AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
STUDENT’S NAME:
SUPERVISOR’S NAME:
PURSUED DEGREE:
P h D T h e s is
IOANNIS NIKOLAOU GRIGORIADIS PROFESSOR WILLIAM M. HALE PHD IN POLITICS
SCHOOL OF ORIENTAL AND AFRICAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
DATE: 26/9/2005
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS... 5
TABLE OF FIGURES... 12
PREFACE... 14
ABSTRACT...15
I. INTRODUCTION-METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS... 18
1. Th e Sc o p eo ft h is St u d y... 18
a. Turkey and Europe in Historical Perspective...18
b. H ypothesis... 21
c. Importance-Contribution...23
2 . Th e o r e t i c a l Co n s i d e r a t i o n s... 2 5 a. Understanding Europeanisation...25
b. Theories o f European Integration... 28
c. Path Dependence Theory...34
d. The Two-Level Game M o d e l...36
e. A Historical Institutionalist Approach... 37
3 . De f i n i n g Po l it i c a l Cu l t u r e... 3 9 a. Aim s...39
b. Definitions o f Political Culture... 40
c. The Debate on Political Culture... 42
4 . Re s e a r c h De t a i l s... 5 0 5 . Ch a p t e r Ou t l i n e...51
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE ON TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE... 54
1. Th e Em e r g e n c eo ft h e Re p u b l i c...5 4 a. The Republican Impact on Turkish Political Culture... 55
2 . Ea r l y Re p u b l i c a n En c o u n t e r sw it h Po l it i c a l Li b e r a l i s m... 5 9 a. The Profile o f Liberalism in Early Republican Turkey... 59
b. The First Liberal Attempt: The Progressive Republican P a rty ... 60
c. The Second Liberal Attempt: The Free Republican Party... 62
3 . Po s t- Se c o n d Wo r l d Wa r De v e l o p m e n t s... 6 4 a. The Rise o f the Opposition...64
b. The Introduction o f Multiparty Politics and the Democrat P a r ty ...66
c. The 1960 Coup and the 1961 Constitution... 67
d. The Coups o f 1971 and 1980... 69
4 . E U - Tu r k e y Re l a t i o n sint h e 1 9 9 0s... 7 0 a. The Transformation o f the European U nion... 70
b. The Domestic D eb a te... 72
c. Strategic Implications o f Turkey's EU Membership... 75
i). The D om estic F ie ld ... 75
ii). The U S F actor... .... 76
iii). The European V is io n ... . ... 79
5. A Br ie f Ch r o n o l o g yo f E U - Tu r k e y Re l a t i o n s... 8 2 III. COMPARING EUROPEAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURES... 85
1. In t r o d u c t i o n... 85
2 . Fe a t u r e so f Eu r o p e a n Po l it i c a l Va l u e s... 86
a. Defining the term “European”... 86
b. Pre-M aastricht European Political C ultures... 88
c. The Maastricht Treaty and European Political Values- Is there a Single European P olitical Culture?...89
d. In Defence o f an Emerging European Political Culture- The Case o f the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs-FPO)...95
e. In Defence o f the Enduring Multiplicity o f European Political Cultures-The Cases o f France, Germany and the United K ingdom ... 97
i). F r a n c e ... 98
ii). G erm any,... 99
iii). U nited K in g d o m ... 100
3 . As s e s s i n g t h e Co n g r u e n c e o f Po l it i c a l Cu l t u r e s o f E U Me m b e r St a t e s a n d Tu r k e y...103
a. Civil Society... 103
b. State Tradition... 108
c. Religion and P olitics... H I d. National Identity... 114
IV. CIVIL SOCIETY... 119
1. Wh a tis Ci v i l So c i e t y... 119
2 . Ci v ilSoci e t yi n Tu r k e y... 121
a. The Ottoman Legacy... 121
b. Civil Society from 1923 to the 1990s... 125
c. Civil Society since the 1 990s...128
i). The Impact o f G lobal A cto rs...128
ii). The Im pact o f D om estic P o litic s ... 131
1). The Kurdish Is s u e ...131
2). The R ise o f Political Islam ...134
d. The Collapse o f the State Icon...137
i). The Susurluk A cc id e n t... 138
ii). The M anisa A ffa ir... 139
iii). The 1999 Earthquake... 140
iv). The 2 0 0 0 -2 0 0 1 E conom ic C risis...141
e. A Typology... 143
3 . Th e Im p a c to ft h e Eu r o p e a n Un i o n... 145
a. Financial Support... 145
b. Legislative Reform... 149
i). B efore the R eform ... 149
ii). The Reform P r o c e ss... 152
4 . Th e St a n c eo f So c i a l Ac t o r s... 156
a. The Bureaucracy...156
b. The Business C apital... 157
5 . Th e In c i d e n c eo f So c i a l Le a r n i n g... 1 6 0 6 . Co n c l u s i o n s...161
V. THE ST ATE...163
1. De f i n i n g St a t e Tr a d i t i o n...163
2 . St a t e Tr a d i t i o nin Tu r k e y... 16 6 a. The Ottoman Legacy... 166
b. The Turkish State from 1923 to the 1990s... 171
c. The Turkish State since the 1 9 9 0 s... 180
i). The Im pact o f G lobal A cto rs...180
ii). The Impact o f D om estic P o litic s ... 181
1). The Securitisation o f Turkish D om estic P o litics... 183
2). The N ational Security C ouncil {M illi G uvenlik K u ru lu -M G K )... 187
3 . Th e Im p a c to ft h e Eu r o p e a n Un i o n... 1 8 9 a. Before the Reform... 189
b. The Reform Process... 192
i). The N ational Security C ouncil {M illi G iiven lik K u r u lu -M G K )... 193
c. The Judicial S ystem ... 195
4 . Th e St a n c eo f So c i a l Ac t o r s.. ... 1 9 7 a. The Bureaucracy...197
b. The Political Elite... 201
5 . Th e In c i d e n c eo f So c i a l Le a r n i n g... 2 0 5 6 . Co n c l u s i o n s...2 1 0 VI. THE SECULARISM DEBATE...212
1. De f i n i n g Se c u l a r i s m...2 1 2 a. History and Types o f Secularism... 212
2 . R e l i g i o n a n d P o l i t i c s in T u r k e y ... 2 1 4 a. The Ottoman Legacy,... 214
b. Religion and Politics from 1923 to the 1990s... 216
c. Religion an d Politics since the 1990s...224
i). The Im pact o f G lobal F actors... 22 4 ii). The Impact o f D om estic P o litic s... 225
d. Is Turkey a Secular State?...228
3 . Th e Im p a c to ft h e Eu r o p e a n Un i o n...231
a. Legislative Reform...231
i). B efore the R eform ... 231
ii). The Reform P ro cess...233
b. The Transformation o f Turkish Political Islam ... 235
c. A New Version o f Secularism in the M aking? ... 240
i). The H eadscarf Is s u e ...243
ii). The Directorate o f R elig io u s A ffairs (Diyanet l§leri Ba§kanligi)...245
4 . Th e St a n c eo fs o c i a l Ac t o r s... 2 4 8 a. The Bureaucracy... 248
b. The Intelligentsia... 250
5 . Th e In c i d e n c eo f So c i a l Le a r n i n g... 2 5 2 6 . Co n c l u s i o n s... 2 5 4 VII. TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY...256
1. Te r r i t o r ia lv s. Et h n i c Na t i o n a l i s m... 2 5 6 2 . De f i n i n g Tu r k i s h Na t i o n a l Id e n t i t y... 2 5 7 a. The Ottoman Legacy... 257
b. Turkish National Identity from 1923 to the 1990s... 260
i). Territorial N a tio n a lism ...261
ii). Ethnic N a tio n a lism ... 263
iii). The R ole o f Islam ... 266
c. Turkish National Identity since the 1990s...270
i). The Im pact o f G lobal A cto rs... 270
ii). The Im pact o f D om estic P o litic s... 272
1). The Kurdish Is s u e ... 272
2). The A le v i R e v iv a l...275
iii). Early Liberalisation A ttem p ts... 27 7 3 . Th e Im p a c to ft h e Eu r o p e a n Un i o n... 2 7 9 a. Before the Reforms... 279
b. The Reform Process... 282
i). Constitutional R efo rm ...282
ii). L egislative R eform .... ... 28 4
iii). Im plem entation o f R eform ... 28 6
4 . Th e “ Wo r k i n g Gr o u po n Mi n o r i t ya n d Cu l t u r a l Ri g h t s” Re p o r t... 2 8 9
a. The Content o f the Report...289
b. The Opposition to the Report... 293
c. The Supporters o f the Report... 295
5 . Th e St a n c eo f So c i a l Ac t o r s... 2 9 8 a. The Bureaucracy...298
b. The Intelligentsia... 301
6 . Th e In c i d e n c eo f So c i a ll e a r n i n g... 3 0 3 7 . Co n c l u s i o n s... v ... 3 0 5 V I I I . C O N C L U S I O N S / P R O S P E C T S O F T U R K I S H P O L I T I C A L C U L T U R E ... 3 0 8 1. Th e o r e t i c a l Co n s i d e r a t i o n s...3 0 8 a. Path Dependence and Turkish Political Culture...308
b. The Applicability o f Historical Institutionalism... 312
i). The European C o m m issio n ... 312
ii). The European Parliam ent... 315
c. Two-Level Games and Political C ulture...316
2 . An As s e s s m e n to ft h e E U Ro l e...3 2 1 a. Legislative Reform...321
b. The Empowerment o f Liberals...322
c. The Sense o f Irreversibility... 324
3 . Th e E U Li b e r a l i s i n g Ef f e c to n Tu r k i s h Po l it i c a l Cu l t u r e...3 2 4 a. European and Turkish Political Cultures Revisited...324
b. Elements o f Continuity in Political Culture... 325
i). C ivil S o c ie ty ... 325
ii). S ta te ... 325
iii). The R ole o f R eligion in P o litics... 326
iv). N ational Id en tity ... 327
c. Evidence o f Change in Political Culture...328
i). C ivil S o c ie ty ... 328
ii). S ta te ... 3 2 9 iii). The Role o f R eligion in P o litics... 330
iv). N ational Id en tity... ... 331 d. A Gradual Shift towards a New Paradigm ... 331
i). Turkey’s EU M em bership Perspective and the Euro-M editerranean Partnership (E M P )... 335
4 . Th e Fu t u r eo f Tu r k e y’s E U Ad v e n t u r ea n d Po l it i c a l Cu l t u r e... 3 3 8
a. A View from Brussels...339 b. Turkey’s Democratic Consolidation and Political Culture... 345
BIBLIOGRAPHY...348
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Political Map o f Turkey (From the CNN W ebsite)... 20 Figure 2. Political Map o f the European Union. M ember states are coloured in yellow, while candidate states in grey (From the European Commission W ebsite)... 24 Figure 3. "Gentlemen" (Efendiler): Atatiirk is imagined addressing the Parliamentary Assembly o f
the Council o f Europe on the day the start o f EU-Turkey accession negotiations is decided (From the Turkish daily Sabah, 17/12/2004)... 74 Figure 4. Map o f the EU Eastern Enlargement (From the Delegation o f the European Commission to the United S tates)...94 Figure 5. A Demonstration o f the "Saturday Mothers" at Galatasaray Square, Istanbul (Picture by Aclan U raz)... 134 Figure 6. "Don't stay silent about torture!" (fykenceye sessiz kalmaP). A poster from the 2004
campaign o f the Human Rights Foundation o f Turkey {Tiirkiye insan Haklan Vakfi-T\\\N) ... 155 Figure 7. Turkey's Prim e M inister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a form er football Player, in probably the most difficult shot o f his career. (Published in the Financial Times, 30/6/2005)... 337 Figure 8. European Duplicity and End (Ziel)-moving regarding Turkey's EU Membership. By Hule
Hanisuc, 1st International Cartoon Competition, Don Quichotte Magazine, Stuttgart, Decem ber 2004... 339 Figure 9. The uncertain future o f EU-Turkey relations is succinctly illustrated in this cartoon.
(Published in the Economist, 30/9/2004)... 341 Figure 10. Orientalist stereotypes persist even among the supporters o f Turkey's EU Membership.
This is how a cartoonist o f the Economist perceives Turkey's EU M embership. (Published in the Economist, 7/10/2005)... 344
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The completion o f this study became possible through the generous financial support o f the Alexander S. Onassis Public Benefit Foundation and the Hellenic State Scholarships Foundation (IKY).
My fieldwork in Turkey was facilitated through travel grants awarded by the University of London Central Research Fund and the SO AS Additional Fieldwork Grant Scheme.
I would like to express my appreciation to Sabanci University, which became my academic base during my fieldwork. I greatly benefited from the library and all the faculty members who showed kind interest in my research work and offered invaluable help.
I would like to thank all my interviewees and other informants for finding the time and patience to answer my questions and clarify my misunderstandings. I would especially like to extend my thankfulness to Prof. Murat Beige, Prof. Metin Heper, Prof. Ziya Oni§, Dr. Ali Qarkoglu, Dr. Meltem Miiftuler Bac, Dr. Akkan Suver, Ambassador Gundiiz Aktan, Mr. Taml Bora and Mr. Soli Ozel.
Last, but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. William M. Hale, whose tireless support throughout my PhD studies cannot be overstated.
PR EFA C E
Studying Turkish politics is not an easy task for a Greek student. One needs to overcome numerous prejudices and stereotypes, which shape Turkey’s image in Greece and form his own view. The task becomes even more difficult if one comes from a family whose fate was tragically shaped by the process o f nation
state formation in the former lands o f the Ottoman Empire.
Turkey then becomes something more than just a foreign or a neighbour country. Its land becomes the homeland o f ancestors, and fieldwork there is rather a long-expected return than a simple fact-finding mission.
I tried hard not to let my national and family background affect my research work. I would like to apologise in advance for any errors or misperceptions, which were based on prejudice and eluded my attention, and ask for the understanding of the reader.
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations on Turkish political culture since the 1990s. While republican institutions and a multi-party political system were introduced in Turkey by the 1950s, political liberalism was the missing part o f Turkey’s substantive democratisation. The subject character o f Ottoman political culture, compounded by the leading political role o f the military and successive military coups, resulted in the consolidation o f a republican political culture, which valued submissiveness toward state authority and did not favour citizen participation. The liberal deficit o f Turkish politics became apparent with Turkey’s decision to pursue membership of the European Union.
Turkey’s need to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria to achieve the start o f EU accession negotiations meant that political liberalisation reforms were inevitable.
This study embarks from an examination o f the historical background to the political culture debate in Turkey. It then explores European and Turkish political cultures and draws a comparison between them. The core of this study consists o f an exploration o f the impact that Turkey’s EU-motivated political reform had on civil society, state-society relations, the role o f religion in politics and national identity. An assessment whether Turkish political culture has become more participant and citizen-centred is attempted in the concluding chapter.
The theoretical framework o f this thesis is informed by the work o f Almond and Verba on civic culture. Historical institutionalist theories o f European integration and path dependence theory are also applied to explain the role o f the European Union in the liberalisation process of Turkish political culture. Putnam’s work on two-level games helps explain the interplay o f Turkish and European actors in the process of EU-Turkey negotiations, while his work on
social capital points at a feature, which can serve as the acid test for the emergence o f a liberal, participant political culture in Turkey.
I. INTRODUCTION-METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Scope of this Study
a. Turkey and Europe in Historical Perspective
The relations between Turkey and the European Union and the future o f Turkey’s EU vocation have attracted considerable public interest in both the EU countries and Turkey. The European identity o f Turkey, the economic, social and political consequences, as well as the practicality of Turkey’s potential membership o f the European Union, have been discussed at length. Based on Turkey’s history and religion, some argued that Turkey is not a member o f the “European family” for geographical and cultural reasons and, therefore, not eligible for EU membership.1 Driven by Turkey’s relatively large size and economic underdevelopment, it was also argued that Turkey’s membership would disrupt EU economic and population balances. Others stressed that the European Union is based on values and a culture of which Turkey is not a part. According to this opinion, EU-Turkey relations could at best reach the level of institutionalised close political and economic co-operation, a “privileged partnership.” Hence, Turkey could never become a full member of the European Union. On the other hand, it was also argued that tolerance and multiculturalism are the key properties o f the emerging European identity and that Turkey’s EU candidacy comprised an excellent opportunity for the European Union to show its inclusive character.
Turkey’s quest to join Europe is by no means novel or without historical precedents. A campaign aiming at the recognition o f a European Ottoman identity
1 The relative ease with which Eastern European states were accepted as members o f the
“European family” in the process o f the EU Eastern enlargement in the 1990s made a striking contrast with European circumspection in the case o f Turkey. See Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand?
The Question o f Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy", Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, no. 3 (2002), pp. 503-07.
had marked Ottoman foreign policy agenda since the initiation o f the Ottoman modernisation programme (Tanzimat) in 1839. A first success was marked in March 1856 when the Ottoman Empire was invited to participate in the “Concert o f Europe” under the provisions o f the Treaty of Paris, which marked the end of the Crimean War (1855-1856).2 Yet the failure o f the Tanzimat leaders to bring about political, economic and social change in the Ottoman Empire and the relapse into authoritarianism under the rule of Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) reinforced existing European stereotypes about the Oriental essence of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire might have been in Europe, as it had successfully invaded and occupied vast parts o f Southeastern and Central Europe in the past and still ruled over a large part o f Southeastern Europe in the late 19th century. Nonetheless, it was not viewed as being an integral part o/E urope, a part o f the European continent in historical, cultural and political terms.3 On the contrary, the Ottoman “Turk” was the geographically proximal manifestation of the Oriental “Other,” against which Europeanness was measured.4 Despotism, underdevelopment, brutality and all the other stereotypical properties of the Orient were epitomised in the Ottoman Empire. The 1908 Young Turk revolution, which ended the despotic rule o f Sultan Abdiilhamid II, raised hopes for political and social change, which would bring the Ottoman Empire closer to Europe.
However, these hopes were soon refuted, as the failure o f the Young Turk
2 The Crimean W ar involved Great Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire, which formed a military alliance that successfully checked the rise o f Russian naval power in the Black Sea. The
“Concert o f Europe” was a term with little real political content. However, what was important for the Ottoman Empire was that for the first tim e it was accepted as a “European power”. See William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London & Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2002), pp.
26-27.
3 The consolidation o f the Ottoman Empire in European territory and its early diplomatic engagem ent with Western European powers did not affect these views.
4 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition. A Critical Addendum to the Literature on International Society", Review o f International Studies, Vol. 17, no. 4 (1991), pp. 330-31
leadership was much more serious than that of the Tanzimat leaders. The situation deteriorated even further when the Ottoman Empire was caught in the maelstrom o f the Balkan Wars and the First World War, which made it a belligerent against Great Britain and France, the two states whose civilisations had arguably contributed the most to what was then understood as Europeanness. The Ottoman defeat did not signal the end o f hostilities, as Mustafa Kemal [A tatiirkf resumed the armed struggle in Anatolia. Nonetheless, despite continued hostilities, Ataturk reckoned that Turkey’s economic political and economic development could only come from the West, from Europe.6
(Figure 1)
Russia Black
Bulgaria Georgia
imenia
O National Capital
• Region Capaal
• S e co n d ary City Prim ary H oad R a ilr o a d A/lmmwmtiv*. Border
— International B order
Mediterranean Sea
F igure 1. P olitical M ap o f T urk ey (F rom th e C N N W ebsite)
s Surnames in brackets were adopted after 1934, when the Family Name Law was passed.
h The concepts o f the “W est” and “Europe” could be interchangeably used at that time, as the United States had not yet gained its dominant position in international politics, which entailed the introduction o f a different paradigm o f W esternisation. The rise o f the European Union as a major international actor in the late 20lh century made the distinction between the terms “Europe” and
“W est” even sharper.
The concept o f “Westernisation despite the West” (Bati ’ya ragmen Batihla§ma) gained crucial importance in Atattirk’s campaign to integrate Turkey into the European political, cultural and social paradigm. Despite the recurrence of atavistic nationalistic suspicions, Europe would always remain the model for Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation.
Yet, the focus o f this study will not be on the intricacies o f Turkey’s Westernisation project, or what its potential membership o f the European Union would mean for both the European Union and itself. This study aims to explore Turkish political culture under the prism o f improving Turkey-EU relations since the 1990s. Given that political culture is an accurate indicator o f political and social transformation, a change o f Turkish political culture under the impact o f its ever-closer relations with the European Union and its membership perspective would constitute a significant step toward its effective Europeanisation.
b. Hypothesis
The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that Turkey’s decision to pursue full membership of the European Union in the 1990s has significantly influenced Turkish political culture. Through the Copenhagen Criteria, the European Union required the introduction o f political liberalism in all states interested in EU membership. Turkey, which had adopted republican ideas since its foundation, had now to imbue its political culture with political liberalism, the element of Western political thought that was disregarded in the process o f Turkey’s political and ideological Westernisation. The impact of political liberalism on Turkish political culture has been profound. Kemalist nationalist ideology, which has been dominant since the foundation o f the Republic, has come under considerable pressure. Turkish national identity has been reconsidered, as all versions of
Turkish nationalism as well as Turkey’s minorities have enjoyed increased protection o f their rights and have also been exposed to the debate that the introduction o f the European supra- or post-national model has opened. Turkey’s state tradition has also been influenced by liberal ideas espoused by the European Union. State intervention in the public sphere has been reduced, whilst the concept of national security has been openly discussed for the first time. Turkey’s human rights legislation has undergone extensive reform aiming at increased protection o f citizens’ human rights. The convergence process with the EU human rights standards has led to a compromise o f state interests for better protection o f individual rights and freedoms. Islam, whose role in the public sphere was historically severely restricted by the secular state, could aspire to improved protection o f religious freedom. Civil society has also benefited from the political liberalisation process. State-independent socialisation, expression and advocacy of group interests against the state have never been more profound and vibrant.
Political and cultural pluralism has been aided through increased protection of individual and social rights. The Turkish state, economy and society have already undergone substantial transformation; their full convergence with the European Union standards, though, is yet to be accomplished.
Turkey’s membership o f the European Union would be the culmination o f a perennial quest for participation in European political and cultural space.
Turkey’s accession to the European Union would also require the successful completion o f its transformation process, leading to complete liberalisation o f Turkish political culture. On the other hand, Turkey’s EU membership would also leave a heavy imprint on the European Union itself. Current debates on European
identity would then have to be then reconsidered, and a more inclusive interpretation of Europeanness would need to be adopted.
c. Importance-Contribution
The importance o f studying Turkish political culture lies in the fact that the liberalisation o f Turkey’s political culture in view o f its integration into the European Union would have a profound impact on Turkey itself, the European Union and directly affect regional politics. Notwithstanding the impact of Turkey’s economic situation, the Cyprus question and Greek-Turkish disputes, Turkey’s illiberal political system has so far been the biggest domestic obstacle to its membership o f the European Union.7 Its political liberalisation would lift the most serious obstacle for its EU membership. Nonetheless, Turkey’s prospective EU membership is o f critical importance for the European Union as well: The membership o f a liberal, democratic Turkey would comprise an acid test for the political values the European Union stands for. As Turkey’s population is almost exclusively Muslim, the integration o f a liberal, democratic Turkey would affirm the inclusive, multicultural, tolerant and universalistic character o f the European Union. Besides, Turkey’s EU membership -despite its obvious functional difficulties, due mainly to its size and relative poverty- would multiply the strategic capabilities o f the European Union in regions as sensitive as the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Studying the debate on Turkish political culture that Turkey’s approach toward the European Union and subsequent political liberalisation steps have initiated, would also contribute to a better understanding o f the challenges faced by liberalising developing countries
7 “Cultural” objections o f European circles to Turkey’s EU vocation constitute an additional hindrance that, however, rather concerns the ongoing debate within the European Union on its identity and potential borders and not Turkey p e r se.
with a strongly authoritarian past and provide valuable insights for the global questions o f democratisation and liberalisation. Although the number o f democratic states has risen considerably in the recent years, this has not meant that democracy has dominated the sphere o f world politics, especially in the Middle East. The difference between procedural and substantive democracy has become clearer than ever.
(Figure 2)
Q A M Q S T A N
R O M A N IA
h aUs t u n
Figure 2. P olitical M ap o f the E uropean U nion. M em ber states are colou red in yellow , w hile ca n d id a te states in grey (F rom the E uropean C om m ission W eb site)
Democratic institutions and elections cannot guarantee the existence o f a fully- functioning democratic political system, if a democratic political culture is not
present. There is a clear need to assist the development o f a civic, participant political culture, which will then enable the successful functioning o f democratic institutions. Transition to political liberalism and the introduction o f participant political culture elements are universal demands, and the political liberalisation of Turkey, a Muslim-populated state with strong historic and political links with Europe and a secular political tradition, would be highly indicative o f the prospects of the same experiment at a regional level. Turkey’s success would weaken the argument that Islam and Western liberal and democratic tradition are incompatible.
2. Theoretical Considerations
Studies focusing on Europeanisation, historical institutionalism, path-dependence theory and the two-level games model comprise the theoretical framework o f this thesis.
a. Understanding Europeanisation
This study has greatly benefited from the theoretical framework on Europeanisation proposed in the volume Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, which focuses on the impact o f Europeanisation on the domestic structures o f the EU member states.8 Europeanisation is thus defined as
“the emergence and development at the European level o f distinct structures o f governance.”9 EU member states change under the exertion o f adaptational pressures whose strength is inversely proportional to the compatibility o f pre-
8 M aria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., Transforming Europe:
Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY & London: Cornell University Press, 2001) 9 Thomas Risse, M aria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction" in M aria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca N Y & London: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 3
existing domestic conditions {goodness o f fit). If domestic structures are largely compatible, convergence occurs at relatively low cost. Nevertheless, when, domestic structures turn out to be both incompatible and enduring, the process of Europeanisation becomes synonymous with radical domestic reform, which often meets serious reaction, and whose success is uncertain.10
The process o f adaptation is further affected by the presence or absence and activity o f mediating factors. Multiple veto points in the domestic structure, facilitating formal institutions, the organisational and policymaking cultures of a country, the differential empowerment o f domestic actors and learning are cited as examples o f mediating factors.11 Structural adaptation can be seriously hampered by the existence o f multiple veto points within a given policy-making structure,12 while mediating formal institutions provide social actors with material and ideational resources to induce structural change. Organisational and policymaking cultures have their own impact on the ability of domestic actors to bring about structural change through the use of adaptational pressures, whilst differential empowerment o f actors in the process o f Europeanisation provides them with incentives to pursue reform with zeal. The extent to which learning mechanisms become operational and domestic actors thereby modify their goals, identities and preferences is also instrumental for the successful implementation o f structural change. Learning constitutes “an agency-centred mechanism to induce such transformations.” 13 The relative strength of elite learning and grassroots societal
10 Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber identified four different types o f Europeanisation, policy- related, political, societal and discursive. See Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper Kaliber, "Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction", South European Society &
Politics, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 3-7.
11 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 2 12 George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, M ulticameralism and Multipartyism", British Journal o f Political Science, Vol.
25, no. 3 (1996), pp. 289-325
13 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 12
pressure on elites in the process o f structural change is also a function of domestic structures. Societal pressure is prevalent in liberal and less so in corporatist structures, while elite learning prevails in elitist and less so in statist ones.14
Differentiating between the Europeanisation and globalisation processes and their effects is also o f critical importance. As Europeanisation and globalisation trends are often interlinked, identifying the effects o f Europeanisation on the domestic political structures o f EU member states can often become difficult. In some cases, Europeanisation itself might constitute a response to the globalisation processes by reinforcing their trends or by protecting EU member states against their undesired effects. Careful process-tracing and attention to the time sequences between EU policies and domestic changes allow us to distinguish between Europeanisation and globalisation effects. The same method can be useful for identifying whether specific structural changes can be attributed to domestic factors, with minor or no independent effects of Europeanisation.15
Turkey is not directly in the focus of this analysis, as the concept o f Europeanisation stricto sensu relates to states that have already joined the Union.
Nevertheless, states in the process o f fulfilling the criteria for EU membership face similar challenges and undergo significant structural changes in their effort to meet the Copenhagen Criteria and become eligible for EU membership. In that respect, the concept o f Europeanisation could also be understood in the wider sense, so that it becomes applicable in the cases of states in the process o f joining the European Union. Improving EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s desire to join
14 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Europeanization o f Citizenship?" in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca N Y & London: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 182
15 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 4
the European Union have resulted in increasing adaptational pressures on Turkey’s domestic political structures, depending on their goodness o f fit.
Meanwhile, mediating factors similar to those described in the study, have emerged and been o f critical importance in influencing the convergence process o f Turkey’s political structures to EU norms. Distinguishing between the effects o f Europeanisation, globalisation and domestic factors on political structures is an equally challenging task, and the aforementioned methodological tools can be successfully applied in the case o f Turkey as well. The model o f Europeanisation can, therefore, be useful in understanding the impact o f improving EU-Turkey relations on Turkish political culture.
b. Theories o f European Integration
Among the theories that have attempted to explain the political role o f institutions in the context o f European integration, four have attracted considerable interest:
functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism and historical institutionalism. Functionalism stresses the autonomous power and energy of society, especially when coupled to entrepreneurial institutions and agents.16 What matters in politics, is the economy, the society and efforts to resolve practical problems faced by individuals trying to solve them cooperatively.17 In this approach, institutions have little bearing on policies and political structures. What really matters is the self-sustainability o f European integration, which becomes possible as a result o f a spillover process. Initial cooperation efforts are amplified due to endogenous economic and political dynamics and result to further integration. This spillover can be functional or political: It is functional, when
16 Ibid., pp. 13-14
17 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. xviii-xxi
problems resulting from incomplete integration enforce deeper policy coordination, mainly in the economic field. It is also political, when existing EU institutions mobilise a self-reinforcing process o f institution-building.
Functionalism lost ground when the development of the European Economic Community turned out to be neither cumulative nor smooth. This showed that institutions had much more bearing on political developments than functionalists had predicted. Neo-functionalist views attempted to bridge the gap between functionalism and political developments at the European level, by addressing the deficiencies o f functionalist arguments with regards to the definability of European cooperation outcomes18 and the persistence o f national interest considerations within supranational institutions.19 Nonetheless, they failed to produce a theory offering a satisfactory account o f European integration.20
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, states are the primary decision makers, while governments are able to structure agendas and control other organisational agents. Moravcsik identified three essential elements at the core of liberal intergovernmentalism: the assumption o f rational state behaviour, a liberal theory o f national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis o f interstate negotiation.21 The “liberal” aspect o f liberal intergovernmentalism refers to the way social and economic interests use domestic political systems to
18 Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory o f Regional Integration", International Organization, Vol. 30, no. 2 (1976), pp. 475-76
19 The case o f the French President de Gaulle and its impact on EEC policies in the 1960s makes a clear case. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting o f Europe and the Uniting o f Latin America", Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, no. 4 (1967), pp. 325-27.
20 Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, no. 4 (1993), pp.
474-76
21 Ibid., p. 480. For an earlier version o f M oravcsik’s argument in defence o f what he then called
“intergovernmental institutionalism”, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European Act - National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European-Com munity", Vol. 45, no. 1 (1991).
influence central decision makers.22 Interdependence in different fields o f politics influences state decision-making processes. Thus, economic interdependence becomes the main determinant o f state policies in the field o f economics, while political-military interdependence has a crucial bearing on foreign policy decisions. Rationalist bargaining and institutional choice theories are additionally applied in order to explain how states reach compromises on disputed issues.23 In their study o f the EU Amsterdam Treaty, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis came up with
“four categories o f evidence confirming the overriding importance o f a rational ranking o f concerns about issue-specific interdependence in the formation of national preferences and positions.” First, the positions o f major state governments on important issues did not disprove the most common theories of issue-specific incentives for cooperation. Second, rational, issue-specific preferences were what was assumed and reported by officials. National policies were also relatively stable before and during the negotiations. Finally,
“exceptional cases of salient policy reversal were positively correlated with salient, predictable and structural changes in domestic politics.”24 When it came to the question of how agreements were reached, interstate bargaining to achieve a substantive outcome was based on asymmetrical interdependence formation.
International actors may have been very active, yet their activity was not in direct proportion with their real influence. States decided to cede sovereignty rights to international actors only where necessary to increase the credibility o f their commitments. In view o f their findings, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis stressed that
22 M eltem M iiftuler-Bac and Lauren M. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", Journal o f European Integration, Vol. 25, no. 1 (2003), pp. 19-20
23 Andrew M oravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Explaining the Treaty o f Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions", Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, no. 1 (1999), pp. 61-62 24 Ibid., pp. 62-69
the governments o f the EU member states and not the EU institutions are the primary actors shaping EU politics.25 Moravcsik elaborated his position by adding the role of institutions in the process o f preference formation and bargaining.
This does not mean an approach toward institutionalism. Institutions are not recognised as primary actors in shaping preferences or affecting identities. Yet, they help enforce agreements, make bargains credible and provide a rule-based structure as a bulwark against defection.27
Constructivist views o f Europeanisation argued that critical decisions for the future o f the European Union were made not on the base o f rational, but normative arguments. The Eastern enlargement is a characteristic case of a norm- based decision within the European Union. The decision to incorporate ten new member states, whose level of economic development was in most cases far behind the EU average levels, could hardly be explained on the basis of the national interests o f existing member states. The enlargement decision could only be made under the influence o f “rhetorical action,” the strategic use of norm- based arguments. Given that liberal democracy has acted as the core and legitimating basis o f the European integration project, it provided the bulk of norm-based arguments, which were used for the further deepening, and widening o f the European Union. Since the new candidate states adopted a rhetoric heavily influenced by political liberalism and democratic ideals, it was virtually impossible for EU institutions and member states to give priority to their economic grievances over the need to prove their loyalty to the constitutive values
25 Ibid., pp. 82-83
26 Andrew M oravcsik, The Choice fo r Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Rome to Maastricht (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 3-4
27 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", pp. 13-14
and norms o f the European Union.28 Identity politics also significantly influence political decision-making within the European Union. Collective nation-state identities define the realm of interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a given political discourse. The responses o f Germany, France and the United Kingdom to the introduction o f a single European currency in the late 1990s differed because o f the unequal identification o f their respective national identities with a common European identity. An increasingly Europeanising national identity in the case o f Germany coincided with strong support for the Euro. In the case o f the United Kingdom, anti-European sentiment and emphasis on British national identity was followed by strong opposition to the Euro, while in France fluctuations in the European vs. national identity debate were mirrored on the
• • 29
French stance regarding the introduction o f the Euro.
While functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism adopt an essentially bottom-up approach, in which social actors are important rather than institutions, institutionalism adopts a top-down approach. Institutions are political vehicles, which can crucially affect political structures and policies, sometimes against the wish o f domestic actors. Hall and Taylor identified four key features o f historical institutionalism:
First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in relatively broad terms. Second, they emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions. Third, they tend to have a view of institutional
28 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norm s, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement o f the European Union", International Organization, Vol. 55, no. 1 (2001), pp. 27-28
29 Thomas Risse et al., "To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union", European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 5, no. 2 (1999), pp. 175-78
development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Fourth, they are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes.30
Historical institutionalism becomes distinctive by emphasising the effects o f institutions on politics.31 In contrast with functionalist views that institutions have been deliberately designed by contemporary actors for the efficient performance o f specific functions, historical institutionalists argue that institutional choices made in the past can persist and thereby shape and contain actors over time.32 Temporary setbacks may occur due to contemporary actor activities, yet institutional choices in the end prevail. Putnam outlined three basic principles, which explained differences in democratic performance.33 According to the first,
“social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions.”
Institutions do not operate in a historical or social vacuum, and the lack or existence o f civic cooperation, democratic government and public trust traditions have a profound influence on institutional performance. As Putnam put it,
“effective and responsive institutions depend, in the language o f civic humanism, on republican virtues and rights.”34 According to the second principle, “changing formal institutions can change political practice.” Institutions do matter in shaping public policy and can become the means for the implementation o f policies and
30 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", Political Studies, Vol. 44, no. 4 (1996), p. 938
31 For a concise account o f historical institutionalism, see Kathleen Ann Thelen and Sven Steinmo,
"Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen and Frank Longstreth, eds,, Structuring Politics : Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cam bridge & N ew York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
32 M ark A. Pollack, "The N ew Institutionalisms and European Integration" in Antje W iener and Thomas Diez, eds., European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 139 33 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 182-85 34 Ibid., p. 182
