CONVERTING PREFERENCES INTO VALUES:
POWER, SYMBOLIC THREATS AND THE PROCESS OF MORALIZATION
Master Thesis, MSc Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
2 ABSTRACT
3 INTRODUCTION
When seeing another person in a supermarket bringing along his or her own bags, people can think in two ways about that person. Does this person like to save money by bringing his or her own bags? Or, does this person really care about the environment, and therefore brings his or her own bags? These questions distinguish between a moralized perception and an amoralized perception, the central topic of this research. Moralization implies the attainment of moral qualities by objects or activities that first were seen as morally neutral; it therefore converts preferences into values (Rozin, Markwith & Stoess, 1997). The main difference between preferences and values is that values are seen as longer-lasting, more self-centered and more internalized (McCauley, Rozin & Schwartz, 1995). Also, less attention is needed to support preferences that become internalized and these have a higher resistance to temptation (Rozin, 1999). According to Rozin (1999), the moralization process is convertible, as well; something previously observed as a moral value of an individual can stop to be a value and become a preference only. Rozin (1999) states that moralization is of importance because “as an entity acquires moral status, it influences society and individual lives in different and more powerful ways (p.218)”. For example self-relevance can result in the fact that morally-laden entities will become internalized. The process of moralization works on various levels and is important for making sense of norms, socialization, and, especially, health-related behaviors and stances towards health issues. On the individual level, for example, new experiences or cognitions may move a situation or event first perceived as a neutral situation into an already active moral idea (Rozin, 1999). The attribution of one‟s own behavior to the area of morality raises the self, rather than threaten it (Jordan & Monin, 2008). On the other hand, moral transgressions are likely to create feelings of guilt or shame, and subsequently, when experiencing guilt or shame, people feel, for example, more morally wrong (Flicker & Barlow, 1996). Literature also shows that individuals having equal social support have a slightly lower probability to moralize with the aim to protect resources (Petersen, 2011). Individual intelligence at the point of motivated reasoning, especially moral rationalization, should empower individuals to frame situations differently. So, situations that will form a threat to the self-interested rationally of individuals will be reframed into situations that will establish their moral position (Kunda, 1990; Haidt, 2001). Thus, it is likely that threats affect moralization.
4 will influence perception (Bell & Hughes-Jones, 2008). Research has shown that power affects the basic cognition of individuals. According to Guinote (2006), the level of perceived power will cause a difference in experience concerning the treatment of information in the visual field. Results of this study indicated that individuals high in power were more capable to make the distinction between relevant and irrelevant information. In particular, differences would be expected when it is relevant to inhibit contextual information (Guinote, 2006). Various researchers found that individuals low in power, like subordinates, will face more social and material threats (e.g. Chance, 1967; Fiske, 1993; Hall & Halberstadt, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Whitney & Smith; 1993). Hence, these individuals are conscious of both the threats and the constraints these threats place on them (Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). Keltner et al. (2003) pointed out that individuals low in power frequently show symptoms of an inhibition system. This inhibition system is sometimes called an alarm system (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006). At the moment that the inhibition system is activated by threats it calls for states related to moods, feelings and attitudes, such as fear, increased alertness for threats and hindrance of response (Gray, 1991; Higgins, 1997). In addition, Anderson and Berdahl (2002) found that powerful individuals, for example managers, experienced more positive and less negative emotion, were positively associated with access to rewards and had a lower probability to perceive threats. In view of that, power will likely moderate the relationship between threats and moralization. This study will contribute to current research because, until now, nothing is investigated about how the relationship between threats and moralization is dependent upon the perception of power. A threatened identity includes a variety of effects, namely a decrease in individual performance (Steele, 1997); a lower self-esteem (Taylor & Brown, 1988) and the wish for fulfilling leading positions will decrease, as well (Davies, Spencer & Steele, 2005).
5 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
Moralization and Threat
6 Perceived Threats and their Sources
Existing research describes various categories of threats, stemming from different sources. Three of these categories are discussed in this paragraph, namely ego threats and physical threats, internal threats and external threats and finally symbolic threats and realistic threats.
Ego threats and physical threats. When experiencing ego threat, one faces a situation or discussion in which there are unfavorable suggestions about the self (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1993). A possible source of facing an ego threat is failure on a task that has to be performed (Heatherton, Herman & Polivy, 1991). Opposed to ego threats, Heatherton et al. (1991) investigated physical threats like taking blood samples or experiencing threats of electrical shocks. In their study, they propose that physical threats have stronger unconscious effects than ego threats do. However, ego threats cause a disinhibiting effect according to otherwise inhibited behaviors, rather than physical threats do.
Internal threats and external threats. A distinction has to be made between internal and external threats; the main difference between those two kinds of threats lies in the presence of social relevance. Internal threats derive from an individual‟s personal life and are therefore perceived only by that person him or herself. These internal threats obviously do not have any relevance for the society (Onraet, Dhont & Van Hiel, 2014). An example of an internal threat for a person could be that he or she is scared to death. Opposed to internal threats, external threats do have societal relevance and hence are caused by the society. An external threat can be perceived as a threat to the individual self, as well as an experienced threat to the overall society (Onraet et al., 2014). Threats to the economy can, for instance, be perceived as external threats.
7 (1999: p. 2222) these threats concern “morals, values, norms, standards, beliefs and attitudes”. The out-groups adhering other views of the world than the in-group, threaten the view of the in-group and consequently the out-groups are disliked (Stephan, Diaz-Loving & Duran, 2000). Realistic threats are defined as: “threats to the very existence of the in-group (e.g. through warfare), threats to the political and economic power of the in-group, and threats to the physical or material well-being of the in-group or its members (e.g. their health)” (Stephan et al., 1999: p.2222). In short, it includes all threats to the welfare of both the group and/or its members (Stephan et al., 1999). The latter category, symbolic versus realistic threats, will be the focus of this study. The reason for this is that, as mentioned before, symbolic threats are threatening to the morals and values of individuals and this will likely influence the extent to which individuals moralize the behavior of others. As opposed to symbolic threats, realistic threats are threatening to the political and physical welfare issues, and thus have nothing to do with values and morals. It is interesting to see if the difference between those threats will result in a different level of moralization. I specifically propose that symbolic threats are most important for influencing the relationship between threat and moralization because these threats concern morals and values of individuals. Within the concept of moralization, morals and values will probably encourage moralization because it is a form of social sanctioning, while realistic threats, concerning political problems, economic problems, and physical well-being will be less influential for moralization.
Hypothesis 1: Symbolic (as opposed to realistic) threats will positively affect moralization.
8 system functions to stimulate goal-directed cognition and behavior (Shen & Dillard, 2007). As mentioned previously, the approach and inhibition theory indicates that the social cognition of individuals is influenced by their level of power. Obviously, the main difference between high-and low-power individuals with respect to social cognition is that the powerful perceive their social surroundings less detailed and more automatic opposed to the powerless who make more cautious and detailed judgments about others‟ behaviors (Keltner et al., 2003). Resulting from the approach and inhibition theory, when living in the same environment, individuals with low power become more sensitive to perceive symbolic threats relative to high power individuals (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002). I propose that the main effect of symbolic threats on moralization will occur only for those low in power.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between (symbolic) threats and moralization will only exist for those low in power.
METHODOLOGY Participants
I collected the data by means of Mechanical Turk (Mturk). The study took approximately 15 minutes to complete and participants were paid $1.25 for their participation. A total of 331 participants (147 men, 184 women) from the United States took part in the online study. They ranged in age from 18 to 83 years, with an average age of 36.14 (SD = 11.70). The majority of the participants (75.5%) were White/Caucasian, followed by Black/African Americans (10.0%) and Asian Americans (6.6%). The remaining participants were of other ethnicities.
In total, 34 participants were excluded after the data was collected due to failed attention checks (n= 10), high suspicion (n= 19), strange comments (n= 2) or the power manipulation check showed that participants did not correctly indicated their role assignment (n= 3). This left 297 participants on which to perform the final analyses.
Research Design
9 Power manipulation. A role-based manipulation method was used to manipulate power. All participants were told that they would be taking part in a workplace training simulation with another Mturk worker at the end of the session. Participants were first asked to complete a short Leadership Questionnaire (adapted from Anderson & Berdahl, 2002) in which they answered the question „How many different leadership roles have you served during the last five years?‟. They then indicated the extent to which twenty different traits applied to them as a person. These traits were, for example, „inventive‟, „assertive‟, „lazy‟, and „dominant‟. The participants indicated their responses to these traits on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = „does not describe me at all‟; 5 = „describes me very well‟). After the leadership questionnaire, participants were told that based on the results of the questionnaire they were assigned to either the role of manager (high power) or the role of subordinate (low power) in the online workplace simulation training that would take place later on in the session. However, in fact, this leadership questionnaire was completely bogus; participants were randomly assigned to the high- and low-power conditions.
In the high-power condition they received the following information (adapted from Rucker, Hu & Galinsky, 2014):
“As a manager, you are in charge of directing your subordinates in the workplace training. You have the influence on structuring the process of the training and you will set the standards by which the training is to be evaluated. You have the complete control over the instructions that are given to your subordinates. In addition, you will evaluate the performance of your subordinates during the training and on the basis of this evaluation you will distribute a bonus among you and your subordinates. There is no opportunity for your subordinates to evaluate you.”
Participants assigned to the low-power condition received the following information (adapted from Rucker et al., 2014):
10 Symbolic and realistic threats manipulation. After the leadership questionnaire and the role assignment, participants were asked to complete an “opinion survey” about a specific topic, namely refugees. This opinion survey served as the threat manipulation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: the realistic threat condition, the symbolic threat condition, or the control condition. Participants indicated on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = „strongly disagree‟; 5 = „strongly agree‟), the extent to which they agreed with the statements presented.
In the symbolic threat condition the statements about refugees were framed as threatening America‟s values, beliefs and culture, such as „Refugee intake is undermining American culture.‟ and „The values and beliefs of refugees regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.‟ (α = 0.89).
The opinion survey in the realistic threat condition presented statements about how refugees were threatening the fiscal welfare of Americans. Examples of these statements included: „Refugees are displacing American workers from their jobs.‟ and „Refugees get more from the United States than they contribute.‟ The symbolic and realistic threat items were derived from the threat scales by Schweitzer, Perkoulidis, Krome, Ludlow and Ryan (2005) (α = 0.89).
As opposed to the symbolic and realistic threat condition, the opinion survey in the control condition showed neutral statements about refugees, for example about their native language and origin. Example statements were: „Refugees come from war-ravaged countries.‟ and „English is often not the native language of refugees.‟ (α = 0.74). I chose such statements because those were in no way related to threats.
The full threat manipulation surveys can be found in Appendix A.
Moralization. I measured moralization using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = „strongly disagree‟; 7 = „strongly agree‟). Included in this moralization scale (Jordan & Mazar, 2014) were nine items. Two examples of these scale items were: „The type of music a person likes listening to says something about how moral of a person they are.‟ and „The way a person dresses says something about how moral of a person they are.‟ (α = 0.91). The full moralization scale can be found in Appendix B.
11 at the start of the study. Thereafter, I asked: „Based on your role assignment, to what extent do you expect to have power over the workplace training simulation?‟, „Based on your role assignment, to what extent do you expect to be in charge of the workplace training simulation?‟ and „Based on your role assignment, to what extent do you expect to have control over the allocation of the bonus in the workplace training simulation?‟. The participants had to rate these three items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = „not at all‟; 5 = „extremely‟) (α = 0.98). For these, I predicted that people assigned to the high-power condition, would score higher on these questions than people assigned to the low-power condition.
In order to check if the surveys successfully manipulated perceived threat as desired, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements (1 = „strongly disagree‟; 5 = „strongly agree‟): „The items about refugees suggested that those refugees pose a threat to Americans.‟, „The items about refugees suggested that refugees pose a threat to the economic well-being of Americans.‟ and „The items about refugees suggested that refugees pose a threat to the values and beliefs of Americans.‟ For these, I predict that the scores on the first question would be higher for both the realistic and symbolic threat condition than they would be for the control condition. I also predicted that the scores on the second question would be higher for participants in the realistic threat condition than they would be for the participants in the symbolic threat condition and the participants in the control condition, whereas the scores on the third question would be higher for participants in the symbolic threat condition as opposed to both participants in the realistic threat condition and the control condition.
12 participants had to wait a couple of minutes “to be paired with another Mturk worker” – although, in reality, this time delay was inserted merely to create the impression that they were being paired. Directly thereafter, participants did complete the leadership questionnaire and they had to wait again to be assigned to either the role of manager or subordinate. After the role assignment, participants read the corresponding story about their role and, while setting up the training simulation task, participants had to complete the threat manipulation – depending on which condition they were randomly assigned to.
Participants then completed the moralization measurement scale. This scale was followed by both the power manipulation check and the threat manipulation check. Lastly, participants completed a suspicion probe and some demographic questions (e.g. gender, age, and ethnicity). They were lastly debriefed and compensated for their time.
RESULTS Manipulation Checks
The power manipulation was successful. As mentioned before, three participants did not correctly indicate their role assignment, therefore I excluded those participants. On the three-item manipulation check for power, the participants assigned to the high-power condition indicated that they had more power (M = 4.27, SD = .72) than the participants assigned to the low-power condition (M = 1.26, SD = .64), F(1, 294) = 670.78, p < .001.
13 TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations of General Perception of Threat Threat Conditions
Power Conditions Realistic Symbolic Control
Low 3.02A 1.15 3.02A 1.26 1.75C 0.84
High 2.98A 1.17 2.70B 1.12 2.17D 1.21
Notes. Means with different subscripts differ at a level of p < .10.
The realistic threat question showed a main effect for threat, F(2, 294) = 34.11, p < .001. That is, the realistic threat question showed that participants assigned to the realistic threat condition felt a higher realistic threat opposed to both participants assigned to the symbolic threat conditions and participants assigned to the control condition. There was no main effect for power, F(1, 294) = 0.17, p = 0.68, and also no interaction effect of power and threat, F(2, 294) = 0.92, p = 0.40. Table 2 contains the power conditions, threat conditions, means and standard deviations of the level of perceived realistic threat.
TABLE 2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Realistic Threat Perception Threat Conditions
Power Conditions Realistic Symbolic Control
Low 3.36 1.19 2.90 1.32 1.92 1.01
High 3.36 1.23 2.60 1.17 2.06 1.16
14 TABLE 3
Means and Standard Deviations of the Symbolic Threat Perception Threat Conditions
Power Conditions Realistic Symbolic Control
Low 2.68 1.14 3.10 1.36 1.79 0.90
High 2.70 1.22 2.98 1.17 2.06 1.17
Study Variable Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Based on the bi-variate correlations coefficients, the level of moralization shows a negative correlation with the threat condition (r = -0.12, p < 0.05), however, because the conditions were not rank ordered the number was meaningless. The threat condition positively correlated with the perceived level of threat (r = 0.63; p < 0.01), but this number is also meaningless because the conditions were not rank ordered.
The manipulation checks also showed some correlations. The manipulation check for power and the power conditions were positively correlated (r = 0.91, p < 0.01), such that a higher condition of power correlated with a higher level of perceived power. The power manipulation check also showed a positive correlation with the level of moralization (r = 0.16; p < 0.01), such that a higher level of perceived power was related to a higher level of moralization.
15 0.01) and symbolic (r = 0.82; p < 0.01) manipulation check correlate positively with the general threat manipulation check, such that a higher level of perceived realistic and symbolic threat correlates with a higher level of general perceived threat. Lastly, the symbolic threat manipulation check and realistic threat manipulation check positively correlate with each other (r = 0.72; p < 0.01), such that a higher perceived symbolic threat correlates with a higher perceived realistic threat.
Table 4 contains the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all study variables.
TABLE 4
Descriptive Statistics and Study Variable Correlations
Notes. N = 297. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Gender (1 = male, 2 = female), power conditions (1 = high power, -1 = low power), threat conditions (1 = realistic threat, 2 = symbolic threat, 3 = control condition).
Test of hypotheses. In order to test my two hypotheses, I ran a two-way ANOVA. The results showed a marginally-significant main effect of power on moralization, F(1, 294) = 3.12, p = 0.08. There was no main effect of threat on moralization, F(2, 294) = 2.24, p = 0.11, and there was also no interaction effect of power and threat on moralization, F(2, 294) = 0.33,
16 p = 0.72. The means and standard deviations from the ANOVA of power and threat on moralization can be found in Table 5.
TABLE 5
Means and Standard Deviations from the ANOVA of Power and Threat on Moralization Threat Conditions
Power Conditions Realistic Symbolic Control
Low 3.77 1.30 3.35 1.38 3.40 1.32
High 3.94 1.09 3.78 1.13 3.58 1.41
To explore the results further, I ran another two-way ANOVA with the threat level as a covariate, because these scores could have influenced the level of moralization. These results again showed a main effect of power on moralization, F(1, 293) = 4.09, p = 0.04. This means that a higher level of power resulted in a higher level of moralization. Hence, a main effect of threat on moralization was also shown, F(2, 293) = 3.57, p = 0.03. There was no interaction effect of power and threat on moralization, F(2, 293) = 0.31, p = 0.74. The results of the simple contrast tests indicated that overall a realistic threat was related to a higher level of moralization, in opposition to a symbolic threat. The means and standard deviations from the ANOVA of power and threat on moralization, with the level of perceived threat as the covariate can be found in Table 6.
TABLE 6
Means and Standard Deviations from the ANOVA of Power and Threat on Moralization, with Threat as a Covariate
Threat Conditions
Power Conditions Realistic Symbolic Control
Low 3.77A 1.30 3.35B 1.38 3.40B,C 1.32
High 3.94A 1.09 3.78A 1.13 3.58B, D 1.41
Notes. Means with different subscripts differ at a level of p < 0.05.
17 And according to Hypothesis 2, I predicted that the relationship between (symbolic) threats and moralization will only exist for those low in power. The results showed that there exists no interaction effect between power and threat on moralization. In addition, the results showed that there was a marginally-significant main effect of a power on moralization. This main effect was found to be positive, indicating that individuals lacking power will moralize less than individuals high in power. When again inserting the threat level variables as a covariate, the main effect of power on moralization became significant, but there was still no interaction effect between power and threat on moralization.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between threats and moralization and the moderating role of power; the threats were perceived either as a symbolic or realistic threat. The findings of this study suggest that the perception of a threat resulted in a higher level of moralization, particularly when perceiving a realistic threat. There was no interaction between power and threat on the level of moralization. The positive relationship between threats and moralization is thus not conditional upon the level of perceived power. The results showed that there is no influence of power on the relationship between threats and moralization. The findings further suggest that power and moralization are related, however, the results were not in line with the expectations. I expected that power and moralization would be negatively related, such that a high level of power results in a low level of moralization. In opposition to that, the results show that a high level of power results in a high level of moralization, power and moralization are thus positively related.
18 Another explanation why powerful people are more likely to moralize can be found in the work of Rozin. As mentioned in the introduction, Rozin (1999) indicated that when acquiring moral status, individuals can influence society and other individuals in more powerful ways. Individuals who already possess a level of power, can thus seek for opportunities to be more influential and more powerful. An important opportunity for them is acquiring moral status by the moralization of behavior.
The results of the manipulation checks showed that besides the power manipulation, also the threat manipulation was successful. The power manipulation method was partly adapted from Rucker et al. (2014); but, the adjustments I made to use this manipulation method for an Mturk study were successful. Using an opinion survey to serve as a manipulation for different threats was also successful. The five-item scales were reliable enough to combine them into one item; answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = „strongly disagree‟; 5 = „strongly agree‟). Therefore, mean scores of the perception of power are computed; realistic threat, M = 2.67, SD = 1.06, symbolic threat, M = 2.78, SD = 0.97, and the control condition, M = 4.52, SD = 0.47. This suggests that the developed realistic and symbolic threat scales inserted in an opinion survey can be used successfully as a manipulation method. In addition to the positive relationship between power and moralization, it seems that the perception of a symbolic or realistic threat does not interact with the level of power an individual perceives. However, the main effect of threat indicates that perceiving a threat results in a higher level of moralization.
Theoretical Implications
Until now, little research has been conducted about the concept of moralization. There is some existing research about the relationship between power and moralization, which suggests that the perception of power will result in a low level of moralization. This study adds to the existing literature that relationship between power and moralization is not purely negative. The results show that power and moralization can also be positively related; such that, a high perception of power results in a high level of moralization.
Limitations
19 realistic threat. This correlation makes it difficult to measure the direct effect of perceiving either a realistic or a symbolic threat on the level of moralization.
Secondly, the way of measuring moralization can be a limitation for this investigation. There is a possibility that some behaviors are moralized more directly (e.g. the hobbies of a person), while others are not directly thought of as either moral or amoral behavior (e.g. the places a person travels to). The behaviors that are moralized more directly can form a sort of foundation for further moral development, such that people who already moralize those basic behaviors also make moral extensions with respect to other behaviors. People who have a low initial level of moralization, will also not moralize the more extensive behaviors. The moralization scale exists of various behaviors, of which some could serve as the foundation and some are more extensive moral considerations.
Because of these limitations, the results need to be interpreted with caution.
Future Research
The focus of future research could be on reasons for differences between which behaviors people are more likely to moralize and which they are less. As mentioned above, some behaviors could be moralized directly, while others are not. Research could focus on the reasons for this phenomenon, for example by letting participants themselves indicate which behaviors they see as moral of a person rather than providing a moralization scale with specified behaviors.
In addition, research could focus on the other types of self-threats introduced in the methodology, namely ego threats versus physical threats and internal threats versus external threats. These threats could also influence the level of moralization, but are not investigated in this study. Ego threats and physical threats can be two interesting variables to manipulate within an experiment, while participants themselves can indicate which internal and external threats they face in their environment by means of a survey.
20 Managerial and HRM Implications
As mentioned above, an important implication for managers and HRM can be linked to the influence of acquiring moral status. Rozin (1999) stated that an entity or person that acquired moral status will influence others in more powerful ways. Therefore, it may be favorable for managers to acquire moral status. Because moralization is influential at various levels, it is important to take into account the effects of moralization for HRM. Moralization can raise the self, but also create feelings of guilt and shame. Individual intelligence should empower individuals to frame situations differently, and thus establish their moral position. This indicates that moralization can become an important point of attention for managers and HRM.
Conclusions
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24 APPENDIX A
THREAT MANIPULATION SCALES Preamble
Before you begin the workplace training simulation, we are interested in your opinion about a specific topic, namely refugees in America. Currently, there are many refugees coming to the United States. In the United States, almost half of all refugee arrivals last year came from the Near East/South Asia – a region that includes Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.
Items from the realistic threat scale:
1. Refugees get more from the United States than they contribute. 2. Refugees have increased the tax burden on Americans.
3. Refugees are displacing American workers from their jobs.
4. The children of refugees should not have the same rights to attend public schools in the United States as American children do.
5. Refugees should not be eligible for the same health care benefits (i.e. Medicare) as those received by Americans.
Items from the symbolic threat scale:
1. Refugee intake is undermining American culture.
2. The values and beliefs of refugees regarding moral and religious issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.
3. Refugees should have to accept American ways.
4. The values and beliefs of refugees regarding family issues and socializing children are basically quite different to that of Americans.
5. The values and beliefs of refugees regarding social relations are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans
Items from the control threat scale:
1. Refugees come from war-ravaged countries.
2. Generally, refugees are from countries outside the United States. 3. Refugees consist of adults and children.
25 APPENDIX B
MORALIZATION SCALE Preamble
Now, please indicate to what extent you agree with each of the following statements from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Items from the moralization scale:
1. The way a person dresses says something about how moral of a person they are.
2. The design/decoration of a person‟s home says something about how moral of a person they are.
3. The hobbies a person engages in says something about how moral of a person they are. 4. The books or magazines that a person reads say something about how moral of a person
they are.
5. The type of music a person likes listening to says something about how moral of a person they are.
6. The places a person likes to travel to say something about how moral of a person they are. 7. The type of job a person holds says something about how moral of a person they are. 8. The behavior of one‟s friends says something about how moral of a person one is. 9. The language or words a person uses says something about how moral of a person they
