Can self-affirmation help reduce
impatience among the poor?
The intervening power of agency- and value affirmation
By Dominic Brenneisen
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Can self-affirmation help reduce
impatience among the poor?
The intervening power of agency- and value affirmation
By Dominic Brenneisen January 2018 S2048817 Westerbinnensingel 8a 9718BT Groningen d.s.brenneisen@student.rug.nl 0648341825
Msc. thesis Marketing Management
University of Groningen Faculty of Economics & Business
Department of Marketing PO Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen
First supervisor: Dr. Mehrad Moeini Jazani Second supervisor: Prof. Dr. Bob M. Fennis
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Abstract
Research has shown that people with financial constraints have a tendency to make myopic decisions. Specifically the poor are more impatient (preferring smaller sooner rewards, over larger later rewards) in intertemporal choices, which perpetuate their economic state and wellbeing. Building on findings of the self-affirmation theory, in the present research, we propose and find that affirmation interventions enable the poor to become more patient in intertemporal choices. We also examine the underlying process of this effect and find that affirmation extents its reparative effect among the poor by increasing their self-esteem.
Key words: Poverty, Financial constraints, Welfare-Stigma, Stereotyping, Time-discounting, Cognitive
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Table of contents
Abstract ... 3
Introduction ... 5
Literature Study ... 7
1. The poverty trap ... 7
2. The poor, intertemporal choice and impatience ... 8
3. Reason for impatience ... 9
3.1 The poor, stereotyping and cognitive functions ... 9
3.2 Cognitive functions, executive functions and impatience ... 10
4. Self-affirmation Theory: ... 11
4.1 Stereotyping, a psychological threat ... 11
4.2 The self-affirmation method ... 12
5. Other variables ... 14
5.1 Self-control, self-esteem and mood... 14
Research Design... 15
6. Method ... 15
6.1 Participants. ... 15
6.2 Materials and procedure ... 16
6.3 Poor or rich manipulation ... 16
6.4 Self-Affirmation ... 17
6.5 Time discounting ... 19
6.6 Mood, self-esteem and feeling of control... 19
Results ... 20
Discussion & Recommendations ... 29
Future research ... 31
Limitations ... 32
Managerial implications ... 32
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Introduction
Inequality is a given in the world. It reveals itself in many different aspects of society: class, gender, race, age, sexual orientation and so on. Although we have to strive for equality as much as possible, for things to change, first an awareness and understanding has to be created. One of the most central inequalities in our society is income inequality. Reports show that the gap between the rich and poor is on a level not seen for more than half a century (Gurria, 2011). Based on figures of the 20 Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the income of the top 10% of these countries is nine times higher than that of the bottom 10%. In comparison this gap was only around seven times 25 years ago. This increase is a very worrisome trend as people in poverty face many hardships. Schillbach, Schofield & Mullainathan (2016) documented that the poor face more physical pain, noise, air pollution and sleep deprivation. Beside these tough external hardships, people also face many mental problems. Decrease in trust, stress, motivation, social behaviors and an increased feeling of meaninglessness are some of the reported hardships the poor face on a daily basis (Haushofer, Schunk, & Fehr, 2013). These mental and physical hardships are a continuous problem as they do not only damage the current generation, but are also passed on to the next (Lewis, 1996).
To counter these worrisome predicaments interventions have to be made. This study focusses on one of the most important causes that hinder the poor of overcoming their financial situation: their impatient behavior. Studies show that the poor are significantly more impatient than people in better economic situations (Hausman, 1979; Cagetti, 2003; Stephens Jr. & Krupka, 2006). Some real life examples of this problem can be seen through the poor favoring excessive borrowing, consuming more unhealthy food, investing less in education and drinking more. Impatience is often connected to being short-sighted or impulsive, and expresses itself by choosing an immediate (less fruitful) reward, over a (better) reward at a later time. In terms of money this would mean that the poor often favor an immediate less rewarding sum of money, over a greater amount at a later time. Because the shortsighted option is chosen regularly, the poor will systematically miss out on monetary gains, inevitably leading them on a path to poverty.
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Atkeson, 1997). Therefore, a two way relationship exists: impatient behavior leads to poverty, while poverty leads to impatient behavior. This loop is often referred to as the “poverty trap”. The poverty trap is one of the main drivers of poverty and is a well-established issue (Haushofer, Schunk, & Fehr, 2013; Jachimowicz, Chafik, Munrat, Prabhu, & Weberr, 2017).
It is of the utmost importance to find interventions which can break this cycle. However, first a better understanding must be developed on why the poor have the tendency to act impatient. One key difference between the financially constrained and the financially adequate is a continuous external psychological pressure on the former, namely: stereotyping. Mani et al. (2013) suggests that because the poor constantly face stereotyping, they cannot optimally use their cognitive capabilities. They found that being poor reduces their cognitive functions equal to a person missing a whole night of sleep. Stereotyping causes to inflict worry to the threatened person. These worries will lead to impeding cognitive functions. Cognitive functions are used for, among others, regulating and updating goals, and blocking irrelevant information (Miyake, et al., 2000). Shah, Mullainathan & Shafir (2012) make this same suggestion. Because the poor’s cognitive functions are impeded, they cannot adequately plan for the future, which is an ability attributed to patient behavior. Based on these findings this paper makes the suggestion that welfare-stereotyping does not only effect the poor’s cognitive functions, but also their patience.
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functions should be reduced. This in turn should lead to more goal directed behavior and thus more patience.
Through this logic we research the intervening possibilities of self-affirmation. This paper looks at two separate affirmation methods, namely: agency- and value affirmation to further our knowledge and understanding on the subject.
Literature Study
1. The poverty trap
The poor are considered to be more myopic and often choose instant gratification over long-term benefits. Reports of the poor preferring instant gratification is shown through many instances: saving less, declining medical health, eating less healthy food, exercising less and not accepting long-term education plans for their children (Fehr & Falk, 2002; Tanaka, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2016). These preferences are all clear instances of behaviors pointing to a short sighted view, as these behaviors undermine chances for their ‘future self’. Myopia is described as being short-sighted and is often exhibit through choosing an immediate (smaller) reward over a later (higher) reward. The relationship between myopia and financial constrains have been researched extensively (Green, Myerson, Lichtman, Rosen, & Fry, 1996; Yang, 2016; Tanaka, Camerer, & Nguyen, 2016). The main issue of being short sighted is that it systematically will lead to less advantages. When smaller immediate options are chosen over better later options regularly, the self is damaged in the long run. In terms of monetary gains this would mean that choosing less money consistently will reduce their income, leading to financial constraints over time.
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Figure 1: The poverty trap
2. The poor, intertemporal choice and impatience
The all-encompassing theme of short-sighted behavior revolves around the concept of intertemporal choice. Intertemporal choice contains “all decisions involving tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different times” (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'donoghue, 2002). This is usually tested by letting a person make a choice between an immediate reward and a larger reward at a later time. Intertemporal choice measures the depreciation of the latter option. The theory states that if the sooner option is chosen, the second option was depreciated at such a high rate that its ‘present value’ is lower compared to the immediate option. This phenomenon is called time discounting (Samuelson, 1937). It is formally defined as “the rate at which an individual or group discounts a delayed (better) reward over time”. Discount rates are often referred to as the core of intertemporal choice and is the most common way of measuring impatience (Yang, 2016). The later, bigger reward generates more value in the long term. Therefore, it is accepted that choosing the former option is an indication of impatient behavior. The theory behind this choice is that impatient people do not value the latter reward as patient people do. They devaluate its worth faster as they do not have intentions to wait.
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indicating their preference for impatient behavior. It is therefore well established that people in poverty are linked to higher discount rates compared to people in higher socioeconomic situations. Hausman (1979) was the first to find a relationship between impatience and poverty. In their study they found that, between households, the poor had a significant higher discount rate compared to the rich. This was later confirmed by many studies researching different demographics like the United States, China and India, indicating that this relationship is a global phenomenon (Cagetti, 2003; Stephens Jr. & Krupka, 2006; Ogaki & Atkeson, 1997).
3. Reason for impatience
We have established that the poor are actually more impatient. In this section, we will explicate one of the possible reasons for their impatience, namely: their cognitive functions. Although not much research has been conducted on the reason why the poor are more impatient, we will derive it through two separate relationships. In the first section we will describe the relationship between financial constraints and cognitive functions, while in the second section we will look at the relationship between cognitive functions and impatient behavior.
3.1 The poor, stereotyping and cognitive functions
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that being poor reduces the cognitive functions equal to a person missing a whole night of sleep. They conducted a study inducing financially constrained and financially adequate respondents to think about financial demands. They showed that when the same actual issue was addressed, the cognitive impact on the financially constrained participants was much greater. Hereafter, they again studied the effects of financial constraints but now induced in the same person. They looked at farmers before and after their harvest and reported that before the harvest the farmers’ cognitive capabilities had a bigger shortfall, clearly showing the effect of financial constraints on the cognition.
3.2 Cognitive functions, executive functions and impatience
Besides evidence of the poor and decreased cognitive performance, there are also a number of articles pointing to a relationship between decreased cognitive performance and impatience. Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999) reported that individuals have a 22% higher chance of choosing a cake over a salad when an individual has to memorize a 7-digit number at the same time (a common way to increase cognitive load). Follow-up studies also looked at impatience related to cognitive functions but now used monetary gains as their dependent factor, and found congruent results (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003; Getz, 2013; Deck & Jahedi, 2015). The theory is that the cognitive system of a person does not have unlimited resources and will deplete when utilized (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Luck & Vogel, 1997; Neisser, 1976). Because cognitive resources are not unlimited not every cognitive function can be served simultaneously. Therefore, the cognitive system will constantly have to consider on which areas the resources are focused. One of the cognitive functions that regulates updating goals and blocking irrelevant information is the executive function (Miyake, et al., 2000). Welfare stereotyping impedes the poor’s executive functions leading them to lose goal-directed behavior (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). Goal directed behavior is an important attribute for being patient and thus making proper intertemporal choices, meaning that if this executive function cannot be resourced properly it may very well lead to more impatient behavior. In this light, stereotyping, and thus their lack of cognitive resources, can be a very important reason for the poor’s increased impatience.
Because of the mentioned studies already claiming a relationship between financial constraints and impatience, this article will first confirm these previous findings. Therefore:
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If it is actually the case that stereotyping leads to more impatient behavior, ridding the poor of these worries will have a positive effect on the patience of the poor.
4. Self-affirmation Theory:
Now that we have established that stereotyping can be an important reason for the poor’s impatience, we will now look at an intervention method which can help the poor cope with this issue. This method is a well-known technique that already has instances of shielding against stereotyping and is a method found in the self-enhancement field, namely: self-affirmation. In the first section we will explain how stereotyping is approached in the self-affirmation theory and how it effects the poor psychologically. In the second section we will explain how self-affirmation can help deal with this problem and articulate our other hypotheses.
4.1 Stereotyping, a psychological threat
Self-affirmation is defined as “confirming some important aspect of the self that is unrelated to a threatened domain” (McQueen & Klein, 2006). Self-affirmation was first touched upon by Steele, Spencer & Lynch (1993) and is used to guard the inner idea of the self against psychological threats. It is built around the premise that a person is motivated to keep and maintain his integrity. This basically means that a person thinks of himself as being overall good and appropriate (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). However, when this self-image is contradicted by an external situation the integrity of the person is confronted. These types of external situations are described as a psychological threat. A psychological threat can come in many different forms, but are in all cases “a perceived failure to meet social standards” (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). A psychological threat contradicts the positive self-image of a person and its adequacy leaving them in a state of dissonance (Cohen & Sherman, 2014).
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more beliefs are held, but are contradictory to each other” (Festinger, 1962). The dissonance preoccupies the mind, draining the subject of mental resources, which could have been used for e.g. performance and problem solving (Cohen & Sherman, 2014).
With regard to the poor, stigmatization conflicts with the poor’s believe in their self-image. It takes away their sense of control over their lives, as the threat conflicts with their belief in themselves. This constant confrontation causes them to doubt and worry resulting in a scarcity mindset. These doubts are manifested inside the mind and preoccupy it, leaching the cognitive resources of the poor (Mani, Mulllainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013). If nothing is done to expel these worries, it can manifest itself externally through behavior. The poor can become more extreme version of themselves (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979) or, more often, implement coping mechanisms which are expressed through avoidance behavior (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Cohen & Sherman (2014) named this coping mechanism the “psychological immune system”. This immune system will try to recover the idea of the “self” through others or things. Generally, the person will change the meaning of the psychological threat in such a way that beliefs or actions were wrongly assumed, ‘clearing’ the contradiction mentally (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). In practice, this would mean showing behaviors that are congruent with the stereotype. E.g. for the poor, showing lazy and unmotivated behavior.
4.2 The self-affirmation method
In many cases stereotyping can be overcome through self-affirmation. Self-affirmation helps remind a person of achievements outside of a threatened domain and therefore broadens a person’s perspective (Sherman & Hartson, 2011). It trivializes the psychological threat and aims at becoming a positive coping resource (McQueen & Klein, 2006). It is important to note that self-affirmation does not “maximize” the view of the self, but rather helps maintain an adequate and overall positive self-image (Liu & Steele, 1986). Maintaining this image will help relieve the dissonance by overcoming the need to dismiss every threat and instead admit, or acknowledge some of its meaning (McQueen & Klein, 2006).
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actually increase. Steele & Aronson (1995) studied affirmation preferences of university students. In their study they induced the students to violate their compassionate self. The students were encouraged to take a stance against handicapped people and had to write about how handicapped services had to be reduced. This action would lead to a psychological threat among the students, as this would contradict their self-identity as being compassionate. After being exposed to the psychological threat the students were given the option to freely reaffirm themselves. They were given a (fake) personality test with positive feedback on a number of domains. Although they knew the feedback was positive, in the end the students avoided picking feedback on their compassion, and rather chose other domains. This gives implications that direct-affirmation is not a wanted experience. In a follow up study by Blanton, Cooper, Skurnik & Aronson (1997) the previously described study was mimicked, but now they directly measured levels of dissonance. They reported that when participants were exposed to direct affirmation they showed increased levels of dissonance.
Therefore, affirming through a direct method can backfire. When a person is affirmed within the threatened domain, the affirmation itself can also be trivialized. Normally, the affirmation is used as a coping mechanism. The affirmation detaches the psychological threat from the self by taking away its self-defining power. However, when the same domain is chosen there is a possibility of trivializing the affirmation itself. Now, the psychological threat detaches the affirmation from the idea of the self. A positive self-defining moment loses its power drawing the person further in doubt. Therefore, an indirect-affirmation method is chosen which affirms an unrelated domain. Based on this information it is very possible that self-affirmation will have a positive effect on the patience of the poor. Therefore this paper will look at multiple affirmation methods. Firstly, the most generally used affirmation method will be considered, namely: value-affirmation. Therefore:
Hypothesis 2: Value-affirmation moderates the positive effect of financial constraints on impatience.
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our reasoning. Furthermore, it gives us knowledge about the power of different affirmation methods and possible nuances. Therefore, this paper will hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: Agency self-affirmation moderates the positive effect of financial constraints on impatience.
5. Other variables
To explore the effects of affirmation on impatience a little further this paper looks at some possibly related variables. Previous literature has stated that the personality of a person can have an effect on the time discount rate, therefore we will delve in some of these variables.
5.1 Self-control, self-esteem and mood
5.1.1 Positive- and negative mood
Hirsh, Guindon, Morisano & Peterson (2010) found a relationship between positive mood and time discounting. They found that extraverted people were more likely to prefer an immediate reward when they were first put into a positive mood. In contrast, a study triggering happy feelings in participants through exposure to a number of short movies revealed that the participants actually became more patient. On the other side, Lerner, Li and Weber (2013) found that feelings of sadness also increased impatience. They found that participants that had a high-sadness state accepted 34% less money to avoid to wait three months. It is therefore likely that mood effects the impatience of the poor.
5.1.2 Self-esteem
Sherman & Cohen (2006) suggested that those wo have more self-esteem will also have more psychological resources through which they can self-affirm. There are two schools of thought. “Affirmational resources view”: says high self-esteem people have more positive resources to cope with psychological threats and thus show less dissonance (Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993). The “Self-consistency view” says that because people have high self-esteem, they are more susceptible to psychological threats, as there is more discrepancy between the self and the threat. Either way, it is possible that self-esteem will also effect the impatience of the poor.
5.1.3 Feelings of control
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of consumers paying a higher price to avoid a delay on their order. They suggest that people with feelings of less control will try to use intertemporal choice to regain this feeling. For example, buying the immediate premium option would reinstate their agentic feeling, as this is prove of their control. The article found that both increased feelings of control led to decreased present bias. This effect was the same for decreased feelings of control as this led to increased present bias.
5.1.4 Effects of self-affirmation
Based on the above mentioned effects on discounting it could be possible that affirmation effects these personality variables and therefore can partly explain the effect on the impatience of the financially constrained. This paper will research these variables for further clearance on the subject.
Research Design
Participants were randomly assigned and manipulated to one of two possible conditions (the financially constrained condition, or the financially adequate condition). Firstly, the participants had to indicate their monthly income on a slider. The slider’s extreme values (0 to 2 000, and 0 to 50 000) depended on the condition which the participant was randomly assigned to. Hereafter, the participants had to reflect and write about their feelings on being financially (in)adequate. After the participants were framed in either of the two groups, they were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions (agency-affirmation, value-affirmation, and no-affirmation/control). After this second manipulation technique all participants had to indicate how much money they would want in the future (3, 9, or 11 months), when their immediate reward would be 65 dollars. We predicted a one-way interaction such that when the participant was conditioned to the poor-frame this number would be significantly lower for both the direct- and the indirect-affirmation group compared to the control group. In contrast, there should be no significant difference for the rich-frame participants.
6. Method
6.1 Participants.
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participants’ mean age was 36 years old, 57,5% was full-time employed and the gender of the participants was distributed evenly (57,2% female and 41,8 Male). Most respondents (72,1%) had a household size of between 2 and 4. Exclusion of participants was based on several reasons, these include: ‘inappropriate discounting’, ‘no text’ and ‘failed IMC’. In the end in total 57 participants were excluded.
6.2 Materials and procedure
The research was done in an online setting using the platform Qualtrics. The participants were told that this survey had been launched by a well-known research center investigating how people manage their financial resources. The survey consisted of five main parts: demographics, financial manipulation, affirmation manipulation, discounting and “other” questions. All the instructions and procedures were computerized. Because of the possibility of scarce data for particularly the “financially adequate” participants, we randomly assigned and manipulated the participants to either a financially constrained- or financially adequate condition, rather than dividing them based on absolute income numbers.
6.3 Poor or rich manipulation
This section consisted of two parts. In the first part the participants were randomly assigned to either the financially constrained condition (n=265) or the financially adequate condition (n=241). In both cases they had to use a slider to indicate their monthly income. For the financially adequate condition, the slider was set from 0 to 2000 dollars. In contrast the financially constrained condition had a slider from 0 to 50 000 dollars. After they indicated their income, a (fake) loading screen popped up which would calculate their “relative financial standing and well-being”. In the next screen they would either be told that they are relatively financially adequate or inadequate based on the condition they were assigned to. Then in the next section they were asked to “consider and write carefully and vividly what the consequences are of their financial situation on their life and how it effects on living a good life” to further manipulate their financial frame. Examples are shown in figure 2.
Financial adequate framing answers
- “It feels comforting to not have to worry about money that much. My
finances used to be a big stress on me and I think it effected my
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- “It is good to know that I will have enough money to cover my living
expenses. I don't have to worry about paying my bills or whether I will have food to eat. I also have some extra to spend on fun outings and socializing with friends, or to buy items that I enjoy for their beauty or trendiness.”
- “I guess it feels good to know that I am in an adequate financial place,
although it does come as a surprise. It is nice to have enough money to do what I want while supplying what I need. There are no real
consequences, I just get to live my life fairly comfortably.” Financial inadequate
framing answers
- “Not having enough money for routine expenses sucks. “There's a lot of panic sometimes when it's close to bill time and there's no guarantee that the money will be there. It makes holidays really difficult and more stressful than they are already. It's just hard all around.”
- “The most difficulty that I face with financial means is the price of all my bills. The cost of food, gas and housing is a financial constraint. I continually cut back each month shaving a dollar here and there to make ends meet.”
- “My lack of financial resources is very challenging, because I have debts to pay off and having to cut corners just to save what little money I can. Reflecting on it only makes me angry, because I am always searching for ways to put more money in my pocket.”
Figure 2: Examples of financial framing answers
6.4 Self-Affirmation
In the second part of the study all participants were assigned to one of three experimental conditions. These contain the control/no-affirmation condition (182 participants), the agency-affirmation condition (161 participants) and the value-agency-affirmation condition (163 participants). Examples of answers of the affirmation manipulations are shown in figure 3.
6.4.1 Control/no-affirmation
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6.4.2 Agency affirmation
In the agency affirmation method the participants had to write about their feeling of control. They had to write about “an episode in their life, not related to their financial situation, in which they felt assertive, self-determined, influential, competent, resilient, or when they had inner strength”. This manipulation comes from the “Big Two” literature (Abele & Wojciszke, 2013), which states that there are two modes of existence. Through social relatedness (communion) and individual striving (agency).
6.4.3 Value-affirmation
For the value affirmation manipulation the participants had to rate a list of domains, based on importance, from 1 to 11. This method was copied from the article of Schmeichel & Vohs (2009). The list mentions the domains artistic skill, humor, relations, spontaneity, social skills, athletics, musical ability, physical attractiveness, creativity, business skills and romantic values. After the participants had rated the 11 domains they were instructed to write about a particular, personally important time which is related to their most valued item.
Agency affirmation answers
- “Over the summer I spent hours and hours studying to take the LSAT, I ended up scoring in the 99th percentile, and have been admitted to some top law schools. I feel vindicated, strong, and smart.”
- “I once built a large rabbit hut out of scratch for my girlfriend. I had never completed such a complicated woodworking project and I felt very competent and resilient after finishing it. I also felt proud.”
Value affirmation answers - “Relationships with friends and family is the most important thing. There've been many times when I've needed help from friends and/or family and they have always been there for me.”
- “Creativity is very important to me because it makes me feel like I am different than the ordinary person. It’s important for my job for me to come up with creative solutions to problems. I am also trying to be creative in my everyday life when I think of things to say to people. I don’t want to be boring and being creative is a big factor in that.”
Control group answers - “It was yesterday we did laundry so that we can have clean clothing.” - “I have had to make use of my parents washer, dryer to get my clothes
washed once a week, which was yesterday.”
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In the third part of the study the participants were asked to imagine that they can receive 65 dollars. They were then asked to indicate an amount that would be required to wait for ‘X’ amount of months (3, 6 and 9 months). This is a common monetary intertemporal choice task which is adopted from the article of Van den Bergh, Dewitte and Warlop (2008).Through these values a comparison discount rate could be calculated, which is called the area under the empirical discounting curve (AUC).
6.6 Mood, self-esteem and feeling of control
In the final section other questions were asked ranging in a number of topics. These include questions about the participants education degree, their job state and ethnic background. Also control questions were added to verify the attentiveness of the participants. We asked whether they left the PC, were alone, had background noises and used a control question which would mislead the non-attentive participants.
As stated in the literature section we will also look at other variables which could be related to our main hypothesis. These variables are positive- and negative mood, esteem and self-control. More details about the data collection on these variables is given below.
Mood: As stated, this paper will also look at a number of possibly related variables. For mood we
took PANAS (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988). PANAS asks 22 questions related to mood. In the questions the participant has to rate on a scale from 1 to 7 how much the mood is reflective of the participant’s current feeling (e.g. “Please indicate to what extent you feel each of the following states right now, that is, at the present moment. – Distressed”). The positive mood of a participant was calculated based on the average number of the 10 positive mood questions in PANAS. While negative mood is the average of the 12 negative mood questions. Based on these questions an average was calculated for both positive and negative mood, which would make up their end score.
Self-esteem: Self-esteem was measured using 10 items from the Rosenberg self-esteem scale
(Rosenberg, Schooler & Schoenbach 1989). The answers to these questions were reported on a 5-point Likert scale about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statements.
Self-control: Self-control was measured during the second interview with a scale developed by.
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to being fatalistically determined (Folkman, Lazarus, Gruen, & DeLongis, 1986). Subjects responded on a 4-point Likert scale about the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with in total 4 statements.
Results
Results
Main Analysis
To test the hypothesis that affirmation reduces impatience (or the discount rate) of the financially constrained, we subjected participants’ AUC (area under the empirical discounting curve) to a 2 economic condition (financially adequate vs financially constrained) x 3 affirmation condition (agency affirmation vs value affirmation vs no affirmation) between-subjects ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect on the economic condition F(1, 499)=11.71, p<.001. We did not find a main effect on affirmation F(2, 499)=0,016, p=.984. As hypothesized we found a two-way interaction between financial constraints and affirmation, F(2, 499)=3.656, p=.027. To further explore the nature of this interaction and to examine our hypotheses, we ran contrasts analysis. Among those who did not affirm, the financially constrained people showed more impatience (M= 0,32, SD= 0,19) relative to those who were financially adequate (M= 0,46, SD= 0,23, F(1, 499)=18.498, p< .01, CI=[-,.209, -.078]). This is in line with past studies claiming the same relationship between the financially constrained and financially adequate. Therefore, we successfully recreated past findings. Noteworthy is that among those who affirmed their agency, there was no significant difference between the financially constrained (M= .37, SD= .21) and the financially adequate (M= .41, SD= .23, F(1,499)=1.159, p= .282, CI=[-.109, .032]). Likewise, among those who affirmed their values, there was also no significant difference between those who were in the financial constrained condition (M= .37, SD= .24) and those who were in the financial adequate condition (M= .40, SD= .24, F(1, 499)=.473, p= .492, CI[-.094, .045]). As these results suggest, in line with our expectations, both affirmation methods eradicated the difference in patience between the financially constrained and adequate group.
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.136, CI[-.117,.016]), suggesting the effectiveness of agency affirmation in increasing patience among the poor. Similarly, those who affirmed their values also showed marginally more patience (M= .37, SD= .24), relative to those who did not affirm (M= .32, SD= .19, F(1, 499)= 2.617, p= 1.00, CI[-.121, .011]). Finally, we did not find a significant difference between agency affirmation (M= .370, SD= .21) and value affirmation (M= .374, SD= .24, F(1, 499)= 0.02, p= .883, CI[-.073, .063]), suggesting that both affirmation methods are equally effective in reducing impatience among the poor.
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Figure 4: Mean AUC table for all conditions
Underlying mechanisms
To explore the underlying mechanism, we used the moderated-mediation model 8 of Process Macro (Hayes 2017) for each of the potential mediating variables which were discussed in the previous section. We will report results of these moderated mediations one by one.
The mediating role of Self-Esteem
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Figure 5: Self-esteem regression (X1=Agency vs. no-affirmation, X2=Value vs. no-affirmation)
As the results show, indeed the interaction between economic condition and affirmation is significantly predicting self-esteem. X1 in the model above represents the dummy variable that compares agency-affirmation to no-affirmation condition. X2 represents the dummy variable that compares value-affirmation to no affirmation condition.
Affirmation condition
Economic condition
Mean SD N
No Affirmation Poor condition
Rich condition 3.715 4.287 .094 .097 94 88
Agency Affirmation Poor condition
Rich condition 4.084 4.236 .099 .104 85 76
Value Affirmation Poor condition Rich condition 4.029 4.160 .098 .104 86 77
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Next, to establish the moderated-mediation effect, we ran a regression with economic condition, affirmation (two dummy variables) and their respective interaction, as well as self-esteem (mediator) and AUC as our DV (see figure 6).
Figure 6: AUC regression (X1=Agency vs. no-affirmation, X2=Value vs. no-affirmation)
Results revealed that self-esteem had a significant main effect on AUC while controlling for other independent variables, while the interaction effect between the economic condition and self-affirmation condition on AUC became weaker and marginally significant (p = .0524). Indicating an effect of self-esteem on the total model. Therefore we proceed to decompose the potential mediating role of self-esteem as a result of self-affirmation at different levels of the economic condition.
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Similar patterns were obtained for the value affirmation condition. Specifically, among participants who were financially constrained, value affirmation vs. no affirmation increased self-esteem which subsequently lead to more patience (Effect= .079, SE= .005, 95%= [.0001, .0120]) However, this mediation did not occur among participants with financial adequacy (Effect= -.003, SE= .004, 95% = [-.0113, .0034]).
These results suggest that both agency and value affirmation extent their reparative effects on the poor’s impatience trough boosting self-esteem.
The mediating role of sense of control
To examine whether sense of control was mediating the interaction between economic condition and affirmation, first we ran a regression to see if these experimental conditions were predicting participants’ sense of control (see figure 7).
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X1 in the model above represents the dummy variable that compares agency-affirmation to no-affirmation condition. X2 represents the dummy variable that compares value-no-affirmation to no affirmation condition. As the results show, the interaction between economic condition and affirmation does not predict sense of control. Therefore, we cease further analysis and conclude that among the financially constrained participants, agency- and value affirmation vs. no affirmation does not increase sense of control which subsequently leads to more patience.
The mediating role of positive mood
To examine whether positive mood was mediating the interaction between economic condition and affirmation, first we ran a regression to see if these experimental conditions were predicting participants’ sense of control (see figure 8).
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X1 in the model above represents the dummy variable that compares agency-affirmation to no-affirmation condition. X2 represents the dummy variable that compares value-no-affirmation to no affirmation condition. As the results show, the interaction between economic condition and affirmation does not predict positive mood. Therefore, we cease further analysis and conclude that among the financially constrained participants, agency- and value affirmation vs. no affirmation does not increase positive mood which subsequently leads to more patience.
The mediating role of negative mood
To examine whether negative mood was mediating the interaction between economic condition and affirmation, first we ran a regression to see if these experimental conditions were predicting participants’ negative mood (see figure 9).
Figure 9: Positive mood regression (X1=Agency vs. no-affirmation, X2=Value vs. no-affirmation)
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affirmation condition. As the results show, the overall interaction between economic condition and affirmation is marginally significant in predicting negative mood (p= .0695).
Affirmation condition
Economic condition
Mean SD N
No Affirmation Poor condition Rich condition 1.87 1.45 .783 .513 94 88 Agency Affirmation Poor condition Rich condition 1.57 1.48 .724 .713 85 76 Value Affirmation Poor condition Rich condition 1.70 1.56 .814 .664 86 77
Table 2: Descriptive table for negative mood under economic- and affirmation conditions
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Figure 10: AUC regression (X1=Agency vs. no-affirmation, X2=Value vs. no-affirmation) 2
Results revealed that negative mood did not have a significant main effect on AUC while controlling for other independent variables. Therefore, it is unlikely that negative mood mediates the interaction between economic condition and affirmation on AUC.
Discussion & Recommendations
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impatience. Although marginally significant these results are promising as they show the reparative effects of psychological interventions such as self-affirmation in helping the poor in reducing their myopic tendencies. Specifically, we found that self-affirmation either in the form of agency affirmation or through value affirmation enables the poor to become more patient relative to their non-affirmed counterparts. More importantly, our findings also highlight the underlying mechanism through which affirmation interventions extent the reparative effects in reducing the poor’s myopia. Specifically we found that a boost in self-esteem, as a result of affirmation strategies, enabled the poor to be more patient in intertemporal choices.
In addition to our main finding (that affirmation helps the poor become more patient) we also found that self-affirmation made participants in the financially adequate condition less patient. This is surprising as self-affirmation does usually not affect people who are not under psychological threats. A possible explanation could be that self-affirmation overpowers the self, leading to irrational behavior. Sherman & Cohen (2014) argue that affirmed people no longer feel obliged to make ‘correct’ choices with regard to decisions in the affirmed domain, and rather act in ways that violate these principles. This could mean that self-affirming the financially adequate participants gave leverage to make ‘incorrect’ assessments with regard to time discounting objective. It has to be noted that Sherman & Cohen (2014) argued this from a moral context. Subjects would make immoral choices when they were first affirmed in that moral domain (Jacks & O'Brien, 2004; Monin & Miller, 2001). Nevertheless, it could explain this counterintuitive finding.
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This study is the first to examine the effectiveness of affirmation interventions with respect to behavioral measures of financially constraint people and given the promising results we expect fruitful avenues for future research on this topic.
Future research
In this section we will talk about our propositions for future research. Firstly, although we have marginally shown the positive effect of self-affirmation on the patience of the poor, it still has to be seen what the duration of this effect will be. This could be a possible subject for future research. Several studies have shown that self-affirmation interventions (similar writing interventions as used in this research) can have long lasting effects (Ross & Nisbett, 2011; Wilson, 2011). It is even possible that the affirming effect can grow over time (Cohen & Sherman, 2014). Therefore, more knowledge about nuances of the duration of the effect with regard to the poor and intertemporal choice would be a very beneficial step in helping the poor.
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effects of self-affirmation can be seen in a more practical setting. These can be related to practical intertemporal choices like food consumption, savings and education plans. Also affirmation methods could be applied in a retail store setting to see if this would lead to a different consumption pattern.
Limitations
In our study there were a number of limitations. Firstly, there is no standard manipulation check in the literature to test the effectiveness of these manipulations. As a result it is not guaranteed that our affirmation manipulations have been powerful enough to influence the poor’s behavior. However, increase in participant’s self-esteem, after self-affirmation interventions, in our results indicates a successful effect of affirmations on our participants.
Secondly, the average AUG in the dataset was low. This might show that participants on mturk are relatively financially constrained. However, the fact that we still found an effect between the economic conditions and affirmation conditions shows the power of affirmation interventions in helping the poor. This paper purposely used manipulation techniques that could induce feelings of financial constraints or adequacy on the participants, rather than take actual income levels. However, because it is possible the participants were exceptionally poor it is not guaranteed that this manipulation worked. Future research could look into other manipulations. For example one way to induce feelings of financial deprivation is through social comparison. We expect, consistent with our findings in this paper, similar findings to be found for manipulations using social comparison methods.
Managerial implications
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Although we urge managers to incorporate self-affirmation methods, nuances have to be discussed. In this paper the emphasis laid on the dangers of directly affirming subjects. However, it has to be stated that there is also a danger in affirming co-workers through unrelated domains. This was not articulated in the main section as this problem would have no effect on the dissonance of the researched participants. However, it does have practical effects and thus should be considered when actually utilizing the self-affirmation method. Blanton et al. (1997) hypothesized that indirect affirmation leads to ‘masking’ of the psychological threat. The actual psychological threat does not disappear, but is shielded by the indirect affirmation. The drawback is that when the domain which is indirectly affirmed is also threatened, dissonance can reappear (Galinksy, Stone, & Cooper, 2000).
Secondly, direct affirmation, though dangerous, can lead to benefits which are different from the indirect method. Blanton et al. (1997) suggested that directly affirming subjects can be beneficial. The indirect affirmation method results in a strengthening of the own stance. They suggest that this has to do with the difference between toleration, as Steele & Liu (1983) described, and the need for actual change. If the financially constrained are reaffirmed outside of the threatened domain, the psychological threat can be coped with (in other words: tolerated). Contrary, by reaffirming the threatened domain directly, it buffers it, and encourages actual positive change. The subject regains his positive self-concept by reaffirming the threatened domain. Through this, the positive worth of the domain is recovered which leads to the ability to confront the psychological threat.
It is important to understand these nuances when applying affirmation tactics. In context of the poor and their need to be more patient, the goal will determine the method. Through direct affirmation methods the risk of backfiring increases, which would also mean increased levels of dissonance. However the chance of actual conscious (long-term) change is also increased. On the other side, when using the indirect method the chance of backfiring is minimized, while at the same time deep-seated concepts will not be altered. For the financially constrained, their self-image of fitting into their stereotype consists, but can be coped with mentally.
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