Whole of nation coherence within the comprehensive approach and its challenges

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Whole of nation coherence within the

comprehensive approach and its challenges

A case study of the Dutch integrated ISAF mission in Uruzgan

J.Y. van der Wal

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Master thesis IB/IO - J.Y. van der Wal Page 3

Whole of nation coherence within the

comprehensive approach and its challenges

A case study of the Dutch integrated ISAF mission in Uruzgan

Jense Yge van der Wal Studentnumber: 1562916

J.Y.van.der.Wal@student.rug.nl University of Groningen

Faculty of Arts

International Relations and International Organizations Masterthesis, January 2012

Supervisor:

Dr. M.E. Drent (University of Groningen)

Cover picture: Website Radio Netherlands Worldwide (RNW), visited on 5-07-2011,

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English summary

After the Cold War the international security environment has changed dramatically. It became clear that not only military, but also political, economic and societal factors influence security. States realized they needed to include these factors in their complex crises management operations. This became known as the Comprehensive Approach. Influenced by the „nature of war‟ debate, critical security studies, COIN theory and human security, the CA is based on the assumption that current crisis operations will be more effective when actors of different backgrounds (e.g. military, diplomacy or development) combine their efforts. The concept of coherence was used to analyze the CA, for example on which levels coherence can be pursued, what its assumption is, how it can be achieved and which factors undermine coherence. This paper takes a closer look at the ISAF mission the Netherlands conducted in Uruzgan, a southern province in Afghanistan, between 2006 and 2010, to find out how the Dutch CA actors implemented the concept of whole of nation coherence and to what extent the WoN coherence was influenced by the three selected challenges to coherence. These challenges are: (1) practical differences in organizational cultures, (2) different values and principles and (3) the tension between short-term output and long-term impact. During this mission, the Dutch Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several local and international NGOs combined their efforts to support the Afghan authorities in Uruzgan to realize that the they could eventually guarantee security and stability within the province on their own.

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mechanisms included NGOs. Except the DCU and the occasional coordination in the field, NGOs were not integrated in the governmental mechanisms.

With regard to the three challenges to whole of nation coherence, this paper asks whether the literature on the case study indicated that these challenges were present during the Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan. Reflecting on these challenges, one can say that the operational cooperation between the actors improved significantly during the mission, for example by the strategic planning process and organizing joint preparation courses between the MFA and the MoD. Although there are still some practical issues that decrease coherence, like the short staff rotations of the MFA and MoD, which tend to decrease continuity and increase the emphasis on short-term goals. There are still several fundamental differences (for example caused by different values and principles) between the actors that negatively influence coherence on the impact level. The case of Uruzgan therefore seems to confirm the assumption that practical challenges (e.g. different organizational processes and structures) are easier to overcome than deeper-rooted challenges (like challenge 2 and 3).

Search terms: Comprehensive approach, integrated approach, 3-D approach, international

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Dutch summary

De internationale veiligheidsomgeving is na de Koude Oorlog drastisch veranderd. Het werd steeds duidelijker dat niet alleen militaire, maar ook politieke, economische en maatschappelijk factoren veiligheid beïnvloeden. Staten kwamen tot het inzicht dat ze deze aspecten moesten betrekken in hun crisismanagement operaties. Dit is bekend komen te staan als de geïntegreerde benadering (CA). Beïnvloed door verschillende theorieën, zoals COIN theorie en „human security‟ theorie, is de CA gebaseerd op de aanname dat huidige crisismanagement operaties effectiever zijn wanneer actoren met verschillende achtergronden (defensie, diplomatie, ontwikkelingshulp) hun krachten bundelen.

Dit onderzoek gebruikt het begrip „coherentie‟ om inzicht te krijgen in de werking van de CA, bijvoorbeeld over de niveaus waarop samenhang kan plaatsvinden, wat de aanname van de CA is, welke mechanismen kunnen worden gebruikt om de samenhang te verbeteren en welke factoren de samenhang ondermijnen. In dit onderzoek wordt de Nederland ISAF missie in Uruzgan, een zuidelijke provincie in Afghanistan, tussen 2006 en 2010, gebruikt om uit te vinden hoe de Nederlandse actoren de CA in praktijk geïmplementeerd hebben en in welke mate de samenhang was beïnvloed door de drie geselecteerde uitdagingen voor samenhang. Deze drie aspecten zijn: (1) praktische verschillen in organisatieculturen, (2) verschillende waarden en principes en (3) de spanning tussen korte termijn resultaten en lange termijn impact. Tijdens deze missie bundelende het Ministerie van Defensie, het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en verschillende lokale en internationale NGO hun inspanningen om de Afghaanse autoriteiten in Uruzgan te ondersteunen in hun doel uiteindelijk zelf veiligheid en stabiliteit te kunnen garanderen in de provincie.

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veelvoud aan coördinatie eenheden. De derde vaststelling is dat weinig mechanismen de NGOs officieel hadden opgenomen in hun structuren. Behalve het DCU, waren NGOs niet betrokken bij de mechanismen van de overheid.

Aan de hand van literatuur over de casus is onderzocht of en in hoeverre de drie uitdagingen invloed hebben gehad op de samenhang van de Nederlandse ISAF missie in Uruzgan. Reflecterend op de bevindingen, concludeert deze paper dat de operationele samenwerking tussen de Nederlandse actoren zich heeft ontwikkeld tijdens de missie, bijvoorbeeld door de ontwikkeling van een strategisch planningsproces (wat leidde tot het Uruzgan Campaign Plan) en door het organiseren van een gezamenlijke voortraject voor de Ministeries van Defensie en Buitenlandse Zaken. Er bestaan echter ook enkele praktische zaken die de samenhang ondermijnen, zoals de korte duur van de stafrotaties van de twee Ministeries, waardoor het moeilijk is de continuïteit te garanderen en korte termijn doelen van groter belang worden omdat elke rotatie zich wil bewijzen. Er zijn ook enkele fundamentele aspecten (bijvoorbeeld het verschil in waarden en principes tussen de actoren) die een negatieve invloed hebben gehad op de samenhang van de missie. De casus bevestigt de veronderstelling dat de praktische uitdagingen (zoals de verschillende procedures en structuren van organisaties) makkelijker te overwinnen zijn dan dieper gewortelde problemen (zoals uitdaging 2 en 3).

Zoektermen: Comprehensive approach, geïntegreerde benadering, 3-D benadering,

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Abbreviations

3-D - 3-D approach (Defense, diplomacy and development) ANA - Afghan National Army

ANDS - Afghan National Development Strategy ANP - Afghan National Police

ATF - Air Task Force

CA - Comprehensive approach CIMIC - Civil-military cooperation CIVREP - Civil Representative COIN - Counterinsurgency CULAD - Cultural advisor

DAC - Development Assistance Committee DCU - Dutch Consortium in Uruzgan DEVAD - Development advisor

EU - European Union

EUPOL - European Police Mission HAM - Hearts and minds

HGIS - Homogenous Group of International of International Cooperation

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force IR - International Relations

KAF - Kandahar Air Field MoD - Ministry of Defense

MFA - Ministry of Foreign Affairs NGO - Non governmental organization NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization ODA - Official Development Assistance

OECD - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom

POLAD - Political advisor

PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team SF - Stability Fund

SMO - Steering Group for Military Operations SPRoL - Steering Group for Police and Rule of Law SSR - Security Sector Reform

SVW - Steering Group Security Cooperation and Reconstruction TFU - Task Force Uruzgan

TLO - The Liaison Office WoN - Whole of nation

UCP - Uruzgan Campaign Plan

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1. Introduction

On both the theoretical and the practical level, theorists, soldiers, diplomats and development workers struggle with the complexity of contemporary crisis management systems. One conceptual response to this complexity is the comprehensive approach (also called „3-D approach‟ or „integrated approach‟), which is based on the thought that there should also be a political, civilian and economic component besides the traditional military component (Thruelsen , 2011: 3). There are still many problems with the effective implementation of comprehensive efforts. For example which actor is responsible for which sector (Rietdijk, 2008: 481) or that there seems to be a gap between policy makers and policy implementors and between headquarters and field operations. Other problems are that the carefully-defined and packaged policies and programs rarely translate into effective programs on the ground (Tschirgi, 2005: 13). This would mean that there is a considerable gap between the degree to which the benefits of coherence are held to be self-evident at the policy level, and a persistent inability to achieve coherence at the operational level (De Coning & Friis, 2011: 259). Other researchers even argue that the basic assumption of the CA, that the joint efforts lead to a positive synergy, is incorrect (Kamphuis, 2010: 429).

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principles; and (3) long-term impact versus short-term output; (De Coning and Friis, 2011: 261; OECD, 2006: 18). These challenges will be addressed in detail in chapter 5.

To address the concept of coherence and the influence of the three challenges, this research examines the Dutch ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The Netherlands was the lead nation in the Afghan province of Uruzgan from 2006 to 2010. During that period, the Netherlands made a contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with thousands of military and scores of civilian personnel (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2010: 429). In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the aim of the mission was to promote stability and security by increasing the support of the local population for the Afghan authorities and eroding the support for the Taliban and related groups (Dutch Government, 2005). And, specifically, also to create the conditions for governmental and economic progress. To achieve these goals, the Netherlands used an approach which encompassed military, diplomatic, development and economic elements. Within this approach, the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) was one of the central implementation tools through which development projects were carried out. A more detailed description of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan follows in chapter 3.

The selection of a case study is primarily based on the relevance of the case to the objective of the study (George & Bennet, 2005). As the whole of nation coherence is the objective of study here, there are several options for a case study, such as the Canadian, Norwegian or Dutch ISAF efforts in Afghanistan. The latter is the central case in this study, because it is considered to be a working example of the comprehensive approach (The Economist, 2009; Grammticas, 2009). Furthermore, it is an interesting case, because for the first time in history, the Dutch government organized meetings with development organizations (like Cordaid Healthnet TPO and ICCO) before the mission to prepare the intervention using the experience available within these organizations (Van der Lijn, 2011: 44). Another singular aspect is that in March 2009, the Dutch Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) was placed under dual-headed civilian and military leadership (Van der Lijn, 2011: 36).

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Research design

To answer this questions, the research is divided in three parts. In the first part, the historical and theoretical context of this study, the nature of contemporary conflicts and the measures of the international community to stabilize them will be addressed. The nature of war-debate, critical security studies, counterinsurgency theory and human security theory have been chosen to address the theoretical foundations of the CA. Furthermore the question why contemporary peace building efforts maintain a rationale of coherence will be addressed. This will lead to the assumption that a coherent peace building effort is more effective than a non-coherent effort. In the second part the case of the Dutch ISAF mission will be introduced by addressing the three actors and their efforts. The study will try to cover as much aspects of the mission as possible, however, due to space limitations it is impossible to address all aspects thoroughly. In the third part the coherence mechanisms that the actors used on the strategic, planning, financial and implementation level during the Uruzgan mission will be analyzed. Due to size limitations, this chapter only addresses the organizational side of coherence and cannot address the effects in the province of the mission in Uruzgan.

After that, the three challenges to whole of nation coherence will be analyzed. The three coherence challenges will be addressed by using a discourse analysis. First potential problem areas are deduced from the discourses of the three actors (MFA, MoD and NGOs). Using discourses is based on the idea that the actors have developed their own unique historical, philosophical and organizational context. For example that development cooperation traditionally engages in countries based on an understanding that change is a slow process and that obstacles are structural in nature. This implies a long-term goals and engagement. In contrast to Ministries of Defense, which are generally more focused on short-term outputs (OECD, 2006: 35). After tracing these potential tensions, literature about the interagency cooperation between the three actors will have to determine whether there were actual cases in which the differences led to problems that decreased coherence. Especially the final assessment of the mission in Uruzgan written by the Dutch government (2011) and a SWOT-analysis (identifying the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) of the Dutch 3-D approach in Uruzgan (Van der Lijn, 2011) have provided lots of information for chapter four and five.

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result, this study can only estimate the influence of the challenges by deducing possible clashing points and by reflecting on the mechanisms that were used to advance the whole of nation coherency. Furthermore, most sources on this topic are general texts about the integrated or „3-D approach‟, which do not elaborate on the cooperation between the MFA and the MoD. Sources about possible difficulties in the interagency collaboration during the Dutch effort in Afghanistan are especially hard to find, because this information is kept for internal use mostly by the ministries.

Goal of the study

By answering these questions this research tries to understand (1) which mechanisms can be used to increase WoN coherence and (2) which aspects undermine the cohesion of an interagency cooperation effort. These two questions will be addressed in the conclusion (chapter 6). However, this study also wants to address the consequences of this information. This will be done in the „discussion‟ (chapter 7), by assessing these challenges to coherence, this study asks whether this has implications for the basic assumption of the CA. A further reaching objective of this study is to shed light on the question which level of coherence (see subchapter 4.1.) is desirable or possible given the challenges of coherence.

Justification and motivation

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The context

2. Contemporary conflicts and security theory

Before addressing the concept of coherence in depth in the next chapter, this chapter will contextualize the CA by sketching the main developments in the international security environment after the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, boundaries between the areas of security, development, economy and diplomacy have blurred and it became evident that old concepts and practices are not applicable anymore (Travers & Owen, 2007: 4). This is relevant, because the CA is a response to crises in this security environment. Four theoretical influences on the comprehensive approach will be addressed, being the „nature of war‟ debate, the critical security studies paradigm, COIN theory and the human security theory. These four have been chosen, because they approach the subject from multiple perspectives. The first two are more abstract theories about the nature of conflicts and security in general, while the last two address the subject from a more practical and operational perspective. Furthermore, they have different background as well, as one is a military doctrine (COIN), two of them have an academic background (security studies and nature of war debate) and one has a development cooperation background (human security). By showing that the CA has been influenced by these different theories, it becomes clear that the CA is a complex term that relates to many aspects of reality. These theories will provide a conceptual background of the CA. At the end of the chapter, the development and the rationale of the comprehensive approach itself will be discussed.

2.1 International security after the Cold War

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contradiction paralyzed decision making in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), because the permanent members used their veto right to block each other‟s initiatives. During the first few years after the end of the Cold War this was no longer the case and as a result it was possible to adapt UN resolutions that mandated military operations that could end intra-state violence. This resulted in an increasing number of international peacekeeping missions. A simple indicator of this is the exponential increase in the number of UN Peacekeeping Operations: by 1990, the UNSC had authorized 15 peacekeeping operations in four decades, while it authorized the same number in the next four years (Smith, 2004: 17).

The increasing number of peace missions was not the only change after the Cold War. The nature of operations also changed. In the early 1990s so called „second generation missions‟ made their appearance. In 1992, former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali outlined his view on how the UN should respond to conflict in the post-Cold War word in An Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). He sought to overcome the conceptual and bureaucratic division that had previously separated aid and politics. The analysis of the causes of conflict was broadened to include social, economic and environmental factors and the UNSG called for the mobilization of political, military and aid assets in a coherent manner to build peace and security (Macrae & Leader, 2000: 1). Earlier missions emphasized maintaining peace, whereas missions from the early 1990s were also aimed at stabilization and reconstruction. This meant that peace missions tried to achieve more ambitious goals and used a broader approach to achieve these goals. Also more actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and financial institutes, became involved in peacekeeping operations (Klep & Van Gils, 1999: 21). This shift from peacekeeping to stabilization operations, which are intended to manage change (Aoi, De Coning and Thakur, 2007: 4) reflects significant normative shifts. Where sovereignty was once sacrosanct, the emergence of concepts like human security and the frequency of humanitarian action now point towards new understandings of the rights and responsibilities of states (Travers & Owen, 2007: 4).

2.2. Theoretical influences on the CA

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The nature of war-debate

The shift from traditional peacekeeping into a spectrum that now includes stabilization and reconstruction reflects the recognition that war has changed. Since the 1990s, a body of literature has developed concerning what Martin van Creveld (1991) has called „the transformation of war‟ and Mary Kaldor (2008) „new wars‟. These scholars argue that during the 1990s a new kind of warfare began to emerge (or had already emerged). Today‟s wars, unlike in the past, are increasingly ‘within States rather than between States’. These wars were ‘often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty’ and were largely directed against civilians (Boutros-Ghali. 1995: 7). As a result, these new conflicts are increasingly taking the form of complex political emergencies; including elements of guerrilla campaigning, criminal profiteering, and terrorism (Duffield, 2001; Kaldor, 2008). One explanatory factor in the transformation of conflict is how warring parties get their (financial) resources. In the post-Cold War era, political disengagement by the major powers from various proxy wars meant that their influence over many contemporary conflicts has diminished. The withdrawal of superpowers‟ subsidy for proxy wars in the South has also meant that warring parties have come to rely upon extracting resources from civilians and exploiting primary commodities such as gems, oil and forest products. This process created the conditions for massive abuse of human rights and destruction of livelihoods. It created an economic rationale for sustaining conflict (Macrae & Leader, 2000: 2). As a result of these changes the characteristics of war have changed. Former British general Sir Rupert Smith identified several characteristics of contemporary war (Smith, 2006):

1. The ends of war are changing from pursuit of outright victory to the creation of particular sets of conditions in particular situations;

2. The fighting occurs among the people. Warfare is no longer about regular armies engaging on set battlefields on behalf of states, but warfare that goes amongst the people (e.g. by guerrilla or insurgent irregular forces);

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The debate on the question whether the rationale of conflict has changed, can be seen as an influence on the CA, because from this realization one can draw the conclusion that crisis management operations need to face conflicts differently. When, for example, organized crime turns out to be a catalyst for conflict, an operation will have to consist of police activities and take on the roots of crime by creating alternatives.

Critical security studies

A second theoretical influence on the CA is critical security studies. Within the International Relations (IR) sub-field of critical security studies, a broader understanding of the concept of security was already pleaded for by Barry Buzan (1983) in the early 1980s. Since then, the paradigm of critical security studies has grown into a diverse field that challenged traditional definitions of security and emphasized the socially-constructed nature of state identities and international systems.

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the referent object (by arguing that individuals of humans collectively should be the referent object of security) and explores ontological and epistemological debates which seek to deepen understanding of security (Newman, 2010: 84).

There have also been scholars from this field of study that critique the increasingly closer connection between conflict and development. Duffield (2000) argues this change has led to a „political humanitarianism‟. As humanitarian organizations often do not have the financial means to take on humanitarian crises by themselves, they constantly need financial support from donor countries. However, these donor countries can use their financial support for political ends, for example by imposing conditions of internal political change to the receiving state that concern conflict resolution, the promoting the rule of law or security sector reform. The humanitarian community seems to share this critique by making serious reservations about the placement of humanitarian agencies under the same control structure as the political and military branches of the mission. Their main concern is that the integration results in the politicization of aid, and the degradation of humanitarian space. As the shape of integrated missions has evolved over the past few years, two basic tensions have emerged. Namely, the tension between (a) the pragmatic need to collaborate and coordinate the disparate crisis response systems in such a way as to carve security and stability out of highly volatile and multidimensional conflicts, and (b) the need to respect the essential distinction between the political dimensions of the peacekeeping response, and the necessarily neutral and impartial position of humanitarian actors (Weir, 2006: 9).

Counterinsurgency

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focusing on the nature of threats and the relationship between development and security. COIN turned out to be a powerful critique of the use of conventional war fighting tactics applied in Iraq and Afghanistan. Central to the COIN theory are the protection of civilians and establishing a legitimate government that can guarantee a rule of law. Furthermore it argues for an „appropriate level of force’, suggesting ‘[s]ometimes the more force you use the less effective it is’; „[s]ome of the best weapons for COIN do not shoot’; and ‘[s]ometimes the more you protect your force the less secure you will be‟ (US Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2006). It also calls for the integration of military and civilian activities (Kaldor, 2011: 9).

The final assessment of the Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan recognized the influence of COIN theory on the Dutch 3-D approach by pointing out several similarities (Dutch government, 2011: 20). Both COIN and the CA are convinced that military force alone is not going to solve a crisis. To do this, a political solution is necessary. The strategy to take away the support of civilians for insurgents by improving their living standards is another aspect that has influenced the 3-D approach. Also the protection of individuals and the principle to use as little violence as possible characterize both the CA and COIN. As these similarities show, COIN theory has influenced the CA quite a bit. However, during the mission in Uruzgan, the Dutch military was not allowed to use the term COIN (Van der Lijn, 2011: 34). The most logical explanation for this is that the term COIN is considered to be a military term, while the Dutch mission in Uruzgan was framed as a stabilization and especially (re)construction mission (Van der Lijn, 2011: 32). Using COIN as a central term during the mission would not correspond with these goals. Also, labeling the efforts in Uruzgan as a COIN-mission would be unacceptable for most Dutch NGOs as it would mean they were not neutral (Van der Lijn, 2011: 68).

Human security

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changing nature of conflict thesis is questionable, it is essential for the problematic of human security. The changing nature of conflicts theme sees organized crime as „development in reverse’ (Collier, 2000: ix). Conflict can be redefined as a terminal threat to sustainable development. The threats to development are caused by poverty and alienation as result of exclusion. This can be exploited by violent and criminal leaders, resulting in wrecking infrastructures and livelihood systems and increasing the risk of enduring cycles of violence and displacement To prevent this, the human security approach argues that the referent object of security should be the individual rather than the state and that environmental, health, demographic, economic and political issues should be included in the definition of security (Klingebiel, 2006: 20-22). A constituent element of human security is the protection of people or individuals. On this point, it differs fundamentally from the term „national security‟, where the focus is on the security of the state (Klingebiel, 2006: 2). Besides the Agenda for Peace (1992), the UNDP‟s Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) had a great influence on human security thinking. It presented human security as being constituted by „freedom from want‟ and „freedom from fear‟ and identified seven influential areas of security: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community and political. In 2003, the Commission on Human Security declared that „not only are peace and development both important (…) they are also interconnected (…) the chain from poverty and deprivation to violent conflict, and back, has to be followed carefully’ (Commision on Human Security, 2003: 7).

There is a link between the Comprehensive Approach and the development of the concept of human security. With the change of security paradigm and the birth of the security-defense continuum, crisis management is no longer seen as a lethal battle to conquer a territory, but as the confrontation of adversaries who have to find a means to restore peace. It is not only about intervening on ceasefire, but also integrating human aspects for returning to good governance, an administration, police structures and ensuring economic development. There is thus a link between the concept of human security and establishing the comprehensive approach (Wendling, 2010: 13).

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2.2. The comprehensive approach (CA)

From the assessment of the Commission on Human Security of the interconnectedness between political stability and underdevelopment it is a small step to the corollary that international interventions must address all the factors contributing to a crisis. The development and the rationale of such comprehensive approaches will be addressed here. The CA is among others also called multidimensional approach, the integrated approach, the whole of nation approach, interagency approach, networked security, multifunctional approach and 3-D approach (diplomacy-development-defense). Although the idea behind all these expressions conveys the idea that a one-dimensional approach proves counterproductive in tackling complex crises, it proves to be very difficult to find a single definition for the concept of comprehensive approach. There is, however, broad agreement that it „implies pursuing an approach aimed at integrating the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions of international crisis management operations’ (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008: 11). A broad and useful definition is given by Daniel Korski who says that: „In its simplest definition, the comprehensive approach means blending civilian and military tools and enforcing co-operation between government departments, not only for operations but more broadly to deal with many of the 21st century security challenges, including terrorism, genocide and proliferation of weapons and dangerous materials’ (House of Commons Defense Committee, 2010: 11). However, this definition seems to focus solely on the governmental actors, while the definition of Rintakoski and Autti also entails NGO efforts in CA missions and therefore seems to be a more comprehensive definition.

The CA assumes that security and development cannot be achieved separately and that failure in one sector risks failure in all others. In this sense, comprehensive crisis management operations are field-level expressions of a broad normative understanding of security (Drent & Zandee, 2010: 5). A practical consequence is that the organizations that combine their efforts should avoid duplication of their efforts, as this will result in a waste of energy and resources (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008:12).

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cooperation (CIMIC) operations that implemented humanitarian tasks to support the local population with basic services (Thruelsen, 2011: 3).

In the early 2000s, the label comprehensive or integrated approach began to appear in line with the growing understanding of the complexities of post-conflict peace-building. One of the first influential documents that introduced the concept of the integrated approach was the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (United Nations, 2000), better known as the Brahimi Report. This report, made by a commission in 2000, provided a thorough review of UN peace and security activities to make recommendations to improve the UN‟s efforts. Among other things, the report stressed the importance of an integrated approach to peace operations at the UN level. To achieve this, the report recommended to create „Integrated Mission Task Forces‟, with staff from throughout the UN system seconded to them, to plan new missions and to reach full deployment. International organizations such as the EU, UN and NATO gradually accepted the comprehensive approach as a relevant strategy. A UN Security Council Presidential Statement from 2001 stated that:

The Security Council further reaffirms that a comprehensive and integrated strategy in peace-building must involve all the relevant actors in this field, taking into account the unique circumstances of each conflict situation. The Council emphasizes that a well-planned and coordinated peace-building strategy can play a significant role in conflict prevention. In this connection, the Council underlines that international efforts in peace-building must complement and not supplant the essential role of the country concerned (UNSC, 2001).

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The European Union (EU) has adopted the CA concept as well in its European Security Strategy of 2003, stressing that the Union must „pursue coherent policies’, „bring together the different tools and capabilities of EU policy, such as European assistance programmes, the European Development Fund and the Member States’ military and civilian capabilities’. It also underlines the importance of „working with partners’, i.e. major powers and organizations (Solana, 2003).

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The case

3.

The Dutch integrated ISAF operation in Afghanistan

Before addressing the mechanisms that the Dutch actors used to increase WoN coherence, this chapter will introduce the case of the Netherlands in Uruzgan. First a general outline of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan is given, followed by an explanation of the missions goals, the actors, strategies and resources of the Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan (see Van der Lijn, 2011: 32-37 for a detailed description of the mission itself).

3.1. The International Security Assistance Force

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covered the entire country (stage 4) (Dutch Government, 2011: 16). ISAF aims to promote stability and security in Uruzgan by increasing the support of the local population for the Afghan authorities, to support the capacity- and capability building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), to facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development and to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency (Dutch Government, 2011: 16).

3.2. Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan 2006 – 2010

The Netherlands has been actively involved with the ISAF mission from its start in 2001. They were active in the northern province of Baghlan and on the ISAF headquarter in Kabul. On August 1st 2006, the Netherlands became lead nation of the ISAF mission in the southern province of Uruzgan by taking command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Tirin Kot. Before then, Uruzgan fell under command of the American led operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Uruzgan is a rather isolated area, with a population of 395.000, which mainly earns its significance through the fact that it produced many Taliban leaders and that President Karzai chose to start his quest for power there in late 2001 (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2010: 431). The Dutch operation was initially planned to last two years, but was extended to August 1st 2010. After that, the discussion over the possibility of a second extension stalled when the cabinet fell on February 20th 2010 over the decision to extend the mission for a second time.

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To achieve these goals, the Netherlands used an approach which encompassed military, diplomatic, development and economic elements. The Dutch Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs cooperated with Dutch and local Afghan Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in their reconstruction activities in Uruzgan. The approach of the mission, named 3-D approach (development, diplomacy/governance and defense/security), was carried out under the motto „as civil as possible and as military where necessary‟ (Gabriëlse, 2007: 68). It corresponds closely with existing COIN doctrines in its emphasis on support of the local population, and enhancing the legitimacy of the Afghan authority (See Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2010 for a detailed assessment on this point).

The implementation of the strategy contained both top-down and a bottom up efforts. The larger part (two-thirds) of the annual development aid was spent through trust funds and multilateral programs that aim at creating preconditions of good governance (top-down). In Uruzgan the Dutch tried to create the preconditions for national programs to be rolled out by actively involving local NGOs and by directly funding projects in the sectors of education, infrastructure, health and alternative livelihoods (bottom up) (Gabriëlse, 2007: 69). The operational implementation of the bottom up strategy took place in four phases (shape, clear, hold and build), in which first the military conditions were created, after which an area was freed from insurgents and the delivery of improvement of infrastructure and public services could begin (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2010: 437). When one takes into account that the four phases often could not be carried out consecutively, it becomes clear that military and civilian efforts were closely intertwined during the mission. As a result of this and to stress the importance of the civilian component, the Task Forde Uruzgan was placed under dual-headed civil-military leadership, consisting of the highest soldier (C-TFU) and the highest civilian (CIVREP) in March 2008 (Van der Lijn, 2011: 36).

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In the development sector, the 3-D approach meant that the Dutch tried not to do the development work for the Afghans, but rather to facilitate them to do it themselves. This meant that the Netherlands provided the funds but the reconstruction work was done by the Afghan government, the UN, and international and Afghan NGOs (TLO, 2010: ix). The projects that were deployed throughout the mission varied from small scale and quickly visible CIMIC activities, to long-term developments project to national and local government capacity building projects. Development activities covered several sectors, like health care, education, agriculture, water recourse management, infrastructure, media and gender.

The goal of the security sector was to provide the security conditions for the development and governance projects. The approach that was chosen to achieve this was the „inkblot‟ strategy, focusing on the central districts of Tirin Kot, Deh Rawod and Chora (see map 1).

Map 1: Uruzgan districts and Dutch bases (Dutch Government, 2009: supplement III)

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Rawud in 2008. In the security sector training and monitoring programs were used to stimulate the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghanistan National Police (ANP) to take control in the province. These activities fell under „Security Sector Reform‟ (SSR) activities, which are meant to reform and train security forces (i.e. police and army).

Actors and recourses

The relevant actors for this study are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (within which Development Cooperation is housed)) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD), because they were responsible for the (implementation of) policy of the Dutch government in Uruzgan, and the Dutch NGOs for their executive role in Uruzgan. Besides these actors, many international and Dutch actors were involved with the ISAF mission in Uruzgan. The MFA and the MoD were responsible for the policy and practice of the Dutch government. Within this the MoD focused on the military aspects, for example the equipment, rules of engagement and securing the PRT. The military presence in Uruzgan constituted of a Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) and an Air Task Force (ATF) of F-16‟s fighter planes and Apache helicopters in Uruzgan and Kandahar Air Field. The main element, the TFU, consisted of a staff of approximately 100 people, a PRT-team of 60 people, a Battle Group (combat unit) of approximately 450 soldiers and an Australian Monitoring and Reconstruction Task Force. In total more than 20.000 Dutch soldiers have been deployed in a four-month rotation system throughout the mission in Afghanistan (Van den Aker, 2009: 10).

The second actor, the MFA, was responsible for the civilian presence in Uruzgan, and the political and development aspect, like improving the rule of law, human rights and development projects. The MFA in particular is faced with the challenge of providing an integrated policy taking into account the political, security, development and humanitarian aspects, because the MFA includes development cooperation and because it has been appointed to coordinate all foreign affairs of all Dutch ministries (Beijnum & Van der Goor, 2006: 4).

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beginning of the mission there were three civilian PRT employees, (a POLAD, a DEVAD and a CULAD). After the summer of 2007 it expanded with a Civil Representative (CIVREP) and more POLADs and DEVADs. During the second half of the mission (2008 - 2010) a counter-narcotics adviser was added to the civilian part of the mission team and a political advisor was also assigned to the regional headquarter of ISAF in Kandahar Airfield. At the end of the mission, the number of civilian employees had quadrupled to twelve civilian personnel per rotation (Dutch government, 2011: 31). The occupation of the political and socio-economic department of the embassy in Kabul more than doubled as well during the mission. Although the amount of civilian personnel is still rather small in relation to the amount of military personnel, in comparison with previous Dutch missions, the amount is relatively large.

The third set of actors are the Dutch NGOs that were involved in Uruzgan. An NGO is an organisation that is not part of the government. Although they often receive significant sums from government sources, they are autonomous in their politics and activities. Furthermore, they are non-profit organizations (Klem & Douma, 2008: 17). There has been a clear shift with regard to the roles that NGOs have in peace management efforts the past decades. Where NGOs used to concentrate primarily on emergency relief and poverty reduction, NGOs become increasingly involved in conflict resolution and reconstruction (Klem & Douma, 2008: 20). The issue of civil-military relations is often categorized as CIMIC (Civil-Military Cooperation). However, this term harbors a limited military logic, while civil-military relations covers a much greater range of activities and forms of cooperation than those labeled as CIMIC (Frerks & Klem, 2006: 8).

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4.

Coherence mechanisms and the Dutch ISAF mission

When it comes to the implementation of a comprehensive effort, the implementing actors are essentially „flying blind‟, because there is little accumulated knowledge about how best to combine the different sectors of development, governance, rule of law and security. Nor is there a tested method how to sequence these components in response to specific local contexts. A complicating factor is that these operations require a wide range of actors, including the military, diplomats, development workers, the private sector and NGOs to work together in a coherent and coordinated effort (Rintakoski & Autti, 2008: 11). To get a better view on the cooperation within integrated approaches, the concept of coherence is addressed in this chapter. This chapter will also address three kinds of coherence mechanisms that were used during the Uruzgan mission: (1) strategic and planning mechanisms, (2) financial mechanisms and (3) implementation mechanisms. Furthermore, the development of the degree of comprehensiveness throughout the mission will be addressed.

4.1. What is coherence?

There are several ways to define coherence. The Poverty Guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines coherence as „the systematic promotion of mutually reinforcing policies across government departments and agencies creating synergies towards achieving the defined objective‟. The DAC Journal of Development Cooperation defines policy coherence slightly differently, as „different policy communities working together in ways that result in more powerful tools and products for all concerned. It means looking for synergies and complementarities and filling gaps between different policy areas to meet common and shared objectives‟ (Lockhart, 2004: 2). A similar definition of coherence is given by De Coning and Friis (2011: 253), they say coherence is „the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives’.

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relationship between coherence, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability (De Coning & Friis, 2011: 251). In order to be effective, policy coherence should go beyond providing a collection of independent policies guided by departmental mandates. If not, the risk of policy incoherence is magnified. The advantages of coherence are clear: more coherent policies and activities can contribute to the overall objective of long-term development and stability in fragile states at a lower overall fiscal cost. In addition, the risk of these objectives either being compromised, or simply not being met, is reduced. Finally, from the perspective of harmonization and alignment, coherent policies and activities may have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the recipient country and will therefore be more likely to receive a positive response (OECD, 2006: 18).

Coning and Friis (2011: 253) distinguish four elements of coherence: (1) intra-agency coherence, which encompasses the coherence among the policies and actions of an individual agency. For example the internal coherence of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs or an agency such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. (2) Whole of government coherence, which includes the coherence of policies and actions of the different government agencies of a country. For example coherence between the MFA and the MoD in the UK. (3) Inter-agency coherence, which includes the consistency among the policies pursued by the various international actors in a given country context. An example could be NATO-EU-UN coherence in Kosovo. And (4) internal-external coherence, which encompasses the consistency between and among the policies of the internal and external actors, in other words the host nation and the international actors, in a given country context. For example an agreed national strategic framework between the international community and the host government of Afghanistan. As this paper addresses the Dutch governmental actors (MFA and MoD), the whole of government element seems to be the most relevant. However, this paper also includes the Dutch NGOs that were active in Uruzgan, because they played an important role in the implementation of the Dutch policy by carrying out development projects. Therefore, this paper uses the term „whole of nation‟ coherence (Van der Lijn, 2011: 24), which encompasses the Dutch governmental and NGO actors in Uruzgan.

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types of relationships (De Coning and Friis, 2011: 258). Giving these different degrees, one can differentiate two levels of coherence: the first is coherence on a practical or tactical level, for example by sharing information and adjustment of actions to avoid duplication. The second is strategic (or impact level) coherence, which asks for a common understanding of a situation and cooperation for the common good, measured as sustainable impact on a peace process over time.

The ultimate goal of a coherent approach is to ensure „system level‟ coherence, which means that the goals, objectives, policies and implementation mechanisms in all four elements are coherent with each other. This requires both practical/tactical as strategic coherence. In this model, the coherence of a peace effort as a whole is a function of the degree of coherence in each of these four elements (De Coning & Friis, 2011: 253). Actors are therefore likely to pursue coherence at all four levels simultaneously. While this research focuses on „whole of nation‟ coherence, it is clear that all four types of coherence are relevant in comprehensive efforts. Action will be needed at each level to ensure coherence between strategic goal, policy objectives and implementation mechanisms at a systemic level.

4.2. Coherence mechanisms

Many researches and evaluations of operations have tried to identify what is necessary to achieve system level coherence. Every CA effort requires laborious negotiations between the actors to balance the priorities and capabilities of individual agencies possessing very different principles, priorities, organizational cultures, skill sets, and time frames, without homogenizing or losing the comparative advantages of the different entities (Patrick & Brown, 2007: 133). In general one can say that during the whole process of an CA operation, from preparation to evaluation, there should be communication between the actors to reach a whole number of goals like a common understanding of the problem; common country-specific objectives; joint analysis which leads to an overall strategy towards the conflict situation; joint training; joint planning; joint financial mechanisms and arrangements on leadership and the division of responsibilities (Ekengard, 2009; Lockhart, 2004; Munsing & Lamb, 2011; OECD, 2006; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Rintakoski & Keller, 2008; Smith, 2004; Thruelson, 2011;Tschirgi, 2005; Travers & Owen, 2007).

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Master thesis IB/IO - J.Y. van der Wal Page 35 to coordinate their strategies, finances, activities, etc. It is important to note that „effective‟

does not refer to the result of a comprehensive operation in a certain area, for example Afghanistan, but to which level of coherence can be achieved. Due to size limitations this paper can only go into the organizational side of coherence and cannot address the effects in the province of Uruzgan.

Coherence mechanisms can take many forms, like inter-departmental coordination meetings, joint financial mechanisms or joint preparation courses. These mechanisms are the tools that provide the link between theory and practice. As stated in the introduction, this paper distinguishes three kinds of coherence mechanisms: (1) strategic and planning mechanisms, (2) financial mechanisms and (3) implementation mechanisms. After mapping the Netherlands‟ approach to coherence in its foreign policy, the mechanisms that were used during the Dutch ISAF mission in Uruzgan will be addressed in detail.

4.3. Mapping the Netherlands approach to coherence in foreign policy

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on foreign policy, it is also documented in the renewed assessment framework of 2009 (in Dutch: „Toetsingskader‟) for the deployment of Dutch troops abroad. The document obliges Dutch cabinets to address the integration of the political, economical, development and security aspects when they inform the Lower House of a future peace building mission. The cabinet that was in power during the deployment of the mission in Uruzgan, Balkenende III, also expressed its conviction that an integrated approach was necessary in the Dutch policy towards fragile states, it stated that ‘[s]trengthening operational cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense provided better policy coherence. This government has opted for an intensification of efforts in fragile states in which coherence will be central (MFA DGIS/CE, 2008: translation by author). The Dutch government had several coherence instruments to achieve this. These will be addressed now.

4.4. Strategic and planning coherence mechanisms

To reach coherence on the strategic planning level an agreed single strategic process between the actors is required, which encompasses setting goals, a hierarchy of objectives and a set of policy plans (Lockhart, 2004: 7). The question here is whether such a process existed between the three actors and which mechanism helped achieving it. When addressing strategy in the mission in Uruzgan, it is not sufficient to refer to COIN, local ownership, the ink spot-strategy or the shape-clear-hold-build concept. These concepts are conceptual strategic tools that can be used to achieve objectives, but they do not determine them. In the case of Uruzgan this was done during a planning process that resulted in documents like the Uruzgan Campaign Plan (UCP).

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benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact in the areas of security, governance, rule of law and human rights and economic and social development.

The Compact and the ANDS do not give specific objectives for individual provinces though. Before their mission in Uruzgan, the Dutch government was very cautious to define long-term goals and expectations for Uruzgan. The Dutch government stated in the Article-100 letter from 2006 that it was very reluctant express any expectations of the mission. The letter states that ‘it is possible to make a significant contribution in this period to the creation of a situation in Uruzgan which the Afghan authorities have increased their influence and authority in the province and can increasingly provide security and stability on their own’. Furthermore it stated that ‘the Netherlands can give an impulse to the reconstruction and the improvement of the living conditions of the population’. The government also stressed that ‘results will not be visible from the beginning, but will require some time’ (Dutch Government, 2007: 6: translation by author). Plausible reasons for this are that the government realized that it was very hard to define specific long term goals that made sense, given the complexity of the context in Uruzgan. Besides, it would be very dangerous to do this in a political sense, because the domestic political parties would certainly use these long-term objectives to measure the degree of success of the mission afterwards. A third explanation for the vagueness of the objectives is that it was politically convenient not to make a choice between reconstruction and defense and security, since that would guarantee support across the political spectrum (Van der Lijn, 2011: 25).

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This process translated the conceptual comprehensive approach into specific plans that were drawn in document like the Focal Paper (2007-2008) and the UCP (2009-2010).

The process that led to these documents was different from the traditional military planning process, which takes the desired end-state as starting point and use backward reasoning to set their goals. The mission in Uruzgan, however, had to achieve goals in several dimensions and it was impossible to define an end-state as a result of the high complexity and the continuous changes in the mission environment (Spoelstra & Van Bemmel, 2001: 1). Therefore, the UCP was condition based instead of time based and offered rough objectives for the long term (decades), desired situations for the mid-term (years) and realistic and specific effects for the short-term (months). The rationale behind focusing on concrete manageable short- and mid-term goals is that each short mid-term goal builds towards the long mid-term goal: the promotion of development and the legitimacy of the Afghan government in the province. Another reason to focus on short- and mid-term goals rather than a traditional end-state is that it provides the necessary agility to cope with the wide range of influences and (un)expected changes in the field (Spoelstra & Van Bemmel, 2011: 2). The objectives in the UCP apply to so called Afghan Development Zones that are cleared of insurgents and that are stable and secure enough to start reconstruction activities. They form the basis for the so called inkblot strategy, which implies that security and reconstruction can be spread from these zones; from the safe zones the military clears other areas and start reconstruction activities.

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The process that led to the UCP document consisted of seven phases (see figure 1), starting with the formation of a planning group and concluding with writing the plan itself. At least every new TFU rotation updated the UCP. The planning process was executed by a group of the most important military and civilian stakeholders to provide input from their perspectives (phase 1). After the formation, a thorough orientation took place (phase 2). Amongst others, the „Civil Assessment‟ that was made by the MFA in cooperation with the Afghan NGO The Liaison Office (TLO) before the mission and the reconnaissance missions that took place in Uruzgan with a joint MFA-MoD team, provided input for the orientation of the UCP. For the first time, Dutch NGOs (e.g. Cordaid and Healthnet) were also involved in the preparation for the mission by assessing the social context of the mission (Homan, 2010: 272). The Civil Assessment and the „recce‟s‟ were meant to get a better idea of the social conditions and context of the province. After the orientation, the group formulated its mission (phase 3) and a conceptual framework is developed based on relevant factors of influence identified in the initial orientation (phase 4). After that, short- mid- and long-term objectives were formed (phase 5) and the political, social, economic and military approaches to realize those objectives were made (phase 6). When the plan was developed and agreed upon by the group, the final plan was written (phase 7) (Spoelstra & Van Bemmel, 2011: 3).

The UCP did not only function as a planning tool, it also functioned to provide continuity of policy of the years. As a result of the relatively short rotations of the military and civilian crews (4-6 months), there was not as much continuity as one may wish. The Uruzgan Campaign Plan provided a tool that provided some policy continuity. It must be noted that the employees of the embassy in Kabul, in The Hague and the employees in Uruzgan that staid longer than one rotation (e.g. CULAD) also had an important role in safeguarding the continuity of knowledge and policy.

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advisors that were allowed to join the planning group (Spoelstra & Van Bemmel, 2011: 4). So, NGOs were not officially part of the strategy and planning process. There was, however, much contact with the NGOs during the implementation phase. This occurred mainly in the established cooperation bodies, which will be addressed below.

To conclude, While the strategic planning of operations was integrated only to a certain degree at the start of the mission in 2006 as each player (i.e. MFA and MoD) made its own separate, only partly synchronized, plans (Van der Lijn, 2011: 34), the UCP, was developed throughout the rotations and became the main mechanism for coherence on the strategic planning level. It provided a single strategic process for the the military and civilian of the Dutch government. But, to come back to the term of Lockhart (2004: 7), one cannot speak of system-wide coherence in this case, because the UCP did not incorporate all the actors (e.g. NGOs). Because of the complexity of the mission and domestic political reasons, it set general goals for the long-term, desired situations for the mid-term and specific goals for the short-term.

4.5. Financial coherence mechanisms

Anne Fitz-Gerald (2004: 22) has argued that a truly integrated effort requires an integrated budget or a joined-up pool of resources. The first step towards such an integrated budget was taken in 1997, when the Netherlands has created the Homogenous Group of International of International Cooperation (HGIS), which is coordinated by the MFA. The reason was to bring all foreign affairs expenses of the various Dutch Ministries together in one budget overview. As drafted by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, HGIS distinguishes between spending that meets the criteria for Official Development Assistance, (ODA) and other international policy expenditures (non-ODA). However, HGIS was rather meant to formulate a coherent foreign policy rather than providing a coherence mechanism for international peace missions (Van Beijnum & Van der Goor, 2006: 4), because it is not an independent budget for one specific mission but combines the total financial inputs of all ministries involved in foreign policy (Van der Laan, 2011: 40).

Whole of nation coherence within the comprehensive approach and its challenges

Whole of nation coherence within the

comprehensive approach and its challenges

A case study of the Dutch integrated ISAF mission in Uruzgan

J.Y. van der Wal

Whole of nation coherence within the

comprehensive approach and its challenges

A case study of the Dutch integrated ISAF mission in Uruzgan

Table of contents

English summary

Dutch summary

Abbreviations

1. Introduction

The context

2. Contemporary conflicts and security theory

The case

The Dutch integrated ISAF operation in Afghanistan

Coherence mechanisms and the Dutch ISAF mission