Explaining EU policy responses after the Islamist terrorist attacks in January and November 2015 in France

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Explaining EU policy responses after the Islamist terrorist

attacks in January and November 2015 in France

Author: Sebastiaan Vingerhoets Student number: S1914812

Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs MSc. Crisis and Security Management Words: 26073

Thesis supervisor: Prof. Dr. A. Schmid Second reader: Dr. G. M. van Buuren

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank everyone who helped and supported me during this Master programme and, especially, through the last few months of thesis writing.

I especially would like to thank my supervisor, prof. Alex Schmid for his quick, elaborate and critical feedback that he provided at any given time. In addition, I would like to thank all lecturers of this Master programme that prepared me to write this paper academically.

Furthermore, I would like to thank my aunt and uncle, Caroline and Richard Tracey for taking the time and effort to comment on my thesis. Their input dotted the I’s and crossed the T’s and improved the overall impression of my final thesis.

Today, 9th January 2017, I’m going to celebrate my 25th birthday and the finalisation of my thesis. As it is finally done.

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Abstract

This study explains whether the agenda setting theory by John Kingdon (1984) and the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 1998) can be used to adequately explain the counter-terrorism policy responses of the EU in the policy (re-)formulation phase in the wake of the Islamist terrorist attacks in France on the office of the Charlie Hebdo magazine and the Paris attacks, in January and November 2015.

In order to establish an historical context to the EU policy response, this study analyses and explains earlier major terrorist attacks, the U.S. 9/11 terrorist attack, the Madrid bombings on 11th March 2004, and the London bombings on 7th July 2005, using both theories. The results of this part of the analysis show that both theories are suitable to explain the agenda setting of international- and Islamic terrorism, and the securitisation of subjects such as democratic values and borders after the 9/11 attacks and the Madrid bombings. The theories proved only to be partly suitable to explain the responses to the London bombings, after which the ‘home-grown’ aspect of terrorism reached the political agenda.

The analysis of the Charlie Hebdo attack shows how European leaders framed the events as attacks on democratic values, such as freedom of speech and religion and refused to link international terrorism with immigrants. These acts of framing, however, did not contribute to the securitisation of new subjects, as these subjects had already been securitised after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The EU policy response to the Charlie Hebdo attack consisted mainly of the adoption of counter-terrorism measures that pre-dated the event, but were introduced as ‘new’ solutions to prevent similar events in the future. Cases in point are the EU PNR framework and smart borders, which had been opposed by several EU institutions for years. When looking at the policy response in the light of the agenda setting theory, it can be said that the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo had opened a policy window, which had been seized by policy-makers to re-introduce previous controversial and rejected proposals. The implementation of these adopted policies, however, were postponed due to the migration crisis in Europe. But when France was struck by another major attack of Islamic terrorism in November that year, the EU responded by accelerating the implementation of these already adopted measures.

In response to both the Paris attacks, President Hollande and other political leaders within the EU only intensified the securitisation of already securitised subjects in spite of the fact that he

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4 identified that the democratic values and the Western way of life were threatened existentially by IS.

Based on the analysis of the cases using the agenda setting framework and the securitisation theory, this research concludes that these theoretical frameworks are only to some extent applicable to the Charlie Hebdo attack and the Paris attacks in 2015. The securitisation theory is mainly useful to analyse and explain speech acts of political leaders, but falls short in these cases as the referent objects had already been securitised on earlier occasions.

The same applies for the agenda setting framework, which is suitable to explain how

previously proposed, and opposed or rejected, measures were proposed again as ‘solutions’ to prevent similar attacks in the future. However, as the policy responses mainly consisted of the re-proposing and the re-advancement of previous measures, the framework is not applicable in these cases to explain how subjects or measures were put on the political agenda.

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1. Introduction

1.1. Research Subject

In 2015, the French public was shocked twice as some of its citizens were targeted by the largest and most coordinated terrorist attacks in Europe since the Madrid bombings in 2004 (Henly, 2015). In January, three gunmen killed seventeen people in separate, but related attacks in Paris and pledged their allegiance to Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Charlie Hebdo Attack’). In November that same year, three teams, consisting of terrorists from IS of Syria and Iraq, killed 129 people in attacks on three different locations in and around the French capital (hereafter referred to as the ‘Paris attacks’).

The attacks led to widespread solidarity with the victims and condemnation by many foreign (mainly European) leaders (The Telegraph, 2015). The European Union (EU) reacted by reinforcing its response against terrorism and accelerated the implementation of already accepted measures (European Council, n.d). This study seeks to investigate how policy makers on the EU-level responded to the major1_{acts of terrorism committed in 2015 in}

France. It seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the discussed and/or adapted policies after these major acts of terrorism and also seeks to analyse how policy makers framed these events to achieve desired results.

The research starts with analysing the policy responses of the EU after earlier major terrorist attacks, namely the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 in the U.S, the Madrid bombings in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005. These major attacks caused apprehension within the EU and increased the political will to combat terrorism more forcefully (Wouters, Duquet, 2014). The academic literature regarding the aftermath these earlier attacks is studied and analysed by applying Kingdon’s (1984) framework for agenda setting and the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 1998). The study focuses on the policy (re-) formulation phase of the EU in the aftermath of the two terrorist attacks in France in January and November 2015, using content analysis.

1.2. Research Question

This study seeks to answer the following research question:

Can the policy framework for agenda setting, as described by John Kingdon (1984), and the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 1998), adequately explain the

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9 counter-terrorism policy responses of the EU in the policy (re-)formulation phase, in the wake of the Islamist terrorist attacks in France on the office of the Charlie Hebdo magazine and the Paris attacks, in January and November 2015?

1.3. Sub-Questions

The following sub-questions should assist in answering the main research question, while also structuring in the research:

• How has EU policy been influenced by the U.S. 9/11 hijackings in 2001, the 11/3 Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the 7/7 London transport system bombings in 2005?

• How did France respond to the terrorist attacks in January and November 2015, and how did France urge the EU to respond?

• How has EU policy reacted after the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ terrorist attack in January and the ‘Paris attacks’ in November 2015?

• How have (EU) actors framed the terrorist attacks in France to pursue certain (other) political goals?

• Are the frameworks of agenda-setting and securitisation still useful, or are the (re-)formulated policies after January and November 2015 mainly incremental?

1.4. Academic Relevance

Since the terrorist attacks in the US on 9/11, terrorism has become a well-studied subject. Most studies on agenda setting after terrorist attacks focus on the 9/11 attacks. However, there are only few analyses that focus on the policy response of governments in Europe after the Charlie Hebdo and Paris attacks. The studies conducted by Katrina Prosser (2016) and Christina Uhlig (2015) have a particular focus on the (assignment of) responsibility and on how several media reported the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, leaving a noteworthy gap regarding the understanding of the EU policy (re-) formulation process after major terrorist attacks.

Studies regarding both the Charlie Hebdo and the Paris attacks in France in 2015 have been conducted by the think tank Centre of European Policy Studies. Think-tanks often have their own agenda, as they want to put certain policy recommendations on the political agenda. There is room for an independent analysis which this thesis seeks to provide.

1.5. Societal Relevance

After large-scale terrorist attacks, counter-terrorism policies are generally reviewed in order to prevent or better counter similar future threats. As terrorism is often a cross-border threat, these policy responses are not limited to policies on the national level. International

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10 organisations such as the European Union, the United Nations, OSCE and NATO also take measures to enhance the safety and well-being of citizens and institutions.

When such events take place, policy makers within these organisations tend to push old ideas forward or advance new ideas and solutions in the form of policy proposals. It is of societal relevance to understand how this ‘(re-)formulation phase’ takes place and what the motives of the policy makers are to put certain policies on the political agenda again with the expectation to see these implemented in practice.

1.6. Thesis Outline

The first chapter of this research describes the theoretical frameworks of agenda setting and securitisation, which are used to describe and analyse the cases in this study. The next chapter describes the methodological components of this study, describing the research design, the sampling of cases, the operationalisation of the indicators and, finally, the validity and reliability of the study.

Chapter four then starts with the analysis of the first set of cases, the U.S. 9/11 attack, the 11/3 Madrid bombings, and the 7/7 London bombings, with the use of the theoretical frameworks described in chapter two. Chapters five and six focus on the cases of the Charlie Hebdo attack and the Paris attacks in January and November 2015, describing how France responded to these acts of terrorism and what they urged the EU to do, before then describing and analysing the EU policy response using the frameworks for agenda setting and securitisation. Based on the results of the analysis of the case studies in previous chapters, chapter seven reviews the applicability of the theoretical frameworks to the cases of January and November 2015. The final chapter, chapter eight, concludes with the main findings of this study and answers the main research question of this study.

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2. Theoretical Framework

The two theoretical frameworks that have been used for the first part of the analysis of this thesis are (i) Kingdon’s (1984) analytical framework for agenda setting and (ii) the

securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School. These two theories have been chosen due to their perceived suitability to explain the process of policy (re-)formulation in the aftermath of major terrorist attacks. The two theories have been combined and applied to the major

terrorist attacks in 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2015.

2.1. Agenda Setting Framework

Kingdon’s (1984) agenda setting framework examines the influences of both states- and non-states on the agenda setting process. It is important to investigate the role of political

entrepreneurs, both in- and outside governments, and to explore to what extent they construct and utilize ‘policy windows’, as agenda setting opportunities to put their preferred solutions on the political agenda. In this study, policy windows will be conceptualized as ‘’a confluence of events that allows advocates to push their policy solutions to problems onto the political agenda’’ (Cit. Kingdon, 1984: as quoted in Farley, Baker, Koliba, Matteson, Mills and

Pittman, 2007, p. 345). In his framework, Kingdon (1984) suggests that these policy windows open and close as a response to the dynamical interaction of political actors, institutions and solutions. As the interaction of these forces, or streams, open and close policy windows, they create opportunities for political entrepreneurs to influence the political agenda (Howlett, Ramesh and Perl, 2009). Kingdon (1984) identifies three separate streams. Firstly, the

problem stream ‘’The perceptions of problems as public issues requiring government action’’, secondly, the policy stream ‘’Experts and analysts examining problems and proposing

solutions to them’’, and thirdly, the political stream, which is ‘’composed of such factors as swings of national mood, administrative or legislative turnover, and interest group pressure campaigns’’ (Cit. Kingdon, 1984: as quoted in Howlett et al, 2009, p. 103). These streams can be made to interact by several factors, some of which can be predicted, while others are more random. Upcoming elections, for example, are predictable causes for the different streams to interact. Unpredictable events, such as terrorist attacks or natural hazards, can cause the streams to interact suddenly and at random. Such events are conceptualized as ‘focusing events’, which are defined as ‘’an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be

reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest;

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12 and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously’’ (Cit. Kingdon, 1995, p. 94-100: as described in Birkland, 1998, p. 54).

The reason for choosing this framework is that it remains one of the most cited models on policymaking (Cohen-Vogel, McLendon, 2009). Its application to analyse the policy response of the EU after the major terrorist attacks in 2001, 2004, 2005, and 2015 can offer a deeper understanding of the extent to which such events affect the political agenda and how it has done so in these concrete, earlier cases.

2.2. Securitisation Theory

The securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School contends that the objective qualities of an issue are not what qualify it as a security issue, but rather the choices of relevant actors with institutional or political power, such as a government leader (Waever, 1995). Ole Waever (1995) therefore argues that issues are not security issues by themselves, but are being

constructed or framed with ‘speech acts’ by so-called ‘security actors’ to lift an issue from the political debate and place it above.

The most important elements of the securitisation theory consist of (i) the referent object, (ii) the securitising actor, and (iii) the audience. The referent object is defined by Buzan et al (1998), as ‘’things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’’ (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). Traditionally, the referent object has been the nation state, however, the securitisation theory allows many more objects to be securitised. In principle, securitising actors can try to portray anything as a referent object. However, most security action is taken around collective objects, meaning that the actors have a better chance to successfully construct such objects as referent objects (Buzan et al, 1998). The

securitisation of referent objects has been divided into five main sectors by securitisation theorists: (i) the economical, (ii) the military, (iii) the societal, (iv) the environmental, and (v) the political sector. In each one of these sectors, a particular threat is described to threaten the referent object, which may thus vary per sector. In the political sector, for example, a referent objective could be democracy, while in the societal sector the referent objectives can consist of the culture and/or values of a specific country. The only sector in which the nation state remains the referent object is the military factor (McGlinchey, Walters, Scheinpflug, 2017). Securitising actors play a key role in portraying the issue to be seen as existentially

threatened, and are defined as ‘’actors who securitise issues by declaring something –a

referent object– as existentially threatened’’ (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36). By presenting an issue to pose an existential threat to the referent object at hand, the use of extraordinary measures is legitimatized to counter this security threat and protect the referent object. Hence, by invoking

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13 security, the actor claims special rights to use special force or powers that would normally not be accepted (Buzan, et al, 1998).

It is only when a securitising actor manages to push beyond the usually binding rules and procedures, that one can speak of securitisation. If a securitising actor claims something as a referent object that is being threatened existentially and proposes extraordinary measures to stop the threat, but does not convince his or her audience, there is no securitisation but just a securitising move. Issues are thus only securitised when both pictured as such by the

securitising actor, and accepted by his or her audience, making it an existential threat to a referent object and which is requires extraordinary measures (Buzan et al, 1998).

The securitisation theory contributes to our understanding that (inter)national security policies are thoroughly designated by policy- and decision-makers, rather than a natural given

(McGlinchey, Walters, Scheinpflug, 2017).

In several cases to which the securitisation theory is applied, extraordinary measures consist of measures that introduce surveillance measures, restrict the freedom of movement and travel, violate people’s individual privacy, and suspend (some) basic rights. These measures are merely outlined to illustrate what possible responses to a security issue are possible when it is perceived to be an existential threat. This list does not exclude other possible measures and does not suggest that every single one of these actions will be taken in response to a security issue.

2.3. The Combining of the Two Frameworks

The reason for combining these two theoretical frameworks is that they, to some extent, overlap. As described earlier in this chapter, the agenda setting theory describes that the interaction of the three political streams can cause a policy window to open, allowing policy makers to put public problems and solutions on the political agenda. These streams consist, firstly, of the ‘problem-stream’, which states that an issue has to be perceived as a public problem which requires the attention of the government. This particular stream overlaps with the speech act component of the securitisation theory, in which the actor claims that a referent object is threatened. The second stream of the agenda setting framework is the policy stream, in which policies are proposed to deal with a given public problem. The proposing of

solutions to the public problem in this stream overlaps with the securitisation theory, in which a securitising actor proposes extraordinary measures to deal with the problem that the actor is trying to securitise. The third stream in the agenda setting framework is the political steam, which consists of swings in the public mood or legislative changes. The components of this stream are less obviously overlapping with the securitisation theory. However, the securitising

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14 actor convincing the audience that the proposed extraordinary measures are a necessity, is related to the swings of public mood in the political stream.

The overlap of some of the components of these two theoretical frameworks allows this study to analyse more extensively the EU policy responses after the selected major terrorist attacks.

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3. Methodology

3.1. Research Design

To study the subject and answer the research question of this thesis research, a qualitative, multiple case study design has been chosen. This design is the most appropriate for this study as the study is qualitative of nature and the research question is explanatory. The design allows the study to test the selected theories on several units of analysis (Yin, 2009). The advantage of a case study design is that several features within a few cases can be examined, making it possible to gain in-depth and detailed information and knowledge of these complex cases and their context. This deeper understanding of the examined phenomena makes it possible to come up with explanations that can capture and explain the complexities of the phenomenon under consideration (Neuman, 2014).

A limitation of this particular design is the lack of generalisability of its results. However, as this thesis research seeks to explain policy (re-)formulation after terrorist attacks by applying theoretical frameworks, generalisability is not a required outcome.

3.2. Sampling of Cases

The different cases of the case study design have been separated in two clusters. The first cluster consists of an analysis of earlier formative moments regarding the development of counter-terrorism policies in the EU, which took place before 2015. The cases in this cluster consist of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 in the U.S, the Madrid bombings in 2004, and the London bombings in 2005. The aims of this cluster are to create a historical context, to serve as illustration and to indicate the policy measures that are already in place and which policy intentions are still imminent.

The second cluster consists of the Charlie Hebdo attack and the Paris attacks in France in November 2015. The cluster with these two cases forms the main focus of this thesis research and will be used to analyse whether the frameworks of securitisation and agenda-setting are still useful or whether what happened after January and November 2015 was mainly

incremental.

3.2.1. Selecting the Units of Analysis

The 9/11 terror attack, the Madrid bombings and London train bombings in the first cluster are chosen due to the formative moments these events created on EU level regarding counter-terrorism. These attacks caused great apprehension in the EU and generated the political will to combat terrorism more forcefully (Wouters, Duquet, 2014).

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16 The January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack and the November 2015 Paris attacks are chosen as the main focus of analysis as these attacks deviated from previous attacks in Europe due to the large number of victims and the significant degree of coordination of the attacks. The attacks also were the deadliest terrorist attacks in France in decades, and highlighted the increased threat from Islamist terrorist groups and individuals, with connections to Syria and Iraq (Europol, 2016).

3.2.2. Selecting the Units of Observation

The gathering of data for this thesis research includes policy documents and proposals that were adopted by the EU in response to the various terrorist attacks. Many of these measures were not new, but rather re-formulated to fit the purpose to counter terrorism. It needs to be mentioned that the analysis of these policy documents views the developments from an ‘outside’ perception. The thesis research focuses on the following EU counter-terrorism measures:

• The Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism; • The Declaration of Combatting Terrorism;

• The EU Declaration condemning the London attacks; • The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy;

• The EU Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. These measures have been selected for analysis as they consist of the most important and formative measures that have shaped the EU’s response regarding counter-terrorism.

In addition to these measures, the research will also focus on the following instruments as part of some of these measures:

• The European Arrest Warrant; • The Money Laundering Directive;

• The Passenger Name Record data exchange.

These CT instruments have been challenged in both national and European courts, and are sometimes described as draconian measures in the literature, violating provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights. They are therefore also selected for analysis (Devoic, 2012).

3.3. Data Gathering and Analysis

Within this thesis research the focus lies upon academic research regarding the historically formative moments and EU policy documents regarding counter-terrorism.

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17 this research have been studied extensively by other scholars2, providing reliable information to which the theoretical framework of this study can be applied.

For the analysis of the remaining cases, the research will draw upon substantive documents such as EU policy documents, speeches made by leaders after the crisis, and official

communiqués and press releases.

The cases of this research are content analysed by applying Kingdon’s (1984) framework for agenda setting and the Copenhagen School’s securitisation theory (Buzan et al, 1998). The choice of content analysis for the analysis of these cases is due to the limited amount of available time to conduct this thesis research, and the large amount of relevant (policy) documents available. Using a more finely grained method like discourse analysis would therefore be too time consuming.

The research makes use of the results of the content analysis of the first cluster of units to analyse the usefulness of the frameworks after the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks.

The content analysis in the thesis research is deductive as it explores and tests the validity of existing theories by applying them to a selection of cases.

3.4. Operationalisation

The studied concepts in this research have been conceptualised in the theoretical framework in chapter two. This paragraph explains how these concepts were measured during the research.

Firstly, the concepts within each theory were defined, after which indicators were established and defined. 2_{R. Bossong, 2016;} G. Truc, 2017; F. Reinares, 2009 & 2016; U. C. Schroeder, 2013; B. Devoic, 2012; A. Tsoukala, 2004; L. Thieux, 2004.

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18 3.4.1. Assessing the Indicators for Agenda Setting

Concept & Definition Indicator Focusing event

‘’A focusing event is an event that is sudden; relatively uncommon; can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms; has harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest; and that is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously’’ (Cit. Birkland 1997; Kingdon 1995, p. 94: as described in Birkland, 1998, p. 54).

1. Suddenness of the event

2. The event is relatively uncommon

3. The event can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future harms.

4. The event caused harms that are concentrated in a particular geographical area or community of interest 5. The event is known to policy makers and the public simultaneously.

Policy window

‘’policy windows open and close based on the dynamic interaction of political institutions, policy actors and the articulation of ideas in the form of proposed policy solutions’’ (Howlett, et al, 2009, p. 103).

1. Problem stream: Signs of the perception of a problem as a public issue which requires government attention.

2. Policy stream: Solutions posed by experts and analysts to counter the public issue.

3. Political stream: Swings in public mood, legislative changes or pressure campaigns by interest groups.

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19 3.4.2. Assessing the Indicators for Securitisation

Concept & Definition Indicator Securitisation

The most important elements of the securitisation theory consist of the (i) referent object, (ii) the securitising actor, and (iii) the audience.

(i): ‘’things that are seen to be

existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival’’ (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36).

(ii): ‘’actors who securitise issues by declaring something–a referent object–as existentially threatened’’ (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 36).

(iii) the convincing of the audience that extraordinary measures are justified to counter the threat. (Buzan et al, 1998).

1. Claims by an actor that a referent object is existentially threatened.

2. Demanding of right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with the threat.

3. Convincing of the audience that rule-breaking behaviour is justified to counter the threat.

Table 2:Indicators of securitisation theory

3.5. Validity and Reliability

One of the main disadvantages of case-studies is that they are limited regarding their external validity. As this study will only focus on a few units of analysis within one overarching case, its external validity is low. The results of this research can therefore only apply to this case study and are not generalisable to other or similar, cases. As this thesis research seeks to gain a deeper understanding of policy (re-) formulation after acts of terrorism by using theoretical frameworks, generalisability is not a required outcome. .

Besides the external validity, another important concept is the internal validity of the study. The internal validity refers to measuring what you want to measure (Neuman, 2014). To strengthen the internal validity of this research, a set of pre-defined sub-questions have been established to shape and structure the data gathering and analysis. This also increases the reliability of the research, as it prevents the analysis from becoming erratic. In addition, to

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20 increase the transparency of this research, all steps have been made clear in the analysis, allowing the possibility of back-tracking.

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4. Analysing the EU Policy Response after the 9/11, 11/3 and

the 7/7 Terrorist Attacks

This chapter seeks to address the first sub-question of the research, namely: How has EU policy been influenced by the U.S. 9/11 hijackings in 2001, the 11/3 Madrid train bombings in 2004, and the 7/7 London transport system bombings in 2005? The chapter analyses the policy responses of the EU, by using the theoretical frameworks of agenda setting and securitisation theory. The paragraphs offer only brief descriptions of the events, more elaborate descriptions can be found in appendix A.

4.1. Context of the U.S. 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

Despite the fact that the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place on the other side of the Atlantic, it triggered a worldwide response as the attacks were, among other targets, aimed at the World Trade Centre, an important symbol within the globalized West, in which citizens of more than 60 countries were killed. By immediately voicing support and solidarity, the EU emphasised that it shared the same values as the U.S. - values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights (Dubois, 2002).

In the aftermath of the attack, the U.S. and the EU issued a joint statement, emphasising their decision to enhance their cooperation to counter terrorism:

‘’Our resolve is a reflection of the strength of the US–EU relationship, our shared values, and our determination to address together the new challenges we face. The nature of our

democratic societies makes it imperative to protect our citizens from terrorist acts, while at the same time protecting their individual liberties, due process, and the rule of law. The US and the EU are committed to enhancing security measures, legislation and enforcement. We will work together to encourage greater cooperation in international fora and wider

implementation of international instruments’’ (Cit. Dubois, 2009, p. 320).

European politicians took active part in the securitisation of terrorism. For example, Chris Patten, EU External Relations Commissioner, stated: ‘’This is an act of war by madmen’’ (Cit. CNN, 2001, p. 1), and German Chancellor Schroeder referred to the attacks as ‘’a declaration of war against the entire civilized world’’ (Cit. CNN, 2001, p. 1).

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22 Based on these judgmental statements, and the support and solidarity in the joint statement, in which the EU and U.S. expressed their determination of enhanced cooperation, one could argue that both the U.S. and the EU found a new common threat by securitising international terrorism, more specifically, Islamic Terrorism, as a threat to democratic values (Dubois, 2002).

4.1.1. 9/11 as Focusing Event

In his framework, Kingdon (1984) argues that it is not the stockpiling of indicators that generates slow, incremental change but rather crises and (major) incidents, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters. Such incidents are the cause of sudden, substantial changes in rooted policies. This was also the case in the EU after 9/11. Before the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. the threat perception of terrorism in the EU was negligible. Apart from the decision by the European Council, which instructed Europol to deal with terrorism related crimes, the position of the EU regarding terrorism had been mainly political. While EU institutions always condemned terrorism, common counter-terrorism policies, or a larger role for the EU regarding terrorism, rarely reached the political agenda (Tsoukala, 2004).

Based on the definition of a ‘focusing event’ provided by Kingdon (1984), the 9/11 attacks can be perceived as one, as the attack was (i) sudden, (ii) relatively uncommon (as the attacks were the fourth act of terrorism on U.S. soil in eight years), (iii) the event was harmful: the 9/11 attack caused the most deaths in any such attack in the U.S. or abroad, (iv) the caused harms were concentrated in a geographical area: the hijacked planes were aimed at specific targets: two planes flew into the World Trade Centre, one crashed into the Pentagon and another one, originally meant to target the US Congress on Capitol Hill in Washington DC, crashed in the countryside of Pennsylvania, (v) the event was known simultaneously to the public and policy makers.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks fundamentally changed the EU’s view of the terrorist threat: it provided a window of opportunity to adopt emergency measures to counter the phenomenon of international terrorism.

4.1.2. Policy Window

The 9/11 attacks allowed for the opening of a policy window by causing enhanced interaction between the problem-, policy- and political- streams. This policy window was then seized by EU institutions such as the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, to put

international terrorism on the political agenda and adopt measures to counter the threat (Bossong, 2013).

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23 At the time of the U.S. 9/11 terror attacks in 2001, only six member states of the EU had specific counter-terrorism laws and regulations and instruments in place (Devoic, 2012). Only ten days after the attacks, the European Council held an extraordinary session to discuss the trans-border threat of terrorism and the need for an EU response. After the session, the European Council expressed solidarity with the U.S. and, in order to prevent terrorism, promised to intensify international cooperation and to take a larger role in resolving conflicts all over the world. By voicing solidarity and support to cooperate with the U.S. to combat international terrorism, the EU emphasised that it shared the same values and views as the U.S., and that these values were now being threatened. The EU therefore reinforced the perception of international terrorism as a threat to the public of its member states. This was something that required government action, shaping the problem stream to create a policy window (Bossong, 2013).

The policy stream consisted of the policy solutions that were presented in the aftermath of the attack. Several of the adopted measures pre-dated the terrorist attacks on 9/11. The European Commission had been working on these proposals as it expected that the upcoming Spanish Presidency in 2002 would be interested in pushing them through.

The European Council adopted its first Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism (CVCE, 2001). This plan included guidelines for a European response to counter terrorism, introducing 41 actions and/or measures within five main areas of counter-terrorism: (i) enhancing police and judicial cooperation, (ii) developing international legal instruments, (iii) putting an end to the funding of terrorism, (iv) strengthening air security, and (v) coordinating the European Union’s global action (CVCE, 2001, p.1-3). The Action Plan integrated parts of the Tampere Programme from 1999, which had until then received only limited support. (Wouters, Duquet, 2014).

One month later, on 19th October 2001, the European Council adopted a declaration that emphasised the points described in the earlier adopted Plan of Action which had to be implemented as quickly as possible. In particular, this included the approval of a common definition of terrorist offences and the introduction of a joint European Arrest Warrant, as well as the strengthening of cooperation between intelligence services, Eurojust, Europol and national police forces (European Commission, 2002).

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24 EU member states and the European Commission agreed upon a common definition of

terrorism3 and on an EU list identifying terrorist organisations and terrorist actors, based on the EU common definition of terrorism. The Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism, adopted on June 13, 2002, outlined guidelines regarding implementation of regulations, penalties for supporting terrorism, policing, protection of victims, jurisdiction and

prosecution, and reporting systems. As part of EU law, all EU member states have a binding responsibility to comply (Devoic, 2012).

In addition to the Framework Decision on Combatting Terrorism, the European Arrest Warrant was also adopted on June 13, 2002. This was introduced as a replacement of

‘’complicated extradition procedures between EU member states’’ (Devoic, 2012, p. 21). As described in chapter two, some of these measures have been challenged in several courts and are often portrayed as draconian measures in part of the literature (Devoic, 2012).

Since its adoption, the European Plan of Action has been updated several times; by the end of 2002, 64 measures were added to the plan.

The momentum seemed to be over when there were no new updates to the Plan of Action in 2003. Also, several measures adopted in the aftermath of 2001, such as the Money

Laundering Directive and the European Arrest Warrant, were not evenly implemented for years after their adoption (Devoic, 2012). Even though the 9/11 attacks created the first formative moment within the EU regarding counter-terrorism, it was still perceived as a largely ‘American problem’. The EU lapsed back into ‘business as usual’.

The political stream consisted mainly of swings of public mood and legislative changes in the aftermath of 9/11. After the attacks, the public’s views towards immigrants and Muslims changed dramatically. Debates emerged regarding the identities of Muslims in European countries, such as France and the UK, questioning the extent to which their identities were either oriented towards their state of residence or determined by their religion. Such

transnational loyalties and identification are often perceived as signals of possible linkages to terrorism (Mandaville, 2009).

4.1.3. Conclusion

The 9/11 terrorist attacks caused a major change within the EU’s perspective regarding terrorism, leading to a formative moment in which the EU described its solidarity and

3_{Defined as: ‘’acts committed with the aim of 'seriously intimidating a population', 'unduly compelling a}

government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act', or 'seriously

destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation’’ (European Parliament, 2015, p. 2).

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25 promised commitment to cooperate with the U.S. in the fight against terrorism. Several EU politicians highlighted – and thereby securitised – Islamic terrorism as a threat to Western views and values, emphasising that it was also a threat to Europe.

After (re-)formulation and the adoption of several measures in the cause of counter-terrorism, the EU’s attention for the matter faded for some years. The EU seemed to consider it more as an ‘American problem’, with limited relevance for Europe. After the political momentum had faded, the staying power of the events faded away, and many of the EU member states

became negligent in implementing the proposed and accepted counter-terrorist measures.

4.2. Context of the Madrid Bombings

After the Madrid bombings, the issue of counter-terrorism was again pushed on the agenda of the EU. It emerged that several decisions that were adopted in the aftermath of 9/11 had hardly been implemented (Thieux, 2004). In this thesis, the policy response will be examined by using the agenda setting framework, highlighting contingent dynamics.

4.2.1. The Madrid Bombings as Focusing Event

Despite the fact the several EU politicians tried to securitise international terrorism as a threat to Europe, the attacks on the other side of the Atlantic were mainly perceived as an

‘American’ problem. The attention towards the issue faded away after a while, leaving several adopted measures unimplemented (Schroeder, 2013). The Madrid bombings revived

implementation efforts again, as it was the first major successful attack by Al-Qaeda on European soil. The attacks emphasised the limited effectiveness of the EU’s counter-terrorism efforts and also highlighted the fact that adopted measures had not been implemented

adequately.

Based on the indicators described by Kingdon (1984) in his framework for agenda-setting, the Madrid bombings can be perceived as a wakeup call and focusing event. Firstly, the event was sudden. It proved that the Islamist terrorist groups perceived Europe as legitimate target of attack, apparently retaliating on a NATO member state that participated in the U.S. led ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq (Bossong, 2013). Secondly, the attacks were relatively uncommon, as it was the first major successful terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda on European soil (Thieux, 2004). Spain was well experienced with terrorism, having developed efficient internal mechanisms to counter terrorism. However, Spain’s security structures were not sufficiently suited to deal with the challenges that were linked to Islamic terrorism, especially those of Al-Qaeda (Reinares, 2009). Thirdly, the attacks can be defined as very harmful as 191 people were killed and 1,841 were wounded by the blast of the exploding bombs (Devoic, 2012). Fourthly, the casualties of the attacks were concentrated in particular geographical

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26 areas, as the bombs exploded in four different trains heading for Atocha train station, the largest railway station in Madrid. The fifth and final indicator described in the agenda setting framework, is that the event has to be known to policy makers and the public simultaneously, which was the case with the Madrid bombings.

The Madrid bombings as focusing event caused another political momentum within the EU to improve counter-terrorism efforts. However, the response of the EU did not start from scratch. EU member states put extensive energy to reassert the adopted counter-terrorism policies after 9/11, and countered many new proposals by EU institutions (Schroeder, 2013).

The problem stream after the Madrid bombings consisted of several EU politicians that condemned the attack in strong words. The President of the European Commission described it as ‘’savage blood thirst and totally senseless slaughter of innocent lives’’ (European

Commission, 2004, p. 1), and the President of the European Parliament called it ‘’a

declaration of war on democracy itself’’ and stated that the EU should ‘’root out this cancer of terrorism.’’ (Cit. Cox, 2004, p. 1). Like in the responses after 9/11, EU politicians tried to differentiate between the EU citizens as ‘innocent victims’ and the presumably foreign terrorists, ‘savages with thirst of blood’ that were ‘senseless slaughterers’ and by describing them as a deadly disease that had to be ‘rooted out’. Many of them emphasised that the threat had to be eliminated.

The bombings were committed only days before the general elections in Spain, and appeared to have influenced its outcomes. This made the ‘defence of democracy’ a particular popular framework for politicians to describe these attacks. Strong wordings after the large-scale attack contributed to the opening of a policy window regarding the EU counter-terrorism policies.

The policy stream after the Madrid bombings did not consist of a flow of newly formulated counter-terrorism policies. Firstly, the Members of the European Parliament adopted a

resolution that established 11 March as a European Memorial Day, to remind the public of the victims of terrorist attacks. With the adoption of this resolution, the EU appeared to regard the attacks as ‘Europe’s 9/11’, before even establishing who was behind the attack (Truc, 2017). According to Bossong (2013), the Madrid bombings were a form of retaliation for the presence of Spanish soldiers in Iraq, which contributed to the defeat of the governing

conservative party in Spain in the general elections, after which a swift withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq followed. Reinares (2016), however, researched the attack by conducting interviews with officials and consulting intelligence, judicial and police documents that are

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27 not open to the public. Based on his research, Reinares (2016) argues that the planning of the 3/11 Madrid bombings long pre-dated the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, dating the conspiracy back to 1990. Despite this new insight years after the attacks, a number of member states at the time (March 2004) perceived the attacks as a confirmation of their critique on the ‘war on terror’. The EU Council met two weeks after the attack. During this meeting, the European Council rapidly adopted the actions of a proposed Action Paper in Response to the Terrorist Attacks on Madrid by the European Commission (2004): the Declaration on

Combatting Terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2004). The Declaration called upon the Union to take the following five measures to respond to ‘’these terrorist outrages’’ (European Commission, 2004a, p.1),

(i) ‘’Declaration of solidarity, to be pronounced solemnly by the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in Brussels on 25-26 March; (ii) Better implementation of existing legislative instruments relevant to the fight against terrorism, and adoption of draft measures already on the Council’s table; (iii) Strengthening the fight against terrorist financing; (iv) Enhanced operational coordination and cooperation; (v) External action’’ (European Commission, 2004a, p.1).

In addition to the adopted measures proposed by the European Council, the Commission created the position of a Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, and assigned him to prepare to revise the Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism. The Commission also included a declaration on solidarity against terrorism, in which EU member states promised to ‘’act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if one of them is the victim of a terrorist attack. They shall mobilise all the instruments at their disposal, including military resources’’ (The Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 19).

The political stream after the Madrid consisted of both swings in the public mood as well as legislative changes. Many observers at the time assumed that the Madrid bombings had been committed by a cell linked to Al-Qaeda, in retaliation to the intervention of Spanish soldiers in the occupation of Iraq. However, the conservative government first tried to put the blame on ETA and the fact that this turned out to be untrue contributed to its defeat in the elections. It appears that the Madrid bombings were a factor in the growing opposition of Spanish citizens against the controversial interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Bossong, 2013).

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28 The legislative changes after the Madrid Bombings did not consist of many new policy

proposals, as the European Commission and Council emphasised the urgency of implementing already accepted measures 4 in the wake of 9/11.

The Madrid Bombings caused the EU to approach counter-terrorism more jointly than ever, developing its counter-terrorism framework of 2002 further by adopting the Declaration on Solidarity Against Terrorism and the establishment of the new position of the European CT Coordinator. Especially the Declaration signalled greater integration within the EU, as well as a further step towards greater coordination in the fight against international terrorism. This unification, however, did not lead to the adoption of new EU counter-terrorism policies as it was emphasised that member states should implement previously adopted measures

(European Commission, 2004 and European Union, 2004). Also, the EU still lacked a binding counter-terrorism strategy (Devoic, 2012).

4.3. The London Transport Bombings

The 7/7 London bombings in 2005 led to the next formative moment within the EU regarding its counter-terrorism policies. However, Jonathan Faull, Commission’s Director for Justice and Home Affairs, noted that the attacks did not cause the shock or surprise that the previous major attacks did (European Report, 2005). As the EU had become more familiar with the threat of terrorism, there was no Joint Statement by the EU member states, nor was there an extraordinary European Council session organized like after the attacks in the U.S. and Spain. The London bombings highlighted the phenomenon of a new type of terrorism by so-called ‘home-grown’ terrorists, as the perpetrators were all Britons, though with an immigration background5. This shifted EU perception in the sense that the terrorist threat did not only come from the ‘far enemy’ – asylum seekers and immigrants, but also from the ‘enemy

within’ – the children of immigrants, living in Western countries (Do Céu Pinto Arena, 2017). 4.3.1. The London Transport Bombings as Focusing Event

The terrorist attack on 7th July 2005 led to a new political momentum within the EU, as a consequence of which it implemented additional counter-terrorism measures6. However, with

4_{‘’The Commission does not believe that the right answer to these attacks is proposing new legal instruments or}

new institutions.’’ (European Commission, 2004, p. 1) and ‘’ The Council urged the finalization of work on existing measures, which can play their part in combating terrorism.’’ (European Union, 2004, p. 5).

5_{The home-grown concept refers to the fact that ‘’the members of these mainly Muslim Diaspora groups in the}

West were born and radicalized in the host country’’ (Sageman, 2008, p. 134).

6_{Adoption of Declaration condemning, the London attacks and the adoption of the European Counter-Terrorism}

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29 this response, the EU proved again to be incident driven, this time by the terror attack in London.

The London Bombings were sudden and uncommon, as it was the first successful attack in the U.K. in the name of the global jihad (Kaunert, 2012) and the first attacks in Western Europe that involved suicide terrorists. The four bombers killed 74 citizens and injured more than seven hundred, targeting three different locations in the London transport system (Devoic, 2012).

European leaders had publicly framed the previous terrorist attacks of 9/11 and 3/11 as transnational and a threat to Western democracies. Owing to this framing, a large part of the public in these countries perceived international terrorism as a real threat. Therefore, when London was struck by a terrorist attack on 7th July 2005, there was growing public pressure to take more decisive action. (Argomaniz and Bures, 2014).

The policy stream consisted of a quick reaction by the EU: the European Council responded to the London bombings by adopting a declaration in which it condemned these attacks and promised to strengthen ‘’its commitment to combatting terrorism and upholding the

fundamental principles of freedom, security and justice.’’ (European Commission, 2005, p. 6). It also sought to accelerate the implementation of existing commitments, such as the Action Plan on Combatting Terrorism (European Commission, 2005). This declaration adopted by the European Council further stressed the necessity of increasing the capabilities of the EU and its member states to pursue and investigate terrorists transnationally, protecting citizens and vital infrastructures from acts of terrorism and the prevention of violent radicalisation. In 2005, the EU still lacked a strategic counter-terrorism policy that provided guidance for governments of member states. Due to the absence of a guiding European strategy to counter terrorism, the UK took the initiative during its turn of the rotating presidency of the EU. Together with the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, it developed the first outline of a European counter-terrorism strategy (Devoic, 2012) which describes the commitment of the EU ‘’to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and to make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice (Council of the

European Union, 2005, p. 3). The strategy categorised previously adopted counter-terrorism policies into four pillars: (i) prevent, (ii) protect, (iii) pursue, and (iv) respond (Council of the European Union, 2005).

The speed with which the EU Counter-Terrorism strategy was adopted this time was striking. It took as little as forty days to negotiate and adopt the strategy, while other important

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30 counter-terrorism measures had been adopted only after lengthy and tough negotiations

(Devoic, 2012).

As the perpetrators of the London bombings were Britons with an immigration background, emphasis was placed on the ‘homegrown’ aspect of terrorism. The European Council therefore adopted the European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and

Recruitment to Terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2005a). The plan corresponding to this strategy was originally classified, but was declassified partly in 2010, revealing fourteen measures and actions7.

Swings in the public mood after the London attacks, as part of the political stream, consisted mainly of an intensified securitisation of Islamic terrorism. Some British citizens started to target the Muslim population in Britain after the London bombings, more were questioning the multiculturalism of London, which is known for its large populations of Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims. Opponents argued that the government’s promotion of

multiculturalism facilitated the violent radicalisation of some young Muslims. With the threat of home-grown terrorism, ethnic profiling and xenophobia increased due to the contested assumption that specific sub-cultures within the European society were closely associated with extremism if not terrorism.

Despite the fact that transnational terrorism was becoming a more familiar phenomenon, the Madrid Bombings led to the next political momentum regarding counter-terrorism within the EU. The attacks highlighted the new, home-grown dimension of terrorism, which was not directly led (but inspired) by a terrorist organization like Al-Qaeda, but consisted of loosely organized, bottom-up networks. In response, the EU adopted the European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism8. This strategy introduced a greater emphasis on prevention, (rather than merely combatting terrorism) as a constitutive part of the EU counter-terrorism strategy.

The emphasis on home-grown terrorism also intensified the earlier securitisation of Islam and young Muslims, linking their culture with terrorism in the eyes of parts of the public. This

7_{Council of the European Union, (2010). The European Union Action Plan for Combating Radicalisation and}

Recruitment to Terrorism. Online available at:

http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014782%202005%20EXT%201

8_{Council of the European Union (2005a). European Union Strategy for Combatting Radicalisation and}

Recruitment to Terrorism. Online available at:

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31 securitisation contributed towards ethnic profiling and increased xenophobia in parts of

Western Europe.

In the ten years between the London bombings in July 2005 and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015 in France, various terrorist attacks were carried out within Europe9. The

deadliest attack occurred on 22nd July 2011 in Norway, as right-wing extremist, Anders Behring Breivik killed more than seventy people, mainly children, in two separate attacks. Breivik first targeted the building that housed the office of the Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg. By detonating a fertilizer bomb, he killed eight people. Right after this first attack, Breivik took a ferry to the Norwegian island Utøya, where the annual summer camp for the youth wing of Norway’s Labour party was hosted. Dressed as a police officer, he convinced Monica Elisabeth Bøsei, the head of security of Utøya, to take him to the island to reassure the children. Once he reached the island he killed Bøsei and started to fire at the campers, hunting them as they are trying to escape. The mass shooting on the island lasted two hours before he was arrested by an elite police unit (CNN, 2017).

Breivik never voiced any remorse for his deeds. During session in the Oslo criminal court, he stated that his victims were ‘’not innocent civilians or children, but political activists who actively promoted multiculturalism and cultural Marxism.’’ (Breivik, 2012, p. 1). and he described the island Utøya as ‘’an indoctrination camp for political activists (Breivik, 2012, p. 1). Breivik was found guilty for the killing of 77 people during the bombing in Oslo and the mass shooting on Utøya on 22nd July 2011. He was sentenced 21 years in prison, with a so-called preventive detention clause, which can extend his prison sentence if he is considered to be a threat to society (De Graaf, van der Heide, Wanmaker & Weggemans, 2013).

9_{22nd July 2011: Anders Behring Breivik preforms a bombing in Oslo and a mass shooting on the Norwegian}

island Utøya, killing 77 people, mainly children;

2nd_{November 2011: The offices of Charlie Hebdo are targeted with a firebomb, no injuries}

11th_{, 15}th_{, and 19}th_{March 2012: A lone gunman, claiming to act on behalf of Al-Qaeda, shoots and kills one}

off-duty paratrooper, two soldiers and three children and a rabbi in three separate attacks in Southern France; 22nd_{May 2013: Two extremists hack and stab down a British soldier in London in an Al-Qaeda inspired attack;}

24th_{May 2014: A lone gunman, armed with an automatic rifle, entered a Jewish museum in Brussels and shoots}

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32

5. Responses after the Charlie Hebdo Attack

With the results of the previous chapters in mind, this chapter analyses the responses of both France and the EU to the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. This section seeks to answer the following three research questions regarding the Charlie Hebdo attack, (i) How did France respond to the terrorist attacks in January and November 2015, and how did France urge the EU to respond? (ii) How has EU policy reacted after the ‘Charlie Hebdo’ terrorist attack in January and the ‘Paris attacks’ in November 2015? And (iii) How have (EU) actors framed the terrorist attacks in France to pursue certain (other) political goals?

These same sub-questions will be answered for the Paris attacks in November 2015 in the next chapter.

5.1. The Responses by the Government of France

In January 2015, France was struck by the largest terrorist attack since the Second World War (Do Céu Pinto Arena, 2017). On 7 January 2015, two men entered the offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, armed with Kalashnikovs and killed twelve people while injuring eleven more. A manhunt of the attackers followed, which ended as the gunmen were shot and killed after seeking refuge in a printing siege. In another related event, a third gunman shot and killed a police officer on the street, and later took fifteen hostages in a Jewish grocery store. The three gunmen killed a total of seventeen people during their acts and had pledged their allegiance to the two terrorist organisations Al-Qaeda and IS. A more elaborated description of these attacks can be found in appendix A.

François Hollande responded directly after the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, describing it as a ‘’cowardly attack’’ (Hollande, 2015, p.1) and stressed that the French response had to ‘’be commensurate with the crime committed against us’’ (Hollande, 2015, p.1). He deployed around 10,000 soldiers and 5,000 additional police officers on the streets of France to protect potential targets, such as tourist attractions and places of worship. The main focus of this deployment was to assure the Jewish community in France that the French government was in a position to provide effective protection (Pons, 2016).

Another response of the French government in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack was the adoption of the ‘Loi Renseignement’, a law on intelligence in May 2015. This law enables intelligence agencies to log internet communications and activities, texts and record phone calls. In addition, the law enables authorities to use hidden cameras and tap wireless phones. None of these actions requires a judicial warrant, rather the intelligence services and police

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33 authorities are obliged to consult a panel of military police, senators and judges, however, the recommendations of these panels are not conclusive (Conseil constitutionnel, 2015).

Other measures taken by France in response to the Charlie Hebdo attack were aimed to address the problem of violent radicalisation. The ‘’Stop Jihadism’’ campaign was launched, warning potential jihadists by countering the propagandist messages from IS. For example, ‘’Sacrifice yourself by our side for a just cause,” is countered swiftly: “In reality, you'll find hell on earth and you'll die alone, far from home.” (Cit. Tharoor, 2015, p. 1). Another effort to fight violent radicalisation was the opening of a deradicalisation centre. In this centre

radicalised youth ranging in age from 18 to 30, seeking to travel to Syria or other conflict zones, were supposed to be deradicalised. Participation in the program was, however, voluntary, and the participants were allowed to return home for the weekends (McPartland, 2016). However, the centre closed its doors after less than a year as it was found to produce no significant results. The centre only treated nine radicals, of whom not a single one completed the program. The centre had also been criticised by several politicians and local residents since they felt uncomfortable that the participants of the program could move around freely due to the voluntary nature of the program (The Local, 2017).

These and other projects to fight violent radicalisation were part of a wider anti-terrorism effort, which had been initiated by Manuel Valls, Prime Minister of France, after the Charlie Hebdo attack. He devoted 480 million EUR to this effort, to be spent for increased law

enforcement, cyber patrols, to counter online radicalisation and create an additional 3,000 jobs within government to fight terrorism (Tharoor, 2015).

5.1.1. France’s Encouragement to an EU Response

The terrorist attacks on Charlie Hebdo revived the discussions regarding the proposed

Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data (PNR Directive), as France urged the EU remove obstacles to share airline passenger data. Although the proposal had been tabled for the first time by the EU Commission in 2007 (European Commission, 2007), in 2008 the EU Parliament had refused to vote on it due to concerns regarding privacy and data protection (Statewatch, 2015). The Commission proposed a new version of the Directive in 2011, which was rejected again by the EU Parliament as the EU Commission could prove the effectiveness of the Directive for combatting transnational terrorism by nothing more than some anecdotal evidence (Eur-Lex, 2011).

Despite the fact that the EU’s PNR initiative had been blocked, EU member states already shared their PNR data with the U.S. on the basis of bilateral agreements. In addition, several member states, such as the U.K., had created national data systems for monitoring air travel.

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34 The pooling of already existing data among EU member states, however, has been opposed by the European Parliament (Traynor, 2015).

Despite the efforts of France to implement the EU PNR Directive for all passengers that enter or leave the EU by aeroplane, this did not result in the adoption of the Directive (Pons, 2016).

5.2. The EU Policy Response

This paragraph seeks to analyse the policy response of different EU institutions in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack by applying the agenda setting framework of Kingdon (1984). It will analyse whether the events of Charlie Hebdo can be perceived as focusing event, which led to interaction of the various policy streams, opening a policy window in which new policy solutions could be proposed.

5.2.1. The Attacks on Charlie Hebdo as Focusing Event

The terrorist attacks targeting the offices of Charlie Hebdo, formed the first major successful terrorist attack in the EU since the London bombings in 2005 and, like other major terrorist attacks in Europe, revitalised the political momentum to discuss and adopt policies to fight international terrorism. Following the criteria described by Kingdon (1984), the events of the Charlie Hebdo attack can be perceived as a focusing event.

Despite the fact that the attackers were known to the security services of France, the attacks were unforeseen and therefore sudden. The attack was also uncommon as France had not been hit by a terrorist attack of this magnitude since mid-1990, and it was the first major Islamist terrorist attack in Europe since the London bombings in 200510.

The two attackers specifically targeted the offices of Charlie Hebdo, killing twelve people present at the office and a police officer who responded to the attack. Following the attack, the two gunmen fled to a printing firm, where they were challenged by the security forces and subsequently killed. The day after the Charlie Hebdo attack, a police woman was shot and killed by a third gunman, who later also killed four hostages in a Kosher supermarket in the wake of the earlier attack (Martinez, Debucquoy-Dodley, and Sanchez, 2015). The Charlie Hebdo attack and the related events claimed the lives of seventeen people, and can therefore be rightly described as major. As the attackers were all French citizens with immigration backgrounds, the events also hinted that there might be more such attacks in the future, committed by similar home-grown terrorists. The events of the terrorist attack were mostly concentrated in a limited geographical area.

10_{However, a right-wing attack in Norway in 2011 by A. Breivik had killed more than 70 people, mainly}

Explaining EU policy responses after the Islamist terrorist attacks in January and November 2015 in France