Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J.H. de Wilde

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. J.H. de Wilde

2

Index

Preface ...

p. 3

Introduction ...………... p. 4

1. Defining International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime

and International Security Sector Reform...

p. 9

1.1 International Terrorism ...

p

. 10 1.2 Transnational Organised Crime ...

p

. 13 1.3 International Security Sector Reform ...

p

. 16 1.4 Conclusion ...

p.

20

2. The Convergence Thesis:

Emerging Threat or Fashionable Security Issue? ... p. 23

2.1 Explaining the Crime-Terror Continuum ...

p.

24 2.2 The Convergence Thesis ...

p.

26 2.3 The ‘Black-Hole syndrome’ ...

p

. 27 2.4 Evaluating the Convergence Thesis ...

p

. 29 2.5 Evaluating the ‘Black-Hole syndrome’ ...

p.

33 2.6 Conclusion ...

p

. 35

3. ISSR-logic and the Convergence-Thesis:

Is there a need for structural reform? ... p. 37

3.1 Dysfunctional international security sector? ...

p.

39 3.2 The European Union and the Convergence Threat ...

p

. 41

3.2.1 The European Organised Crime Threat Assessment ...

p

. 43

3.2.2 The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report ...

p

. 44 3.3 The Black-Hole threat ...

p

. 47

3.3.1 Afghanistan ...

p

. 48

3.3.2 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ...

p.

53 3.4 The ‘Black-Hole Index’(BHI) ...

p

. 56

3.4.1 Afghanistan ...

p.

57

3.4.2 North Korea ...

p.

58

3.4.3 Afghanistan and North Korea compared ...

p.

60 3.5 Conclusion ...

p.

65

Conclusion ...

p. 67

Recommendations for ISSR ……….

p. 70

3

Preface

My Master’s thesis is the result of research into the convergence between International Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime. It provides an analysis of its implications and consequences for International Security Sector Reform. With this thesis I will complete my Master International Relations and International Organization.

The writing process of this thesis has not always been easy, and often I felt lost in the complex field of international security studies. There have been times when I felt a bit desperate and pessimistic. However, in these instances there were some people who encouraged, supported, motivated and stimulated me to complete my thesis and pushed me towards delivering a good result.

First of all I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Jaap de Wilde who was always available to provide me with vital and critical feed-back. He frequently helped me unravel my own web of thoughts and ideas and made sure that I did not lose track of the fundamentals. Most importantly he stimulated me and encouraged me to believe in myself. I believe my thesis would not be the same if it was not for his help and support. Secondly I would like to thank my friends and family who despite their endlessly returning question: “Are you finished by now?”, supported me all the way. Without them I would not have been able to write this thesis. Special words of thanks are in place for my parents, Frans and Jeanine, and my sister, Anouk, who supported me during my entire studies and functioned as my sounding board, had patience, showed genuine interest and motivated me all the way. Also my friends Klaske, Danielle and Sanne deserve a special place in this preface due to their encouragement and sympathies. I would also like to thank Stefan who patiently helped me to order my thoughts and sat with me during numerous brain-storm sessions.

I hope you will enjoy reading my thesis and it will provide you with some new and surprising insights in the field of international security.

Eva van der Veeken

4

Introduction

“Increasingly since the end of the Cold War and the subsequent decline of state sponsorship for terrorism, organised criminal activities have become a major revenue source for terrorist groups worldwide. Building on the precedent set by narco-terrorism, as it emerged in Latin America in the 1980s, the use of crime has become an important factor in the evolution of terrorism. As such, the 1990s can be described as the decade in which the crime–terror nexus was consolidated: the rise of

transnational organised crime and the changing nature of terrorism mean that two traditionally separate phenomena have begun to reveal many operational and organisational similarities. Indeed,

criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s successes and failures, meaning that it is necessary to acknowledge, and to understand the crime–

terror continuum to formulate effective state responses to these evolving, and periodically converging, threats.”

Tamara Makarenko1

Since the first manifestations of crime and terrorism, academics all over the world started to analyse both phenomena. They soon discovered the interdependent relationship between them. However, during and after the Cold War this relationship became even more interdependent than it already was. As Mary Kaldor noted in her work on ‘new wars’, after the Cold War the global security context was changing. It became harder if not impossible to separate the state from the non-state, the private from the public, the formal from the informal and what is done for political or economic motives. This meant a blurring and inapplicability of classical security concepts like war, organised crime and large-scale violations of human rights.2 In fact, the underlying nature of security threats became harder to pinpoint. This made the fight against these threats increasingly difficult. When one is not even able to indicate what the underlying causes of a problem are, a real solution is unreachable. Such a problem is defined as the ‘grey-area phenomenon’ by Max Manwaring and his conclusion was that economic, political and military threats became more and more

1

Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime-Terror Continuum: Modelling 21st Century Security Dynamics’ Global Crime Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2004 p. 1

2

5

interdependent in recent years.3 This might mean that the threats stemming from terrorism and organised crime seem to have a common basis.

Glenn Schweitzer suggests that those characteristics which, before the changing international security context, were unique once to organised crime and terrorism are quickly evaporating. Schweitzer argues that the positions of these previously polarised groups are increasingly overlapping on the continuum as both groups rely on the same global underworld infrastructure to construct and organise illegal operations.4 An example of these evaporating characteristics is given by Frank Perri who quotes Vindino about al Qaeda, “Crime is now the main source of cash for Islamic radicals.”5 This raises the question of how one would be able to find its way in this grey-area. Policy makers had to be given tools and instruments to at least find the black and white sources of the grey-area.

In 2004 Tamara Makarenko presented a model capable of explaining the new emerging threat that stems from the convergence between terrorism and organised crime. Her work moves away from traditional key assumptions in international security studies. For example she does not regard the state as the sole relevant actor in security policy. According to Makarenko, the state has lost its monopoly of violence and its full control of the security system. The state in contrast, is now one of many players that compete for control over state functions. Although the link between crime and terrorism is not a new one, the research and theoretical foundation that has emerged, in fact is. Most of the literature til Makarenko had focused primarily on the relationship between political violence and crime in the context of civil war, and not specifically between TOC and terrorism.

Makarenko’s ‘convergence thesis’ explicitly refers to the idea that criminal and terrorist groups could converge into one single entity. This entity would initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously but has the potential to transform itself into a specific terrorist or criminal entity. Makarenko highlights this grey area in which terrorism and crime converge as the most unstable and threatening point along the Crime-Terror- Continuum (CTC). At the centre of the CTC criminal and political motivations converge and are displayed in the manifestations of a single group. Transformation thus occurs to such a degree that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed. In

3

Max Manwaring, Grey Area Phenomen: Confronting the New World Disorder (Boulder 1993)

4

Ryan Clarke and Stuart Lee, ‘The PIRA, D-Company , and the Crime-Terror Nexus’ Terrorism and Political Violence Volume 20 (2008) Issue 3 p. 380

5

6

these cases, the groups no longer retain the defining points that have hitherto made them a political or criminal group.6

Makarenko’s theory on the convergence between crime and terrorism is relatively new. It’s innovative due to the way she deconstructs the threat that stems from the grey area in which crime and terrorism converge. Makarenko succeeds in analysing the threat, but fails to pay attention to the response from the international community. Security Sector Reform (SSR) is currently very “hot” in international security studies. In short, it means the need to reform the security sector of a state in order to provide better safety for its inhabitants. If there is a need for SSR, this implies an imperfect working security sector, which is not able to provide security for its people. It implies that the security sector of that state is not able to handle security threats, or even is a threat itself. The convergence between TOC and IT produces such a security threat.

Because the convergence between crime and terrorism to a great extent manifests itself on the international level, this study will take this level as a starting point. Therefore crime and terrorism are lifted to the international level. This causes for this study to deal with Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) and International Terrorism (IT) which is placed in the context of an international security sector. Is the international security sector able to deal with this threat effectively? Does it provide security for its people when it comes to this threat? In other words, is there any need for International Security Sector Reform (ISSR) regarding the threat that stems from IT and TOC?

In order to make sure that every reader understands what is meant with the most fundamental factors in one’s work is essential. Problems and misunderstanding concerning defining can cause great difficulties regarding interpretation. Therefore, the first chapter will explain what the author means when writing about the fundamental concepts. These concepts are International Terrorism (IT), Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) and International Security Sector Reform (ISSR). Al three will be analysed and based on already existing definitions, the chapter concludes with clearly established definitions.

Once it’s clear what we mean with IT, TOC and ISSR separately we need to understand how these concepts relate to each other. The second chapter starts with analysing the relationship between IT and TOC and the threat that stems from this relationship. Makarenko’s Crime-Terror-Continuum is the basis of this part of the chapter.

6

7

However, her theory will not be duplicated without critically evaluating it. The question that will concern the second chapter is: Is the convergence between IT and TOC a real considerable and new emerging international security threat or is it just an increasingly fashionable security issue due to the international trend since the terrorist attacks of 9/11? It will become apparent that the convergence threat produces two different types of threats: 1. the convergence threat itself, and 2. Black-Hole states. After clarifying the Makarenko’s convergence thesis, evaluating it and point out its loopholes, the next part of the second chapter adds ISSR to the mix. It will become apparent that the framework of ISSR is an effective tool in order to assess international security policy regarding the convergence threat.

The third and final chapter will provide a bridge between theory and practice. Having assessed the theoretical part of the convergence threat, it deals with its practical applicability and significance. In this chapter the two types of threat, and asses the policy of the international security sector regarding countering them. First of all the policy of an actor in the international security sector, Europol is reviewed. How does Europol, which says to deal with both terrorism and crime simultaneously, counter the convergence threat. Do they even acknowledge the fact that this threat is presently growing and deserves increasing attention? What do their policy documents say about the convergence threat? Does the way Europol handles the convergence threat require reform? Secondly we will look closer into the phenomenon of Black-Hole states, which Makarenko defines as the most threatening part of the crime-terror-continuum. Two different types of Black-Hole states, Afghanistan and North Korea, are chosen to function as examples.

8

9

1

Defining International Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crime

and International Security Sector Reform

However certain the facts of any science may be and however just the ideas we have formed of these facts, we can only communicate false impressions to others while we want words by which these may be properly expressed.

A. Lavoisier7

Misunderstandings, false impressions, miscommunications, dispute and even war may result from parties not having reached consensus or not understanding the meaning the other gives to certain concepts. Basic conceptual analysis needs to be the fundament on which scientific research is done, in order to avoid such problems. Therefore this chapter focuses on defining the main concepts that will be leading during this study. These concepts are International Terrorism (IT), Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and International Security Sector Reform (ISSR). The definitions that will be identified in this part will descend from a thorough analysis of already existing definitions from several other authors. What all eventual definitions will have in common is that they will be applicable at an international level and to international security issues.

7

10

International Terrorism

The search for an adequate definition of International Terrorism (IT) is still on. There continues to exist considerable uncertainty about the right context in which to put this security problem. While consensus on an adequate social science definition of terrorism is still lacking, this study tries to formulate a comprehensive definition. The concept of terrorism is being studied frequently, especially after the attack on the twin towers of 9/11 2001. People who have studies the phenomenon agree that terrorism has many dimensions, levels, causes, manifestations and definitions. In order to understand the international dimension of terrorism, we will first of all need to establish the meaning of terrorism itself. Therefore we will start with defining terrorism in general and afterwards apply this definition to an international level.

Some conceptual questions will become apparent when attempting to define terrorism. An example of such a question is what the boundary is between terrorism and other forms of political violence. Does terrorism always represents a illegitimate act or can it sometimes be justifiable? Another question is to what extent the definition of terrorism should be a broad or a narrow one. In order to answer these questions this study looks at some already existing, commonly used and significant definitions of terrorism. These definitions will be assessed and reviewed on their applicability for this study.

An example of such an already existing definition is that of The U.S. Ministry of Defence, which defines terrorism as “The unlawful use of- or threatened use of- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives”.8 A point of criticism regarding

this definition is that it is a very wide and broad definition. At the same time it excludes some objectives that may also be applicable to terrorism, like criminal motivations. Another point of criticism is that it does not separate terrorism from political violence.

The Dutch intelligence service, AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheids Dienst), tries to define terrorism in such a way that it is explicitly de-linked from political violence. They regard terrorism as “…the use of, or threatened use of, at human lives aimed violence, with the goal of accomplishing societal changes or affect political decision making.” 9 Here

terrorism is separated from political violence in that it does not only aim to influence

8

American Ministry of Defense, 1990 from B. Hoffmann, Inside Terrorism (London 1999) p. 38 (Indigo)

9 _{National Security Service, Terrorisme aan het begin van de 21}e _{eeuw: Dreigingsbeeld en positionering BVD,}

11

political decision making, but in addition makes civilian their targets. However, this definition of terrorism does not include the randomness and selectiveness that are characteristic for terrorism. It also excludes a very important form of terrorism which is political terrorism.

To my opinion a definition of terrorism should be comprehensive and include several aspects like the actors, the victims, the motivation, the nature, the targets and the environment. In practice it is hard to create a definition which includes all these aspects. Some would say that including all these elements will lead to a too narrow of a definition. However, to my opinion terrorism is such a distinctive phenomenon, that in order to properly address it, one should be aware of this distinctive nature. On the other hand, a definition of a security threat should never be too broad and should always leave room for a certain grey-area which prevents exclusion. Therefore groups and organizations which some people define as terrorists and others do not, are also included in the definition. In order to include these groups in this study, a broad definition to some extent is necessary and may possibly lead to some overlapping with for example political violence. However, at least it will not leave any security gaps and therefore will be a better solution than defining terrorism too narrowly.

The most comprehensive definition I found was that of Schmid and Jongman. On account of publishing their first definition of terrorism, after analyzing thirty-five other definitions, they received a lot of criticism from the academic community of which they made a list of thirty-three points of main comments. This new lengthy definition is a result of an attempt to accommodate all these comments and criticism, which to my opinion includes all important elements and is balanced in breadth.

12

target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending in whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought. 10

The next question is what the factors or environments are in which terrorism can be regarded as operating at an international level. As long as it is not established what “international terrorism” (IT) comes down to, the search for relationships between IT and other variables, like Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is likely to be frustrating and confusing. Defining International Terrorism (IT) may not only be important for science purposes but also for legal purposes. Any cooperation on a international level to fight or prevent terrorism should be based on a common understanding of the concept.

P. Wilkinson (1974) defines IT as “… terrorism committed outside the borders of one or all of the parties to the political conflict… when it is motivated by revolutionary objectives.” However, this definition does not include acts that do not take place across national borders, but do affect the entire international community. It also includes the revolutionary motivation on which terrorism is based. However taking the definition of terrorism of Schmid and Jongman as a starting point, this motivation is already included in the term terrorism itself. For these reasons the definition of A.P. Pierre (1976) is more comprehensive, he defines IT as “… acts of violence across national boundaries, or with clear international repercussions, often within the territory or involving citizens of a third party to a dispute.”11 To include the definition of terrorism of Schmid and Jongman in the definition of IT of Pierre, results in the definition of IT that this study will be based on:

Acts of an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—In contrast to assassination— the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending in whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sough. Taking place across national boundaries, or with clear international repercussions, often with the territory involving citizens of a third party to a dispute.

10

Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman et al., Political Terrorism. A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature (Amsterdam 1988) p. 28

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Transnational Organized Crime

In order to come up with a comprehensive and accurate definition of the concept of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), one should first of all define crime as a concept. Secondly, one should define what elements make crime to be called organized. Is it a certain scale in turnover or does the amount of people involved results in crime being organized? After defining these two concepts they can be lifted to an international level and being applied to the concept of TOC. The reason for calling such crime transnational instead of international will also be explained in the next section.

What is crime? This question trouble’s criminologist minds for decades. It is a question which is exceptionally complicated and to which many answers are possible. The description or definition of behaviour which can or cannot be considered criminal is dependent on the context in which it takes place. It is, in other words socially constructed. Most criminologists actually take the line of criminal science definitions of crime. An example of such a definition is established by Willem Adriaan Bonger, the first professor of criminology in the Netherlands. He builds on a criminal law definition of crime and distinguished two elements regarding this definition. Crime is: 1) a serious anti-social act, on which 2) the State by supplementing grief (punishment or punitive measure) reacts consciously. This would however mean that when an serious anti-social act is not punished it is regarded as not being a crime at all. Pursuing this line causes criminologist to be dependent on criminal law. As Schwendingers (1975) pointed out that criminal law definitions are expressions of existing power structures, and therefore criminologists should not presume them.12

In searching for different, already existing, definitions of crime it seems that they all mean sort of the same and most of them have some connection to criminal law. Some simple examples of such definitions are rule-breaking behaviour, committing a felony or the fact that offences are committed. However, these are all not independent definitions of crime. A independent definition should include the human grief aspect of crime. An example of such a definition is disrespectful, human- societal- or naturehostile and damaging behaviour from a egocentric, angry or negative individual- human or worldview.13 These

12

Elisabeth Lissenberg, Definities van criminaliteit. From: E.Lissenberg, S. van Ruller and R. van Swaaningen, Tegen de Regels IV. Een inleiding in de criminologie (Nijmegen 2001) p. 31-50

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definitions, however, also contain some loopholes and may be sensitive to criticism. It seems that defining crime independently from criminal law is very hard, if not impossible. The term implies a breaking of societal acceptable norms, which are converted in rules, which in turn are converted in criminal law. Therefore, the definition of crime on which this study will be based is anti-social behaviour (or acts) which violate criminal laws.

The next step is to define organized crime. Organized crime is a very complex phenomenon. It affects social, political, economical and cultural aspects of the society and therefore it is difficult to create a proper comprehensive definition. A common definition of organised crime and TOC do not even exist in national and international judicial systems. There are criminological definitions designed to both operationalize and measure organized crime. Descriptions of its attributes, its activities and the way of organization are available. Nevertheless, nowhere there is one agreed upon, comprehensive definition of one of the most prevalent manifestation of criminal activity in the world. In order to come up with a working definition of organized crime, this study uses the definition of Jay Albanese. He analyzed and reviewed several other definitions before coming up with a comprehensive definition which contained the most commonly mentioned attributes:

Organized crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained by the use of force, threat, and/ or the corruption of public officials.14

When attending to the definition of TOC I first of all explain my own adherence to the term transnational organised crime as an analytical tool for this study. I find this the best option, more appropriate than others like international and global, to attend to the elusive concept of cross-boundary organised crime. I recognize that this preference is a pragmatic principle and I also recognize the contestability of the term. However, for this study in which crime is linked with terrorism, the term transnational is the most comprehensive one which deals with all forms of crime above the national level that may be connected to International Terrorism.15

14

Jack R. Greene, The Encyclopedia of Police Science (New York 2007) p. 888

15

15

As with the concepts of crime and organised crime, there is also no consensus on the definition of transnational organised crime (TOC). In 1994 researchers defined transnational crime as including offences whose inception, prevention, and/or direct or indirect effect involving more than one country. The United Nations (UN) sought a suitable working definition in its Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. According to the UN, organised crime groups consist of more than three persons, existing for a period of time and acting in the concert of committing one or more serious crimes or offences… in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit. (Article 2 of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime)

However the definition of the UN is too narrow for this study. It is impossible to check whether or not all TOC groups and/ or organizations that will be covered consist out of more than three persons. Therefore I have chosen to lift the definition of organized crime of Albanese to a transnational level in adding the definition of transnational crime as stated above. This leads to a definition of TOC, on which this study will be based on, as:

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained by the use of force, threat, and/ or the corruption of public officials, including offences whose inception, prevention, and/or direct or indirect effect involve more than one country.

It is worth mentioning that the manifestations of TOC and IT sometimes overlap. Both groups operate frequently in cell-based structures, tend to target civilians, and use similar tactics such as kidnapping and drug dealing. 16 Furthermore, definitions merge because a growing number of extremists may feel justified in committing the criminal activities themselves, on the grounds that such acts square with their ultimate “terrorist” aims.17 However the chance of overlapping is reduced by specifically define TOC and IT at the

16

CRS Report for Congress from March 20, 2006 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33335.pdf p. 6 17

“A Taliban-linked man who allegedly sought to poison U.S. streets with millions of dollars of heroin in a deadly ‘American jihad’ has become the first person extradited from Afghanistan to face federal charges.”

16

beginning of this study. If there still is some overlapping, this will not be a problem since the convergence between the two phenomena, which is the objective of this study, already implies overlapping to a certain extent.

International Security Sector Reform

SSR has become a fashionable term amongst the scholars of security studies. However, it seems that there is no consent as to the definition of SSR. Hence a universal applied definition is missing. According to the British Department for International Development (DFID) one of the leading organizations dealing with SSR, defines ‘security sector’ as:

The military, police, gendarmerie, paramilitary and the machinery associated with assuring accessible justice, intelligence, customs enforcement and the civilian management and oversight authorities, including the Ministries of Defence and Finance.18

To speak of an international security sector, which is the level-of analysis for this study, one should add to this definition an international dimension and get rid of the national dimension which is in the inclusion of the Ministries. The international security sector would then be defined as the military, gendarmerie, paramilitary and the machinery associated with assuring accessible justice, intelligence, customs enforcement and the civilian management and oversight authorities which operates and affects the entire international community. Part of the International Security Sector are organizations such as the European Police Office (EUROPOL), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OCSE), the United Nations (UN) but also national security organizations which operate in international mission like Operation Enduring Freedom of the U.S. army in Afghanistan.

SSR implies the precondition of a dysfunctional security sector. So far SSR is mainly used linked with the security sector at a state level. However, since there is a trend towards a international security sector, one could also apply SSR at an international level. Therefore, this study uses a broad definition of SSR, in order to prevent any national or state-level basis. The UK Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) provides such a definition and

17

defines SSR as: A broad concept that covers a wide spectrum of disciplines, actors and

activities. In its simplest form, SSR addresses security related policy, legislation, structural and oversight issues, all set within recognized democratic norms and principles.19 However,

this definition is to broad and meaningless and therefore it is necessary to lift it to an international level. It is better to use the definition of SSR given by the OECD’s Guidelines on Security System and Governance Reform, which is:

SSR includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions- working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more efficient and effective and thus contributes to a well-functioning international security framework.20

Yasumtomi and Carmans see the function of SSR as being bipartite with both different but closely connected goals. The first one is to ensure that security sector authorities function efficiently and effectively. The second one is that these authorities have an effective democratic oversight over these sector’s functions. Hendrickson and Karkoszka refer to the first as the ‘operational effectiveness and efficiency aspect’ and the second as the ‘democratic governance aspect’.21

There are a lot of actors involved with SSR, which can broadly be categorized into two groups. The first one is the group of local actors. The actors in this group include individuals and institutions which truly undertake SSR. Examples of such institutions and individuals are armed forces, the police, gendarmerie, paramilitary, border police, customs and intelligence officers. The second group of actors that are involved with SSR are external donors. External donors are often the main sponsors of security sector reform, providing financial and material resources, as well as personnel. Examples of such donors are the UN, the OECD, NATO and the OCSE.

SSR provides a framework of some specific components, which can be divided into several levels of SSR. The reform of the security sector consists of three dimensions, which each have their own instruments and can operate in three different security environments. The next part discusses these separate components and finally puts them together in an ISSR-framework.

19

http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR_A_Beginners_Guide_to_SSR_v2.pdf p.5

20 _{Yasutomi, Building Local Ownership p. 8} 21

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SSR can be discussed in three dimensions: security, political and socio-economic. 1. The security dimension

As described above one of the key pillars in security sector reform agenda concerns security efficiency and effectiveness. Thus armed forces and other security forces are given direction and guidance on maintaining their basic security functions.

2. The political dimension

The political dimension encompasses the rebuilding of political authorities, rebuilding these systems that govern these authorities, establishing basic values and human rights, empowering civil society, reconciliation and achieving transitional justice. 3. The socio-economic dimension

This encompasses the reform of the socio-economic infrastructure of the security sector. 22 Each dimension of SSR has its own instruments

1. Security dimension - Defence reform - Police reform - Intelligence reform 2. Political dimension - Judicial reform - Prison reform 3. Socio-economic dimension - Right-financing

- Strengthening civilian management

SSR can be used in three different environments:

1. Post-conflict security situations

Here Security Sector Reconstruction is needed; the entire security sector lacks the operational efficiency and effectiveness as well as the democratic governance aspect 2. Transitional security situations

Here SSR’s prime goal is introducing the democratic governance aspect 3. Developed security situations

Here’s SSR’s goal is optimizing the operational efficiency and effectiveness aspect

22

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The extent of this study is limited, for that reason the focus lies primarily on the operational effectiveness and efficiency aspect of the international security sector. Secondly it only focuses on the security dimension of ISSR. This implicates that this study only analyses defence, police and intelligence reform. The principle environment on which this selective study is based is that of a developed security situation in which democratic governance already is set and consensus is reached. Figure 1 represents the entire International Security Sector Reform Framework (ISSR Framework). The specific areas of the framework on which is the objective of this study, as explained above, are coloured and positioned on the left.

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Conclusion

This chapter has provided the analytical tools that are needed for further research in the convergence between International Terrorism (IT) and Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and its International Security Sector Reform (ISSR) consequences. It is important in addressing the potential threat that emerges from the convergence, that the international community reaches consensus about definitions regarding concepts like IT and TOC. Otherwise, international justice and rule of law would not be able to operate effectively and efficiently. Not to reach consensus would imply certain scientific- and therefore policy problems. Due to the way these concepts are defined it has consequences on the way laws are framed, investigations and prosecutions are conducted, research studies are done, and, increasingly, mutual legal assistance across borders is or is not rendered. In other words, it affects the way the international security sector operates. 23 A first step in ISSR would be to reach consensus on essential security-related definitions, which in this case are International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime.

Recognizing the complexity of setting clear and sharp definitions of social concepts like International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and International Security Sector Reform one must conclude that it is actually impossible. However, it is important to have one leading actor in the international security sector which is leading for others. Ideally this is an independent organisation of experts who determine on a case-by-case basis whether or not a situation, organisation or even a state fulfils the criteria of IT and TOC. Hence we need to be realistic and acknowledge that such an institution may never be realizable.

What makes it so hard to reach consensus on these concepts? We need to take into account the fact that the international arena is consists of contradicting interests of millions of actors. Once one of these actors is being labelled by another as being terroristic or criminal, this implies a certain standpoint. Objectivity and neutrality are impossible concepts because of this complexity. Nevertheless, recognizing that reaching consensus over these concepts and especially over International Terrorism (IT) and Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) would be impossible does not mean that one should just accept such a notion but the international community should provide a platform on which debate and criticism is welcomed.

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Besides from providing an analytical tool which helps to apply intangible concepts like IT and TOC in practice, defining them also has another function for this study. When defining TOC and IT it becomes apparent that there is some overlapping between both definitions. Both definitions contain some of the same terminology. It seems that both the definitions of TOC and IT contain the use of threat and violence as instruments to reach political, ideological or criminal goals. Let us compare both definitions by highlighting their similarities and differences. Similarities are highlighted in yellow and differences are coloured red.

Internationals Terrorism contains acts of an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby—In contrast to assassination—the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence- based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending in whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sough. Taking place across national boundaries, or with clear international repercussions, often with the territory involving citizens of a third party to a dispute.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities that are in great public demand. Its continuing existence is maintained by the use of force, threat, and/ or the corruption of public officials, including offences whose inception, prevention, and/or direct or indirect effect involve more than one country.

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manifestation of violence by terrorism also has a more random and selective nature, in which its target is not necessarily linked to the final goal. Rather the victim serves as a message generator and deterrent. The victims are actually a target of terror.

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The Convergence-Thesis:

Emerging Threat or Fashionable Security Issue?

They are not al-Qaeda, they are just a Mafia

Majib Benhamiche, Algerian Militiaman24

There is a lot of vagueness and disagreement among experts, academics and policy makers regarding issues related to the convergence between International Terrorism (IT) and Transnational Organised Crime (TOC). Are IT and TOC actually converging with one another or are they only transforming in each other? Mark Galeotti states that until now, fears of an international alliance between terrorists and criminals have proven to be exaggerated. 25 Some even question if a real connection between the two even really exists.26 This chapter will try to give answers to these questions with the help of the Crime-Terror Continuum Model, of Tamara Makarenko. Especially her related convergence-thesis will function as a starting point. In 2004 Makarenko designed a model which should be capable of explaining the emerging threat of the convergence between terrorism and organised crime. In this section the Crime-Terror Continuum, and also the convergence-thesis, will be discussed and evaluated. This will finally give an answer to the most important question which will be dealt with in this chapter: Is the convergence between IT and TOC a real considerable and new

24

Frank S. Perri, ‘Evil Twins: the Crime-Terror Nexus’ The Forensic Examiner (2009) Winter p. 2

25

Louise Shelly, ‘Threat from International Organized Crime and Terrorism’ from: 1997 Congressional Hearings Intelligence and Security October 1997

26 _{Thomas M. Sanderson, ‘Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines’ Sais Review Volume}

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emerging international security threat or is it just an increasingly fashionable security issue due to the international trend since the terrorist attacks of 9/11?

Explaining the Crime-Terror Continuum

Terrorism and crime have traditionally been regarded as separate security issues, due to the perceived difference in their motivational structures and aims. Following this line of thought, terrorism has a certain ideological and political drive, in contrast to crime which is purely motivated by selfish ideals such as profit and power. This idea is what has determined state policies: national and international security and law enforcement have traditionally been separated. Nevertheless, globalization has caused the relationship between terrorism and crime to evolve into something more complex. The distinction between political and criminal violence is often blurred. Security as a result should now be viewed as a fusion of traditional and emerging threats that interact with another, and at times, converge. It is in this context that the ‘Crime- Terror Continuum’ (CTC) exists.27

Makarenko makes an interesting classification effort by placing terrorism and TOC on a continuum (see Figure 1) each existing at opposite ends of the threats spectrum based on motivation. Terrorism is motivated by ideological and political aims, while TOC has traditionally been motivated by profit-maximisation. These two seemingly separate forms of security threats move towards each other when their motivations converge. As was explained in the previous section, after the Cold War these motivations have become blurred and converted with each other.28 The crime-terror relationship is placed on a continuum by Makarenko because this illustrates that a single group can slide up and down the scale, depending on the environment in which it operates.

27

Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime- Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism’ Global Crime Vol. 6, No. 1, February 2004, p. 129-130

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Figure 1. Makarenko’s Crime-Terror Continuum

In assessing the relationship between crime and terrorism seven points on the continuum can be distinguished, which can be divided in four general groups: 1. alliances (for example FARC and Colombian drug cartels) 2. operational motivations (for example the Italian Mafia), 3. convergence and 4. the ‘Black Hole’ Thesis. Point 1 highlights the situation where two separate groups come together and alliance with one another, which implicates that crime and terror at some point share the same interests. Point 2 is based on the convergence of tactics only, whereas point 3 is based on the convergence of all group characteristics, including: motivational drives, organisational dynamics, tactics and membership composition. Point 1 up to and including point 3 strictly illustrate the relationship that exists between terrorism and organised crime as concepts. Point 4 illustrates the environment that is created when the convergence of point 3 thrives. Explained in greater detail in the next section, the ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome ensures that the most complex and extreme relationship between organised crime and terrorism is allowed to persist and may eventually take over territorial control.29

The Crime- Terror Continuum (CTC) covers many aspects of the relationship and links between TOC and IT. For example the evolution of criminal groups into terrorist organizations or vice versa, groups that are both terrorist and criminal in nature, but also the link between failed states, civil war and terrorism. It seems that when the motivation of civil war has an economic nature the convergence between IT and TOC is apparent.

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The Convergence Thesis

The ‘convergence thesis’ explicitly refers to the idea that criminal and terrorist groups could converge into one single entity which initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously; but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the opposite end of the CTC from which it began. It is the most unstable and threatening point along the CTC, where criminal and political motivations simultaneously converge and are displayed in the actions of a single group. Transformation thus occurs to such a degree “that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed. In these cases, the groups no longer retain the defining points that have hitherto made them a political or criminal group”.30

In its most basic form, the convergence thesis includes two independent, yet related components. First, there are criminal groups that display political motivations, and second terrorist groups which are equally interested in criminal profits, but ultimately begin to use their political (ideological) rhetoric as a facade for solely perpetrating criminal activities. The direct implication that ideological rhetoric may become a facade, for criminal activity is that these groups should no longer be considered terroristic, but simply be referred to as criminals. In the context of this thesis, it is important to remember that these groups are capable of sliding up and down the CTC- and depending on the environment in which they operate they are also capable of transforming themselves. This means that to understand the evolution of these entities, both criminal and political aspects must be acknowledged and analysed continuously.31

Three essential security threats can originate from the convergence point (4). In Figure 2 these points are portrayed by the letters A, B and C. The first threat is political

crime, which refers to the situation in which criminal organisations – in addition to engaging

in criminal activity – also have political aims. These groups can be distinguished from TOC organizations in general by referring to them as political criminal organisations (POCs), for example the Colombian drug cartels. These cartels profit tremendously from narcotics trade but at the same time also fight against the Colombian government for political reasons. Originally focused on criminal activities, these cartels slowly got involved into politics, and know both cannot be separated from each other anymore. The second part of the

30 _{Makarenko, ‘The Crime-Terror Continuum’ p. 131} 31

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convergence thesis is termed commercial terrorism. It generally refers to traditional terroristic groups who have engaged in criminal activities to secure funding for their operations, and now primarily or equally focus on that. An example of such an organisation is the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Although research shows that almost all terrorist groups are involved in criminal activities, the difference between “general” terrorism and commercial terrorism is that one cannot determine what their primary goal exactly is. The third and final point of the convergence thesis is called the ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome and is the epitome of the CTC. The next section will deal more specifically with this point on the CTC.32

Figure 2. Makarenko’s ‘Convergence thesis’

The ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome

The centre of the continuum specifically refers to situations in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between TOC and IT, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of criminal-terrorist groups. This is where the greatest single threat to international security is emerging from the CTC, identified as the ‘Black-Hole’. It is at this point that the convergence between criminal and political motivations within a single group allows that group to subsequently gain economic and political control over a state.33

Should this situation occur there are two prevailing environments that may threaten to emerge. First the ‘black hole’ can produce a failed state- such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia- that lacks central authority, and thus displays the characteristics of anarchy. Second the ‘black-hole’ can produce a criminal state, such as the Democratic

32 _{Idem p. 136-137}

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People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Myanmar and potentially the Russian Federation. However, according to Makarenko essential for the emergence of a ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome is a weak or failed state where the government authority, legitimacy and territorial control does not exist or has been significantly challenged to the point where the state is fragmented and therefore various components of the state become vulnerable to the relative power exerted by commercial terrorist or political crime groups.34

What these two scenarios have in common and the reason why they perfectly illustrate the most extreme point along the CTC, is that they reveal the ultimate danger of this new security threat: the creation of a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. In both aspects of the ‘black hole’ syndrome, it may be concluded that war has provided “legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to produce their positions of power and for access to resources”.35

There is a difference between ‘black-hole’ states and so-called failed states. According to Rem Korteweg state failure is not sufficient to explain the creation of these black-holes, specific comparative advantage of an area to attract terrorist groups must be taken into account. Thus, state failure alone is not enough to explain why some states are more attractive to become terrorist sanctuaries than other states. Rem Korteweg analyzes the question why some failed states tend to become terrorist sanctuaries while other states do not.36

However, the way Rem Korteweg uses the term Black-Hole states seems to differ from how Tamara Makarenko has introduced the term. With the term ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome Makarenko refers to the situations in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between transnational organized crime and terrorism, and ultimately creates a safe haven for the continued operations of convergent groups. According to Makarenko the ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome encompasses two situations: first, where the primary motivations of groups engaged in civil wars evolves from a focus on political aims; second, it refers to the

34

Idem p. 139

35

Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum’ p. 140-144

36 _{Rem Korteweg, ‘Black Holes: On Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness’ Civil Wars (2008) 10. p.}

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emergence of a ‘black hole’ state- a state successfully taken over by a hybrid group as outlined in the previous section.37

Korteweg conceptualises black-holes as areas where effective state control is jeopardised and which are inhabited by criminal, terrorist and militant non-state actors. In his studies Kortweg primarily focuses on ‘ Terrorist Black-Holes’ in which he does not really include the role of TOC, and comes up with a world map of Terrorist Black Holes (Appendix A). When introducing the term ‘Terrorist Black-Holes’, Korteweg refers to Makarenko’s Black-Hole thesis. However, her definition of a ‘Black-Hole state’ already includes the presence of terrorism in relation to TOC. The term ‘Terrorist Black-Hole’ is therefore a superfluous term which implies that the inventor did not really understand Makarenko’s meaning of the ‘Black-Hole syndrome’. Korteweg also states that the theory of black-holes is proposed as a refinement of the state failure theory, which has until now been considered the authoritarian approach for studying terrorism and state weakness. Therefore Korteweg’s studies do not really contribute to the understanding of the Crime- Terror Continuum but rather to the field of terrorism.38

Evaluating the Convergence Thesis

The basic assumption which Makarenko’s Crime-Terror Continuum is based on is the classification effort which is based on motivation. To repeat this briefly, crime is motivated by profit-maximisation and terrorism by ideology and political aims. Related to this idea is the greed-grievance debate which was introduced by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler in 2003.39 They suggest that rebellion is either motivated by greed (obtaining economic profit) or by grievance (obtaining psychological profit). Related to the classification of Makarenko crime would then be motivated by greed and terrorism by grievance. However, they also point out in that rebellion could be motivated by both at the same time. Although they find that greed considerably tends to outperform grievance. Makarenko suggests that these motivations can converge which leads to one single organization which is motivated by

37

Tamara Makarenko, ‘The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the interplay between Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism’ Global Crime Vol. 6 (2004) No. 1, p. 129-130

38

Rem Kortweg and David Ehrhardt, ‘Terrorist Black Holes. A study into terrorist sanctuaries and governmental weakness’ Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies (2005) http://www.hcss.nl/en/publication/39/Terrorist-Black-Holes;-A-study-into-terrorist-sanc.html

39 _{Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, in Oxford Economic Papers 2004, Volume}

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greed as well as by grievance. But can motivations actually converge? Can an organization have the same level of political or ideological drives as it has profit-seeking ones, or is one always of greater and fundamental importance than the other?

I agree with Phil Williams when he acknowledges the fact that in the recent global security environment it is hard to distinguish threats from each other, as is with the CTC. However one should distinguish between the essence of the organization and the instrumental use of peripheral activities. The essence of terrorism is according to Williams then, the effort to bring about political change to which he refers to as “ the use, or threat of use of anxiety- producing, extra- normal violence… which is intended to influence the attitude and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate.” Similarly, the combination of profit-seeking with the systematic use of criminal activities is the essence of organised crime and differentiates criminal enterprises from illicit business. With this notion of essence in mind it is necessary to consider the distinction between organizations and activities. The reason why this is important is because defining the essence and activities of an organization has implications for policy making aimed at fighting IT and TOC.40

This might be the crucial point of criticism of Makarenko’s Crime-Terror Continuum Model. Both international terrorists organizations and transnational criminal organizations may show some activities which implies that there is a motivation behind it which is typical for the other organization category. For example in order to finance terrorist attacks terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda invest in the smuggling of drugs which is regarded as a criminal activity. However, this does not mean that Al Qaeda’s is suddenly motivated by profit-seeking at the same extent to which it is motivated by ideology. And it is the same with criminal organizations like for example the Italian Mafia. They are known to target and kill politicians. This can is regarded as a political act of violence, so could therefore be regarded as a terrorist act. Likewise this does not mean that the Italian Mafia is suddenly motivated by ideology and political aims at the same extent to which it is motivated by profit-seeking. Rather both Al Qaeda and the Italian Mafia use instruments which are traditionally typical for the other organisation in order to achieve goals which stem from their basic motivation which is greed in the case of the Mafia and grievance to the West in the case of Al Qaeda.

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When policy makers are not aware of the importance of distinguishing motivation from action the counter-fighting of these organization may be ineffective or at least inefficient. I acknowledge Makarenko’s conclusion about the dynamic nature IT and TOC can have. To my opinion, emphasising this nature and its consequences is also the added value of the CTC Model. This is also illustrated by Ryan Clarke and Stuart Lee who challenge in their article “The PIRA, D-Company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus” Makarenko’s model. Clarke and Lee suggest that the continuum proposed by Makarenko cannot sufficiently account for the blurred distinction between categories of criminal and terrorist activities, because of their used example of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which can be placed at both sides of the continuum simultaneously. It may seem that it therefore implies the middle of Makarenko’s CTC. However the PIRA, a split off of the IRA did not become a criminal organization but rather a organization that emphasized criminal action over terrorism. PIRA is prove of Clarke’s and Lee’s view that as globalisation continues and the needs of militant/criminal groups diversify along with their suppliers, a subversive organisation may no longer be able to remain safely on one end of the spectrum and will have actually their beginnings in the black hole stage, thus arguably rendering Makarenko’s model as obsolete.41 However, the foundation and motivation of a criminal or terrorist organization will always be based more on grievance or more on greed. Therefore it is always possible to make a distinction, even though the manifestations may seem the same.

Why would the convergence between crime and terrorism than be considered a ‘new’ or ‘greater’ security threat than TOC and IT themselves already are? Is the violence more brutal, the numbers of victims or the amount of kidnappings higher? It seems that the ‘new’ security problem that stems from the merging between terrorism and crime lies elsewhere. The fact that it becomes increasingly easier for organizations to move up and down the continuum implies that the nature of organizations becomes more and more dynamic. The danger is not an absolute increase of the security threat itself, but rather the disability of the international security sector to effectively and efficiently fight both IT and TOC due to their high level of convergence. However one could ask if the level of difficulty in fighting a threat actually increases the threat? I believe it does, because policy which aims to

41

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fights both IT and TOC should keep in mind the intertwinement and interdependence between the two in order to be effective and efficient in their function.

It is important to make a clear distinction between crime and terrorism based on their motivation. The danger in perceiving an organization as both criminal and terrorist at the same time is the creation of a security gap which is hard to fill with standard law enforcement and military counter measures. This labelling may be difficult due to the resemblance they might have in manifesting themselves through the use of the same instruments. Related to this is the ‘grey-area phenomenon’ introduced by Max Manwaring and which is mentioned before. The ‘grey-area’ in this context refers to the inability to pinpoint the nature of a security problem, being political, criminal, ideological or violence without a cause. His conclusion is that economics, politics and military threats are becoming more and more interdependent.42

How should one then define an organization as criminal or as terrorist when they are the same in their actions? I believe that this depends on the way the organization is financed and where the profit is invested in. If the profit which is made with criminal activities disappears in the pockets of individuals one could say that this organization is motivated by greed and profit-maximisation, however is the profit is invested in other instruments to reach political or ideological goals this organization is motivated by grievance.

What implications does this labelling then have? With Transnational Organized Crime the policy with regard to fighting it is build around trying to minimize or even eliminate their profit. This part of international security policy has usually only a security dimension, meaning that the fighting of TOC does not have a political or socio-economic dimension since their motivation is greed. However, International Terrorism also has a deeper psychological aspect to it because it is motivated by grievance (psychological profit seeking). This implies that policy that is aimed at fighting terrorism should also have a political and socio-economic dimension. Only looking at the security dimension would not be enough since this would only fight the manifestations of terrorism and not the underlying grievances which is the generator of these manifestations. What does all of the above mean for International Security Sector Reform (ISSR) and more specifically for the reform of police, defence and intelligence? The next chapter will deal with this in more detail an tries to give an answer to the former question.

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Evaluating the ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome

Makarenko describes the ‘black-hole’ syndrome as a environment in which the convergence between crime and terrorism is fostered. However the CTC does not represent environments, or preconditions but rather manifestations of the convergence like for example commercial terrorism, which may arise from these environments. In contrast to commercial terrorism which is a manifestation of the convergence thesis, the ‘Black-Hole syndrome’ is a situation in which commercial terrorism can thrive because the state is not able (weak state) or willing (rogue state) to fight the manifestation. Therefore the ‘black-hole’ syndrome does not really fit within the theory of the crime-terror-continuum, which represents a model of manifestations in which the convergence between crime and terrorism is expressed. The convergence between IT and TOC only takes place and thrives in ‘Black-Hole’ states being rough states like North Korea or weak states like Afghanistan. The ‘Black-Hole’ syndrome represents an environment in which these manifestations thrive, but is not a manifestation itself.

If IT or TOC take place in ‘Black-Hole’ states the international security threat will increase. This is due to the fact that the ‘Black Hole’ state is either unable to fight the security threat itself or even worse is unwilling to fight the threat. The first situation occurs when the convergence between IT and TOC takes place in weak states which lack proper law enforcement or even lacks a national military. An example of such a state is Afghanistan since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1989. Afghanistan can be regarded as a ‘Black-Hole’ state for several reasons. However the main reason is that there is an absence of a central authority and therefore Afghanistan lacks a law enforcing backbone. This provided terrorist and criminal organizations with a safe haven in which they thrived and based their training camps. 43

The second situation occurs when IT and TOC take place in criminal states which does have a central authority and has a rule of law to a certain extent. The Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea is such an example. In this situation IT and TOC are also able to thrive due to the acceptance or even the support of the fostering state. This situation may even be more dangerous than the former because it is hard to fight IT and TOC when they are protected by the boundaries of a state sovereignty.44

43 _{Tamara Makarenko, ‘ The Crime-Terror Continuum’ p. 138} 44

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