Bridging the gap : EU foreign policy in Georgia and Ukraine

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MASTER THESIS

POLITICAL SCIENCE

“Bridging the gap”: EU foreign policy in Georgia and Ukraine

24 JUNE 2016

IVO VAN DER HART

ANDREY DEMIDOV

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Abstract

The European Union (EU) seeks to promote stability in its neighbourhood by means of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The policy has booked some moderate successes, but has also received much criticism. Scholars have claimed that the EU’s foreign policy is “high on rhetoric” but “low on delivery”. There appears to be a discrepancy between what the EU says and what it does. This paper argues that the EU has recently started to bridge this gap. By deploying a neoclassical realist framework, I move away from the notion of the EU as a “normative power”. Instead, I propose to conceptualize the EU as a “normal power”, shifting the emphasis away from the EU’s official, highly normative discourse towards a more interest-based approach. In the course of this paper, I argue that the EU’s foreign policy decisions in regards to its neighbourhood are dictated by energy politics and constrained by its multilevel character.

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1 Introduction

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is a key part of the European Union's foreign policy. Through the ENP, the European Union (EU) works with its southern and eastern neighbours to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration, without the prospect of full EU membership. Launched in 2004, the ENP was designed to help the EU support and strengthen stability, security and prosperity in the countries closest to its borders. The EU envisioned a ring of countries, sharing the EU’s fundamental values and objectives: democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The ENP was designed to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the recently enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural co-operation (Commission, 2004). The importance of a neighbourhood policy is also highlighted in the European Security Strategy, which states that the EU's task is to "make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (Council, 2003).

A major challenge for the ENP is that the EU’s attempts at democracy promotion in its eastern neighbourhood do not align with the interests of its big and powerful neighbour, Russia. The EU’s support for democracy has on many occasions collided with Moscow’s preference for more authoritarian regimes (Nitoiu, 2014: 234). The former Soviet countries are considered by Russia to be its “sphere of influence”. Speaking on the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Russia’s defence minister asserted that Moscow’s interests in post-Soviet countries were a strategic priority. Russia would therefore “react very sharply to the export of [democratic] revolutions to the former Soviet countries” (Halbach & Eder, 2005: 7). Recent history has shown us that this was not an empty threat. Moscow has not hesitated to respond with force to democratic transitions in neighbouring countries like Georgia and Ukraine. Russia’s growing assertiveness has put the EU in a difficult position, because it poses a threat to the stability of the region, one of the key objectives of the ENP. However, the EU is not keen on opposing Russia, with whom it has close economic ties.

Although the ENP has booked some moderate successes, it is often criticized for being ineffective. Warkotsch (2006) claims that the EU’s attempts at democracy promotion in eastern Europe are “high on rhetoric” but “low on delivery”. Similarly, Nitoiu (2014) argues that the EU’s approach towards Russia and the eastern neighbourhood is characterized by a large discrepancy between what the EU says and what the EU does. This paper contradicts these findings and argues that the EU has started to bridge this so-called “consensus-expectations gap” (Toje, 2008). A comparison is made between the cases of the Russo-Georgian war (2008) and Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine (2014-present). The Georgian case provides an example of the effects of Europe’s lack of cohesiveness, whereas the Ukrainian case shows the EU’s capacity to make assertive collective decisions and stick to them. By deploying a neoclassical realist framework, this paper moves away from the notion of the EU as a “normative power”. Instead, I propose to conceptualize the EU as a “normal power”, shifting the emphasis away from the EU’s official, highly normative discourse towards a more interest-based approach. This paper argues that the EU is susceptible to systemic and material drivers of foreign policy and therefore acts in a far more self-interested and rational manner, as opposed to the conceptualisation of the EU as a normative focussed actor.

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1.1 Problem description

During the Russo-Georgian war, Russia’s actions were heavily criticized by several EU member states (the UK, Poland, the Baltic States and Hungary), the US and Ukraine. France and Germany took an intermediate position, abstaining from naming a guilty party but merely asking both parties to end the violence. One EU member state, Italy, supported Russia’s position, as did Belarus (Bennhold, 2008). Although some EU members condemned Russia’s actions in Georgia, there was no strong reaction from the EU as a whole. The division between the Eastern and Western member states prevented the EU from formulating a joint response. Some authors claim that the Western countries were unwilling to harm their relationship with Russia over “tiny and insignificant” Georgia (Malek, 2009). As a result, no sanctions were imposed and Russia’s international relations remained mostly unharmed.

The EU reacted differently to Russia’s recent military intervention in Ukraine. The EU strongly condemned Russia, accusing it of breaking international law and violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. Many EU countries, as well as the US, have implemented sanctions (Peter, 2014). Although the effectiveness of these sanctions is disputed (see Veebel & Markus, 2015), at the very least they send a message, saying that the EU will no longer tolerate Russian aggression.

1.2 Research question

The cases of Georgia and Ukraine have resulted in different EU policies towards Russia. My aim is to explore what caused these differences. This has resulted in the following research question:

“Why have the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine resulted in different EU policies towards Russia?”

This central question is followed by a set of sub-questions:  What caused the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine?

 How did the EU respond to the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine?

 What are the differences between the cases of Georgia and Ukraine?

 To what extent do the differences between the two cases account for the variation in EU policy?

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2 Design

In this chapter, I will give an overview of my research design. I will specify what type of research I will be conducting (qualitative or quantitative) and the methods I will be using.

As Flyvbjerg (2011: 313) points out, most research nowadays is problem-driven and not methodology-driven, meaning that those methods are employed that for a given problematic best help answer the research questions at hand. Often a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is used, since they both have their strengths. This research, on the other hand, will be strictly qualitative. Not only is the number of cases used (N = 2) too small for statistical comparison, I believe a qualitative research design to be the most fitting for my research purposes. The aim of this paper is to understand why the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine have resulted in different EU policies towards Russia. Through identifying the EU’s interests in both cases, I hope to discover what has caused the EU to react differently. As Maxwell (2012) indicates, for research purposes like these, qualitative studies are especially suited. Alongside understanding the particular context within which the participants act, and the influence that this context has on their actions, he distinguishes two other purposes which fit my thesis: identifying unanticipated phenomena and influences, and generating new grounded theories about the latter; and developing causal explanations (Maxwell, 2012: 19-20).

2.1 Data collection

In the next chapter we will encounter the model I will use in order to explain EU foreign policy decisions. According to this model, EU foreign policy decisions are the result of the interests the EU has and the distribution of power in the international system. These decisions are guided and constrained by domestic factors (identity; the perceptions of policymakers; and the institutional setting of the EU). Collectively, these factors should account for the differences in policy outcome. In the following chapters, I will describe the EU’s interests in both conflicts; the EU’s power position relative to Russia; the EU’s identity as a “normal” power; the way that both cases are perceived by EU makers; and the constraints that EU institutions put on the decision-making process.

Written documents provide the bulk of the data used in this paper. Since the factors mentioned above vary in nature, different types of documents are required. Both EU-Russia relations and the institutional constraints on EU decision-making are documented extensively in academic papers. These provide a reliable source of information. The EU’s identity is hard to grasp, since “identity” is an elusive concept. However, since the EU is regarded as a “normal” power in this paper, the question of identity will not be addressed. The perceptions of EU decision-makers will be derived from official statements and articles in newspapers. The EU’s interests can be difficult to pin down, since the EU is not likely to deviate from its self-perception as a normative power and will therefore not acknowledge its “real” agenda publicly.

2.2 Method of analysis

In order to answer my research question, I will compare the cases of the Russo-Georgian war and Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. Therefore, I will be conducting a qualitative comparative analysis or, more specifically, a comparative case study. Dealing with a small number of cases – usually between two and twenty – the comparative method is a preferred strategy for political and social scientists when they

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investigate institutions or other macro-political phenomena (della Porta, 2008: 202). Flyvbjerg (2011: 314) highlights the strengths of case studies: depth; high conceptual validity; understanding of context and process; understanding of what causes a phenomenon, linking causes and outcomes; and fostering new hypotheses and new research questions. These are the qualities I hope to achieve by conducting a (comparative) case study. Instead of analysing a large number of cases on a few characteristics, I will be studying two cases in depth. By looking at a multitude of dimensions, I hope to uncover the reason why these cases have resulted in different policy outcomes.

2.3 Case selection

I have selected the cases of the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and Russia’s recent military intervention in Ukraine. These two cases have some common characteristics, but triggered different responses from the EU. I am following the most-similar systems strategy, which assumes that factors common to the countries sampled are irrelevant in explaining some observed differences (della Porta, 2008: 214). Instead, I will be focusing on the variables that are different. By comparing relatively similar countries, I hope to find what caused the EU to react in different ways.

You could –successfully– argue that the cases of Georgia and Ukraine are in fact quite dissimilar and therefore cannot be labeled as “most similar”. However, I have selected them based on the characteristics these two countries share. First of all, both countries are former Soviet countries. Situated in the eastern neighbourhood, both countries are target countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and member of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Secondly, both countries are (or have been) involved in an armed conflict with Russia. And last but not least, the EU intervened or mediated between the two conflicting parties. In my opinion, these criteria provide enough common ground to make a meaningful comparison between the two countries.

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3 The EU as an international actor: theoretical background

This chapter serves as the theoretical backbone for this paper. The chapter starts with an explanation of the capability-expectations gap, followed by the introduction of my conceptualization of the EU as a “normal” power. In the third subsection I shall elaborate on my choice for a neoclassical realist perspective to analyse EU foreign policy.

3.1 The consensus-expectations gap

Hill published an influential article in 1993 on what he called Europe’s “capability-expectations gap”. In his article, he analysed the international role of the European Community (EC), the EU’s predecessor. He identified a gap between what the EC supposedly could do and what the EC was actually able to deliver. He identified three primary components of the gap: the ability to agree, resource availability and the instruments (institutions) at the EC’s disposal (Hill, 1993: 315). Hill argued that if the gap is to be closed, the notion of a European foreign policy must be grounded in demonstrated behaviour rather than potential and aspirations. For this, the EU will require credible capabilities. It is not sufficient to simply accumulate power: the political unit must also possess the institutions to mobilize them and the decision making mechanisms to command them (Hill, 1993).

Although the EU has undergone various transformations since the early 1990s, Hill’s concept is still relevant today. In his article on the topic, Toje (2008) argues that the EU today possesses the necessary capabilities and institutions, but still finds itself unable to deliver the expected foreign policies. According to him, the capabilities and operational capacity of the EU are no longer the primary factors constraining the EU as a foreign policy actor, but the lack of consensus among EU member states is (Toje, 2008: 124). He therefore chooses to use the term “consensus-expectations gap”. In the course of this paper, we will uncover whether the lack of consensus among EU member states has had a constraining effect on foreign policy decisions.

3.2 Conceptualizing EU foreign policy: the EU as a “normal” power

Many scholars have attempted to conceptualize the EU and its external action, in order to determine what is the driving force behind its foreign policy. Famous examples are the notion of Europe as a civilian power as set out by Duchêne (1972), and the concept of Normative Power Europe (NPE), introduced by Manners (2002). More recently, Aggestam (2008) has brought forward his notion of Europe as an ethical power, moving beyond Duchêne’s and Manners’ conceptualizations. Although some of these ideas have proven to be highly influential in the field of international relations and European studies, I choose to conceptualize EU foreign policy in a different, rationalist fashion. Deriving from the work of Pardo (2011), I will argue that the EU is not a civilian, normative or ethical power, but a “normal” power. Characterizing the EU as a civilian, normative or ethical power implies that most other actors should not be labelled as such because their objectives and the policies to achieve them differ. It also implies that the EU is not a normal actor. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to distinguish the EU from other powers by developing a new term to highlight what makes it different. However, the EU is not a special type of power with objectives and policies different from those of other actors. Rather, it has the same goals as other actors, and it uses a similar set of instruments (including military power) to achieve them (Pardo, 2011: 5).

There is no standard definition of what a “normal” power is. But, according to Pardo, the three most used theoretical approaches to the study of international

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relations (realism, liberalism and constructivism) agree on one point: states seek to influence the behaviour of other actors in order to increase their own security (Pardo, 2011: 6). This is what constitutes a “normal” power: an actor primarily concerned with maximizing national security by influencing other actors. Both military and non-military means are employed to achieve this goal. This is what differentiates “normal” powers from civilian, normative and ethical powers, which pursue goals other than security maximization and which do not use military power. However, there are some resemblances too, since both “normal” powers and civilian, normative and ethical powers use non-military tools to achieve their goals, such as cooperation, economic measures or norm diffusion. These are all tools that “normal” powers may deploy too and which some powers deem more preferable than military action (Pardo, 2011: 7). Pardo continues by arguing that a “normal” power does not fit into a realist, liberalist or constructivist theoretical framework. I, however, do not support this argument. Although he makes a compelling argument that these theories are not mutually exclusive, I would like to argue that a (neoclassical) realist perspective is most suitable to accommodate the concept of the EU as a “normal” power. My understanding of realism is the idea of actors (states) rationally pursuing their own interests in an international system of sovereign states (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008: 37). “Normal” powers are defined as actors who seek to maximize their own security, by influencing other actors. To me, this sounds inherently rational. Therefore, a realist perspective seems justifiable. Since realism is traditionally preoccupied with the concept of (military) power, the use of non-military tools would seem uncharacteristic. However, excluding all forms of non-military power as a means of influence would be a very narrow view of realism. Certainly, realism prioritizes power accumulation. But realists acknowledge that cooperation may also boost security by influencing the nature and scope of cooperative relationships (Pardo, 2011: 6). Using the works of Rose (1998) and Smith (2016), I will demonstrate how neoclassical realism can provide us with a framework for foreign policy analysis.

3.3 EU foreign policy from a neoclassical realist perspective

Rose (1998) distinguishes four theories of foreign policy: Innenpolitik, offensive realism, defensive realism and neoclassical realism.

The most common approach to foreign policy is the Innenpolitik theory, which assumes that foreign policy has its sources in domestic politics. Innenpolitik theories argue that internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave toward the world beyond their borders. There are many variants of the Innenpolitik approach, each favouring a different specific domestic independent variable, but they all share a common assumption, namely that foreign policy is best understood as the product of a country’s internal dynamics. To understand why a particular country is behaving in a particular way, therefore, one has to examine the preferences and configurations of key domestic actors. However, Innenpolitik theories have one serious flaw: they struggle to explain why states with similar domestic systems often act differently in the foreign policy area and why dissimilar states in similar situations often act alike (Rose, 1998: 148).

Some scholars sought to circumvent the problems posed by the Innenpolitik theory. They generated two new theories: offensive and defensive realism (Snyder, 1991). Both theories are based on the assumption that the international system is composed of unitary, rational states motivated by a desire for security. The theories differ over what incentives they assume the international system offers such states and how they are likely to respond, as well as over the degree to which they assume the tension inherent in anarchy can be modulated by other factors, such as the state of military technology (Rose, 1998: 149).

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Offensive realism assumes that, within the anarchical international system, security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximizing their relative advantage. In the offensive realist world, rational states pursuing security are prone to take actions that can lead to conflict with others. Although states often begin with a defensive motive, they are forced to think and sometimes act offensively because of the structure of the international system (Mearsheimer, 1994). Domestic differences between countries are considered to be relatively unimportant, because pressures from the international system are assumed to be strong and straightforward enough to make similarly situated states behave alike, regardless of their internal characteristics. To understand why a state is behaving in a particular way, offensive realists suggest, one should examine its relative capabilities and its external environment, because those factors will be translated relatively smoothly into foreign policy and shape how the state chooses to advance its interests (Rose, 1998: 149).

Defensive realism, on the other hand, assumes that international anarchy is less hostile. In the defensive realist world, rational states pursuing security can often afford to be relaxed. States only have to respond to external threats, which are rare. From this perspective, foreign policy is regarded as the result of rational states reacting properly to clear structural incentives, coming into conflict only in extreme circumstances. Defensive realists consider aggressive behaviour to be unnatural (Rose, 1998: 150).

Neoclassical realism claims that these perspectives all three are flawed, since they focus either on structural factors (the international distribution of power) or domestic factors. Through balancing the constrains of in the international system with the internal dynamics of the state, neoclassical realism proposes a framework for foreign policy analysis which takes into account both systemic and domestic factors (Smith, 2016: 32). The figure below displays the causal relation between these factors:

Figure 1: Smith’s (2016) neoclassical realist model for analysing the EU’s foreign policy

The independent variable in this particular model is the state’s relative power position in the international system which encourages or discourages particular action. This power position guides and constrains the EU’s foreign policy decisions (Smith, 2016: 32). In the anarchy of the international system, the most reliable break on the power of one state (or actor) is the power of other states. The term balance of power

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refers to the general concept of one or more states’ power being used to balance that of another state or group of states (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008: 43). Power (from a realists perspective) is a mix of several ingredients: natural resources, industrial capacity, moral legitimacy, the strength of the military and popular support of the government. A state’s gross domestic product (GDP) is often used to measure its power, but this is a rough indicator at best (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2008: 38). I have chosen to incorporate another independent variable: the EU’s interests. As we have read in the previous paragraph, the EU is considered to be a “normal power”, concerned with maximizing its own security. The distribution of power in the international system may show us the opportunities an actor has for achieving its goals, but it insufficiently explains why an actor makes certain foreign policy decisions.

In this neoclassical realist model, intervening variables are used to account for the important and influential role domestic-level politics has on foreign policy decisions. The domestic factors of states “channel, mediate and (re)direct” systemic pressures into foreign policy outcomes (Schweller, 2004). Three such variables have been identified by Smith (2016): the EU’s international role identity, the EU’s foreign policy decision-makers’ perceptions and the institutional constraints on the EU’s foreign policy decision-making process.

The first intervening variable is identity, specifically the international role that a state’s identity prescribes to it. The impact of identity in foreign policy formation is the most abstract and, consequently, the most difficult to measure. Identity is defined as the values, beliefs, norms and assumptions that actors prioritize in their actions. Thus, identity acts as a kind of mental framework for decision-makers, a filter which makes sense of systemic pressures and which dictates how an entity should appropriately respond. Consequently, identity plays a constricting role in foreign policy formation as it narrows the options available to decision-makers (Smith, 2016: 33). As we have read earlier, the EU is often conceptualized as a civilian, normative or ethical power. However, this paper assumes that the EU is a “normal” power: an actor who rationally pursues the maximization of its own security. Therefore, in this paper much of the influence identity (supposedly) has on foreign policy decision-making is left out of the equation.

The second intervening variable is the influence of decision-makers’ perceptions. Neoclassical realists argue that foreign policy decision-makers, whether they are politicians, military personnel or bureaucrats, make decisions that are based on their perceptions and calculations of relative power and other states’ interests and motivations (Lobell et al, 2009). Perceptions help explain why states often undertake different responses to similar situations as interpretations of systemic pressures can vary significantly. Unlike identity, the perceptions of foreign policy makers are not constricting. They provide a framework for the assessment of the options available to a state. However, this process is prone to human error (Juneau, 2013).

The third and final intervening variable is formed by the institutional constraints on the EU’s foreign policy decision-making process. Neoclassical realism holds that all states have a national security executive, comprising the head of government and the ministers and officials involved with making foreign security policy. The national security executive is charged with making the final foreign policy decision. This decision is based on both the state’s role identity and the decision-makers’ perceptions. The EU’s institutional design significantly constrains its foreign policy decisions, since multiple institutions are involved in the EU’s complex foreign policy decision-making process: the European Council, the European Commission, the Council and the EEAS. According to realism, EU foreign policy is a product of intergovernmental bargaining and therefore hindered by the consensus-expectations gap (Smith, 2016: 34).

One could argue that employing a neoclassical realist approach for the analysis of EU foreign policy might be problematic, since the EU is not a state. Though this is

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undeniably true, this paper assumes that the EU is an international actor, capable of producing a foreign policy. Whether the EU possesses enough actorness to be a foreign policy actor is a different question altogether, one that this paper shall not engage with.

4 Description of the conflicts

In this chapter, I will describe the events leading up to the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. After a brief summary of both conflicts, I will then discuss how the EU reacted to them.

4.1 Russo-Georgian war

Figure 3: map of Georgia

4.1.1 Background of the conflict

In April 1991, after the crumbling of the Soviet Union, Georgia declared independence from Russia. Ironically enough, in that same year, South Ossetia (a semi-autonomous region situated in the north-east corner of Georgia) declared its independence from Georgia, calling itself the Republic of South Ossetia. The Georgian government sought to re-establish its control over the region by force, which led to an escalation of the conflict. A war between the Georgian government and the separatists followed, lasting from 1991 to 1992 (Donaldson et al, 2005: 199). The war was ended by a Russian-brokered ceasefire, after which a joint peacekeeping force (including Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia) was established. The ceasefire agreement left South Ossetia divided into areas controlled by the Georgian government and areas controlled by the unrecognized government of South Ossetia (ICG, 2004: 3). During the same period, a second region rebelled against Georgia: Abkhazia. The region of Abkhazia lies in the north-west corner of Georgia and borders the Black Sea, making it a strategically important area. The fights between the Abkhazian separatists and the Georgian army lasted until 1993, causing thousands of Georgians to fled their homes.

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Ultimately, the Georgian troops were defeated by the insurgents. Some claim that this can be attributed to Russia’s military support of the Abkhazian troops (Gachechiladze, 1995). As a result of the war, Georgia effectively lost control of the Abkhazian region. Abkhazia has declared itself as an autonomous region (the Republic of Abkhazia), but is still internationally recognized as a part of Georgia (Cooper, 2003).

After the two wars, the situation in Georgia remained relatively stable throughout the rest of the 1990s. This period of peace and stability ended in 2003, when Georgia witnessed a pro-Western regime change, the Rose Revolution. Saakashvili was installed as the new president, who declared integration with the West as his main priority (BBC, 2012). This angered Moscow. From that moment, relations between Georgia and Russia began to deteriorate. The Russian government began a massive distribution of Russian passport to the residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia without Georgia’s permission; this “passportization” policy laid the foundation for Russia’s future claim to these territories (Van Herpen, 2014). By April 2008, the countries had reached a diplomatic crisis. Saakashvili had voiced his wish to become member of NATO. This did not land well with the Russians, who considered a possible expansion of NATO to Russia’s border a direct threat to the security of their country (Evans, 2008). After the NATO summit in Bucharest in April 2008, Russia became more aggressive and began to prepare for the invasion of Georgia, in order to stop Georgia’s accession to NATO and to bring about a regime change (Van Herpen, 2014).

4.1.2 The war

The fighting commenced on 1 August 2008, when separatists from South Ossetia began shelling Georgian villages, killing several people. The Georgian army retaliated by launching a full-scale military operation on August 7. Georgian troops took control of Tschkinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, the same day. Russia accused Georgia of “aggression against South Ossetia” and launched a large-scale land, sea and air operation against Georgia on August 8, with the stated aim of “peace enforcement” (Allison, 2008). Russian and Ossetian troops fought the Georgian army for several days throughout South Ossetia, until the Georgian troops were forced to retreat. At the same time, Russian and Abkhazian troops opened a second front (Barabanov, 2009). Unable to stop the advancing Russian, Ossetian and Abkhazian troops, the Georgian army was pushed back, all the way to the capital Tbilisi (Daily Mail, 2008). On 12 August, Russian president Medvedev announced that he had ordered to cease the “peace enforcement” operation. "The operation has achieved its goal, security for peacekeepers and civilians has been restored. The aggressor was punished, suffering huge losses," Medvedev said. He warned that Russia would be ready to respond if Georgia attacked again (Sputnik International, 2008). A peace was brokered by the French president Sarkozy, who acted on behalf of the EU. Both Saakashvili and Medvedev signed the peace plan (The Kremlin, 2008). However, the hostilities did not end immediately after the ceasefire agreement. Russian troops continued to seize and destroy military equipment, in order to demilitarize the Georgian army (Barabanov, 2009). On 8 September, Sarkozy and Medvedev signed a new agreement on a withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia. Although Medvedev agreed to pull his troops out of Georgia, a withdrawal from South Ossetia and Abkhazia was not mentioned (BBC News, 2008a). The agreement was not signed by Georgia. On 25 August, Russia had recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states (BBC News, 2008b). In response to Russia’s action, the Georgian government severed all diplomatic ties with Russia (BBC News, 2008c).

As a result of the war, Georgia lost control over the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia by Russia was

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condemned by the West (BBC News, 2008d), Russia’s international relations remained largely unharmed.

4.2 Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine

Figure 4: map of the conflict area in Ukraine

4.2.1 Background of the conflict

Similar to Georgia, Ukraine witnessed a pro-Western regime change in the early 2000s. During the Orange Revolution, which took place from November 2004 to January 2005, thousands of protesters demonstrated daily against the widespread corruption in the government (Wilson, 2009). The demonstrations erupted when several domestic and foreign election monitors reported that the results of the presidential election had been rigged by the government, in favour of candidate Viktor Yanukovych (Quinn-Judge & Zarakhovich, 2004). On 26 December 2004, Ukraine’s Supreme Court declared the results of the presidential election invalid and ordered a revote (Los Angeles Times, 2004). A second election was held, under heavy scrutiny by domestic and foreign observers. This time, Viktor Yushchenko was declared the official winner. With his inauguration on 23 January 2005 in Kiev, the Orange Revolution ended (Voronovych, 2005). During an interview, president Putin denied that the Orange Revolution would harm EU-Russia relations, despite the EU’s role in helping the pro-Russian candidate’s defeat in the Ukrainian election (Steele, 2004). However, the developments in Ukraine were monitored anxiously by the Russians.

Despite his defeat in the previous elections, Viktor Yanukovych was elected president in 2010. With his election, Ukraine’s pro-Western course came to a halt (Osborn, 2010). Although the elections were marked as fair by election monitors, his presidency was only short lived. In November 2013, Yanukovych refused to sign an association agreement with the EU but choose for closer ties with Russia instead (BBC News, 2013). Unrest swept through Ukraine again, resulting in mass protests. This

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so-called Euromaidan movement initially demanded closer ties with the EU. As the demonstrations grew bigger, protesters also began to call for the resignation of president Yanukovych and his government (Balmforth, 2013). The protests led to the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution. In February 2014, after a series of violent events involving protesters and riot police, president Yanukovych fled the country, together with many high government officials. Immediately after Yanukovych’s departure, several changes were made. A new interim government was formed, the previous constitution was restored and new presidential elections were announced (McElroy, 2014). Unsurprisingly, the Russian government refused to recognize the new interim government, calling the revolution a coup (RT News, 2014). At the end of February 2014, Russia began a covert invasion of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine, in order to protect Russia’s interests across Ukraine (Sullivan, 2014).

4.2.2 The conflict

In the aftermath of the Euromaidan movement and the Ukrainian Revolution, demonstrations by pro-Russian and anti-government groups (the anti-Maidan movement) took place in cities across the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. The ousting of Yanukovych sparked a political crisis in Crimea, where pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian supporters clashed. On 27 February, Russian troops moved into Crimea, taking control over the Supreme Council and various strategic sites. After the annexation, a pro-Russian government was installed and a referendum was held about the status of Crimea. Crimea, which has a Russian-speaking majority, voted to join Russia. Both the West and Ukraine deemed the referendum illegal (BBC News, 2016). On 17 March, following the referendum, the Supreme Council declared the independence of the Republic of Crimea. That same day, the parliament requested the Russian government to admit the breakaway republic into Russia (The Guardian, 2014). Russia officially recognised the Republic of Crimea as a sovereign and independent state and approved the admission of Crimea into Russian territory. On 18 March, Crimea and Russia sign a treaty of accession (The Kremlin, 2014).

In the same period, demonstrations by pro-Russian groups in the Donbass area of Ukraine (situated on the eastern border with Russia) escalated into an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatist forces of the self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (Grytsenko, 2014). In April 2014, both republics declared independence from Ukraine (OSCE, 2014). During the middle of 2014, the separatists were backed heavily by the Russian army. Russian paramilitaries were reported to make up for 15 to 80 percent of the combatants (Baczynska & Vasovic, 2014). In August 2014, Russian troops moved into the Donbass area, which led to a defeat of the Ukrainian army in September 2014. Western and Ukrainian officials described this as a “stealth invasion” of Ukraine by Russia (Kramer & Gordon, 2014). With help from the Russian army, the separatists from Donetsk and Lugansk managed to regain much of the territory they had lost during the military offensive by the Ukrainian government. On 5 September 2014, a ceasefire agreement (the Minsk Protocol) was signed by the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian insurgents (BBC News, 2014). However, the ceasefire agreement was often violated by both sides. The ceasefire completely collapsed in January 2015, when heavy fighting erupted all across the conflict area. A new ceasefire agreement, Minsk II, was signed on 12 February 2015 (Euronews, 2015). Despite this new ceasefire, the separatists immediately launched a new offensive, forcing the Ukrainian army out of the city of Debaltseve. After the fall of Debaltseve, the conflict reached a deadlock (Tsvetkova, 2015). Although the fighting continued, no significant territorial changes have occurred since.

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5 EU response to the conflicts

In this chapter, I will explain how the EU has responded to the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine. Since we are dealing with EU foreign policy here, I will first clarify how the EU conducts foreign policy.

5.1 EU foreign policy

The EU conducts foreign and security policy by means of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the EU’s security. The CSFP also includes a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which covers the defence, military and civilian crisis management aspects of EU policy. The EU’s foreign policy is guided by the principles defined in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009):

“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”

The EU’s foreign policy has four key aims, based on the principles from the Treaty: supporting stability, promoting human rights and democracy, seeking to spread prosperity, and supporting the enforcement of the rule of law and good governance (EEAS, n.d.). Keep in mind that this is the EU’s official narrative on foreign policy. In this paper, the EU is regarded as a rational actor who pursues its own interests. In this particular context, foreign policy is a mere tool used by the EU to serve its own interests.

5.1.1 Agenda setting, decision making and implementation

Three EU institutions are involved in the foreign policy making process: the European Council, the European Commission and the Council. The European Council, a body consisting of the heads of governments (prime ministers) and heads of state (presidents), identifies the EU’s strategic interests and determines the objectives of the CFSP. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been given formal agenda setting power. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam, only the Commission had the right of initiative (Dijkstra, 2013: 79). The Council (also known as the Council of Ministers) takes the objectives and strategic direction set out by the European Council into account and votes on actions or positions to be taken under the CFSP (EUR-Lex, n.d.). Since the CFSP is regarded as a sensitive matter, the voting has to be unanimous (The Council, n.d.).

The CFSP is implemented by the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. The High Representative, who presides over the Foreign Affairs Council, is supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service. The EEAS is active in various policy areas, such as counter-terrorism, human rights and democracy, and nuclear safety. The EEAS can deploy several foreign policy instruments, such as sanctions (EEAS, n.d.).

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5.1.2 Sanctions

Sanctions (also referred to as restrictive measures) are mainly aimed at changing the behaviour of the target (a tool for coercion), to limit its behaviour (a constraining effect), or to send the target a message (a signalling effect) (Brzoska, 2002). The EU can impose restrictive measures against third countries, individuals or entities, to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country, part of a country, government, entities or individuals. Some sanctions are imposed as a result of a Resolution adopted by the UN. The EU may also decide to impose its own measures in addition to UN sanctions or to impose sanctions autonomously (EEAS, n.d.).

5.2 EU response to the Russo-Georgian war

When the Russo-Georgian war broke out in August 2008, no wars had taken place in Europe since 1995. The EU had tried hard to maintain a stable and peaceful neighbourhood through enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), but ultimately failed to prevent an armed conflict on European soil. In the section that follows, I shall explain how the EU responded to this conflict.

As we have read in the previous chapter, a peace between Georgia and Russia was brokered by the French president, who acted on behalf of the EU. Nicholas Sarkozy was eager to act as a peace mediator, since France had the presidency of the Council at that time. Due to Sarkozy’s assertive performance, a EU monitoring mission (EUMM Georgia) was deployed rapidly to oversee the ceasefire. This benefited the EU’s credibility as international actor, through showcasing its willingness and ability to act as a reliable conflict solver and to prevent new escalations in the conflict zone (Larsen, 2012: 106). But even though France invested all diplomatic efforts in order to promote a common EU position in the conflict, it failed to brings all member states together. Officially, the EU clung to its position as a neutral mediator, refraining from naming a guilty party (Valasak, 2008). But the internal landscape of the EU was depicted by a great variety of attitudes towards the conflict. Mouritzen and Wivel (2012) use three different profiles to describe the diversity of international reactions to the Russo-Georgian war (including those of non-EU members): traditional hawks, fervent hawks and doves. The traditional hawks, the USA and Great Britain, quickly condemned Russia’s “disproportionate response”. The fervent hawks, made up by former Soviet satellite states (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Ukraine), not only condemned Russia’s behaviour but also issued heavy criticism towards the rest of the Europe for their soft reactions towards Russia. The doves, on the other hand, responded modestly, since they would not risk aggravating Russia with a strong response. Germany serves as the best example of this category, but its position was shared by several West and Central European states as well. France ended up somewhere between the hawks and doves, hoping to find a compromise among the EU member states. Mouritzen and Wivel (2012) do not mention Italy in their division, but it is worth mentioning that Silvio Berlusconi openly supported Russia’s position, since he and Putin are close allies (Bennhold, 2008). This lack of consensus among EU member states regarding the relationship with Russia eventually undermined the EU’s position as a mediator. It prevented the EU from responding adequately to developments such as the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Ossetia by Russia; the maintaining of Russian checkpoints on Georgian territory; and the stationing of Russian troops in the two breakaway republics (Oproiu, 2012: 188).

At the end of the day, Russia only faced symbolic sanctions. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) talks between the EU and Russia were suspended temporarily, until Russia withdrew its troops (European Council, 2008). Two months later, the negotiations were resumed. Perhaps the most tangible example of a sanction is the short-lived suspension of the NATO-Russia Council (Larsen, 2012: 107). After

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the conflict, the Council established an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG). In its report, the mission concludes that Georgia broke international law by attacking Tskhinvali and the Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia. By starting the war Georgia gave Russia the justification to defend its troops. However, the subsequent Russian military campaign into Georgia went far beyond the reasonable limits of defence and was deemed unnecessary and disproportionate (IIFFMCG, 2008: 22-24). Since the publication of the report, other researchers have claimed that the invasion of Georgia had been planned and provoked by Russia (Asmus, 2012; Cornell & Star, 2009).

5.3 EU response to Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine

When the peninsula of Crimea was annexed by the Russians on 18 February 2014, Russia received a storm of criticism from the international community. The EU was one of the actors that condemned Russia’s behaviour. On 1 March, just days after the Russians had moved their troops into Crimea, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton issued a statement, saying:

"I deplore today's decision by Russia on the use of armed forces in Ukraine. This is an unwarranted escalation of tensions. I therefore call upon the Russian Federation not to dispatch such troops, but to promote its views through peaceful means. […] I call on all sides to decrease the tensions immediately through dialogue, in full respect of Ukrainian and international law. The unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine must be respected at all times and by all sides. Any violation of these principles is unacceptable. More than ever, restraint and sense of responsibility are needed” (Ashton, 2014).

During the Crimean crisis, interim president of Ukraine Oleksandr Turchynov compared Russia’s military intervention to the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. He accused Russia of “provoking a conflict” and called on president Putin to withdraw his troops from Crimea (Kyiv Post, 2014). Turchynov may have drawn parallels with the Russo-Georgian war, but there are some significant differences in the way the EU has reacted to the conflicts. In 2008, the EU was represented by a decisively acting Sarkozy, who used his position as president of the Council to actively broker a peace between Russia and Georgia. At the time of the Crimean crisis, Greece had the presidency of the Council. Greece has always enjoyed excellent diplomatic relations with Russia, due to the deep cultural and religious ties between the two countries. Given their strong historical friendship, Greece’s deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Venizelos showed more constraint than his French colleague did in 2008. After a visit to Ukraine on 2 March 2014, he stated:

“The meeting gave me the opportunity to better understand the situation and to convey the Greek message as well as the European message. As the current Presidency of the European Union, and as a state, Greece supports the territorial integrity, the independence, the sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine, because we exercise a foreign policy of principles, based on respect for international law. We want there to be stability and security for all citizens. We want the transitional government to be inclusive of all the political forces and all the regions of the country. […] But the acute problem right now is the economic crisis. We are prepared to convey our proposals and views on how the international community can help Ukraine. […] Of course, all of this has to be taken against the backdrop of the tensions in Crimea. Ukrainian-Russian relations are decisive, not just for the region, but, I would say, for pan-European and global stability as well. Everything has to be approached with restraint, with

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composure, with dialogue, within the framework of international law and the existing contractual texts that link Ukraine with Russia and with the international community” (Venizelos, 2014).

Although Venizelos voices his support for the sovereignty of Ukraine, he chose to shift the attention away from the ongoing conflict by labelling the economic crisis as the most pressing matter. His call for “restraint, composure and dialogue” clearly indicates that the Greeks were unwilling to aggravate Russia. However, despite the restraint from the Greek Prime Minister, the EU decided to intervene. In the next section, I will specify which measures the EU took in hopes of resolving the conflict.

5.3.1 Non-recognition policy

The annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by Russia is seen by the EU as a violation of international law. In response, the EU has issued a policy of non-recognition. This policy consists of a broad range of measures. The goal is to demonstrate that the EU does not accept the illegal annexation, using tangible measures in addition to regular political and diplomatic action (EEAS, 2016).

In March 2014, the European Council agreed the first diplomatic measures in response to the illegal annexation of Crimea and the deliberate destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Instead of the G8 summit in Sochi, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels. Since then, Russia has been excluded from all meetings. The EU-Russia summit was also cancelled and EU member states decided not to hold regular bilateral summits. Bilateral talks with Russia on visa matters as well as on the new EU-Russia Agreement were suspended. In addition, EU countries also supported the suspension of negotiations over Russia's joining the OECD and the International Energy Agency (Council, 2015a).

Since Russia refused to withdraw its troops from Crimea and seize its military activity in the Donbass region, the EU decided to impose sanctions to put pressure of Russia. Several types of measures were taken. In March 2014, the Council issued travel bans and asset freezes against Russian and Ukrainian officials over their responsibility for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. In June 2014, the Council imposed restrictions on economic relations with Crimea. These restrictions first included an import ban on goods from Crimea and were followed by a full ban on investment and a prohibition to supply tourism services in Crimea in December 2014 (Council, 2014a). The export of supplies for certain sectors was also banned, including equipment for the prospection, exploration and production of oil, gas and mineral resources. In July and September 2014, the Council imposed economic sanctions on Russia, targeting specific economic sectors. These sanctions limit access to EU capital markets for Russian companies and financial institutes, impose a ban on the import and export of arms and reduce Russian access to certain sensitive technologies and services that can be used for oil production and exploration (Council, 2014b). In the same period, restrictions on economic cooperation between the EU and Russia were introduced. The implementation of EU bilateral and regional cooperation programmes with Russia was reassessed and certain programmes were suspended (Council, 2015a). Since the sanctions were first imposed in March 2014, they have been prolonged on various occasions and are still in place today (Council, 2014c; Council, 2015b).

5.3.2 Effectiveness of sanctions

Although the aim of this paper is not to assess the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the EU, I would like to mention that their effectiveness is contested. For instance, the sanctions have not reached the core areas of the Russian economy: the

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export of oil, gas and raw materials. Top ranking politicians were only partially targeted; president Putin and prime minister Medvedev were not included. And as a countermeasure, Russia has imposed restrictions on a wide range of products originating from the EU member states that had imposed sanctions against Russia (Dreyer & Popescu, 2014). In their paper on this topic, Veebel and Markus (2015) conclude that the sanctions imposed to force Russia to withdraw its troops have in general not been successful. According to them, the EU-sanctions imposed during the Russian-Ukrainian crisis have been more or less focused on a symbolic and communicative level and therefore function merely to persuade the European Union member states and the allies of the EU that they stand united in the international arena. It is unlikely that the sanctions against Russia could force it to change its behaviour in active way, by returning Crimea. The maximum that can be expected is to discourage Russia from further aggressive actions against other former Soviet republics (Veebel & Markus, 2015: 188).

6 Explaining the variation in policy outcome

In the previous chapters we have read how the conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine originated and how the EU has responded to both conflicts. Recapitulating, we can see several similarities between the cases of Georgia and Ukraine. Both countries are post-Soviet states, situated in Russia’s near abroad, with large Russian-speaking populations. Territories were seized: the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia came de facto under Russian control and the peninsula of Crimea was annexed by the Russians. In this chapter, I will answer the question why these conflicts resulted in different EU policies towards Russia. I will do so by identifying the distribution of power and the EU’s interests during each conflict, and the domestic factors that influenced the final foreign policy decision. With these results, I will argue if these differences in policy outcome indicate whether the EU has begun to close the consensus-expectations gap.

6.1 The Georgian case

6.1.1 Independent variables: the EU’s interests and the distribution of power

According to the causal model presented in chapter three, there are two independent variables: the EU’s interests, which fuel foreign policy decisions; and the EU’s relative power position in the international system, which encourages or discourages particular actions. In this section, I will address both variables, starting with the EU’s interest, followed by the distribution of power.

Malek (2009) wrote that the Western countries were unwilling to harm their relationship with Russia over “tiny and insignificant” Georgia. But is Georgia really that insignificant to the EU? It is positioned strategically in the Caucasus, where it forms a buffer zone between Russia and the Middle East. It borders Turkey and it has access to the Black Sea. But most importantly, Georgia has a long tradition as a transit country for the oil and gas that is found in the region (Transparency International Georgia, 2008: 5). It hosts three major pipelines: the Baku-Supsa pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan to a Black Sea port in Georgia; the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which transports oil from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean Sea; and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzorum (BTE) pipeline, which exports gas towards Turkey and Greece (Foucher & Giuliani, 2008: 3). The construction of the BTC pipeline has substantially decreased Moscow’s leverage over Azerbaijan and Georgia, allowing them to resist political and economic pressure from Russia (Baran, 2007). The pipeline has also decreased Western dependence on Middle Eastern oil, which explains US support for

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Georgia during the war with Russia in 2008 (Gearan, 2008). Since the BTC pipeline bypasses Russia, it could help the EU to diversify its energy supplies. But Georgia would only perform a small role, since it has very few natural resources of its own. It possesses no large gas or oil fields. Apart from the oil and gas that finds its way towards the EU through Georgia, the EU has little economic interests in Georgia. For the EU, trade with Georgia (who ranks 77th_{as trade partner for the EU) only accounts}

for 0,1% percent of its total trade (Commission, 2016a).

The presence of several pipelines may have given the EU an incentive to intervene, but this would be an insufficient explanation, given the limited economic interests the EU has in Georgia. We must therefore find another reason that motivated the EU to intervene during the Russo-Georgian war. The answer can be found in the realm of security. Simply put: war on European soil is a threat for the security of the EU. In 2004, the EU launched the ENP, to help the EU support and foster stability, security and prosperity in the countries closest to its borders. As part of the ENP, the EU has declared to contribute actively to the settlement of regional conflicts, since these disputes can have a negative effect on the stability of the entire region. Following this line of reasoning, one could argue that it was in the EU’s own interest to intervene when war broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008. However, Georgia’s remote position in Europe did not necessarily provide the EU with a strong incentive to act.

As Friedman (2008) argues, the Russian invasion of Georgia did not change the balance of power in the region. It had already shifted. The United States were absorbed in its own wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and distracted by potential conflicts with Iran and Pakistan. It had no strategic ground forces in reserve and was in no position to intervene in Russia’s near abroad. This opened a window of opportunity for Russia to reassert its influence, since it did not have to concern itself with the potential response of the US. The EU did not pose a threat to Russia either; since the EU does not have a standing army, military intervention would not be an option. The EU is a far bigger power in conventional terms (population, economy, military spending), but its power is severely undermined by the lack of unity among member states (Leonard & Popescu, 2007: 2). The effects this had on the final policy decision will be explained in the next paragraph. Another factor that may have impacted the EU’s relative power position was the beginning of the Eurocrisis in September 2008. The Russo-Georgian war took place in August, but it is possible that the aftermath of the conflict received little attention from the EU, as EU officials were preoccupied with the emerging crisis. Moscow has only partially implemented the peace plan, and there has been little effort on part of the EU to tackle Moscow on these issues (Paul, 2015: 37). In terms of power, Russia had a clear advantage over the EU during the Russo-Georgian war.

6.1.2 Intervening variables: perceptions and institutional constraint

The relation between the EU’s interests, the distribution of power and the foreign policy decision is moderated by two intervening variables: the perceptions of policymakers and institutional setting of the EU during the conflict. In this section, I will look at these domestic factors.

The EU’s reaction during the Russo-Georgian war was dictated mostly by the big member states (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), who have adopted a predominantly pragmatic and interest-based approach towards Russia (Larsen, 2012: 116). They are keen on maintaining a good relationship with Russia instead of isolating it, because the EU has strong economic ties with its big neighbour and it needs Russia’s support in dealing with international problems such as human trafficking and international terrorism. For that reason, France and Germany blocked Georgia’s NATO membership bid, since they feared it would aggravate Russia (Croft, 2014). When the Russo-Georgian war broke out and the EU had to formulate a response, the preferences of the smaller European states were not reflected by the final policy

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outcome. Their call for sanctions that would punish Russia for its behaviour was not backed by any of the big member states, as none of them, even Britain, were willing to run the risk of sacrificing the long-term relations with Russia over Georgia (Larsen, 2012: 116).

The way the Russo-Georgian war was perceived by the EU had a negative impact on the foreign policy decision as well. Although most member states called upon both parties to end the violence, several member states (in particular the big powers, France and Germany) refrained from naming a guilty party. The new, eastern European member states and the traditional “hawks” perceived the conflict in a different way: for them, this conflict was yet another example of Russia bullying its smaller, weaker neighbours. However, the IIFFMG report concluded in 2009 that it was Georgia who had started the war, which gave the Russians the right to defend their troops. This perception may have had a negative impact on the foreign policy decision, but the institutional setting of the EU has proven to be one of the crucial factors in influencing the final outcome. It was largely due to Sarkozy’s decisive performance that a peace was brokered between Russia and Georgia and that a monitoring mission was deployed rapidly to oversee the ceasefire. It is doubtful whether any other of the major European states in the function of EU President (such as the Czech Republic, which assumed the presidency after France) would have shown an engagement as eager as France (Larsen, 2012: 106).

6.1.3 Foreign policy decision

As mentioned in the previous chapters, a peace was brokered by the French president. Russia faced only symbolic sanctions, which were lifted after a short period of time. At the end of the day, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states received a clear message from the Russian leadership that possible accession to NATO would cause a foreign invasion and the break-up of the country. Russia made it abundantly clear that it was back as a regional power and that Western support for Georgia was hollow (Stratfor, 2013).

6.2 The Ukrainian case

6.2.1 Independent variables: the EU’s interests and the distribution of power

What interests does the EU have in Ukraine? Ukraine is, like Georgia, a target country of the ENP and member of the Eastern Partnership (EaP). This makes the country’s stability and security a direct concern for the EU, as the EU is set out to create a stable, secure and prosperous “ring of friends”. A country being torn up by war and conflict does not fit this image, which gives the EU a strong incentive to intervene.

Secondly, Ukraine is the main transit route for Russian gas that is exported to Europe. In particular, over 50% of Russian gas supplies to the EU go through pipelines in Ukraine (EU Energy Commission, n.d.). Any interruption to this supply would have serious consequences for at least a dozen EU member states. The current conflict poses a major threat to the EU’s energy supply security. In the not too distant past, disputes between the Ukrainian gas and oil company (Naftohaz Ukrayiny) and the Russian gas supplier (Gazprom) over the price of natural gas and the cost of transit led to the disruption of the gas supply to Europe. In January 2006, Russia cut off all gas supplies passing through Ukrainian territory, after a dispute that had arisen a year earlier (BBC News, 2006). Three years later, in January 2009, it happened again, resulting in supply disruptions in many European nations, with eighteen European countries reporting major drops in or complete cut-offs of their gas supplies transported through Ukraine from Russia (Reuters, 2009). In response to these

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recurring disputes, the chairman of Gazprom has stated that Russia will redirect its gas supplies to Europe bypassing Ukraine from 2019 (TASS, 2015). Although it is unlikely that the necessary infrastructure will be completed in time, the effects for the Ukrainian economy would be devastating. Ukraine earns up to 3 billion annually in transit fees, making it the country’s most lucrative export service (Sarna, 2013: 3).

In addition to being the most important transit country for Russian gas, Ukraine has its own natural gas reserves, which could help the EU diversify its gas supplies. Since 2011, Ukraine has been trying to raise its natural gas production levels in the Black Sea. In 2013, the Ukrainian government signed 50-year production sharing agreement with Shell, which paved the way for the development of Ukraine’s shale gas deposits. However, most of the gas is destined for the internal market. Despite a drop in gas consumption, Ukraine remains a major gas consumer: ranking 13th_{in the}

world and 5th_{in Europe (Sarna, 2013). Drilling for new types of gas (such as shale}

gas) will take years and will not become available until at least the start of the next decade. Until then, the EU’s dependence on Russian gas will almost certainly increase in light of declining indigenous gas production. Even beyond 2020, Russia will remain one of the largest foreign suppliers of natural gas to the EU (Pflüger, 2014). Therefore, it is in the EU’s interest to secure a stable transit route for its gas supplies.

Apart from gas, the EU has other economic interests in Ukraine. The country offers a market of 45 million consumers, and 70 percent of its arable land is made up of some of the most fertile soil in Europe, making it the breadbasket of Europe. Ukraine is the EU’s 29th _{biggest trade partner, making up for 0,8% of its total trade. The effects}

of the sanctions imposed by the EU are noticeable: imports have dropped by 7% and exports have gone down 18%, in the period 2014-2015. This has a significant impact on the Ukrainian economy, since the EU is Ukraine's largest trading partner, accounting for more than a third of its trade. The EU is also the biggest foreign investor in Ukraine (Commission, 2016b).

In 2008, Russia paid no price for its invasions of Georgia. In hindsight, this was a serious mistake, as it reinforced Russia’s belief that the West, in particular NATO and the EU, were weak and in decline (Paul, 2015: 31). Unchecked by the US or the EU, Russia’s assertiveness has only grown. And while most Western leaders agreed that Putin must be stopped, none of them wanted to engage in a direct (military) confrontation with Russia. In fact, the US government advised the interim Ukrainian government to avoid military confrontation with Moscow, when the Russian forces took over Crimea in 2014. The White House feared that if the Ukrainian military fought in Crimea, it would give Putin justification to launch greater military intervention in Ukraine, using similar logic to what Moscow employed in 2008 when Putin invaded large parts of Georgia in response to a pre-emptive attack by the Georgian government. But assuming that avoiding conflict with Moscow would temper Russia’s aggression turned out to be a miscalculation. Russian-backed separatist forces are still in control of two large Ukrainian provinces (similar to the occupation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and the fragile ceasefire between the two sides is in danger of collapsing (Rogin & Lake, 2015). Western European governments want the US to take the lead in assisting the Ukrainian army, but the US is unwilling to send its troops into combat (Saunders, 2015). Perhaps it is this inability to provide military support to Ukraine that motivated both the EU and the US to result to economic measures and implement sanctions instead.

6.2.2 Intervening variables: perceptions and institutional constraint

How did the domestic factors influence the EU’s decision to implement sanctions on Russia? The way the conflict was perceived plays an important role. In the case of the Russo-Georgian war, only some EU member states accused Russia of being the aggressor. Russia was even partially acquitted by the independent fact finding mission

Bridging the gap : EU foreign policy in Georgia and Ukraine

MASTER THESIS

POLITICAL SCIENCE