The Cultural Genocides of the Kurds and Baha’is: a comparative
study in Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Destruction of the House of the Bab, Shiraz 1979
MA Thesis 1st July 2018
University van Amsterdam
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Johannes Houwink ten Cate Second Reader: Dr. Thijs Bouwknegt
Abstract
The phrase Cultural Genocide was cultivated by Raphael Lemkin in succession with his creation of Genocide. Cultural genocide is the intention to destroy, in whole or in part, a group through sustained attacks on the those features which culminate the group identity. Nevertheless, resulting from the United Nation’s omission of the phenomena of cultural genocide from the final draft of the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of
Genocide, cultural genocide has been largely bypassed by scholarly works. This omission,
however, does not mean that regime’s who seek the destruction of a group do not enact a policy of cultural genocide. Through a comparative approach of two cases of cultural genocide, the Kurds in Syria and the Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran an, this thesis will prove the existence of cultural genocide and the necessity that it be re-evaluated in international law.
Abbreviations
Cultural genocide – CG United Nations – UN
The Islamic Republic of Iran – IRI
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – DRIP Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission – CTRC Baha’i International Community - BIC
Figure 1: A map of Syria detailed the difference governates
Contents
Introduction ………..3-12 - Genocide: a historiography
- Theoretical Framework: cultural genocide - Methodology and Sources
Chapter I Who are they: An introduction to the Baha’is of the IRI and the Kurds of Syria….. 13-23 - The Kurds Historical Background Historiography - The Baha’is Historical Background Historiography - Summary
Chapter II Political Measures……….24-34 - Legalising the persecution
- Constitutions
- Attacks on Organisations - Summary
Chapter III Economic Measures……….35-48 - The Kurds Stateless Kurds Land Reforms Agriculture Urban Kurds - The Baha’is Financial Institutions Public sector Private sector
Proof of genocidal intent: 1991 memorandum Compensation
- Summary
Chapter IV Cultural Measures………49-64 - Education - Cultural Sites - Tradition - Family Status - Summary Conclusion………65-72 - Current situation
Introduction
In 2012, while the Syrian Civil War was in its infancy, government forces withdrew from three Kurdish enclaves in Northern Syria, leaving the region under the control of local militias. Following the rise of underground Kurdish political movements and the military defeat of ISIS, the region became de facto autonomous.1 In 2016, the Kurdish ruling
executive committee created a new constitution for the region, officially naming it the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria.2 However, this newfound freedom is atypical of
the experience of the Kurds in Ba’athist Syria. Upon assuming power in 1963, the Ba’ath party systematically targeted Kurds with unfavourable policies aiming to destroy the Kurdish national sentiment. In IRI, on the other hand, the Baha’is, the minority targeted in a similar fashion to the Kurds in Syria, have achieved no such autonomy and are still the victims of systematic, religiously-motivated persecution.
The Kurds in Syria and the Baha’is in IRI are the largest minorities of their respective governments system of rule. The rule of the Ba’ath party in Syria is predicated on Arab nationalism and the Kurds are the largest ethnic minority. In contrast, IRI is a religiously ruled country; the Baha’is are IRI’s largest religious minority. However, neither minority has been accepted and as a result both the Kurds and Baha’is are denied the rights of ordinary citizens. The status of the Kurds and Baha’is as the largest minorities and resulting separate cultural traditions and practises is perceived as a direct challenge to the ruling regimes. As a result, both minorities have been targeted by discriminatory policies aiming to ultimately force assimilation to the majority since the regimes’ inception.
Laurence Davidson, a historian specialising in CG, explains the general pattern of behaviour prevalent in CG as ‘the stronger party must create a thought collective that makes the victim’s culture appear antiquated and unworthy of survival’.3 This was indeed
undertaken by both the Syrian and IRI regimes who sought to interrupt all elements of Kurdish and Baha’i social and cultural life. A comparative study of cases CG is rare. The intention behind the comparative approach is to utilise the case studies as evidence proving the existence of CG. This existence demonstrates the necessity of the phenomena being 1 Eliott C. McLaughlin, ‘Kobani liberated: Kurds take strategic city from ISIS’, CNN,
https://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/26/middleeast/syria-kobani-fighting/index.html (accessed 28/06/2018). 2 Tom Perry, ‘Syrian Kurds, allies set to approve new government blueprint’, Reuters,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-constitution/syrian-kurds-allies-set-to-approve-new-government-blueprint-idUSKBN14H0X3?il=0 (accessed 28/06/2018).
recognised by the international community. CG is much more than a theoretical framework; CG is a real-life practise implemented to destroy communities.
Genocide: a historiography
CG, just like genocide, results from the intention to destroy a group. However, unlike genocide, which involves the slaughter of members of a group, CG is a non-violent attack on the unique features of group identity. Perpetrators enact CG as a means of dissolving the group through the forced disintegration of all cultural identity markers, with the aim of total assimilation with the perpetrator. Resulting from this definition, CG is the frequently overlooked counterpart of genocide. Nevertheless, to understand CG, one must be acquainted with the history of “genocide”.
The term genocide was first coined in 1943 by lawyer Raphael Lemkin who combined the Ancient Greek genos (race/people) with the Latin cide (killing). Lemkin defined genocide as ‘a coordinated plan of di erent actions aiming at the destruction offf essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves’.4 The term destroy is subjective and Lemkin’s understanding of genocide greatly
expanded the linguistic roots. Whilst mass killing was a component, Lemkin additionally classified alternate means and specified that genocide did not intrinsically mean the immediate, violent destruction of a nation. To explain his more encompassing definition, Lemkin referenced eight different dimensions which amounted to genocide: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral, each targeting a different aspect of group identity.5
In 1948, the UN adopted Genocide Convention, based on Lemkin’s proposal, a milestone for international law. However, the UN definition was far from the encompassing definition initially proposed by Lemkin.
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
4 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for
Redress 2nd Edition, (New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange, 2008), 79. 5 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 82-90.
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.6
The limited scope of the UN definition restricts many social and political groups from accessing the rarefied status of genocide victim, and the associated political recognition. This constraint was initially criticised in 1959 by Pieter Drost who predicted governments would take advantage of this loophole.7 Building on Drost, more contemporary scholars, Frank
Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, contended the UN definition ‘to be of little use to scholars’.8 As a
result, there is no singularly accepted definition of genocide, instead scholars seek to propose their own definitions.
Following Drost, there was a perceptive lull of scholarly engagement with the genocide definition until the 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars including Vahakn Dadrian, Leo Kuper and Irving Horowitz expanded the UN definition, albeit ignoring the wider classifications of Lemkin, focusing on mass killing as the signifier.9 This period
additionally experienced the recognition of cases other than the Holocaust as genocides, in 1987 the European Parliament recognised the Armenian genocide.10 However, a significant
scholarly counter-current during the 1980s asserted the singularity of the Jewish Holocaust.11
Nevertheless, the conflicts in Rwanda (1994) and Former Yugoslavia (1991-1999) all but ended the argument of Holocaust uniqueness and inspired the resurgence of the term ethnic cleansing.12 Similar to the previous generation, scholars in the 1990s were unhappy with the
limitations imposed by the UN legal definition of genocide and sought to create new terms to atone for the UN omissions. Addressing Drost’s concerns, Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr conceived “politicide” to recognise the targeting of groups based on their political beliefs. “Ethnocide,” often used interchangeably with CG because of its similar definition: the denial of an ethnic group’s right to ‘enjoy, develop and transmit its own culture’ originally created by Lemkin, received a similar revival during this period.13 CG is a more helpful theory
because it expands beyond just ethnic groups, as this thesis will demonstrate. In contrast, millennial scholars initiated a cyclical return to the UN definition as it became evident that 6 United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
7 Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analysis and Case Studies, (London: Yale University Press, 1990), 12.
8 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology, 10. 9 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology, 13.
10 Harut Sanssounian, ‘Genocide Recognition and a Quest for Justice’, Loyola Law Review 32, no.115, (2010), 117.
11 Alan Rosenbaum, Is the Holocaust Unique?: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 496.
12 ed. by Samuel Totten and Paul Bartrop, The Genocide Studies Reader, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 57. 13 Totten and Bartrop, The Genocide Studies Reader, 58.
scholarly additions were not recognised outside of academia. Despite the flaws of the UN definition, it was the only definition recognised worldwide and therefore the only chance of pursuing justice. Moving away from the definitional debate, contemporary scholars instead explored the probability of genocide occurring throughout human history, arguing against the idea that it was a modern concept. 14
Theoretical Framework: Cultural Genocide
Amongst the scholarly debates surrounding the limitations of the legal definition of genocide is the question of CG. Unlike genocide, the ‘crime of all crimes,’ CG does not require killing to take place.15 Lemkin asserted that the cultural form of genocide consisted of
actions to ‘prevent the expression of national spirit.’16 The aim of regimes who enact CG is to
destroy the collective identity of group, rather than the individuals who compose the group, under the guise that this would facilitate the total collapse of the group for the members would no longer be homogenously joined. Lemkin used the forced teaching of only German language and the destruction of national monuments in Nazi occupied Europe to evidence his theory.17
If the common feature of a group is religious belief, to forcibly destroy all means of the religion, for example through prohibition and the demolition of sacred sites and places of worship, by undoing the religious belief, the commonality no longer exists, and the group disbands. Similarly, if the group identity is formed around ethnic homogenisation, the destruction of traditions, languages, cultural sites and artefacts and leadership would lead to the breakage of the group identity. Lemkin’s ideas on CG were initially included in the first draft of the Genocide Convention. The crime of CG was defined as measures ‘undermining the existence of a group of human beings’ by:
(a) Forced transfer of children to another human group […]
(b) Forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture of a group […] (c) Prohibition of the use of the national language even in private intercourse […] (d) Systematic destruction of books printed in the national language or of religious
works, or prohibition of new publications […]
14 Benjamin Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 12.
15 Nicole Hahn Rafter, The Crime of All Crimes: Towards a Criminology of Genocide, (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
16 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 80. 17 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 80.
(e) Systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments or their division to alien uses, destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value, and of objects used in religious worship […].18
However, in the Ad Hoc Committee’s discussion on the proposed convention, following ‘a fairly full discussion’ and on opposition from the several countries including the United States (US) and Lebanon, it was democratically decided that the crime CG should be redacted from the Genocide Convention and made the focus of a separate article.19 This separate article
was never composed. The only reference to CG in the Genocide Convention adopted in 1948 was ‘Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group’.20
The only other time CG was considered in international law was in the 1994 draft UN DRIP. CGs were conceived in comparatively similar terminology to the initial Genocide convention, as discussed on page 4.
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of assimilation or integration by other cultures or ways of life imposed on them by legislative, administrative or other measures;
(e) Any form of propaganda against them.21
However, once again the term “CG” was omitted from the final draft, replaced instead simply with genocide. The DRIP legislation is progressive for it provided legal obligation for ‘the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutes’, nevertheless, it can additionally be criticised.22 The legislation only provides
protection for indigenous peoples, minorities are ignored. This is problematic because CGs occur at the hands of national, as well as settler regimes. The focus on specific groups when discussing cultural rights has become a notable trend in international law.23 Additionally, this
18 United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC), Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, (E/447; 26 June 1947), (pp.25-26).
19 United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC), Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: Commentary on
Articles Adopted by the Committee, (E/AC.25/W1; 26/04/1948), (pp.5-6)
20 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’, 9/12/1948, Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx (accessed 30/04/2018).
21 United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR): Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Technical Review of the United Nations draft declaration on the rights of
indigenous peoples, (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1; 20 April 1994), (p.4).
22 UNCHR, Technical Review of the United Nations draft declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, 4. 23 For example, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of a Child, and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’, (34/180; 18/12/1979), Office of the United
declaration occurred more than forty years after the official proposal of the UN and so all the violations that occurred before are unaffected. Finally, the ratification of all treaties is voluntary.24 The UN has no military power to enforce its declarations which means a
country’s decision to be a signatory is largely symbolic. For the DRIP, the United States of America, Australia and Canada voted against, countries with high indigenous but majority settler populations. The United Kingdom, a country with a large history of colonialism, additionally expressed criticism but ratified the bill.25
This discussion has demonstrated the limitations of the UN statute, nevertheless, individual countries have created their own definitions of CG within national law. The 2015 ruling of the CTRC of Canada’s Aboriginal policy as a ‘CG’ suggests hope for future legal recognition.26 The CTRC recognised CG as a distinct crime from physical genocide and
described it as ‘the destruction of those structures and practises that allow the group to continue as a group’.27 When evidencing policies of CG, the CTRC listed the intention to
destroy the targeted groups political and social institutions, the seizure of land, the forcible transfer of populations and the restriction of the movement of said populations. Additionally, the CTRC referenced the prohibition of languages and spiritual practises, the persecution of spiritual leaders, and the dissolution of families to prevent the transmission of cross-generational cultural values and identity.28 These definitions directly reflect the proposed
drafts attempts to enshrine CGs into international law. This demonstrates that though unsuccessful in creating a legally binding definition, the contents of the proposed drafts have not been completely ignored or forgotten. Resulting from this judgement, more than one thousand of the adopted aboriginal children filed a class-action lawsuit against the federal
Nations High Commission for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CEDAW.aspx (accessed 30/04/18): 3-4; United Nations General Assembly, ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’, (44/25; 2/09/1990), Office of the United Nations
High Commission for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CRC.aspx (accessed 30/04/2018): 8-9; United Nations General Assembly, ‘International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families’, (45/158; 18/12/1990), Office of the United Nations
High Commission for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx (accessed 30/04/2018): 14.
24 The USA for example has so far refused to ratify nearly all UN conventions.
25 ‘General Assembly adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples: ‘Major Step Forward’ Towards Human Rights for all, says President’, United Nations, 13/09/2007,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/ga10612.doc.htm (accessed 29/06/18).
26 For over a century, the Canadian government enacted a policy against the Aboriginal population to cause the Aboriginal people to cease to exist as distinct racial, legal, social, cultural, and religious peoples. This was implemented through the elimination of Aboriginal governments, ignoring Aboriginal rights, terminating treaties with Aboriginals and trying to force assimilation. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (TRCC), Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, 1.
27 TRCC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 1. 28 TRCC, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future, 1.
government, seeking compensation ‘for the loss of their culture and emotional trauma’.29 At
the time of writing, the case is still ongoing, thus the result is unknown. Nevertheless, the CTRC’s recognition of the crime of CG and the resulting court case suggests that the international climate is becoming more accepting of the notion of CG.
The absence of CG from international law is not resultant from a lack of case studies. However, often in cases where a CG has been implemented, the victim-group is additionally targeted with physical trauma. Therefore, the cultural element of the suffering is overshadowed.30 A concrete example of this is the Cham Muslims in the Vietnam war. Before
the Vietnamese government began their policy of mass extermination, for which perpetrators were later convicted of genocide, the regime had tried to force the Muslims to assimilate by banning their religion, language and prohibiting traditions.31 As a result of the later genocide,
the policies targeting cultural facets are often overlooked by the international community. However, this thesis will break this cycle and demonstrate the existence of CG without the situation dissolving into genocide.
Methodology and Sources
Despite inherent differences between the Kurds (ethnic) and the Baha’is (religious), multiple similarities can be drawn between the two case studies, making a comparative approach feasible. The regimes of Syria and IRI, despite utilising different frameworks for legitimisation, religion in IRI and Arab nationalism in Syria, both rule autocratically and use the legitimisations to justify their oppressive policies. Both regimes publicly deny any wrongdoing against their minorities.32 Furthermore, Syria and IRI are geographically very
similar, and the Baha’is and Kurds represent the largest minorities in each country. The similarities between the treatment of the two minorities have been recognised academically. Harriet Montgomery, one of the leading academics on the Kurds in Syria, asserted that the government’s attempt at the forced assimilation of Kurds to Arab identity is directly reflected in IRI but in IRI the policy ‘has been to homogenize its citizens under a religious banner 29 Unknown, ‘Aboriginals sue Canadian government over adoptions to white families during 1960s’, National
Post, 10/02/2015, http://nationalpost.com/news/canada/aboriginals-sue-federal-government-over-adoptions-to-white-families-during-1960s (accessed 1/05/2018).
30 Kristina Marie Hon, ‘Bringing CG in by the Backdoor: Victim Participation at the ICC’, Law School Student
Scholarship, Paper 352, (2013), 2.
31 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), Transcript of Proceedings Public: Case File
No 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, 17/10/2014, 41.
32 Karim Yildiz and Harriet Montgomery, The Kurds in Syria: denial of Rights and Identity, (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2004): 75; Baha’i International Community, The Baha’i Question Revisited: Persecution
rather than an ethnic one’.33 The comparison of two different minority groups demonstrates
the phenomenon of CG as multi-faceted, both ethnic and religious minorities can be victimised. Furthermore, the continuation of the oppressive policies to the modern day demonstrates the failure of the international community to truly grasp the extent of the persecution and act accordingly. This reveals the need for a re-evaluation of CG’s place in international law.
To present the case of the Kurds and Baha’i as CGs this thesis utilises mixed methodology. Whilst mainly relying on qualitative data as my primary evidence base, quantitative data is additionally referenced. This ensures the findings presented represent the whole community. However, the secrecy of the regimes in Syria and IRI make the acquisition of primary, governmental documentation difficult. Therefore, this thesis is predominantly limited to documentation which has been leaked to the international community. Furthermore, there are linguistic limitations, not knowing Farsi or Arabic, so there is a reliance on translations of leaked documents. Nevertheless, the paucity of government documents paints a limited picture of the policies of both regimes. Therefore, to supplement the research report from the UN, Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other smaller NGOs and human rights groups are utilised. However, the reports of the UN Special Representatives are limited because in order to be granted permission to visit the country again, the reports had to be toned down. This contradicts the objectives which were to record the human rights abuses in IRI in full.34 The relative anonymity of the plight of the
Kurds and Baha’is in international media means that much of the research has been carried out by their own organisations. Whilst a reliance on such sources could be criticised for bias, through cross-examination and close-reading of their sources such critique is dispelled. Nevertheless, the limitations of the primary documentation leaves my thesis open to criticisms of generalisations for I fail to examine individual experience in detail, my focus is on the collective. Therefore, I have tried to present examples which represent the largest number or the entire community.
Chapter Divisions
This thesis is divided into four chapters, beginning with an explanation of the unique identity features of both the Kurds and Baha’is. CG target the identity markers of a group and 33 Harriet Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria: an existence denied, (Berlin: Europäisches Zentrum für Kurdische Studien, 2005), 96.
34 Nazila Ghanea, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in IRI, (Oxford: George Ronald, 2002); Richard Falk,
so this chapter will explore the features targeted by the oppressors. The first chapter additionally contains historiographies for both case studies which illustrates the relative lack of scholarly enquiry conducted on the Kurds and Baha’is. The next three chapters explore the specific measures undertaken by both regimes to try and force the dissolution of the communities. Divided thematically, they explore the political, economic and social measures. The chapter divisions reflect Affolter’s assessment of the four main strategies used to persecute the Baha’is: ‘attacks on the leadership, economic persecution, social isolation, cultural cleansing’.35 The existence of these policies for the Kurds as well as the Baha’is once
more demonstrates the utility of a comparative analysis. The comparative approach demonstrates that that although the specific discriminatory measures enacted by the Syrian and Iranian regimes differ, the persecutions all fit under broader classifications. These classifications result from the symmetry present in intended consequences of the acts, the destruction of the group identity. This work largely bypasses the physical measures undertaken against the communities.36 Statistically, the arrests, tortures, disappearances and
murders do not constitute a physical genocide and their inclusion is irrelevant to a discussion of CG.
This work utilises evidence from the inception of the regimes until the millennia because of available source material. Despite this, the policies have not abated and continue to the present day. Resulting from the current failure of the international community to intervene, the conclusion includes suggestions for countering the CGs utilising examples where CGs have been halted. The aims of this work are twofold: firstly, to identity the regressive policies of both the Syrian and Iranian regimes against their largest minority groups and demonstrate that these amount to CG. Secondly, the comparative approach of the implementation of CG by national, non-settler governments against both ethnic and religious minorities, demonstrates the necessity for a re-consideration of CG in international law. Utilising a predominantly historical approach to tackle a legal issue could be criticised however the non-existence of CG within international law means this is not just a legal issue. Furthermore, scholars including Johannes Houwink ten Cate highlight the importance of historical study to document and be involved in the prosecution of genocides, for typically the law deals with individuals whereas historians address groups.37
35 Friedrich Affolter, ‘The Specter of Ideological Genocide: The Baha’is of IRI’, War Crimes, Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity 1, no.1, (2005), 84
36 For more information see the archives of Amnesty International.
37 Johannes Houwink ten Cate, ‘On Outlawing of Genocide Denial’ in The Genocide Convention: The Legacy
of 60 Years ed. Johannes Houwink ten Cate, Harmen Wilt, Jeroen Vervliet, Goran Sluiter (Leiden: Nijhoff,
Chapter I
Who are they: An introduction to the Baha’is of the IRI and the Kurds of Syria
To fully understand the governmental policies of persecution taken against the Baha’is and Kurds, it is necessary to explore why the two minorities were targeted. Resulting from the more descriptive nature of this chapter, the two case studies are presented individually. CG targets the specific homogenising features of a group identity, therefore this chapter presents an overview of the distinctive characteristics of the Baha’is and the Kurds. Following this, a historical background of both case studies is provided as a means of identifying whether the discrimination was reflective of past regimes, or whether the implementation of a CG was unique to the Islamic and Ba’athist regimes. Concluding each section is a literature review of the available scholarship. A common theme is the comparatively small amount of academic interest in either of the case studies. This historiography builds on the source discussion in the introduction and illustrates themes throughout the scholarship, such is missing from the available academia.
The Kurds
The Kurds compromise the fourth-largest ethnic group in the Middle East, but have never been granted a state. Instead, Kurdish populations are dispersed throughout Iraq, Turkey, IRI and Syria. Despite these geographical divisions, Kurds are united in their desire for the creation of a national state, Kurdistan, and through their national language,
Kurmanji.38 The nationalist sentiment is expressed through music and dance. The Kurdish
nation is not religiously homogenous.39 In Syria, the Kurds are the largest minority. Lacking
official statistics, it is estimated Kurds make up around ten percent of the population.40 The
majority of the Kurdish population is condensed into three regions in northern Syria near the Turkish and Iraqi borders, known to Kurds as Western Kurdistan: the al-Hasakah governate41,
and the Aleppo Governate42, and around the Kurd Dagh (mountain), by Afrin.43 However,
38 Kurmanji comprises of many closely related dialects spoken between the Kurdish communities in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran and Armenia. It belongs to the Indo-Iranian branch of the Indo-European language family. Paul Ludwig, ‘Kurdish Language’, 15/12/2008, Encyclopaedia Iranica,
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/kurdish-language-i (accessed 22/06/2018).
39 Kurds follow Islam, Alevism, Yazidism, Yarsan and several different dominations of Christianity. G.R. Driver, ‘The Religion of the Kurds’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 2, no.1, (1992). 40 Mustafa Nazdar, ‘The Kurds in Syria’, in People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan edited by. Gerard Chaliand (London: Zed Press, 1980), 211.
41 Specifically, the cities Qamishli and Hasakah.
42 In the city Ayn al-Arab (known informally as Kobanî). 43 See Figure 1 for a map of Syria, p1.
there are also sizeable Kurdish populations in Syria’s cities. The Syrian regime, relying on Arab nationalism to legitimise its rule, sees the Kurdish national identity and desire for a state as a threat its power. This perceived threat, however, was not historically founded.
Historical Background
During the Ottoman Empire (1808-1922) relations between the Kurds and Muslims were favourable.44 Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, modern-day Syria was created
in 1920 as a French mandate.45 James Paul, a researcher for Human Rights Watch, asserted
during the mandate, ‘Kurds generally prospered’. 46 Unlike the national Arab identity,
Kurdish identity was not perceived to be a threat, so Kurds were granted political and cultural rights including the use of the Kurdish language and the employment of Kurds within the government and the military.47 However, whilst some Kurds supported the mandate because
it did not challenge their traditional authority, relations were mixed, Kurds were additionally found in uprisings and rebellions against the French.48
Following Syrian independence in 1946 and the rise of Arab nationalism, the position of Kurds deteriorated. Use of the Kurdish language was heavily restricted, the expression of Kurdish culture and history was prohibited, and Kurdish associations became illegal.49 The
1958 union of Syria and Egypt greatly increased Arab nationalist sentiment in Syria, further threatening Kurdish identity. During this period campaigns were launched against the Kurds and Communists, the Arab nationalist movement. The government targeted Kurdish political groups, conducting a campaign of arrests and spreading anti-Kurdish propaganda. In a complete reversal to the French mandate, Kurdish officers were purged from the military, Kurdish language was forbidden and Kurdish publications and music was banned. 50
Politically, the Kurdish Democratic Party, created in 1957, was targeted. Hundreds of members were arrested, and the leaders were tried. Kurds additionally believe government 44 Nazdar, ‘The Kurds in Syria’, 215.
45 French possession of Syria was decided in the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, where the Allies divided up the Ottoman Empire, and the dream of an independent Kurdistan was destroyed. Yildiz and Montgomery, The
Kurds in Syria, 20.
46 James A. Paul, Human Rights in Syria: A Middle East Watch Report’, 09/1990, (Human Rights Watch), 88. 47 Paul, Human Rights in Syria, 88.
48 Michael Gunter, Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014), 9-10; The rise of Kurdish nationalism in Syria was comparatively slower than in Iraq or Turkey. Following the exile of many members of Istanbul’s Kurdish clubs from Turkey, exiled members created one “national” organisation in 1927: the Khoybun League. The Khoybun created Kurdish, nationalist committees and
organisations within Syria. Because the nationalist movement arose from Turkey, Turks were the initial enemy, not Arabs. In 1945 the Khoybun was replaced by the Kurdish League. However, resulting from the lack of outside support, neither organisation received much interest from the wider Kurdish community. Jordi Tejel,
Syria’s Kurds: History, politics and society, (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), 17-21
49 Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria, 39. 50 Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria, 40-42.
caused the deaths of two hundred and eighty-three Kurdish school children in a cinema fire in 1960.51 Therefore, whilst under the French mandate the Kurds lived relatively freely, the
oppressive measures taken following after independence set the precedence for the Kurdish experience under the Ba’ath regime. In 1963, the Ba’ath party, already established in Iraq, took control by a military coup and implemented a state of emergency law, granting the government virtually unlimited authority to restrict the individual freedoms and investigate suspects whenever there was deemed to be a risk to national security and/or public safety. The state of emergency was only lifted in 2011. Under this egregious political control the Kurds were targeted.
Historiography
Historically, the Kurds were overlooked by Middle Eastern specialists and research was only produced from Kurds themselves. However, recent years have witnessed the advent of new academic study on the Kurdish communities with the opening of the European Centre for Kurdish Studies in Berlin in 1999 and the Centre for Kurdish Studies in 2006 at the University of Exeter.52 Nevertheless, despite the dramatic increase in academic interest in the
Kurds, scholarship tends to focus around the populations in Turkey and/or Iraq. It is the widely accepted that research on the Kurds in Syria is minimal.53
The explanation for the lack of scholarship is twofold and relates to the nature of the Kurdish population. The population of Kurds in Syria, whilst constituting the largest ethnic minority, is relatively small in comparison to the populations of Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. In addition, in Syria the Kurdish communities tend to be more dispersed and Syria has not experienced the same unified movements trying to violently enforce the creation of Kurdistan. Whilst the outbreak of civil war in 2011 allowed researchers greater access to the country and particularly the Kurdish communities, this availability was short lived as the continuing conflict has cyclically restricted access to Syria.54 Nevertheless, the available
scholarship provides a valuable insight into the experiences of Kurds in Syria. Academia can be roughly delineated into two branches: firstly, the discussion of Syrian Kurds as part of a wider, cross border study on Kurds, exploring Kurds in Turkey, Iraq and IRI in addition to 51 Gunter, Out of Nowhere, 16-17.
52 Exeter University is the first university in the United Kingdom to offer both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in the Kurdish language and a Masters in Kurdish Studies. ‘Centre for Kurdish Studies’, University of
Exeter, https://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/research/centres/kurdish/
53 Robert Lowe, ‘The Kurds of Syria: An existence Denied. By Harriet Montgomery’, Review. International
Affairs 82, no.4, 2006, 819-820.
Syria. The second branch of scholarship focuses solely on the plight of Kurds in Syria. Whilst such monographs are less common, they have been more helpful given the considerably greater detail, and Syria-specific analysis.
Beginning with a discussion of the first category: the exploration the Kurds in Syria as part of a wider study on Kurds and the quest for Kurdistan. Scholars including Gerald Chaliand, David Romano and Mehmet Gurses, Lungthuiyang Riamei fall into this classification.55 The benefit of this the presentation of the experience of Kurds in each
country under the broader contextualisation of the whole community, allowing for comparisons to be easily drawn. However, a common downside to these edited volumes is the relative lack of attention attributed to the discussion of the Kurds in Syria in comparison to their counterparts in Turkey and Iraq. It has been suggested that the nature of both the Syrian regime and the relatively docile Kurdish population are adequate explanations for the comparative lack of scholarship however, Romano and Gurses’s large chapter on Kurds in IRI unravels this excuse.56 The nature of IRI’s regime makes information acquisition on
minorities just as challenging or arguably more than Syria. This suggests that whilst the lack of research on Syrian Kurds is partially due to issues with accessing sources, it ultimately results from a lack of scholarly interest. Whilst a comparative discussion respects the national hegemony of the Kurds it overlooks the specifics of Syria. Both Syria and Iraq were ruled by nationalistic Ba’athist leadership however the persecution encountered by both Kurdish populations differed greatly. This illustrates the need for the growth of scholarship focusing solely on the Kurds in Syria.
The oversight of scholarly work discussing the entire Kurdish population has been amended by scholars Harriet Allsopp, Ismet Chériff Vanly, Michael Gunter and Karim Yildiz.57 The ethnicity of the scholars can be used to delineate between them. It is a false
oversimplification to assume that all national scholars are overly emotive and that the works of foreign scholars are incomplete for they can never truly understand the culture of the people they are studying.58 Nevertheless, for the scholarship of the Syrian Kurds, these
criticisms are somewhat valid. Both Vanly and Mella are Kurds who grew up in Syria. Both 55 Gerald Chaliand, People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, (London: Interlink Publishing Group, 1978); ed. David Romano and Mehmet Gurses, Conflict, Democratisation, and the Kurds in the Middle East:
Turkey, IRI, Iraq, and Syria (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014); Lungthuiyang Riamei, The Kurdish question: identity, representation, and struggle for self-determination (New Delhi: KW Publishers, 2015).
56 Romano and Gurses, Conflict, Democratisation, and the Kurds in the Middle East.
57 Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East; Yildiz, The Kurds in
Syria; Gunter, Out of nowhere; Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria.
58 Taylor Cox Jr, ‘Problems with Research by Organisational Scholars on Issues of Race and Ethnicity’, The
are deeply involved in Kurdish political movements and their resulting publications and arguments are constrained by the influence of cultural memory and personal bias, reducing their factual utility.59 However, countering this criticism is Vanly’s later work in The Kurds:
A Contemporary Overview, which explores the experiences of the Kurds in Syria much more
neutrally.60 This demonstrates that the stereotype of national authors is not wholly prevalent
in the study of the Kurds in Syria. Similarly, the writing of Karim Yildiz, a Kurd from Syria, human rights lawyer and chief executive of the Kurdish Human Rights Project, cannot be criticised as overly emotive or falsely inspired by personal beliefs and experiences. Furthermore, works undertaken by non-Kurdish scholars, including Montgomery, have been highly praised by both Kurdish and non-Kurdish readers for their in-depth analysis.61
The scholarship universally recognises the harsh policies implemented against Syrian Kurds. Most scholars pair their discussions of the Syrian policies against the Kurds with the international laws ratified by Syria which the discrimination breaks to demonstrate the actions amounting to a breach of human rights.62 However, the only scholar who linked the
experience of the Kurds to genocide is Vanly. Vanly’s very emotive work The Syrian Mein
Kampf against the Kurds; Baath thinking reviewed, compares the Arabisation plan
constructed by Mohamed Talab Hilal, head of security for al-Hasaka, and adopted by the Syrian government to Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf.63 Vanly evidences his theory by placing
quotes from each work together to demonstrate the similarities. One presumes that Vanly’s comparison was to demonstrate intent, a key requirement for genocide. However, whilst his ideas are revolutionary, Vanly does not analyse the similarities between the texts and leaves all interpretation up to the readers. This focus on reader interpretation is where Vanly can additionally be critiqued, Vanly chose the extracts from each work leading one to question whether the two texts are inherently similar or whether the display of the evidence manipulates the content. A problem with Vanly’s interpretation is that it was published soon after receiving a copy of the plan and therefore the effects of it were not discussed.64
Therefore, Mella’s 2006 work The Colonial Policy of the Syrian Baath Party in Western
Kurdistan which presents Hilal’s text in full and provides commentary, demonstrating the
explicit harmful effects of the policy goes someway to amend the limitations of Vanly’s early 59 Ismet Chériff Vanly, The Syrian Mein Kampf against the Kurds; Baath thinking reviewed; Mella, Kurdistan
and the Kurds under the Syrian Occupation.
60 Ismet Chériff Vanly, ‘The Kurds in Syria and Lebanon’ in The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, edited by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (London: Routledge, 1992)
61 Lowe, ‘The Kurds of Syria: An existence Denied. By Harriet Montgomery’, 819-820. 62 Yildiz, The Kurds in Syria; Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria.
63 The Arabisation plan is explored in detail in Chapter II.
study.65 Building on Vanly’s work, this work demonstrates that the Syrian government did
commit a genocide, but in the cultural, rather than physical sense. This thesis utilises both governmental policies and the social effects, but the theoretical framework of CG is the most distinctive feature.
The Bahai’s
Second only to Christianity, the Baha’i faith, an independent religion, has the most widely dispersed following in the world.66 The largest percentage of Baha’is are found in the Islamic
Republic of IRI (IRI), the country of the religion’s conception. Just as the Kurds, the Baha’is are IRI’s largest minority, however, they have never received legal recognition. Since the religion’s inception, its followers have been persecuted. Abbas Amanat, an Iranian historian, described the Baha’i situation as ‘the most telling, and shameful, features of IRI’s modern history.’67
The persecution is directly resultant of the beliefs of the Baha’i faith which often contrast with the fundamentalist Shi’a Islam under which IRI is ruled. Three core principles establish the basis for Baha’i teaching: the unity of God, religion and humanity. From these Baha’is believe that each religion is a chronological marker for society’s religious progression, directly countering the Islamic belief that Muhammad was God’s final messenger. The Baha’is abstain from all political involvement, choosing to support whichever party is in power. Baha’is additionally believe that an individual’s search for God and truth should be conducted independently. Baha’is are expected to demonstrate their faith through their daily existence, rather than try to convert others to Baha’ism verbally. Baha’is do not believe in spiritual hierarchy, therefore there are no clergy. This denial of the need for religious clergy directly challenges the Shi’a ecclesiastical system. Affolter highlights this as an explanation for the history of persecution being enacted by Shi’a mullahs.68 Instead of clergy, the Baha’i
faith is organised and administered by the National Spiritual Assembly, the members of which are elected by the community, which in turn provides instruction to Local Spiritual Assemblies.69
65 Jawed Mella, The Colonial Policy of the Syrian Baath Party in Western Kurdistan (London: Western Kurdistan Association, 2006).
66 ‘The Baha’is: Introduction to a World Community’ http://www.bahai.com/thebahais/pg5.htm (accessed 02/04/2017)
67 Abbas Amanat, ‘The Historical Roots of the Persecution of the Babis and Baha’is in Iran’, in The Baha’is of
Iran: Socio-historical studies, ed. by Dominic Brookshaw and Seena Fazel, (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).
68 Affolter, The Specter of Ideological Genocide’, 82.
69 ‘What Baha’is Believe: The National Spiritual Assembly’, http://www.bahai.org/beliefs/essential-relationships/administrative-order/national-spiritual-assembly (accessed 04/05/2018)
A further belief that directly counters Shi’a law is the Baha’i advocation of equal rights for both genders, particularly regarding education. In Shi’a IRI a woman’s role is in the home and girls are denied the same rights to education as boys. Resulting from the precarious position of Baha’is in IRI, the Baha’i World Centre was built in Haifa, Israel. This has lead the Iranian regime denouncing Baha’is as Zionist agents. The high religious diversity within the population of Haifa highlights the illegitimacy of the regime’s claims.70
Historical background
The history of the Baha’is differs from the Kurds because Iran was ruled nationally at the founding of Baha’ism. The history of Baha’i persecution began almost at its conception, with the religion’s earliest form: the Babis, followers of the Bab.71 The earliest record of
repression is the 1845 trial of the Bab’s representative in which the emissary was sentenced to death for spreading “the heresy” and the Bab was declared an apostate. The trial ruling inspired violent clashes between Babis and Iranian officials. Attempting to quell the uprisings, Iranian officials executed the Bab, the leader and movement’s most holy figure. Following a retaliatory assassination attempt on the Shah, IRI’s leader, the Shah ordered a massacre of all Babis.72 Estimates of the death toll vary as much as scholarly classification.
Whilst Geoffrey Nash, a historian specialising in Baha’i persecution, defined the actions as a ‘holocaust’, Amanat, countered this claim arguing the Iranian regime never implemented a genocidal campaign against the Babis.73
The Babi movement remained underground until 1863 when it resurfaced under the leadership of Baha’u’llah, transitioning the movement into Baha’ism. Despite Baha’u’llah professing political neutrality, a key tenant of the religion, he was exiled, ultimately residing in modern-day Israel. Israel consequentially became the home of the Baha’i International Centre. Moojan Momen, a Baha’i historian, asserted that with the fall of the Qajar dynasty (1785-1925) and the establishment of the Pahlavis rule (1929-1979), the impetus and 70 Haifa Municipality, ‘Demography: No. 7’, 03/2008,
www1.haifa.muni.il/spru/doc/YB/Dmgrp/Y2006/Download/DemographyDL.pdf
71 Babism is an Abrahamic, monotheistic religion which was founded in IRI in 1844 under the leadership of a merchant from Shiraz who claimed, aged twenty-four, to be a messenger of God. The primary belief of Babism was the belief in one, incomprehensible God who continually manifested his will through an unending list of messengers. Initially Babism was based on the laws in the Qur’an and sunna however following the Bab’s “resurrection” in 1948, he dispelled Islamic laws and customs. Following military defeat by the Qajar state in 1950, Babism collapsed as viable religious and political movement. Denis MacEoin, Rituals in Babism and
Baha’ism (London: British Academic Press, 1994): 1-9.
72 Moojan Momen, ‘The Babi and the Baha’i community of Iran: A case of “suspended genocide”?’, Journal of
Genocide Research, 7.2, (pp.221-241) 2005 (pp.221-222).
73 Geoffrey Nash, Iran’s Secret Pogrom: The Conspiracy to Wipe out the Baha’is (Suffolk: Neville Spearman, 1982) 23; Amanat, ‘The Historical Roots of the Persecution’ p.170.
intensity of the persecution changed. Previously, persecution had been mainly localised, under the Pahlavis it became government sponsored.74 The most notable attack during this
period were the 1955 “Ramadan riots” in which Baha’is nationwide were attacked by mobs inspired by inflammatory radio broadcasts from clerics. Whilst not disputing Momen’s claims of intensified persecutions under the Pahlavis, the persecution was further intensified and institutionalised following the 1979 Islamic revolution in which the country fell under religious rule.
The 1979 revolution culminated with the abdication of the Shah and saw IRI under the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, a fundamentalist Shi’a cleric previously exiled for his outspoken opposition of the Shah. Whilst it was hoped the Islamic revolution would signal a new age in IRI’s history of human rights, most of this hope has remained unfulfilled. Following his seizure of power, Khomeini ordered the trial of all members of the Shah’s regime and executed thousands of political prisoners.75 Furthermore, women were denied the
same rights as men in official legislation and, in keeping with Sharia law, women were forced to cover their hair and bodies or face arrest.76 Additionally, freedom of the press was sharply
curtailed. The human rights violations in IRI were so acute that in 1985 they were placed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, making IRI the fourth ever country to which this had happened. This is the political climate under which my work is framed.
Historiography
IRI’s autocratic political system resulted in scholarship on the persecution of the Baha’is being limited. Despite the UN appointing a special representative to explore allegations of human rights abuses in IRI, Andres Aguilar (1984-1986), Reynaldo Galindo Pohl (1986-1995) and Maurice Copithorne (1999-2002) the representatives struggled to obtain the necessary permission to visit IRI and conduct investigations, leading to several resignations. This demonstrates the challenges encountered by scholars.
A form of division between scholars who study the Baha’is are their disciplinary backgrounds. These directly influence the specialisation of the works. Scholars trained in international human rights law, Nazila Ghanea-Hercock, Richard Falk and Paul Allen focus
74 Momen, ‘The Babi and the Baha’i community of Iran’, p.223.
75 Abrahamian Ervand, Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern IRI, (London, University of California Press, 1999): 125.
76 Patricia Higgins, ‘Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Legal, Social, and Ideological Change’, The
on the legal ramifications of the treatment of the Baha’is.77 Falk explores the persecution of
the Baha’is under the framework of international human rights law.78 Ghanea-Hercock
formulates her research around the interactions and relationship of the Baha’is to the UN.79
Allen utilises international human rights resolutions in relation to the Baha’i situation. Allen’s argument is more sophisticated, utilising Baha’is as evidence for the failures of the current UN procedures, whereas Ghanea just presents the relationship. However, Allen’s work was published in the mid-1980s so fails to account for the whole period.80 More
narrative accounts of the history of Baha’i persecution in IRI since the Islamic revolution were undertaken by historically trained scholars including Firuz Kazemzadeh and Siyamak Zabihi-Moghaddam.81
The disciplinary backgrounds and focus of the works furthermore impact the sources used to evidence the arguments. Legal scholars unsurprisingly utilise international human rights laws and UN publications as well as utilising newspaper articles secondary sources for more information on the Baha’is. Whereas, the source base of historically trained scholars, often with Iranian language skills, has been the translation of leaked government documents in combination with interviews. In addition to scholarly works, individuals, including William Sears and Olya Roohizadegan, have recounted personal experiences of Baha’is in revolutionary IRI. While providing a first-hand account of the effects of the persecution, highlighting the refusal of the Baha’i people to succumb to forced assimilation, the personal nature of the works means the scope of the examples is limited. Additionally, resulting from the works concluding in the 1980s, Sears and Roohizadegan focus on the early arrests and executions, failing to account for the later social and economic exclusionary policies, the key focus of this study.82 A common theme prevalent across the literature is the positive
endorsement of the BIC. The wide range of source material ensures that work sponsored or published by the BIC is not accused of bias. However, the large involvement of the BIC demonstrates the relative lack of scholarly interest in the Baha’is.
77 Ghanea, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in Iran; Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1981); Paul Allen, ‘The Baha’is of Iran: a proposal for enforcement of international human rights standards’, Cornell International Law Journal 20, 1987.
78 Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty.
79 Ghanea, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in Iran. 80 Allen, ‘The Baha’is of Iran’.
81 Firuz Kazemzadeh, ‘The Baha’is in Iran: Twenty Years of Repression’, Social Research 67, no.2, 2000; Siyamak Zabihi-Moghaddam, ‘State-sponsored Persecution of Baha’is in the Islamic Republic of Iran’,
Contemporary Review of the Middle East 3, no.2, 2016.
82 William Sears, A Cry from the Heart, (Oxford: George Ronald, 1982); Olya Roohizadegan, Olya’s Story: A
Survivor’s Dramatic Account of the Persecution of Baha’is in Revolutionary Iran, (Oxford: Oneworld
The connection between Baha’i persecution and genocide has been much more extensively explored than the discussion of the Kurds suffering from genocide. However, resulting from the scholarly dissensus to an accepted definition of genocide, as previously discussed, the question of the Baha’i situation as genocide is the source of scholarly division. Momen supports his claim of a genocide against Baha’is with a comprehensive application of theories of genocide to the Baha’i case. Momen heightens his assertions through a comparison of the Baha’i persecution to other cases more widely scholarly accepted as genocides. Aside from Momen there has been no detailed study as to whether the Baha’i fate constitutes a genocide through an analysis of Baha’i suffering against genocide theories.83 As
a result, scholars which do classify the situation as genocide utilise a multitude of terminologies. Focusing on the attitude of the perpetrators, Michael Fischer asserted Khomeini’s rhetoric as ‘a declared genocidal call’.84 Looking more practically at both the
arrests, executions, and the policies restricting education, employment and travel, Allen classified the Baha’is as suffering from a ‘systematic genocide’.85 Focusing on the motives of
the Iranian regime to wipe out the “challenge” the Baha’is presented to the new Islamic order, Friedrich Affolter utilised the term ‘ideological genocide’.86 Whilst Momen is a Baha’i, the
prevalence of other non-Baha’i scholars also utilising the framework of genocide demonstrates that this idea has received recognition outside of the Baha’i community.
Nevertheless, these suggestions of the persecution amounting to genocide are not universally accepted. Scholars who utilise the definition of genocide being contingent on mass killings instead recognised the potential for a genocide but do not believe one ever occurred. In 1985, following the number of Baha’i executions reaching its peak, Leo Kuper categorised the Baha’i situation as ‘threatened genocide’.87 Ervin Staub believed that this
threat was ‘halted’ in the 1990s when, following growing international pressure, the number of Baha’i executions and arrests sharply decreased.88 Dominic Cooper, on the other hand,
asserted that the proportionally low number of Baha’i executions means the situation cannot amount to genocide.89 Similarly, Ghanea noted the UN and Amnesty International, never
83 Momen, ‘The Babi and the Baha’i community of Iran’
84 Michael Fischer, Debating Muslims: cultural dialogues in postmodernity and tradition, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1990): 224.
85 Allen, ‘The Baha’is of Iran, 339-340.
86 Affolter, ‘The Specter of Ideological Genocide: The Baha’is of Iran’, 76-77.
87 Nauzanian Knight, State Terrorism in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Understanding the Case of the Iranian
Baha’i Community, (Florida: Dissertation.com, 2015): 90.
88 Knight, State Terrorism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 90.
89 Dominic Cooper, The Baha’is of Iran: The Minority Rights Group, Report No.51, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1985): 12.
classified the Baha’is’ suffering as genocidal.90 There are no discernible categorisations to
explain the difference in the scholarly application of genocide, the scholarly backgrounds and publication dates are diverse on both sides of the argument. These vast scholarly discrepancies therefore demonstrate the need for a new schema based on an internationally accepted legal definition. In keeping with the legal definition of genocide, one accepts Cooper and Staub’s assertions that the execution statistics fail to amount to mass killing. The persecutions instead amount to CG, a view shared by Nader Saiedi, Bill Frelick and Ghanea.91
However, these scholars only mention the phase in passing, this discussion therefore greatly expands on this by explicitly evidencing the direct measures imposed by the Iranian government enacting CG.
Summary
This chapter has negated a discussion of scholarly works comparing the Baha’is and the Kurds because such a study does not exist. In general, comparative scholarly works including the Kurds utilise only the experience of Kurds in other countries because of the unifying national character. Similarly missing from my historiography was an in-depth discussion of the case studies as CG. The unrecognition of CG in international law is an explanation of its omission from discussions on the abuses experienced by the Baha’is and Kurds, just as millennial scholars sought a return to the legal definition of genocide because it is the only one recognised internationally by governments and populations alike. The lack of legal recognition means that CG, just like politicide and other scholarly creations of the 1990s, is not widely publicly known. This public ignorance means that the scholarly application of CG is less controversial and inspires less of a reaction. Therefore, both the comparative and theoretical approach in this study are unique.
90 Ghanea, Human Rights, the UN and the Baha’is in Iran.
91 Nader Saiedi, Gate of the Heart: Understanding the Writings of the Bab, (Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008): 377; Bill Frelick ‘Iranian Baha’is and Genocide Early Warning’, Social Science Record 24, no.2, 1987, 35-37; Nazila Ghanea-Hercock, ‘Review of secondary literature in English on recent persecutions of Baha’is in IRI’, Baha’i Studies Review 7, 1997.
Chapter II Political Measures
‘It’s like being buried alive’92
In his explanation of the political technique of genocide, Lemkin asserted that the aim of the perpetrator was to ‘disrupt the national unity’.93 Lemkin constructed this typology
around the Nazi destruction of all local governments and the imposition of a German administration in occupied Europe as his example. While Syria and IRI are ruled nationally, similar policies have been undertaken against the Baha’is and the Kurds. This chapter explores two areas of persecution that serve to disrupt national unity.94 Firstly, legislation
constructed by national governments which served to codify the persecution Baha’is and Kurds within legal statute. Secondly, this chapter addresses the specific measures which targeted the organisational structures and leadership of the two minorities: Kurdish political parties in Syria, and the National and Local Spiritual Assemblies of the Baha’is. The chapter is divided thematically to demonstrate the inherent similarities between the measures imposed by the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Through the application of the framework of CG it will be evident that these measures were implemented to weaken the unified character of the groups.
Legalising the persecution
In the case of both the Baha’is and the Kurds, their respective regimes’ initiated state sanctioned persecution immediately, when, within months of attainting power, discriminatory measures were integrated into national law. Even superficial legal process is significant in that it offered a veil of legitimacy to the discrimination. For the Kurdish community this occurred in 1962, when, following a one-day census of the al-Hasaka region conducted by the Syrian authorities, 250,000 Kurds, an estimated quarter of the Kurdish population in Syria, were deprived of their Syrian citizenship.95 Montgomery described the census as a ‘landmark
event in Kurdish history of Syria’.96
92 Maureen Lynch and Perveen Ali, Buried Alive: Stateless Kurds in Syria, (Refugees International, 2006): i. 93 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 82-83.
94 The Baha’is are not a nationally homogenous group, they are nationally Iranian, however I use the term “national” to describe Baha’is as a group.
95 The ICTY ruling of Srebrenica as a genocide demonstrated that international justice recognised the occurrence of genocide with the destruction of only part of a group. United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ‘ICTY Remembers: The Srebrenica Genocide 1995-2015’,
http://www.icty.org/specials/srebrenica20/?q=srebrenica20/ (accessed 26/06/2018). 96 Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria, 77.
The government asserted that the census was carried out as a means of identifying ‘alien infiltrators’ who had illegally crossed the border from Turkey.97 However, scholars and
human rights organisations reference the ‘arbitrary manner’ under which it was carried out as evidence that the census was implemented to deliberately curtail the rights of Kurds.98
Successful completion of the census and consequentially retaining citizenship necessitated the provision of proof that the inhabitant had been residing in Syria since 1945. Yet, proving this was not easy: the census was carried out over one day only, residents were not forewarned of its happening, nor were they informed of the ramifications. As a result, many failed to fill it in satisfactorily because they did not have access to necessary proof.99
Additionally, some Kurds deliberately avoided completing the census in an attempt at avoiding being drafted for military service.
The results of the census divided the Kurdish community into those who retained citizenship; Ajanib (foreign/alien), Kurds who had their Syrian citizenship revoked; and
Maktumiin (unregistered), Kurds who failed to complete the census, regardless of whether
they had previously held Syrian citizenship. For the Ajanib, this loss of citizenship meant the Kurds became stateless, their previous identity cards were replaced red pieces of paper containing their name and status. Ajanib Kurds were denied many of the rights awarded to citizens, including the right to marry, own property and foreign travel.100 Maktumiin Kurds,
additionally stateless, hold an even lower status than Ajanib Kurds. They are awarded no rights or opportunities because they are illegal aliens and thus do not exist in the eyes of the state.101 Ironically, it has been reported that stateless Kurds are still required to do military
service.102 The hereditary nature of statelessness means that the number of stateless Kurds
residing in Syria has inflated exponentially.103
The social limitations imposed by statelessness are exemplified by academic theories of nationalism. Ernst Gellner, a leading nationalism theorist, highlights that those without a nation ‘provokes revulsion’ because they defy the norm.104 Reflecting this theory, stateless
Kurds suffered greatly from social alienation. Academics have pointed out the numerous 97 HRW, ‘Syria’.
98 HRW, ‘Syria’; Allsopp, ‘The Kurds of Syria’; Yildiz and Montgomery, ‘The Kurds in Syria’.
99 A large percentage of the population worked agriculturally. The only documentation available to farmers was records of sheep tax however, because the census was demanding documentation from nearly twenty years previous, many had either been thrown away or lost because there had been no reason to store the documents securely.
100 The provision of passports and other identity documents suitable for travel was prohibited. HRW, ‘Syria’. 101 Montgomery, The Kurds of Syria, 80.
102 Yildiz and Montgomery, The Kurds in Syria, 81. 103 HRW, ‘Syria’.
