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MA thesis International Security, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

The Functional Accommodation of

the Comprehensive Approach to

Peace Operations within the United

Nations System

Exploring the implementation of an effective Comprehensive

Approach

Name: Eline Dorst

26-6-2015

Address: Hereweg 27a, 9725 AA Groningen

Phone: 0031 653907322

Student number: 1872818

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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “The Functional Accommodation of the Comprehensive

Approach to Peace Operations within the United Nations System: Exploring the implementation of an effective Comprehensive Approach”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name: Eline Dorst

Date: Signature:

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Table of Contents

Introduction ... 1

Chapter I: On Definition and Doctrine ... 5

On definition ... 8

Part I: Approaching the Comprehensive Approach to peace operations as a Multi-team System Chapter II: Multi-team Systems ...16

Multi-team Systems ...19

Goal Setting and Goal Hierarchy ...21

Social Identities ...23

Component team identity versus MTS identity ...24

Multicultural Multi-team Systems ...25

Chapter III: CA as a Multi-team System...29

Goal Hierarchy in CA ...30

Social Identities in CA ...33

What are the implications of approaching CA as a multi-team system? ...35

Part II: The Placement of the Comprehensive Approach to peace operations in the United Nations System Chapter IV: From First Generation to Generation 2.5 ...40

First Generation ...41

Second Generation ...43

Generation 2.5 ...47

Chapter V: Institutionalization of CA through key documents ...49

The Agenda for Peace – 1992 and the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace - 1995 ...49

Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) – 2000 ...53

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (the Capstone Doctrine)-2008 ...57

Chapter VI: Institutionalization of the CA through the United Nations structure ...62

Integrated Missions ...63

Peace-building Commission (PBC) ...67

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How has CA been incorporated into the United Nation’s approach to peace operations? ...72

Part III: The Comprehensive Approach to peace operations as a Multi-team System in the United Nations framework Chapter VII: Challenges on the operational level in terms of Multi-team Systems...76

Challenges concerning Goal Hierarchy ...77

Challenges concerning Social Identity ...79

How can the United Nations system be evaluated on CA in terms of organizational effectiveness? ...81

Conclusion ...84

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Introduction

In the post-Cold War world, civilians have made up 90% of casualties in conflict. At the time of World War I this number was only 10%, and had risen during World War II to 50%.1 Much of

the high number of civilian deaths of the last 3 decades is often attributed to the shift from interstate to intra-state conflict and to asymmetric warfare, a phenomenon in which mighty militaries are struggling to keep a few hundred insurgents at bay.2 Mary Kaldor made a distinction

in her 1999 book by calling these modern conflicts ‘new wars’ as opposed to the ‘old wars’ of another era. She described them as a mixture of war, crime, and human rights violations. It was then, according to her, pertinent that the international response must be a mixture of soldiers and policemen.3

Even though Kaldor’s view was limited to law enforcement, the idea was aligned with a broader sentiment that the response to conflict could not be limited to military action alone. The forms of peace operations came to include preventive action, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations, peace support operations, and peace-building operations, all requiring a different set of actors and a range of involvement.

While the international community has dabbled in a Comprehensive Approach to peace operations (CA) since the turn of the century, it has, to date, struggled with a universal

interpretation of the concept. The many actors involved in peace operations each have varying perceptions of CA and how it should be implemented. Such discussions are politically sensitive; is there sufficient political will; which actors are involved in the decision-making process; what are the power relations between them; how are financial resources distributed? Admittedly, these questions are in need of asking, but also can limit the perspective on CA to one dependent on different political processes. As a consequence, specific strategy and policy choices are tied to these diffuse interpretations, so that ad hocery becomes common and meaningful claims about the practice of CA become rare due to subjectivity. It is not the aim of this paper to resolve this issue, rather it takes a different perspective that allows for evaluation of CA action in a structural way. It leaves open political and economic questions that are not agreed upon internationally and,

1 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon:

Routledge, 2006: 20.

2 Christian Leuprecht. “Conclusion” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive

Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 59-66. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 239.

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instead, focuses on the dynamics that could facilitate and promote integration between actors. By employing organizational theory to approach CA, one is forced to look at inter-agent or team dynamics as a factor in optimizing the effort. Regardless of a precise definition given to CA, and the specific strategy and policy choices that stem from it, an organizational approach allows for an examination of cooperation and coordination between actors and emphasizes the contribution thereof to effective execution of CA efforts. This paper, then, aims to examine the level of integration that is desired for an effective comprehensive approach to peace operations. It will consequently apply the conclusions drawn from organizational theory to the United Nations peace operations system, and produce findings on the extent to which the United Nations system functionally accommodates for the level of integration desired for effective CA.

As the world’s largest peace operations authority, the United Nations’ (UN) perspective on CA carries some weight. Its worldwide membership would suggest that an acceptance and

implementation by the UN would be closest, though still a rough approximation, to a universal interpretation. The UN, as well as many other actors, have expressed a need for CA. The arguments made hereafter, therefore, will rely on the premise that effective CA is desired. I will examine this desire by formulating an answer to the following research question:

To what extent does the United Nations system functionally accommodate for the level of integration desired for an

effective Comprehensive Approach to peace operations in terms of structure and institutionalization?

This paper will concern itself with the strategic and operational level of peace operations. It includes the planning stages and the transition to the field. It is then that the underlying strategy and implementation of mechanisms relevant to organizational theory and CA come to the fore. Moreover, the strategic and operational level correspond more with the aim of structural conclusions on evaluation of CA, as opposed to the tactical level, which tends to be rather executive and case-specific. The strategic and operational level are highly linked together, since operational planning needs to stem from a strategic vision. Singling out either level would produce an incomplete analysis. Therefore, the two levels should be examined in conjunction to ensure analysis that takes into account both the foundation and the operationalization of CA.

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that exist, this chapter does provide a basis for a working definition, so that some limits and boundaries to the concept are set.

Part I of this paper will examine the notion of multi-team systems in organizational theory. Approaching CA as a ‘team of teams’ in which each component team comes from a distinct cultural background, organizational, national, or otherwise, places an emphasis on the interaction between components. It holds that all component teams exhibit functional interdependencies, whereas their different backgrounds can form obstacles to smooth cooperation. To increase team effectiveness, and with it the chances for success, the notions of goal hierarchy and social identity play an instrumental role. For goal hierarchy, the correlation between climbing up the hierarchy to achieve higher order goals and increased functional interdependence demonstrates that in order to achieve the goal at the top of the hierarchy, there must be a high degree of integration. Social identity becomes relevant when discussing component team identity versus multi-team system identity. So-called faultlines between component teams can stand in the way of close cooperation. For effective teamwork, therefore, there needs to exist some sort of multi-team system identity in which all component teams can recognize themselves, causing increased integration. The level of integration, then, seems linked to the degree of effectiveness.

Part II this paper will focus on the placement of CA in the UN system. First, it will give an overview of the changes in UN peace operations that caused a need for CA to manifest itself. In the last few decades, the circumstances in which peace operations are deployed have shifted tremendously. The expansion of responsibilities in a variety of areas has led to a conclusion that CA is needed to successfully fulfill these responsibilities. Next, this part of the paper will map institutionalization of CA in the UN system through rhetoric and structure. Key documents pertaining peace operations are used to identify how CA has become a part of the strategic vision of the UN. Subsequently, the mechanisms that have been put in place that are to functionally accommodate CA in the UN system are examined, so that an evaluation based on effectiveness can take place.

Finally, the mapping of the degree of institutionalization of CA in the UN system serves for its results to be viewed in light of effectiveness based on the concept of multi-team systems. By applying the notions of goal hierarchy and social identity to the UN system, much can be deduced about the degree to which CA is functionally accommodated in the UN system.

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operational plan in a way that makes effective use of CA. When the issues hindering effectiveness on a operational level would be dealt with, the probability of success for CA undertakings would increase greatly. If these issues are not resolved, the United Nations will increasingly be unable to provide an adequate response to the responsibilities it has been endowed with.

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Chapter I: On Definition and Doctrine

The origins of the Comprehensive Approach to peace operations (CA) remain unclear. The basic logic that is underlying the idea has existed for centuries. Some authors note the similarities between CA and the concept of grand strategy. When grand strategy is defined as ‘the integrated use of power resources in pursuit of national objectives’, parallels are easily distinguished, though perhaps more so in method than in purpose. 4 Such strategies, calling for the use of a variety of

resources, including economic, military, diplomatic, and legal-judicial resources, have presented themselves throughout history. More aligned with the objective of international peace, many point to the Marshall Plan and the reconstruction of Japan after World War II as successes precursory to the modern undertakings of CA.5 In the case of Japan, the United States (US) was

able to develop a practical inter-agent strategy for reform and reconstruction of the occupied territory.6

Over time, many came to understand CA as an integration of the pillars of defense, diplomacy, and development. The non-governmental organization (NGO)-military interface has long existed in peace operations. With the creation of the Red Cross (though technically not an NGO) in 1863, a coexistence on the battle field between a medical relief organization and the military emerged. Later, NGOs started to become involved with economic development as well.

CA in its current form has only emerged around the turn of the century. Some refer to UNOSOM I in Somalia in 1993 where a Civil-Military Operations Coordination Center was established.7 The US-led Iraq War of 2003-2011 is often named as a catalyst for the use of CA.8 It

is argued that in the Iraq War different resources, capabilities, and expertise were used in a concerted effort and that the idea spread across the western alliance.9 Critics, on the other hand,

argue that the Iraq War demonstrated that joint efforts are needed, and that the record shows that a decade and a half after the Cold War, the international community was still doing poorly at

4 Definition by Stephen Metz. American Grand Strategy: Concepts, Theory, History, and Futures. Presentation at the US

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Army War College, 2008. Found in Peter Gizewski. “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 13-23. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 15.

5 Peter Gizewski. “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian

Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 13-23. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 16.

6 Ibid.

7 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon:

Routledge, 2006: 6.

8 Kim Richard Nossal. Introduction: Security Operations and the Comprehensive Approach. In Security Operations

in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 1-10. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 2.

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creating civil-military partnerships.10 The Iraq War, then, served as a wake-up call. Around the

same time, other concepts related to peace operations, such as the counter-insurgency doctrine (COIN), went through a development that underpins similar logic as does CA. The US

Counterinsurgency Guide of 2009 describes COIN as ‘comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.’11 Up until this

acceleration of CA, the efforts taken beforehand were sporadic and ad hoc.12 Since then, much of

the international community has attempted to institutionalize CA into their peace operation approaches.

As CA has only emerged in its current form so recently, it is still very much subject to substantiating. The environments in which it takes place are complex and there are many different actors involved. On a theoretical level, it brings a new dimension to the debate on the changed nature of conflicts in a post-bipolar world (the ‘new wars’). On a practical level, it actively shapes peace operations and more broadly, security policy in general. It demands a scaled-up engagement from actors that hitherto have played a subsidiary role (or no role at all) in peace operations.

The meeting place for academics and practitioners is doctrine. Doctrine has been defined as a set of guiding principles, carried into effective structures and roles.13 Bernard Crick has described it

as referring to ‘a coherent sum of assertions regarding what a particular topic should be.’14 It

strives to enshrine shared principles, as can be illustrated by e.g. the development of common law. It does not need explaining that this process extends itself over a long period of time. It aims to minimize ad-hocery and to facilitate synchronization.15 It needs to be emphasized that doctrine

does not equal dogma, as doctrine is rather permissive than restrictive.16 It need not be equated

with ideology either, as doctrine has a much more specific nature than ideology, and focuses on a much smaller scope of action. Ideology has rather totalizing tendencies, it being a universal way

10 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon:

Routledge, 2006: 6.

11 Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (U.S.). U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. United States Government

Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009: 2.

12 Peter Gizewski. “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian

Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 13-23. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 17.

13 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon: Routledge, 2006,

15.

14 Bernard R. Crick. Socialism (Concepts in Social Thought). New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1987: 6.

15 Beth Ellen Cole. “Comprehensive Approach: A View from South of the Border.” In Security Operations in the 21st

Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 59-66. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 60.

16 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon: Routledge, 2006,

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of interpreting reality.17 According to Beth Ellen Cole, doctrine serves several purposes: (i) it

provides a common lexicon and definitions based on the experience of others; (ii) it analyzes experience and translates it into principles; (iii) it explains relationships; (iv) it links to other documents; and (v) it offers a guide for allocating resources.18

Peace operations doctrine is notoriously imprecise. There is an incomplete language and it is unclear what peace operations doctrine encompasses exactly, predominantly after the changes in perspective and practice after the Cold War ended. James V. Arbuckle, having served thirty-six years as an infantryman in the Canadian Forces and currently serving as a member of the Faculty of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, has asked:

“What types of peace operations are we discussing? Or, more to the point, what sort of operation are we

now doing? What do these terms mean: use of force, rules of engagement, command and control? – and these are military terms. How are they to be communicated to putative civilian partner agencies, when the military are themselves unclear as to what they mean by these terms? What, today, is war? What then is a war crime? And just what is a complex humanitarian emergency? What is the difference between and the relationship to one another of man-made and natural disasters? What is a state? Then what is a failed state? And, above all, so what? When is an armed conflict a war? And is the absence of war, peace? It’s as Samuel Johnson has said of the weather: it ‘generates language more efficiently than knowledge’.”19

These matters of semantics do not exist in a vacuum; they have real-world implications. One only has to be reminded of the rather successful evasion of the usage of the term ‘genocide’ by the United States Delegation to the United Nations in 1994 referring to the situation in Rwanda, to realize that a clear understanding of relevant terms is indispensable for effective foreign policy.20

The relation between language, meaning, and practice is especially relevant in providing legitimacy for these practices. Delineation and demarcation of the concept will identify parameters and clarify the scope of action.

Existing within the peace operations doctrine, CA faces similar obstacles. The next section explores the concept and gives an approximation of its meaning.

17 Daniel Sandru. “Ideology, Between the Concept and the Political Reality.” Sfera Politicii. XX(3) (169) (May-June

2012): 94.

18 Beth Ellen Cole. “Comprehensive Approach: A View from South of the Border.” In Security Operations in the 21st

Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 59-66. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 60.

19 James V. Arbuckle. Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations: No job for a soldier? Abingdon: Routledge, 2006,

15.

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On definition

CA has manifested itself under many different appellations. The concept is referred to by designations such as the 3D (or 3D + C)21 approach, whole-of-government (WOG) approach,

interagency approach, multifunctional approach, or integrated approach, among others. Seemingly these terms refer to a similar perspective, however interpretations and nuances can vary substantially.

Several countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Canada view CA from a rather egalitarian perspective, where civilian leadership is emphasized over military leadership. The Canadian Forces have adopted the following perspective:

The Canadian Forces’ (CF) acknowledgement of the need to practice a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident- and also pressing. Accordingly, DND [Department of National Defence] leadership- both civilian and military- is increasingly calling for the adoption of a force that takes a comprehensive approach to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would entail traditional and non-traditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the Effects Based Approach to Operations. The result would be greater mission effectiveness.22

The UN, the largest authority in international security, has adopted CA into their perspective of dealing with conflicts. In 2001, the Security Council issued a statement on the necessity of CA:

(S)uccesful peacebuilding is predicated on an effective and an unambiguous division of labour, based on the comparative advantage of different implementing bodies, between all the international partners, including the United Nations system, the international financial institutions, regional and subregional organizations, non-governmental organizations and the wider international community.23

21 3D stands for Diplomacy, Defense, and Development. The occasionally added ‘C’ stands for commerce. 22 Retrieved from <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no1/04-leslie-eng.asp>. Found in Jerry Guo and Mie

Augier. “The Comprehensive Approach, Strategy, and Organizations: An Overview and some Suggested Future Directions” in The Comprehensive Approach to Operations: International Perspectives. Eds. Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff, 13-33. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013: 17. Spelling un-edited from source.

23 United Nations Security Council. Presidential Statement on, among Others, Integrated Strategy,

Interrelationship among Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peace-building. SC/7014. UN SCOR. 4278th Meeting, UN Doc

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This definition focuses on coordination between the different actors, including military and non-military actors. As an international organization, it emphasizes the role of international actors, which are likely to be its direct partners. NATO, on the other hand, emphasizes the comparative advantage of different bodies in a slightly more strategic manner:

(E)ffective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments…The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.24

With this definition, NATO focuses on a WOG approach that members can implement during a NATO mission. It does not differentiate between international or national actors, as the UN does in the statement above. It emphasizes, as a military organization, that the Comprehensive Approach refers to crisis management solely, excluding e.g. (long-term) development.

It is notable that the United States has formulated its Comprehensive Approach in a much more military sense than NATO, though the latter is an organization which has a strictly military focus. The US refers to it as ‘Unified Action’ and has been defined as follows:

A broad, generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified

commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those demands.25

The American perspective implies a hierarchical structure, where coordination and cooperation with other government departments (OGDs) and non-governmental agencies (OGAs) fall under the leadership of the military. Compared to the other perspectives discussed here, the US

commits relatively little effort to developing CA. Its core approach has changed little since World War II and the National Security Strategy merely recommends that CA should be incorporated, without defining or expanding the subject.26

Similar perspectives to the Canadian (and Scandinavian and Dutch) position can be found in academia. Leslie, Gizewski and Rostek offer an approximation of the concept that is aligned with

24 NATO. Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Lisbon: NATO, 2010.

25 Hancock, Jason M. Whole of Government- The Search for a True Joint Interagency Approach to Military

Operations. Leavensworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008.

26 Jari Mustonen. Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Helsinki: Finnish Centre of Expertise

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the Canadian perspective. They emphasize it is an orientation to both policy and campaign planning and the range of players stretches from official to private, and draws upon diplomatic, defense, development and commercial resources.27 De Coning suggests that a Comprehensive

Approach is where various civilian and at least one military entity are engaged in a joint initiative or mission.2829

While some researchers see CA as a means of interacting with a myriad of national and

international entities to resolve security challenges, others have used the term to refer primarily to WOG and interagency coordination (Friis and Jarmyr)30. Still others, such as Roy31, have loosely

employed it to refer to simple coordination mechanisms.32 Other definitions have been provided

by Millen33, Haugevik34, Gavas35, Dijkstra36, Yost37, and Lindley-French.3839

A telling illustration of the mirky collection of interpretations is the book ‘Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach’, edited by Rostek and

Gizewski. Though focused on the Canadian perspective solely, the contributing authors offer a

27 Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski, and Michael Rostek. Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian

Forces Operations. Canadian Military Journal 9(1) (2008): 11.

28 Cedric de Coning. “Civil-Military Coordination Practices and Approaches within United Nations Peace

Operations.” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 10(1) (2007): 1.

29 This section, including references to sources, has been derived from Jerry Guo and Mie Augier. “The

Comprehensive Approach, Strategy, and Organizations: An Overview and Some Suggested Future Directions.” In The Comprehensive Approach to Operations: International Perspectives. Eds. Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff, 13-33. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013.

30 K. Friis and P. Jarmyr. Comprehensive Approach: Challenges and Opportunities in Complex Crisis Management. NUPI

Report, Security in Practice 11. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2008.

31 LCol Richard Roy. All in: Developing de Comprehensive Approach. Vanguard. Aurora, Ontario: John Jones. At

http://vanguardcanada.com/ExplainingTheComprehensiveApproachRoy. Found in Peter Gizewski. “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 13-23. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 14.

32 Peter Gizewski. “Discovering the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian

Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 13-23. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 14.

33 Raymond A. Millen. “Time for a Strategic and Intellectual Pause in Afghanistan.” Parameters (Summer 2010):

33-45.

34 Kristin M. Haugevik and Benjamin de Carvalho. Civil-Military Cooperation in Multinational and Interagency Operations.

NUPI Working Paper 718 (2010).

35 Mikaela Gavas and Eleonora Koeb. Setting up the European External Action Service: Building a Comprehensive Approach.

Background Note, Overseas Development Institute (2010).

36 Hylke Dijkstra. ‘The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad

Politics.”International Peacekeeping. 17(3) (2010): 395-407.

37 David S. Yost. “NATO’s Evolving Purposes and the Next Strategic Concept.” International Affairs. 86(2) (2010):

489-522.

38 Julian Lindley-French. Operationalizing the Comprehensive Approach. Atlantic Council Issue Brief (2010). 39 These references are derived from Jerry Guo and Mie Augier. “The Comprehensive Approach, Strategy, and

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dozen or so definitions of CA. There is no adherence to the same usage of relevant terms. Some authors equate CA with 3D or WOG, others compartmentalize these as being a part of CA.40

Some authors make a distinction between the terms ‘integration’ and ‘coordination’ , whereas yet other contributors use these terms as synonyms and interchangeably. 41

This impreciseness prompts us to ask similar questions as James V. Arbuckle did concerning peace operations doctrine: What is the Comprehensive Approach? Does it differ from 3D and WOG? What is civil-military cooperation? What is a multifunctional approach? How do integration, coordination, and cooperation differ from each other? What is unified command? What players are involved? What about role clarity? What are the policy implications? And especially, so what?

The complicacy of an approximation of CA is furthered by its manifestation in several

dimensions. The Dutch government identifies three dimensions, in which meaning depends on organizational perspective and context. The first dimension manifests itself in the perspective of conflict areas or fragile states. When international support is being offered, CA consists of cohesion in government action and activities of local actors and coherence in action of all civil and military actors on site. This includes bilateral donors, multilateral organizations, NGOs, etc. The second perspective concerns coherence within and between international organizations. CA here is based on the notion that international organizations often act in a fragmented manner, which hurts the efficacy of international efforts as a whole. Finally, the third dimension in which CA takes place is at the government level. This dimension is what the Dutch consider the whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach. The whole-of-society approach includes societal partners, such as research institutes, NGOs, business partners, as well as the relevant

departments in government.42

40 Compare chapters by Laura C. Ball and Angela Febbraro (Chapter 2: Discovering Effective Civil-Military

Cooperation: Inisghts from the NGO-CF Relationship, 25-34) and Gavin Buchan (Chapter 9: Civil-Military

Coordination: Canada’s Experience in Kandahar, 2005-2009, 97-108). In Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian

Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011.

41 Compare chapters by Laura C. Ball and Angela Febbraro (Chapter 2: Discovering Effective Civil-Military

Cooperation: Inisghts from the NGO-CF Relationship, 25-34) and Nipa Banerjee (Chapter 4: Comprehensive Approach and Fragile States: Non-Governmental Organizations’Roles in Fragile Situations, 49-58). In Security

Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter

Gizewski. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011.

42 Directie Veiligheidsbeleid (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) and Hoofddirectie Beleid (Ministerie van

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This classification offers useful insights and shows the complexity of any such approach by elaborating on the different levels of operations and the plethora of different actors involved, both state and non-state, and both national and international. It demonstrates that terms as WOG and 3D (or 3D + C) are insufficient in encompassing the phenomenon.

Though CA could benefit from better language in practice, there seems to be reasonable shared understanding and consensus on the environment in which CA is to take place. This

environment can be characterized as being joint, interagency, multi-national, and public (JIMP).43 44 It is a means to operationalizing CA45 and by extension, this would also be operationalizing the

WOG approach.46 The environment is directly proportional to how comprehensive an approach

is demanded or driven by policy.47 It needs to be noted that the JIMP environment does not

displace the more traditional elements of military environment, such as enemy or terrain, nor should it be confused with the environment of geography, air, space, etc. It is about making sense of the crowded battle space. 48

The JIMP environment originated in Canada and has been put on the map by advocates such as Leslie, Gizewski, and Rostek. In the recency of the construct, it has demonstrated, to a certain extent, glamor. The Canadian Forces have adopted JIMP, as well as several of their key partner nations.49 However, the state of JIMP literature remains underdeveloped. It can partly be

attributed to the recency of the concept, and that many current initiatives have not yet been

43 Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek. “Towards a Comprehensive Approach to CF Operations: The Land Force

JIMP Concept.” Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM, 2007: 60.

44 The 4 terms are being used in the following sense:

Joint: involving other national military elements or support organizations; interagency: involving other government departments or other government agencies, both domestic and foreign; multi-national: involving one or more allies or international coalition partners; public: involving variety of elements, including domestic and international publics, NGOs, public volunteer organizations (PVOs), private sector, media and commercial organizations (both domestic and foreign). See: Andrew Leslie, Peter Gizewski, and Michael Rostek. Developing a Comprehensive Approach to Canadian Forces Operations. Canadian Military Journal 9(1) 2008: 14.

45 Peter Gizewski and Michael Rostek. “Towards a Comprehensive Approach to CF Operations: The Land Force

JIMP Concept.” Ottawa: DRDC CORA TM, 2007: 7.

46 Jim Simms. “The JIMP Environment: Military Operations in a Crowded Battle-Space. In Security Operations in the

21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 75-86. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 79.

47 Jim Simms. “The JIMP Environment: Military Operations in a Crowded Battle-Space. In Security Operations in the

21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 75-86. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 80.

48 Ibid.

49 However, the USA uses JIM, forgoing the “P” or public element. Found in Jim Simms. “The JIMP

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published.50 On the other hand, not enough has been written about the subject to fully explore its

potential. A better understanding of the environment in which CA takes place, would benefit the development of an institutional framework for CA.

The collection of definitions given above, not being close to comprehensive as it merely highlights a limited number of interpretations, demonstrates the difficulty of coming up with a commonly accepted definition. It is not the aim of this paper to produce one. Therefore, it is concerned only with providing the basis for a working definition. Hodermarsky argued for a very broad baseline by suggesting a working definition to be ‘mobilizing the resources of an entire society’.51 Such a broad formulation is given so that it expands on the WOG notion by including

intergovernmental organizations, academia, the private sector, etc.52 While the inclusion of such

actors is appreciated, this baseline definition leaves open too many questions concerning interaction and direction. Therefore, the addition of environment and aim will both dam and enhance a working definition in such a way it can be utilized in this paper. Considering what has been discussed above, and the provisional acceptance of the concept, including JIMP into a working definition anchors the interaction between actors as a core feature of CA. Furthermore, by adding aim to a working definition provides direction and motivation for action. Richard Nossal has argued, and generally undisputedly so, that the aim of CA is to create sustainable conditions for peace in security zones by employing multiple different resources, capabilities, and expertise in a concerted effort.53

Such a working definition leaves room for the wide variety of interpretations of CA, yet identifies some clear principles that are needed to make meaningful use of the concept. However, the provision of a working definition should not stand in the way of the development of a commonly or universal accepted definition or unambiguous doctrine. Practitioners need to possess the tools to develop a modus operandi that allows for adjustments in the planning, execution, or

evaluation phase, on a strategic, operational, and tactical level. In order for organizations to better craft their roadmaps to manage the way forward, CA needs to be clarified and codified.54 Better

language is indispensible for this process. Though some countries have further developed their

50 Brown, Andrea L. and Adams, Barbara D. Exploring the JIMP Concept: A Literature Review. Toronto:

Humansystems Incorporated on behalf of Department of National Defence Canada, 2010: 7.

51 Jari Mustonen. Good Practices of a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Helsinki: Finnish Centre of Expertise

on Comprehensive Crisis Management, 2015: 12.

52 Ibid.

53 Kim Richard Nossal. “Introduction: Security Operations and the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security

Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 1-10. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 2.

54 Caroline Vavro and Richard Roy. “International Development of the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security

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perspective on CA than others, there is still a lack of shared understanding among these countries. Key terms are not being perspicuously explained, yet are incorporated into policy. Most notably, the concept is being referred to by close to a dozen designations. Policy executives show preference for a specific designation, which they conjoin with their specific policy choices. Ad hoc perspectives on CA need to be overcome in order to achieve a long-lasting common practice. The concept needs to be examined to better identify parameters and meaning. The key terms, even though embraced by many, cannot be accepted as a doctrinal term at this time. The delineation of how this policy is translated into a conceptual approach, and what the doctrinal ramifications to this approach are, is not universal and would benefit from more concise language and, eventually, doctrine.55 As doctrine is in part developed by experience and lessons learned,

there must be a benchmark to measure best practices against.56 Herein lies a concern for the way

ahead, in the sense that practitioners are steering towards a scaling-up of CA, with increase in practices occurring more rapidly than conceptualization and the development of a shared language. It cannot be expected of policy-makers to make meaningful policy decisions without a meaningful conceptualization of the matter. Doctrine is meant as a meeting place for theory and practice, for academia and practitioners. It is essential for the development of CA that research is accelerated more rapidly than the scaling-up of implementation of CA by practitioners. Only when the lacunae in CA research cease to exist will CA doctrine develop and will peace operations doctrine improve.

Doctrinal context must be kept in mind when approaching CA. The complications surrounding ambiguous doctrine and research and the validity of its conclusions are not to be underestimated. Acknowledging these limitations, this paper has adopted an approach that circumvents any single interpretation of CA and instead focuses on how conclusions on its functionality can be drawn. The next chapter provides a theoretical grounding by utilizing a concept from organizational theory that allows CA to be evaluated in terms of organizational effectiveness.

55 Jim Simms. “The JIMP Environment: Military Operations in a Crowded Battle-Space.” In Security Operations in the

21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach. Eds. Michael Rostek and Peter Gizewski, 75-86. Montreal and Kingston: Queen’s Policy Studies Series, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2011: 75.

56 Caroline Vavro and Richard Roy. “International Development of the Comprehensive Approach.” In Security

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Part I: Approaching CA as a Multi-team

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Chapter II: Multi-team Systems

The need for CA has been widely recognized. A singular set of resources has proven insufficient to deal with the complexity of peace operations. It is hoped that the variety of actors will enable a synergetic environment to accomplish core goals, purposes, and mission, but also to maximize its productivity.57 For the result to be greater than the sum of its parts, cooperation between actors

has to be executed in an integrated and proactive manner. Therefore, inter-agent dynamics have significant implications for the outcome of the project.

As a consequence, it is valuable to examine the concept and practice of CA from an

organizational perspective. Obstacles, difficulties, and failures are often attributed to politics or a lack of funding. When one examines the concept from an organizational perspective, however, much can be discovered about effective team work, which tremendously increases the chance for success. The dynamics between actors as approached by team-effectiveness, are better

understood than when one solely adopts a political or IR view. As the actors involved in CA function as a work group or a team, they will be subject to team dynamics, structures, and behavior. It would be improvident to disregard the notion that team effectiveness plays a role in the outcome and chances for success of a CA project. Presuming CA will be successful merely because there is political will or adequate allocation of financial resources forgoes the needs of the actors involved during the engagement, both in the planning stages and in the field. When these aspects of organizational theory are mapped and viewed in relation to CA, much can be learned about optimizing the effort and it will provide further suggestions for effective team leadership. By making use of the concept of multi-team systems in organizational theory, I seek to explain CA in terms of conditions relevant to team effectiveness, which is a key indicator for success.

Work groups can best be described as a dynamic system, made up of an interjection of members, tasks, and tools. These tools refer to the technology that is comprised of hardware that is needed to carry out the activities, but also refer to software, meaning procedures and norms.58 The form

of the work group is dependent on which of the three elements – members, tasks, tools- is most

57 Gregory B. Northcraft, Jeffrey T. Polzer, Margaret A. Neale, and Roderick M. Kramer. Diversity, Social Identity,

and Performance: Emergent Social Dynamics in Cross-Functional Teams. In Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace. Eds. Jackson, Susan E. and Ruderman, Marian N., 69-96. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1995, 71-72.

58 Joseph E. McGrath, Jennifer L. Berdahl, and Holly Arrow. Traits, Expectations, Culture, and Clout: The

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prevalent. As CA is born out of the aim to deal with armed conflict, its ‘tasks’ are at the forefront. As shown in the figure below developed by McGrath, Berdahl and Arrow, this indicates that CA operates in a task force manner.

Figure 1. Three Types of Work Groups

From: Joseph E. McGrath, Jennifer L. Berdahl, and Holly Arrow. Traits, Expectations, Culture, and Clout: The Dynamics of Diversity in Work Groups. In Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace. Eds. Jackson, Susan E. and Ruderman, Marian N., 17-46. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1995, 21.

Task forces are assembled in a logical sequence:

project  members technology

This assembly sequence is indicative of CA, though often the selection of members is at least in part influenced by the technology they can bring to the table. The project −the humanitarian crisis, the military intervention, the nation-building attempt− is the raison d’être of peace

operations. It also implies that the taskforce disbands after the project is terminated. With tasks being the emphasized element in CA, organizationally, a focus is placed on the division of labor.59

Each actor possesses a unique set of skills, knowledge, expertise, and resources to inject into the

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project that will contribute to its completion. Their complementarity increases the chances of positive completion of the project. Unlike most traditional task forces, teams in CA are not comprised of individuals but of teams, forming a multi-team system (MTS). MTSs are not necessarily limited in tenure like task forces; they are established to deal with highly turbulent environments, possess the ability to transform work units, and respond rapidly to changing circumstances, precisely because the wide array of tools at its disposal.60 There is a great overlap

between traditional task forces and MTSs, as an MTS is ‘an open system whose particular

configuration stems from the performance requirements of the environment it confronts and the technology it adopts.’61 In the MTS, like the task force, it is the tasks that are the emphasized

element. The actors in CA demonstrate both the overlapping features and the unique

characteristics of a task force as well as an MTS, allowing them to identify as both. An MTS is perhaps best described as tightly coupled networks of teams, where the component teams are distinct enough to give them a separate identity.62 They are, as it were, a team of teams. The

composition of teams, including their diversity, is a structural characteristic that must be understood in order to use teams effectively.63

This chapter will examine the dynamics of multi-team systems in CA. I propose that in relevance to CA, two factors are at the core of effective team work in an MTS: goal hierarchy and social

identity. Goal hierarchy and social identity both relate to the level of integration needed to increase

the chances of success. These two core elements have proven to be problematic in CA, and hinder effective team work. Understanding these dynamics will give direction to effective leadership. Goal hierarchy relates to the level of functional interdependence between the component teams in an MTS. The component teams are likely to have a distinct social identity, which can be a complicating factor because in CA, they exist in an organizational and

occupational sense, but also on a national culture level. Traditionally, much of culture literature has been focused on identifying dimensions of national culture, such as individualism versus collectivism or power/distance relations.64 In CA, cultural differences that stem from

60 Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In

Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 4-7.

61 Leslie A. DeChurch and John E. Mathieu. Thinking in Terms of Multiteam Systems. Team Effectiveness in Complex

Organizations: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches. Eds. Salas, Eduardo, Goodwin, Gerald F., and Burke, C. Shawn, 267-267. New York and London: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009: 270.

62 Idem, 271.

63 Susan E. Jackson and Marian N Ruderman. Introduction: Perspectives for Understanding Diverse Work Teams.

In Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace. Eds. Jackson, Susan E. and Ruderman, Marian N., 1-16. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1995, 2.

64 Stacey L. Connaughton, Elizabeth A. Williams, and Marissa L. Shuffler. Social Identity Issues in Multiteam

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organizational variations between civilian and military actors are of equal impact. Both social identities and component team objectives have implications for the level of cooperation within an MTS. The chapter will conclude with some remarks on the level of integration that is displayed by current initiatives in the real world, based on what has been examined in the previous chapter.

Multi-team Systems

The term ‘Multi-team Systems’ was introduced by Mathieu, Marks, and Zacarro in 2001, as a response to insufficient literature on subgroups. They found that the way subgroups had thus far been described did not fully match teams that work comprehensively. The authors define multi-team systems as follows:

[An MTS is] two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the accomplishment of collective goals. MTS boundaries are defined by virtue of the fact that all teams within the system, while pursuing different proximal goals, share at least one common distal goal; and in so doing exhibit input, process, and outcome interdependencies with at least one other team in the system.65

While MTSs can exist within an organization, then being called an internal MTS, perhaps their most distinguishing feature lies in their cross-boundary membership.66 Component teams stem

from different mother organizations. Often, the members of an MTS are partially or fully dispersed geographically. Some component teams might be co-located with others, however, most MTSs experience some level of difficulties in communications, trust building among teams, and member coordination.67 When the geographical location is a complex and at times dangerous

environment in itself, these difficulties will be exacerbated.

The second feature that distinguishes MTSs from other teams is the high level of reciprocal or intensive functional interdependence across component teams. Functional interdependence does not necessarily translate to equal power distribution between component teams. Differences in the power balance of an MTS can be based on a variety of sources, such as higher placement in

Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 109-140. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 121.

65 J.E. Mathieu, M.A. Marks, and S.J. Zacarro. Multi-team Systems. In International Handbook of work and

organizational psychology. Eds. Anderson, N., Ones, D., Sinangil, H.K., Viswesvaran, C., 289-313. London: Sage Publications, 2001: 290.

66 Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In

Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 8.

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the hierarchical arrangement, size, functional centrality to the core mission, or by appointment.68

Though component teams, in contrast to individuals in component teams, can execute

independent actions, there exist, as the definition states, interdependencies with at least one other component team.69 Functional interdependence has been described by Mathieu et al. as “a state

by which entities have mutual reliance, determinations, influence, and shared vested interest in processes they use to accomplish work activities.”70 More traditional organizational units typically

undertake collective or joint activity in the form of co-action, pooled interdependence, or sequential interdependence.71 Functional interdependence stems directly from the activities that

each of the component teams perform. 72 Referring back to the definition of MTSs provided

above, component teams have (a) different proximal goals, but (b) share at least one common distal goal. In doing so, they (c) exhibit interdependencies based on input, process, and outcome.

Input interdependence entails the sharing by component teams of human, informational,

technological, material, and financial resources. It reflects the challenges that call for an integrated response from multiple component teams.

Process interdependence refers to the degree of inter-team interaction that is required during the

completion of goals. During this phase, sequential interdependency, where one component team accomplishes a task and hands the next step in goal attainment over to another team, and reciprocal interdependency, when there are cyclical accomplishments of proximal goals by separate component teams, can occur. Intensive interdependence refers to a situation where the actions of component teams need to be integrated in such a manner that they transpire in simultaneous (or rapidly sequential and reciprocal) collaboration. Simply put, process

interdependence refers to the degree to which teams depend on each other to perform the tasks at hand.73

68 Idem, 19.

69 Leslie A. DeChurch and John E. Mathieu. Thinking in Terms of Multiteam Systems. Team Effectiveness in Complex

Organizations: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches. Eds. Salas, Eduardo, Goodwin, Gerald F., and Burke, C. Shawn, 267-267. New York and London: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009: 272.

70 J.E. Mathieu, M.A. Marks, and S.J. Zacarro. Multi-team Systems. In International Handbook of work and

organizational psychology. Eds. Anderson, N., Ones, D., Sinangil, H.K., Viswesvaran, C., 289-313. London: Sage Publications, 2001: 293.

71 Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In

Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 7.

72 Leslie A. DeChurch and John E. Mathieu. Thinking in Terms of Multiteam Systems. Team Effectiveness in Complex

Organizations: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives and Approaches. Eds. Salas, Eduardo, Goodwin, Gerald F., and Burke, C. Shawn, 267-267. New York and London: Psychology Press, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009: 272-274.

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21 Outcome or output interdependence describes the degree to which the outcomes for component teams

depend upon the goal accomplishments of other teams in the MTS. Although all component teams benefit from successful fulfillment of the superordinate goal or mission, the successful accomplishment of proximal goals will depend upon the goal outcomes at still lower levels. Outcome interdependence, then, flows largely from the collective goal hierarchy of the MTS.7475

However, it is possible for each of the component teams to be successful and yet for the system to fail. I will elaborate more on goal setting and goal hierarchy as a determinative factor in MTSs in the next section.

Goal Setting and Goal Hierarchy

Cooperation theory suggests that groups work best together when they share congruent

objectives.76 It aids in the creation of positive orientation towards others and promotes the useful

flow of information.77 As component teams can take action independently, their proximal goals

reflect their tasks and responsibilities. It is the common distal goal that binds the component teams into an MTS.78 However, there seems to be a gap between the foci on a temporal scale.

Policy coherence assumes that organizations are motivated by long term impact perspective, but empirical research has shown that decisions are more based on short term outcome

considerations.79 Technically and ideally, this should not matter, as proximal goals build up to the

common distal goals, however, it does bring considerations that need to be taken into account when goals are being set. A short-term focus could lead to inappropriate proximal goals or disproportionate weight assigned to proximal goals. It is therefore important that when in the process of goal-setting, which occurs continuously, a special focus lies on the role of the proximal goal in the goal hierarchy. It has to be ensured that these goals are adequate, proportionate, and

74 Ibid.

75 Unless indicated otherwise, information on input, process, and outcome interdependence has been derived from

Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 9-11.

76 See for example Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Book, Inc Publishers: New York, 1984. The

author views cooperation in terms of mutual rewards and actors as acting in self-interest. To obtain mutual rewards, actors will therefore align their objectives to cooperate.

77 Gregory B. Northcraft, Jeffrey T. Polzer, Margaret A. Neale, and Roderick M. Kramer. Diversity, Social Identity,

and Performance: Emergent Social Dynamics in Cross-Functional Teams. In Diversity in Work Teams: Research Paradigms for a Changing Workplace. Eds. Jackson, Susan E. and Ruderman, Marian N., 69-96. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1995, 77.

78 Daniel J. Watola, R. Jeffrey Jackson, and Douglas R. Lindsay. A Framework for Understanding Multicultural,

Multiteam Systems in Support of a Comprehensive Approach to Operations. In The Comprehensive Approach to Operations: International Perspectives. Eds. Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff, 35-50. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013: 38.

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necessary in relation to the superordinate goal. Proximal goals between component teams are not always compatible. However, a comprehensive approach needs to be visible and formulated in the short-term goal setting. When input, process, or outcome functional interdependence is specified within the proximal goals, including the lower proximal goals, one moves from coherent goals, to comprehensive goals. Issues concerning role clarity and communication obstacles are more likely to be minimized when it is incorporated in the performance mandate of the component teams.

While the distal, superordinate goal is at the apex of the goal hierarchy, it is the component team that stands at the lowest level. The component teams work towards their more proximal goals, as the superordinate goal rests on the accomplishment of the lower goals. As such, MTS goal hierarchies have a minimum of two levels. Goals vary in their priority and valence, and might be modified during the duration of the project. The lower order goals must contribute to the accomplishment of the higher order goals. They serve, as it were, as building blocks towards the superordinate goal. For this reason, higher order goals are likely to have a longer time horizon than the lower ranked ones. 80 It has to be noted that such a temporal consideration does not

equal linear progression. Especially with the dynamic environment in which MTSs often operate, component teams need to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances and adjust their goals

accordingly.

Goal hierarchy dictates the level of teamwork process as the most important predictor of success. When an MTS is less interdependent, within-team processes are more important, but when the need for interdependency increases, between-team processes become more critical.81 An MTS

will exhibit less interdependency when component teams independently execute actions towards their own proximal goal, and interdependency will increase when seeking to accomplish goals higher in the hierarchy. This notion contributes to the idea that a high level of integration needs to be attained to successfully accomplish the superordinate goal of the MTS.

Functional interdependence and goal hierarchy are connected in the sense that both are indispensable for higher order goal attainment and completion of the mission of the MTS. Effective communication between component teams is key in increasing the chances of success,

80 Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In

Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 9.

81 Stacey L. Connaughton, Elizabeth A. Williams, and Marissa L. Shuffler. Social Identity Issues in Multiteam

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since interdependencies grow when one moves up the goal hierarchy. However, inter-team communication is time-consuming and can divert critical resources away. The allocation of component team resources to team task performance affords more attractive, reliable, and immediate rewards than the allocation of resources to inter-team communication. In high-urgency environments, the high-performance demands leave less time and effort for

communicating with the other component teams. However, in the long run, such team-level allocation hinders the system’s performance by underfunding the communication that is necessary to goal attainment, especially the higher order, longer term goals.82 When multi-team

goals do not reward or articulate the benefits of proactive inter-team communication for the team, teams are unlikely to construe such activities as part of their performance mandate.83 As such,

inter-team communication is indispensible in both goal setting and process interdependencies to avoid incompatibility between core missions of component teams.

Social Identities

It has been widely accepted that work groups, such as teams, function as potential social

identities. They are bounded social categories where it is specified who constitutes a member and who does not. Membership is often important to the individual and collective interests are of the interest of the individual, characterized by interdependence.84 Tajfel and Turner have argued that

social identity constitutes “those aspects of an individual’s self image that derive from the social categories to which he [or she] perceives himself [or herself] as belonging.”85 It is not much of a

stretch to say that teams form social identities around the functions they perform.86 The

behavioral component of a group identity, the joint effort toward a common goal, is telling of how relevant social identities are for teams. For a team of teams, however, complication arises

82 Ruth Kanfer and Matthew Kerry. Motivation in Multiteam Systems. In Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for

Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 81-108. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 93-94.

83 Ibid.

84 Marilynn B. Brewer. Managing Diversity: The Rolde of Social Identities. In Diversity in Work Teams: Research

Paradigms for a Changing Workplace. Eds. Jackson, Susan E. and Ruderman, Marian N., 47-68. Washington DC: American Psychological Association, 1995, 47.

85 H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner. The Social Identity Theory of Inter-group behavior. In Psychology of intergroup

relations. Eds. S. Worchel and L.W. Austin, 7-24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986: 16. Found in: Stacey L. Connaughton, Elizabeth A. Williams, and Marissa L. Shuffler. Social Identity Issues in Multiteam Systems: Considerations for Future Research. In Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 109-140. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012.

86 Verlin N. Hinsz and Kevin R. Betts. Conflict in Multiteam Systems. In Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for

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when discussing the benefits of social identity for team effectiveness. Here, I will discuss two complications of social identities when applied to an external MTS: component team identity versus MTS identity and multicultural multi-team systems.

Component team identity versus MTS identity

In many MTSs, individual component team members come from different cultures (based on a variety of attributes) and are likely to identify with that culture before engaging in an MTS. Zacarro, co-coiner and developer of the term MTS, has argued that individual team members are more likely to identify with their component teams than with the MTS, because these component teams have often more freedom to exhibit significant degrees of diversity around the core

attributes that define them.87 There may, however, be a more obvious consideration that needs

pointing out: the component team social identity often precedes the MTS identity, making it arguably stronger and more persistent as it serves as a framework against which new information and perspectives are measured, including possible new identities. As the component teams stem from different existing mother organizations and the individual team members might possess even more distinguishing attributes, they are likely to have already formed a social identity. The component teams and their members do not appear out of thin air, rather they have backgrounds that they can identify themselves with. It then becomes a notion that is not easily dismissed when discussing relative strength of component team identity and MTS identity.

Social identity theory states that individuals use mechanisms of categorization, identification, and comparison88 to determine their identity within groups.89 Though most visible with identification,

these processes all have as an implication that they create in- and out-groups. When perceptions of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ are strong, they can have several consequences for the effectiveness of an MTS. If component team members cannot identify as part of an MTS but can identify as part of a component team, they may only focus on the accomplishment of their component team

(proximal) goals, thus raising issues pertaining goal setting and goal hierarchy, and potentially

87 Stephen J. Zacarro, Michelle A. Marks, and Leslie A. DeChurch. Multiteam Systems: An Introduction. In

Multiteam Systems: An Organization Form for Dynamic and Complex Environments. Eds. Zacarro, Stephen J., Marks, Michelle A., DeChurch, Leslie. A., 3-33. New York and London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2012: 12.

88 Categorization takes place when one is placed in categories based on perceived similarities. Identification holds

that individuals identify with a group to which they perceive they belong. Comparison, or social comparison, occurs when one learns about their own attitudes and abilities by comparing themselves with others to whom they are similar.

89 C. Shawn et al. Understanding the Cognitive Processes in Adaptive Multicultural Teams: A Framework. Team

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