Master Thesis
Post-Normalisation Migration: how changes in political climate influence Cuban migration to the United States
Author: Supervisor:
Celia Gaillard Emanuela Dalmasso 11125039
Cuban woman wearing American flag, Santa Clara, Cuba, March 2016 Photo: Celia Gaillard
Abstract
Since the Cuban revolution in 1959 migration from Cuba to the United States, has been thoroughly researched to explain influencing factors on surges in migration. A rapid increase in migration has been noted since December 2014, when Castro and Obama announced the normalisation of relations between socialist Cuba and the democratic United States
This study aims to highlight causative factors behind this migration spike and investigates to what extent the recent political developments have impacted on Cuban migration to Miami. Through qualitative and statistical data collection and analysis three hypotheses were tested regarding the influence of the normalisation process, the change of the remittance policy and the role of migrant networks.
The normalisation of the relationship between Cuba and the U.S. provokes uncertainty regarding the future of the Cuban Adjustment Act, and together with the influence of migrant networks, was found to be an important motivational factor for Cubans to migrate post December 2014. The remittance change had a lesser impact on the decision to migrate. Findings of this research study explain important factors influencing the most recent Cuban migration spike defined as ‘Post-normalisation migration’.
Key Words
Cuba - Migration - Cuban Adjustment Act - Miami - Remittances - Migrant networks - Post-normalisation
Acknowledgments
There are a number of people without whom writing this thesis would not have been possible. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Emanuela Dalmasso, for her expert guidance and helpful advice throughout this research project. The feedback from the rest of the ‘Authoritarian in a Global Age’ research team was extremely valuable.
I would like to thank Jorge Duany and Holly Ackerman, who took the time to liaise with me and point me in the right direction whilst I was in Miami. Many thanks, to the countless friendly people in Miami, who made their knowledge of the city available to me and offered me emergency rides.
I am especially grateful to my grandparents, Claus and Bärbel Reyer, who enabled my field work in Miami. My gratitude extends to my parents, who have shown me continuous love and support not only throughout my Master studies, but throughout my entire education.
Finally, I am thankful to the many Cubans, who educated me about their motives and circumstances, despite having just arrived into an unknown setting. Their determination and optimism were an inspiration.
Abbreviations
CAA CACR CANF CMPP CMR ESOL INA LPR MDC NGO OFAC REVEST UDHR U.S. USCIS USDOS USRAP YCICuban Adjustment Act
Cuban Assets Control Regulations Cuban American National Foundation Cuban Medical Professional Parole Cuban Migration Reform
English for Speakers of Other Languages Immigration and Naturalization Act Legal Permanent Resident
Miami Dade College
Non-Governmental Organisation Office of Foreign Assets Control
Refugee/Entrant Vocational Education Services Training Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United States of America
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services United States Department of State
United States Refugee Admissions Program Youth Co-op Inc. Refugee Services
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview ...………1
1.1 Introduction ……….1
1.2 Motivation for the Study ……….3
1.3 Research Question ………...4
1.4 Hypotheses ………...4
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ………...7
2.1 Background ………...7
2.2 Historical Context ………...7
2.2.1 Pre 1959 Revolution ………...7
2.2.2 Post 1959 Revolution ………...8
2.2.3 The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act ………...9
2.2.4 ‘Open Arms’ Policy and the Mariel Boatlift ………..11
2.2.5 1994 Balsero Crisis and the ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’ Policy……..13
2.2.6 The Cuban-American Lobby ………..15
2.2.7 Recent Developments in Cuba ………...15
2.2.8 Post Normalisation ……….16
2.3 Migration Theory ………..17
2.3.1 Causes of Migration Processes ………...18
2.3.2 Functionalist Theories ………18
3.2.3 Historical-Structural Theories ………29
3.2.4 ‘Push-Pull’ Framework ………..21
3.2.5 Controlling Migration ………21
3.2.6 Meso-Level Migration Theories ……….22
3.2.7 State Relations ………23 Chapter 3: Methodology ……….25 3.1 Research Design ………....25 3.2 Study Population ………...26 3.3 Study Location ………..26 3.3.1 Refugee Services ………27
3.3.2 Miami Dade College ………..…………28
3.4 The Sample ………....29
3.5 Study Time Period ………..………...30
Chapter 4: Qualitative Analysis ……….…………31
4.1 Background ………...32
4.2 Interview Design ………...32
4.3 Interview Findings ………..…...32
3.3.1 Remittances ………....34
4.3.2 Fear that the Cuban Privilege will become Unjustifiable……...37
4.3.3 Information Flow enhances Migration ………...…40
Chapter 5: Statistical Analysis 5.1 Background ………...43
5.2 Questionnaire Design ………....44
5.3 Survey Findings ……….……...44
5.3.1 Remittances ………....46
5.3.2 Fear that the CAA will be amended ……….…..47
5.3.3 Migration Networks ………...49 Chapter 6: Conclusions ………...51 6.1 Conclusions ………...51 Bibliography ………...53 Appendix………...………60 Interviewee List………60 Table of Codes……….61 Specialised Doctors………..63 Questionnaire……….…..64
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview
1.1 IntroductionOn December 17th, 2014 the President of Cuba, Fidel Castro, and the President of the United States (U.S.), Barack Obama, declared that they are working towards normalising their relationship after political ties were severed in 1961, during the Cold War. Although the U.S. blockade still remains, some restrictions pertaining to travel, telecommunications and remittances - ‘the transfer of private income to other households’ (Barberia, 2002:1) - have been relaxed (Sullivan, 2016:8), and on 20th July 2015 diplomatic relations were restored, when the United States and Cuba reopened their embassies in each other's capitals. In March 2016 Obama made a historic visit to Havana, being the first sitting U.S. president to visit Cuba for over 60 years, since Calvin Coolidge in 1928 (Guardian, 2016).
In parallel to these events, a drastic increase in the number of Cubans entering the United States was recorded since December 2014. Overall, 43,159 Cubans entered the U.S. via ports of entry in fiscal1 year 2015 (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2015), a 78% increase compared to 2014 when 24,278 Cubans entered the U.S. (Krogstad, 2015). The U.S. Coast Guard also reported a spike in interdictions of Cubans at sea, with around three times the typical numbers of Cubans making the journey in December 2014 (Coast Guard News, 2015). In January 2016 U.S. authorities reported the interception of 435 Cuban migrants at sea, which is a significant increase to the 355 encountered in January 2015 and 240 in January 2014 (Sun-Sentinel, 2016).
This recent influx of Cuba-U.S migration can be seen as part of a wider trend of growing numbers of migrants making the journey since 2012. A Cuban travel reform, made effective in January 2013, ensured that it is easier for Cubans to both leave and return to the island legally and eliminated a costly exit visa. This reform contributed to increased migration prior to December 2014 (Guardian, 2014).
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However, the sharp increase in Cuban migration to the U.S. between 2014 and 2015 is salient and could have further social and political implications for the U.S. and Cuba.
Indeed, Cuban migration to the U. S. is by no means a new phenomenon. Large-scale Cuban immigration began in 1959, when Castro-led revolutionaries overthrew the Batista regime. Since then, emigration has been driven by the communist single-party autocracy2 (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010:124) in Cuba. Severe economic control, restricted freedom of expression and highly regulated movement are three particularly challenging realities that Cubans deal with in everyday live.
The U.S. is the most popular destination, with a Cuban immigrant population of over one million amounting to 2.8% of the total U.S. immigrant population (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). Statistics provided by the Pew Research Centre show that around 70% of Cuban immigrants live in south Florida. While 37% of U.S. Latinos are foreign born, nearly 60% of U.S. Cubans were born outside of the United States (2015). This is the result largely of the geographical proximity but is also due to the unique place that Cubans occupy in U.S. immigration law, enjoying a relatively straightforward immigration process as political asylum seekers (Rusin, Zong and
2
The definition of single-party regimes provided by Magaloni and Kricheli is that they ‘proscribe opposition parties’ participation in elections’ (2010:124).
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Batalova, 2015). Currently, a fast-track process gives Cubans legal permanent resident (LPR) status after living in the U.S. for only one year. This privilege, enjoyed by no other migrant group is known as the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA). Due to the 1995 interpretation of the CAA, commonly referred to as the ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy, Cubans must be standing on American soil before it is effective; those making the journey and caught at sea, will be sent back to Cuba.
However, the December 2014 decision taken by President Obama and President Castro to normalise relations between the United States and Cuba is likely to herald further revisions to U.S. foreign policy that will affect Cuban migrants to the United States. Remittance laws have already been relaxed, allowing increased amounts of money to be sent to relatives in Cuba from $500 to $2000 per quarter (USDOS, 2015).
Speculations about future developments have been circulating since the announcement; hopes for the U.S. embargo on Cuba to be lifted and fears that the already controversial Cuban Adjustment Act, which enables the exceptionally quick immigration process for Cubans, will no longer be justifiable in U.S. foreign policy.
Interestingly, the changing relationship between authoritarian, migrant sending Cuba and democratic, migrant receiving United States has an impact on migration due to the flow of information within migrant networks. Those living in Miami have more access to information and are exposed to the political debates surrounding the CAA in the United States. They are relaying a sense of urgency to relatives and friends who they have left behind in Cuba, pushing them to reunite in Miami rapidly, before the Cuban privilege potentially ceases to exist.
1.2 Motivation for the Study
The study arises from the observation of an apparent correlation between two events: the normalisation process of diplomatic relations and the increased migration between Cuba and the United States. The question why a rapidly inflated number of ordinary people made the life changing decision to migrate is posed. In the search for an explanation, the relationship between an authoritarian migrant sending country and a democratic receiving country is evaluated in the context of impact on migration.
4 1.3 Research Question
The research questions are as follows;
1. What factors are most significant in determining the increased Cuban immigration to the United States since December 2014?
2. How does the relationship between authoritarian migrant sending and democratic receiving countries impact on migration?
Two research questions are addressed throughout this study; the first is answered directly and aims to describe the motivations of recent Cuban diasporas for emigrating to the United States. The second question, which looks at the interaction between sending and receiving states and how it impacts on migration, is a by-product of the first, and will be answered more broadly.
1.4 Hypotheses
There are always a large variety of reasons for migration in general and Cuban migration to the United States since December 2014 is predictably no exception. The research process was guided by three related hypotheses, with the anticipation that at least one, or a combination will be significant when analysing the recent spike in Cubans entering the Unites States.
The first hypothesis considers the recent developments, in which Cuba and the United States have started the process of normalising their diplomatic relationship, and predicts that the increased number of Cuban migrants can be explained by a feeling of Torschlusspanik, a German expression used to describe the fear that time is running out to act, usually relating to a life goal or opportunity, and often specifically regarding a border closing (German Missions in the United States, 2012). The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act promises Cubans work permits and, after living in the Unites States for one year, the right of legal permanent residency (‘green card’). This applies to any Cuban arriving in the United States by any means, legal or illegal. This special privilege exempts Cubans from certain aspects of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), such as immigration quotas, or the following requirements; showing a family-based or employment-based reason for residency, entering the U.S.
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at a legal port of entry and not being a public charge.3 The fact that no other nationality enjoys this opportunity could mean that it is no longer justifiable for the U.S. to maintain the CAA. Many Cubans may fear that this might be their last chance to take advantage of the CAA and therefore took the decision to migrate.
The second hypothesis concerns the change in remittances policy. The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) regulates U.S. restrictions on remittances to Cuba. After a series of policy shifts regarding remittances to Cuba in 2009 and 2011, 2015 saw the rise in the amount Cuban-Americans were allowed to remit to a Cuban national4 from to $500 to $2,000 per quarter (Sullivan, 2016:8). Since the four-fold increase of allowed remittances, figures show that the annual funds sent from the U.S. to Cuba nearly doubled to $1.4 billion in 2015 from the previous year (Council on Foreign Relations, 2016). In 2016 the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) removed the dollar limit on authorised remittances travelers to Cuba. Economically motivated migrants can now send more money back to Cuba, as well as import more money, facilitated by the eased travel restrictions (Sullivan, 2015; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2016). This may have provoked a further increase in migration to the United States.
A third hypothesis looks at the role of migrant networks and the perception of the U.S. by Cuban immigrants living in the United States. Although migrant networks often play a significant role in stimulating further migration (Bakewell et al., 2011:15-16) usually taking similar paths to specific destinations (Lee, 1966:54), the flow of knowledge within migrant networks could be especially important in accelerating migration in this case, because it involves the information flow from a democratic state to an authoritarian one. Cuba is governed by an authoritarian regime, which restricts freedom of expression through virtually complete control of all media outlets in Cuba and by tightly restricting access to outside information (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Cuba is ranked 171st of 180 countries in the 2016 World Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders, 2016). Therefore, a lot of Cubans depend on their family and friends living in the United States, to pass on information otherwise inaccessible to them and the perception of those living in Cuba is shaped by
3
A Public charge is ‘an individual who is likely to become primarily dependent on the government for subsistence, as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at government expense’ (USCIS, 2013).
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how U.S. based Cuban immigrants discern developments in the United States. To what extent the Cuban immigrants already living in the U.S. influence migration, will be analysed in an attempt to explain the recent increase in Cuban migration.
The first and third hypotheses were supported by the findings of this study. The improved relations between Cuba and the U.S. instilled a fear in Cubans that they might miss the opportunity to take advantage of the privileges they currently receive as political refugees. Migrant networks facilitated the move in numerous ways, including finance, but most importantly family members informed those in Cuba about the changing political landscape and hereby encouraged them into migrating. It is of note however, that policy shifts surrounding remittances did not prove to have a major impact on migration, and therefore the second hypothesis was not confirmed.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
‘On both sides of the Florida Straits, policy makers balance domestic political interests with foreign policy objectives, while seeking to manage the ever-present threat of a massive migration crisis’ (Talamo, 2002:707).
2.1 Background
Much of the literature on Cuban migration to the United States and Cuban-Americans is written by authors who are originally from Cuba, now living in the United States. Although this provide a better ‘inside view’ which aids the avoidance of orientalist viewpoints as they best understand the general Cuban culture and mentality, the potential impact their personal experiences has on their research should not be forgotten. Furthermore conducting research in an environment where a strong Cuban lobby, known as the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) flourishes could hinder objective research.
2.2 Historical Context
In Cuban migration research, scholars have focused on explaining reasons for migration between Cuba and the United States. Although, research regarding Cuban migration to the U.S. predominantly focuses on post-revolutionary migration, there is evidence that Cuban political exile in Florida had a long tradition even before 1959 (Masud-Piloto, 1996). The way in which the root cause for migration between Cuba and the U.S. changes with the passage of time is recognised in most research and the grouping of migrant numbers within specified time intervals is the usual method.
2.2.1 Pre 1959 Revolution
John Ribó (2013), places Cuban migration to America within a historical context, shedding light on the complex relationship between Cuba and the United States. The American military occupation of Cuba in 1902 (Pérez, 2004:348) and the establishment of the U.S. naval base Guantánamo Bay, which still remains today,
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both played a role in undermining Cuba’s sovereignty (Hughes and Alum, 2011:191). Ribó shows that there were many different reasons why Cubans emigrated to America before the 1959 revolution, and states that socioeconomic factors predominantly determined the destination of Cubans. Osorio (2013) echoes Ribó’s views, when she explains how the intertwined U.S. and Cuban economies played a significant role in the movement of Cubans to Florida. In 1890, around 20,000 Cubans lived in the United States, a number which had doubled by 1910 (Hughes and Alum, 2011:190). Interestingly, Ribó points out the bi-directional nature of the Cuban-American migration during the early eighteenth century, something that has not been researched extensively.
2.2.2 Post 1959 Revolution
The fact that there was a large flux of Cubans emigrating to America beginning in the late 1950’s could explain why more attention is placed on post-revolution migration. Revolutions typically cause increased migration as the violence associated with it creates refugees (Zolberg, 1989:419-20). However, the reasons why Cubans migrated to the U.S. after the 1959 revolution also vary from political, social to economic factors (García, 1996:13).
Yolanda Prieto (2009) provides an ethnographic portrait of the Cuban-American community, portraying the diversity of the Cuban migration. Her research shows that, in addition to class-based migration, motivated by the social changes brought on by the revolution, family reunification and the search of a better life were major pull factors. Jorge Duany (1999) agrees that, the ‘émigrés’ have become more representative of Cuban society with regard to income, occupation, and education throughout the past four decades, but argues that this is not the case with regard to race or color and region of origin, as Cuban migrants are currently still predominantly white and urban.
9 2.2.3 The 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act
The Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) is a United States federal law enacted in 1996 and applies to any native or citizen of Cuba, who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States after January 1st, 1959. After being physically present in the U.S. for at least one year, legal permanent resident status can be obtained, a unique privilege enjoyed by no other migrant group.
‘The first policy concern behind enactment of the CAA was for humanitarian and practical reasons’ (Estevez, 2002:1277). Reynolds argues that the Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA) originated as a coping mechanism for the inordinate influx of Cuban immigrants in the 1960s’ (2011:1018). Hughes and Alum on the other hand attribute the CAA to the United States policy to ‘discredit the Cuban government ideology by allowing Cubans the opportunity to choose capitalism and democracy over communism and dictatorship’ (2011:195) since Castro's rise to power. Four historical justifications show that it seems to be a combination of the two; (1) to ease the administrative burden for Cuban exiles who wanted to become LPRs, (2) to expedite the rate at which newly arrived refugees could integrate into the American workforce (3) to destabilise the Cuban communist dictatorship and finally, (4) to provide refuge to victims of communist persecution, remarkably allowing Cuban refugees to apply for permanent residency without leaving the U.S. (Reynolds, 2011; Hughes and Alum, 2001). Existing law prior to the enactment of the CAA required Cuban refugees living in the United States who wanted to adjust their status to permanent residency to follow the ‘awkward procedure’ of departing the United States and applying for an immigrant visa at a consulate office in another country. They were only able to return as permanent residents upon approval (Estevez, 2002:1277).
The CAA ‘is the byproduct of an era when the United States Immigration Policy was a testament of the ideals and values of the United States’ (Talamo, 2002:723), which some argue are no longer valid (Hughes and Alum, 2011). The modern rationalisation for the CAA generally fall under two categories; (1) modern political persecution which is the only justification still relevant from the time of enactment and (2) humanitarian concerns. Cuba is struggling economically, yet,
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current immigration regulations do not grant refugees asylum based on economic reasons (Estevez, 2002:1283).
The 1951 Refugee Convention, builds on Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which recognises the right ‘to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ (UDHR, 1948). Refugees are provided with two options to establish permanent resident status in the U.S; through a political asylum process once inside the U.S. or through refugee programmes set up in the applicants’ home countries. The latter contradicts the Refugee Convention, which grants refugee status to anyone who has a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ and ‘is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’ (Refugee Convention, 1951). Yet, the U.S. congress accepts a minimum of 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year through the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), in which the refugee application process occurs entirely in Cuba.
Proving that one is a refugee is difficult, but the CAA acts as a loophole for Cubans who apply for political asylum while in America. The protection of the CAA allows Cuban migrants to ‘circumvent the usual methods used to determine refugee status and their conversion from refugee to permanent resident’ (Estevez, 2002:1277). Additionally, the fact that Cubans are able to return to visit the country allegedly persecuting them5, without jeopardising their asylum seeker status (Curbelo, 2015), makes it very obvious that the conventional definition of a refugee is outdated with regards to Cuban migrants. As the Cuban Adjustment Act only allows Cubans to enjoy special privileges, it is no surprise that immigrants of different nationalities claim that Cubans receive unfair preferential treatment by the U.S. (Estevez, 2002:1277). Haitian migrants, in particular, are often compared with Cuban migrants because they share commonalities such as politically-tumultuous histories and long records of sending large numbers of asylum seekers to the United States by boats. Yet they are subject to harsh immigration laws, which illustrate the double standard of United States migration laws (Pérez, 2004:437-8).
The Cuban government position is clearly opposed to the CAA (Talamo, 2002:720). It has also been attacked by scholars for many years, who advocate the repealment of the CAA or claim that amendments to the CAA are necessary. It has
5
Particularly absurd considering that tourist travel to Cuba is still ‘prohibited under U.S. law for U.S. citizens’ (USDOS, 2015).
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been accused of being racist, favouring Cuban immigrants who tend to be white over Haitians who are fleeing equal, if not worse conditions but tend to be black (Hughes and Alum, 2011:215), even though other immigrant groups would not benefit from the repeal of the CAA (Talamo, 2002:724). How the CAA threatens U.S national security has been highlighted in terms of granting easy entry to potential terrorists (Reynolds, 2011) or Cuban spies (Hughes and Alum, 2011).
Speculations of what the future holds for Cubans migrating to the United States can be validated by the political debate surrounding the issue. Demands to change the 1966 law granting Cubans special immigrant status can be heard from Miami to Congress. The Miami-Dade County Commission voted to lobby Congress in January 2015 to revise the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, which they argue is necessary ‘to ensure the continued protection of Cubans fleeing political persecution by the Castro regime’.6
Later that year, U.S. Representative and Cuban-American, Carlos Curbelo of Florida also filed a bill to amend the existing Cuban Adjustment Act in December 2015. If his legislation ‘Cuban Immigrant Work Opportunity Act of 2015’7
goes through, it will limit the CAA’s protection of Cubans fleeing their country for political reasons. Curbelo reasons that not only is the CAA an inconsistency in law, but people abusing the law should be clamped down upon (2015).
2.2.4 ‘Open Arms’ Policy and the Mariel Boatlift
Whilst focusing on post-revolutionary migration, Osorio (2013) briefly describes the numerous ‘waves’8
of Cuban migrants into the U.S., saying that Americans welcomed initial Cuban migrants; stemming from the elite class, fleeing from socialism, or children during ‘operation Pedro Pan’. Torres (2003) writes extensively about ‘operation Pedro Pan’, a programme partially financed by the U.S. government, through which 14,048 Cuban minors were sent to Miami by parents who
6
See http://www.miamidade.gov/govaction/legistarfiles/MinMatters/Y2015/150243min.pdf [Accessed on: 11/05/2016].
7
See https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr4247/BILLS-114hr4247ih.pdf [Accessed on: 11/05/2016]. 8
Migration is often talked about using aquatic metaphors (De Haas, 2005:1270). Although this can be regarded as disparaging, lack of a better word and the frequency it is used in the literature prompted the use of the term.
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feared that the new communist government would ship their children to Soviet work camps. Many of those children’s families were able to join them in the U.S. (Reynolds, 2011:1016).
The second ‘wave’ of migration took place between 1965 and 1973, bringing 680,000 refugees into the U.S., half of which arrived on flights permitted by an agreement between Cuba and the United States, known as the ‘freedom flights’. Following the Cuban termination of flights to the United States in 1973, a significant decrease in immigration is noticeable as Cubans had to resort to clandestine methods to migrate (Estevez, 2002:1274). Castro reasoned that the loss of many well-educated citizens was causing detrimental effects on Cuba (Hughes and Alum, 2011:199). Human capital flight, also referred to as ‘Brain Drain’ is the emigration of highly skilled individuals in search of better pay or conditions, causing their places of origin to lose those skills and expertise (Castles et al., 2014:161).
In his book, ‘From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959-1995’, Masud-Piloto (1996) claims that the ‘open heart and open arms’ policy instigated by President Carter was somewhat short lived.
There are numerous factors, which can explain why Cubans were met with more restrictive policies in the 1980’s, and more significantly, why the Clinton administration instituted a closed-door policy designed to intercept Cubans hoping to migrate to the U.S. at sea and transporting them to detention camps at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay in Cuba (Masud-Piloto, 1996:1).
The Cuban government's 1980 decision to allow uncontrolled migration to the United States through the port of Mariel, initiated when six Cubans stormed the Peruvian embassy in Havana on April 1st, 1980, brought over 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States. The Mariel boatlift constituted Fidel Castro’s attempt to alleviate problems of discontent within Cuba (Greenhill, 2002:43) and was met with U.S. sanctions, including a revived travel ban and a tightened economic embargo (LeoGrande, 1998:72). Castro officially stated in 1994, that he would no longer act as border guards for the U.S. if it ‘does not take rapid, effective measures to stop promoting illegal departures from our country’ (Hughes and Alum, 2007:203).
García devotes a lot of attention to the Cuban emigration policy, giving insight into how the Castro regime was never fully recovered from the 1980 mass emigration as it proved to be an embarrassing catastrophe and made the Cuban government appear weak (1996:54). Negative backlash from the American media turned the
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Mariel boatlift into a political crisis for the Carter administration as well, eventually contributing to Carter’s electoral loss to Ronald Reagan in 1981 (Engstrom, 1997; Greenhill, 2002).
Keeping in mind that immigrants typically migrate to areas where other members of their culture reside, it is not surprising that more than 83% of all Cuban immigrants want to move to the state of Florida (Bonnin and Brown, 2002:466). Proximity, climate and migrant networks are three reasons why Miami is a popular destination for Cubans. However, the strain that Miami felt, due to the increased numbers of Cubans arriving, meant that racism was not uncommon there (Osorio, 2013) and refugees served as a convenient scapegoat for the increased rates of murder and rape in Miami in 19809. The label ‘Marielito’ stigmatised all those Cubans who came to the United States during the Mariel boatlift by implying that they were criminals (Masud-Piloto, 1996:94).
2.2.5 1994 Balsero Crisis and the ‘Wet Foot, Dry Foot’ Policy
A second crisis arose in 1994 when an increased number of Cubans, arrived on American shores, by this time, they were no longer welcomed and rather pushed away by the Clinton Administration (Reynolds, 2011:1021).
García, LeoGrande, Osorio and Reynolds alike use the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic consequences for Cuba to explain why Castro opened up Cuba’s borders once again. The fourth ‘wave’ of migration between Cuba and the U.S is known as the ‘Balsero’ crisis because the Cubans made the journey to the U.S. on precarious, often self-constructed vessels. Holly Ackerman collected and analysed data from rafters (‘balseros’), to investigate their demography as well as their self-reported motivation to why they made the illegal exit from Cuba by sea between 1959 and 1994. Despite the politically charged nature of the mass exodus, she concludes that the search for personal liberation and a better future prompted Cubans to make the dangerous journey (1996:187). The United States by now showed lessened interest in Cuban refugees. Masud-Piloto (1996) attributes this to both, the Soviet Union's collapse and the growth of popular anti-immigrant sentiments within the
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Between 1979 and 1980, violent crime increased by 46.5% (Dade-Miami Criminal Justice Council, 1986).
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United States. Estevez explains how the ‘immigration crisis eventually culminated in the New York Agreement’ (2002:1275). Again, attempts were made to restrict the flow of refugees, most notably the mutual agreement between Castro and Clinton, who in September 1994 ‘came together to carve out an exception to the CAA in a bilateral migration agreement dubbed the Joint Communiqué’ (Reynolds, 2011:1022-1023).
This revision to the 1966 CAA, established by the Clinton administration, is known as ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy. It allows Cubans which make it to U.S. soil to follow the same procedure of becoming legal permanent residents as has been the case since the CAA came into force. Whereas migrants caught by the U.S coast guard at sea between Cuba and the U.S.A, would be repatriated to Cuba. The contradictions inherent in the ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy have been accused of incentivising migrant smuggling (Reynolds, 2011:1025). Indeed, there is no sound justification that Cubans touching U.S. land are treated differently from those interdicted at sea (Hughes and Alum, 2011:208). The ‘wet foot, dry foot’ policy does not acknowledge the paradox that those most suppressed by the single-party Cuban government are more economically restricted because of their political beliefs (Estevez, 2002:1285) and are likelier to take the cheaper migration route via the sea and therefore at higher risk to be sent back to Cuba.
Another lesser debated outcome of the 1994-1995 Cuba-U.S. Migration Accords, which accompanied the CAA revision, encompasses the United States promise ‘to accept at least 20,000 immigrants a year in exchange for Cuban government efforts to prevent citizens from leaving Cuban shores’ (Estevez, 2002:1275).
Masud-Piloto and LeoGrande put forth, that cooperation between the Clinton administration and the Cuban authorities can be accredited to the fact that above all, there was a desire to prevent another ‘Mariel boatlift’ indictment.
Currently, a majority of Cuban migrants travel to the United States via Mexico, which has been widely labeled as the ‘dusty foot’ route. Although the route is longer in both time and distance, it circumvents the U.S. Coast Guard patrols, meaning that migrants can approach any border crossing and request asylum whilst standing on U.S. soil. The greater success rate of entering the U.S. through Mexico outweighs the challenges of this more complex and more expensive route (Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009:304-5).
15 2.2.6 The Cuban-American Lobby
The strong Cuban-American lobby has influenced the United States’ foreign policy towards Cuba and ensured that fundamental policies toward Cuba such as lack of recognition, the embargo and travel restrictions remained much the same, if not tougher for decades (Haney and Vanderbush, 2005; LeoGrande, 1998).
The Cuban-American lobby consists of various groups of Cuban exiles in the United States and their descendants. Their success despite having a small population size and low concentration outside of Florida is noteworthy (World Heritage Encyclopedia, 2014)10.
Cuban emigrés used the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), an ethnic-interest group, as a platform for their voice to be heard (Hoffmann, 2008:11) and to shift public perceptions about Cuba and create anti-Castro sentiment (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:347-8). Simultaneously, the Reagan administration encouraged the emergence of the CANF and supported its growth, as a political strategy to promote its anti-Cuban foreign policy interests (Haney and Vanderbush, 1999:350).
This symbiotic relationship between the U.S. government and the Cuban-American lobby was first contravened by Obama, who promoted a new approach to Cuba from the onset. During his presidential campaign in 2007 he declared ‘We've been engaged in a failed policy with Cuba for the last 50 years, and we need to change it’.11
2.2.7 Recent Developments in Cuba
This thesis focuses mainly on U.S. policy changes regarding Cuba and Cuban-Americans, however, Cuban policy changes, are important to help explain the current trends in U.S.-Cuban migration.
10
Currently, there are seven Cuban-Americans who serve the United States Congress made up of three Senators in Florida, New Jersey and Texas, and four Representatives; three in Florida and one in New Jersey. Unsurprisingly, Cuban-American legislators hold the most seats in Florida at state-level government.
11
President Barack Obama, during a speech at a political rally in Miami’s Little Havana (August 26th, 2007).
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Cuba has upheld elusive migration policies since the 1959 revolution. Although travel laws were relaxed in January 2013, they still fall short of granting unrestricted freedom to travel. As outlined by the Lexington Institute, the 2013 Cuban Migration Reform (CMR), Decree-Law No.302, abolished the expensive exit permit12 and liberalised the treatment of Cubans who wish who wish to spend extended periods of time abroad or emigrate, or who have emigrated and wish to return. For example, Cuban travelers are only required to have a passport13 and can now stay out of the country for up to two years. Those who left illegally will no longer face difficulties to return after eight years have passed and émigres can now visit the island for up to 3 months (Peters, 2012:3).
The 2013 CMR is accountable for the steady increase in migration, which can be observed prior to December 2014. The large amount of Cuban travel to the U.S. generated in the first year after the CMR was implemented is indicative of this. The number of B-2 tourist visas issued to Cubans jumped by 82 percent; from 20,200 in 2012 to 36,787 in 2013 (Migration Policy Institute, 2015). In response to Cuba’s policy change, the U.S. State Department extended the validity of tourist visas issued to Cubans in July 2013 from six months to five years, which permit multiple entries. Previous visas were single entry only (USDOS, 2015). For specialised doctors, however, travel restrictions were brought back into force in December 2015.14
2.2.8 Post Normalisation
American policies, defining the relationship with Cuba, which have been upheld since the Cold War are changing, and the current normalisation process can be linked to what can be considered as the midst of a fifth wave of migration.
Susan Eckstein (2009), an expert on Cuban migration, points out that the differing attitudes Cubans have toward the homeland and its residents is dependent on the circumstances under which they migrated. For her analysis, Eckstein divides
12
Previously, the total cost of all the official permits needed to exit Cuba ran to around $300; 15 times the average monthly state salary (BBC, 2013).
13
It must be noted however, that $100, the approximate cost to obtain a Cuban passport is still extremely expensive in relation to the average monthly wage in Cuba which lies at around $25 (Cuban News Agency, 2015).
14
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Cuban migration into two main cohorts, based on time. They consist of ‘the Exiles’, those fleeing the changes from the old order to the new revolutionary order, and the ‘New Cubans’, those entering the United States after 1990 due to dissatisfaction with the social, political, economic, or cultural order established by the revolution (Grenier and Moebius, 2010). Duany (1999) breaks up the Cuban exodus since 1959 into four smaller stages; first the Golden Exile (1959-1962), then the Freedom Flights (1965-1973), third the Mariel boatlift (1980), and finally the balsero crisis (1994).
This research suggests a further stage of migration that could be called ‘post-normalisation’ stage. This stage consists of those Cubans who migrated to the U.S from mid-December 2014 onwards, after the declaration that the U.S. and Cuba would start the process of normalising their political relationship. The research aims to look at reasons why there have recently been an increased number of Cuban migrants. Researching trends, will be a priority to determine the most significant factors causing increased migration during the post-normalisation stage.
2.3 Migration Theory
Migration patterns change over the course of development processes. Theories are necessary to understand contemporary processes that drive migration (Massey et al., 1993 and Castles et al., 2014). However, ‘at present, there is no single, coherent theory of international migration, only a fragmented set of theories that have developed largely in isolation from one another’ (Massey et al., 1993:432). This is due to the extremely diverse nature of migration, as well as the fact that the research of migration is intrinsically interdisciplinary (Brettell and Hollifield, 2015).
Migration research highlights, that there is never one sole reason why people migrate with people from the same community, encountering a variety of reasons for migration. Cuban migration to the U.S. is no different with social, political and economic factors motivating Cubans to move to the United States throughout history (García, 1996; Ribó, 2013). There are also numerous factors which influence migration on the macro level where state policies can shape migration. This being said, governments often like to believe they can control their borders more than reality has shown (Doomernik, 2013). Migration theory highlights certain trends and
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when the number of migrants spike along a certain migration path, patterns can be analysed.
Castles et al. (2014) found that migration theory can be divided into two broad categories; theories on the impact of migration for sending and receiving countries and theories on the causes of migration processes. This study focuses on the latter, zooming in on theories pertaining to remittances and how sending and receiving governments efforts to control migration is impaired due to human agency.
2.3.1 Causes of Migration Processes
A variety of migration theories try to explain what causes migration. They encompass social, political and economic factors at all three levels of society; macro, meso and micro-levels. Although many theories tend to contradict each other, understanding which factor or factors play the most significant role in causing Cubans migration to the U.S. since December 2014 is possible using a combination of theories.
2.3.2 Functionalist Theories
Functionalist theories, which cast a positive light on migration, portray society as a system where individuals tend to go towards equilibrium (Castles, 2014; De Haas, 2008). Generally, they represent large scale migration as ‘essentially voluntary by nature’ (Richmond and Verma, 1978:4). Functionalist theory holds the idea that global differences in levels of wealth and human development is the main drive for international migration. Subsequently, the most effective way to reduce international migration is often deemed to entail reducing such differences by boosting development in poor countries (De Haas, 2010:1). Neoclassical economic theory, new economics of migration and the well-received ‘push and pull’ framework are relevant functionalist theories applied in this research.
Traditional neoclassical economics work at both macro and micro levels. The belief is that the main cause for international migration are geographic differences in the supply of and demand for labour resulting in wage disparities between sending
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and receiving countries. Governments can control migration through regulating the labour markets (Massey et al., 1993:433-434). Micro-level neoclassical economics views international migration as a decision undertaken by a rational individual, who expects to maximise income through migration to another country. Therefore, labour tends to flow from low-wage to high-wage countries, according to neoclassical theory. This causes a downward pressure on wages in the migrant receiving country and exerts an upwards pressure on the sending country until, theoretically, equilibrium is reached (Massey et al., 1994:701). In Cuba the average wage equates to approximately $25 a month (Cuban News Agency, 2015), so migration to the United States, where median household income was estimated at $53,657 in 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015), clearly flows from low-wage to high-wage. Although Cubans in the U.S. are labeled political refugees regardless of the circumstances under which they migrated, there are arguments claiming, that nowadays economic conditions, rather than political persecution are the driving force behind Cuban immigration, thereby questioning the validity of the CAA (Estevez, 2002:1282). However, the lines are blurred; Estevez brings forward the case that Cubans migrating in search of a better standard of living can also be considered refugees, escaping the economic strife experienced by Cubans largely due to the U.S. embargo (2002:1297).
The neoclassical economics theories are based on many implicit assumptions, something which has been challenged by the rise of a ‘new economics of migration’ theory. ‘A key insight of this new approach is that migration decisions are not made by isolated individual actors, but by larger units of related people - typically families or households - in which people act collectively’ (Massey et al. 1993:436). Crucially, this theory takes remittances into account as a source of income for families in the country of origin, which not only maximises income, but also minimises risk for the entire household or family.
Since the early 1990’s the flow of remittances to Cuba has significantly increased, making it a remittance-dependent country (Blue, 2004:63). Political refugees, who migrated before 1980, may be reluctant to remit. Their opposition to the government explains their disinclination, as remittances help sustain the macrolevel financial stability of Cuba (Díaz-Briquets and Pérez-López, 1997:420). Hoffman points out, that the growing importance of remittances for countries of origin actually ‘provides migrants with an extraordinary level of socioeconomic power’ (2008:10). However, recent migrants are less influenced by political
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disincentives as they ‘are more familiar with actual socioeconomic conditions in Cuba and are more likely to have immediate family members living there’ (Blue, 2004:75). Barberia (2002), however, emphasises how structural constraints, rather than individual choices, could influence remittance sending. Her findings show that Cuban state policies in regard to promoting, and U.S. policies in restricting remittances are effective to a certain degree, something which the ‘new economics of migration’ theory does not take into account.
2.3.3 Historical-Structural Theories
Contradicting functionalist theories, historical-structural theories emphasise how social, economic and political structures constrain and direct the behaviour of individuals, not towards greater equilibrium, but rather they reinforce the inequalities among developed and underdeveloped countries (Castles et al., 2014:32). Historical-structuralists postulate that underdeveloped countries are trapped by their disadvantaged position within the global geopolitical structure due to capitalist expansion (De Haas, 2007:15). In particular, the ‘dependency’ theory must be paid attention to.
The ‘dependency’ school, ‘views migration not just as detrimental to the economies of underdeveloped countries but also as one of the very causes of underdevelopment’ (De Haas, 2007:7). It classifies countries according to their degree of dependency on capital. A distinguation is made between powerful and wealthy ‘core’ societies, weak and poor ‘peripheral’ societies and ‘semi-peripheral’ societies, which display elements of both characteristics. The ‘core’ capitalist societies dominate and exploit the ‘peripheral’ societies usually for labour and resources, which results in labour following capital, rather than in the opposite direction, as functionalists believe. The United States is deemed to be a ‘core’ society and Cuba is a country in the ‘periphery’. Although the notion that the U.S. exploits Cuba for resources cannot be said to be true, after all imports and trade were cut off in 1962, the U.S. embargo prevents the economic expansion of Cuba, which ensures that Cuba remains an economically weak and dependent state. Arguably, this generates ‘a recognisable duty upon the United States to enforce the CAA as originally intended’
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(Estevez, 2002:1297), which in turn creates a mobile population that can easily make a decision to migrate (Massey, 2009).
2.3.4 ‘Push-Pull’ Framework
Both neoclassical and historical-structural migration theories fail to explain why some people from a certain country migrate and others do not, which gives rise to the ‘push-pull’ framework (Massey et al., 1993). The framework goes beyond a simple cost-benefit calculation. It refers to a migrant's personal choice to migrate based on factors which ‘push’ them out of their country of origin and factors which ‘pull’ them into the country of destination. Although this model can be traced back to the early twentieth century, Everett Lee’s (1966) comprehensive interpretation is widely referenced. He revised Ravenstein’s 19th century ‘laws on migration’, not only stressing the role of factors associated with the area of origin and destination, but he also integrates ‘intervening obstacles’, such as distance, immigration laws and physical barriers, and personal factors into a migrant's decision to migrate. De Haas doubts that the ‘push-pull’ framework can really be called a theory (2007:18) and its flaws cannot be overlooked. For example it ‘does not contrast political and economic migration, except as different negative factors pushing the migrants at the origin’ (Pedraza-Bailey, 1985), which obstructs gaining a complete understanding for the causes of migration. Nevertheless, the framework aids the research process, by outlining the many different factors which need to be considered as influential to the migration process.
2.3.5 Controlling Migration
Historical-institutional approaches to migration places emphasis on the role of the state, which ‘might lead one to think that migration could be curtailed if state strategies change’ (Castles, 2002:1150). Border controls are one of the main regulatory mechanisms of contemporary immigration policy (Vigneswaran, 2013:2). The ‘gap hypothesis’ states that the discrepancy between the goals and the actual results of national immigration policy is growing wider in major industrialised
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democracies, which causes greater public hostility towards immigrants and results in pressure on governments to adopt more restrictive policies (Hollifield et al., 2014:3). Although the ‘wet-foot, dry-foot’ extension of the CAA is a perfect example of this, the U.S. policy towards Cuban migrants is still considered lenient on the whole, undermining Castro’s attempts to control emigration. As with many authoritarian regimes, and especially prevalent within socialist states (Zolberg, 1989:412), controlling emigration is a key component in Cuban state policy for a number of reasons; including minimising human capital flight and retaining state legitimation. Albert Hirschman diverged from his initial view argues that exit and voice are mutually exclusive (1970), arguing that ‘exit’ is tantamount to ‘voting with one's feet’; it serves as an alternative to protest, which could bear unpleasant consequences (1981). Mass emigration therefore threatens the legitimacy of a country, something which is reinforced by tense international conjunctures such as the one between the United States and Cuba (Zolberg, 1989:413). Tighter control over emigration is an obvious solution; however, on many accounts it has proven to be unsuccessful.
What is interesting is that despite antagonism between Cuba and the United States, increasing cooperation emerged when it came to controlling migration (Colomer, 2000:423). The 1994-1995 migration accords being a prime example of collaboration,, to prevent the risk of a further migration crisis.
2.3.6 Meso-level Migration Theory
A simple explanation for the widening ‘gap’ between state aims and the realities of migration, illustrates clearly that governments have less power over their borders as they make out, which largely comes down to migrant human agency. Migration networks theory is the most valuable useful meso-level theory that helps explain Cuban migration to the United States. They use the concepts of social networks and globalisation to explain how migrants challenge social constraints (Castles et al., 2014).
Migrant networks have always been of importance in migration, as was first recognised by Glick Schiller, Basch and Blanc-Szanton (1992). Massey et al. define migration networks as ‘sets of interpersonal ties that connect migrants, former
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migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through bonds of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin’ (1993:448).
‘It is a common observation that migrants proceed along well defined routes toward highly specific destinations’ (Lee, 1966:54). Most scholars also agree that they play a crucial role ‘in lowering the material and psychological thresholds to migration’ (De Haas, 2008:5), as well as stimulate further migration (Bakewell et al., 2011:15-16). Perhaps just as important, ‘is the flow of knowledge back from destination to origin and, indeed, the actual recruitment of migrants at the place of origin’ (Lee, 1966:54-55). The flow of information is particularly noteworthy when considering that an authoritarian regime, which restricts access to information and a democracy, where information is more readily available, is involved. The flow of information from the U.S. to Cuba is enabled by migrant networks, who not only communicate changes in the global sphere, information, which those living in Cuba have a difficulty obtaining otherwise, but also advise when to migrate based on these changes.
2.3.7 State Relations
We are thus faced with a paradoxical situation. Reduction in international tensions makes exit from the Socialist countries more likely, but it also lessens the propaganda value of "defection", and hence leads to the treatment of people desiring to leave as ordinary immigrants, having to face severe restrictions (Zolberg, 1989:414).
Although scholars acknowledge the need to consider migration as a dynamic system where migration evolved from linkages between sending and receiving countries (Boyd, 1989; Fawcett, 1989), migration networks are the principal focus. Few scholars have recognised that research ‘on the non-people linkages in a migration system may point the way toward a more comprehensive view of the international migration process’ (Fawcett, 1989:673). ‘State-to-State Relations’ are one of the four categories of diverse linkages between countries that Fawcett includes in his conceptual framework needed for analysing migration processes. Yet, the State relationships between migrant sending and migrant receiving countries is something which is still needs to be thoroughly researched. Zolberg (1989) briefly mentions the significance of state relations in regards to migration. He predicts that a reduction of
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international tensions lowers the costs of migrating and, warns that this will be accompanied with the drawback, that migrants will be met with stricter immigration laws at the country of destination.
Although this research paper touches upon how state-state relations involving an authoritarian and democratic country impacts on migration, further research is needed. The normalisation of the U.S. Cuban relations is too fresh to allow absolute conclusions on how this impacts on migration in the long term.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Research DesignMulti-method research was applied for the research collection and analysis. Qualitative research consisting of interviews with migrants originally from Cuba, who arrived to the U.S. after December 2014, performed in Miami is used as the principal element. Qualitative research is most appropriate when searching for motivations why a certain phenomenon is happening (Creswell, 2014; Gerring, 2012; Mahoney and Goertz, 2006). In-depth interviews can provide a better insight into why Cubans are currently migrating. A statistical analysis based on questionnaires distributed in Miami to Cuban migrants, who arrived to the U.S. after December 2014, complements the interviews by attempting to ‘reproduce the paradigm of the controlled experiment in the context of an observational study’ (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006:230). The statistical analysis can identify certain trends but cannot explain causal effects and will therefore be used to back up the qualitative interviews which generalise causation of the phenomenon using case studies (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006) and a side-by-side approach (Creswell, 2014).
Despite the use of multi-method research, the research process was intended to be flexible, which is the reason why it is appropriate to say that a qualitative research design was applied. First of all, the initial hypotheses of the research should be regarded as inklings to the likely explanations for the increase in migration from Cuba to the United States, and came in useful to guide the research process, when designing the questionnaire and during semi-structured interviews, for example. The hypotheses were therefore open to scrutiny and revision, which is a characteristic of a qualitative research design (Maxwell, 2013; Glaser and Strauss, 2009). Secondly, the methodology was adaptable when particular unforeseeable situations arose. It was clear from the onset that an ‘emergent design’ (Creswell, 2014:186) would be used, as time restrictions and the distance between Amsterdam, where the researcher was based, and Miami, USA, the location of research, meant that not all possible scenarios, problems or possibilities could be fully anticipated before the completion of the research. Although connections to potential data collection sites were made
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prior to arriving to the United States, they differed to those that were ultimately utilised.
The research predominantly entailed inductive reasoning, extracted from the interviews; however the reflexivity of the researcher could explain why certain themes were examined more thoroughly. Objectivity should be strived towards to ensure validity of results, therefore the role of the researcher must always be taken into consideration, especially when qualitative data collection and analysis is involved. Different outcomes could have been deduced from decisions and interpretations made by a researcher of a different background (Creswell, 2014). The fact that the researcher had never before been in contact with Cubans who had migrated out of Cuba before data collection began, means that prior biases and assumptions were perhaps less prevalent than had someone who was themselves a Cuban migrant or was heavily involved in the migration process. Previous interaction with Cuban migrants could have compromised objectivity, but would also have undoubtedly provided valuable insider knowledge and may have eased and accelerated the research process.
3.2 Study Population
The studied population includes adults (18 years and older) originally from Cuba, who migrated to the United States in December 2014 or later. As the research was conducted in the last week of March 2016, this is the final month of entry to the U.S. included in the study population.
3.3 Study Location
The chosen location to perform the study was Miami-Dade County, Florida, for a number of reasons. Not only does Miami-Dade host the largest Cuban community, but also the Cuban population can be found in a relatively concentrated area. This explains why it was a popular target for many other academics who studied Cuban migration (Ackerman, 1996; Portes, 1984; Fagen et al., 1968). More valid comparisons to other research studies on Cuban migration can be made by choosing
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to research within the same community, albeit at a different time, which allows for some longitudinal interpretation. Furthermore, seven established refugee centers, almost exclusive to Cuban migrants are situated in Miami-Dade county were common portals for previous research (Ackerman, 1996 and Fagen et al., 1968) and also provided easy access to recently arrived Cuban refugees for this research.
Jorge Duany argues that it is a mistake to take the Cuban ethnic enclave in Miami as the prototype for the experiences of all Cubans in exile in the United States, despite it being the most predominant Cuban-American community (1999). However, conducting research in Miami still felt appropriate because it served as gateway to get in contact with the largest community in the U.S., thus it was deemed a suitable platform on which to do research which aims to highlight significant trends in contemporary Cuban migration.
The results of this study does not aim to explain why all Cubans have moved to the U.S. since December 2014, especially due to the multifaceted and diverse nature of migration, it merely wants to highlight significant trends which could explain the increased migration of Cubans to the United States in that time frame and conclusions should not simply be extrapolated to other Cuban settlements in the United States.
3.3.1 Refugee Services
Refugee service centres have been a popular portal to gain access to Cuban exiles in past research (Ackerman, 1994; Fagen et al., 1968). Although not always the same non-governmental organisation (NGO) has been used in previous research, no major differences between the seven refugee service centres in Miami were apparent apart from religious association and size of the organisation. Only two out of the seven refugee services acting in Miami were not affiliated to a church group. Youth Co-op Inc., was one of the non-religious NGOs, which made access easier in the given time-frame as less bureaucracy stood in the way of the research process.
Interviews were conducted and questionnaires were distributed at two Youth Co-op Inc. refugee service centres; at the corporate headquarter in Little Havana, and the Hialeah office. Little Havana, or in Spanish, ‘La Pequeña Habana’ where the Youth Co-op Inc. headquarter can be found is a neighbourhood in Miami which was
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named after Cuba’s capital in the 1960’s after the surge of Cubans, who fled to Miami after Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. Although a strong Cuban culture surrounds the area, especially on South West 8th street, dubbed ‘Calle Ocho’ by locals, it has in fact become much more diverse and is an established haven for newer, often poorer Hispanic migrants from other countries (Atlantic, 2016). Hialeah, on the other hand is a city in Miami-Dade County, Florida with a Cuban or Cuban-American population of over 62%. Hialeah therefore has the highest percentage of Cuban and Cuban-American residents of any city in the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000), which makes them a distinctively prominent feature of the city's culture.
3.3.2 Miami Dade College
Miami Dade State College (MDC), founded in 1959 is the largest institution of higher education in Florida, and the second-largest in the United States. What makes it so exceptional is the fact that it became Florida's first integrated junior college by enrolling African American students and Cuban exiles, who could not afford other colleges. The InterAmerican Campus, also located in Little Havana, is one of eight MDC campuses. It started out as a refugee outreach center with the aim of accommodating bilingual education. Since 2007, the InterAmerican Campus hosts The Honors College Dual Language Honors Program, a bilingual programme (English-Spanish) that tailors to the needs of the growing Spanish-speaking population in the United States. English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes are offered at the InterAmerican campus as morning and evening classes, accommodating those who work. Both qualitative and statistical data was collected at Miami Dade InterAmerican Campus. At the main Miami Dade College campus, also known as the Wolfson Campus, a Refugee/Entrant Vocational Education Services Training (REVEST) programme is held and some interviews where done there, but permission to distribute surveys at this programme was not granted.
