Western philosophical tradition in that it shows “systematic thinking, reflection and rationality”.

A great deal of the teachings of the old Chinese masters from the so-called Golden Age of Chinese philosophy (the fifth to third centuries) rarely meet these demands. Thinkers like Laozi and Confucius, who are traditionally branded as the founders of Taoism and Confucianism, respectively, expressed themselves in short proverbs, aphorisms, or conversations without concerning themselves too much with systematicity, logic, or any other philosophical criterion.

10

Defoort, Carine, “Is there such a thing as Chinese Philosophy? Arguments of an Implicit Debate.”

Philosophy East and West, Vol. 51, No. 3 pp 393-413

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17 Roger Ames 12 tells us ‘to take Chinese philosophy on its own terms and says of the

interpretation of Chinese ‘philosophy’ the following:

[t]hen, that we must begin from the interpretive context by taking into account the tradition’s own indigenous presuppositions and its own evolving self-understanding. We must be aware of the ambient, persistent assumptions that have given the Chinese

philosophical narrative its unique identity over time .

He gives us an example by mentioning some of the most ‘familiar’ terms, but warns that these are interpretations from a philosophy based on Greek standards that cannot be seen but from a Judeo-Christian perspective. Ames (2007, 14):

To the extent that Chinese philosophy has become the subject of Western philosophical interest, it has more often than not been analyzed within the framework of categories and philosophical problems not its own. (…) There are numerous examples of grossly

inappropriate language having become the standard equivalents in the Chinese/English dictionaries that we use to perpetuate our understanding of Chinese culture: ‘the Way’ (dao 道), ‘Heaven’ (tian天), ‘benevolence’(ren仁), ‘righteousness’ (yi義), ‘rites’ (li禮), ‘virtue’ (de德), ‘substance’ (ti體), ‘principle’ (li理), ‘material substance’ (qi氣), and so on. Can a Western student read the capitalized ‘Heaven’ as anything other than a metonym for the familiar notion of a transcendent God? Is living a life as someone’s son or daughter a ‘rite?’ Should we reduce what is quite literally the image of cultivated, consummate human beings in all their aspects – cognitive, moral, esthetic, religious, somatic – to a single

psychological disposition: ‘benevolence?’ When and in what context would a native English speaker ever utter the word ‘righteousness?

Thus Ames warns us not to employ a static Western interpretation of the works of the Chinese Masters. He certainly acknowledges the fact that we can compare East and West as to their philosophical thought, but we should always try to take into consideration the

comprehensive world behind it. Chinese thought is about ‘growing’, ‘developing’ and ‘moving’, both for the individual, the country and the universe. As an example: what Ames here calls ‘benevolence’, I would like to translate by a word that is now obsolescent in this meaning: ‘humaneness’, which does indeed mean showing benevolence, but encompasses

12

Ames, Roger T. (2017) “Better late than never: understanding Chinese philosophy and ‘translating it’ into the western academy.” Ethics and Education, 12:1, 6-17

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18 more. Humaneness is the essentiality of being human and becoming completely human and acting as a human being should at the same time, it points to the qualities that befit a man. The concept includes a sense of cultivating the self, attaining a higher level of one’s character, and that is exactly how it is used in Chinese thought. In modern day English it is hardly used differently from the meaning it has in e.g. a humane society that advocates “humane

treatment” of animals, which has come to mean ‘inflicting less pain’. Human is the term that has often replaced humane now, a static concept, not stressing the flow and the movement that is in the qualities of ‘humane’. So, what is wiser, translating from the Chinese using a term hardly anybody employs these days, or losing some of its meaning in ‘benevolence’? The point is that everybody strife to become a humane/benevolent human being and that is ‘practical ethics’.

1.1.3. My opinion

It is my opinion that the works of the Chinese Masters should be considered ‘philosophy’ of a practical kind and that they can be compared with the concepts of Western philosophers such as Peter Singer’s, who calls his philosophy ‘practical ethics’. I am comparing Peter Singer’s Western philosophy of the 21st century AD with how Mencius and Mozi of the 4th century BCE see an ideal society, worlds apart we might think. The titles of Peter Singer’s books: One

World (2002) and the revised edition One World now (2016) may make us think otherwise.

1.1.4. Zhongdaology, a Chinese view on the ‘Masters of Wisdom’

We should bear in mind that the methods of going about philosophy East and West are different. I am quite sympathetic to the ideas of Professor Keqian Xu of Nanjing Normal

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19 University who - in his 2016 essay-13: sheds some light on this difference by proposing an interesting view, based on Chinese concepts

‘The essence of traditional Chinese Confucian philosophy can be termed “Zhongdaology’’; it searches for the appropriate degree of zhong which is a standard guiding people’s

actions.’ [Generally translated as ‘the doctrine of the mean’ JvM]

He confronts his concept of ‘Zhongdaology’ or “zhong dao (the Way of Zhong)”with the concept of ontology in traditional Western philosophy. He states that the latter

‘[f]ocused attention on metaphysics, which studied the fundamental being of entities in reality. (…) With the premise that all entities in reality have their constant and fixed being, ontology deals with the abstract and static concept of being and the categories of being.

It goes without saying that there are a great number of important differences between the Western and Chinese philosophical traditions. In part they are due to the philosophical concepts that are the basis of their views and the language they are founded on. A.C. Graham, in his appendix 2 to Disputers of the Tao enlightens us on the subject 14 and Xu tells us in his article that in early ancient Chinese language the verb ‘to be’ and hence the gerund being did not exist. It is his view that therefore Chinese early philosophical masters have not paid attention to the ontological concept of being. ‘Only in the later Han Dynasty (25-220 B.C.E.) the modern Chinese equivalent of “to be”, i.e. shi began to be used as a predicate verb.’(189) In this essay and an earlier one “A Synthetic Comprehension of the Way of Zhong in Early Confucian Philosophy” of 201115

Xu explains that the concept of zhong is a synthesis of all the meanings of the word [and this means in ancient Chinese also a concept that could be used

13

Xu, Keqian (2016) “Confucian Philosophy of Zhongdaology and its practical significance in resolving conflicts”. Dialogue and Universalism No.4/2016

14

To Disputers of the Tao (1989), A.C. Graham attached Appendix 2: “The Relation of Chinese Thought to the Chinese Language in which he tells us many of the same things Professor Xu does.

15_{Xu, Keqian (2011)”A Synthetic Comprehension of the Way of Zhong in Early Confucian}

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20 in a philosophical sense]. As the word-concept zhong has no exact equivalent in English, Professor Xu provides us here with a number of options so that we can taste the gist of it e.g.

zhonghe (zhong and harmonious), zhongzeng (being just and correct [or sincere]’), zhizong

(wisdom and zhong, holding to the principle of zhong). (423). He claims that the translation that is generally used for zhongyong (practising zhong) or zhongdao (the Way of zhong) is the “doctrine of the mean”, although e.g. “Central Harmony”16

or Focusing the Familiar17 have been proposed.

The Origin of the ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ lies with Confucius, who found himself in a society out of harmony (和, he) in the middle of the 6th century BCE. Confucius suggested for improvement on the existing situation to put into practice the ‘doctrine of the mean’,

zhongyong. 18 He advocated returning to the detailed rites and rituals ‘li’ of the Zhou Dynasty. For him this was the exemplary model of society. It had been a just system and above all there was harmony in those days. Confucius believed that the Zhou Dynasty had reached the Dao of heaven, tian Dao天道. To quote from Confucius, Lunyu 8:2019

:

The Zhou, with two thirds of the world in its possession, continued to submit to and serve the House of Yin. The excellence of Zhou can be said to be the highest excellence20 of all.

Confucius stresses ‘station in society’ here. Possession of goods and land is not the criterion for excellence, but reverence and obedience to one’s masters, teachers or to tian, heaven itself. A virtuous person –or a whole dynasty in the case of the Zhou- knows exactly what his place in society is and does not veer from its path. He knows the right dao and for

16

Lin, Yutang. (1938). The Wisdom of Confucius. New York: The Modern Library.

17

Ames, Roger T., and Hall, David L. (2001). Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and

Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

18_{Confucian learning. See e.g. Legge, James (1920)The four books : Confucian analects, The great}

learning, The doctrine of the mean, and The works of Mencius, Shanghai

19

Translated as the Analects, I use the translation of Ames and Rosemont in this thesis 20

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21 Confucius that is the one guided by the principle of zhong, the doctrine of the mean.

Zhongyong, the practice of zhong, entails that in all activities and thoughts moderation should

be practised. Moderation engenders harmony in action and this then leads to a harmonious society. Harmony was a virtuous state to be reached through virtuous behaviour. Sincerity, 誠,

cheng, a virtuous behaviour played a key role here, it was seen as the root of human

behaviour. It should be practised until it became part and parcel of a just way of life and this is where 理 li, ritual comes in. Practising ritual and rites ensures this just and righteous

‘middle of the road’ way of living. Man must not go too far left or right but stand in the centre ‘without leaning towards one side’. For pure harmony it is necessary not to wander from the right tone, this is the central tone in music – music practised in the right way, harmoniously, is a firm basis for a well ordered society. Mark that Chinese is a musical language with its four notes to pronounce words on and words can be used as philosophical concepts. This is why the Ru/Confucianist Xunzi has devoted a whole chapter, number 20, of his book to music, how it should be used as a means of harmony, and why both Xunzi and Mencius attack Mozi on this subject. From Xunzi 20.4:21

It is precisely in their ritual and music that the Way of the Ancient Kings has its highest expression Yet Mozi condemns it. Thus, I say that Mozi’s understanding of the Way is like that of a blind man trying to distinguish white from black, or of a deaf man bass and treble notes, or like someone who tries to reach Chu [in the south] by traveling to the north.

Mozi proposed to do away with music altogether, because in his view rituals with dance and music cost too much money and time spent on making music could not be used on providing more basic needs. The Ru (Confucians) had lost their good practice of zhong in his days; Mozi describes how ritual was not moderate anymore. Professor Xu suggests that zhong

21_{Xunzi, Xunzi. (1999).Translated into English by John Knoblock. Hunan People’s Publishing House,}

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22 and dao together be used as a philosophical term for the Chinese practice of what I would call ‘practical’ ethics’:‘zhongdaology’. I must remark here that it cannot be a coincidence that the ‘zhong’-part of professor Xu’s term seems to fit Ruism (Confucianism) to a ‘T’, thereby perhaps leaving little room for alternative ‘philosophical’ worldviews for Early Chinese society. My view is that Mohism cannot be described in terms of ‘zhongdaology’, because it takes a position that is too extreme for Ruism. (See also:‘Mencius between his philosophical rivals’ on page 39 of this thesis).

1.2 The concept of Dao, 道

The concept of Dao can be looked at from various angles. The inherent quality of Dao is that it is utterly flexible. This means that we may think it is constant according to one perception, but that it turns out to have fled from our grasp the next moment. Why such a vague description of Dao here? The reason is that this is exactly the way Dao is made known to us. Dao might be a mainstream word in all Chinese classical philosophical texts - Dao is everywhere- but Dao means more than just the way it is still used in modern Chinese language today, namely a road to walk and drive on. Dao means a way of life, the road as a metaphor for the quest that life is. And Dao is considered the equivalent of a –maybe even firm- first principle by some scholars. From Dao comes everything in heaven and earth: 道生 萬物, dao sheng wan wu. Wanwu means the indefinite multitude of all forms and beings in manifest existence and is translated by Eno as ‘the things of the world’ 22

or in another, more literal translation it is the ‘ten thousand things’ and those cannot be but concrete, but it seems that the beginning of heaven and earth lies in nothingness. For me the truth of the matter lies

22

Lao zi (2010) Dao de Jing Translated by Robert Eno, version 1.2.of 2018. Indiana University, Bloomington.In his foreword Eno states: This translation was originally prepared for use by students in a general course on early Chinese thought. It should not be regarded as a scholarly translation.

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23 in the fact that Dao is empty and can be filled in accordance with the particular situations it is to serve. I would like to compare it to a classical Chinese painting of a landscape on a silk role. The art of landscape painting, 山水, shan shui (literally mountain-water)23 is strictly bound to rules: e.g. there should be at least one empty space in the painting, a void. This void is Dao. What it can be filled with is qi, 氣 the principle of energy which is the life force, the breath of life, the air around us that makes beings live and simply denotes the weather as well. ‘Tian qi hao’, in contemporary Chinese is just a greeting, meaning ‘It is nice weather’,

literally translated the qi, the life force of heaven (= the weather) good. The metaphor of the bellows, Laozi 24uses to describe Dao seems to go well with this thought

‘All between heaven and earth is like a great bellows. Empty, yet it does not collapse,

The more it is moved the more it issues forth.’

There exist many translations of this ancient manuscript, when I quote from a more modern one of 2001 that is quite poetic in style, it reads as follows:

Ways that can be spelled out. Cannot be the eternal way. Names that can be named

Must change with time and place.

“Emptiness” is what I call the origin of heaven and earth;

“Existence” is what I call the mother of everything that had a birth. Appreciate Emptiness, that we may see nature of the Way’s versatility; Appreciate Existence, that we may see the extent of the Way’s possibilities. These two, Emptiness and Existence, came from the same source.

Though they bear different names, they serve the same mystical cause. A mystery within a mystery,

Such is the gateway to all versatility.

23

See e.g. Trouveroy, N. (2003)”Landscape of the Soul: Ethics and Spirituality in Chinese Painting”.

India International Centre Quarterly, 1 July 2003, Vol.30(1), pp.5-19

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24 This translation is by Lok San Ho, who translated the Daodejing into English as: The Living

Dao: The Art and Way of Living A Rich & Truthful Life .25 At the end of his introduction Ho wants his readers to know that:

[L]aozi did not write the Daodejing as a Chinese, but as a member of the human race. I hope that readers will see the Daodejing not as a sample of Chinese philosophy, but as an exploration to the meaning and value of life itself from someone whose inner reflections are unusually sharp and downright honest.

To adhere to a certain Dao also means agreeing with that particular lifestyle and the principles connected with it, e.g. the Confucian Dao, or the Mohist Dao or the Daoist Dao. Just as Keqian Xu informs us about zhong in the paragraph before this, there is no one-to-one corresponding translation in English for Dao. Dao takes various forms in the philosophical texts that are considered. For Western philosophers this makes it not the most agreeable concept to consider, it is not straightforward enough to their prevalent taste for seeking Truth. Professor Xu even suggests translating Dao by Truth at times. 26

The Pre-Qin scholars’ enthusiastic attitude in pursuing “Dao”, was quite similar to the attitude of the ancient Greek philosophers in pursuing “Truth”, which was considered as the ultimate goal in their philosophic pursuing.

There is, however, a difference, in paragraph 2.4, Xu says:

Searching for “Truth” in traditional Western philosophy mainly asks the question of “What is?” While searching for “Dao” in Pre-Qin Chinese philosophy mainly asks the question of “How to?”

25

Ho, Look San (2001) The Living Dao: The Art and Way of Living A Rich & Truthful Life

November13, 2001, Lingnan University, Hong Kong (revised August 4, 2009

26_{Xu, Keqiang “Chinese “Dao” and Western “Truth: A Comparative and Dynamic Perspective 6}

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1.3 The Period of the Warring States, the quest for a uniting political

philosophy (475– 221BCE)

From: Ancient History Encyclopaedia online (free of copyright for educational purposes)

The Chinese masters Mencius and Mozi whose works I will discuss in this thesis lived in the period of the Warring States. As already suggested by the name, the period was rampant with war, but due to this turmoil it provided room for innovation as well. In agriculture better water management was applied and peasants started to use iron tools, which advanced production a lot. A new type of administrator, not only chosen from the ranks of the landed gentry

anymore, was being employed in the cities. China did not know a bourgeois middle class. The court of the ruler with its vast household was at the top of society, immediately thereafter came the peasants, then the artisans and craftsmen and merchants held the lowest position. Due to the constant shifting of power among the rulers in the Period of the Warring States, there was also room for innovation in thought. Chinese masters of wisdom were employed by

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26 the rulers of the states as political advisers and once they had got famous, their value went up, so to speak, and rulers tried to lure them away from their rivals.

Near the end of the period of the Warring States the seven largest states were: Qín (秦), Chǔ (楚), Qí (齊), Yàn (燕), Hán (韓), Zhào (趙), and Wèi (魏): There had been other, smaller states, but these had been conquered and enfeoffed by the larger states. The ruler of such a state goes by the name of hegemon; he is not just any ruler, but one with influence over a large area, mostly with several cities in it. This period was to last to 221 BCE when the state of Qin had grown large enough to claim the over-all hegemony. Then Qin Shi Huangdi proclaimed himself emperor and ruler of the whole area known to its inhabitants as the Middle Kingdom: zhong guo. 中国.

In the period of the ‘Warring States’ the role of city states changed, largely due to economic prosperity. They became ‘macro-states’, that extracted taxes and services [e.g. conscription for military service] from the peasantry and were to be ‘nodes in an

administrative network that “existed for the sake of the country and not vice versa”. So the rural component rather than the cities ‘defined the Chinese way of life’.27

Crops were more abundant in these days, due to better water management, iron tools and use of fertilizers. Many new cities were founded and older ones expanded. In the Warring States Period cities grew from populations of a few thousand to a few tens of thousands, to cities of ‘ten thousand households’ or more and that will have meant up to 200,000 people. An interesting

development was the shift from the ‘concentric’ city to the ‘double city’. Formerly the entire hustle and bustle of the city with all its specific quarters designated to administration or varied handicrafts had been enclosed by one wall. Now a new urban space was created by raising a

27_See_{Lewis, M.E. (2006). The construction of space in early China. State University of New York}

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27 rammed earth platform which was to house a district for nobles and political affairs. Larger cities such as Linzi in the state of Qi had two distinct walled enclosures, of which one served as the ‘palace-city’ for rulers and administrators and the other as a place for merchants, artisans and peasants. Sometimes artisans had their own distinct place as well (Lewis (2006), 150,151).

1.3.1 Philosophers in the Period of the Warring States

In order to make his influence last, a hegemon needed more than just the conquest of other states and a raised platform in the city from which he ruled. In the period of the Warring States, there was a quest for a political philosophy that could serve as a firm basis for an ever enlarging kingdom that would ultimately grow into the Empire in 221 BCE, based on the state of Qin and its conquests.

The various rulers of the Warring States employed masters. They were itinerant scholars, wandering from one court to the next. Mostly they were invited to stay for a large period of time, so that they could advise the ruler on politics and related philosophical

matters. Ancient Chinese Philosophy is a practical philosophy as a matter of course. When the state and its people do not experience chaos and the ruler is able to maintain harmony, all things, i.e. heaven and earth (and man in the middle) prosper. These philosophical masters did not come alone; they brought their ‘manuscripts’ with them, a collection of bamboo slips, transported in a great number of ox-drawn carts. With them travelled their families and

servants and their disciples. The ruler of a state had to provide lodging for all these people and their animals and belongings. Small wonder that sometimes such a peripatetic philosopher was left standing at the gate of a city. The ruler had to decide first whether it was worthwhile to invest in the ideas of this master of wisdom and his retinue.

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28 From Mencius IIIB 4:

P’eng Keng asked, ‘Is it not excessive to travel with a retinue of hundreds of followers in scores of chariots, and to live off one feudal lord after another?’

Mencius answers when P’eng Keng says that a 君子,junzi, gentleman (literal meaning: lord’s son) should earn his keep by working for it, that the philosopher should be fed because he is ‘a man who practises morality’ and that is ‘how he makes a living.’

1.3.1.1. The hundred schools of thought

The period of the Warring States knew much turmoil, but such an almost chaotic situation creates opportunities as well. This certainly occurred in the field of thinking. As pointed out in the previous chapter there were many itinerant philosophers who offered their services to the rulers. They had all kinds of suggestions for an ethical mode of behaviour in society. This applied to the behaviour of the peasants and other common people and implied the ways of governance by the principal rulers of the country. The Han Feizi (mid-3rd century BCE) by Han Fei Zi or- though of a much later date but before 139 BCE, the Huainanzi by Liu An –a prince himself, the king of Huainan, are examples of books with prescriptions of how princes should rule.

1.3.1.2. The Jixia Academy

The ruler of the state of Qi founded and funded the famous Jixia academy, where philosophers were able to share their thoughts in debate. We know that Mencius was employed here for a period of time. Richard Hartnett 28 (2011, 79) writes:

28_{Hartnett, Richard A. (2011)The Jixia Academy and the Birth of Higher Learning in China. The}

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29 The Jixia was given faculty privileges, including completely free thought and expression, and in return the Qi ruler expected Jixia to contribute to good government, including frank and fearless criticism of the ruler when this was necessary. Jixia balanced scholarly inquiry and disputation with scholarly responsibility for the affairs of state. The relation between scholars and the state was seen as one of mutual dependence.

1.3.1.3. The six schools of thought jia

The most common indexation of all philosophical theories that were known as the ‘Hundred Schools of Thought’ is the one made by the historian Si Ma Tan shortly before Chin Shi Huangdi proclaimed himself the first emperor of the Middle Kingdom in 221 BCE.

According to Sima Tan’s classification and invention the most important schools of thought were the following six:

1. Yinyang,

2. Ru (known to us as Confucians), 3. Mo (The Mohists),

4. Fajia (called Legalists), 5. Mingjia (called Sophists)

6. Daojia (or Daode, the supposed Daoists).

As Westerns students of ancient Chinese philosophical thought, we are accustomed to these six which might be to our minds the ‘most important’ schools. At the least they are the most well-known to us. The writings have been translated and/or commented upon by many scholars since the reception of Chinese thought in the West in the seventeenth century AD by eminent scholars of the Enlightenment both in France and in Germany among whom Leibniz, Malebranche and Voltaire.

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30 I will quote Kidder Smith next who is interested how these schools of philosophical thought functioned in society, since Si Ma Tan is not explicit on this point.

From Smith (2003, p. 150)29

As a historian, I am curious about the Warring States origins of those ideas Tan appropriates to the six jia. In particular, I would like to know more about groupings-of men, of ideas, over time, in one place or many, in their relationships with their own and other groups, formed to what ends and by what means, in their conjunction with state power. Until recently, all students of this past accepted the theory of the Many Schools (baijia)-six or ten main ones, plus many smaller, family-owned ones. (…) we know it does not represent conditions in the Warring States.

Csikszentmihalyi and Nylan (2003) for instance prefer the term ‘scholastic lineages’ to be applied to these bodies of philosophical thought. 30

The framework of six schools of thought or more accurately ‘scholastic lineages’, as jia is typically translated, was an invention of: Sima Tan. He was lord grand astrologer (taishigong) to the Han court. His essay Yaozhi (Essential points) was included in the final chapter of his son Sima Qian’s Taishigong , which is generally known in Chinese as the Sjiji and in English as Records of

the Grand Historian.31

And Smith again (2003, 129)

All previous classifications of thought had identified doctrine with the name of a founding teacher, e.g. “the transmissions of Laozi.” By contrast Sima Tan’s account omits all personal names save Mozi, and instead of seeking to group men or texts, it organizes knowledge with reference to its intellectual content. Tan abstracted this content from the zi or Masters literature of the Warring States/early Han period and refashioned it into six ideal types. Names for the first three types – Yinyyang, Ru and Mo –pre-existed Tan. The other names –Fajia, Mingjia, and Daojia – were his own invention. All six groups were in an important sense synthetic. Though drawing on presently existent knowledge (e.g. yinyang cosmic cycles, the frugality of the Mo), each was in varying degrees a novel combination, crafted for its usefulness in ruling the empire.

29

Smith, Kidder (2003). Sima Tan and the Invention of Daoism, “Legalism,” et cetera. The Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 1 (February 2003):129-156

30_{See Csikszentmihalyi, M. and M. Nylan, (2003) Constructing lineages and inventing traditions}

through exemplary figures in early China. Toung Pao LXXXIX pp 59-99. Brill, Leiden 31

Sima Qian (145 or 135 BCE-86? BCE) followed into his father’s footsteps (Si Ma Tan 190-110 BCE) and was responsible for the library of the first Q’in emperor Qin Shi Huangdi and consequently in charge of all written material that was to be read during this period, he continued to use his father’s classification of the six jia that bundled slightly varying, but still distinctive philosophical lineages together.as in the case of the three Daoist ‘branches’: He made the Zhuangzi the authoritative writings for this jia. Sima Qian compiled the Shiji 史記, the first large and universal history of China that influenced countless generations of Chinese historians.

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1.4. The Ru mandate of heaven

天命,

‘tian ming’ and Mozi’s

天志,

tian zhi,

intention (or will) of heaven

Heaven and earth together, tian di (天地), have in modern Chinese still the same meaning as in ancient times: it means: all. In Chinese cosmic thought of how the world is composed,

macrocosm and microcosm mirror each other and form at the same time a closed system with man on top of the microcosm between heaven and earth. When there is peace and quiet and order in society, everybody will benefit. Chaos should at all times be avoided. Chinese

philosophy is about relations and must explain how things and people are placed in the greater scheme of the totality of things that have originated from the same source, i.e. Dao. It is of the utmost importance that all things and people are in their right place and have the right names that indicate the right relations.

In the Confucian strain of thought the ruler was endowed with tian ming, the mandate of heaven. Confucius, who saw that in his time, the Spring and Autumn period (Confucius was born in the middle of the sixth century B.C.E, during the eastern Zhou dynasty.), the right order in society was lost, had proposed a strict system of rites and ritual that involved both everyday good behaviour and higher order rituals, such as the ‘Spring and Autumn offerings’ executed by the ruler, that served a well-ordered functioning of society.

As history had taught, a ruling house could hold tian ming, the mandate of heaven, only as long as it acted in a morally right way. Therefore it was of the utmost importance that rulers and ruled alike believed in a sound philosophical basis for politics. Confucius had proposed a system of rules and rituals based upon the stability of the sovereignty of the ruler. As long as people recognised that heaven and earth could only be in harmony through the intermediary of a good ruler and practised rites and rituals as they should, there would be

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32 prosperity in the land. From common people to the ruler, all should comply with li, ritual. All should adhere to their station and position in society and do what their specific duty is. The ruler should execute the state sacrifices directed at tian, heaven and the common people should honour their ancestors by small sacrifices. So li, ritual or duty, became one of the main virtues in Confucius’ thinking and was considered the source of harmony.

Mencius (孟子, 372-289 BCE), some two centuries after Confucius, sees heaven as an anonymous, ethical force that may reward and punish, but does this through the behaviour of the ruler. When a ruler is unjust and inhumane towards his subjects, tian, heaven, will see to it that he is abolished from the throne. The people will become so dissatisfied in that situation that the ‘mandate of heaven’ is taken from him. This is a situation that occurs about every five to seven hundred years according to the Mencius. Then a new, humane leader will come to power. Mencius’ ideal state is one that is led by a virtuous absolute ruler, who constantly watches over and cares for his grateful subjects.

The Mohists believe in tian zhi, heaven’s ‘íntention’ or the ‘will of heaven’. Tian, heaven is a force to be reckoned with for everyone, it can punish and reward. Note, however, that tian, heaven is never a transcendent notion. Tian, heaven, has just a special place in nature and people should find a way how to live with tian, heaven, on an daily basis. Mozi has to make a change to the ‘mandate of heaven. He acknowledges the ruler as the governing force of society, just as the Confucians do, but does away with the hierarchy that is inherent in the ‘mandate of heaven’. For him tian, heaven is there for all people and what is more, treats them all in an equal way. Mozi had to change the theoretical position of tian, heaven because of his egalitarian theories. Even the king was subject to these. When a king can be just as fallible as any other person and can be abolished from the throne by a man with better

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33 leadership qualities, the mandate of heaven is no longer existent. Tian, heaven gets the

function of being able to directly punish and reward without the mediation of the ruler. I quote here from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mohism: 3. the search for objective standards)32:

This notion of taking Heaven as a moral role model leads the Mohists to develop a credible normative theory based on equal, impartial concern for the welfare of all. At the same time, however, it steers them into formulating some of their central normative principles in a potentially problematic way. Their conception of Tian (Heaven) provides a compelling basis for arguing that everyone’s interests have equal moral worth. But since the Mohists believe that Tian acts impartially on everyone’s behalf, adopting it as a moral model tends to imply that each of us as individuals is obliged to treat others and ourselves equally — to act in others’ interest exactly as we act in our own. This view, if indeed the Mohists hold it, would invite several objections commonly levelled at crude forms of utilitarianism. The most obvious is that limitations on our time and resources make it practically impossible for us to act equally on others’ behalf as well as our own. (…)The Mohists’ ethical theory thus raises fundamental questions concerning the moral claim on us of others’ interests, the role of impartiality, fairness, and benevolence in an adequate ethical code, and the elements of a good life — questions that remain vital in moral philosophy today.

The Mohist dao, seen as a method and a way of life, gradually lost its appeal.

Obviously because Qin Shi Huangdi, the first ruler of the Qi empire (221-206 BCE) had made Han Feizi’s legalist theory based on standards and laws the official theory of the state and during the dynasty that followed, the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 AD), Ruism

(Confucianism) was the dominant political ideology. The real reason why Mohist ethics, which have a rather sound practical basis, faded into the background is not fully known. Of influence might have been that such a stringent life-style could only be followed to the letter in small groups of like-minded people and that society at large demanded more from life than just a frugal subsistence.

32_{Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}_{https://plato.stanford.edu/}_{“Mohism” by Chris Fraser First}

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1.5 The concept of filial piety xiao:

孝

Although filial piety seems to be a matter of course, as it is customary in most cultures to honour your parents and elders, xiao, filial piety deserves extra attention in ancient Chinese philosophy. It is the basis for order in society. Confucius had even made it into one of the main virtues of people and so of civilisation as a whole. As Läänemets 33 writes, it had acquired a sacred dimension in China

In tribal life elders and seniors kept a leading role in the society. The worship of ancestors was a necessary component of the cultivation of filial piety, and it was transferred into the religious cult as early as in the Shang-Yin period. In the early Zhou period, the concept of filial piety had obtained a sacred dimension, and the cultivation of that was considered as the main guarantee for the maintaining of the stability and order in the society.

As the family was and is considered the building block of society, filial piety is by extension applied to society as a whole. Sons should show filial piety to fathers, fathers to ancestors, common people to their superiors and ministers to rulers. Filial piety is considered a standard of behaviour throughout civilization. It was and still is the pillar of the

hierarchically organised Chinese family unit. The Chinese saying “Of all virtues, filial piety is the first”, is still in use today. Not being filial enough creates a sense of shame, you lose face and it means that you show lack of character. It is a matter of honour to behave as a good son to one’s parents and as a good citizen to one’s country. Filial piety is symbolised in food and money. These two aspects rank highly in Chinese civilisation and beyond. Good food which is attractively presented and eating out with the family is a revered tradition and the deceased are given a lot of money and food (often in the form of paper objects) with them in the grave to continue the good life they had on earth wherever they may be going.

33

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35

1.6 The concept of xin:

心,

both heart-organ and heart-mind

The heart is considered by the Chinese to have more functions than that of physical engine of the body alone. Emotions, impressions and deliberations come together in this central human organ and are welded into a meaningful moral whole. Xin is the seat of life: the physical heart-organ and at the same time the ‘heart-mind’, seat of reflection and moral conduct. Living a morally meaningful life starts within the heart. Xin always refers to something good and is directly connected to the life people lead.

To give an example, when [today] the Chinese refer to ‘using Heart’ to do a task, it refers to efficiency and quality of the work, and to have a positive attitude. Therefore, having xin throughout the entire process of completing a task is highly valued and regarded as genuine and noble. Conversely, one cannot say in Chinese ‘use Heart to cheat’ or ‘use Heart to steal’. Just as xin relates to moral values, it is also related to doing something good. 34

The Chinese are devoted to tiao xin 條心

,

orderliness of the heart, cultivating the heart, so that life can be led in peace and harmony with oneself and others. For that reason so many Chinese practise some sort of cultivation of the body in the form of physical exercise as Qigong and peaceful martial arts such as Tai Qi.

In the Analects, Confucius uses

[t]he metaphor of ‘ The heart is the ruler of the body’, the heart organ is regarded as the central faculty of cognition and the site of both affective and cognitive activities in ancient Chinese philosophy. The heart is considered the central faculty of cognition. The universe will make no sense to us without our heart functioning as the organ for thinking, knowing, and understanding. (Yu, N. 2007 p 33)35

34

Li, Jing, Christer Ericsson and Mikael Quennerstedt, “The meaning of the Chinese Cultural Keyword Xin “ Journal of Languages and Culture, 2013, Vol.4(5), pp.75-89

35_{Yu, N. (2007). “Heart and cognition in ancient Chinese Philosophy”. Journal of Cognition and} Culture 7(1-2):27-47

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36

Chapter 2: Mencius

孟子

(372-289 BCE)

2.1 Introduction:

The four duan (端), beginnings or sprouts:

Ren(仁), humaneness or benevolence,

yi (義), righteousness or duty,

li (禮), ritual and etiquette and

zhi (智), wisdom, discerning right from wrong.

Mencius or Mengzi, master Meng, 孟子 (372–289 BC or 385–303 or 302 BC) -his given name was Meng Ke 孟軻 is an ancient Chinese philosopher of (low) noble birth whose work the Mencius is probably compiled by his pupils and disciples. Mencius elaborates on

Confucius whose stories, anecdotes and wisdoms are written down in the Analects.36 For Mencius man’s nature, 性,xing, is good to begin with, but in order to make this innate goodness flourish, cultivating this human nature with its four good sprouts, the beginnings, the 端,duan,37 is necessary. Those sprouts are in themselves virtues or serve as virtuous attitudes to attain virtue. With Confucius they are still virtuous behaviours, in the Mencius virtues in their own right. The four sprouts are: ren, benevolence or [as I prefer] humaneness,

yi, righteousness or duty, li, ritual and etiquette and zhi, wisdom: discerning right from wrong.

The English translations of the Chinese concepts slightly vary with the translator’s

interpretation of their meaning; sometimes they decide that ‘being faithful to the original in

36

or Lunyu as its original title goes

37_{In modern Chinese duan means straight or upright as an adjective: literally (bean)sprouts are}

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37 meaning is more important than gaining in fluency and clarity.’38 With Mencius humaneness is a virtue in itself and so is righteousness, but the latter also serves as the virtuous attitude through which one can become a humane person. The virtues of humaneness/benevolence and righteousness are often paired in the Mencius, which leads to courage and courageous

behaviour.

Mencius IV A, 27 39

Mencius said, ‘The content of benevolence is the serving of one’s parents; the content of dutifulness is obedience to one’s elder brothers; the content of wisdom is to understand these two and to hold fast to them; the content of the rites is the regulation and adornment of them; the content of music is the joy that comes of delighting in them. When joy arises how can one stop it? And when one cannot stop it, then one begins to dance with ones feet and wave one’s arms without knowing it.’

2.2 Virtues and emotions in the Mencius

As the example that shows that goodness is innate Mencius uses the imagery of a child on the verge of falling down a well 40 when people see this happening they immediately feel a spontaneous emotion of pity:

He would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of shame is not human, whoever is devoid of the heart of courtesy and modesty is not human, and whoever is devoid of the heart of right and wrong is not human. The heart of compassion is the germ of benevolence; the heart of shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom. Man has these four germs just as he has four limbs. For a man possessing these four germs to deny his own potentialities is for him to cripple himself …

38

Mozi I, translation into English by Wang Rongpei and Wang Hong. Library of Chinese Classics

From the Preface, page 50

39

Mencius, Mencius (1970, 2003/4) Translated into English by D.C. Lau. Penguin Classics

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38 Mencius calls this spontaneous reaction ‘not being able to bear the grief or misfortune of other people’41, and this holds the germ of humaneness/benevolence (ren).So humaneness starts with an emotion. When the environment is beneficial this germ grows into a full virtue. However, this development can be disturbed both from the inside and the outside. For virtues to grow to maturity, a good foundation is needed, well fertilised soil, so to speak.

Mencius speaks of various hearts xin (the Chinese language knows no plural). Edward Slingerland has an interesting theory about the rendering of xin into the English language and what it entails into Western philosophical concepts.

Edward Slingerland42 remarks:

Although the xin is often portrayed as the locus of emotion as well as other cognitive abilities in the pre-Warring States period (roughly 1500 BCE–450 BCE), this study suggests that, by the end of the Warring States (221 BCE), there is a clear trend whereby the xin is less and less associated with emotions and becomes increasingly portrayed as the unique locus of “higher” cognitive abilities: planning, goal maintenance, rational thought, categorization and language use, decision-making, and voluntary willing. This neatly maps onto a parallel trend in the translation of early Chinese texts: in pre Warring States texts,

xin is almost exclusively translated as “heart,” whereas translations begin to switch to

“heart–mind”(or simply vary among themselves between “heart” or “mind”) by the early Warring States and then render xin almost exclusively as “mind” by the time we reach such late Warring States texts as the Zhuangzi or Xunzi.

Slingerland’s study gives a kind of proof that the ‘heart-mind’ that was considered both the source of emotions and of thinking had developed into a source of cognition in philosophical writings at the time of the Warring States. For me the four sprouts, duan, of Mencius and what they entail form a mixture of emotions and cognition in xin, the heart. I regard the use of emotions in the case of the child due to fall into the well as a prelude to a sense of cognition that provides us with reason. The contents of reason in this case is that a human being that

41

Mencius translation into Dutch by Karel L. van der Leeuw page 107 . It says here literally ‘the heart

of the not being able to bear’, but it is clear that this is the’ not being able to bear the grief or misfortune of other people’. The example of the child on the verge of falling down the well has become the staple image of spontaneous compassion [my translation]

42_{Slingerland, Edward (2013) “Body and Mind in Early China: An integrated humanities-science}

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39 shows humaneness/benevolence cannot bear the suffering of a fellow human being. The emotion that stirs up the cognition may not be considered a sufficiently valuable philosophical concept for moral action in Western philosophical thought. At least, Peter Singer does not think so, for him only a utilitarian philosophical concept that is ‘universalizable’43 and seen from the ‘standpoint of the universe’ –he quotes Henry Sidgwick- 44 can give a reason for ethical behaviour such as his movement of ‘Effective Altruism’. Yet Singer frequently uses emotions to make us see the reason why we should have altruistic feelings. I wonder if his audience would be just as interested in his theories if his lectures did not contain the examples he shows us and which he uses to make us see reason in spending our ‘surplus’ money on people in need. In that case his theory could be compared to a Kantian ‘categorical imperative’: you should give to people in need, as you would like them to do, were

circumstances reversed. And then Singer’s theory would be not much more than the golden rule of Confucius: ‘Do to others as you would like them to do to you’45

. Singer, by the way ascribes this rule to the figure of the Moses of the Old Testament of the Bible.

2.3. Mencius among his philosophical rivals: Yang Zhu and Mozi

Mencius likes to walk the Confucian path of the middle and to adhere to the ‘doctrine of the mean’ (zhongyong). That is why he polarises his position towards his philosophical rivals of the period of the Warring States. Yang Zhu 楊朱 (around 440-360 BCE)46

of whom is said that he promotes a philosophy of egoism [probably just meaning that he takes the ‘self’ and its preservation as a guiding standard], belonged to the circles of the individualists or

43

Singer (1979,205) On ‘universalizable’: ‘Ethics and reason both require us to rise above our own

particular point of view and take a perspective from which our own personal identity –the role we happen to occupy – is unimportant. Thus reason requires us to act on universalizable judgments and, tot hat extent, to act ethically.’

44_{Singer, Peter (1979). Practical Ethics . Cambridge University Press, p. 219} 45

Analects, 15,24

Are double standards required? A case study in evaluating ethics East and West: Mencius, Mozi and Peter Singer