INTRODUCTION
“Why do they hate us?”1 By aksing this question, President George W. Bush effectively summarized the emotions that many Americans felt after the horrific events of September 11, 2001. The attacks served as a painful reminder of the brewing anti-American sentiments througout the world, and especially the Middle East, which seemed to serve as the epicenter of these hostilities and the terrorism they invoked. Consequently, the War on Terror largely focused on the Middle East, with President Bush argueing that “as we saw in the ruins of two towers, no distance on the map will protect our lives and way of life. If the greater Middle East joins the democratic revolution that has reached much of the world, the lives of millions in that region will be bettered, and a trend of conflict and fear will be ended at its source.”2
However, the War on Terror has yet failed to bring peace and stability to the Middle East. Indeed, it only seems to have had the reverse effect, as the level of anti-American sentiments and the number of conflicts in the region only increased. Americans efforts to rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq into democratic states have resulted in nearly uncontrollable sectarian violence, and especially the invasion of Iraq seems to have opened a Pandora’s Box. Meanwhile, Iran is increasing its activities to thwart America in the region, while Tehran also seeks to develop a nuclear arsenal. Syria and Lebanon are another source of anxiety, especially since both countries support Hizbollah in its struggle with Israel. The Palestinian territories, furthermore, continue to be a scene of chaos, while prospects for peace between Israel and its neigbors are grim.
Hostility against America in the region, meanwhile, is sky-rocketing, and serves as fuel for most of these conflicts. Since the War on Terror started, these sentiments have strongly increased. In Egypt, for instance, the percentage of the population that held a negative view of America increased from seventy-six percent to a staggering ninety-eight percent in merely two years. Other countries show similar patterns.3 When comparing the popularity of Osama bin Laden and George W. Bush in Pakistan, Jordan, and Marocco, it became clear that respectively sixty-five, fifty-five and forty-five percent of the citizens had a favorable view of bin Laden, while only seven, three and eight percent held a similar
1
George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September 2001, available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html; INTERNET.
2
George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace Royal Banqueting House,” 19 November 2003, available from http://merln.ndu.edu/merln/pfiraq/archive/wh/20031119-1.pdf; INTERNET.
3
sympathy for the American President.4 Hostility against America in the Middle East is not a new phenomenon,5 but the current situation is extremely alarming due to the unprecedented high levels of anti-Americanism and the accompanying support for terrorism. In the words of Telhami, “what we’re seeing now is a disturbing sympathy with Al Qaeda coupled with resentment toward the United States, and we ought to be extremely troubled by that.”6
In order to better understand these strained relations between America and the Middle East, it is important to investigate whether the cause can be found in Washington’s own foreign policy. Indeed, when Middle Easterners were asked to describe their first thought when they heard the word “America,” an overwhelming percentage answered: “unfair foreign policy.”7 Telhami, for instance, found that fifty-nine percent of the Saudi Arabians cited American politics as their most important reason for disliking America, while only nineteen percent cited American values, and other Middle Eastern countries displayed similar percentages.8 Thus, while some have viewed the problems between America and the Middle East as “a clash of civilizations,” the cause of the friction between America and the Middle East goes beyond the merely cultural.9 Telhami explains that, “certainly there are some in the Muslim world [...] who have intolerant views, who are racist, who hate Western values broadly,” but “the central issue behind the resentment that most hold toward the United States is not American values but American policies.”10 Indeed, in my view, the political part of the problem is where the shoe pitches, and this is where many explanations and solutions to America’s precarious situation in the Middle East can be found.
To do this properly, however, it is necessary to specify the policies that invoke the most repugnance. Obviously, the chaos in Afghanistan and Iraq have not added to America’s popularity in the region, but Washington’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is also pivotal. Indeed, when the State Department formed a commission to investigate possible changes in
4
Unknown Author, “A Year After Iraq War: Mistrust of America in Europe Even Higher, Muslim Anger Persists,” (Washington DC: The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2004), available from
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/pdfs/PewSurveyIraq.pdf; INTERNET.
5
For a thorough overview of America’s relations with the Middle East, please see David W. Lesch, The Middle
East and the United States:a Historical and Political Reassessment (Boulder: Westview Press, 2007).
6
Linzer, A26.
7
Ibid., A26.
8
Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America and the Middle East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for
Peace (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 46. These figures are based on his own research and polls by Gallup and Zogby International.
9
Samuel Huntington already predicted a clash of civilizations in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). This book has been cited by many as an explanation for the current turmoil in the Middle East. His thesis has also been subject to much criticism, however. See for instance Emmanuel Todd, After the Empire (London: Constable and Robinson, 2004), 16.
10
America’s Middle East policy, they concluded that “citizens in these [Arab] countries are genuinely distressed at the plight of Palestinians and the role they perceive the United States to be playing [in the Arab-Israeli conflict].”11 Indeed, a staggering eighty-eight percent of Middle Easterners disapproved of Washington’s role in the conflict and cited it as one of their main reasons for disliking America.12 The 9/11 Commission also warned that “American policy regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” is a “dominant staple of popular commentary across the Arab and Muslim World.”13 Telhami further elaborates on this by explaining that the Arab perspective of the United States is established “through the prism of the violent events in its own neighborhood [the Arab-Israeli conflict], for which it blamed America as Israel’s supporter.” Thus, “no issue resonates with more people or does more to shape attitudes toward the Unites States than the Arab-Israeli dispute.”14 Consequently, when Middle Easterners were asked what America could do to improve its unpopularity in the region, “stop supporting Israel” was one of the most popular answers.15
And indeed, it can hardly be disputed that America’s role in the conflict is highly dubious. Throughout the sixty years that this “war without end” has lasted,16 America has structurally favored Israel, while largely ignoring the Arab side of the conflict, which has lead to what Shannon describes as “a fairly demonstrable bias in favor of Israel.”17 This already started with FDR, who considered Arabs “primitive and pagan,” while his religious beliefs resulted in a firm conviction that the Jewish people belonged in Palestine.18 Therefore, while Roosevelt realized the dangers of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine, he continued to support this cause during his presidency.19 Consequently, as Christison observes, when Roosevelt died in 1945, “U.S. support for the formation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine […] became an unalterable and unassailable pillar of policy ever after.”20
11
Edward P. Djerejian, et al. eds., “Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World,” (Washington DC: Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, 2003), available from http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf; INTERNET.
12
Telhami, 49.
13
Thomas H. Kean et al. eds., “9/11 Commission Report,” 26 July 2004, available from http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911report.pdf; INTERNET. 14 Telhami, 59. 15 Linzer, A26. 16
Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, The Middle East: War Without End? (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998).
17
Vaughn P. Shannon, Balancing Act: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 128.
18
Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 45.
19
Conrad Black, Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 1068.
20
Harry Truman continued this policy, and was the first head of state to recognize Israel in 1948. Indeed, after Tel Aviv had declared independence, it obtained Truman’s approval within eleven minutes, despite fierce opposition from the more Arabic-minded State Department. While this diplomatic gesture was not followed by significant military or economic aid, the symbolic importance remained pivotal, as the blessing of a superpower greatly changed the world’s perception of Israel’s right to exist.21 Israel thus remained grateful to Truman, who held a weakness for the Jewish state throughout his presidency.22
The Eisenhower administration showed less commitment to Israel, however. Eisenhower’s primal motivation was to keep the Middle East out of Soviet hands, and he realized that strong support for Israel would automatically cause Arab countries to seek support in Moscow, which he feared would “Sovietize the whole region, including Israel.”23 He was therefore determined to threat Israel and the Arab nations on an equal basis. In doing so, Eisenhower largely ignored the pressure of American Jews, and aimed to handle foreign policy “as though we didn’t have a Jew in America.”24
John F. Kennedy showed more affinity toward Israel, and it has often been argued that “the warm and enduring nature of the U.S.-Israeli tie essentially began with Kennedy.”25 Based on political, strategic and emotional reasons, he strongly supported Israel throughout his Presidency, and was the first to provide military aid to Tel Aviv.26 Thus, when he was assassinated, his successor Lyndon Johnson told an Israeli diplomat that “Israel had lost a great friend.” However, he promptly added: “but you found a better one.”27 Johnson illustrated this statement throughout his presidency, when he further narrowed relations between the two countries by increasing military and economic support, while also promising to guarantee Israel’s security.28
While Kennedy and Johnson thus started the special relationship between America and Israel, Richard Nixon finalized this development. This might have come unexpected, because Nixon was highly anti-Semitic in private. He once stated during one of his anti-Semitic rants
21
David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 619.
22
This mutual affection was illustrated when Isaac Halvevi Herzog, Chief Rabbi of Israel, told the President that “God put you in your mother’s womb so you would be the instrument to bring the rebirth of Israel after two thousand years.” According to an aide, “tears were running down [Truman’s] cheeks” when he heard those words. See McCullough, 620.
23
Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: President and Soldier (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 421.
24
Melvin Small, Democracy & Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Policies on U.S. Foreign Policy 1789-1994 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 99.
25
Christison, 106.
26
Clyde R. Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Congressional Research Service, 6 June 2002, 13.
27
Christison, 109.
28
that “generally speaking, you can’t trust the bastards.”29 Nevertheless, Nixon revered the Jewish state, and claimed that “Americans admire a people who can scratch a desert and produce a garden. Israelis have shown qualities that Americans identify with: guts, patriotism, idealism, a passion for freedom.”30 He was convinced that Israel depended on Washington for its survival, and without this support, he believed, “the Jews can check out of Israel and go back to Germany.”31 Consequently, according to an aide, “in every crisis Nixon stood by Israel more firmly than almost any other President save Harry Truman.”32 Nixon also channeled many dollars toward Tel Aviv, which made Israel the most important receiver of American foreign aid.33
President Ford continued the course of his predecessor, but Jimmy Carter significantly changed America’s position in the Middle East. He was the first President to openly support the creation of a Palestinian homeland, and cherished close relations with most Arab countries.34 Contrary to his predecessors, Carter was not burdened by emotions or personal sentiments toward Israel, and dealt with the Middle East in a purely intellectual way. He realized that peace in the region was a necessity, and could only be obtained by cooperation with Arabs.35 This approach resulted in the 1978 Camp David Accords, a breakthrough in the peace process that yet remains unequaled.36
This nuance lacked in the policy of Carter’s successor, however. Reagan showed an unconditional support for Israel throughout his eight years in office, because, in the words of an aide, he saw “Jews as part of the ‘us’ group in his us-against-them mind set.”37 Aside from personal sentiments, he valued Tel Aviv as a reliable partner in his crusade against communism, while his religious beliefs further convinced him that Israel’s existence should be treasured.38 This support for Israel had significant consequences for the power relations in the region. In the words of Christison, America retreated “into inaction and a closer alliance with Israel that allowed the Israelis to take the policy lead and gave them a free hand to
29
Richard Reeves, President Nixon: Alone in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 343. In private Nixon often talked about “those fucking Jews,” while describing Kissinger as “my Jew boy.”
30
Embassy of Israel in Washington D.C., “Historic quotes by American Presidents,” available from
http://www.israelemb.org/US-Israel-Relations/US-Israel-Relations_famous.htm; INTERNET.
31
Reeves (2001), 499.
32
Unknown author, “Nixon and the Jews,” Time, 1 March 1982, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922803,00.html; INTERNET.
33
Mark, 13.
34
Ashraf Ghorbal, “The Way to Perceive Peace in the Middle East,” International Security 2, no.3 (1978), 14.
35
Christison, 161.
36
For Carter’s memoirs of his involvement in the Middle East peace process, see Jimmy Carter, The Blood of
Abraham: Insight into the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1993).
37
Christison, 197.
38
proceed with settlement construction and a crackdown on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.”39
George H.W. Bush revived the peace process, though, therein enabled by the end of the Cold War and the success of the Gulf War.40 Peace and stability in the Middle East was an important aspect of his self-proclaimed “New World Order,” and Bush’s pragmatic and unemotional approach toward the region resulted in the Madrid peace conference, which eventually culminated in the Oslo Accords. Bush thereby initiated this breakthrough, albeit America had hardly participated in the negotiations.41 Oslo resulted in the Declaration of Principles, and Bill Clinton spent most his two terms trying to implement this promising document.
In doing so, however, he showed a structural preference for Israel. This became clear in his close friendship with Yitzhak Rabin, of whom Clinton said in his memoirs that “I had come to love him as I had rarely loved another man.”42 Clinton was fully committed to the peace process and strove to make it an important part of his legacy, but this was not to be the case. In the end, the peace process backfired, and Clinton blamed the Palestinians.43 This came to the surface in the last conversation between Arafat and Clinton, shortly before the latter left office, and in which Arafat called him “a great man.” Replied Clinton: “The hell I am, I’m a colossal failure, and you made me one.”44
Given these discouraging developments, George W. Bush initially showed little interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but this changed after the attacks of September 11. Realizing the importance of Arab allies in the War on Terror, Bush openly courted the Arab nations by declaring that he sought to establish a Palestinian state before the end of his second term.45 As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq turned into quicksand, however, the Arab-Israeli conflict was once again pushed into the background.
This structural favoring of Israel also shows in America’s foreign aid program, because Tel Aviv annually receives around five billion dollars from Washington.46 Even 39 Christison, 218. 40 Ibid., 264-65. 41 Shannon, 94. 42
Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 679. See also David Remnick, Reporting: Writings
from the New Yorker (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 325.
43
Shannon, 103. For an overview of Clinton’s role in the peace process, see Dennis Ross, TheMissing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004).
44
Sidney Blumenthal, The Clinton Wars (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 780.
45
Mike Allen and Glen Kessler, “Bush Goal: Palestinian State by 2009,” Washington Post, 13 November 2004, A1; Shannon, 105.
46
though Israel is a wealthy country, it thereby receives about one fifth of Washington’s foreign aid budget, and only Iraq currently receives more money.47 This further complicates power relations in the Middle East, because the five billion that Israel annually receives is higher than the GDP of most Arab nations.48 Furthermore, the Palestinian territories, which, in contrast to Israel, fully depend on foreign aid, receive only 300 million dollars from Washington, and this figure is under constant threat of reduction.49 This makes the Palestinian territories dependent on the European Union and Arab countries like Saudi-Arabia for more significant sums of money.50 America’s financial support has thus greatly benefited Israel in its conflict with Arab neighbors, seeing that America pays for about sixty percent of Israel’s military expenditures.51 One therefore has to agree with Monte Palmer when he stated that American help “facilitated Israel’s victories against its Arab foes.”52
America’s bias in the Arab-Israeli conflict has thus added to the strained power relations in the region, which has increased the number of conflicts in the region. Also, it has created a categorical antipathy against America in the Middle East, which is a significant breeding ground for terrorism.53 For instance, Ramzi Yousef, who masterminded the 1993 attacks on the World Trade Center, cited Washington’s support for Tel Aviv as his primal motivation.54 It also seems to be a crucial catalyst for Bin Laden’s crusade against America. Indeed, Rodenbeck concluded that “the notion of payback for injustices suffered by the Palestinians is perhaps the most powerfully recurrent in bin Laden's speeches.”55
Given these dramatic consequences, the question arises what factors create this unfortunate policy. While economic, strategic and ideological factors all play an important part, one should not underestimate the role of domestic politics in the creation of America’s Middle East policy. Indeed, Arthur Schlesinger jr. once commented that “the manner in which
Service, 6 June 2002, available from http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/IB85066.pdf; INTERNET; Richard Curtiss, “The Cost of Israel to U.S. Taxpayers: True Lies About U.S. Aid to Israel, Washington Report on
Middle East Affairs, available from http://www.wrmea.com/html/us_aid_to_israel.htm; INTERNET.
47
For a list of the recipients of American foreign aid, please see Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels, “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, 15 April 2004, 13.
48
For comparisons with the GDP of Arab states, see CIA World Factbook, available from
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/; INTERNET.
49
David R. Francis, “What Aid Cutoff to Hamas Would Mean,” Christian Science Monitor, 27 February 2006, available from http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0227/p17s01-cogn.html; INTERNET.
50
Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Aid to the Palestinians,” CRS Report for Congress, 2 February 2006, 5.
51
Martha Wenger, “US Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace,” Middle East Report 164/165 (1990), 14.
52
Monte Palmer, The Politics of the Middle East (Belmont: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2002), 169.
53
Mearsheimer and Walt, 65.
54
Ibid., 66.
55
Max Rodenbeck, “Their Master’s Voice,” New York Times Review of Books 53, no. 4 (2006), available from
a state conceives and conducts its foreign policy is greatly affected by its national particularities.”56 He is supported in this conclusion by Small, who noted that “domestic components lurk behind virtually every American international interaction.”57 Thus, in accordance with Stern’s statement that “understanding American foreign policy requires an understanding of the domestic politics shaping its formulation,” the domestic factors that create America’s attitude in the Arab-Israeli conflict deserve more scrutiny.58
There are several such factors. Stern, for instance, cites the fact that America is “a pluralistic society, a land of immigrants, an economic superpower, a nation with a sense of moral responsibility for events occurring elsewhere, and a country with a federal government featuring two separate but equal branches of government sharing foreign policy-making powers.”59 The latter seems especially important in the light of the Arab-Israeli conflict, because America’s bias toward Israel originates to a large extend on Capitol Hill. As Shannon points out, while the State Department has been “more sensitive to the Arab perspective,” Congress has always taken a fierce pro-Israel stand.60 Indeed, he rightly concludes that the Hill is “in lock-step behind Israel by huge margins on most any issue,” and Presidents “often chafe at such congressional assertiveness.”61
Thus, America’s position in the Arab-Israeli conflict has greatly contributed to America’s precarious situation in the Middle East. When seeking to explain or alter this unfortunate policy, the domestic forces that shape it deserve further scrutiny. Indeed, I will argue that Congress plays an important role in determining America’s foreign policy, even though this is traditionally viewed as the domain of the President. In this decision-making process, Congress is largely influenced by domestic factors, and especially interest groups play a pivotal role. Applying this to America’s position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, I will further argue that the pro-Israel lobby is extremely powerful and influential on the Hill, and this alliance between the lobby and Congress leaves no room for a balanced approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In addition, I will contend that Arab Americans are largely unable to influence Congress, which makes a more nuanced congressional view virtually impossible. However, Arab-Americans are slowly discovering their ability to influence Congress, and there is a viable foundation for improvement, albeit they cannot be expected to equal their
56
Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Cycles of American History (New York: Mariner Books, 1999), 5.
57
Small, xix.
58
CHAPTER I: CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY
To fully understand Washington’s position in the Arab-Israeli conflict, one must first turn to the process that shapes American foreign policy. The President is generally acknowledged to be, in the words of Lowi and Ginsberg, “the epicenter of foreign policy.”62 However, despite this apparent supremacy of the President, there are many other office holders and institutions that shape foreign policy, notable the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Adviser, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA.63
However, the role of Congress has largely been ignored by scholars.64 They thereby disregard the fact that Congress can exercise, in the words of Lindsay, “considerable influence on the substance of U.S. foreign policy.”65 Indeed, in my view, Congress plays a vital role in shaping American foreign policy. I will argue that the Constitution has granted the legislative branch important rights in the foreign policy arena. Although Congress took a back seat during much of American history, from the 1970s onwards, it started to make effective use of those powers. Furthermore, it currently possesses many ways to influence foreign policy, and is therefore a formidable sparring partner for the President. This has led to “neocongressional government,” which has made it impossible for every President since Carter to go it alone when it comes to foreign policy.
This tug of war between the President and the Hill goes back a long way. The Founding Fathers refused to centralize power, and thus divided the authority on foreign policy between the executive and legislative branch. Congress received a considerable share, because, as Small points out, no less than “six of the eighteen powers delegated to Congress in the Constitution relate to foreign affairs.”66 These powers often overlap with those of the President, however, and the Constitution therefore served as “an invitation to struggle.”67 Consider, for instance, that the authority to make treaties and diplomatic appointments was delegated to Pennsylvania Avenue, but the Senate needs to ratify them. The President may be Commander in Chief during wartime, but depends on Congress for a declaration of war. The White House can formulate foreign policy, but relies on the House of Representatives for money to implement the goals. Moreover, Congress’ power to “regulate commerce” with
62
Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg, American Government: Freedom and Power, 7th ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 364.
63
Ibid., 365.
64
James Lindsay, “Congress and Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters,” Political Science Quarterly 107, no. 4 (1992-1993), 607. 65 Ibid., 609. 66 Small, xiv. 67
As defined by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign
foreign nations and its “duty of oversight” can also have a profound influence on the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy.68
Beside these overlapping powers, the true “invitation to struggle” originates in the vague nature of the Constitution. As Hodgson explains, “the Founding Fathers […] left a substantial area of doubt as to where the President’s powers in policy end, and those of Congress begin.”69 James Madison and Alexander Hamilton famously quarreled over these “implied powers,” and the latter argued that the President possessed these powers in the foreign policy arena.70 Hamilton’s vision proved the most accurate, because, as Hodgson observes, “the President has taken [the] powers in foreign affairs […] which are not spelled out in the Constitution.”71 Indeed, despite, or perhaps because of, the vague nature of the Constitution, the President managed to become the most important force in American foreign policy, and Congress was condemned to a marginal role.
This rising importance of the President finalized during the 1930s and 1940s, when America became an international superpower and the Presidency was subject to various changes. Consequently, starting with Franklin Roosevelt, the Oval Office started to dominate international affairs.72 Indeed, the country expected its president to set the agenda on foreign affairs, just as the Commander in Chief was supposed to lead the nation in times of crises. Furthermore, after the involvement in two world wars, Congress was ready to expand the President’s war powers, and delegated much of its authority on foreign policy to the executive branch. This led to an “institutialization” of the Presidency, as the size of the executive branch expanded to meet its increased duties.73
These expanding and effective powers of the Presidency quickly marginalized Congress’ role in foreign policy. Even in the rare case of a confrontation, the President was often victorious, because Congress could only overrule a foreign policy veto in exceptional circumstances.74 The Supreme Court further added to Capitol Hill’s misery, and consistently favored the White House in legal disputes with the legislative branch over foreign policy.75 Congress itself also bore much of the blame, as it is divided into two chambers, two parties,
68
Ibid., 8-16 and 37-49.
69
Godfrey Hodgson, Congress and American Foreign Policy (Hertford: Stephen Austin and sons, ltd., 1979) 1.
70
Ibid., 1-2.
71
Ibid., 2.
72
Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to George W. Bush, 2d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3-4.
73
David M. Abshire, Foreign Policy Makers: President vs. Congress (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1979), 33.
74
Lindsay, 611.
75
several sub-committees, and 535 members, each with their own agenda. This obviously makes it very difficult to reach a consensus. And, as Linday points out, “lacking consensus, […] Congress will not act.”76 Thus, it often failed to seize the initiative in foreign affairs, which left the momentum to the President.
This marginalization of Congress reached its peak during the Vietnam War. Francis Wilcox effectively expressed this when he stated in 1971 that “Congress had neither the time, the patience, the machinery, nor the capacity to take an active part in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy.”77 This was to change, though, as Congress begun to realize in the early 1970s that a more assertive role in foreign policy was desirable. Indeed, the Vietnam War had shown the dramatic consequences of completely contracting out foreign policy, as Congress had done in the Gulf of Tunkin Resolution. The Watergate Affair further confronted Congress with the necessity of congressional oversight and the dangers of giving a President too much authority.78
Congress therefore started to flex its muscles in the early 1970s through a series of bills that reestablished congressional oversight.79 The 1973 War Power Act, for instance, required the White House to inform Congress within forty-eight hours after sending troops into combat, and, when lacking approval of the Hill, to end the activities within sixty days.80 The Hughes-Ryan Amendment ended the President’s freedom to spend money on covert operations on his own discretion, and required a report to Congress confirming the expenditures and their necessity in the light of American national security.81 The Nelson-Bingham Act stipulated congressional approval of arms sales exceeding $25 million.82 The Foreign Assistance Act, finally, placed human right provisions on countries that were to receive foreign aid.83 Congress’ new role quickly materialized, as it was able to pressure
76
Ibid., 612.
77
Quoted in John D. Lees, “Techniques of Congressional Oversight of Foreign Policy in the 1970s,” in Congress
and American Foreign Policy, ed. Goran Rystad (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1981), 29.
78
Goran Rystad, “From ‘the Imperial Presidency’ to ‘Neocongressional Government’? Congress and American Foreign Policy in the 1970s,” in Congress and American Foreign Policy, ed. Goran Rystad (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1981), 25.
79
Lees, 29-30.
80
Unknown author, “Congressional Control of Presidential War-Making under the War Powers Act: The status of a Legislative Veto after Chadha,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, no.5 (1984), 1218.
81
Harry G. Zeidenstein, “The Reassertation of Congressional Power: New Curbs on the President,” Political
Science Quarterly 93, no. 3 (1978), 398.
82
Vanessa P. Sciarra, “Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure,”
The Yale Law Journal 97, no. 7 (1988), 1446.
83
Nixon to end the Vietnam War with a series of what the latter referred to as “jackass amendments.”84
With the role of Capitol Hill changing, Congressmen chose a different approach toward foreign affairs. They updated their sources of information and expanded their staff to deal with their increased agenda. Also, structural reforms provided members of Congress with a more “autonomous and individualistic membership,” which enabled them to become a distinctive voice in the foreign policy.85 Instead of resisting these developments, the executive branch gradually became convinced that a more dominant Congress could benefit the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.86
After this successful bid for power in the early 1970s, I would contend that Congress currently possesses many effective, and often subtle, means to maintain their influential position in the foreign policy arena.87 For instance, there is the phenomenon of “anticipated reactions,” which means that a President will attune the introduction of a bill to the congressional mood. Knowing that a public showdown with Capitol Hill weakens its image and political capital, the White House often abandons controversial bills.88 Congress can also indirectly influence policy by changing executive structures and procedures, for instance by creating new agencies to guarantee more scrutiny in areas that Capitol Hill deems important.89
In addition, Congress can also keep the executive branch on a short leash by changing certain procedures, which results in more information, participation and influence for the Hill. Congress, for instance, provided itself with a legislative veto, can stipulate certain conditions for congressional support, and can require agencies to report on a regular basis.90 The congressional arsenal also constitutes “grandstanding,” which can include, according to Lindsay, “threats of protecting legislation, fiery speeches, and political theater.”91 In seeking this exposure, Congressmen can influence policy, public opinion, or members of the executive branch, thereby hoping to keep pressure on the White House. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent visit to Syria, for example, can be regarded as an example of this.
political power has shifted heavily in the contest of congressional vs. presidential government.” As a result, “the congressional view tends to set the limits to what the White House can attempt.”92 In my view, his analysis has withstood the hands of time, and Congress has been influential in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in every administration since the late 1970s.
Neocongressional government first surfaced during Carter’s presidency. He initially wished to by-pass Congress as much as possible, but was quickly confronted with the impossibility of this approach. This resulted in a notoriously strained relationship with the Hill, even though it was in Democratic hands. Carter managed to pull some of his foreign initiatives though Congress, but constantly had to compromise, and paid a high price for his victories.93 President Reagan also found it impossible to circumvent Congress, and complained that it was impossible to “run a foreign policy [with] a committee of 535 telling us what we can do.”94 He had to accept the facts, however, and spent much of his time lobbying Congress.95 For instance, when Reagan proposed an arms sale to Saudi-Arabia, the Senate only went along after Reagan had organized private meetings with every single member of the upper branch.96
President Bush, laurelled in international relations, found himself in a constant clinch with Capitol Hill over foreign affairs, and often used his veto power to stop what he considered “extra-constitutional attempts” by an “amateurish and sentimental” Congress to “limit his authority in the international sphere.”97 Bill Clinton encountered even more problems with Congress, and displayed an inability to work with the Hill that resembled only Carter’s awkwardness.98 He found it even more problematic to get his foreign policy enacted after the Republican landslide of 1994. Consequently, as Edwards and Wayne point out, he suffered “the lowest level of success in winning votes in Congress in modern history.”99
His successor had the luxury of a unified government, and therefore experienced few obstacles in getting his foreign policy carried out.100 Bush could even afford to neglect Congress in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, and openly declared that he did not 92 Abshire, 6. 93 Greenstein, 134-140. 94 Small, 132. 95 Reeves (2006), 60. 96 Ibid., 94. 97 Small, 157. 98
George C. Edwards and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making, 7th ed. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 338.
99
Ibid., 342.
100
intent to seek congressional approval.101 When he was finally convinced otherwise, however, Congress was unable to make a stand. Most members were concerned about the midterm elections and their possible presidential aspirations for 2004, and did not dare to get involved in such a complicated issue. As a result, it delegated all authority to the President, and produced a resolution that mirrored the Gulf of Tunkin resolution in its vagueness and ineffectiveness.102
This self-inflicted second-rate position of Congress did not last long, however, and following the Democratic victory in 2006, the Hill once again manifested itself in the foreign policy arena. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi undertook a well-publicized trip to Syria and Congress is emphatically pushing Bush to alternate his Middle East policy, while also demanding and end to the war in Iraq.103 Bush’s veto power provides a powerful response to these pleas, but he has undoubtedly lost most of his freedom of movement in the foreign policy arena. Indeed, the current level of congressional oversight and initiative has not been this high since the 1970s.104
101
Louis Fisher, “The Way We Go to War: The Iraq Resolution,” in Considering the Bush Presidency, ed. Gary L. Gregg and Mark J. Rozell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 111.
102
Ibid., 112-120.
103
Hassam M. Fattah, “Pelosi, Warmly Greeted in Syria, is Criticized by the White House,” New York Times, 4 April 2007, A6.
104
CHAPTER II: INTEREST GROUPS
It can thus be concluded that Congress has a major influence on American foreign policy. However, as domestic and foreign policy are closely intertwined on the Hill, most of the congressional foreign policy decisions are initiated by domestic factors. These include electoral politics, political parties, the constituency of Congressmen, their individual ideology, their private interests, deals with colleagues, and interest groups.105 In my opinion, especially the latter are crucial in influencing foreign policy.106 Even though interest groups have been active in American politics for a long time, they came to the foreground in the second half of the twentieth century, and increased rapidly during the 1960s and 1980s, which led to a countless number of organized interest groups.107 Smith concludes that there are currently “more interest groups […] lobbying in Washington than ever before” and that they are “lobbying more vigorously than they once did.”108 Indeed, I would contend that interest groups have a firm grip on congressional decision making, due to the successful use of multiple strategies, such as lobbying, gaining access, electoral politics and mobilizing constituents.109
Lobbying is undoubtedly the most effective way for interest groups to gain influence. In 1975 already, U.S. News&World Report rated lobbyists among the ten most powerful U.S. institutions.110 Their influence has only grown since then, especially after the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, which granted lobbyists unprecedented access to the Hill. The successful lobbyist Jack Abramoff, for instance, enjoyed such unrestricted power that it was often claimed that GOP members worked for him, instead of the other way around.111 There was a price to pay, though, and many corruption scandals led to the downfall of several influential lobbyists and Republicans.112 To end these practices, Democrats have introduced
105
Lowi and Ginsberg, 106.
106
Ibid., 308. Lowi and Ginsberg define interest groups as “a group of individuals and organizations that share a common set of goals and have joined together in an effort to persuade the government to adopt policies that will help them.”
107
Richard A. Smith, “Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 20, no 1. (1995), 89; Lowi and Ginsberg, 312.
108
Smith (1995), 103.
109
While interest groups influence both domestic and foreign policy, this paper will focus solely on their influence regarding the latter category.
110
Russell Warren Howe and Sarah Hays Trott, The Power Peddlers: How Lobbyists Mold America’s Foreign
Policy (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1977), 5. For another cohesive, although outdated, account on lobbying, please see Unknown author, “The Swarming Lobbyists,” Time, 7 August 1978, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,948209-1,00.html; INTERNET.
111
Karen Tumulty, “The Man Who Bought Washington,” Time, 8 January 2006, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1147156-1,00.html; INTERNET.
112
an extensive lobbying reform bill to Congress, but it has little change to succeed.113 Indeed, lobbyists yearly contribute $2,5 billion to Congressmen,114 and, in the words of Bacon, “Congress has never been known to bite the hand that feeds it.”115
It is often argued that lobbyists have little success in changing Congress’ mind, because they would primarily focus on Congressmen that already sympathize with their cause. This claim does not correspond with the facts, though. Smith, for instance, concludes that “lobbyists may be more capable of influencing the decisions and actions of members of Congress than conventional wisdom would suggest.”116 He explains that Congressmen can interpret situations in different ways, depending on the circumstances. Alternating, or framing, their perspective on a certain bill can hence create a change in their voting behavior.117 Lobbyists are also highly successful in counteractive lobbying, which is aimed at changing the minds of congressmen who are either uncommitted or likely to vote against a certain interest.118 Smith thus reaches the conclusion that lobbyists can shift “thirty to forty votes in the House of Representatives.”119 Especially in a closely divided Congress, such margins can alter the outcome of roll call votes.
Financial contributions by interest groups also explain their firm grip on the power structures of the Hill. They contribute through Political Action Committee’s (PACs), which are, as defined by Hersey, “political groups, other than party organizations, whose purpose is to raise and spend money to influence elections.”120 When campaign finance got out of control in the 1970s, the federal government aimed to restrict it through the Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA). This act contained many loopholes, however, and turned PACs into the most lucrative way to obtain campaign finance. This resulted in an explosive growth in the number of PACs; their number has risen from 608 in 1974 to 4037 thirty years later.121
Currently, PACs provide a large segment of the money for congressional elections. For instance, in the 2002 elections, PACs contributed over thirty-nine percent of the money
113
Charles Babington, “Lobbying Reform Losing Steam in The House,” The Washington Post, 11 May 2007, available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/11/AR2007051101237.html; INTERNET.
114
Data available from http://www.opensecrets.org/lobbyists/index.asp; INTERNET.
115
Perry Bacon jr., “Lobbying Reform: Limping Along,” Time, 9 March 2006, available from
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1171357,00.html; INTERNET.
116
Smith (1995), 97.
117
Richard A. Smith, “Advocacy, Interpretation and Influence on U.S. Congress,” The American Political
Science Review 78, no 1. (1984), 44.
118
David Austen-Smith and John R. Wright, “Counteractive Lobbying,” American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 1 (1994), 25.
119
Smith (1995), 99.
120
Marjorie Randon Hershey, Party Politics in America, 11 ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 2005), 221.
121
spent by congressional candidates.122 This has greatly improved the importance of interest groups on the Hill, because, in the words of Calabresi, “members of Congress know their job security depends on the money they raise before each election, and much of that comes from K Street.”123
Interest groups often use this financial power to “buy access.” Harry Truman once said that “some people like government so much that they want to buy it,” and the current influence of PACs supports his observation.124 Indeed, several studies have compared the hours that Congressmen weekly spend with representatives of interest groups and the amount of money that these groups donate through PACs. The conclusion is that “PAC contributions appear to significantly influence access,” as Congressmen that depended heavily on PAC money spent considerable amounts of time with the matching interest group.125 The amount of money also matters, and the most generous groups receive the most time.126 Thus, through strategically donating large sums of money, interest groups are able to buy access with key legislators that can support their cause, which is an extremely important step in gaining influence.
Electoral politics are another effective way to apply pressure. Through “door-to-door drives, mass e-mailings and telephone campaigns” groups mobilize voters and pressure them to vote for the candidate that is most receptive to their interests.127 In close elections, turnout can often decide the outcome, and interest groups hence play an important role. This was often a benefit for the Republican Party, because the conservative interest groups that back the GOP are highly successful in motivating their members to vote.128 Therefore, even when more people sympathize with the Democrats, the high turnout among Republicans has granted the party some unexpected victories.129
122
Hershey, 221.
123
Massimo Calabresi, “When the Democrats Take Back K Street,” Time, 26 November 2006, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1562940-1,00.html; INTERNET.
124
Quoted in Walter Isaacson, “Running with the PACs,” Time, 25 October 1982, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,953584,00.html; INTERNET.
125
Laura I. Langbaum, “Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence,” The Journal of Politics 48, no. 4 (1986), 1060.
126
Ibid., 1061.
127
Michael Moss and Ford Fessenden, “Interest Groups Mounting Costly Push to Get Out Vote,” New York
Times, 20 October 2004, available from
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/20/politics/campaign/20vote.html?ex=1256011200&en=ed8b8897640fb72c& ei=5090&partner=rssuserland; INTERNET.
128
David van Biemen, et al., eds., “Evangelicals in America,” Time, 30 January 2005, available from
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1022583-3,00.html; INTERNET.
129
And if there are no elections due, constituency pressure is yet another highly effective tool to influence the voting behavior of Congressmen. For example, when President Ford was meeting with Anwar Sadat in 1975, nineteen Senators drafted an open letter, in which they asked Ford not to reduce foreign aid to Israel. Pro-Israel interest groups then started to pressure members of the upper branch to sign the letter, eventually convincing seventy-six Senators. Constituency pressure had been pivotal in their campaign. Daniel Inouye, for instance, had initially refused to sign the letter, but this led to a tsunami of telephone calls and letters to his office, initiated by pro-Israel interest groups. Inouye eventually surrendered, quipping that it was “easier to sign one letter than [to] answer five thousand.”130
Interest groups are thus highly influential on Capitol Hill, and influence many of Congress’ foreign policy decisions. It is difficult to generalize these groups, however, as they come in many forms. One such group, ethnic interest groups, are especially worth mentioning when it comes to foreign policy. America is rapidly turning into an unprecedented multicultural society, and the political influence of ethnic minorities can no longer be ignored.131 America includes many diasporas, which are defined by Shain as “people with common ethnic-national-religious origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory.”132
It is inevitable that these groups seek to influence Washington’s policy toward their homelands. As early as 1787, Gouverneur Morris complained that “admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France; an Englishman, he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England.”133 In the 1840s, Irish-Americans were the first ethnic minority to influence America’s foreign policy. Many other diasporas followed their example, among them German-Americans, American Jews, Greek-Americans, Italian-Americans, African-Italian-Americans, Asian Italian-Americans, Latino Italian-Americans, and Arab-Americans.134 These diasporas transformed into powerful interest groups, and quickly realized that the most effective road to political power goes through Capitol Hill.135 Their efforts to influence the foreign policy process through Congress have been highly adequate, and ethnic interest groups have obtained, according to Shain, “a meaningful voice in U.S. foreign affairs.”136
130
Quoted in Howe and Trott, 273.
131
It has been estimated that, within fifty years, whites will constitute less than fifty percent of the American population. See Frank Pellegrini, “The Coming of the Minority Majority,” Time, 31 August 2000, available from
CHAPTER III: THE JEWISH LOBBY
Given this importance of Congress in the foreign policy process, its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict needs further scrutiny. Congress plays an important role in establishing America’s position in the Middle East, because they have always taken a fierce pro-Israel stand. For instance, after analyzing the voting behavior of senators on issues involving Israel over a three-year period, eighty-four percent of these votes proved to be in favor of the Jewish state.137 And indeed, throughout the short and turbulent existence of Israel, Congress has always sided with the Jewish state, and pressured the President to do the same, despite the far-reaching consequences that these decisions had for the stability in the region. As Senator Biden summarized this congressional view: “I would rather take instability [in the Arab world] and the might of Israel secure than I would stability in the Arab nations and Israel not secure.”138
As argued above, interest groups strongly influence Congress in its foreign policy decisions, and this is certainly the case with American support for Israel, seeing that American Jews, in the words of Ambrosius, “have an exceptional influence on American foreign policy.”139 Fifty years ago, John Foster Dulles already voiced his concern that “the Jewish influence [in Washington] is completely dominating the scene and making it almost impossible to get Congress to do anything they don’t approve of.”140 Many Arabs throughout the world have taken this argument one step further by claiming that Washington is a slave to the Jewish lobby, and Jews practically run the country.141
The role of Jews in American politics has received little serious academic attention, though, and the Jewish lobby has become something of a taboo in American political science.142 In my view, this is a major gap in academic literature concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, because the Jewish lobby on Capitol Hill is crucial to understanding Washington’s position in the conflict. Indeed, I will argue that even though Jews are a small part of the
137
Robert H. Trice, “Congress and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Support for Israel in the U.S. Senate, 1970-1973,”
Political Science Quarterly 92, no. 3 (1977), 447.
138
Ghassan Bishara, “Israel’s Power in the US Senate,” Journal of Palestine Studies 10, no. 1 (1980), 72.
139
Lloyd E. Ambrosius, “The President, the Congress and American Foreign Policy: The Ethnic Factor,” in
Congress and American Foreign Policy, ed. Goren Rystad (Lund: Esselte Studium, 1981), 74. Many authors support this claim. See Hodgson, 17; Stern, 212; Howe and Trott, 4; Pipes, 116; Christison, 137; Vaughn, 129.
140
Small, 100.
141
There are many such allegations to be found on the Internet, see for instance
http://www.radioislam.org/islam/english/toread/lobby1.htm; INTERNET.
142
American population, their political importance is disproportionately high. Furthermore, as the American Jewish community has prioritized the security of Israel, they have translated this political importance into a powerful pro-Israel lobby. This lobby, in turn, has obtained much influence on the Hill through Jewish lobby organizations, constituency pressure, electoral pressure and financial contributions. Due to a successful implementation of these tactics, the lobby has an iron grip on Congress. The resulting alliance between the lobby and Congress, I will argue, is the major reason for America’s bias toward Israel, because they have steered American foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction, and thereby make a more balanced approach toward the Arab-Israeli conflict impossible.
The 5.2 million Jews in America constitute a mere two percent of the American population, but they are highly important in American politics.143 This is largely due to their high participation in the political process.144 American Jews have always recognized the political process as the most effective way to improve their situation, and consider it, in the words of Shapiro, as “the means to create a better world.”145 Consequently, forty-three percent of American Jews claims to be interested in politics, compared to twenty-two percent of the Gentile population.146 This has especially benefited the Democratic Party. According to Ginsberg, “Jews have always been the most active of liberal activists – willing to invest incredible time, energy, an money in politics,” and thereby became “the political army that leads the battle for Democratic causes and candidates.”147
The political importance of American Jews is further increased by their electoral importance, which is due to their geographical distribution, high voter turnout, and bloc voting. American Jews tend to cluster in key electoral states, such as New York, New Jersey, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Maryland, Florida, California, Connecticut, Nevada, Pennsylvania and Illinois.148 These states together constitute 207 electoral votes, and in the winner-takes-all system of American politics, close margins in these states can decide
143
Multiple authors, The National Jewish Population Survey 2000-2001: Strength, Challenge and Diversity in
the American Jewish Population. (New York: United Jewish Communities, 2003), 2. As the official US Census does not report religion, the number of Jews in America remains subject to estimation, and differs depending on the exact definition of Jewishness. See Egon Mayer et al., eds., American Jewish Identity Survey (New York: The Graduate Center of the City University of new York, 2003). 17
144
Benjamin Ginsberg, “Identity and Politics: Dilemmas of Jewish Leadership in America,” in Jews in American
Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 4.
145
Edward S. Shapiro, A Time for Healing: American Jewry since World War II (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1992), 221.
146
Greenberg and Wald, 188.
147
Ginsberg, 13.
148
“Jewish Population of the United States by State,” available from
primaries and presidential elections.149 Congressional elections in these states are also strongly influenced by the Jewish vote, and, as these states together have many congressional delegates, the Jewish influence on Congress cannot be ignored.
The high voter turnout among Jews also explains their electoral prominence. American elections are characterized by a low turnout, especially in congressional elections, in which the majority of the American population does not participate.150 This is not the case in the Jewish community, though, as more than eighty percent uses its democratic right.151 Consequently, as Stephen Whitfield concludes, Jews are almost “twice as likely to vote” compared to non-Jews, and therefore constitute “about six percent of the electorate.”152 One thus has to agree with Jay Lefkowitz when he stated that Jews have “a disproportionate influence on the outcome of elections.”153
This Jewish vote mostly goes to the same candidate, as the community is known for “bloc voting,” which means that they largely vote for the same candidate. This can be explained by the fact that the community plays a large role in American Jewish life. Indeed, Greenstein concludes that “Jews are undoubtedly the most, if not the best, organized communal group in the United States.”154 Therefore, the American Jewish community is characterized by what Goren characterizes as “collective behavior,” and in the political arena, this results in bloc voting.155 In presidential elections, for instance, Democratic candidates often receive eighty to ninety percent of the Jewish vote.156
The high socio-economic status of American Jews has further contributed to their political power.157 For instance, fifty-five percent of the Jewish population graduates from college and twenty-five percent has a graduate degree, compared to respectively twenty-nine
149
“Distribution of electoral votes,” available from http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm; INTERNET.
150
Lowi and Ginsberg, 251; Jacobson, 114. Since 1980, the voter turnout in Presidential elections has never exceeded 55%. In Congressional elections, turnout rates are even lower, and vary between 30% and 50%.
151
Anna Greenberg and Kenneth D. Wald, “Still Liberal After All These Years? The Contemporary Political Behavior of American Jewry,” in Jews in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 188.
152
Stephen J. Whitfield, “American Jews and Politics,” in From Haven to Home: 350 Years of Jewish Life in
America, ed. Michael W. Grunberger (New York: George Braziller Inc., 2005), 193.
153
Jay P. Lefkowitz, “Does the Jewish Vote Count?” Commentary, 3 January 2001, 50.
154
Ginsberg, 16.
155
Arthur A. Goren, The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 188.
156
Ina N. Forman, “The Politics of Minority Consciousness: The Historical Voting Behavior of American Jews,” in Jews in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2004), 153. FDR and LBJ, for instance, received 90% of the Jewish vote (1940, 1944, 1964), while JFK, Humphrey, Clinton and Gore received around 80% of the vote.
157
and six percent of the non-Jewish population.158 Furthermore, while forty-six percent of Americans work in the three highest job categories, this number is about fifteen percent higher in the Jewish community. Also, thirty-four percent of the Jewish households has an income of at least $75,000, compared to seventeen percent of the Gentile population. Poverty is also significantly lower among Jews, and it thus comes as no surprise that the median income among Jews is twenty-nine percent higher than the American average.159 The National Jewish Population Survey therefore rightly concludes that “the educational success and socio-economic status of Jews constitute a significant source of strength for the community and its organizations.”160
This wealth has translated into another reason for the Jewish influence, the Jewish money in American politics.161 American Jews have set up powerful PACs, and the community is also treasured by politicians for their individual donations.162 Especially the Democratic Party relies heavily on Jewish money, and it has been claimed that “no liberal Democrat gets less than fifty percent of his financing from the Jewish community.”163
American Jews also hold many influential positions in American politics. Currently, two Supreme Court Judges and forty-three members of the 110th Congress are Jewish, which means that thirteen percent of the Senate and seven percent of the House is in Jewish hands.164 In 2000, Lieberman, an orthodox Jews, was nominated for the second highest political office in the country, and the public resistance against a Jewish (vice-) President has largely disappeared.165 Aside from these positions in the spotlight, however, Jews are most influential behind the scenes. As Pomper and Pomper point out, “Jews have served as key advisers to
158
Jack Wertheimer, “American Jewry Since 1945,” in From Haven to Home: 350 Years of Jewish Life in
America, ed. Michael W. Grunberger (New York: George Braziller Inc., 2005), 116.
159
National Jewish Population Survey, 6.
160
Ibid., 6.
161
Gerald M. Pomper and Miles A. Pomper, “Movers, Shakers, and Leaders: Jewish Party Politicians,” in Jews
in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 94.
162
Steven L. Spiegel, “Israel and Beyond: American Jews and U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Jews in American
Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 264; Jerome A. Chanes, “Who Does What?: Jewish Advocacy and Jewish Interest,” in Jews in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 111-12.
163
Margaret Arakie, The Broken Sword of Justice: America, Israel and the Palestine Tragedy (London: Quartet Books, 1973), 167.
164
Robert A. Burt, “On the Bench: The Jewish Justices,” in Jews in American Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 66; “Jewish Members of the 110th Congress,” available from http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/US-Israel/jewcong110.html; INTERNET.
165
both political parties, using their intellect to influence leaders while largely remaining out of the limelight.”166 This started during the FDR administration, as fifteen percent of his top-level appointments were Jewish.167 Thereafter, Jews continued to play an important role in Presidential administrations as Cabinet members or key advisers, and especially Carter and Clinton relied heavily on Jewish intellect.168
Given this political importance of Jews, it is interesting to see for what causes they tend to flex their political muscles. The New Deal first incorporated Jews into American politics, and, while most of the New Deal Coalition fell apart, Jews have remained dedicated to a liberal domestic policy.169 The pivotal issue within the American Jewish community remains the security of Jews worldwide, however, and foreign policy issues therefore take precedence over domestic politics.170 American Jews are especially known for their “laser beam focus on Israel,” as Israel remains the largest Jewish community in the world, and is caught up in a constant struggle with its Arab neighbors.171
The fate of American Jews and Israel has always intertwined. The support of the American Jewish community, which consisted of lobbying efforts and donations, was essential for the founding of Israel.172 The war of 1967 was the real defining moment of the relationship, however, because it served as a painful reminder of the Arabic intentions to drive the Jews out of Israel. With the memory of the Diaspora and the Holocaust still in their mind, American Jews were determined not to lose their hard-fought Jewish homeland. They consequently sought to support Israel by any means necessary, because, in the words of one Rabbi, “Israel’s survival is our survival.”173 Time effectively captured this new attitude: “to be a Jew was to commit oneself to Israel.”174 Consequently, seventy-five percent of American Jews believe that “caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.”175 This is a unique situation, because, as Time magazine rightly stated: “no other foreign power [...] has
166
Pomper and Pomper, 94.
167
Ginsberg, 10.
168
David G. Balin, “At the Summit: Presidents, Presidential Appointments, and Jews,” in Jews in American
Politics, ed. L. Sandy Maisel and Ira N. Forman (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 35-45.
169
Greenberg and Wald, 173. Much has been written about Jewish liberalism, but for a good overview, please see Steven M. Cohen and Charles S. Liebman, “American Jewish Liberalism: Unraveling the Strands,” The
Public Opinion Quarterly 61, no. 3 (1997), 405-430; Murray Friedman, “The Changing Jewish Political Profile,”
American Jewish History 91, no. 3-4 (2003), 428-29.
170 Chanes, 101. 171 Stern, 8. 172 Goren, 188; Christison, 51,73. 173
Friedman, 426; Odeh Abu Rudeneh, “The Jewish Factor in US Politics,” Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 4 (1972), 95.
174
Rudeneh, 95.
175
