• No results found

American Empire through Foreign Aid: The Case of the Global Gag Rule

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "American Empire through Foreign Aid: The Case of the Global Gag Rule"

Copied!
43
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

American Empire through Foreign Aid:

The Case of the Global Gag Rule

Tom Meinderts (S1533762)

t.o.meinderts@umail.leidenuniv.nl

3 July 2020

MA International Relations: Global Political Economy

Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan London

Second Reader: Dr. Fynn-Paul

Wordcount: 14981

(2)

Table of Contents

Introduction ... 2

Case and Context: The Global Gag Rule Introduced ... 4

The Politics of the Global Gag Rule ... 6

Theorising American Empire ... 8

The United States as an Empire ... 11

Imperialism through Foreign Aid ... 11

Gaps and the Puzzle ... 13

Analytical Framework and Method ... 14

Neo-Gramscianism ... 14

Gramscian Hegemony in Foreign Aid ... 15

Intermestic Affairs ... 16

The Intermestic President ... 17

An Intermestic Neo-Gramscian Framework ... 18

Operationalising Neo-Gramscianism ... 19

Research Design ... 20

Explanatory Case Study Design ... 21

Evaluating Claims ... 22

The Evangelical Advisory Board and the Global Gag Rule ... 23

American Lobbying Practices and the New Christian Right ... 23

Religion, Politics, and Domestic Hegemony ... 24

Christian Right Policy-Making as a Political Tool ... 28

The Diffusion of Ideology through Foreign Aid ... 30

Conclusion: The Global Gag Rule and American Empire ... 32

Bibliography ... 34

(3)

Introduction

Mere days after his inauguration, President Donald Trump reinstated the Global Gag Rule (GGR). The GGR1 – also known as the Mexico City Policy – bans US federal funding for international NGOs providing services for abortions. The GGR, originally implemented under the Reagan administration, was maintained under President George H. W. Bush, before being rescinded by President Bill Clinton, reinstated by President George W. Bush, and rescinded once more by President Barrack Obama. However, the embracement of the gag rule under the Trump administration amounted to more than a reinstatement. In contrast to practices maintained during the Reagan and Bush administrations, Trump’s GGR targets not only specific family planning services, but entire organisations that provide such services. Moreover, it applies not only to Federal agencies providing developmental aid, but all “global health assistance furnished by all departments or agencies.”2 As such, Trump’s variant of the

GGR is wider in its scope and has broader implications for the administration of foreign aid and, say critics, for global public health and human rights.

While a great deal of attention has been given to GGR’s impacts and questionable effectiveness in achieving its goals, relatively less has been given to a broader but in respects more fundamental concern: how successive US presidential administrations use foreign aid to promote their ideological commitments worldwide. Addressing this concern, this thesis construes the Trump administration’s GGR as an instance of a crucially important but often overlooked aspect of US presidential power, the role of ideas in American empire.

As this thesis will show, an analysis of the GGR illustrates how foreign aid can be used to spread American ideology and how the diffusion of this ideology is contingent on the administration and the contemporary domestic discourse. Especially with programs in which other states are reliant on foreign aid, the US is able to effectively diffuse American values and pursue American interests because these programs are essential for the recipient country. This power dynamic can be interpreted as a form of imperialism as the US is able to

influence the values and practices of peoples in the countries where they provide developmental aid.`

1 Donald J. Trump. “Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Mexico City Policy.” The White House Website.

January 23, 2017.

(4)

In its analysis of the GGR, this study draws our attention to a still more fundamental and equally overlooked dynamic: how the character and diffusion of a presidential

administration’s ideology is itself contingent on US domestic politics and US presidential electoral politics in particular. Specifically, it locates the origins of Trump’s GGR in the administration’s ties to right wing US Christian groups, a key element of the president’s domestic base. This confluence of domestic and international politics has been dubbed ‘intermestic’ and is especially prevalent as a concept in foreign aid. As such, this thesis argues that the Global Gag Rule is an intermestic instance of American empire which simultaneously consolidates political power domestically, while exporting conservative Christian ideology.

Theoretical literature on foreign aid and empire reflects multiple perspectives, each distinguished by different assumptions concerning the nature, origins, and dynamics of ideology and its role in international relations and the politics of empire. Among numerous theoretical frames, the intermestic Neo-Gramscian approach stands out for its attention to the power dynamics between the hegemon and those it impacts simultaneously on a domestic and an international level. This thesis will illustrate the value and limits of this approach. It will use the GGR to contribute to a critique of intermestic Neo-Gramscian theory. As such, this thesis will contribute to current debates on an important issue in global public health, a key aspect of US foreign policy and aid, and to broader theoretical debates on the role of ideas in the politics of empire and the confluence of domestic and foreign policies.

The thesis is organized in five sections. Section one, immediately below, provides additional background on the origins of the GGR and the problems it raises for analysing the US and, more specifically, US presidential power. The second section addresses theoretical literature, identifying the value and limits of extant literature. On this basis, the third section outlines a theoretical framework and analytical approach specifying the research question and the methods to be employed in addressing it. This section also specifies theoretical

hypotheses of the intermestic literature to be explored. The fourth section constitutes the analysis and its findings. The fifth and final section discusses the significance of these findings while also pointing out the limitations of this study and areas for further research. Overall, this study shows how the GGR is used to consolidate political power

domestically while also diffusing conservative Christian ideology through developmental aid. In this way, the GGR is shown to be an instance of intermestic policy which is used to

simultaneously consolidate political power domestically, while exporting conservative Christian ideology through foreign aid as American empire.

(5)

Case and Context: The Global Gag Rule Introduced

The GGR was created by the Reagan administration as an elaboration of the administration’s stance on abortion and foreign aid at the United Nations International Conference on Population and Development in Mexico City in 1984. The original policy stated that “Attempts to use abortion … must be shunned,” that “the United States does not consider abortion an acceptable element of family planning,” and most significantly, that “the US will insist that no part of its

contribution will be used for abortion.”3

While this statement was a clear policy deviation from the previous administrations, there was already a legislative precedent for this policy stance through the Helms

Amendment of 1973. The Helms Amendment states that foreign aid cannot be used to

perform abortions as family planning. Due to the wording of the amendment, abortions could still be performed by international organisations if they could argue that the abortion was for a purpose other than family planning. However, coupled with the GGR, the Helms

Amendment effectively banned foreign aid to organisations which perform, advocate, or advise about abortions.

Reagan’s GGR remained the official policy stance of the US for nine years until it was rescinded under the Clinton administration in 1993. The Clinton administration argued that the GGR’s “excessively broad anti-abortion conditions are unwarranted” and that they “have undermined efforts to promote safe and efficacious family planning programs.”4

However, the Bush Jr. administration restored the GGR eight years later arguing that it was the conviction of President Bush that “taxpayer funds appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act should not be given to foreign nongovernmental organizations that perform

3 White House Office of Policy Development. “US Policy Statement for the International Conference on

Population.” Population and Development Review 10, no.3 (1984): 578.

4William Clinton. “Memorandum for the Acting Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 22 January 1993. 1973 •Helms Amendment

1984

•Mexico City Policy (GGR) •Reagan, 1st Iteration

1993 •Clinton, 1st Rescinding

2001 •Bush, 2nd Iteration

2009 •Obama, 2nd Rescinding

(6)

abortions or actively promote abortion.”5 Bush’s iteration of the GGR was rescinded by the

Obama administration in 2009 which reiterated Clinton’s argument that the GGR’s

“excessively broad conditions on grants and assistance awards are unwarranted” and “have undermined efforts to promote safe and effective voluntary family planning programs.”6 The last iteration of the GGR was created in 2017 when it was reinstated once more, by the Trump administration.7 The GGR is a highly partisan issue, as becomes apparent from the list of administrations that have reinstated or rescinded the policy. As the following sections will show, the different iterations of the GGR were, at least partially, reinstated due to active lobbying efforts by conservative Christian lobby groups. This has created a synergy within conservative administrations wherein the administration is able to consolidate its Christian voter base, while the lobby groups are able to achieve tangible policy goals. The wide net cast by Trump’s GGR has significant implications on global health and human rights. Its supporters may argue that the GGR could decrease abortions, but whatever the moral implications, there is no evidence of the GGR decreasing the number of abortions.8 On the contrary, there is evidence suggesting that the GGR might increase abortion rates.9 Moreover, the GGR cuts funding to the entire organisation if they provide abortions. Therefore, access to healthcare is decreased for those using these facilities.

Furthermore, the GGR has a direct impact on reproductive rights. Article 16 of the “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” states that women have the right “to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their childrenand to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights.”10 As such, the GGR has a direct impact on a woman’s ability to exercise these rights.

5 George W. Bush. “Restoration of the Mexico City Policy.” Executive Office of the President, 29 March 2001. 6Barrack Obama. “Mexico City Policy and Assistance for Voluntary Population Planning.” Executive Office of

the President, 28 January 2009.

7 Donald J. Trump. “Presidential Memorandum Regarding the Mexico City Policy.” The White House Website.

January 23, 2017

8 Ann M. Starrs. “The Trump Global Gag Rule: An Attack on US Family Planning and Global Health Aid.” The

Lancet 389, no. 10068 (2017): 485-486.

9 Eran Bendavid, Patrick Avila, and Grant Miller. “United States Aid Policy and Induced Abortion in

Sub-Saharan Africa.” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 89 (2011): 873-880c.

10 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Convention on the Elimination of All

(7)

The Politics of the Global Gag Rule

The GGR can be considered a prime example of American empire through foreign aid, fuelled by conservative Christian lobby groups. However, literature concerning the GGR is limited, particularly in the case of the Trump administration. Moreover, most of the literature is concerned with global health outcomes and implications, rather than its politics and

rhetoric. As such, most of the literature regarding the GGR is rooted in either healthcare policy or international law. Nonetheless, some of these studies do point out some of the power dimensions within the GGR as a political tool. The most extensive and notable of these studies is by feminist economist Yana van der Meulen Rodgers. Her study points out that family planning assistance as foreign aid simultaneously provides much-needed assistance to developing countries, while also binding these countries to US foreign aid.11 When Presidents instate the GGR, this reliance on family planning assistance increases the impact of the gag rule.

Barbara Crane and Jennifer Dusenberry provide two possible explanations for the establishment of the GGR: it aligned with the personal convictions of the presidents, or it was used to appease advocates against abortion.12 Lindsay Gezinski posits that these advocates are social conservative Christians.13 She argues that because the endorsement of this group helped in the election of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, they were able to impose a “pro-life” agenda.14 Ann Starrs argues that the efforts of the “social conservatives” under

Trump’s GGR may be “mirrored domestically by efforts to restrict abortion.”15 Since Starrs

wrote this article, her argument has at least partially proven true. Figures appointed under the Trump administration such as Supreme Court Judge and Brett Kavanaugh and former director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement Scott Lloyd, have both actively worked to prevent immigrant minors from seeking an abortion.16

Others have pointed out how the GGR has posed both a domestic and an international

11 Yana van der Meulen Rodgers. The Global Gag Rule and Women’s Reproductive Health: Rhetoric versus

Reality. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

12 Barbara B. Crane, and Jennifer Dusenberry. “Power and Politics in International Funding for Reproductive

Health: The US Global Gag Rule.” Reproductive Health Matters 12, no. 24 (2004): 129.

13 Lindsay B. Gezinski “The Global Gag Rule: Impacts of Conservative Ideology on Women’s

Health.” International Social Work 55, no. 6 (2012): 839-840.

14 Gezinski, “The Global Gag Rule,” 839.

15 Starrs, “The Trump Global Gag Rule,” 486; Rachel Benson Gold, and Ann M. Starrs. “US Reproductive

Health and Rights: Beyond the Global Gag Rule.” The Lancet Public Health 2, no. 3 (2017): e122-e123.

16 For the case of Kavanaugh, see: “Judge Kavanaugh’s Judicial Record on the Right to Abortion.” Center for

Reproductive Rights. 2017. For Lloyd see: Oppenheim, Maya. “Trump Official Who Blocked Pregnant Migrant

(8)

threat to US democracy. Smith et al. argue that US foreign policy is negatively affected by the GGR, for it “erects barriers to the development of the democratic process in other countries.”17 Others similarly point out that the GGR undermines democracy promotion.18

Gezinski agrees on the adverse effects of the GGR on US foreign policy and points out that their departure from WHO and the UN discourse, “resulted in hostility towards the United States.”19 Others have pointed out how the GGR is antithetical to US international ideology,

for “one of the stated goals of US foreign policy is the promotion of human rights, yet the Gag Rule undermines the very foundation of a rights-based approach to public health.”20 This short overview of the GGR has introduced some of the political mechanisms behind its (re)instatement. In terms of foreign aid, van der Meulen Rodgers points out that the recipients of US foreign aid are bound to the US due to the essential nature of the service. This in turn leads the recipients being significantly impacted by the GGR. This thesis

conceptualises this interaction as an instance of empire. The following section will provide a theoretical discussion on American empire, particularly concerning imperialism through foreign aid.

17 Priscilla Smith, Kathy Hall Martinez, and Tzili Mor. “The Global Gag Rule: A Violation of the Right to Free

Speech and Democratic Participation.” Human Rights 29, no. 3 (2002): 14.

18 “The US Global Gag Rule Violates Human Rights.” Reproductive Health Matters 8, no. 16 (2000): 185-186. 19 Gezinski, “The Global Gag Rule,” 842.

20 Dina Bogecho, and Melissa Upreti. “The Global Gag Rule: An Antithesis to the Rights-Based Approach to

(9)

Theorising American Empire

The period of American global dominance after the Cold War is often referred to as a unipolar moment; the period where the US was unchallenged as the world’s greatest

superpower. Centuries before this unipolar moment, the US had already been referred to as an empire. John Becker makes a comparison between America and the Romans, “Nineteenth-century America was the new Rome. Rome as republic, certainly, or was it Rome as Empire? Probably it was both.”21 Indeed, the rapid American expansion of the 19th century can be compared to the Roman expansions by Julius Caesar almost two millennia earlier. The Thirteen Colonies doubled in size after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and the frontier kept expanding westwards. Two decades later, Florida was transferred to the US. Two decades after that, the US annexed Texas. And after the Mexican-American War, the mainland US territories that we know today as California and New Mexico were ceded to the US. In less than 50 years, the US had more than tripled in size and had become one of the largest countries in the world.

This rapid expansion of US territory continued in the following decades with the purchase of Alaska, the colonisation of the pacific islands – including Hawaii – and the conquest of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines from Spain. While the American expansion of the 19th century was a traditional depiction of an empire, the Cold War ended the traditional practice and rhetoric of empire in the US. However, while the rapid expansion and colonisation of the US came to a halt after the Second World War, American influence kept expanding. As such, while the American empire in the ‘traditional’ sense may have halted, the influence of the US around the world only grew larger. Early historians of American empire argue that this global American influence was even present before the Second World War.22

One of the ways in which American influence has expanded abroad since the Second World War is through foreign aid. This literature review outlines the different scholarly debates concerning the imperial status of the US and different forms of American empire. Of particular interest to this thesis is the literature on American empire through foreign aid and

21 John Becker. “Andrew Bacevich, ‘American Empire,’ Amy Chua, ‘World on Fire:’ To Be Read Book Review

Column.” Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 3 November 2003.

22 The argument of the informal American Empire was first made by the Wisconsin School and most notably

William Appleman Williams. See: William Appleman Williams. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (New York: World Publishing Company, 1959).

(10)

the literature on the GGR in the context of American empire. As such, this section aims to establish the concept of American empire and examine the literature on American empire in the context of foreign aid.

The United States as an Empire

After the Second World War, the US shifted from a formal empire to an informal empire as its territorial expansion was halted despite its increased role on the global political stage. An informal empire is characterised, not by its aspiration for territorial power, but for its pursuit of ‘informal’ power. Paul Kramer typifies the distinction between formal and informal empire, as a difference between US dependency and independence.23 Historian Robin Winks points out that such an informal empire can get the economic returns without the

administrative costs of annexing and controlling the territory.24 As such, the empire can enhance its power without expanding its borders physically.

However, scholars do not agree on what kind of empire the US is, or whether it even is an empire. The main premise of those who are against calling the US an empire is that they view an empire in the traditional sense of formal empire, wherein the hegemonic state seeks unlimited territorial expansion. The main distinction between those who do assert that the US is an empire, is a normative one: is US imperialism good for the world? This has led some scholars to argue that the US is a ‘benevolent empire’ that, while having imperialist tendencies, has benevolent motivations and brings stability to the world.25 The final

significant distinction concerns what kind of empire the US is: how does the US consolidate its global power? As this section will show, scholars have reflected on the US’s status as an informal empire through its military, economic, and cultural influence. As Daniel Immerwahr puts it: “Even as presidents disavowed territorial conquest, they dropped bombs, seized markets, meddled in foreign politics, and ‘Coca-colonized’ the world.”26

As beforementioned, the US halted their territorial expansion after the Second World War. However, as Immerwahr puts it, “even as the United States was partially divesting from

23 Paul Kramer. “How Not to Write the History of U.S. Empire.” Diplomatic History 42, no. 5 (2018): 911. 24 Robin Winks. “On Decolonization and Informal Empire.” American Historical Review 81, no. 3 (1976): 544. 25 Some notable proponents of the benevolent empire thesis include: Robert Kagan. “The Benevolent Empire”

Foreign Policy 111 (1998): 24-35; Niall Ferguson. Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire. (London: Penguin Books, 2005); Stephen Porter. Benevolent Empire: U.S. Power, Humanitarianism, and the

World’s Dispossessed. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017).

26 Daniel Immerwahr. “The Greater United States: Territory and Empire in U.S. History.” Diplomatic History

(11)

its colonies, it was consolidating its investments in a new form of territory: military bases.”27

Immerwahr argues that these military bases are “little Americas” and constitute “pockets of extraterritorial control scattered throughout the world.”28 Immerwahr further points out that

these bases have become even more significant as an instance of empire with the advent of the War on Terror.29 As Benjamin Barber shows, the War on Terror has been a military intervention into the political systems of other states in which the US has established an “empire of fear” through its global crusade against terrorism.30

The military imperialism of the US comes closest to the ‘traditional’ notions of empire and imperialism. However, it is America’s economic empire which may be the most significant and persistent one around the globe. Critical international political economy scholars have pointed out that the ability to set the rules through institutions of global governance has been key in strengthening US economic power.31 Robert Wade explains the creation of the American economic empire as based on their advantage because “rules such as those for patents and copyright … and the U.S. dollar being the main international currency … frees the U.S. government of constraints in key areas of economic policy while putting other states under tighter constraints.”32 As the US has been able to enforce their economic rules, the US has consolidated its economic power into an empire of economic governance. Through its global economic governance, US rules and standards have become normalised. However, it is through its cultural exchange where the US has normalised its culture and values across the world. As historian Rob Kroes puts it, “its cultural products reach the far corners of the world, communicating American ways and views to people elsewhere, while America itself remains relatively unaware of cultural products originating outside its national borders.”33 Jason Dittmer’s case study on the Captain America comic book series shows how cultural products construct “ä dominant American geopolitical

27 Immerwahr. “The Greater United States,” 389. 28 Ibid., 390.

29 Ibid., 390.

30 Benjamin Barber. Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy. New York: W. W. Norton & Company,

2003.

31 See for example: David Harvey. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005);

Ha-Joon Chang. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. (London: Anthem Press, 2002); Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, and Naná de Graaff. “Beyond Neoliberal Imperialism? The Crisis of American Empire.” In Neoliberalism in Crisis, edited by Henk Overbeek, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 207-228. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

32 Robert Wade. “The Invisible Hand of the American Empire.” Ethics and International Affairs 17, no.2

(2003): 87.

33 Rob Kroes. “American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End.” Diplomatic

(12)

narrative” which “defines what America is.”34 James Chapman and Nicholas Cull call

Hollywood a “vehicle for the projection of US imperialism.”35 The dominance of the US film

industry means that American culture and values are projected everywhere around the globe.

Imperialism through Foreign Aid

The final form of American empire that this literature review will discuss is empire through foreign aid. When people depend on foreign aid, they become a prime target for the diffusion of values as they have no alternative. This fact means that American empire, ideology, and foreign aid are inherently intertwined. The influence of ideology in shaping foreign aid has seen increased attention in political and diplomatic history over the years, such as Nick Cullather’s work on American Cold War efforts to spread US ideology through tackling hunger and poverty, linking US ideology and foreign aid.36 Cullather argues that by linking hunger to communism and surplus to capitalism, the US aimed to simultaneously spread agricultural technology and capitalism to developing states during the Cold War.

But, as some scholars point out, imperialism through foreign aid is not solely a governmental venture, but also deeply influenced by foundations, charities, and other interest groups.37 Edward Berman’s study on the influence of foundations on US foreign policy

shows a clear link between the ideology of these foundations and foreign aid.38 His work

shows that the US government works together with these foundations in order to diffuse American ideology, particularly through academic and scientific institutes. The vast amounts of money that these foundations use to diffuse American ideology allows them to spread American empire over the world.

However, as is more often the case when discussing the US as an empire, some authors also posit that the US constitutes a ‘benevolent empire’ because of their commitment to foreign aid. As Stephen Porter argues, “U.S. ascendance to and maintenance of a position

34 Jason Dittmer. “Captain America’s Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11

Geopolitics” 95, no.3 (2005): 641.

35James Chapman and Nicholas Cull. Projecting Empire: Imperialism and Popular Cinema. (New York: I.B.

Tauris, 2009), 9.

36 Nick Cullather. The Hungry World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).

37 Some examples include: Robert Arnove, ed. Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at

Home and Abroad. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Edward Berman. The Influence of the

Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy. (New

York: State University of New York Press, 1983); John Krige. American Hegemony and the Postwar

Reconstruction of Science in Europe. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008); Giles. “Maintaining Transatlantic

Community: US Public Diplomacy, the Ford Foundation and the Successor Generation Concept in US Foreign Affairs, 1960s-1980s.” Global Society 28, no.1 (2014): 90-103.

(13)

of elite global power was significantly justified and fueled by the proposition that the country’s objects of philanthropic concern might potentially include any vulnerable people across the globe.”39 As such, proponents of the benevolent empire thesis argue that while the

American foreign aid empire does consolidate the position of the US as the global hegemon, it is justified by the outcomes of its developmental aid programs.

As American empire has spread through philanthropy, it is not surprising that this includes religious organisations as well. Recently, studies have started focusing on the role of Christian ideology in foreign policy and foreign aid. Doris Buss’s study on the globalisation of family values has been instrumental in establishing a place for Christian Right influence in international politics as one of the earlier studies to focus on the Christian Right lobby as a foreign policy actor.40 While their work was a more general study on the influence of religion in US politics, Kenneth Wald and Allison Calhoun-Brown published a landmark study on the influence of the Christian Right on American political culture.41 The significance of this study lies in its ability to show how all-encompassing the influence of the Christian Right lobby is, not just on American politics, but on American life.

Studies focussing solely on the influence of Christian ideology on foreign aid are scarce. However, two recent studies have made significant progress in establishing the Christian Right lobby as an international actor that ought to be mentioned. The first is Melani McAlister’s The Kingdom of God Has no Borders (2018). Her study analyses the

international engagement of American Evangelical Christians, particularly in Africa and the Middle-East.42 While her study is less concerned with the Christian Right’s influence on (international) politics, it is nonetheless able to show how, through “evangelical

internationalism,” the influence of the Christian Right extends beyond the borders of the US.43 The second study that ought to be highlighted is Andrew Preston’s Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith (2012). Preston’s work is concerned with the influence of Christian ideology on diplomacy and war and spans the entire history of the US up to President

39 Stephen Porter. Benevolent Empire: U.S. Power, Humanitarianism, and the World’s Dispossessed.

Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017), 2.

40 Doris Buss. Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics. (Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

41 Kenneth D. Wald, and Allison Calhoun-Brown. Religion and Politics in the United States (Lanham: Rowman

& Littlefield, 2014).

42 Melani McAlister. The Kingdom of God Has no Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals. (New

York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

(14)

Reagan.44 Although his study does not include contemporary politics, it is currently one of

the most complete histories of the influence of Christian ideology on foreign policy and establishes the Christian lobby as a political group that has persisted through the entire history of the US.

Gaps and the Puzzle

This short overview of American Empire shows how pervasive American empire is in all facets of life. Its focus on empire through foreign aid shows how ideology can spread through developmental aid. However, three elements are missing in the existing literature. First, there is not yet any literature on the GGR in the context of American empire. Second, while there have been studies on the effects of the GGR, there is no extensive literature that attempts to explain why the gag rule was (re)instated. Third, literature concerning American empire focuses on the impact of empire internationally, rather than its guiding domestic processes. By analysing the motivations and political processes behind the reinstation of the GGR, this thesis examines the influence of conservative Christian interest groups on US foreign policy. The current resurgence of Christian conservatism and Christian nationalism in US politics under the Trump administration underlines the relevance of such an approach. Through this investigation of the political influence of Christian conservatism in US foreign aid, this thesis aims to examine the confluence of domestic and international politics in the context of American empire. This thesis focuses on the mechanisms of American empire using the case of the GGR as an instance of American empire. Literature on American empire shows its pervasiveness in international relations, but often neglect the domestic political processes behind its policies. As such, the following section conceptualises US foreign aid as intermestic; simultaneously subject to domestic discourse and foreign policy considerations.

44 Andrew Preston. Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New

(15)

Analytical Framework and Method

This thesis examines the diffusion of US ideology through foreign aid. It does so by

combining a Neo-Gramscian theoretical framework with the concept of ‘intermestic affairs.’ Using this combined framework will allow this thesis to examine the different power

structures that have guided the instigation of the GGR under the Trump administration on the nexus of domestic and international politics. This approach allows for the critique and further development of both Neo-Gramscian theory and the concept of intermestic politics.

Neo-Gramscianism

Neo-Gramscianism applies the Gramscian notion of cultural hegemony to the field of International Relations. Cultural hegemony is explained by Gramsci as:

“the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is 'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.”45

Robert Cox brings Gramsci’s notion of hegemony into International Relations by reading Gramsci’s ideas on International Relations as saying that changes in social relations lead to “changes in international power relations or world order.”46

Cox’s reading on Gramsci’s ideas on international relations takes a bottom-up approach; social relations influence the hegemon’s decisions. However, others have taken a different theoretical approach wherein the hegemon influences social relations. David Harvey, in his study on the rise of neoliberalist thought, posits that active commitment to an ideology is unnecessary if it becomes “common sense.”47 This conceptualisation of

hegemony is a top-down approach, wherein the hegemon is able to consolidate its power

45 Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Edited and Translated by Quintin Hoare and

Geoffrey Nowell Smith. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2005), 12.

46 Robert Cox. “Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method.” In Gramsci, Historical

Materialism, and International Relations, pp. 48-67. Edited by Stephen Gill. (New York: Cambridge University

Press: 1993), 58.

(16)

through influencing social relations. Through a colonisation of the mind, the hegemon is able to maintain and expand its power by making the ideological status quo normative. This thesis conceptualises American empire as a form of cultural hegemony.

Another central point to Gramscian theory is historical materialism; the notion that history is based on material conditions. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn ‘transnationalises’ historical materialism “on the claim that international relations and interstate politics have historically become embedded within and mediated by transnational capitalist social relations.”48 Herein, van Apeldoorn posits that social relations cut across borders in a globalised world. A

‘transnational historical materialist’ approach then, examines the globalised social relations within a materialist global power structure, focusing on their historical specificities.

Gramscian Hegemony in Foreign Aid

Taking Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony into International Relations allows us to conceive of a global power structure of social relations. Most of Neo-Gramscian International Relations research has focused on hegemony in trade relations and global governance.49 However, due to its ideological dimension, foreign aid can be perceived as a prime example of a hegemonic tool. In the case of the GGR, its ideological component is obvious and, as such, constitutes a well suited case for examining US foreign aid as American empire. In his monograph, Ha-Joon Chang examines how neoliberal global governance institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, have consolidated the material power of the economic ‘Western elite,’ by adopting neoliberalist policy recommendations.50 The

legitimacy of these institutions, coupled with the reliance of developing countries on said institutions, allows the established hegemon to use a neoliberalist ideology to enforce rules that are beneficial to them unto other countries. The more that a country relies on

developmental aid, the easier it is to diffuse ideology through aid, as there is no alternative

48 Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “Theorizing the Transnational: A Historical Materialist Approach.” Journal of

International Relations and Development 7, no. 2 (2004): 156.

49 See for example: John Kannankulam, and Fabian Georgi. “Varieties of Capitalism or Varieties of

Relationships of Forces? Outlines of a Historical Materialist Policy Analysis.” Capital & Class 38, no. 1 (2014): 59-71; Henk Overbeek. “Transnational Historical Materialism.” in Global Political Economy: Contemporary

Theories, edited by Ronen Palan, 168-183. New York: Routledge, 2000; Bastiaan van Apeldoorn. “Theorizing

the Transnational: A Historical Materialist Approach.” Journal of International Relations and Development 7, no. 2 (2004): 142–176; Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, and Naná de Graaff. “Beyond Neoliberal Imperialism? The Crisis of American Empire.” In Neoliberalism in Crisis, edited by Henk Overbeek, and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, 207-228. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

50 Ha-Joon Chang. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. (London:

(17)

for essential aid.

As such, this thesis conceptualises foreign aid as an executive arm of the hegemon’s ideology. However, while the transnational materialist condition of the hegemon’s

reproductive health strategy creates a significant issue, there is also a significant domestic factor at work in the diffusion of US ideology through foreign aid. The following sub-section section addresses the influence of domestic interest groups on foreign aid, before synthesising this factor with Neo-Gramscianism.

Intermestic Affairs

This thesis utilises the ‘intermestic’ concept. “Intermestic affairs” refers to a policy

dimension of foreign affairs that is inherently linked to the domestic sphere and, as such, is guided by both international and domestic considerations.51 While the term was originally used to examine policy areas that were inherently intermestic, such as tariffs, energy policy, and immigration, the concept has evolved within the field of diplomatic history to also include foreign policy decisions that are guided by domestic public opinion.52

Simultaneously, the concept has seen increased use in IR scholarship, where it has been used to analyse the effects of public opinion on foreign policy decision-making.53

If a foreign policy will not create the most optimal outcomes for a state, one may still consider endorsing the policy if it will lead to positive outcomes in the domestic sphere. While placing sanctions on another state may not be optimal as foreign policy, it may still be implemented if it strengthens certain supportive domestic interests. In the United States, the president plays a significant role (and increasingly so) in shaping foreign policy. Therefore, the president is likely to pursue foreign policy as an intermestic issue: for its international effectiveness, and its ability to enhance their domestic political standing.

A case study by Brenner et al. demonstrates the importance of this intermestic

51 Bayless Manning. “The Congress, The Executive, and Intermestic Affairs.” Foreign Affairs 57, no. 2 (1979):

306-324.

52 Ryan J. Barilleaux. “The President, ‘Intermestic’ Issues, and the Risks of Policy Leadership.” Presidential

Studies Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1985): 754-767; Fredrik Logevall. “Domestic Politics” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, Edited by Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, 151-167. (New York:

Cambridge University Press, 2016)

53 Shah M. Tarzi. “The Trump Divide and Partisan Attitudes Regarding US Foreign Policy: Select Theoretical

and Empirical Observations.” International Studies 56, no. 1 (2019): 46-57; Philip Brenner, Patrick J. Haney, and Walter Vanderbush. “The Confluence of Domestic and International Interests: US policy toward Cuba, 1998–2001.” International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 2 (2002): 192-208; Helen V. Milner, and Dustin H. Tingley. Sailing the Water's Edge: The Domestic Politics of American Foreign Policy. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

(18)

dimension.54 After the Cold War, during the Clinton Administration, the US embargo on

Cuba was no longer relevant as a foreign policy. On the contrary, trade between the US and Cuba could have been beneficial to both states. However, the administration would lose the support of the Cuban-Americans in Florida who had fled from Cuba to the US after the revolution if the embargo was lifted. Therefore, due to lobbying by Cuban-American interest groups, the Clinton administration decided to keep the embargo on Cuba in place. 55 As such, foreign policy towards Cuba was heavily influenced by domestic considerations, making it an intermestic policy.

The influence of domestic interest groups on foreign aid allows these actors to diffuse their ideology. Pandering to domestic interest groups consolidates the state’s power

domestically, while these interest groups can project their ideology abroad. In the case of the US, agencies such as USAID could be argued to be the executive tool which combines the interests of the state apparatus with domestic interest groups.

The application of this intermestic lens, allows one to analyse how actors will make decisions based on how much relative power they gain not just internationally, but also domestically. Utilising this framework may help us understand how domestic factors

influence foreign policy. As will be shown in the next paragraphs, an intermestic framework is particularly relevant in the case of the US due to the significant power that the President holds.

The Intermestic President

Political scientist Tanguy Struye de Swielande divides advisors of the Trump administration into five categories: The “Nepotists,” the “Spineless,” the “Political Climbers,” the

“Ideologues,” and the “Damage Controllers.”56 The ‘Nepotists’ is the group that constitutes

Trump’s family who hold direct political power. An example would be Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, who has led several taskforces for the administration. The ‘Spineless’ are congressmen who have been able to gain power by staying close to the President. Mitch McConnell for example, has gone back on many of his stances to support the President,

54 Philip Brenner, Patrick J. Haney, and Walter Vanderbush. “The Confluence of Domestic and International

Interests: US policy toward Cuba, 1998–2001.” International Studies Perspectives 3, no. 2 (2002): 192-208.

55 This particular lobby group has been attributed Bush’s success in Florida in the 2000 election. See for

example: “United States: Payback Time for the Miami Cubans?” The Economist, 14 April 2001.

56 Tanguy Struye de Swielande. “Trump and Covid-19: The Arrogance of Ignorance” Centre d’Etude des Crises

(19)

regardless of his own stance. The ‘political climbers’ such as Kellyanne Conway and Mike Pence have been able to quickly gain political power since the start of the Trump

administration. They have refrained from critiquing the President, earning his loyalty. The ‘ideologues’ such as conservative Christian Paula White, represent a voter base with a specific goal. Their loyalty to the President allows them to achieve that goal in exchange for political legitimacy. The ‘Damage Controllers’ are the people within the administration that directly go against the President. This group includes people like Dr. Fauci who has directly contradicted the President regarding his handling of Covid-19.

Besides the first category, these groups are present in any administration, although these different categories are most clearly visible in the Trump administration. While the last category directly goes against the President in order to minimise the damage done to the country, the other four categories each have something to gain by expressing their loyalty to the President. Nonetheless, the fourth category (‘the Ideologues’) has been able to change the decisions and positions of the President the most. While the first three categories are mainly seeking to enhance their personal power, ideologues represent a voter base with a specific goal. Although they may also want to gain more political power for themselves, diffusing their ideology to the administration is their main goal. As such, it is the ideologues who the President can gain something more than loyalty from: voters.

An Intermestic Neo-Gramscian Framework

This thesis combines the aforementioned concept of intermestic affairs with a

Neo-Gramscian framework. Intermestic decisions are made based on the pursuit of foreign policy goals, as well as the consolidation of domestic support. As Struye de Swielande has pointed out, this gives significant power to the ideologues in a president’s administration, for they are the ones who are able to grant domestic support to the administration’s foreign policy. In the context of Gramsci’s cultural hegemony, pursuing the foreign policy goals of the ideologues can grant the hegemon the political legitimacy to pursue its own goals. If one conceptualises this goal of the hegemon in materialism, then one can posit that pandering to the cultural goal of the ideologues’ voter base allows the hegemon to consolidate its political and economic power to enrich itself. In the case of the GGR, this policy is enacted not to enhance the hegemon’s foreign political power, but to consolidate its domestic power through playing to the cultural values of conservative Christians. In order to examine if this is the

(20)

case, the following sub-sections will provide the research design for analysing the power dynamics between the hegemon and domestic interest groups in the case of the GGR.

Operationalising Neo-Gramscianism

In order to operationalise transnational historical materialism, John Kannamkulam and Fabian Georgi conceptualised a historical materialist policy analysis. A historical materialist policy analysis consists of three analyses: a context analysis, actor analysis, and process analysis.57 The context analysis places the central conflict in its geographical and spatial context as a result of “historical conditions and processes,” the actor analysis identifies the actors within this historical context, and the process analysis identifies the different phases that the conflict went through in its historical context.58

Central to their analysis is the need to examine a case in its specific historical and spatial context. The intermestic aspect of this particular approach, adds to this by focusing not only on the international actors, but also focusing on the domestic dimension. As such, this thesis will examine the power relations between foreign aid and domestic interest groups in the case of the GGR. Within this case study, the United States is conceived as the global cultural hegemon, with its president as a particularly powerful actor. Domestic interest groups plays a double role and are simultaneously the abuser and the abused; the hegemon panders to the domestic interest groups’ cultural goals as a tool to consolidate its own power, while the interest groups are able to instate their political goals.

This thesis loosely follows the format of the historical materialist policy analysis as it does place the same emphasis on historical and spatial specificities, albeit without following the order of analysis as stated by Kannamkulam and Georgi. As such, this thesis will

conceptualise the GGR within its historical context specific to the US. As the GGR has existed in different forms since the Reagan administration, this thesis examines the GGR as an outcome of the ongoing political influence of conservative Christian interest groups in US politics. As such, the GGR functions as a case study of the power dynamics between the

57John Kannankulam, and Fabian Georgi. “Varieties of Capitalism or Varieties of Relationships of Forces?

Outlines of a Historical Materialist Policy Analysis.” Capital & Class 38, no. 1 (2014): 59-71; John Kannankulam and Fabian Georgi. “Die Europäische Integration als materielle Verdichtung von

Kräfteverhältnissen: Hegemonieprojekte im Kampf um das ‘Staatsprojekt Europa’.” [“European Integration as a Material Consolidation of Power Relations: Hegemony Projects in Conflict with the ‘European State Project’”]

Forschungsgruppe Europäische Integration am Institut für Politikwissenschaft des Fachbereichs

Gesellschaftswissenschaft und Philosophie der Philipps-Universität Marburg, Working paper no. 30, (2012).

(21)

hegemonic state and domestic interest groups in the creation of foreign policy and foreign aid.

Research Design

One of the main purposes of this thesis is to critique, test, and develop the theory of intermestic affairs in the US. In order to do so, the analytical section of this thesis will test key claims from the intermestic literature through an explanatory case study. Four distinct hypotheses, highly specific to the case of the US, arise from the intermestic literature:

1. “Most issues on the new international agenda have an immediate and profound impact upon domestic interests in the United States.”59

2. “U.S. presidents act both as domestic political actors and as international figures.”60 3. “The need to win elections forces presidents and legislators to contemplate the

domestic consequences of different types of foreign policy choices.”61

4. “from a perspective of intermestic realism, a government will choose to pursue a policy if the domestic power gained is greater than the international power lost and vice-versa.”62

These claims may be restated in more universal terms as follows:

1. Controversies in foreign policy have profound effects on domestic interests. 2. In presidential systems, presidents act both as domestic and international actors. 3. Features of elections in presidential systems demand attention to the domestic

consequences of different types of foreign policies.

4. From the perspective of intermestic realism, a government will choose to pursue a policy if the domestic power gained is greater than the international power lost and vice-versa

The first of these hypotheses is Manning’s original conception of intermestic affairs. Written in 1979, Manning’s conception was ahead of its time, but has since become obsolete as it takes a narrow definition of intermestic affairs which includes issues like trade and

59 Manning. “The Congress, The Executive,” 308. 60 Brenner, et al. “The Confluence of Domestic,” 204. 61 Milner and Tingley. “Sailing the Water’s,” 13.

62 Tom Meinderts. “Intermestic Realism: Domestic Considerations in International Relations.” E-International

(22)

immigration, while ignoring electoral politics and domestic discourse. The second hypothesis is concerned with examining the president as the sole arbitrator of intermestic policy and, as such, is less relevant for this thesis. The fourth hypothesis is a more general claim on

intermestic issues and, while useful for the following analysis as a whole, lends itself less well to being tested.

Therefore, this thesis will test the third hypothesis from the intermestic literature. In a general sense, this hypothesis begs the question: do features of elections in presidential systems demand attention to the domestic consequences of different types of foreign policies? As such, this thesis is concerned with the question: Does the need to win elections force the President to prioritise domestic consequences over foreign policy outcomes? More

specifically, in the context of the Global Gag Rule, this thesis asks the question: Was the Global Gag Rule reinstated under the Trump administration in order to consolidate the Christian Right voter base?

Explanatory Case Study Design

This thesis employs an explanatory case study design. A case study analysis is an “inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence.”63 A case study therefore allows one to understand a conflict or

phenomenon in its specific context. As the intermestic origin of the GGR is a highly specific one (that is to say, not comparable), it can only be examined as a case study. While the GGR as a foreign policy cannot be fully generalised to make any meaningful claims on the entirety of US foreign policy, it is able to make claims about those policies that are intermestic in nature. Moreover, as this particular case study heavily relies on its theoretical approach, this thesis seeks to further expand its theoretical framework through this case study.

Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman posit that an explanatory case study follows a theoretical hypothesis wherein the attributes of an analysis are extracted from its theoretical approach.64 In the case of this thesis, the GGR under the Trump administration is analysed in order to explain how its instigation is reliant on domestic interest groups. As such, the case

63Khairul Baharein Mohd Noor. “Case study: A Strategic Research Methodology." American Journal of

Applied Sciences 5, no. 11 (2008): 1602.

64Andrew Bennett, and Colin Elman. “Case Study Methods in the International Relations

(23)

study functions to further develop the intermestic thesis, while also contributing to the scarce literature on the politics of the GGR.

Evaluating Claims

In order to test the intermestic hypothesis and answer the research question, this thesis adopts an explanatory case study analysis. To evaluate its claims, this thesis conducts a critical desk study to trace the influence of Christian Right interest groups on policy making. As the nature of this thesis is historical and highly contextual, the hypothesis is stated in terms specific to the US context. Furthermore, this thesis is interested in ascertaining features of international policy formation and interest group politics in the US context rather than a timeless

nomothetic principle. Rather, this thesis is based on the hypothesis that domestic interests often guide foreign policy decisions. Without seeking to identify “smoking gun” evidence, the thesis seeks to gauge whether and to what extent administration officials or the president themselves pursued the GGR to win domestic political support.

This thesis will gauge the motivation of the administration by identifying the different Christian Right actors within the Trump administration and analysing their motivations. If the intermestic hypothesis holds up, then the following analysis should show that successful lobby-practices by Christian Right groups have led to the reinstating of the GGR and its maintenance despite its demonstrable ineffectiveness with respect to its stated goals. On the contrary, if this intermestic hypothesis is wrong we would expect to see that the foreign policy goals of the GGR are beneficial to the US, or that an ulterior motivation has guided the reinstatement of the GGR (e.g. the personal motivation of the executive).

(24)

The Evangelical Advisory Board and the Global Gag Rule

This section is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section analyses the synergy between the Trump administration and the Christian Right, while the second sub-section seeks to explain how the GGR diffuses conservative Christian ideology globally through developmental aid. Before proceeding to these sub-sections, the following paragraphs will give a short overview on American lobbying practices and the early proliferation of the New Christian Right, the collective name for conservative Christian interest groups that spawned in response to progressive movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

American Lobbying Practices and the New Christian Right

In their handbook on lobbying practices in the US, Ronald Hrebenar and Bryson Morgan posit that the power of a lobbying group is based on the characteristics of the people they represent.65 They posit that, generally, the larger a group, the more financial power they have,

but the harder it is to decide on specific policy goals.66 With more members comes more disagreement. However, they have more financial backing to support the issues that its members do agree upon. This means that if a group has a single point that all its members agree upon, such as a ban on abortions, that this group can focus its efforts on this specific issue that they agree upon. In their lobbying handbook, Hrebenar and Morgan mention lobbying groups such as Focus on the Family, the Traditional Values Coalition, and the American Family Association as powerful lobbying groups that emerged around 1980 as the ‘New Christian Right groups.’67

These New Christian Right groups arose in as a counter-movement to the civil rights movement and the general progressive political trends in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly after Roe v. Wade. Roe v. Wade was a landmark decision in 1973 by the US supreme court which recognised a woman’s right to abortion. Some scholars have specifically pointed to Roe v. Wade as the catalyst for the proliferation of the New Christian Right groups.68 As

65 Ronald Hrebenar, and Bryson Morgan. Lobbying in America: A Reference Handbook. (Santa Barbara:

ABC-CLIO, 2009), 15.

66 Hrebenar and Morgan, Lobbying in America, 16. 67 Ibid., 20.

68 Wald and Calhoun, Religion and Politics; Buss, Globalizing Family Values; van der Meulen Rodgers, The

(25)

Wald and Calhoun put it, “Outraged by Roe v. Wade, religious conservatives effectively stymied the ratification of the equal rights amendment and began to mobilize against abortion rights.”69

While these New Christian Right groups have not succeeded in overturning Roe v. Wade as of writing this thesis, they were successful in other policy areas, perhaps most notably the GGR. The influence of the New Christian Right groups can be seen through the communication between the leaders of these groups and the previous presidents. For

example, James Dobson, founder of Focus on the Family, was an appointed member of several advisory committees under the Reagan administration.70 Later, during the Bush Jr. administration, Dobson gained an even greater advisory role to the President having a

personal communication line to President George W. Bush as president and later chairman of the Focus on the Family board.71

While this thesis will draw on the previous administrations for context, the following analysis is primarily concerned with identifying the role of Christian Right groups in the creation of the current iteration of the GGR under the Trump administration. The following sub-section will examine the role of Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board during the 2016 Trump Presidential campaign. In doing so, this sub-section will outline the role of

contemporary conservative Christian interest groups in the Trump administration and point out the synergy of political power between the President and Christian interest groups.

Religion, Politics, and Domestic Hegemony

There is a clear link between the Trump administration and conservative Christian ideology. In May 2020, in the midst of the Corona pandemic, President Trump stated in a press

statement that “`some governors have deemed liquor stores and abortion clinics as essential, but have left out churches and other houses of worship. It’s not right. So I’m correcting this injustice.”72 Such statements by the President show how important religion is to the

69 Wald and Calhoun, Religion and Politics, 186.

70 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library. “Nominations and Appointments, May 21, 1982.” Presidential

Speeches, Public Papers of the President, May 1982, May 21, 1982. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/52182a.

71 This is evidenced through the vast number of records related to James Dobson in the George W. Bush

Presidential Library. See: George W. Bush Presidential Library, FOIA 2015-0037-F.

https://www.georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/en/Digital-Library---2/~/link.aspx?_id=A307DA4E2B5A4982BE74AF7CDCFB42A7&_z=z.

72 Donald. “President Trump Calls Houses of Worship Essential During Coronavirus Pandemic.” Youtube,

(26)

administration. However, when Donald Trump announced his presidential candidacy in June 2015, he did not mention anything to do with religion or religious values in his 45 minute speech, except: “I will be the greatest jobs president that God ever created. I tell you that.”73 Besides this remark, the presidential nominee refrained from speaking about religion.

Nonetheless, Trump’s silence on religion was short-lived, as Trump’s speeches would start to include Christian nationalist rhetoric more and more over the election period. Trump’s strategic inclusion of Christian nationalist issues became especially apparent when the Trump campaign formed an Evangelical Advisory Board. The formation of the Evangelical Advisory Board for the Trump presidential campaign was announced in June 2016.74 Information about the members of the Evangelical Advisory Board, or the board itself, are not available as public records. This thesis has created a list of the advisors based on public information which can be found in Appendix 1. However, as no official records of the board exist, this list may be incomplete.

The list from appendix 1 includes some familiar names, such as James Dobson, – founder of Christian lobby group Focus on the Family and advisor in both the Reagan and Bush Jr. administrations – Jerry Falwell Jr., – son of the founder of the Christian lobby organisation Moral Majority and political supporter of Jesse Helms and Ronald Reagan – Richard Land, – advisor for the Bush Jr. administration – Frank Page, – President of the Southern Baptist Convention and former advisor to the Obama administration’s advisory council on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships - and Ralph Reed – former executive director of the Christian Coalition lobbying group and advisor for the Bush Jr. campaign. These people on Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board are household names in US politics and were advisors to previous Republican administrations that (re)instated the GGR. The establishment of the Evangelical Advisory Board was a strategic move of the Trump campaign. Many of its members such as Paula White, Kenneth Copeland, and James MacDonald lead megachurches and hold significant sway over the voting behaviours of their congregations. Some of these pastors have been particularly vocal in their support of

President Trump. For example, Paula White proclaimed at a Trump rally: “Let every demonic network that has aligned itself against the purpose, against the calling of President Trump, let it be broken, let it be torn down in the name of Jesus.”75 With the Paula White Ministries’

73 Donald Trump. “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.” Time Magazine, 16 June 2015. 74 Nick Gass. “Trump’s Evangelical Advisory Board Features Bachmann, Falwell.” Politico, 21 June 2016. 75 Paula White. “Trump’s Faith Advisor Paula White is Now a White House Staffer.” Youtube, Uploaded by

(27)

Youtube channel garnering thousands to millions of views per reuploaded video of her sermons, – thus not even counting the original broadcasts of the services themselves – White has a significant following listening to her every word.76

The decision of the Trump campaign to align themselves with these evangelical pastors was a strategic move to gain the votes of the congregations of these pastors. As such, this synergy between the ‘Ideologues’ and the President has been present since mid-2016 and has granted the administration the support of a large part of Evangelical America, while it has enhanced the political power of the advisory board. Although the Evangelical Advisory Board was originally formed to advise the Trump campaign, the board has remained an advisory board to the Trump administration after Trump won the presidential election. Any of the advisory groups to the White House are subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972. This act states “advice by the various advisory committees formed over the years is objective and accessible to the public.”77 Johnnie Moore, the executive of the Evangelical Advisory Board, argues that the board is an ‘informal’ board and, as such, not subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972.78 However, when he described the nature of the board in an interview on C-SPAN, the board sounded very similar to any formal advisory board. Moore described the board as: “The group that, while not formally an

advisory board to the White House, has maintained a relationship, not only with the President, but lots of people within the White House and members of the group have been invited to lots of meetings and such.”79 He further states that the influence of the board on

policy is “pretty significant,” and that “lots of us are called and asked questions on specific issues and decisions to be made. And then, secondary from that, in our pastoral function, we have a very active role in personally advising […] just the regular every day staff people” and that the board has “frequently been requested when it comes to policy considerations.”80 Moore’s description of the board makes it clear that it is much more than an ‘informal get-together,’ but rather a formal advisory organ to the White House. Moore confirmed this in a National Catholic Reporter article when he told them that lower-White House staffers were “taking prolific notes and those notes being delivered as memos, is what we’re told, to the

76 Paula White Ministries. Youtube. 29 April 2011.

77 Rob Boston. “All the Presidents’ Men and Women: Members of President Trump’s Evangelical Advisory

Board Are Hard at Work Changing Public Policy – But They’d Rather You Not Know About It.” Americans

United for Separation of State and Church. October 2018

78 Boston, “All the Presidents’ Men.”

79 Johnnie Moore and Kimberly Atkins. “Johnnie Moore on President Donald Trump’s Evangelical Advisory

Board.” C-SPAN, Part of Washington Journal. 1 September 2017, (00:01:03-00:01:16).

(28)

various departments.”81

Hearing some of the members of the Evangelical Advisory Board speaking on the frequency and significance of the meetings shows how direct their access to the White House is. Other members of the advisory board supported Moore’s claims. In response to an inquiry by the National Catholic Reporter, some of its members replied openly about the nature and frequency of these meetings:

“Moore said there have also been conference calls ‘every few weeks.’ And in-person meetings involving some of the key players appear to have taken place on the margins of other events — such as the National Prayer Breakfast and the July 1 ‘Celebrate Freedom’ concert at the Kennedy Center in Washington, co-sponsored

by Jeffress’ church, First Baptist Dallas. ‘There are more meetings now than there were during the campaign,’ said Suarez … Harry Jackson said he’s had as many as a dozen meetings with Trump, Kushner and others since the inauguration. ‘My

experience is I’ve had more access with these guys than I did under Bush and other GOP leadership,’ Jackson said, referring to President George W. Bush’s

administration.”82

As such, it becomes clear that the significance of the board was not overexaggerated by its executive, as they indeed seem to have significant access to the President and the White House.

The influence of the members of the Evangelical Advisory Board further increased over the following years of the Trump administration. Johnnie Moore and Tony Perkins, two high-ranking board members, were both assigned Commissioner for the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, together with fellow board member Gary Bauer who was undersecretary of education during the Reagan administration. Darrell Scott became a member of the administration’s executive transition team after the presidential election and Paula White, board member and personal pastor to the president, became Director for the White House Faith and Opportunity Initiative, an initiative which attaches Centers for Faith and Opportunity to all departments of the US government and are tasked with providing access to funding for faith-based organisations. And while Tony Suárez may not have gotten a governmental position himself, Andrea Ramirez, Suárez’ co-director from

81 Adele Banks, Emily Miller, Yonat Shimron, Jerome Socolovsky. “All the President’s Clergymen.” National

Catholic Reporter, 5 September 2017.

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

Van Dixhoorn: ‘De anderen voelen zich zo betrokken dat ze hem zelfs bellen om te zeggen dat hij iets bijvoorbeeld wel of niet moet doen.’ Al vindt Jan dat wat ver gaan,

• In vergelijking met de schroefpersfilter ligt bij de decanter de N/P verhouding in dikke en dunne fractie verder uit elkaar en worden er scheidingsproducten gemaakt die

Dit komt volgens deze respondenten ten goede aan de kwaliteit van de samenwerking tussen de coalitiepartijen van het project ‘Slimmer met Zorg’.. Het is opvallend dat

For GDP ++ , we used the posterior median of our news and noise model with correlated measurement errors, for GDP + we employed the benchmark model of Aruoba et al. We

Hydrogen can be produced through mixed-conducting ceramic membrane reactors by means of three reactions: water splitting, the water-gas shift reaction and autothermal reforming..

In order to answer the question of how is international education related to contemporary global citizenship, the analysis deals with four levels of investigation, where all four

Therefore, I interpret the estimates found from the linear probability model where I find positive, moderate effects of changing income levels on the disbursement dummy variable at

Can we reliably elicit and measure nociceptive and tactile steady-state evoked potentials1.