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WHEN AND HOW DOES A STAR PERFORMER’S PROSOCIAL MOTIVATION BOOST TEAM PERFORMANCE? Master thesis, MSc Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business July 27

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TEAM PERFORMANCE?

Master thesis, MSc Human Resource Management

University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business

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WHEN AND HOW DOES A STAR PERFORMER’S PROSOCIAL MOTIVATION BOOST

TEAM PERFORMANCE?

ABSTRACT

The presence of star performers is valuable in organizations because star performers can bring

disproportionate contributions and enhance team performance. Yet, how and when a star contributes to team

performance remains undefined. I propose two types of contribution; individual and collective contribution,

and examine these as mediating factors affecting team performance. As research found that motivation is

an important drive to reach goals, I posit that prosocial motivation plays an important role to a star’s

contribution in a team. Previous research on stardom did not highlight the effect of (prosocial) motivation

to the star impact. Therefore, I propose that the star’s prosocial motivation fosters team performance via

individual and collective contribution. Further, I propose that this indirect effect is stronger when the star

receives more peer support. Testing the hypotheses with survey data of 25 teams, this research did not find

evidence to support the hypotheses. However, evidence was found that stars differ in their contributions

when the star is pro-socially motivated. Limitations and future directions of this study are discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

“Superior talent will be tomorrow's prime source of competitive advantage” (Chambers, Foulon,

Handfield-Jones, Hankin & Michaels, 1998: 2). Already in 1998 research demonstrated star members would

be important for organizations and this interest in star members has been growing. Currently, in different

businesses there are bidding wars for star performers (Groysberg, Polzer, Elfenbein, 2011).

Stars can be seen as employees with the highest performance in their work units (Aguinis &

O’Boyle Jr., 2014; Call, Nyberg & Thatcher, 2015). A line of star research has been emerging suggesting

that stars are beneficial for organizations (Kehoe, Lepak & Bentley, 2018) and add more organizational

value compared to non-stars (Call et al., 2015).

In current research inconclusive findings exist on what star performers bring to teams and whether

stars have positive or negative effect on team performances. For example, research suggests that star

members have positive effects on co-workers and organizations through their disproportionate contributions

(Call et al., 2015). Star members can bring knowledge spillovers, resources, developmental support and

guidance to co-workers (Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015). However, Li, Li, Li and Li (2019) found that a star’s

presence in a team restricts non stars’ learning behavior and may hurt their individual’s contributions. Even

more, star performers indirectly have negative effects on team outcomes such as team creativity (Li et al.,

2019).

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individual contributions of stars. Moreover, Li et al. (2019.) explored the impact of stars on peer learning,

implying the collective contributions of stars that may inspire members’ learning and

development. Consequently, star performers may contribute in teams through individual (e.g. generating

own ideas) and collective contribution (e.g. incorporating other people's ideas).

Therefore, in this research I propose two types of star contribution: individual and collective

contribution, inspired by the two general idea contribution types of Elsbach and Flynn (2013). In this

research I define individual contribution as actions that are indicative of expressing someone’s own actions

in team processes, whereas collective contribution entails someone’s actions that are actively involving

other members in team processes. Specifically, I aim to examine the mediating role of the individual and

collective star contributions in teams.

Team researchers have widely recognized that team members ought to be motivated to contribute

to team processes. The most relevant theory is the MIP-G model (motivation information processing-group

model) of De Dreu, Nijstad and Van Knippenberg (2007), which suggests that members are driven by

epistemic (understanding the world) and social motivation (wanting outcome distributions between oneself

and others) to share their insights or to help others for team tasks. Social motivation has two dimensions;

pro-self and prosocial motivation. An individual with pro-self-motivation is concerned with only the

individual’s own outcomes while an individual with a prosocial motivation is concerned with fairness and

collective outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2007). Prior studies often assume that stars express their novel ideas

(Li et al., 2019) and contribute largely through task performance (Groysberg et al., 2011). However, based

on the MIP-G model one can expect that stars also ought to be motivated to contribute to team processes

and team performance.

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I posit that the star’s prosocial motivation may shape the star’s contributions to a team. More specifically, I

propose the star's prosocial motivation to be a positive predictor of individual contributions (predominantly

someone’s own actions in team processes) and collective contributions (actions that are actively involving

other members in team processes), which in turn leads to increased team performance.

In addition, the star performer’s prosocial motivation to contribute in team information processes is

assumed to be subject to the stars’ concern for collective outcomes and the contextual support of co-workers.

Groysberg, Lee and Nanda (2008) suggested that when stars switch employers, they are likely to decline in

performance through the lack of support of their previous co-workers. Peer support refers to the extent to

which an individual receives emotional and instrumental support from co-workers (Fenlason & Beehr, 1994;

Holton et al., 1997). Moreover, according to Bowling, Beehr and Swader (2005) it is likely that support in

a work setting (peer support) can be reciprocated with a different type of support in return. Therefore, I

propose that stars’ contributions are subject to support the co-workers, which may affect team performance.

In this research, I examine the role of the star’s received peer support as a moderator along the indirect effect

of the star's prosocial motivation on team performance via two proposed types of the star’s individual and

collective contribution.

By examining the relationship between the star’s prosocial motivation, the star’s types of

contributions, the star’s received peer support to team performance, this research contributes to both theory

and practice. As earlier research about stardom did not examine the (prosocial) motives of stars on team

performance, this research advances the stardom literature by investigating the effect of the star’s prosocial

motivation and the relationship with two types of star contributions. This study helps practitioners to

understand when and why the star’s contribution to team performance is more pronounced. By examining

the before mentioned relationships, it contributes to practice by helping managers to understand how stars

can have different impacts on team processes and team performance.

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Aguinis and O’Boyle Jr. (2014) have defined stars by assessing their relative productivity and

performance to delineate outputs in context of others. More extensively, stars are defined as employees who

show “disproportionately high and prolonged (a) performance, (b) visibility, and (c) relevant social capital”

(Call et al., 2015, p. 623); where high means relatively high (Aguinis & O’Boyle Jr., 2014) and prolonged

means for a sustained period (Call et al., 2015). Given that a star’s visibility with great colleague effects

(e.g. being recognized) can be referred to as a ‘celebrity’ and that having a relatively larger social capital

can be referred to as a ‘social star’ (Call et al., 2015), I define stars as employees with the highest

performance in their work units. This definition is a combination of both Call et al., (2015) and Aguinis and

O’Boyle Jr. (2014).

As aforementioned, stars seem to enhance benefits in team context and can positively affect a firms'

productivity (Call et al., 2015). However, stars might constrain other co-workers’ opportunities to shine in

an organization (Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015). Therefore, the star’s contribution deviates in team processes. On

the whole, star performers can show different types of contributions in a team, such as bringing in relevant

social capital (Call et al., 2015), contributing their unique ideas (Li et al., 2019) or sharing their knowledge

in information processes (Kehoe, Lepak & Bentley, 2018). Elsbach and Flynn’s (2013) classification of

information contributions can be linked to understand the types of contributions that stars express. As

mentioned before, Elsbach and Flynn (2013) argue that there are two types of information contributions in

team processes: idea giving and idea taking. Idea taking behavior includes considering ideas, that can be

discussing and thinking about offered ideas, soliciting ideas (asking for help and for ideas) and incorporating

ideas (using ideas of others). Idea giving behavior, on the other hand, includes promoting and offering ideas

(Elsbach & Flynn, 2013). Both idea giving and idea taking behavior are important in team processes to bring

beneficial team outcomes, hence team performance.

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as well (e.g. discussing ideas), pointing at collective contributions. Therefore, the type of contribution (idea

giving and idea taking) that a star employee will perform, may be more individually or collectively focused.

To follow up on these findings, this research proposes two types of star contributions that I aim to

test: individual contributions and collective contributions. I foresee that a star expresses these two types of

contributions in teams. For instance, individual contributions (predominantly someone’s own actions in

team processes) consist of providing the best ideas (Girotra et al., 2010). Collective contributions (actions

that are actively involving other members in team processes) includes utilizing knowledge that support

learning of co-workers by e.g. discussing ideas (Kehoe & Tzabar, 2015). Therefore, these two types of

proposed contributions may help to understand what stars express in teams and how this impacts team

performance.

Star motivation and star contributions

Prior research highlighted the importance of stars in organizations as they can create value for the

organization (Aguines & O’Boyle, 2014; Call et al., 2015; Groysberg et al., 2011; Kehoe et al., 2018).

However, research shows that stars can also impact team outcomes negatively (Li et al., 2019), and for

instance decrease group effectiveness (Groysberg et al., 2011). In line with these findings, Call et al. (2015)

state that past research suggests that the star’s impact can lead to contradictory outcomes and adds that past

research does not explain when or why the star’s impact leads to both positive and negative outcomes. To

create more understanding in the star’s impact, Call et al. (2015) invited researchers to link motivation to

stardom research. Since motivation can drive behaviors, motivation can be an important element to examine

in the relation to the star’s deviating contributions in teams and the impact on team performance.

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motivation has two different dimensions; the pro-self and the prosocial motive. The pro-self-motive can be

seen as the preference for outcomes distributions that maximize the individual’s own benefit. In addition,

the prosocial motive is the preference for fair and joint outcome distributions between oneself and other

group members (De Dreu et al., 2007). Thereby, these two dimensions may drive individuals to contribute

to maximize their own benefits (pro-self) or to strive for beneficial group outcomes (prosocial) in team

processes.

A meta-analysis of the effects of motivation on negotiation strategies show correlational evidence

that prosocial negotiators reach more often common agreements and engage more in problem solving than

pro-self-negotiators (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). These results show that a prosocial motive may

shape someone’s contribution in team processes and that this may influence team performance outcomes in

turn. The prosocial motive from the MIPG-Model is therefore relevant to star members who are presumably

included to benefit the team. A prosocial motive of the star may shape the star’s type of individual or

collective contributions in teams.

In line with the theory of De Dreu et al. (2007), I expect that if stars have a prosocial motive, they

are motivated to come to collective and fair team outcomes. Since stars are assumed to possess valuable

resources for team processes (Call et al., 2015), I expect that the star’s prosocial motivation drives them to

express individual contributions to benefit team performance. This research posits the star’s prosocial

motivation to increase the star’s individual contribution. Moreover, I expect the star’s valuable individual

contributions will lead to higher team performance in turn.

Considering the collective contributions of stars, this research proposes the star’s prosocial

motivation increases the stars to collaborate and to incorporate their own and the group’s ideas and interests.

Consequently, this research proposes the star’s prosocial motivation will increase the star’s collective

contributions will increase, which in turn will lead to increased team performance. This leads to the

following two hypotheses:

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Hypothesis 1b: The star’s prosocial motivation has a positive and indirect effect on team

performance via the star’s collective contribution.

The moderating role of peer support

According to Tezci, Sezer, Gurgan and Aktan (2015), an individual’s desire to perform can be

influenced by different factors. I posit that the star’s prosocial motivation shapes the star’s contribution,

where the star’s motivation occurs at the individual level of the star. However, stars are also part of groups

in this research, since the stars are member of teams at work. Since groups (and teams) act as information

processors (De Dreu et al., 2007), stars engage in social information processes with other team members as

well.

Social cues can be seen as signals that arise from group membership and include influence processes

and behaviors by other members (Holton, Bates, Seyler & Carvalho, 1997). Similarly, social cues may arise

in teams with stars since they are a member of a group. The social cues that stars receive may be important

since the success of stars depend on cooperation with co-workers (Kehoe & Tzabbar, 2015).

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The study of Tezci et al. (2015) suggests that there is a positive correlation between individuals

who receive support from their environment and that individual’s motivation. Their study suggests that

received support encourages the individuals to take responsibilities and to achieve success. This positive

correlation may be explained by the equity theory of Bowling et al. (2005) who argue that individuals might

want to avoid negative feelings of unfairness or guilt when they do not equally give and receive support.

Moreover, the findings of Bowling et al. (2005) suggest that individuals might contribute in ways that match

the received benefits. In line with this theory, the study of Zhou and George (2001) suggests that the support

of co-worker may provide a promotive context for to solve problems or to combine objects in useful ways.

More specifically, the results suggest that peer support is likely to be reciprocated in useful contributions of

the receiver, which in turn may lead to more team performance. In line with this reasoning, the before

mentioned equity theory is relevant for stars, because stars are ought to express contributions and enhance

team performance (Call et al., 2015).

Consequently, I expect that when stars receive peer support, stars can reciprocate their contributions

that may be useful to increase team performance, such as providing their ideas to other members (Li et al.,

2019), pointing at the proposed type of the star’s individual contributions. I expect that when a star

experiences high levels of peer support, the star is more likely to increase his or her individual contribution

in the team, which in turn leads to higher team performance.

In addition, since support is suggested to have an effect on how problems are solved collectively

(Zhou & George, 2001), peer support may reciprocate the star’s collective contributions that benefit team

performance. Hence, this research posits that when a star receives high levels of peer support, the positive

relationship between the star’s prosocial motivation and the stars collective contribution is more positive

and will increase team performance. Thus, I hypothesize the following, which is in line with hypothesis 1a

and 1b:

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Hypothesis 2b: The star’s received peer support moderates the indirect effect of the star’s prosocial

motivation on team performance via the star’s collective contribution, such that the star’s prosocial

motivation fosters team performance via individual contribution when the star receives more peer support.

FIGURE 1

Conceptual model

METHOD

Sample and procedure

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is 32.67 years) (M = 88.88, SD = 107.24). The average individual performance score of the 25 stars was

5.71 and ranged from 4.14 to 7 (SD = .62).

To reduce common source biases, I collected data from team leaders and team members separately.

All surveys were administered online in Dutch or English. Since the original survey items were developed

in English, I used a back-translation process (Brislin, 1986) to increase the accuracy of the translation from

English to Dutch. Team leaders reported the performance of the team members and the team as a whole,

while team members reported prosocial motivation, received peer support, individual and collective

contribution of individual members. At the 20

th

of March 2020 the surveys were sent out by email. After the

first request, I sent four reminders in a period of 5-6 weeks. As soon as the data was collected, I altered the

names into numbers to ensure confidentiality.

Measures

Unless otherwise noted, all items are measured using a 7-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree,

7= strongly agree).

Identification of the star member. Team leaders rated the individual performance (read down

below) of team members and I identified the star by selecting the team member whose performance score

was highest compared to other members the within the team. When there were more stars in a team, I

calculated for all scales the average score of the multiple stars in that team and divided them by the number

of stars. Since the adopted measures described below are originally not specific measures for stars, I

captured the scores of the stars for these measures to refer to for example the star’s prosocial motivation.

Consequently, I utilized these scales below as the star’s prosocial motivation; the star’s received peer

support; the star’s individual contribution and the star’s collective contribution.

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Star’s individual contribution. Individual contribution was self-rated by team members. I adapted

the items of idea giving (promoting and offering ideas) behavior from Elsbach & Flynn (2013) to develop

a 4-item scale to measure individual contribution (α = .72). An example of an altered item is: ‘In the team

process I attempt to sell others my ideas/proposals’. I added new items to create a comprehensive scale for

individual contribution. An example of a new item is: ‘In the team process, I actively contribute ideas to

solve the problem(s)’.

Star’s collective contribution. I developed a 5-item scale to measure collective contribution (α =

.72), adapted from idea taking (considering, incorporating and soliciting) behavior (Elsbach & Flynn, 2013).

Team members self-rated the items and an example of an altered item is: ‘In the team process, I actively ask

others to contribute to solve the problem(s)’.

Star’s received peer support. Team members self-rated their received peer support with three items

of the social support scale of Campion, Medsker and Higgs (1993). Examples of the scale are ‘Being in my

team gives me the opportunity to work in a team and provide support to other team members’ and ‘Members

of my team help each other out at work when needed’ (α = .68).

Team performance. I measured team performance with an altered version of the team performance

scales from Anacona & Caldwell (1992) and Mohammend & Nadkarni (2011), (α = .86). Team leaders

rated the performance of their team on 7 items using a 7-point Likert scale (1= far below average, 7= far

above average). Examples of these items are ‘Please rate the team's efficiency (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992)

and ‘Please rate the team’s innovation’ (Mohammand & Nadkarni, 2011). I added the option ‘not applicable’

for one item: ‘If applicable, rate the client's satisfaction with the team's performance (on the last project)’. I

added this option since it is possible that this item does not apply for every team, e.g. when a team does not

have to work directly for a client.

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point Likert scale (1= far below average, 7= far above average) with 7 items (α = .89). I adapted the items

from two scales measuring team performance of Ancona and Caldwell (1992) and Mohammend and

Nadkarni (2011). An example of this altered scale is ‘Please rate the quality of this team member’s overall

performance (Mohammand & Nadkarni, 2011). I included the option ‘not applicable’ for the following item:

‘If applicable, rate the client's satisfaction with the team member's performance (on the last project)’. I added

his option in the individual performance measure since it is possible this item does not apply for every team

context.

RESULTS

Preliminary, I assessed assumptions for normality and outliers. I checked for the dependent

variable whether abnormalities were visible. I detected no outliers within 3.29 standard deviations on the

low, nor the high end of the distribution. Through a Shapiro-Wilk test, I checked the distribution of the

data further for normality. Results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, showed that the dependent variable

was normally distributed ( p = .22), and that team performance distribution is slightly positively skewed

and Platykurtic (skewness = .40, SE = .46; kurtosis = -.47, SE = .90).

In Table 1 the descriptive statistics and correlations for the study variables are presented.

---

Insert Table 1 about here

---

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

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model and the one-factor model are significant (χ2diff = .00, p < .001). Therefore, this justified my choice

of treating individual contribution and collective contribution of the star performers as two separate

variables.

---

Insert Table 2 about here

---

Since prosocial motivation, peer support, individual contribution and collective contribution were reported

by the same source (team members), I ran CFA to examine the discriminant validity of these concepts. As

Table 3 depicts, The four-factor model fits the items better (X

2

/Df = 1.78; RMSEA = .08; CFI = .84; TLI

= .81), than to the one-factor model (X

2

/Df= 3.46; RMSEA = .15; CFI = .48; TLI = .40). The Analysis of

Variance (ANOVA) showed that the differences between the four-factor model and the one-factor model

are significant (χ2diff = .00, p < .001).

---

Insert Table 3 about here

---

Hypotheses Testing

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contribution did not affect team performance (b = .23, SE = .20, t = 1.15, p = .26). Altogether, I found no

evidence to support for hypothesis 1a.

---

Insert Table 4 about here

---

I tested hypothesis 1b using PROCESS Model 4. Hypothesis 1b proposed that a higher level of the

star’s collective contribution positively mediates the relationship between the star’s prosocial motivation

and team performance, such that the star’s prosocial motivation increases team performance. As shown in

Table 4, the indirect effect of star’s prosocial motivation on team performance via star’s collective

contribution was not significant (b = .05, SE = .13, LLCI = -.16, ULCI = .27), which is in contrast with my

prediction. The entire mediation model explained 14% of the variance in team performance (R² =.14).

Hence, I did not find support for hypothesis 1b. More specifically, I found that star’s prosocial motivation

was significant and positively related to the star’s collective contribution (b = .50, SE = .19, t = 2.70 p =

.01). Nevertheless, I found a positive but not significant effect of the star’s collective contribution on team

performance (b = .09, SE = .24, t = .37, p = .71), as shown in Table 4. Therefore, no I found no evidence

to support hypotheses 1a.

---

Insert Table 5 about here

---

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low level of the star’s received peer support (-1 SD, b = .14, SE = .15, LLCI = -.13, ULCI = .34). Moreover,

I found no conditional significant indirect effect for the mean level (b = .07, SE = .09, LLCI = -.08, ULCI =

.21), or the high level (+1 SD, b = .02, SE = .08, LLCI = -.12, ULCI = .14). Hence, Hypothesis 2a was not

supported.

I tested Hypothesis 2b using PROCESS model 7, proposing that star’s received peer support

moderates the indirect effect of the star’s prosocial motivation on team performance via the star’s collective

contribution, such that the star’s prosocial motivation fosters team performance via collective contribution

when the star receives more peer support. As shown in Table 5, the moderation mediation index was not

significant (b = -.02, SE = .10, LLCI = -.20, ULCI = .11). The interaction effect between prosocial motivation

and star’s received peer support show a negative and not significant relationship with a star’s collective

contribution (b = -.23, SE = .26, t = -.88, p = .39). Moreover, I found no significant conditional indirect

effect for the low level of received peer support (-1 SD, b = .07, SE = .22, LLCI = -.25, ULCI = .48) the

mean level (b = .05 , SE = .15, LLCI = -.18, ULCI = .30) or the high level (+1 SD, b = .03 , SE = .11, LLCI

= -.16, ULCI = .20). Consequently, I found no evidence to support hypothesis 2b.

Supplementary analysis

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---

Insert Table 6 about here

---

As Table 6 depicts, via the star’s individual contribution the moderated mediation index was not

significant (b = -.04, SE = .09, LLCI = -.18, ULCI = .07). In addition, via the star’s individual contribution

I found no significant conditional indirect effect for the low level of received star non-star performance gap

(-1 SD, b = .06, SE = .12, LLCI = -.11, ULCI = .22). Also, I found no significant support at the mean level

(b = .02 , SE = .09, LLCI = -.14, ULCI = .12), or the high level (+1 SD, b = -.02 , SE = .14, LLCI = -.26,

ULCI = .13) of star non-star performance gap. Therefore I found no evidence to support a moderated

mediation effect in which star non-star performance gap moderates the indirect effect of the star’s prosocial

motive on team performance via the star’s individual contributions. Further, as shown in the results of Table

6, I found that via the star’s collective contribution the moderation mediation index was not significant (b =

-.04, SE = .09, LLCI = -.18, ULCI = .07).

In addition, via the star’s collective contribution I found no significant conditional indirect effect

for the low level of received star non-star performance gap (-1 SD, b = .15, SE = .20, LLCI = -.15, ULCI =

.48). Also, I found no significant support at the mean level (b = -.01 , SE = .15, LLCI = -.25, ULCI = .21),

or the high level (+1 SD, b = -.18 , SE = .25, LLCI = -.52, ULCI = .16) of star non-star performance gap.

Hence, I found no evidence to support a moderated mediation effect in which star non-star performance gap

moderates the indirect effect of the star’s prosocial motive on team performance via the star’s collective

contributions.

DISCUSSION

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First, results suggest that the star’s prosocial motivation is related to the star’s collective

contribution. However, I found no evidence to support that a star’s individual contribution or collective

contribution mediates the relationship between a star’s prosocial motivation and team performance. In

addition, I did not find evidence that peer support moderates the indirect effect of the star’s prosocial

motivation on team performance via a star performer’s individual contribution or collective contribution,

such that a star performer with a higher level of peer support is increased pro-socially motivated to contribute

and thereby promoting team performance. Similarly, additional analysis showed no significant moderation

mediation effect on team performance with performance gap as moderator.

Theoretical implications

The present research adds to the existing stardom literature in understanding how stars contribute

in teams. Although I did not find evidence to support my hypotheses, this study builds upon the knowledge

about what stars contribute. Previous research illustrates that stars create value in teams by expressing

meaningful contributions, which may include e.g. sharing tacit knowledge in teams (Kehoe et al., 2015),

bringing in useful suggestions for solutions (Li et al., 2019), or social capital (Call et al., 2015). I elaborated

on the contribution of stars in teams. I proposed two new types of contributions that stars may express in

teams that I adapted from Elsbach and Flynn’s idea contributions (2013). Results of this study suggest that

stars express two different types of contributions in teams, namely individual contribution and collective

contribution.

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motivation were more likely to contribute in a collective way. In line with the theory of De Dreu et al.

(2007), the outcomes of this research confirms that the type of motivation has influence on the contributions

of members within teams. Even more, this study contributes to the existing MIP-G theory since these results

suggests that this theory also applies for key players in teams like star members.

Moreover, this study advances the literature of De Dreu et al. (2007) with two new types of

information processing, namely collective and individual contributions. The MIP-G model considers that a

certain type of motivation influences e.g. the depth in which information is processed by team members and

how the information is integrated into group outcomes (De Dreu et al., 2007). It extends the theory that in

the group processes stars show different types of contributions. Further, it extends the MIP-G theory since

this study implies that prosocial motivation has an effect on the type of contributions that members express

in group processes, namely individual or collective contributions.

Practical Implications

This study suggests that prosocial motivation inferences the type of the stars’ contributions in teams.

The results imply that the prosocial motivation of the star may lead to more collective contributions from

the star. This might have an import implication for managers, if they want to want to increase prosocial

behaviors of stars and if they want them to contribute in a collective way. I argue that the prosocial

motivation of the star members is an important drive to increase collective contributions in teams and

therefore managers could attempt to increase the prosocial motivation of stars.

Limitations and future research

The present research has some important limitations and future research directions. The first

limitation is that the survey study was conducted during the arising corona-crisis. This external influence

has been impacting people’s daily life and work life. It is therefore possible that respondents had less

opportunity to fill in the survey. This might have interfered with the next limitation, namely that the sample

size of 25 teams was small. It is possible that the stars might have been better represented in this research

with a bigger sample size.

Met opmerkingen [HM1]: Nog even MIPG lezen maar

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A methodological limitation of this study lies in the definition and operationalization of star

performers. As pointed out by Call et al., (2015) studies use different definitions and operationalizations of

stars, including performance as one of the most important aspects. I selected stars by choosing the member

with highest individual performance within that team. However, in the way that I differentiated stars from

non-stars, it was not clear how absolute the differences between each other were. Therefore, it does not

necessarily imply that the selected stars had disproportionate contributions relatively to their co-workers.

Consequently, one could speculate that the selected stars are not always remarkably better in their

performance, which means that they could be plausibly not be treated as absolute stars. Subsequently, the

contributions that the selected stars pronounced, might have been not disproportionately high enough to

boost team performance.

This implies that the operationalization of this stardom definition is not accurate enough and it is

possible that less, but more absolute stars would have been identified with a more comprehensive measure.

Therefore, it is recommended for future research to seek for other differentiative factors that separate stars

from non-stars. For example stars can be differentiated in the sense that they are internally, but also

externally visible in the labor market (Groysberg et al., 2008). This might imply that the star’s professional

network could be an indicator of the visibility of the star. It might be an interesting consideration for future

research to examine this element of visibility as attribute for the definition of stars.

Since it was not clear how absolute the stars were that I selected, I aimed to account for the

performance differences by conducting additional analysis with the performance gap as moderator. I

expected that hypotheses 2a and 2b would be supported at high levels of the performance gap. However,

the star non-star performance gap seemed to be too low to represent stars throughout this research.

Nevertheless, although I found no findings in this additionally analysis to support the interaction between

the star non-star performance gap and the star’s collective or individual contributions, future researchers are

encouraged to explore the different definition and operationalization of stars as pre-mentioned.

In this study I examined the effect of prosocial motivation to contribute in team processes to study

whether this drive was a relevant predictor for stars to boost team performance. Interestingly, the study of

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22

Hu and Liden (2015) implies that team prosocial motivation may increase team success. They suggest that

prosocial motivation is important as a drive to contribute, but that the willingness to engage and the

opportunities to do so may vary depending on the team context (Hu & Liden, 2015). According to Hu and

Liden (2015) little research has paid attention to how team members prosocial motive can contribute to team

outcomes, but their study raises that team contextual factors such as team cooperation strengthen the effect

of prosocial motivation on team outcomes. Therefore it is recommended to extent this knowledge to

multi-level stardom research by including contextual factors that might strengthen this relationship (e.g. including

task interdependence as contextual factor).

In addition I argued that when the star received peer support, the star would be likely to reciprocate

more individual or collective contributions that would in turn increase team performance. However, the

absence of an effect might be due to a methodological limitation in this study. The items for the star’s

received peer support scale had a low reliability, while the measure of the star’s received peer support was

not appropriate enough to account for the star’s perception of his/her received peer support. The items of

this scale account more for a contextual climate of peer support where team members provide support to

each other. Therefore it is recommended for future research to explore team contextual factors that shape

the motive and opportunity for stars to contribute. For example a contextual factor like a cooperative or

competitive team climate might affect the contributions of star performers, since in a competitive climate

team members would try to outperform each other (Zhu, Gardner & Chen, 2018) rather than to contribute

in team processes and work together for the benefit of team performance.

CONCLUSION

This study investigated different moderation and mediation effects that aimed to understand when

and why star performers in teams contribute to team performance. Inspired by Elsbach and Flynn’s (2013)

types of idea contributions, I proposed two types of star contributions; individual contribution and collective

contribution. Future research could incorporate these type of contributions to test under certain conditions

what a star performer contributes in the team and whether it relates to team performance. In addition, this

study invites future research to furtherly explore the attributes of star performers that help to differentiate

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23

stars from non-stars. Moreover, future research is encouraged to investigate underlying mechanisms that

may affect and drive stars to contribute in teams and to examine the impact of team context in this

relationship.

REFERENCES

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performance. Organization science, 3(3): 321-341.

Aguinis, H., & O'Boyle Jr, E. (2014). Star performers in twenty‐first century organizations. Personnel

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Bowling, N. A., Beehr, T. A., & Swader, W. M. (2005). Giving and receiving social support at work: The

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talent. McKinsey Quarterly, (3): 44-57.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Nijstad, B. A., & van Knippenberg, D. (2007). Motivated Information Processing in

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49.

De Dreu, C. K., Weingart, L. R., & Kwon, S. (2000). Influence of social motives on integrative negotiation:

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78(5): 889.

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Girotra, K., Terwiesch, C., & Ulrich, K. T. (2010). Idea generation and the quality of the best

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Grant, A. M., & Sumanth, J. J. (2009). Mission possible? The performance of prosocially motivated

employees depends on manager trustworthiness. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94(4): 927–944.

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individuals decrease group effectiveness. Organization Science, 22(3), 722-737.

Jackson, D. L., Gillaspy Jr, J. A., & Purc-Stephenson, R. (2009). Reporting practices in confirmatory factor

analysis: an overview and some recommendations. Psychological methods: 14(1): 6-23.

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in star scientists' effects on firm innovative performance. Strategic Management Journal, 36(5):

709-727.

Li, Y., Li, N., Li, C., & Li, J. (2020). The boon and bane of creative “stars”: A social network exploration

of how and when team creativity is (and is not) driven by a star teammate. Academy of

Management Journal, 63(2): 613-635.

Overbeck, J. R., Correll, J., & Park, B. (2005). Internal status sorting in groups: The problem of too many

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Tezci, E., Sezer, F., Gurgan, U., & Aktan, S. (2015). A Study on Social Support and Motivation. The

Anthropologist, 22(2): 284–292.

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of voice. Academy of Management journal, 44(4): 682-696.

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TABLE 1

Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

1. Star’s Individual Performance

5.71

.62

-

2. Star’s Prosocial Motivation

6.11

.55

-.28

-

3. Star’s Received Peer Support

4.38

.48

-.10

.17

-

4. Star’s Individual Contribution

5.61

.70

.10

.17

-.21

-

5. Star’s Collective Contribution

5.71

.55

.26

.39

-.02

.39

-

6 Team Performance

5.34

.71

.36

-.13

.20

.24

.14

-

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27

TABLE 2

Results Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of Star Contributions

X2

Df

X2/Df

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

2-factor model

81.01

26

3.11

0.14 at 90%

[.10 - .17]

.81

.74

1-factor model

92.29

27

3.42

0.15 at 90%

[.12 - .18]

.78

.71

Model Comparison

DF

AIC

Chi-sq.

Chi-sq. diff

Df diff

Pr(>c

2-factor model

26

2424.51

81.01

1-factor model

27

2433.79

92.29

11.28

1

.00

***

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28

TABLE 3

Results Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Independent Variable, Moderator and Mediators

X2

Df

X2/Df

RMSEA

CFI

TLI

4-factor model

200.79

113

1.78

.08 at 90%

[.06 - .10]

.84

.81

1-factor model

412.70

119

3.46

0.15 at 90%

[.13 - .17]

.48

.40

Model Comparison

DF

AIC

Chi-sq.

Chi-sq. diff

Df diff

Pr(>c

4-factor model

26

4160.32

200.79

1-factor model

27

4360.23

412.70

211.91

6

.00

***

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TABLE 4

Regression analyses: SIC (hypothesis 1a) and SCC (hypothesis 1b) as Mediators

Mediator: SIC

Mediator: SCC

DV: Team performance

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Intercept

.00 (.20)

.00 (.21)

.00 (.20)

.00 (.18)

.00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

.00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

Control

SIP

.06 (.21)

.12 (.22)

.26 (.20)

.40 (.19)

*

36 (.19)

.35 (.21)

.32 (.21)

.32 (.23)

Predictor

SPM

.20 (.22)

.50 (.19)

*

-.04 (.21)

-.08 (.21)

-.08 (.24)

Mediators

SIC

.23 (.20)

SCC

09 (.24)

R

2

.00

.04

.07

.30

.13

.13

.18

.14

∆R²

.04

.23

.00

.05

.01

Regression results mediation

B

SE

LLCI

ULCI

Total effect of X on Y

-.04

.21

-.39

.32

Indirect effect X on Y

SIC

.05

.07

-.07

.14

SCC

.05

.13

-.16

.26

Direct effect X on Y

SIC

-.08

.21

-.44

.28

SCC

-.08

.24

-.50

.34

Notes. N = 25.

p < .10,

*

p < .05,

**

p < .01,

***

p < .001.

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TABLE 5

Regression analyses: SIC (hypothesis 2a) and SCC (hypothesis 2b) as Mediators

Mediator: SIC

Mediator: SCC

DV: Team Performance

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Intercept

.00 (.20)

.00 (.20)

.04 (.21)

.00. (.20)

.00 (.18)

.04 (.18)

.00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

.00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

Control

SIP

.06 (.21)

.10 (.21)

.10 (.22)

.26 (.20)

.40 (.19)

*

.40 (.19)

.36 (.21)

.35(.21)

.32 (.21)

.32 (.23)

Predictor

SPM

.24 (.22)

.32 (.24)

.51 (.19

)*

.58 (.21)

*

-.04 (.21)

-.08 (.21)

-.08 (.24)

Moderator

SRPS

-.24 (.21)

-.18 (.23)

-.06 (.19)

-.00 (.19)

IV x W

SPM x SRPS

-.25 (.30)

-.23(.26)

Mediators

SIC

.23(.20)

SCC

.09 (.24)

R

2

.00

.10

.13

.07

.30

.33

.13

.13

.18

.14

∆R²

.10

.03

.23

.03

.00

.05

.01

Regression results moderation mediation

B

SE

LLCI

ULCI

Index of moderation mediation

SIC

-.06

.08

-.19

.06

SCC

-.02

.10

-.20

.11

Notes. N = 25.

p < .10,

*

p < .05,

**

p < .01,

***

p < .001. Meaning abbreviations: SIP = Star’s Individual Performance; SPM = Star’s Prosocial

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31

TABLE 6

Regression analyses: SIC and SCC as Mediators and Star non-star Performance Gap as Moderator

DV: Team performance

Model 1

Model 2

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Model 7

Intercept

.00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

00 (.19)

.00 (.20)

.04 (.21)

.00 (.20)

.00 (.20)

.03 (.20)

Control

SIP

.36 (.21)

.35(.21)

.32 (.21)

.30 (.21)

.28 (.22)

.32 (.23)

.29 (.24)

.22 (.24)

Predictor

SPM

-.04 (.21)

-.08 (.21)

-.06 (22)

-.03 (.22)

-.08 (.24)

-.04 (.25)

-.11 (.26)

Mediators

SIC

.23 (.20)

.20 (.21)

.10 (.25)

SCC

.09 (.24)

.06 (.25)

-.03 (.26)

Moderator

SPG

.12 (.22)

.12 (.23)

.17 (.22)

.26 (.23)

M x W

SIC x SPG

-.18 (.22)

SCC x SPG

-.33 (.27)

R

2

.13

.13

.18

.19

.22

.14

.16

.22

∆R²

.05

.01

.03

.01

.02

.0

Regression results moderation mediation

B

SE

LLCI

ULCI

Direct effect X on Y

SIC

-.03

.22

-.11

.91

SCC

-.11

.23

-.43

.67

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32

SIC

-.04

.09

-.18

.07

SCC

-.17

.17

-.40

.33

Notes. N = 25.

p < .10,

*

p < .05,

**

p < .01,

***

p < .001. Meaning abbreviations: SIP = Star’s Individual Performance; SPM =

(33)

Team performance questions

1. Please rate the timeliness (adherences to schedules) by which this team's work is completed.

2. Please rate the team's efficiency.

3. Please rate the quality of this team's overall performance.

4. Please rate the team’s innovation.

5. If applicable, rate the client's satisfaction with the team's performance (on the last project).

* If not applicable, click on the button 'Not Applicable'.

6. Please think of the most important performance measure (or KPI's) for this team or an important

performance indicator that has not been mentioned yet, and rate accordingly.

7. Please rate the team's overall performance.

Individual performance questions

1. Please rate the timeliness (adherences to schedules) by which the individual work of the team

member is completed.

2. Please rate the teammember's efficiency.

3. Please rate the quality of this teammember's overall performance.

4. Please rate the teammember’s innovation.

5. If applicable, rate the client's satisfaction with the teammember's performance (on the last

project).

* If not applicable, please fill in 'Not Applicable'.

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34

Appendix C: survey questions for the team members

Prosocial motivation

1. I like to work on tasks that have the potential to benefit others.

2. I prefer to work on tasks that allow me to have a positive impact on others.

3. I do my best when I’m working on a task that contributes to the well-being of others.

4. It is important to me to have the opportunity to use my abilities to benefit others.

5. I get energized by working on tasks that have the potential to benefit others.

Individual contribution

1. In the team process, I make suggestions to optimize team operations.

2. In the team process, I actively contribute ideas to solve the problem(s).

3. In the team process, I attempt to sell others my ideas/proposals.

4. In the team process, I campaign for the selection of my own ideas.

Collective contribution

1. In the team process, I actively ask others to contribute to solve the problem(s).

2. In the team process, I actively discuss ideas offered by team members.

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Peer support

1. Being in my team gives me the opportunity to work in a team and provide support to other team

members.

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