1
The impact of board gender diversity on firm risk-taking
behaviour: the moderating role of home country culture.
Master Thesis for Double Masters Degree “Managing Multinationals”.
Anouk Osinga
University of Groningen & University of Uppsala Faculty of Economics and Business Zernike Campus, Duisenberg Building
Nettelbosje 2
Groningen, the Netherlands, 9747AE Tel: +31503638900
Email: a.osinga.5@student.rug.nl
Student Number: S2890429 Supervisor: dr. L. (Gary) Ge Co-assessor: dr. S. R. (Sathyajit) Gubbi
Year: 2019 – 2020 Date: 16th January, 2020
2 ABSTRACT
This paper is focused on the effect board gender diversity has on firm risk-taking behaviour within the domain of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). As existing literature has produced mixed findings concerning board effectiveness in the corporate context, it is suggested that external contingencies might have an impact on the influence of female board representativeness. In response, this study examines the impact of board gender diversity on the degree of acquisitiveness by taking a cross-cultural perspective. Building on social identity theory, this paper predicts that female representativeness at the board level is negatively associated with a firm’s acquisitiveness. Additionally, this study theorizes and empirically tests the moderating effect of culture in terms of gender egalitarianism and uncertainty avoidance. The panel data used in this analysis consists of 111 Global 500 firms from 17 different countries, covering the period 2012 - 2016. Results in this paper support the notion that board gender diversity is negatively associated with acquisitiveness and that culture in terms of gender egalitarianism has a weakening effect on this relationship. Moreover, this paper contributes to existing research by offering new insights onto the role culture plays in the relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking behaviour and, as a result, helps to reconcile mixed findings of previous literature focused on this topic.
Keywords: Board Gender Diversity, Culture, Firm Strategic Behaviour, Mergers and Acquisitions,
3
Table of Content
Introduction ... 4
Literature Review ... 8
Implications from board gender diversity ... 8
Social Identity Theory ... 9
Upper Echelon Theory ... 10
Corporate risk-taking behaviour ... 11
Culture ... 12
Theory and hypothesis development ... 14
Board gender diversity and acquisitiveness ... 14
Gender egalitarianism ... 15 Uncertainty avoidance ... 15 Methodology ... 17 Sample ... 17 Independent variable ... 17 Dependent variable ... 18 Moderators ... 19 Control variables ... 19 Analysis ... 20
Descriptive statistics and correlations ... 21
Stationarity ... 23
Normality in distribution ... 23
Hausman test for endogeneity ... 24
Results ... 24
Robustness check ... 28
Discussion ... 28
Theoretical implications ... 29
Practical implications ... 31
Limitations and future research opportunities ... 32
Conclusion ... 34
References ... 35
4 INTRODUCTION
This decade has been characterised by an increased focus on gender equality in the workforce with Norway being the first country to implement gender-based quotas for board positions in 2002. Several countries followed and introduced similar policies and regulations. As a consequence, many firms face a need to draw attention towards the inclusion of female representatives in their boardrooms as they have mainly been male-dominated in the past (Seierstad, Gabaldon & Mensi-Klarbach, 2017). In line with such developments, it is essential to understand the impact of female board representativeness within the corporate context (Chen, Crossland & Huang, 2016).
Past research has shown considerable attention towards the association between board gender diversity and firm performance (e.g. Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003; Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013;), and experienced an increasing interest towards the understanding of how gender diversity influences firm strategic behaviour (e.g. Chen et al., 2016; Levi, Li & Zhang, 2014; Loukil & Yousfi, 2016). Nevertheless, the empirical results present a complex picture of the impact board gender diversity has on firm performance and behaviour by covering both advantages and disadvantages. Several scholars advocate that gender diversity in the boardroom may lead to positive outcomes related to increased board effectiveness (Post & Byron, 2015). Studies for example show that female representativeness may reinforce the breadth of perspectives, knowledge, and information flows (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1992) leading to higher quality decision-making processes (Levi et al., 2014), and in addition demonstrate that it may stimulate monitoring and promotes attendance during meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). On top of that, the presence of female board members is found to result in an improved public reputation which contributes to enhanced firm performance (Low, Roberts & Whiting, 2015). On the other hand, others suggest that gender-based heterogeneity may lead to several disadvantages that relate to board ineffectiveness (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). A possible negative consequence for including females in the board is excessive monitoring which in turn slows down decision-making processes (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), and therefore hampers effectiveness (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Other studies supporting this perspective suggest that gender diversity may hinder effective communication (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996), and impedes group cohesion resulting in higher coordination costs (Michel & Hambrick, 1992).
5
two-sidedness gives an indication of the role context plays when determining advantages and disadvantages of having a gender diverse board as the mixed findings related to effectiveness may be contingent on exogenous factors (e.g. Seierstad et al., 2017; Wang, Holmes, Devine & Bishoff, 2018). Although it is assumed that contextual factors such as a firm’s home country culture or corporate culture can have a contingent relationship with the corporate outcomes related to board gender diversity, this matter is not fully explored yet (Bazel-Shoham, Lee, Rivera, Shoham, 2017; Seierstad et al., 2017; Sila, Gonzalez & Hagendorff, 2016). It is only recently that a few studies attempted to study the association between board gender diversity and firm strategic behaviour (e.g. Bazel-Shoham et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2014; Loukil & Yousfi, 2016). However, besides the research of Bazel-Shoham et al. (2017), none of those studies controlled for the cultural aspect that might influence this relationship. The findings of the study by Bazel-Shoham et al. (2017) show that gaps in linguistic gender marking as an aspect of culture, moderate the impact board gender diversity has on cross-border M&As. Therefore, their findings indicate the role exogenous factors such as culture can play in the relationship between board gender diversity and firm strategic behaviour. However, even though some have examined the moderating role of culture in the relationship between board gender diversity and firm performance (Low et al., 2015), almost none have done so when focusing on the impact on firm strategic behaviour (Bazel-Shoham et al., 2017).
Closing this gap is important because if it is true that the relationship between board gender diversity and firm strategic behaviour is contingent on the firm’s home country culture, scholars need to be cautious when generalising findings stemming from this association. Examining the moderating role culture plays in this relationship may improve the understanding of the firm’s strategic behaviour and how it might differ depending on a firm’s external environment (Seierstad et al., 2017). As a result, scholars, businesses, policymakers and practitioners can use the generated knowledge to understand corporate governance and its structures and perhaps find better ways to shape those structures. Therefore, this paper will adopt a contingency approach to reconcile the complex nature of the effects board gender diversity has on firm strategic behaviour.
6
Additionally, this meta-analysis found no articles referring to the role gender plays in M&As. Therefore, next to the small number of studies examining the moderating role of culture when focusing on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm strategic behaviour, an additional gap can be identified. That additional gap in the literature is the limited number of studies examining the impact board gender diversity has on a firm’s risk-taking behaviour in terms of M&As.
Closing this additional gap by focusing on firm strategic behaviour in terms of risk-taking, as measured by the number of M&As, is important because it can shed light on why a significant amount of M&A deals fail (Chatterjee, 1992). It is argued that M&As form a suitable context for studying the implications of gender diversity in the boardroom (Levi et al., 2014). According to recent literature, gender diversity at the boardroom may affect M&A decisions (Chen et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2014). Secondly, decisions regarding M&A deals involve intense discussions at the board level, and individual directors can therefore have a significant impact on the eventual decision (Levi et al., 2014). Hence, it can be perceived as an ideal setting in which the influence of board gender diversity can be examined.
7
that boards in cultures with a higher degree of uncertainty avoidance are more likely to show gender-based in- and out-group categorisation as females entering the board can be perceived to bring uncertainty in boards that have been male-dominated in the past. Hence, it is hypothesised that conflicts arise and more thorough decision-making is expected, resulting in a lower level of acquisitiveness.
This study makes several important contributions to existing literature and provides implications for business practices. First of all, this study helps to close the gap that is present in the existing literature that has been focusing on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm strategic behaviour. As the mixed findings related to board (in)effectiveness suggests a contingent nature of the relationship examined, this study adopts a cross-cultural approach. A novel contribution lies in the use of the cultural component in relation with social identity theory. No prior research has been identified examining the moderating effect of gender egalitarianism and uncertainty avoidance in this specific context. Secondly, this study contributes to M&A literature by investigating the impact board gender diversity has on M&As. Gender has mostly been neglected when examining factors influencing M&A deals. Therefore, the contribution of this research is of importance as it examines the influence of gender diversity at the board level on M&As by creating hypotheses that are based on the well-established social identity theory. As a result, this study will add to the understanding of the decision-making processes related to acquisitions.
Moving on to the study’s contribution to business practices, this research sheds light on the effect board gender diversity has on strategic risk-taking behaviour of firms. Corporations can take this into consideration when appointing new board members as well as when it analyses its decision-making processes. Secondly, by including a firm’s home country culture, a better understanding of the effect of culture on the impact women have in decision-making processes at the board level can be created. Advancing knowledge on this concept helps to identify and perhaps tackles disproportionate risk-taking behaviour as it provides a better understanding of the sources creating such behaviour.
8
broader concept of strategic behaviour. Moreover, risk-taking behaviour will be examined by focusing on a firm’s degree of acquisitiveness.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section, previous literature on the topics of gender diversity and firm risk-taking behaviour will be reviewed, which will serve as a theoretical basis for this research. First of all, the concept of gender diversity will be explored by a brief analysis of existing literature, followed by an examination of the social identity theory and the upper echelon theory. Afterwards, existing research on corporate risk-taking behaviour and M&As will be discussed and theoretical perspectives on the moderating role of culture in such relationships are being reviewed by using cultural theory.
Implications from board gender diversity
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the implications that stem from the inclusion of female members on corporate boards. As top management teams have mainly been male-dominated in the past, the participation of females in such teams increases group heterogeneity. According to Filley, House and Kerr (1976), such heterogeneity is not beneficial for routine problem solving as this is most effective when a group is characterised as homogeneous. Nevertheless, their findings show that heterogeneous groups are best in handling novel problem solving as such groups own a diversity in opinions, knowledge, and backgrounds which allows for a broader focus on the consideration of different alternatives when making decisions. Sambharya (1996) supports this perspective by arguing that top management team heterogeneity leads to the existence of different perspectives in a firm’s decision-making process. It is found that such groups are more inclined to achieve consensus and try to find agreement among the whole group resulting in less extreme decisions (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969).
9
to be more risk-averse than men (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2001; Hinz, McCarthy & Turner, 1997; Loukil et al., 2016; Sundén & Surette, 1998; Siegrist, Cvetkocivh, & Gutscher, 2002). A meta-analysis on the risk-taking differences between men and women shows that findings in most research indeed give the impression that males are engaged in more risk-taking actions than females (Byrnes, Miller & Shafer, 1999). However, those studies are often conducted in non-corporate environments which makes it difficult to transfer the findings to the board level. This difficulty arises because the nature of the task and the context heavily influence and determine the impact gender has on risk-taking behaviour (Schubert, Brown, Gysler & Brachinger 1999). Additionally, several studies are showing no or little evidence for the assumption that female leaders are more risk-averse than their male counterparts (Adams & Funk, 2012; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). It is thus important to create more clarity on the impact that incorporating women in boards has on firm risk-taking behaviour. To achieve this, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1978; Turner, 1975) will be used for an examination of the impact female representation has on decision-making processes at the board level in the next paragraph.
Social identity theory
Social identity theory can be described as a theory that focuses on the prediction of in-group behaviours by analysing perceived group status differences, perceived legitimacy and stability of the identified status differences, and the perceived availability of the option to transfer to another group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999). According to this theory, a person’s idea of their own identity is based on their group membership (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). An individual’s social identity is thus dependent on the individual’s knowledge of belonging to a particular in-group, but it is also based on the significance of the value and emotion that a person places on its in-group membership (Tajfel, 1972).
10
roles (Bazel-Shoham et al., 2017; Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1985). A director of a board can thus belong to the category male or female.
The second process that is involved in the creation of social identity is comparison (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The behaviour will change following the identity of the group a person belongs to. As individuals try to achieve and maintain a positive social identity, their behaviour will be matched with the in-group relationship (Turner et al., 1987). Additionally, an individual’s in-group membership will affect the way how they perceive and interact with out-groups. In-group favouritism can rise when individuals give preferential treatment to others in the in-group and, in turn, results in an increase in cooperation and cohesion amongst its members (Brewer, 1979; Ellemers & Barreto, 2001). Additionally, according to Yzerbyt and Demouling (2010), group members often show a preference in interacting with other in-group members by allocating resources, attention and support to fellow in-group members. As a consequence of the creation of in-group favouritism, out-group discrimination is being established (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Members of the in-group might, for example, develop a negative stereotype of out-group members and depersonalise individuals of that group (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). This results in a situation in which in-group members who interact with out-group members do not perceive the individuals they have contact with as human beings with their unique personalities, but rather see them as a distinct category called the out-group (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). Additionally, members of the in-group might create a bias towards their group’s success by only identifying their own achievements and focusing on out-group failures (Smith, 1983). As a result of the out-group discrimination as well as the depersonalization of its members, in-group representatives create fear- and greed-responses (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko & Schopler, 2003). These responses are based on the expectation that the out-group will present competitive behaviour and signs of vulnerability (Wildschut et al., 2003). Therefore, representatives are inclined to act competitively and show a lower level of cooperative behaviour towards the other group.
Upper Echelon Theory
11
(Hamsbrick & Mason, 1984). As a result, organisational outcomes are partially predicted by the background characteristics of a firm’s management (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). More specifically, according to the theory, the characteristics of the top management team members are manifested in the strategic behaviour of a firm and therefore, are shaping firm performance. Based on the Upper Echelon perspective it can thus be expected that gender diversity in the boardroom has an effect on the strategic behaviour of a firm as women are found to have different values, experiences and personalities than men (e.g. Beutel & Marini, 1995; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Linking the social identity theory with the upper echelon theory, it can thus be expected that gender diversity manifested at the board level shapes the strategic choices made by a firm. Therefore, it can be assumed that, based on both theories, risk-taking behaviour is being influenced by a firm’s board composition.
Corporate risk-taking behaviour and M&As
Risk is a key factor that determines the strategic behaviour of the firm as it is central to a firm’s survival and advancement (Shapira, 1995). Companies decide to engage in risky projects with positive net present value to gain satisfying shareholder returns (Sila et al., 2016). An example of corporate risk-taking behaviour is a firm’s acquisition intensity (Chen et al., 2016). Acquisition intensity can be defined as the number of deals a firm makes and considers the size of each deal (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel., 1996). For years, many firms choose to acquire other businesses in order to create value. Nevertheless, only a few have been successful using this strategy as research shows that often little or no value is created by acquiring other firms (Hitt et al., 2009; Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001). One of the explanations for the little success that has been achieved with acquisitions is that deals have been made without extensive due diligence and rational consideration of different alternatives (Puranam, Powell, & Singh, 2006). According to Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), the decision to engage in more comprehensive due diligence is a choice between an inevitable loss due to the costs involved in engaging in the due diligence activity and an uncertain gain that is related to the positive outcomes of the acquisition. Therefore this choice leads to risk-taking behaviour (Kahnemann & Tversky, 1979). It can thus be assumed that firms making an acquisition deal have made a consideration of the sure losses and potential gains resulting from the acquisition. Therefore, obtaining new information related to the value of a target is critical to the determination of the risk involved in the acquisition of the target company (Puranam et al., 2006).
12
al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016). Most of those studies find that an increase in female board members is negatively related with the number of acquisitions the firm engages in, which is also called acquisitiveness by many scholars (Chen et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2014). Huang and Kisgen (2013), for example, find that male executives are more likely to engage in value-destroying acquisitions, whereas females have a greater tendency to engage in acquisitions that require a lower premium and offers higher returns. However, others find the opposite or no relationship at all (Adams & Funk, 2012; Graham, Harvey & Puri, 2013). One explanation of the mixing results could be the contextual differences of the companies included in the samples of previous research. It can be expected that there are contextual variables such as culture that could have an impact on the relationship described.
Culture
Erez (1993) identified six changes that underline the importance of being focused on gender diversity and culture. These changes consist of increased diversity in the labour force, the focus from national to international environments, increased numbers of firms engaging in cross-border M&As, organisations restructuring themselves across different nations, technological advancement, and an increase in women entering the labour force worldwide. Terjesen and Singh (2008) also stress the importance of considering the external environment when analysing gender diversity in the boardroom as it can influence the women’s representation in corporate boards. Culture is part of this external environment and is partly reflected by the socially constructed category “gender” in a way that it determines what is feminine and what is masculine (Meier-Pesti & Penz, 2008). One of the studies that made a significant contribution to the existing culture and leadership research is the GLOBE study of 62 countries. Globe identified several cultural dimensions, including gender egalitarianism and uncertainty avoidance (House et al., 2004).
13
gender egalitarianism can affect the decision-making processes of female board members (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). According to Wang et al. (2018), gender egalitarianism is central to the understanding of the acceptance of women in top management as it can create a source of uncertainty that is not present when male executives are included. This might especially be true for boards that have been males-only for a long period. In such cultures where gender egalitarianism is low, the creation of gender stereotypes is more popular (Parboteeah, Hoegl & Cullen, 2008). Contrarily, women and men are perceived as more equal in countries that are characterised by high levels of gender egalitarianism. In such cultures, the presence of gender-egalitarian normative institutions negatively influences the presence of traditional gender role stereotypes (Parboteeah et al., 2008). As a result, females in top management can more easily access resources and opportunities such as education, job offerings, economic participation, and political participation (Post & Byron, 2015). In such cultures, male board members will face a lower degree of uncertainty as they are used to the presence of women in higher ranks and treat them more equally as a consequence (Wang et al., 2018). Therefore, it is assumed that when a high level of gender egalitarianism characterises the home country culture of a firm, women should feel more accepted and more comfortable working with individuals having another gender.
14 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
In the next section, three hypotheses are being described, building on the theories discussed in the literature review. The first hypothesis describes the main relationship tested. The second and third hypothesis include the moderating effect of culture for which the second hypothesis includes the role of gender egalitarianism and the third the impact of home country degree of uncertainty avoidance. The hypotheses created can be found in the conceptual model at the end of this paragraph (Figure 1.).
Board gender diversity and acquisitiveness
15
understanding of the value of the target firm. As a result, when the outcome of the due diligence is a lower expected value of the target firm, the acquirer is more likely to withdraw from the acquisition or redo negotiation processes (Puranam et al., 2006). Building on the arguments discussed above the following hypothesis has been established.
H1: Based on the in-group and out-group categorisation of gender, including female members in the board results in a more thorough decision-making process and, as a result, leads to a lower number of acquisitions.
Gender egalitarianism
The second hypothesis is connected to the cultural concept of gender egalitarianism. As gender egalitarianism minimises the degree of gender inequality (House et al., 2004), it can be expected that it will affect the in-group and out-group categorisation of males and females. The establishment of such categorisation is because gender is found to be a key factor that determines to which group an individual belongs to: females or males (Hogg & Terry, 2000). If a country is known to have a high degree of gender egalitarianism, it can be expected that it is less likely that gender becomes a critical basis for an individual’s group identification. As a result, the presence of categorisation between males and females becomes smaller. Therefore, it can be assumed that when a culture is characterised as having a high level of gender egalitarianism, females entering a board that previously has been male-dominated face less out-group discrimination from males. In such situations, preferential statuses and competitive behaviours are less likely to be based on gender categories. As a result, the effect of gender-based in-group and out-group categorisation will be less present. Therefore, cooperation between males and females is more likely to exist in gender-egalitarian countries. Such cooperation might result in different alternatives not necessarily being discussed more extensively when women enter the board. However, it might be the other way around in countries with a lower score on the gender egalitarianism dimension as gender-based in- and out-group categorisation would be more likely in those cultures. Therefore, based on the arguments discussed above, the following hypothesis is developed.
H2: When the firm’s home country culture is characterised as egalitarian, gender-based in-group and out-group categorisation will be less present and, therefore, weakens the relationship described in H1.
Uncertainty avoidance
16
or group is dependent on rules, social norms, and structure to limit the occurrence of unpredictable events (House et al., 2004). As described above, the introduction of women to corporate boards involves some degree of uncertainty as male-dominated boards are not used to work with female board members. As a consequence, the introduction of females would interrupt this dominance (Seierstad et al., 2017). Therefore, appointing female board members can challenge societal expectations and norms about the concept of gender and, more specifically, the concept of women in leadership positions. Altogether, the introduction of females in leadership positions can thus be perceived as a source of uncertainty (Wang et al., 2018). Consequently, situations will be established in which males try to avoid contact with female members and in which they show fear- and greed-responses. Therefore, males will demonstrate competitive behaviour and develop a bias towards women being vulnerable. Due to competitive behaviour, a more thorough decision-making process is expected in which different alternatives to a strategic issue are being discussed. As a result, it will strengthen the relationship between board gender diversity and acquisitiveness. It can thus be suggested that countries characterised by a lower level of uncertainty avoidance will less likely perceive uncertainty when females are making their way into the boardroom. As a result, there will be a smaller likelihood of the creation of fear- and greed-responses between the two gender groups. Correspondingly, conflicts based on the discrimination between the two groups are less likely, and it is expected that the decision-making processes are characterised as less thorough and less comprehensive leading to a higher chance of risk-taking behaviour. Building on these expectations presented above, the following hypothesis has been created.
H3: When the firm’s home country culture is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty avoidance, gender-based in-group and out-group categorisation will be more present and, therefore, strengthens the relationship described in H1.
Figure 1: Conceptual model
17 METHODOLOGY
In this paragraph, the methodological practices used by this study will be explained. First of all, the sample's characteristics will be described, followed by an explanation of how the variables have been identified and measured. A summary of the variables with their corresponding measures and definitions can be found in Table 1 at the end of this paragraph.
Sample
In order to test the hypotheses, a sample including firms from different home countries is used which allows for testing the effect of the moderating role culture plays. For the creation of the initial sample, companies included in the Global 500 (Fortune, 2019) have been covered. This ranking lists companies from all over the world based on their total revenues and reflects global business and development performance (Long, 2016). Once the firms have been identified, board information has been retrieved from BoardEx, which is a databank providing worldwide company board data. Boardex published the latest files in the year 2017 and lists information from 1.7 million companies covering several years (BoardEx, 2019). Board data for the years 2011-2015 has been collected, covering a period of five years. This period has been chosen as it provides the most complete recent data available. Part of the selection procedure was the criterion that 50% of a firm’s board members should have the firm’s home country nationality. This criterion was established in order to control for the influence of the firm’s home country culture. After excluding companies with missing values, a sample of 275 firms remained. Then, the Zephyr database has been used for company M&A data. This database provides information on the M&A deals from several years. Eventually, acquisition information from the period of 2012-2016 has been collected. After excluding companies with missing values, a sample of 129 firms remained resulting in 645 firm-year observations. Besides BoardEx and Zephyr, a third database called Orbis has been used to collect data for the control variables. Bureau van Dijk is the establisher of Zephyr and Orbis, which are both data resources on private companies that allows for comparison. After using Orbis for the data collection of the control variables, the final sample consisted of 111 firms resulting in 555 firm-year observations. This sample includes companies from 17 different home countries. A list of the countries covered can be found in appendix A, and the list of corresponding companies is placed in appendix B.
Independent variable
18
Blau Index (Harrison & Klein, 2007). This measure focuses on a combination of two concepts, namely categories and evenness of distribution (Stirling, 1998). For this paper, the two categories that being used are “males” and “females”, which are linked with the distribution of the directors belonging to each of the categories (Campbell & Minguez-Vera, 2008). Female representation in corporate boards will, therefore, be measured according to the Blau Index which is calculated as: 1 − ∑𝑠𝑖=1𝑃𝑖2 . Blau’s (1997) Index provides a dummy measure that indicates the presence of one or more female board members. In this index, pi is the proportion of board members in each category (female or male), and s is the total number of directors on the board. The values that result from the Blau Index measurement can range from 0 to 0.5, where 0 corresponds with no female board members in the sample and 0.5 as an equal number of female and male members. Furthermore, it is important to note that one criterion used during the collection of firm board data is the percentage of directors having the home country’s nationality.
Dependent variable
19 Moderators
Home country culture: Home country culture is treated as a moderator and will be measured in terms of the degree of gender egalitarianism and degree of uncertainty avoidance as identified by the Globe Project (House et al., 2004). To obtain measures for these two cultural dimensions, a determination of the firms’ home country has been made. Then, an index has been identified from which values on those two dimensions can be derived. In line with previous studies that focused on the moderating effects of culture in terms of gender egalitarianism and uncertainty avoidance (e.g. Holmes et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2018), the cultural dimensions have been operationalized using the Globe Index on cultural variables (House et al., 2004). The Globe Project provides a country index for which each country is valued on a scale from 1 to 7 in which one is labelled as very low and seven as very high (House et al., 2004).
Control Variables
20 Table 1.
Variables and measures and their corresponding definitions Variables Definitions
Risk-taking Acquisitiveness The number of acquisitions with a stake of 50% or higher in a given year.
Board gender diversity
Gender diversity A Blau index generated dummy variable indicating the degree of diversity.
Moderators Gender egalitarianism
The country score on the dimension gender egalitarianism as measured by the Globe Project.
Uncertainty avoidance
The country score on the dimension uncertainty avoidance as measured by the Globe Project.
Control variables
Firm size The logarithmic value of a firm’s total assets. Firm age The number of years since a firm’s establishment. Industry A dummy variable for which one is taken when the
firm belongs to the service industry and zero when it is linked to the manufacturing industry.
Board size The total number of directors on the board.
CEO duality A dummy variable for which one is taken when the CEO takes the dual position of CEO and COB and zero if there is no dual role.
CEO gender A dummy variable for which one corresponds with a female CEO and zero when the CEO is a male.
Busy board A dummy variable taking the value of one when at least 50% of the members are involved with three or more boards and zero otherwise.
ANALYSIS
21
panel data and testing for fixed or random effects helps to control for unobserved firm heterogeneity that is remaining constant over the period studied (Li & Chen, 2016). For the determination of which model should be used, a Hausman test has been conducted which rejects the fixed effects model. This result supports the decision to use a model that includes random effects. On these grounds, random-effect estimates will be used as a robustness check. However, before performing the Poisson regression, several tests and checks have been performed to prepare the data and to ensure some basic assumptions. Those checks will be discussed in the next part of this paragraph.
Descriptive statistics and correlations
22
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variable Mean S.D Min Max 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1.Acquisition 1.57 1.71 0 12 1.00 2.Gender 0.30 0.13 0 0.5 -0.14*** 1.00 3.EgalP 3.31 0.24 2.5 3.67 -0.15*** 0.42*** 1.00 4.UA 4.42 0.42 3.55 5.16 -0.06 0.09** -0.10** 1.00 5.Firm Age 68.01 50.78 3 325 -0.06 0.10** 0.03 0.11*** 1.00 6.Firm Size 7.95 0.61 5.45 9.43 -0.03 0.12*** -0.01 0.03 0.17*** 1.00 7.Board Size 14.40 5.32 7 30 0.08* 0.05 -0.14*** 0.62*** 0.14*** 0.28*** 1.00 8.CEO duality 0.67 0.47 0 1 -0.07* 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.10** -0.05 0.13*** 1.00 9.CEO gender 0.04 0.19 0 1 -0.05 0.18*** 0.03 -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.08* -0.11** 0.07* 1.00 10. Busy Board 0.71 0.45 0 1 -0.06 0.28*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.06 0.06 1.00 11.Industry 0.22 0.41 0 1 -0.08* -0.10** -0.16*** 0.12*** -0.10** 0.06 0.11*** 0.09** -0.10** -0.08* 1.00 N=580 firm-year observations. Standard errors in parentheses reported under the regression coefficient
23
Table 3.
Variable inflation Factors.
Variable VIF 1/VIF
Board gender diversity 1.37 0.73
Gender egalitarianism 1.31 0.76 Uncertainty avoidance 1.82 0.55 Firm size 1.22 0.82 Firm age 1.13 0.88 Industry dummy 1.08 0.92 Size board 1.94 0.52 CEO gender 1.10 0.91 CEO duality 1.08 0.92 Busy board 1.21 0.83 Mean VIF 1.33 Stationarity
The sample used as a basis for this analysis consists of time series data which makes it essential to check the concept of stationarity. To be ensured that the properties of the time series do not change over time, the Harris-Tzavalis unit-root test for panel data will be applied. This test is suitable for samples having more than 25 observations and a relatively short time dimension (Harris & Tzavalis, 1999). This test is thus applicable for the sample used in this study as there are in total 555 observations in a relatively small time frame (five years). Under the null hypothesis of this test, a unit root in the panel is assumed whereas the alternative hypothesis argues otherwise. After performing the Harris-Tazavalis unit-root test, the null hypothesis had to be rejected (p < 0.01). Hence, it can be assumed that the variables portray stationarity and for this reason avoid the risk of spurious causation problems (Owoye, 1995).
Normality in distribution
24 Hausman test for endogeneity
Besides a pooled data analysis, the hypotheses will be tested by running panel data models. Those models allow for the option to apply fixed effects estimators. However, the use of fixed effects estimators needs to be validated. The Hausman test can be used in order to determine whether fixed or random effect models are most appropriate. The results of this test show which type of estimator is most suitable for the data. The null hypothesis tested considers unrelatedness of board gender diversity as measured by the Blau index to the error term of the acquisitiveness regression. After performing the Hausman test, the results provided sufficient support for the null hypothesis of the random effects model (p < 0.01). This result confirms that the use of random effect estimators will be preferred. Hence, the use of panel data Poisson analysis with random effect estimators is accepted in order to control for the time aspect covered by the data used in this paper.
RESULTS
The pooled Poisson regression reported in Table 4 is used as a first indication of the empirical results. The first hypothesis tested predicts that an increase in the share of female board members would lead to a smaller number of acquisitions. This hypothesis has been tested in Model 1 and shows that board gender diversity has a negative significant effect on the number of acquisitions made by a firm (β = -1.132, p < 0.01). This outcome supports hypothesis 1 and provides evidence that the more gender-diverse a board is, the lower the number of acquisitions made by a firm. This model also shows that firm age has a significant and positive relationship with acquisitiveness but has a small effect as the coefficient is almost zero (β = 0.001, p <0.10). Furthermore, Model 1 shows a significant positive effect on board size on the number of acquisitions made by a firm (β = 0.021, p < 0.01). However, also this relationship is relatively small as the coefficient is close to zero. Moreover, the control variable CEO duality is significantly negatively associated with acquisitiveness (β = -0.145, p < 0.05) indicating that a CEO being the COB results in a lower degree of acquisitiveness. Additionally, the Industry dummy is significantly and negatively related to the dependent variable indicating that the industry in which the company is operating influences the firm’s level of acquisitiveness (β = -0.261, p < 0.01). Other control variables do not show significance in this model.
25
the first hypothesis continuous to hold. Moreover, firm age continuous to manifest significantly with a positive relationship and keeps the low score of the coefficient (β = 0.001, p < 0.10). Firm size is showing a significant negative relationship once the variable uncertainty avoidance is added and shows a negative significant coefficient in Model 2 (β = -0.172, p < 0.01). Moreover, both the cultural dimensions show a significant negative effect (β = -0.569, p < 0.01; β = -0.494, p < 0.01).
26
27
Table 4. Poisson Regression on number of acquisitions.
28 Robustness check
For robustness, random effects have been added to the panel data Poisson regression model after running the Hausman test (see Appendix D). When examining the models it can be observed that nothing changes regarding hypothesis 1 when focusing on the effect of board gender diversity on the number of acquisitions of a firm. The first hypothesis is still supported by the findings. Regarding the second hypothesis, again support is found when running the regression with panel data and the results are similar to the results in Table 4. The coefficient for board gender diversity does become positive in model 5 compared to model 4. This is in line with the hypothesis, but again no significant effect between board gender diversity and acquisitiveness has been found in model 5. Lastly, the findings for the third hypothesis are consistent with the findings in table 4 and indicating that it still does not find support when looking at model 7 and 8 of the Poisson regression for panel data. Furthermore, of all control variables only firm size, board size, the industry dummy, and the culture dimensions are significantly associated with acquisitiveness. In model 2, firm size is still negatively associated with the dependent variable (β = -0.248, p < 0.05) and board size is positively associated with acquisitiveness (β = 0.045, p < 0.01). In the same model, the industry dummy is negatively related to acquisitiveness on a significant level (β = -0.257, p < 0.1). Moreover, the cultural variables gender egalitarianism (β = -0.475, p < 0.1) and uncertainty avoidance (β = -0.506, p < 0.01) are keeping similar findings.
Next to running an additional Poisson regression with random effects for panel data, an alternative measure for gender diversity has been used as a robustness check. Besides the Blau Index, the measurement of the number of female board members as a proportion of the total size of the board has also been commonly used for studies on gender diversity at the board level (e.g. Bazel-Shoham et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2013). This alternative measure has been used in an additional Poisson regression for panel data with controlling for the random effects (see Appendix E). The findings are consistent with the results from the previous regressions (see Table 4 and Appendix D). One minor dissimilarity is the control variable firm age not being found significant in model 8, which has been found significant in the previous models.
DISCUSSION
29
gender diversity and M&As by investigating whether culture has a moderating effect when analysing a sample consisting of 555 firm-year observations. Drawing on social identity theory, upper echelon theory, and cultural theory, culture has been expected to moderate the relationship between gender diversity at the board level and a firm’s acquisitiveness. Building on social identity theory, it is argued that increased female representation in the board results in more comprehensive and extensive decision-making processes. As a result, major strategic proposals receive a more elaborate evaluation.
Moreover, this paper contributes to existing literature in several ways. First of all, prior research has characterised board gender diversity as a double-edged sword that improves board effectiveness in some contexts and hampers it in other situations. To advance knowledge on the contingency of this relationship, a cross-country analysis has been executed and the sources of the mixed results found in previous research have been investigated by accounting for a cultural component. Additionally, this study contributes to M&A literature by examining the role gender diversity can play in acquisition decisions. Furthermore, the findings synthesise and encourage literature on board gender diversity and stimulate further research on the role culture plays within this field of research. In the remaining of this paragraph, the theoretical implications, practical implications, limitations, and future research opportunities will be discussed.
Theoretical implications
30
self-concept is stemming from that person’s knowledge of being a member of a social group together with the value and emotional significance related to being part of that group (Tajfel, 1978). It could be that, in cultures where there is a high degree of gender egalitarianism, the value and emotional significance a person places on the membership of a group that is based on gender identity is relatively limited such that conflicts and discrimination related to gender-based groupings are seldom taking place. Consequently, the creation of in-groups and out-groups based on gender identity is less presumably and fear- and greed-responses based on gender groups might not be common in such national cultures. Hence, the results not showing an association between gender diversity and acquisitiveness.
31
the board level negatively influences the number of acquisitions made by a firm but that the strength of this effect is contingent on the firm’s home country cultural context.
Practical Implications
The findings of this paper also have managerial relevance. As stressed by Pitts and Wise (2010), there is an increasing need to place more attention on what the outcomes are for diversity in top management. This paper contributes to the understanding of the effect of females holding seats on corporate boards. First of all, this paper is relevant for practice by showing that an increase in gender diversity at the board level results in a lower level of risk-taking behaviour. It is found that boards with a larger proportion of female representatives acquire a lower amount of firms, which indicates more risk-averse behaviour. It can be interesting for firms to take this into consideration when forming or assessing their current boards and their decision-making processes.
Additionally, this paper illustrates how a firm’s national culture affects risk-taking behaviour. While previous literature showed mixed findings, this paper points out the relevance of the cultural context as one of the sources of the mixed findings concerning board effectiveness. This study does not only show that national culture has a direct effect on the risk-taking behaviour of a firm, but it also sheds light on the moderating effect culture can have on the relationship between the level of female representativeness at the board and firm acquisitiveness. This study indicates that firms from countries with a low level of gender egalitarianism experience a negative relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking behaviour. This negative relationship results in a lower number of acquisitions per year. On the other hand, firms originating from countries with a high level of gender egalitarianism are not presented with a relationship between board gender diversity and firm risk-taking behaviour at all. For these firms, results suggest that the gender-based composition of boards does not influence the number of acquisitions made by the firm in a specific year. It can, therefore, be argued that the higher the level of gender egalitarianism, the weaker the relationship described.
32
of uncertainty avoidance do face a significant relationship between board gender diversity and acquisitiveness. In contrast, firms with home countries scoring high on uncertainty avoidance do not find such a relationship. It is thus important for firms to consider their national culture when assessing their board in terms of gender diversity and risk-taking behaviour.
Limitations and future research opportunities
This paper is subject to some limitations. One of the limitations identified is that the answer to the question of whether culture has a moderating effect on the relationship between board gender diversity and firm acquisitiveness is still not that clear. There has been support for the moderating effect of gender egalitarianism; however, uncertainty avoidance did not seem to have a strengthening moderating effect in this study. On top of that, this study uses a subsampling method for which the moderating effect of the cultural dimensions is being examined by comparing samples that include observations with high scores on the specific cultural dimension to ones with a low score. Other methods could be used as well to clarify the moderating effect such as using interaction terms. Therefore, there is a need to further investigate the moderating effect of culture in this setting. Future research could use other measurements of culture as well. National culture in terms of gender egalitarianism can also be measured by using the Global Gender Gap Index developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) which lists countries based on economic, educational, political and health indicators. Additionally, uncertainty avoidance could also be measured by using Hofstede’s cultural dimension (Hofstede, 2011).
Second, this study is constrained with a sample of firms from only 17 different countries. Additionally, some countries cover a small number of firms which results in a limited number of observations. Therefore, the sample of countries that cover a limited number of observations lacks generalizability. Future studies might try to investigate this concept including a broader set of companies from a larger variety of countries. National culture and institutions are important concepts to take into account when investigating the effects of board diversity (Grosvold, Brammer & Rayton, 2007). Therefore, it is essential to focus on cross-country analysis for future research. Additionally, such cross-country analysis could make a distinction between firms from developing and developed markets which could cultivate the institutional differences that are present between these two groups (Sinha, 2005).
33
and smaller firms (Chen et al., 2016). Though this is essential as smaller acquisitions are often associated with a lower degree of risk (Hitt et al., 1996). This makes it important to account for the size of the acquisitions as well. Future research could attempt to grasp the concept of firm risk-taking behaviour by taking other risk measures such as transaction value, bid value, and cultural distance into account. Considering these could lead to more valid models and better measurement of firm risk-taking behaviour. Besides the intensity of a firm’s acquisitions, the internationality of the acquisitions can involve risks as well. As crossing borders involves overcoming challenges such as the liability of outsidership and foreignness, the process of acquiring cross-border business becomes more complex and risky (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). Besides corporate culture, the acquirer needs to deal with national cultural differences which pose increased challenges to post-merger integration and affects firm performance (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee & Jayaraman, 2009). Therefore, cross-border M&A can be riskier than domestic M&As as they do cover such liabilities. Future research could thus take the opportunity to focus on cross-border acquisitions as a measure of risk.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to conduct a similar study covering SMEs. The sample used in this paper consisted of 111 Global 500 firms (Fortune, 2019). Those firms are characterised as large MNEs and are distinct from SMEs in several ways. Additionally, the findings of the regression show that the control variable ‘firm size’ are negatively significantly related to a firm’s acquisitiveness (see Table 4.). Therefore, it might be interesting to examine whether the findings in this study apply to SMEs as well. This focus could provide avenues for future research in which a similar relationship between board gender diversity and risk-taking behaviour is conducted in a comparative setting where findings for SMEs are compared with that of MNEs.
34 CONCLUSION
35 REFERENCES
Adams, R. B., Ferreira, D., 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economy, 94, 291-309.
Adams, R. B., Funk, P., 2012. Beyond the glass ceiling: does gender matter? Management science, 58(2): 219-235.
Ashforth, B. E., Mael, F., 1989. Social identity theory and the organization. Academy of management review, 14(1), 20-39.
Barber, B. M., Odean T., 2001. Boys will be boys: gender, overconfidence, and common stock investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116: 261–292.
Bazel-Shoham, O., Lee, S. M., Rivera, M. J., Shoham, A., 2017. Impact of the female board members and gaps in linguistic gender making on cross-border M&A. Journal of World Business.
Beutel, A. M., Marini, M. M., 1995. Gender and values. American sociological review, 436-448.
Boardex, 2017. Board summaries. Retrieved, 06-11-2019 from https://corp.boardex.com/ Brewer, M. B., 1979. "Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situations: A cognitive motivational analysis". Psychological Bulletin. 86 (2): 307–324.
Bunderson, J. S., Sutcliffe, K. M., 2002. Comparing alternative conceptualizations of functional diversity in management teams: process and performance effects. Academy of Management Journal, 45(5): 875–93.
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., Schafer, W. D., 1999. Gender differences in risk taking: a meta-analysis. Psychological bulletin, 125(3): 367.
Campbell, K., Mínguez-Vera, A., 2008. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm financial performance. Journal of business ethics, 83(3): 435-451.
Carpenter, M. A., Sanders, W. G., 2004. The effects of top management team pay and firm internationalization on MNC performance. Journal of Management, 30(4): 509–28.
36
Chatterjee, S., 1992. Sources of value in takeovers: synergy or restructuring implications for target and bidder firms. Strategic Management Journal 13: 267–286.
Chatterjee, S., Price, B., 1991. Regression diagnostics. New York.
Chen, G., Crossland, C., Huang, S., 2016. Female board representation and corporate acquisition intensity. Strategic Management Journal, 37(2): 303-313.
Croson, R., Gneezy, U., 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences." Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (2): 448-74.
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., Johnson, J. L., 1998. Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19: 269–290.
Dowling, M., Aribi, Z. A., 2013. Female directors and UK company acquisitiveness. International Review of Financial Analysis, 29, 79-86.
Eke, C. N., 2019. Poisson Regression Analysis on Economic Determinants of Commercial Banks Branches Expansion in Nigeria. South Asian Journal of Social Studies and Economics, 1-8.
Ellemers, N., Barreto, M., 2001. "The impact of relative group status: affective, perceptual and behavioural consequences". Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes. 3 (1): 324–343.
Erez, M., 1993. Towards a model of cross-cultural I/O psychology. In H.C. Triandis, M.D. Erhardt, N. L., Werbel, J. D., Shrader, C. B., 2003. Board of director diversity and firm financial performance. Corporate governance: An international review, 11(2): 102-111.
Fich E. M., Shivdasani, A., 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance, 61: 689–724.
Filley, A. C., House, R. J., Kerr, S., 1976. Managerial process and organizational behavior. Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman.
Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., 1996. Strategic Leadership: Top Executives and their Effects on Organizations. Minneapolis/St. Paul: West Publishing Company.
37
Gil, A., Brouthers, L. E., Keig, D. L., 2019. Top management team diversity, individualism – collectivism, and MNE performance. International Journal of Cross Cultural Management, 1 – 18.
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., Puri, M., 2013. Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. Journal of Financial Economics, 109: 103–121.
Grosvold, J., Brammer, S., Rayton, B., 2007. Board diversity in the United Kingdom and Norway: An exploratory analysis. Business Ethics: A European Review, 16(4), 344–357. Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., et al., 2010. Multivariate Data Analysis, 7th ed. Upper Saddle River: Pearson Prentice Hall.
Hambrick, D. C., Cho, T. S., Chen, M. J., 1996. The influence of top management team heterogeneity on firms' competitive moves. Administrative science quarterly, 659-684.
Hambrick, D. C., Mason, P. A., 1984. Upper Echelons: the organization as a reflection of its managers. The academy of management review, 9(2): 193-206.
Harris, R. D., Tzavalis, E., 1999. Inference for unit roots in dynamic panels where the time dimension is fixed. Journal of econometrics, 91(2), pp.201-226.
Harrison, D. A., Klein, K. J., 2007. What’s the difference? Diversity constructs as separation, variety, and disparity in organization. Academic Management review, 32(4): 1199-1228. Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., Harris, J., 2002. Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: how do directors differ? Journal of Management 28: 747–763.
Hinz, R. P., McCarthy, D. D., Turner, J. A., 1997. Positioning pensions for the twenty-first century. In: Gordon, M. S., Mitchell, O. S., Twinney, M. M. (eds.), Are Women Conservative Investors? Gender Differences in Participant-directed Pension Investments. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA.
Hitt, M. A., Harrison, J. S., Ireland, R., 2001. Mergers and acquisitions: A guide to creating value for stakeholders. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
38
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., Moesel, D. D., 1996. The market for corporate control and firm innovation. Academy of Management Journal 39: 1084–1119.
Hofstede, G., 2001. Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hofstede, G., 2011. Dimensionalizing cultures: The Hofstede model in context. Online readings in psychology and culture, 2(1), 8.
Hogg, M. A., 2006. Social identity theory. In Contemporary Social Psychological Theories, Burke PJ(ed). Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA; 111–136.
Hogg, M. A., Abrams, D., 1988. Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and group processes. London: Routledge.
Hogg, M. A., Reid, S. A., 2006. Social identity, self-categorization, and the communication of group norms. Communication theory, 16(1): 7-30.
Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., 2000. Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts. Academy of Management Review, 25: 121–140.
Hogg, M. A., Terry, D. J., White, K. M., 1995. A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory. Social psychology quarterly: 255-269.
Holmes, R. M., Jr, Miller, T., Hitt, M. A., Salmador, M. P., 2013. The interrelationships among informal institutions, formal institutions, and inward foreign direct investment. Journal of Management, 39(2), 531-566.
Hornsey, M. J., 2008. Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: a historical review. Social and personality psychology compass, 2(1), 204-222.
Horwitz, M., Rabbie, J. M., 1982. Individuality and membership in the intergroup system. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Social identity and intergroup relations (pp. 241-274). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W., Gupta, V., 2004. Culture, leadership, and organizations: the GLOBE study of 62 societies. London: Sage.
39
Joecks, J., Pull, K., Vetter, K., 2013. Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance: What exactly constitutes a “critical mass?”. Journal of business ethics, 118(1): 61-72.
Johanson, J., Vahlne, J. E., 2009. The Uppsala internationalization process model revisited: From liability of foreignness to liability of outsidership. Journal of international business studies, 40(9), 1411-1431.
Kahnemann, D., Tversky, A., 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), pp.363-391.
Lee, P. M., James, E. H., 2007. She’-e-os: Gender effects and investor reactions to the announcements of top executive appointments. Strategic management journal, 28(3), 227-241. Levi, M., Li, K., Zhang, F., 2014. Director gender and mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28: 185-200.
Li, H., Chen, P., 2018. Board gender diversity and firm performance: the moderating role of firm size. Business Ethics, a European Review, 27: 294-308.
Long, X. J., 2016. Comparative Study on the Fortune Global 500—Basing on the 2005-2015 Ranking. Open Journal of Business and Management , 4, 763-777.
Loukil, N., Yousfi, O., 2016. Does gender diversity on corporate boards increase risk-taking? Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 33: 66-81.
Low, D. C., Roberts, H., Whiting, R. H., 2015. Board gender diversity and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35, pp.381-401.
Meier-Pesti, K., Penz, E., 2008. Sex or gender? Expanding the sex-based view by introducing masculinity and femininity as predictors of financial risk taking. Journal of Economic Psychology, 29(2), 180-196.
Michel, J. G., Hambrick, D. C., 1992. Diversification posture and top management team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal, 35(1): 9–37.
Moscovici, S., Zavalloni, M., 1969. The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 12(2), 125–135.
40
Palmer, T., Wiseman, R., 1999. Decoupling risk taking from income stream uncertainty: A holistic model of risk. Strategic Management Journal, 20: 1037-1062.
Parboteeah, K. P., Hoegl, M., Cullen, J. B., 2008. Managers’ gender role attitudes: a country institutional profile approach. Journal of International Business Studies, 39: 795-813.
Pitts, D. W., Wise, L. R., 2010. Workforce Diversity in the New Millennium: Prospects for Research. Review of Public Personnel Administration, 30(1): 44–69.
Post, C., Byron, K., 2015. Women on boards and firm financial performance: A meta-analysis. Academy of management journal, 58(5), 1546-1571.
Puranam, P., Powell, B. C., Singh, H., 2006. Due diligence failure as a signal detection problem. Strategic Organization, 4: 319–348.
Sambharya, R. B., 1996. Foreign experience of top management teams and international diversification strategies of U.S. multinational corporations. Strategic Management Journal, 17(9): 739–46.
Schubert, R., Brown, M., Gysler, M., Brachinger, H. W., 1999. Financial decision making: are women really more risk-averse? American Economic Review 89: 381–385.
Seierstad, C., Gabaldon, P., Mensi-Klarbach, H., 2017. Gender diversity in the boardroom: Volume 1: The use of different quota regulations. Springer.
Shapira, Z., 1995. Risk taking: A managerial perspective. Russell Sage Foundation.
Siegrist, M., Cvetkocivh, G., Gutscher, H., 2002. Risk preference predictions and gender stereotypes. Organizational behaviour and human decision processes, 87(1), 91-102.
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., Hagendorff, J., 2016. Women on board: Does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 36, 26-53.
Sinha, J., 2005. Global champions from emerging markets. McKinsey Quarterly, 2: 26–36. Smith, K. K., 1983. Social comparison processes and dynamic conservatism in intergroup relations. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behaviour (Vol. 5, pp. 199-233). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
41
Sundén, A. E., Surette, B. J., 1998. Gender differences in the allocation of assets in retirement saving plan. American Economics Review, 88: 207-211.
Tajfel, H. (1972). Experiments in a vacuum. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel, The context of social psychology: A critical assessment. Academic Press.
Tajfel, H., 1978. Differentiation between social groups. London: Academic Press.
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations, Austin WG, Worchel S (eds). Brooks/Cole: Monterey, CA; 33–47.
Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., 1985.The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. In Worchel, S., Austin, W. G. (Eds.). Psychology of intergroup relations (pp.7–24). (2nd ed.). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Terjesen, S., Singh, V., 2008. Female presence on corporate boards: A multi-country study of environmental context. Journal of business ethics, 83: 55-63.
Tienari, J., Lund, R., & Koveshnikov, A., 2015. Why is gender not debated in M&A? In C. L. Cooper, & S. Finkelstein (Eds.). Advances in mergers and acquisitions (pp.17–32). Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Turner, J. C., 1975. Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 1–34.
Turner, J. C., 1999. Ellemers, N., Spears, R., Doosje, B. (eds.). "Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories". Social Identity. Oxford: Blackwell: 6–34. Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., Wetherell, M. S., 1987. Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Vatcheva, K. P., Lee, M., McCormick, J. B., Rahbar, M. H., 2016. Multicollinearity in Regression Analyses Conducted in Epidemiologic Studies. Epidemiology (Sunnyvale, Calif.), 6(2), 227.
