State Violence and Popular Resistance in Uzbekistan

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(1)Society & the State. State Violence and Popular Resistance in Uzbekistan M AT T E O F U M A G A L L I. On 13 May 2005 the security forces of The violent crackdown of a large demonstration pened nor why.2 That hours of intense Uzbekistan reacted to a protest demonby government forces in Uzbekistan in shooting and street fight and killing stration that had gathered in the cenMay 2005 spurred many controversies. The occurred is not under dispute by any tre of Andijan, a town of about 320,000 government tried to legitimate its actions side; what is contested is the number people located in the Ferghana valley by insisting that it had acted against radical and identity of people left dead on the region of post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The Islamists and terrorists, but other sources ground. According to an official invesprevious night a group of armed men claimed that unarmed civilians, including tigation 187 people, mostly “terrorhad assaulted the local prison and children, were massacred. Although tragic, ists” died, whereas according to interfreed several hundred inmates. Among it should be stressed that the events did not national human rights organizations them were twenty-three local entrerepresent a break with the past. Rather, they many more, mostly unarmed, civilians preneurs that the authorities had jailed should be read as part of an on-going struggle lost their lives because of government over the summer of 2004 on the charge between popular forms of resistance and state action. What actually happened still reof being part of the “Islamist” organizaarticulation of a discourse of terrorism. mains wrapped in mystery, largely as a tion Akromiya. They were awaiting an result of the Uzbekistani government’s imminent verdict. Demanding their release, local citizens had assem- refusal to allow an independent investigation into the dynamics of bled in the town centre several times in the preceding months, to no events. avail, but incidentally also exciting no particular reaction by the local The aftermath of the Andijan events was defined by a “war of figures.” authorities. In the morning of 13 May, the insurgents moved on to oc- The dawn of 14 May 2005 was truly a “dawn of the living dead” because cupy the local city council (hokimiyat). At the same time a crowd of of this irreconcilability between the two positions. Hundreds of Uzbeks, thousands took to the streets protesting against the government, as if not a thousand or more, were counted dead by some (human rights they had done many times in previous months. Then, abruptly, gov- organizations), but never died according to others (Uzbek state authorernment forces began a swift crackdown on the demonstrators. Chaos ities). Although there are insufficient verifiable sources to prove the ensued. Curfew was imposed, the region was sealed off from the rest of exact number of casualties, by situating the events within the broader the country, and strict security measures were enforced. Indeed, order developments of state-society relations in Uzbekistan it becomes not was restored at a very high price. only clearer how and why this eruption of violence occurred, but also In the days following the events a large number of people fled the what the short and medium-term implications will be. country. Most of them found temporary refuge in neighbouring KyrOne cannot make sense of this particular set of Andijan events withgyzstan. At the same time demands for an independent investigation out looking at the larger picture of the post-independence difficulvoiced by human rights organization were vehemently rejected by Uz- ties experienced by both state and society. Though the government bekistani authorities. Disputes over the course of events, the rationale allowed a limited multiparty system to develop soon after independbehind government crackdown, the identity of the protesters, and es- ence, democracy remained at a mere façade level, with power and depecially the count of the victim opened a chasm between the Uzbek cision-making being the domain of closed elite circles. The economic official version and that of international organi- downturn plunged most Uzbeks in poverty while privatization benzations. The relations between this post-Soviet efited only a few. With the state failing to act as social safety net, many Republic and Western states who, under the pres- ordinary citizens had to resort to alternative means to cope with ecosure of human right organizations had demanded nomic duress. that Tashkent allowed an independent investigaThus, as Kandiyoti noted, the key to understanding “Andijan” lies tion, reached the lowest point since independ- in the breakdown of the social contract between state and society ence.1 In short, the events of 13 May 2005 marked whereby the latter is experiencing a “crisis in provision, legitimacy and the climax of months, even years, of mounting security.”3 The background to the 2005 tragic events lies mostly in the tensions in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The ruth- convergence of impoverishment of large sections of the population less crackdown on the Andijan demonstrations (economic insecurity), the lack of safety valves for “letting pressure go” together with the events of the preceding night (social insecurity), the state’s fear of any form of opposition and subshould not be taken in isolation: understanding sequent clampdown on it, and a decline of state authority and legitithe context in which events have unfolded and macy (political insecurity). All of these factors have created a state of their broader ramifications is essential. fear and powerlessness among the population which, deprived of any legal outlet for airing grievances has leaned towards various forms of State violence and violence against opposition, some “silent” and non-violent, others more intolerant and the state violent. A glance at the post-independence era suggests that Uzbeks In the weeks following the Andijan events, the have typically resorted to limited forms of protest, due to over-arching government justified its actions as a necessary re- structural constraints. When these have taken place, they have tradiaction to tackle a militant insurgency, organized tionally taken the shape of street demonstrations and pickets. Hence, by Islamic radical organizations. The protesters, taken in isolation, the lead-up to the Andijan events could be read as a but also international human rights organizations, typical example of “coping strategy.” countered the claim by arguing that unarmed ciNevertheless, it would be a misrepresentation to simply depict the vilians, including children, were being shot at. relation between the government and its citizens in terms of violent There is neither consensus as to what really hap- state oppression and peaceful resistance. In rare, though visible cases,. [T]he group’s. successful attempts to provide real-. life alternatives … blatantly. demonstrated. the shortcomings of the regime. 28. ISIM REVIEW 18 / AUTUMN 2006.

(2) radicalized elements of society have resorted to violence. Such radical dissent has been articulated in the language of Islam, as it is a key marker of Uzbek identity and a popular frame for political mobilization. During the 1990s, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) posed an increasing threat to the administration of president Karimov, which culminated in the assassination attempts in 1999 and clashes between Uzbek government forces and the IMU in 2000. These attacks were not fragments of government imagination, but real experiences of anti-government militancy, of violence against the state. Moreover, Hizb-ut Tahrir, a transnational Islamist organization, also banned in Uzbekistan, has been reported to gain in popularity in recent years. Although this growing appeal of Islamist movements understandably unsettles the government, it should be stressed that manifestations of violent opposition remained the exception rather than the rule. The Andijan events, regardless of one’s own reading of them, were thus not an isolated episode of resistance and/or repression in post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The bitter irony is that the entrepreneurs under arrest did not engage in any known violent activities. They were part of a group or network that became known as Akromiya, whose members were engaged in mutual help activities and happened to share strong religious beliefs. Pooling resources for the common good constituted a way of getting around intense economic pressure from the state. It is likely that the group’s successful attempts to provide real-life alternatives to the failures of the government made them an even larger threat to the Karimov regime as they blatantly demonstrated the shortcomings of the regime. This suggests that the Andijan events have less to do with radical Islam, however much strength this may have gained in the country in recent years, and more with the state’s incapacity to comply with the expectations of its part of the social contract. What can be seen here is the convergence of a discourse about “terrorism” propagated by the government, and the actual activities of opposition groups that are or are not violent. Explicitly linked to Islamic radicalism according to the authorities, but seen as an association of pious local entrepreneurs by others (including human rights organizations), Akromiya is perhaps more realistically an “informal association of like-minded individuals, mostly young entrepreneurs … [intent in] pooling their resources for the benefit of their communities.”4 This does not detract from the possibility that radicalism may have become a more popular option for disgruntled elements of Uzbek society, but calls for qualification of the government-articulated thesis that Islamic radicalism might be the “culprit by default” of recent insurgencies in the country. The intensity of the May 2005 crackdown has not just instigated a sense of fear among the population, but also raised the question as to whether instead of being a source of security for its citizens, the state may have become the main source of insecurity. This sentiment was well captured during an interview held with an Uzbek citizen who had assisted to the events in Andijan: “[w]hen the people are hungry and rebel against the state, it is not terrorism, but when the state kills its own people, then that is terrorism!”5 This seems to suggest that the very definition and popular perception of what constitutes terrorism has become blurred over the years. Although only few Uzbek citizens condone violence, the statement returns the accusation of terrorism back to the very actor that has branded any form of opposition as being part of a terrorist threat. Whether such threats are real or imagined has lost its significance as the government’s (increasingly incredible) discourse of stability and security has become the defining element in state-society relations. In this light the Andijan events should be viewed in terms of continuity rather than dramatic change.. Image not available online. ISIM REVIEW 18 / AUTUMN 2006. What next?. Uzbek refugees So, what awaits Uzbekistan and its citizens? However tragic, the Andifrom Andijan in jan events do not represent a rupture with the past. Quite the contrary, a tent village, they “merely” constitute the latest episode in the deterioration of stateJalal-Abad society relations. State and society have begun to isolate from each province, other. While the former now tends to see any instance of popular exKyrgyzstan, pression as evidence of an imminent threat to its survival, the latter has 15 May 2005 developed an explicit distrust and fear of the state. Repeated episodes of popular protest and more rare, but increasingly frequent, violent outbursts of resistance point to a state increasingly out of tune with its own population. Notes By cracking down in such a ruthless way, along 1. In fact they had already soured since the with generating a sense of widespread fear across start of the so-called “colour revolutions” the population, the government reaction may in other post-Soviet republics since 2003 have achieved the objective of sending a mes(Georgia, Ukraine), which president Karimov sage that similar acts of resistance would not be perceived as aiming to effect regime change tolerated. For months, in fact, protest remained and, therefore, threaten his position in dormant. Gradually, however, new acts of propower. tests resurfaced in the country, over the sum- 2. Thus S. Akiner’s Violence in Andijan 2005: mer of 2005 in Samarkand and with women-only An Independent Assessment (Washington DC, peaceful demonstrations across the streets of Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Andijan in January 2006. More than a year after Papers, 2005) represents the account most Andijan state and society have not shown signs sympathetic to the government’s version of reconciliation. Any more wait, let alone failure of the events. By contrast, Human Rights to do so, will only prolong scenarios of instability Watch, Bullets were falling like Rain: The when change ultimately occurs. Andijan Massacre 13 May 2005 (Report vol. 17, 5(D), July 2005) renders those views that are most different from it. The International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising (Asia briefing 38, 25 May 2005) gives a balanced account of the events, background, and immediate consequences. 3. D. Kandiyoti, “Andijan: Prelude to a Massacre,” Open Democracy, 20 May 2005, (http://www.opendemocracy.net). 4. International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: The Andijan Uprising, 2. 5. The interview was held on 22 July 2005, in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.. Matteo Fumagalli is Lecturer at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, National University of Ireland. Email: matteo.fumagalli@ucd.ie. 29. PHOTO BY VLADIMIR PIROGOV / © REUTERS, 2005. Society & the State.

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