Urban Policing in the Age of Interventions: A Thesis on the on the Mission of the International Security Assistance Force during its occupation of Kabul between 2001-2014

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Urban Policing in the

Age of Interventions

2019

A THESIS ON THE MISSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE DURING ITS

OCCUPATION OF KABUL BETWEEN 2001-2014

MARK DE BOER Stud. No.: 11073136 Supervisor: A.M. Kalinovsky Second Reader: S.F. Kruizinga Master Thesis Military History University of Amsterdam

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Abstract

In 2001 the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) entered the Afghan capital Kabul. Its task was to aid the newly created interim government in building up a democratic

Afghanistan. The ISAF’s role was to secure the capital and protect the interim-government that resided within, making it the first long-term operation in an urban environment since the end of the Cold War. Operating in this ‘new’ environment would be no easy feat. During the ISAF’s mission, Kabul would grow exponentially and severely pressure the existing

infrastructure. The city also had a troublesome history, having endured prolonged conflict and neglect in the decades before. Access to necessities and services within the city greatly

differed for each district, resulting in stability differences between districts. These schisms only grew as more and more people flocked to the city, which put the ISAF’s capacities under severe strain. The ISAF, therefore, had to find ways to maintain a modicum of control to ensure safety within the city. The mission had to adapt and evolve as the city changed over time. This thesis seeks to explain the effects of Kabul’s urban environment and

demographical change on the tactical and strategical level of the ISAF-mission. This thesis encompasses a historical overview of past urban policing operations, a detailed description of Kabul’s urban development and an in-depth analysis of the ISAF’s mission development.

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Introduction

On September 11th 2001, the United States had to endure one of the deadliest attacks that ever took place on its soil. Al Qaida, a terrorist group, led by Osama Bin Laden, had taken its war on the United States across the Pacific to the very streets of New York and Washington D.C. Eager to exact justice upon those responsible the United States turned its attention to

Afghanistan, where Al Qaida had its origin and had made its home ever since. The United States gave the Taliban government in Afghanistan an ultimatum in which they compelled them to extradite Osama Bin Laden. When the Taliban failed to deliver on this ultimatum, diplomacy gave way for war. There could be no peace with a country that harboured terrorist groups that were a threat to the western world. On the 7th_{of October that same year,}

Operation Enduring Freedom began and with it the longest counterinsurgency war of the United States since Vietnam. The United States and Great Britain formed a coalition and allied themselves with the Northern Alliance, a collection of mujahideen factions that had been in perpetual war with the Taliban since 1996. A vigorous aerial bombing campaign combined with the force of the Northern Alliance swiftly displaced the Taliban’s stranglehold on the country. On the 13th of November, the Northern Alliance and the Coalition took the capital of Kabul. With the Taliban-regime in tatters, the second stage of the intervention began: the construction of a democratic Afghan state.1

Afghanistan was freed of Taliban reign and had to become a beacon of democracy in the Middle-East. Kabul, the official capital of Afghanistan, would be the seat of a democratic government that would propel Afghanistan into a form of western modernity. It was necessary that this process was undertaken gradually, as such a political system had never before existed in Afghanistan. On the 22nd of December, the Afghan Interim Administration was put into power to take the first steps towards democratisation. This administration was supported by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a collective of United Nations member states mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The ISAF was to provide security to the interim government in Kabul by policing its streets and assist in build-up of Afghanistan’s security forces, as the interim-government had no security forces of its own. Kabul and its direct environments became the ISAF’s area of responsibility.2

1_{T. Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (London 2017) 95.}

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The ISAF’s mission within Kabul was an interesting development in the debates about policing and counterinsurgency as a whole. Policing has been a significant counterinsurgency and state-building tool for multiple centuries and has been subjected to many debates.

Historian Jeremy Kuzmarov has written to extensive lengths on the United States’ policing track record during its interventions across the globe. In his book Modernizing Repression:

Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century, he reframes the way the act of

policing must be seen. He argues that the build-up of police capacity is used to create a repressive tool to consolidate the position of the regime that has been put in place.3 Another author, Marc Raeff, spoke about how policing was used as a social and political transforming-tool in both the German states and Russia between 1600 and 1800.4 What these two views have in common is that both, to a degree, state that policing is used as a way to reform the society and the political environment.

The views of the previous authors, while interesting and superbly substantiated, lacked one significant factor: the effects of society on the policing effort itself. The ISAF-mission in Kabul provides an excellent example that allows the debate to be turned upside down.

Between 2001 and 2013 Kabul’s population grew from a mere 500.000 to 3,3 million

inhabitants.5 The ISAF, on the other hand, had only 5000 soldiers at its disposal to police the entire city.6 With no other security forces in place and lacking a strong government, the ISAF was faced with a difficult task. How is it possible to police an area which’s population grows six-fold in a mere 12 years? The Kabul case allows us to ask a different question: “To what extent was the ISAF’s policing effort influenced on the tactical and strategical level by Kabul’s urban environment and demographical change?”. This question provides a new perspective in which society is given a more active role, instead of being the passive object of or décor to the policing effort.

The first step in knowing how the urban environment and Kabuli society affected the actions of the ISAF and how the ISAF responded, is by looking at how policing is used in past urban counterinsurgency operations. The ISAF as a collective had no previous operations in fast-growing urban environments against an irregular opponent as it was a newly created organisation. Some of the individual member states within the ISAF, however, did have this

3_{J. Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation-Building in the American Century}

(Massachusetts 2012)

4_{M. Raeff, A Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change Through Law in the Germanies and}

Russia, 1600-1800 (Yale 1983).

5_{D. E. Esser, ‘Security Scales: Spectacular and Endemic Violence in Post-Invasion Kabul, Afghanistan’,}

Environment & Urbanization, Vol. 26, Nr. 2 (2014) 378.

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experience. This thesis will start by looking at these past experiences to understand how the ISAF member states policed foreign urban environments in the past and how they dealt with both the urban and the societal environment. What did they intend to achieve, why was this necessary, and how did they seek to achieve this? These past experiences could, in turn, tell us more about how the ISAF as a collective envisioned its policing-role in Kabul.

The second step in answering the main question is to form an understanding of how Kabul as a city has developed. The city the ISAF entered in December of 2001 was a complex system of districts, infrastructure and demography. Especially the latter was complex, as people were separated along economic, cultural, religious and ethnic lines. Before we can even grasp how Kabuli society and its environment impacted the policing effort of the ISAF, we must understand how they were formed and how the divides within the city came to be.

The third step concerns the forming of the ISAF. When both the past of the member states and Kabul’s environment and society have been explained, we can understand how the ISAF’s mission took form. We will do this by dissecting the UN documents in which the ISAF was created, which helps us to understand why the ISAF was formed. The contents of the subsequent resolutions, in which the specific tasks of the ISAF were explicated, will show us what purpose the ISAF had to fulfil and how it had to accomplish this.

The fourth and final step concerns the deployment of the ISAF and the execution of its mission in Kabul. We will be looking at the following questions: How did the ISAF deploy its forces, what did they define as problematic, and how did they respond to these perceived threats? Once these questions have been answered we will be looking at changes on the strategic level, such as adjustments in the mandate and the ISAF’s structural design. Following these steps will enable us to formulate an answer to the central question of how Kabul’s environment and demographic change have influenced the policing effort of the ISAF.

In answering these questions, I will make use of Dutch archival material concerning the first four years of the ISAF mission. These sources allow greater depth into the policing efforts where others were limited to secondhand information from sources like media outlets, NGO’s and public statements. This research will thus be unique in its source-material, which can provide insights into a recent counterinsurgency operation. The sources will also provide a look from the inside, which enables us to unveil what goes on within the organisation itself.

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Chapter 1: Policing in the world of Counterinsurgency

The International Security Assistance Force had a multitude of UN-member states within its ranks. While the organisation itself had no experience in urban policing itself due to its recent creation, the member states surely did. The three players of importance, with regards to experience in urban policing activities, were Great Britain, France and the United States. The other partaking states, such as the Netherlands, Austria and Denmark, lacked these types of experiences or only experienced them to a lesser degree. Great Britain, France and the United States were also the largest contributors to the ISAF mission, which gave them great gravity within the decision-making process. The focus will thus remain on these three major players.

Three particular cases of urban policing of Great Britain, the United States and France will be discussed. The first is the French experience in Algiers in 1957, followed by the United States’ experience in Saigon in 1969 and Great Britain’s experience in Belfast during 1972, While there are many cases before the 20th century, of which several are within Europe, I have chosen to limit myself to the 20th century.7 The reason for this restriction is due to the nature of the 19th century urban conflicts. In this period the policing mission, if it even was recognised as such by the party conducting it, often took place in a very short timeframe. Aside from that, while the conflicts often began as uprisings with an irregular nature, they often turned conventional as the conflict progressed. The 20th-century cases of Belfast, Saigon and Algiers are more in line with the Kabul-case in their duration and irregular nature. By analysing these urban policing experiences, its possible to get a better understanding of why the ISAF’s mandate and mission took the shape it did.

1.1: The French Experience in Algiers

After the Second World War, the grip the European countries had on their colonies was severely weakened. Former colonies sought to break free from their overlords one after another. France, as one of the major colonial powers of its time, had great difficulty holding onto the lands she had subjected the previous century. One of these French colonies was Algeria, a colony so close to the heartland of France that it was viewed as a province. The Algerian War of Independence started after the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)

7_{There are many urban policing cases in Europe during the 19}th_{century, such as Brussel in 1830, Paris in 1848}

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undertook several attacks on police and military targets on the first of November 1954. These attacks became known as Toussaint Sanglante, the Bloody All-Saints Day. In a bid to restore their martial spirit after the Second World War, the French government sought to squash this petty insurrection and restore order in its closest colony. The war for power within Algeria had begun.

Algiers was the capital of Algeria and was of great importance in the Algerian War of Independence. With 900.000 inhabitants, Algiers was the largest city within Algeria itself and the second largest city within the French empire. It was also the administrative heart of the French colonial government within Algiers and, for that reason, a point of gravity within the conflict. In the eyes of the National Liberation Front, Algiers was a high-value target. Algiers became a bone of contention for both parties.8

The first preparations of the FLN to enter the city of Algiers were already made in 1956 when they created the ‘Autonomous Zone of Algiers’ (Z.A.A.) This localised guerrilla

network would be overseen by a four-headed council that monitored the FLN’s actions within the city. They divided the city into three regions: Central-Algiers, West-Algiers and East-Algiers. Furthermore, they subdivided the regions into sectors which they further divided up in districts and sub-districts. Within these areas, the FLN worked together with the Armée de

Libération Nationale (ALN), the armed branch of the FLN. The ALN would lead the armed

forces that it had assigned to the districts. The FLN had its own armed forces that would take

8_{A. Derradji, ‘Account of The Algerian Urban Guerrilla Network and Its Role in The FLN’s Campaign during}

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on the role of a police force within their districts.9 The Casbah, the old city centre, became the heart of the Z.A.A. This densely packed Muslim neighbourhood was purged of those that supported the French forces. Before long, the neighbourhood was turned into a fortress, having secret bomb factories, weapon caches, and hiding-places all connected by hidden passages.10

The organisational system had been created, and the Z.A.A. was ready to conduct operations within Algiers. After the French government executed two FLN members in the Barberousse prison on the 19th of June 1956, the Z.A.A. came into action. Seeking reprisal for what they considered an act of cruelty, a series of indiscriminate attacks within the city began. Between the 20th and 24th of June, members of the Z.A.A. executed a total of 49 civilians. Most of the victims were of European descent that went by the name of pieds noirs. As a result, an internal conflict broke out between the pieds noirs and the Muslim population. Several groups of pieds noirs set off explosions in the Muslim neighbourhoods within the city.11_{As a result, violence within the city spun out of control.}

The French government could not allow Algiers to fall into the hands of the FLN. If they lost control of the city, they would lose control of the colony. Algiers was the political node that enabled France to extend its rule in the colony. To restore order, general Raoul Salan was given combined civil and military control by governor Robert Lacoste in December of 1956. The police and the civilian branches of government were put under his command. Salan, in turn, broadened the mandate of General Jacques Massu, the commander of the 10th paratrooper division, for his operations within Algiers. In January Massu set the operation in motion and the Battle for Algiers began.12

As the French forces had little experience with operating in a city the size of Algiers, they looked towards their rural methods. Within the Algerian countryside, the French had used so-called grid operations, known as quadrillage. This technique had come to use in 1954 after simple search and destroy missions proved inefficient. Insurgents would leave the targeted area only to return and wreak havoc upon its population of the ‘cleared’ area. The French forces subdivided the Algerian countryside into sectors, which would each be assigned

9_{R. Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Santa Barbara 2006) 10-11.} 10_{A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York 2006) 229-230.}

11_{Ibid. 229-230.}

12_{H. Canuel, ‘French Counterinsurgency in Algeria: Forgotten Lessons from a Misunderstood Conflict’, Small}

Wars Journal (2010) https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/389-canuel.pdf (accessed 11-04-2019).

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a garrison to maintain control over the area. The French deployed 300.000 soldiers to conduct these grid operations, of which 90% was assigned to garrison duties.13

This technique of quadrillage was imported to the confines of Algiers when Massu deployed his troops at the beginning of 1957. Algiers was divided into four sectors, each of which had their own regiment of French soldiers. Just like the Z.A.A. had done, they further divided these sectors into districts and sub-districts. To a certain extent, the organisational structure of the French forces mirrored the organisation of the Z.A.A.14 The French had an advantage that the FLN did not have, namely an abundance of manpower.

Once the paratroopers were in place, Massu tightened his grip on the city. The Casbah, being the main guerrilla bulwark within the city, was closed off entirely. The French forces left open few entries- and exit points so they could monitor the inhabitant’s movements. Shortly after the French carried out a census of the population to administer the identities of those that lived within the Casbah. The inhabitants were issued new identification papers which they had to carry on their person at all times. This greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the checkpoints, making it harder for FLN members to conduct operations outside the

Casbah.15

Within the rest of the city, the French asserted control by appointing a head of the family that was responsible for the other family members and had to be informed of their location. These men would be subject to a floor chief, which would answer to the chief of the building in which the families resided. This chain of command would go up to the block leaders, which oversaw the highest organisational unit. This command structure simplified and enhanced the search for suspects, making the French military and police force more effective.16

The searching capabilities of the French military and police force would be further enhanced by administering the amount and identities of inhabitants within certain buildings. They would ask the oldest inhabitants who lived within the building. If the information given did not correspond with the documented information, it would raise the alarm. The anomalies would be treated as suspects.17

13_{K. Tachikawa, ‘The Algerian War: A Model for Counterinsurgency Operations, International Forum on War}

History (2017), http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2017/07_tachikawa.pdf (accessed on 11-04-2019) 68.

14_{Ibid. 69.}

15_{A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace (New York 2006) 190.}

16_{J.R. Price, ‘Algeria (1954-1962)’, in Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. III, The Experience in}

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The French not only tried to combat the insurgency by force. They also imported another invention they had used in the Algerian countryside: The Sections Administrative

Spécialisées (SAS). This organisation had to task to uphold administrative capabilities in the

countryside where civilian administrators often ran short. The SAS would try to re-establish the contact between the local authorities and the residents. From the local population, they would identify capable individuals that would be assigned administrative functions. The system of the SAS proved effective, leading to its use in Algiers.18

In Algiers, the French would create the Section Administrative Urbaine (SAU) that would overlook the slums that had formed within the city due to the influx of refugees. The FLN sought to use these slums to their advantage as they tried to win support among its impoverished inhabitants. The FLN also used these slums as a source of income as they sent in tax collectors that intimidated its population. The SAU was ordered to bring order to these slums and thwart the FLN’s attempts to assert dominance within them. The SAU identified the inhabitants of the slums to filter out the senior FLN members. Shortly after, the SAU created a multitude of jobs, resumed public subsidies to the inhabitants and reopened schools for the youth.19 The SAU managed to wrestle dominance out of the hands of the FLN and re-established French authority in full.

The urban policing campaign within the of Algiers has shed some light on how the French envisioned and executed their campaign. The policing action was created to maintain a firm hold on the colony. Without Algiers, the French government would lose its centre of power within the colony and with it its grip on the territory. The purpose of the policing action was to restore order and reaffirm the dominance of the French colonial government. They intended to achieve this by importing several techniques they had used in the

countryside, such as quadrillage and the SAU. The quadrillage-technique allowed the French forces to divide the city and clear it sector by sector effectively. The SAU’s administrative abilities allowed the French forces to stabilise the city, administer its inhabitants and create goodwill amongst the population. The policing effort was intended to keep the existing power structures within the city in place, at which it was successful.

18_{K. Tachikawa, ‘The Algerian War: A Model for Counterinsurgency Operations, International Forum on War}

History (2017) http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2017/07_tachikawa.pdf (accessed on 11-04-2019) 76.

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1.2: The British in Belfast (1972)

Great Britain was, just like France, a major colonial power that had to cope with uprisings in its colonies. The insurgency that would give Britain its urban counterinsurgency experience was not found in its former Asian or African possessions, but neighbouring Ireland. The British government has had to deal with Irish separatists, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), since the early 20th century. It has been Britain’s longest counterinsurgency war of which the insurgent group persists today.20 One particular period in this prolonged conflict stands out with regards to urban counterinsurgency operations: 1969-1972. During this short period, Great Britain conducted several urban operations against the IRA. These operations were of vast scale and demanded the largest amount of manpower since the Second World War. Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland, was one of the focal points in the conflict. The fights against the IRA in Belfast would be the training ground in urban counterinsurgency that would later return in Kabul.

Ireland had been part of Great Britain since 1801 after the Irishmen Rebellion Rebellion had been squashed by British forces. While the British maintained a firm grip on the Island, the desire to be independent remained. With the start of World War I, the desire of the Irish to be free from British rule flared up once more. When Great Britain tried to conscript Irishmen for the war, some of them refused as they did not want to fight for a government from which they wanted to be free. In 1917 these conscientious objectors formed the Irish Republican Army, a paramilitary movement seeking to break free from British rule and form their sovereign Irish republic.21_{In the subsequent decades, they tried to achieve independence} through military means, using guerrilla warfare to weaken the British hold on Ireland. The cities, as centres of political power, became a high-value target.

In the 1970s the conflict between the British government and the Irish Republican army took a turn for the worse. In 1969 a new faction had emerged from the ranks of the IRA: The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA). This splinter group operated with a higher level of violence than the IRA. They sought to pressure the British government into submission by

20_{E. O’Loughlin, R. Pérez-Peña, 'Lyra McKee, Northern Ireland Journalist, Is Killed in ‘Terrorist Incident,’}

Police Say', The New York Times. (April 19, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/world/europe/lyra-mckee-northern-ireland-violence.html (accessed on 19-03-2019).

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increasing the pressure with bomb attacks, sabotage and assassinations. Belfast, one of their bases of operation, was the main battleground.22

The increasing hostilities prompted Great Britain to send military support to Northern Ireland as part of Operation Banner in 1969. With only three infantry battalions to halt the PIRA’s subversions, operation Banner was unable to hold back the tide of attacks.23_The PIRA knew that the attacks put the British government under increasing political pressure. In early July of 1972, they tried to harvest the fruits of their labour and called a truce during which they would give the British government the chance to give in to their demands. During the negotiations, the PIRA set an ultimatum in which the British were to recognise Ireland as an independent republic. The British government, while initially open to a diplomatic process, could of course not agree with these terms. The PIRA envoys ended the negotiation and resumed their campaign of terror.24

With the negotiations closed, the PIRA returned to the use of explosives to force the British government to agree to the ultimatum. On the 21st_{of July PIRA operators planted} twenty explosives throughout Belfast. In the early afternoon, all explosives were detonated within a short period to achieve maximum chaos. The action did bring the chaos that was intended but brought an end to any possibility for future negotiations. The British government could no longer ignore the threat of the IRA and decided to enlarge their military strength in Northern Ireland with a new operation: Operation Motorman.25

Operation Motorman began on the 31st of July 1972. The goal of this new operation was to bring an end to the fortified neighbourhoods that had formed safe havens and recruiting grounds for the PIRA. The British forces were to dominate these neighbourhoods and deny the PIRA all movement. This goal required additional manpower. The number of forces was raised to a staggering 28.000 soldiers, which made Operation Motorman the largest urban military operation since the Second World War.26

While the operation was military in its composition; it had become apparent to the British government that the use of heavy-handed methods had to be minimalized. The

22_{E. Burke, ‘Counter-Insurgency against ‘Kith and Kin’? The British Army in Northern Ireland, 1970–76’, The}

Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 43, No. 4 (2015) 661

23_{A. Sanders, ‘Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in}

Northern Ireland’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2013) 469.

24_{A. Mumford, ‘Covert Peacemaking: Clandestine Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA}

during the Early ‘Troubles’, 1972–76’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2011) 638.

25_{M.L.R., Smith, P.R. Neuman, ‘Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern Ireland’,}

Contemporary British History, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2005) 422.

26_{A. Sanders, ‘Operation Motorman (1972) and the search for a coherent British counterinsurgency strategy in}

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excessive use of force under Operation Banner had alienated large parts of the Irish

population and delegitimised the political system. The British government realised that a new approach was needed if they were to succeed in driving the PIRA out of the city. The urban terrain, with its dense population, required utmost care. The British government thus construed a preparation plan to subdue the streets of Belfast.

The soldiers that were sent were given extensive training on how to cope with the urban environment. They were taught on building construction, systematic house searching,

detecting mines and booby traps, vehicle searches, the use of search dogs and all of the techniques the PIRA had used in the past.27 The commanding officers were given a course that gave them detailed information about the situation in Northern Ireland. Lastly, the manner of patrolling was trained in great detail. The soldiers were to patrol on foot and were advised to the maintain contact with the local populace to gather intelligence. By patrolling on foot, the units could also familiarise themselves with the environment, getting to know all alleyways and backstreets where vehicles could not go.28

To keep the relations with the local populace as friendly as possible, the soldiers were to proceed with extreme care. The soldiers could only apprehend suspects if it was beyond a reasonable doubt that they had committed a criminal act. Even after apprehending suspects they would be treated as innocent until proven otherwise. These restrictions were installed after random apprehensions in previous years caused great communal dissatisfaction. Apprehending innocent bystanders often worked counterproductive as it was seen as

particularly unjust. The PIRA, in turn, made great use of these judicial mishaps and used it to their advantage as propaganda.29

When Operation Motorman began its plan unfolded rapidly. The British troops swarmed the neighbourhoods, and within days all barricades that had closed off the neighbourhoods were torn down. The IRA could not make a stand as the numbers of British forces

concentrated in the neighbourhoods was overwhelming. Within a couple of days, the former recruiting grounds and bases of operation of the PIRA were all dismantled. As soon as total domination was achieved the British forces conducted further mass patrols to gather

intelligence and began arresting designated individuals for interrogation.30

27_{H. Bennett, ‘From Direct Rule to Motorman: Adjusting British Military Strategy for Northern Ireland in}

1972’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 33, Nr. 6 (2010) 518.

28_{Ibid. 519.} 29_{Ibid. 523, 526.} 30

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During the operation itself, the methods were further recalibrated and improved.

Additional courses were given on PIRA ambushes, the use of explosives and the breaching of houses. The patrol units were furthermore implored to avoid routines. All these efforts

resulted in a highly trained and informed soldiery.31 When the mission had come full circle, they had wrestled control out of the PIRA’s hands. Belfast was safe, for now.32

1.3: American Proxy Policing in Saigon

The United States has an extensive history in counterinsurgency wars. The best known of them all is the war in Vietnam in which they participated between 1955 and 1975. Vietnam had been in perpetuating conflict since 1946 during which the National Liberation Front of Ho Chi Minh, also known as the Vietcong, fought against French authority. The guerrilla tactics were of great effect, leading to victories such as the battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. It became clear that France was fighting a losing battle. The United States saw this development with weary eyes. The fear arose that, if Vietnam were to gain its independence, it could be tempted to adopt communism and strengthen the Soviet-Unions hold on Asia. In 1955 the decision was made to intervene and bring a halt to the Vietcong’s expansion. On the first of November that same year, one of the longest wars in the United States history began. In 1968 the Vietcong would infiltrate Saigon as part of the Tet-offensive. This would force the United States to focus its efforts on urban policing to root out these hostile elements from the South-Vietnamese capital. Saigon was the seat of the South-South-Vietnamese government. If Saigon fell, the regime would fall with it. This resulted in one of the first American experiences in

policing against irregular opponents in an urban setting.

The policing effort of the United States was in many ways different than in the other colonial conflicts such as the one in Algeria. In these conflicts, the intervener had already built up its security forces as they had previously been the leaders of government. When they intervened, it was easy for them to assume full control of both policing and military efforts as it was already in place. The United States, however, had no previous investment in Vietnam and the French security forces had broken down. Therefore, the United States did not use its forces to police the cities and villages but instructed and advised the Vietnamese police force

31_{Ibid. 525-526.}

32_{Smith, M.L.R., Neuman, Peter R., ‘Motorman's Long Journey: Changing the Strategic Setting in Northern}

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to do so for them. While not committing its troops to such tasks, it would be wise to see the actions of the police force as extensions of the American campaign as its actions were still guided and supervised by the United States.33

The policing capacities in Vietnam were split into two categories: rural and urban. In the countryside, the task of policing was handed over to the Civil Guard, a paramilitary organisation that protected the many hamlets and fortified villages. In the larger cities, the policing activities were left to the National Police. As the historiographical record focusses on policing efforts in large urban environments, we will limit ourselves to the efforts of the National Police with special regard to Saigon during the Tet-offensive in 1968. It was during the Tet-offensive that the threat of the Vietcong in the capital became largest, as they

infiltrated the city and sought to undermine the political stability that was already deteriorating.34

In 1968, as part of the Tet-offensive, the Vietcong undertook a large-scale attack across the frontline aimed against a multitude of targets. Saigon was of major importance in this offensive, as it was home to the Vietnamese government and the capital of South-Vietnam. In the days leading up to the Tet-offensive, the Vietcong infiltrated the city and hid amongst the populace. Once settled within the city, they sought to gain the support of the local population by both propaganda and intimidation. They threatened that the city would be attacked time and time again until the city was ‘liberated’. The civilians would only be able to escape the carnage if they were to ‘liberate’ themselves by joining the Vietcong’s side.35_The Vietcong was slowly wresting control out of the South-Vietnamese government’s hands. It was up to the National Police to regain control.

The Vietnamese National Police force underwent a significant change from 1962

onwards. Between 1962 and 1975 the police force grew from a mere 16.000 to 122.000 police officers. These officers were clad in grey and white, earning them the nickname ‘the white mice’. While the nickname might suggest a degree of harmlessness, the arsenal these ‘white mice’ possessed was anything but harmless. The police force was armed with shotguns, hand grenades and trained in the use of explosives and psychological warfare. The National Police

(Massachusetts 2012).

34_{V. Pohle, The Viet Cong in Saigon: Tactics and Objectives During the Tet Offensive (Santa Monica 1969).} 35

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was, however, ill-disciplined and corruption ran rampant. Violent excesses became a standard and often led to civilian casualties.36

The need for a large police force resulted in lower recruiting standards. Training periods were further shortened to several weeks, and the quality reduced. Even criminals were added to the ranks with the promise that each dead communist would result in a decreased prison sentence. With little screening and scrutiny, corruption spread. The National Police both extorted and took bribes, effectively turning the police into a criminal organisation with a monopoly on violence.37

When it became known that the Vietcong had infiltrated Saigon, the United States set up Operation Phoenix. This operation was aimed at readjusting the South-Vietnamese National Police to enable them to find the hostile elements and eradicate them. The Phoenix Program turned the police force into a de facto military force with far going authorisations in the use of violence. The police force was given the task to round up, interrogate and ‘turn’ those suspected of ties with the Vietcong or of having communist sympathies. Those that were part of the inner circle could even be executed on sight. Their success would be determined by their ability to meet the quota of hostile elements ‘neutralised’.

Who was to be considered a hostile element and who was not was determined by searching through the files of the Family Census Program. This program had enabled the South-Vietnamese government to amass vast amounts of information, such as fingerprints, housing information and political beliefs under false pretexts. With little to no clear

boundaries on who was to be considered a hostile element and who was not, the selection process began. The requirements on who to select were stretched to reach the set-out quota. The searching process began including people of which they suspected that they were

remotely left-leaning. Targets that were neutralised often appeared to be political adversaries which made Operation Phoenix appear to be more of a political weapon than a policing tool.38

The quota by which the success of the mission was measured caused unjust

apprehensions and killings as distinctions between civilians and Vietcong were purposely ignored to achieve the required numbers. Roundups and searches did not result in

apprehensions but turned into firefights, and many civilians lost their lives without due

(Massachusetts 2012) 148.

37_{Ibid. 150, 154.} 38_{Ibid. 149-150.}

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process.39 Once suspects did get apprehended, the interrogations would often turn torturous as they were violently beaten until they ‘turned sides’.40 Those who were supposed to be

apprehended or neutralised often escaped the police’s grasp while the innocent were caught in the crossfire. The many arrests were thus of little use as they caught the wrong people.41

The excessive use of force against seemingly innocent people estranged the civilian populace from the South-Vietnamese government. As a result, the civilian's willingness to cooperate shrank to the point where there was no cooperation at all. At the same time, the United States was being pressured both abroad and at home to retreat its forces. In 1973, after the Paris Peace Agreement, they withdrew all combat troops, and soon all military help came to a halt. Now that its main protector and the beneficiary was gone Saigon was left to fend for itself. Saigon would eventually fall in 1975 after it had lost most of its support among both the rural and urban population. The policing effort in Saigon is, therefore, the only one of these three case studies that have led to a direct failure to gain control.

In this chapter we have seen three past urban counterinsurgency operations by three countries that would play a central role in the ISAF. The operations show why they intervened, how they tried to achieve their objectives, the difficulties they faced and how they reacted to them. The British made use of profile patrols to establish firm control in specified parts of Belfast. They upheld strict discipline and used the minimal amount of violence to prevent aggrevating the civilian population. They managed to achieve success where Operation Banner could not. The French imported their rural tactics into the urban environment, such as quadrillage and the SAU. Especially the administrative capacities of the SAU proved of great importance as it allowed them to create a stability and order. The SAU effectively denied the FLN the

possibility to recruit new members within the city. The United States tried to subdue the Vietocng by using the vast database of the Family Census Program and strongly increasing the police force. This turned out to be less effective as violent excesses of the poorly trained and vetted recruits delegitimised the government. Now that we know the three major member states past experiences, we can see what lessons or mistakes they have taken with them for the mission in Kabul.

39_{Ibid. 154-155.}

40_{N. K. Vien, ‘With the Survivors of the Prisons of Saigon’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 4, Nr. 4 (1974)}

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Chapter 2: The Construction of Modern Kabul

When the ISAF entered Kabul in December of 2001, they encountered a city that had been scarred by its past. Decades of internal conflict had torn parts of the city apart brick by brick. Necessities like electricity, drinking water and a sewer system had become luxuries to most. Kabul, however, survived these decades of onslaught and its foundation remained strong. The fundament of Kabul of 2001 was the result of more than a century of both growth and

destruction. Its development, while turbulent due to the conflicts, had led to a complex urban environment. Kabul was home to a manifold of districts that had their own ethnic, economic and cultural composition. Great disparities between the rich and poor translated in schisms of safety between districts and crime ran rampant. Kabuli society and the urban environment of the city were complex phenomena that took decades to form. Before we can understand how Kabuli society and the city environment influenced the ISAF military operation, we have to understand how both formed over time. We must, therefore, ask some crucial questions about the development of the city. When were the first building blocks of the modern Kabul laid, how did the city develop over time after that, and how did this affect the populace. By answering these questions, we can get a grasp of the situation the ISAF found itself in and of the way the city influenced the ISAF’s mission.

2.1: Laying the Foundation

The story of modern Kabul starts in the late 19th century with the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan. This emir came into power during the second Anglo-Afghan war that took place between 1878 and 1880. As a British puppet, his rule was still rather frail.42 He set out to cement his power by undertaking large construction projects. His first objective was to make a capital worthy of his rule. Kabul, as one of the most ancient cities in Afghanistan, had been the centre of power for many previous empires. Abdur Rahman Khan considered the old city to be unsuitable however, but still saw value in Kabul’s central location. He decided to create a new city across the Kabul-river, mere kilometres removed from Kabul. This city centre would become known as Shahr-I-Naw, Persian for “New City”.43 The centralisation

42_{T. Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton 2012) 143.}

43_{J. Habib, ‘Urban Cohesiveness in Kabul City: Challenges and Threats, International Journal of Environmental}

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efforts and reconstruction projects reaffirmed Kabul and its surroundings as the leading political and economic centre of Afghanistan.44

Shahr-I-Naw was a city of splendour that embodied the beginning of a new golden age, or so Abdur Rahman Kahn would make it seem. Its buildings were made in a Central-Asian architectural style that was characterised by open gardens, pools and fountains. The wealthy inhabitants of the old city of Kabul looked upon the construction of Shahr-I-Nao with glee. The construction of the new city gave them a new place to live in which they could showcase their wealth. Not before long the rich traded the cramped alleys of Kabul for the wide

boulevards of Shahr-I-Naw and took their wealth with them. The river that lay between the old and the new city became a divide between rich and poor.45

The new city was, in many ways a work of splendour. Later emirs, however, took the construction of a legacy to an even higher level. Just as the Egyptian pharaohs had done with their pyramids, the Afghan emirs sought to outdo one another with their urban projects. When Amanullah Khan took reign in 1929, he began a city project of his own. Just like Abdur Rahman Khan, he valued the central location of Kabul but felt the need to express wealth. He thus created another city several kilometres to the southwest of Shahr-I-Naw and Kabul. This city was named Darulaman and represented Amanullah’s vision of a modern Afghanistan by western example. Darulaman was comprised of two words: ‘darul’ and ‘aman’. This was Persian for ‘Abode of Aman(ullah)’.46

The vision of western modernity Amanullah had envisioned for the city translated into Neo-Classic European architecture. Darulaman was filled with villa’s that were inspired by the British mansions of the 19th century. Just like Shahr-I-Nao had done, so too attracted Darulaman the wealthiest among the Afghans. While Darulaman became a pearl in the desert, Kabul sank away in the quicksand. The construction of this new modern city centre required an extensive budget. This money was drawn from funds meant for other cities. The old city of Kabul was the first victim of this relocation of money, having to see its budget usurped in favour for its rival. While the west side of the river strode forward into modernity, Kabul was left behind in the past.47

While all of the three cities had been constructed independently, they eventually became one. The major urban projects attracted people from the countryside. The city grew so rapidly,

45_{J. Habib, ‘Urban Cohesiveness in Kabul City: Challenges and Threats, International Journal of Environmental}

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it could not keep up with the influx of people. Homes were in short supply as the residential areas of Shahr-I-Naw and Darulaman were too expensive for the average Afghan, and old Kabul was too cramped to fit any more inhabitants. The eager immigrants took it upon themselves to build a place to live. The land between the three cities offered plenty of space on which they could build. Before long, the vast plains that once separated the different cities had turned into vast plots filled with illegal housing.48 As a result, Kabul, Shahr-I-Naw and Darulaman became one greater Kabul.

While the cities Shahr-I-Nao and Darulaman grew together, they remained solitary isles of wealth surrounded by a sea of poverty. The city centres were recognised as official city districts and were given all necessary commodities, such as drinking water, hospitals, electricity network and sewage disposal. Its citizens lived without fear, as the police closely supervised the streets. The illegal residential plots, however, were given none of these necessities nor were they policed to the same degree as the city centres. This resulted in a large disparity in both security and wealth between the official and illegal parts of the city.49

2.2: Kabul and the Soviet Project

The gap between the wealthy official districts and the illegal plots would remain largely unresolved until 1955. This time, however, the ambitious urban plans came not from the emir, but foreign powers. When the Cold War broke out between the Soviet-Union and the United States, Afghanistan became an area of great importance. Due to its location between Central-Asia and the Middle-East as a natural buffer state, it was of great geopolitical value. In their attempt to win the Afghan emir over to their cause, the Soviet-Union and the United States sought to win the hearts of the Afghan population by modernising its capital city.50

The Soviet-Union was the first of the two powers to commit to the competition in Afghanistan. In 1955 they gave the Afghan state 100 million dollars in credit for building projects. These building projects would, in turn, be executed by workers from the Soviet-Union and its satellite states. The Soviets focussed on the construction of highly visible projects, such as the construction of infrastructure in the form of asphalted roads. The United

48_{Ibid. 368.} 49_{Ibid. 368.}

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States and its European partners chose to focus on less visible but no less important projects, such as the construction of a water network.51

The ambitions of both parties grew as both sides sought to outdo the other. The Soviet-Union eventually offered the Emir to rebuild the entirety of Kabul. They sought to resolve the disparity between the legal and illegal districts and provide necessities to all of Kabul’s inhabitants. To resolve this inequality was to show the virtues of their communist ideology. The Soviet-Union sent one of its most renowned urban planners, Sergei I. Kolesnikov, to draw up a masterplan for the city and set the reconstruction in motion.52

This masterplan was handed over to the Emir and the government of Kabul in 1964. The masterplan was to be completed in a period of 25 years during which the city would undergo major changes. Kabul would be given a water- electricity- and sewage network. Illegal neighbourhoods would be destructed to make room for spacious and modern residential areas to provide the poor with high-quality housing. Shahr-I-Naw too was to be changed drastically. Sergei and his team of architects and urban planners had a different vision for the city than the standard industrial format. They instead sought to make Kabul’s main focus to be on the tertiary sector, which pertains the selling of services instead of raw materials or goods. Shahr-I-Naw would become the true city centre and heart of the tertiary economy, being home to both international companies and government ministries.53

In 1965 the first steps to realizing this masterplan were made and would begin at the city centre from which it would expand into the surrounding districts. Shahr-I-Naw was adorned with new free-standing complexes for the ministries and buildings for international companies. With this new economic centre in place, the need came for residential areas in the near vicinity to house all new employees. To the north-east of Shahr-I-Naw the so-called ‘mikrorayon’ were constructed on the empty plains. Mikrorayons were residential blocks that housed between the 25.000 and 30.000 residents. These blocks had all sorts of luxuries, such as leisure areas, shopping streets, medical clinics and more. These reconstruction efforts turned Kabul into a sprawling modern city one city block at a time.54

Between 1973 and 1978 the construction efforts of the Soviet-Union slowly ground to a halt after Mohammed Daoud Khan staged a coup and overthrew Emir Mohammed Zahir Shah. Only several mikrorayons were constructed, far too little to improve the overall living

51_{E. Beyer, ‘Competitive Coexistence: Soviet Town Planning and Housing Projects in Kabul in the 1960’s’, The}

Journal of Architecture, Vol. 17, Nr. 3 (2012) 311-312.

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conditions for the larger urban population. The coup brought great disorder within the

country. Daoud reigned with an iron fist and suppressed the communists that had once helped him with his coup. Over the years the oppression of the communists worsened and reached a climax in 1978 when Mir Akbar Khyber, a communist activist, was murdered. Communists were quick to point the finger at Daoud and his secret service. When Daoud heard rumours about demonstrations, he acted pre-emptively and arrested several key figures of the communist movement. When the remaining communists heard what had happened, they turned what would have been a demonstration into a coup. On the 27th of April communist elements within the army surrounded the palace in which Daoud and his family resided. Both Daoud and his family were murdered. The communists took over and from Daoud’s death arose the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan as its ruler.55

The new communist regime was led by Hazifullah Amin, a radical communist who forced his communist principles upon the Afghan population. While the urban population was accepting of the communist principles, the rural population had little affinity with this foreign ideology with its atheistic notions. This opposition between the rural population and the urban centres has a long history. The rural population has been averse of influences from the cities since the rise of the Afghan Empire in the 18th century. When the communist government sought to enforce an anti-religious communist lifestyle, these feelings of distrust and aversion were once more fired up. All across the countryside, men took up arms to fight a holy war against the godless regime. So the first mujahedeen factions came into existence, and the fight for Kabul had begun.

The Soviet-Union looked with great despair at the rise of Hazifullah Amin. His reckless and radical policies turned the Afghan population against the government, nullifying the Soviet-Union’s attempt to create a base of support. On the 24th of December 1979, they intervened and sent a total of 10.000 infantrymen to Kabul to depose Hazifullah Amin. Due to diligent preparations and schemes, the city fell swiftly and without bloodshed.56 Once in control of the city, they replaced Amin with Babrak Karmal, a moderate communist that could diffuse the tensions with the rural population.57 This attempt was to no avail, and the groups of mujahedeen kept marching towards Kabul.

56_{J. Valenta, ‘From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion’, International Security, Vol. 5, Nr. 2 (1980)}

131, 134.

57_{J. Valenta, ‘From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion’, International Security, Vol. 5, Nr. 2 (1980)}

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The war between the mujahedeen and the Soviet-supported regime was fought mainly in the areas surrounding the cities. The communist regime had a firm grip on the urban

population, which had benefited the most from the reconstruction efforts. Here the regime had a base of support from which they could draw. The mujahedeen reigned supreme in the countryside, where the control of the regime was elusive, and its anti-religious messages fell on deaf ears. The battles were fought on the borders between the territories of both factions, the areas where city and countryside met.58 Kabul, as the largest city and seat of the

communist regime, became the focal point in this war.

After 1979 the mujahedeen inched closer every year and managed to get in artillery-range of the city in 1984. Once in artillery-range, they used rockets to bombard the military

installations within the city. While the attacks on the city were directed at the installations, the nature of the weapons caused a significant margin of error. Civilian infrastructure and

buildings were caught in the fray. Schools, mosques and roads all fell victim to the bombardments.59

The Soviets formed multiple rings of defence around the city to mitigate the damage the mujahedeen factions could do to the city. These lines of defence, however, would disappear on the 15th of May 1988 as the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan. As their Soviet-Union was crumbling, it had little manpower to spare for the Afghan campaign. On the 15th of February 1989, all Soviet forces had retreated from Afghanistan, and the communist

government was left to stand on its own. Mohammed Najibullah, the successor of Babrak Karmal, thus decided to withdraw all troops to Kabul in a last-ditch attempt to defend the regime.60

2.3: Destroying Kabul

In 1992 the remainder of the regime’s forces deserted and joined the ranks of the mujahedeen factions. Rashid Dostum, the leader of the Jumbesh faction and the garrison of Kabul, took the opportunity to turn against the regime he was supposed to protect. With no one to protect the city, the rat race began. The Jamiat-i-Islami mujahedeen faction that was led by Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhanuddin Rabbani entered the city from the north. At the same time, the Hezb-i-Wahdat of Abdul Ali Mazari entered the city from the west. As their groups were

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too small to secure the city individually, they decided to form a coalition. Their control over the capital allowed them to solidify their position as the dominant groups in the political landscape. All others, such as the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Ettehad of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, were denied entry to the city.

When it became apparent that the coalition within the city was unwilling to share its power, the mujahideen factions outside the city turned their weapons on their former allies. Those outside Kabul waged war upon those within it, and Kabul was once more turned into a battlefield. This time, however, the city did not have the protection it had before and would suffer the full brunt of the violence.

The mujahedeen factions set up their artillery within and around the city. The Jamiat-i-Islami had a significant advantage in weaponry. They were one of the first to enter the city and managed to capture the heavy weaponry that was left behind by the government forces. They installed their weapons on the high ground within the city. Together with the aircraft of the Jumbesh of Dostum, they possessed immense firepower that the other groups could not rival. The Hezb-i-Islami set up its artillery in Char Asiab, which was a mere twenty

kilometres to the south of Kabul. On the 5th of May 1992, Hekmatyar’s artillery fired its first shots. The destruction of Kabul began.61

During the first phase of the siege, both parties made use of long-range missiles to bridge the gap. But as the mujahedeen crept closer towards the city, so too did the bombardments. When the Hezb-i-Islami entered the city’s southern districts, the

bombardments followed without any sign of a decrease in its intensity. The use of residential areas as a battleground was not shunned, causing the barrier between civilians and combatants to fade. The civilians were caught in the middle and had no way of escape while the shells hit the roofs above them. Neighbourhoods as Karta-i-Sakhi, Kara-i-Char, Debori, Kota-Sangi and Karta-i-Seh in the southern districts were especially targeted, as they lay in the vicinity of the frontline. Daraluman, which housed the headquarter of the Ettehad, was bombarded as well. In the West, the Kabuli’s didn’t fare any better. Old residential areas such as Karte Naw and Afshar were neither spared the carnage when it became known that it was home to military installations of Hezb-i-Islami.62

61_{The Afghanistan Justice Project, ‘Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001’.} https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf (geraadpleegd op 17-05-2019) 66.

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In the first months of 1994, the battle for Kabul intensified. Dostum and his Jambesh faction switched sides and allied themselves with Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar decided to act while he still had the firepower of his ally, and began a large-scale bombardment of the city. During this bombardment, Hekmatyar targeted the city centre. The mikrorayon, presidential palace and the ministry buildings were all damaged. The little progress that had been made since 1955 was largely undone.63 Hekmatyar’s bombardment was, however, cut short in February of 1995 by the arrival of the Taliban. The Taliban had swooped in from the south and captured Hekmatyar’s military base in Char Asiab and recovered the artillery that was left behind. The Taliban resumed the bombardment with the intent of taking it for its own and laid siege to Kabul until the city would fall in 1996.64

When the Taliban captured the city in 1996, it was unrecognizably changed. During the besiegement, 25.000 civilians had died, and large parts of the city had been either damaged or destroyed entirely. The districts in the south and the west, while already in poor condition due to its informal status, had suffered the most. The majority of the infrastructure, water network and electricity installations were badly damaged or destroyed. Darulaman, which was one of the few places with luxurious buildings and infrastructure, met the same fate.65 The poor condition of the southern and western districts would linger on as the Taliban had no interest in its reconstruction. To the Taliban, Kabul was but a mere means to a goal, as they saw Kandahar as their true capital.

63_{Z. Khalilzad, ‘Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Disintegration’, Asian Survey, Vol. 35, Nr. 2 (1995) 149.}

The Afghanistan Justice Project, ‘Casting Shadows: War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: 1978-2001’.

https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/ajpreport_20050718.pdf (geraadpleegd op 17-05-2019). 73.

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Chapter 3: Creating the ISAF

After 1996 the Taliban held firm control over Kabul and its direct environment. The Northern Alliance had pulled back to the north where they had the advantage, leaving Kabul

uncontested. The Taliban remained firmly seated until Al Qaida conducted multiple attacks on the United States which they directed from Afghan soil. The United States was eager to exact punishment on those responsible and in part held the Taliban responsible. It was the Taliban that had harboured Al Qaida within its borders and was as such an accomplice. When the Taliban failed to deliver on the ultimatum of Osama bin Laden’s extradition, the United States began planning for war. The United States formed a coalition with Great Britain and allied themselves with the Northern Alliance, the Taliban’s sworn enemies. Operation Enduring Freedom began on the 7th of October that following month.

The Taliban regime quickly dissolved after the invasion by the coalition and the city of Kabul swiftly fell with it. A precise and intense bombing campaign had caused the Taliban to flee the city, after which the city was taken with little to no bloodshed. The Taliban was no longer a force in the political landscape, and the discussion regarding Afghanistan’s future began. Afghanistan was not to fall back into the hands of another fundamentalist group. The new Afghanistan would be democratic and would uphold the humanitarian rights of its people. The Afghan people, however, had never before been introduced to the democratic system and the situation was still rather unstable. Under the supervision of the United Nations, it was decided that an interim government would be formed to bridge the gap and ease Afghanistan into democracy. The interim-government, however, had no existing structures or security forces on which to rely. The United Nations Security Council called upon its members to form a collective that would protect and assist this interim-government. This collective would become known as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Before we can delve deeper into how Kabuli society and the urban environment influenced the ISAF, we have to answer several questions. How was the policing operation of the ISAF envisioned by its member states and the UN-Security council, what role did the ISAF fulfil and how was it to achieve the envisioned mission goal. By combining both the abstractions of the mandate given by the UN-Security Council and the preparations of the ISAF, we can determine a baseline. This baseline will, in turn, enable us to establish how the ISAF deviated from its original plan and what effect the circumstances had on its actions.

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3.1: Shaping the Mandate of the International Security Force

The ISAF found its origin on the 5th_{of December 2001 in the German city of Bonn. Here} several prominent Afghans and western envoys met under the invitation of the United Nations. During these talks, they gave shape to the interim-regime that was to lead

Afghanistan into democracy. At the end of the meeting, the interim regime became a fact, and its members were chosen. The decisions were written down in what would become known as the ‘Afghan Agreement’. At the bottom of this agreement, they added an annexe named the ‘International Security Force’. In this annexe, UN member states were called to form a collective that would secure and assist the interim-government. Hamid Karzai, the declared president of the interim-regime, signed the document and put the ISF’s creation into motion.66

The reason for the mission was clear in its premises. Kabul was the focal point in the creation of a democratic Afghan state. From this central location, a form of western

democracy would be imposed, and the human rights of the Afghan population safeguarded. Kabul and its government had to remain intact to enable this process to take place. The ISF policing mission was created to ensure the safety of the regime and enable it to execute this transition. The ISF’s purpose within this mission was to secure the city of Kabul and ward off attacks by those that sought to oppose this transition, such as the Taliban. Kabul was to become a safe and a model of a stable and democratic Afghanistan. The reason and function of the ISF-mission show several parallels with the United States’ policing mission in Saigon. Kabul fulfilled a similar role, as the centre of a political system. Just like in Saigon, the policing mission was initiated to ensure the safety of the regime to secure a political transition.

The mission differed greatly from intervention collectives of the past however. Its purpose, which was to combat hostile elements such as the Taliban and support the interim regime, made the ISF an active participant in the conflict. Unlike many previous military collectives which conducted peacekeeping operations, the ISF was no neutral party. For this reason, the ISF did not fall under the supervision of the United Nations. The member states that partook in this collective did so voluntarily and formed a central committee to guide their

66_{UN Security Council, ‘Agreement on provisional arrangements in Afghanistan pending the re-establishment}

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efforts, making it an independent organisation. It was, however, mandated by the United Nations Security Council.67

On the 20th of December of 2001, the United Nations Security Council met once more in token of Resolution 1386. In this resolution, the UN-Security Council gave the ISF a mandate in which they further elaborated on its purpose. The mandate stated that the ISF was to assist in the securing of both Kabul and its direct environment. By securing the city, they would enable the UN and the Afghan Interim Authority to operate in a secure environment. The second part of the mandate required the ISF to assist the interim government with the training of new Afghan security and armed forces. The ISF’s mission was, now that the mandate had given further form to its purpose, given an advisory and supportive role. The name of the ISF was changed accordingly to reflect this hierarchy and became the

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This mandate would last for a total of six months, after which it could by either prolonged, adjusted or halted.68

3.2: The ISAF unfolds its Plan

The ISAF, which was now in possession of an extensive mandate, began its preparations to accomplish the goals the UN Security Council had set out. The central leadership decided the ISAF would have a light footprint as the ISAF fulfilled a support-role. The force was,

therefore, kept to a brigade-size of 5000 soldiers. This brigade was named the Kabul

Multinational Brigade and subdivided into three battlegroups and several smaller task forces. Each of these battlegroups encompassed several member states. These battlegroups were assigned to districts, referred to as their Area of Responsibility (AOR), which they needed to secure.

The preparations focussed on the two main tasks the UN Security Council had given them: aiding in securing the city and assisting in the build-up of security forces. It was up to the ISAF to form an appropriate plan of operations that would succeed in achieving the objectives set out by the UN Security Council. The securing of the Kabul and its direct surroundings would be achieved by making the battlegroups conduct profile patrols within their districts. These patrols appear to show parallels with the Belfast operation of the British, where they used profile patrols as a way to dominate the urban environment. Just like in

67_Ibid.

68_{UN Security Council, ‘Resolution 1386’ (2001).}

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Belfast, these patrols needed to be conducted with utmost discipline, maintaining a friendly posture and keeping violence to an absolute minimum. As Great Britain was the lead-nation of the ISAF during this first months, it would not be far-fetched to suggest that they inserted the tactical level of their Belfast-experience in their current mission.

The task of setting up Afghan security forces was divided differently between the member states. All member states were asked to supply the security forces with munition and other materials. However, there would only be two designated member states in control of the training process through which these security forces would be built up. Great Britain was given control over the training process of the Afghan National Army (ANA), while Germany was in control of the Afghan National Police (ANP). How these troops were to be trained was not determined, this was left to these member states to decide during the execution.69

Humanitarian projects, better known as Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), were of low priority. These projects were of small scale and were either financed through leftover budget or specifically assigned budgets assigned by the individual member states themselves. The larger humanitarian projects were to be undertaken by the United Nations, which had formed the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) to oversee all humanitarian action. The ISAF was asked to protect the UN personnel.70

Not only did the preparations concern the tasks that they had to perform, but they also contained specific instructions on what not to do. Certain excluded activities were expressly noted to clarify the exact boundaries of the ISAF’s policing and advising tasks. The ISAF was not responsible for the internal safety and order in and around Kabul, protecting NGO’s other than the UN, protecting the local populace and tackling criminality. The clearing of

unexploded ordnance, such as landmines, was neither considered a task of the ISAF but could be done if the explosive formed an obstacle.71 These exclusions seem to run counter to the objective to secure Kabul. However, it must be considered that these exclusions were based on legalities. If by any chance the ISAF would not be able to make true on its set out objectives, it could always defer the responsibility to the Afghan state. Nevertheless, the exclusion does give some extra insights into how the ISAF envisioned its policing role.

69_{T. Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (London 2017) 98.}

70_{Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, Collectie Vredesoperaties ISAF Infanteriecompagnie (Rotatie 1}

tot en met 4, 1 januari 2002 – 3 februari 2003), ‘Beknopt verslag debriefing en vergadering “Afghanistan” van 15 december 2001’, PowerPoint Appendix.

71_{Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, Collectie Vredesoperaties ISAF Infanteriecompagnie (Rotatie 1}

tot en met 4, 1 januari 2002 – 3 februari 2003), ‘Beknopt verslag debriefing en vergadering “Afghanistan” van 15 december 2001’, 1-2.

Urban Policing in the Age of Interventions: A Thesis on the on the Mission of the International Security Assistance Force during its occupation of Kabul between 2001-2014