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Appendix

A. List of Countries

Africa

Asia

Europe and Former

Soviet Union

Latin America and

the Caribbean

Algeria

Angola

Botswana

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cameroon

Central Africa

Comoros

Djibouti

Egypt (urb)

Egypt (rur)

Ethiopia

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea Bissau

Ivory Coast

Kenya

Lesotho

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mauritania

Morocco

Namibia

Niger

Bangladesh (urb)

Bangladesh (rur)

Cambodia

China (rur)

China (urb)

East Timor

Hong Kong

India (rur)

India (urb)

Indonesia (rur)

Indonesia (urb)

Iran

Jordan

Korea

Laos

Malaysia

Mongolia

Mongolia

Nepal

Papua New Guinea

Pakistan

Philippines

Singapore

South Korea

Sri Lanka

Taiwan

Albania

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Bosnia

Bulgaria

Croatia

Czech Republic

Estonia

FR Yugoslavia

Georgia

Germany, East

Hungary

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyz Rep

Latvia

Lithuania

Macedonia

Moldova

Poland

Romania

Russia

Slovak Republic

Slovenia

Tajikistan

Turkmenistan

Argentina (urb)

Barbados

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Dominican Republic

Ecuador (urb)

El Salvador (urb)

Guatemala

Guyana

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico

Netherlands Antilles

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

2

Niger (rur)

Nigeria

Rwanda

Senegal

South Africa

Swaziland

Tanzania

Tunisia

Uganda

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Thailand

Un. Arab Emirates

Vietnam

Yemen

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Table B2. Descriptive statistics of the mean normalised average income per decile.

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Table B3. Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables. ODA ODA*Pol Pol. Rights FDI GDP Gov. Exp. Infl. Life

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

6

Table B4. Correlation matrix.

FDI

(%GDP) GDP

Gov.

Exp. Inflation Life exp.

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Table B5. Results of selected aid effectiveness studies (Source Mcgillivray et al. 2006)

Selected aid effectiveness studies up to 1996

Author(s)

Results

Rahman (1968)

Foreign capital flows have a negative impact on domestic savings

Griffin (1970)

Foreign capital flows have a negative impact on domestic savings

Gupta (1970)

Foreign capital has no impact on domestic savings

Weisskopf (1972)

Foreign aid has a negative impact on domestic savings

Papanek (1973)

Aid has a positive impact on growth

Mosley (1980)

Aid has no impact of aid on growth

Dowling and Hiemenz (1982)

Aid has a positive impact on growth

Voivodas (1973)

Aid has no impact on growth

Gupta and Islam (1983)

Aid has a positive impact on growth

Mosley et al. (1987)

Aid has no impact on growth

Boone (1996)

Aid has no impact on growth

Result of aid–growth studies, Assessing Aid and beyond

Author(s)

A

i2

(A·P)I

(A·X)i

Results

Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000)

Yes

Aid effectiveness depends on the policy environment

Durbarry et al. (1998)

Yes

Aid has diminishing returns

Collier and Dehn (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness depends on the policy environment

Dalgaard and Hansen (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns and is

independent from the policy environment.

Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness does not depend on the policy

environment, but on climatic conditions

Hansen and Tarp (2000)

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns and is

independent from the policy environment

Hudson and Mosley (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns and is

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

8

Lensink and White (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns and is

independent from the policy environment

Lu and Ram (2001)

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns and is

independent from the policy environment

Chauvet and Guillaumont (2002)

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness depends on political stability

Collier and Dollar (2002)

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness depends on the policy environment

Islam (2002)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness does not depend on the policy

environment, but on political stability

Gomanee et al. (2003)

Yes

Aid is effective after a threshold value of growth

has been reached

Jensen and Paldam

(2003)

Yes

Yes

Aid is not effective in stimulating growth

Kosack (2003)

Yes

Aid is effective in improving quality of life in democratic

countries

Dalgaard et al. (2004)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Aid is effective with diminishing returns, is less effective

in tropical regions and is independent from the policy

environment

Burnside and Dollar (2004b)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Aid effectiveness depends on institutional quality

Easterly et al. (2004)

Yes

Aid effectiveness does not depend on the policy

environment

Notes

:

Ai

2 = Quadratic aid term is included in the growth model specification.

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Table B6 Total outcomes of the three models

Base model. Dependent Variable: Deciles (199 observations)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ODA -0.2116 -0.2237 -0.1418 0.2507 -0.1002 -0.0197 0.0617 -0.0206 -0.2892 0.5817 (0.1178)* (0.1505) (0.1384) (0.2192) (0.1307) (0.1507) (0.1642) (0.1810) (0.2533) (1.0476) Pol. Rights 0.0017 0.0008 0.0018 -0.0042 0.0013 0.0060 0.0107 0.0075 0.0027 -0.0130 (0.0022)** (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0035)* (0.0026)*** (0.0036)** (0.0077) (0.0253) FDI -0.0039 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0062 -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0004 0.0285 (0.0019) (0.0013)** (0.0014)** (0.0012)** (0.0036)* (0.0017)* (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0086)*** GDP -0.0046 -0.0082 -0.0039 -0.0304 -0.0023 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0075 0.0416 (0.0071) (0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0295) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0078) (0.0073) (0.0158) (0.0612) Gov Exp -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0022 7.58E-05 0.0004 -0.0008 -2.11E-05 0.0010 0.0011

(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0118) Infl 2.65E-06 4.32E-06 -1.82E-06 -1.20E-05 -1.06E-05 -7.57E-06 -7.33E-06 -7.29E-07 1.17E-06 3.21E-05 (9.51E-06) (9.96E-06) (9.01E-06) (8.88E-06) (1.16E-05) (1.35E-05) (1.51E-05) (1.79E-05) (1.86E-05) (9.08E-05) Life exp -0.0011 9.70E-05 -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0013 1.89E-06 0.0010 0.0031

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

10

Aid - policy model. Dependent Variable: Deciles

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ODA -0.0095 0.1178 0.2025 0.7809 0.1867 0.1773 0.1596 0.0276 -0.6696 -1.6014 (0.1248) (0.1706) (0.1744) (0.3180)** (0.2060) (0.1908) (0.2029) (0.2834) (0.4586) (0.9931) ODAPOL -0.0472 -0.0791 -0.0807 -0.1420 -0.0682 -0.0460 -0.0226 -0.0106 0.0898 0.5146 (0.0281)* (0.0351)** (0.0353)** (0.0337)*** (0.0417) (0.0337) (0.0313) (0.0396) (0.0855) (0.1754)*** Pol. Rights 0.0048 0.0059 0.0071 0.0049 0.0059 0.0090 0.0122 0.0082 -0.0031 -0.0468 (0.0022)** (0.0035)* (0.0031)** (0.0023)** (0.0047) (0.0030)*** (0.0030)*** (0.0038)** (0.0078) (0.0238)** FDI -0.0042 -0.0036 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0065 -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0025 0.0009 0.0313 (0.0019)** (0.0012)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0035) (0.0016)** (0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0088)*** GDP -0.0043 -0.0074 -0.0030 -0.0253 -0.0016 0.0006 -0.0003 3.05E-06 0.0069 0.0378 (0.0071) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0299) (0.0091) (0.0090) (0.0079) (0.0073) (0.0165) (0.0611) Gov Exp -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0022 2.72E-05 0.0004 -0.0008 -3.35E-05 0.0010 0.0017

(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0117) Infl 2.28E-06 3.35E-06) -2.03E-06 -9.49E-06 -1.04E-05 -7.77E-06 -7.54E-06 -9.65E-07 1.16E-06 3.31E-05 (9.70E-06) (1.06E-05) (1.01E-05) (9.41E-06) (1.15E-05) (1.36E-05) (1.53E-05) (1.81E-05) (1.80E-05) (9.59E-05) Life exp -0.0011 5.98E-05 -0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0013 -1.56E-05 0.0010 0.0034

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Aid² model. Dependent Variable: Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ODA -0.0422 -0.1703 -0.0559 0.2056 -0.0622 -0.0025 0.0924 -0.0490 -0.3981 -0.1262 (0.3076) (0.4687) (0.3874) (0.4176) (0.2742) (0.2779) (0.2987) (0.2459) (0.3885) (2.2460) ODA² -0.4766 -0.1473 -0.2411 0.1383 -0.1067 -0.0486 -0.0866 0.0812 0.3056 2.0003 (0.5753) (0.9491) (0.7876) (0.8952) (0.5414) (0.4622) (0.4267) (0.2843) (1.2049) (3.6329) ) Pol. Rights 0.0018 0.0008 0.0018 -0.0041 0.0013 0.0060 0.0107 0.0075 0.0028 -0.0178 (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0037) (0.0035)* (0.0026)*** (0.0036)** (0.0077) (0.02620)*** FDI -0.0040 -0.0031 -0.0032 -0.0023 -0.0062 -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0004 0.0287 (0.0019)** (0.0012)** (0.0014)** (0.0012)* (0.0036)* (0.0017)* (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0085) GDP -0.0031 -0.0076 -0.0030 -0.0307 -0.0019 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0065 0.0350 (0.0083) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0298) (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0089) (0.0078) (0.0161) (0.0700) Gov Exp -0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0022 8.54E-05 0.0004 -0.0008 -2.06E-05 0.0010 0.0011

(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0120) Infl 3.51E-06 4.46E-06 -1.33E-06 -1.26E-05 -1.03E-05 -7.47E-06 -7.19E-06 -8.24E-07 4.82E-07 2.79E-05 (9.22E-06) (9.17E-06) (8.57E-06) (9.41E-06) (1.18E-05) (1.34E-05) (1.50E-05) (1.79E-0)5 (1.89E-05) (9.05E-05) Life exp -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0008 -0.0013 -1.68E-05 0.0009 0.0027

(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0106) LL 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0010 0.0009 0.0013 0.0004 4.09E-05 -0.0041

(0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)* (0.0005) (0.0006)* (0.0005)* (0.0004)*** (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0027) Trade -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 5.96E-05 0.0004 0.0028

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

12

Graph B1 Absolute average per capita income per decile in dollars.

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Table B7. Coefficients and effects of interacting variables.

Model 1 2 3

Decile ODA ODA ODA*POL

(ODA*POL)

*

pol

Column 2+4 ODA ODA² ODA²*ODA Column 6+8

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

14

Table B8. Outcomes of the Tobit models and the model with the ICRG data. Tobit model 1. Dependent Variable: Deciles (199 observations)

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Is Aid Pro Poor?

16

Tobit Aid² model. Dependent Variable: Deciles

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Aid - policy model with ICRG data. Dependent Variable: Deciles 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 ODA -0.6984 -0.723295 -0.6651 -0.4770 -0.5583 -0.2200 -0.1481 0.1210 0.4061 3.4987 (0.1163)*** (0.1176)*** (0.0936)*** (0.1315)*** (0.1252)*** (0.1571) (0.1824) (0.1822) (0.2737) (1.2912)*** ODAPOL 0.2133 0.1887 0.1780 0.1133 0.1197 0.0095 0.0007 -0.1073 -0.2314 -0.7169 (0.0406)*** (0.0410)*** (0.0354)*** 0.0536)** 0.0364)** (0.0416) (0.0708) (0.0652) (0.0857)*** (0.3358)** Pol. Rights -0.0137 -0.0085 -0.0106 -0.0137 -0.0113 -0.0077 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.006164 0.113474 (0.0046)*** (0.0058) (0.0050)** (0.0064)** (0.0059)* (0.0081) (0.0105) (0.0134) (0.0105) (0.0460)** FDI 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0002 0.0019 0.0040 0.0023 0.0038 -9.23E-05 0.0003 -0.0125 (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0226) GDP -0.0045 -0.0114 -0.0078 -0.0058 -0.0146 -0.0102 -0.0097 -0.0097 0.0016 0.0555 (0.0056) (0.0075) (0.0071) (0.0089) (0.0054)*** (0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0092) (0.0605) Gov Exp -0.0010 0.0005 0.0008 0.0006 0.0016 0.0029 0.0012 0.0028 0.0060 -0.0067 (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0023)** (0.0148) Infl 1.02E-05 9.15E-06 2.48E-06 -3.24E 06 3.23E-06 -3.32E-06 3.16E-06 -9.21E-07 -2.29E-05 -1.61E-05

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