Corporate governance systems

(1)

APPENDIXES

(2)

TABLE 1

Corporate governance systems

Market/network- oriented system of corporate governance

Market-oriented Network-oriented

Country class Anglo-Saxon Germanic Latin Japan

Countries (GDP 1995 x US$ 1,000,000,000; GDP per Capita x US$ 1 at current

prices and exchange rates).

Source: IMF for GDP, OECD for GDP per capita

USA (7,246; 25,512) UK (1,107; 17,468) Canada (569; 18,598) Australia (349;

18,072)

Germany (2,259; 25,133) the Netherlands (396; 21,733) Switzerland (287; 36,790) Sweden (246; 22,389) Austria (233; 24,670) Denmark (175; 28,181) Norway (147; 28,434) Finland (126; 19,106)

France (1,567; 22,944) Italy (1,119; 17,796) Spain (574; 12,321) Belgium (264; 22,515)

Japan (4,961;

36,732)

Concept of the firm Instrumental,

shareholder oriented Institutional Institutional Institutional

Board system One-tier (executive and

non-executive board)

Two-tier (executive and

supervisory board) Optional (France), in

general one-tier Board of directors;

office of representative directors;

office of auditors;

de facto one-tier

Salient stakeholder(s) Shareholders Industrial banks (Germany), employees, in general oligarchic group

Financial holdings, the government, families, in

general oligarchic group

City banks, other financial

institutions, employees, in general oligarchic group

Importance of stock market in the national economy

High Moderate/high Moderate High

Active external market for corporate control

Yes No No No

Ownership concentration

Low Moderate/high High Low/moderate

Performance-dependent executive compensation

High Low Moderate Low

Time horizon of economic relationships

Short term Long term Long term Long term

Source: Weimer & Pape (1999)

(3)

TABLE 2 Research sample Country and the

respective blue-chip stock exchange

Listed Companies

1. Agfa-Gevaert 7. Delhaize Group 13. KBC Group

2. Barco 8. Dexia 14. Mobistar

3. Bekaert 9. D’Ieteren 15. Omega Pharma

4. Belgacom 10. Fortis 16. Solvay

5. Confinimo 11. Group Bruxelles Lambert

17. UCB

Belgium

BEL20

6. Colruyt 12. InBev 18. Umicore

1. A.P. Møller – Mærsk B

11. FLSmidth & Co B. 21. Østasiatiske Kompagni 2. Alk-Abelló 12. GN Store Nord 22. SAS 3. Bang & Olufson B 13. Group 4 Securicor 23. Sydbank 4. Carlsberg B 14. H. Lundbeck 24. TDC

5. Codan 15. IC Companys 25. Topdanmark

6. Coloplast B 16. Jyske Bank 26. Trygvesta

7. D/S Torm 17. Københavns Lufthave

27. Vestas Wind Systems

8. Danisco 18. NKT Holding 28. William Demant Holding

9. Danske Bank 19. Novo Nordisk B

Denmark

OMX Copenhagen 20

10. DSV 20. Novozymes B

(4)

1. Accor 14. France Télécom 27. Saint-Gobain 2. AGF 15. Gaz de France 28. Sanofi-Aventis 3. Air Liquide 16. Groupe Danone 29. Schneider Electric

4. Alcatel 17. L’Oréal 30. Société Générale

5. AXA 18. Lafarge 31. STMicroelectronics

6. BNP Paribas 19. Lagardère 32. SUEZ

7. Bouygues 20. LVMH 33. Thales Group

8. Capgemini 21. Michelin 34. Thomson SA

9. Carrefour 22. Pernod Ricard 35. Total

10. Crédit Agricole 23. PSA Peugot Citroen

36. Veolia Environment

11. EADS 24. PPR 37. VINCI

12. EDF 25. Publicis

France CAC40

13. Essilor 26. Renault

1. Adidas-Salomon 11. Deutsche Borse 21. MAN

2. Allianz 12. Deutsche Post 22. METRO

3. Altana 13. Deutsche Telekom 23. Munich Re

4. BASF 14. E.ON 24. RWE

5. Bayer AG 15. Fresenius 25. SAP

6. BMW 16. Henkel 26. Schering

Germany DAX

7. Commerzbank 17. Hypo Real Estate 27. Siemens

(5)

8. Continental 18. Infineon Technologies

28. ThyssenKrupp

9. DaimlerChrysler 19. Linde 29. TUI

10. Deutsche Bank 20. Lufthansa 30. Volkswagen

1. Allied Irish Bank PLC

8. Elan Corporation PLC

15. Irish Life and Permanent PLC

2. Anglo Irish Bank Corporation PLC

9. F.B.D. Holdings PLC

16. Kerry Group PLC

3. Bank of Ireland 10. Fyffes PLC 17. Kingspan Group PLC

4. CRH PLC 11. Grafton PLC 18. Paddy Power PLC

5. C&C Group PLC 12. Greencore PLC 19. Ryanair Holdings PLC

6. DCC PLC 13. Iaws Group PLC 20. United Drug PLC

Ireland

ISEQ® 20 Index

7. Eircom Group PLC 14. Independent News & Media PLC

1. Alleanza 11. Capitalia 21. Pirelli & C

2. Autostrade 12. Enel 22. Ras

3. BPU Banca 13. Eni 23. Saipe

4. Bnca Fideuram 14. Fiat 24. Sanpaolo Imi 5. Banca Intesa 15. Finmeccanica 25. Snam Rete Gas 6. Banca MPS 16. Generali 26. Telecom Italia

7. Banca Popolare Italia

17. Luxottica Group 27. Tenaris

Italy

MIB30

8. Banca Popolare di Milano

18. Mediaset 28. Terna

(6)

9. Banca Popolare di Verona e Novara

19. Mediobanca 29. Unicredito

10. Bnl 20. Mediolanum

1. Arcelor 3. Quilmes Industrial SA

Luxembourg BdL (Top traded

Securties)

2. SES Global SA 4. BIP Investment Partners SA

1. ABN AMRO 10. Hagemeyer 19. SMB Offshore

2. AEGON 11. Heineken 20. TNT

3. Ahold 12. ING Group 21. Tom Tom

4. Akzo Nobel 13. KPN 22. Unilever

5. ASML 14. Numico 23. Vedior

6. Buhrmann 15. Philips 24. VNU

7. DSM 16. Reed Elsevier 25. Wolters Kluwer

8. Fortis 17. Rodamco Europe

Netherlands AEX

9. Getronics 18. Royal Dutch Shell

1. ABB Ltd 10. FöreningsSparbank en AB

19. Svenska Handelsbanken

2. Alfa Laval AB 11. Hennes & Mauritz AB, H&M

20. Skanska AB

3. Autoliv Inc. SDB 12. Holmen AB 21. SKF

4. ASSA ABLOY AB 13. Investor AB 22. Swedish Match AB

5. Atlas Copco AB 14. Nordea Bank 23. Tele2 AB

Sweden

OMX Stockholm 30

6. Electrolux AB 15. Sandvik AB 24. Teliasonera

(7)

7. Enerio AB 16. Svenska Cellulosa AB SCA

25. Volvo AB

8. Ericsson, Telefonab. LM

17. Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 9. Fabege AB 18. Securitas AB

1. Anglo American 11. Cadbury Schweppes

21. Old Mutual PLC

2. AstraZeneca 12. Diageo 22. Prudential Plc 3. Aviva 13. GlaxoSmithKline 23. Reckitt Benckiser

4. BAE Systems 14. HBOS 24. Royal Bank of

Scotland Group 5. Barclays Bank 15. HSBC 25. Rio Tinto Group

6. BG Group 16. Imperial Tobacco Group

26. SABMiller

7. BHP Billiton 17. Lloyds TSB 27. Standard Chartered 8. BP 18. Marks & Spencer 28. Scottish Power

9. British American Tobacco

19. National Grid 29. Tesco

UK

31 FTSE 100

10. BT Group 20. O2 30. Vodafone Group

(8)

TABLE 3 List of variables

Company level variables

Name Label Value

compid Number of the company

Company numbers have been randomly selected

compname Official company name

compcoo Company country of origin (where Headquarters is located)

Country numbers have been randomly selected

1. UK

2. The Netherlands 3. Germany

4. Belgium 5. France 6. Italy

7. Luxembourg 8. Denmark 9. Ireland 15. Sweden

govsys Governance System (based on country location)

Numbers concerning the corporate governance system have been randomly selected

1. Anglo-Saxon 2. Germanic 3. Latin

brdstruc Board structure applied by the company 1. One-tier 2. Two-tier

999. Missing

(9)

Board level variables

Name Label Value

name Last name and initial(s) of corporate board member

denbm Denomination of board member 1. Executive 2. Non-executive foreign Foreigner

(other nationality than of company country of origin)

1. Yes 2. No

999. Missing national Native country of corporate board member

Country numbers have been randomly selected

1. UK

2. The Netherlands 3. Germany

4. Belgium 5. France 6. Italy

7. Luxembourg 8. Denmark 9. Ireland 10. Greece 11. Portugal 12. Spain 13. Austria 14. Finland 15. Sweden 16. Cyprus

17. Czech Republic 18. Estonia

19. Hungary 20. Latvia 21. Lithuania 22. Malta 23. Poland 24. Slovakia 25. Slovenia 26. Norway 27. Switzerland 28. Turkey 29. USA 30. China 31. Brazil 32. South-Africa

33. Antigua and Barbuda 34. Australia

35. Uganda

36. India

37. Singapore

38. Canada

(10)

39. Tunis 40. Colombia 41. Israel

42. New-Zealand 43. Argentina 44. Egypt 45. Malaysia 46. Namibia 47. Mozambique 48. Lebanon

49. Bosnia- Herzegovina 50. Zimbabwe

51. Japan 52. Mexico 53. South Korea 54. Libya 55. Croatia

999. Missing sourcena Source of information concerning the

nationality

gender Gender 1. Male

2. Female

999. Missing 9. Missing yearbrth Year of birth (4 digits)

9. Missing entrycom Year of entry in the company (4 digits)

In case a merger took place, the date of entry to the company before the merger has been recorded as a remark

When a board member started twice for the same company; thus worked for another company in the meantime, the second date of entry will be recorded

entrybrd Year of entry in the board (4 digits)

In case a merger took place, the date of entry to the board before the merger has been recorded as a remark

9. Missing

exitbrd Year of planned exit from the board 9. Missing dependence Dependence or independence of the board

member, according to the specific corporate governance code

0. Not mentioned 1. Dependent 2. Independent 3. N/A

chair Chairman of the board 1. Yes

2. No remcom Member of the remuneration committee 0. No

1. Yes, member

2. Yes, chair

(11)

9. Missing nomcom Member of the nomination committee 1. No

2. Yes, member 3. Yes, chair

9. Missing audcom Member of the audit committee 1. No

2. Yes, member 3. Yes, chair

9. Missing shemrep Shareholder or employee representative

(One of the features of the Germanic country group is employee representation on the board. In these countries non-executives are classified as shareholder or employee representatives were applicable. Due to the absence of employee representation on the board of Anglo-Saxon and Latin countries, all non-executives in these countries have been classified as shareholder representatives)

0. Not mentioned 1. Shareholder

representative 2. Employee

representative 3. Not applicable

999. Missing otherprof Number of other (supervisory) positions in

profit organizations

999. Missing othernonprof Number of other (supervisory) positions in

non-profit organizations

999. Missing sourcepos Source of information concerning other

positions

1. Annual report 2. Company website yearpos Year of other positions being held

remark Date of entry in the company before merger or other remarks regarding non-executives remark1 Space for additional information regarding

executives

remark2 Space for additional information regarding

executives

(12)

TABLE 4

Board internationalization measurement; dependent variables Name dependent variable Measurement

Ratio of foreign corporate board members (ratforco)

The number of foreigners present in the corporate board of a company divided by the total size of the corporate board of a company

Ratio of foreign executive board members (ratforex)

The number of foreign executives of the corporate board of a company divided by the total size of executives of the corporate board

Ratio of foreign non-executive

board members (ratforne) The number of foreign non- executives of the

corporate board of a company divided by the total size of non-executives of the corporate board of a

company Ratio of foreign shareholder

representatives among non- executives (ratfsrne)

The number of foreign shareholder representatives among non-executives of the corporate board of a company divided by the total size of shareholder representatives among non-executives of the corporate board of a company

Ratio of foreign employee representatives among non- executives (ratferne)

The number of foreign employee representatives among non-executives of the corporate board of a company divided by the total size of employee

representatives among non executives of the corporate

board of a company

(13)

TABLE 5

Hypotheses and associated statistical tests

Hypothesis Statistical test

H1: There are no significant differences in the proportion of foreigners among the executive and non-executive body in the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Paired samples t-test

H2: There are relatively more foreigners among the corporate boards in the Anglo-Saxon countries than there are in the Germanic and Latin countries.

One-Way ANOVA test

Paired samples t-test H3: There are relatively more foreigners in the shareholder

part of the supervisory board in the Germanic countries, than there are in the employee part of the supervisory board.

Paired samples t-test H4: There are no significant differences in the proportion of

foreigners among the supervisory board and the executive board in the Germanic countries.

Independent samples t-test H5: There are relatively more foreigners among the

corporate boards in the Germanic countries, than there are in the Latin countries.

Paired samples t-test H6: There are no significant differences in the proportion of

foreigners among the executive and non-executive body in the Latin countries.

One-way ANOVA test H7: There are relatively less foreigners among the corporate

boards in the Latin countries than there are in the Anglo- Saxon and the Germanic countries.

Pearson R correlation H8: The presence of foreign board members on the

nomination committee will be positively associated with the number of foreign executive board members.

H9: The presence of foreign board members on the

nomination committee will be positively associated with the number of foreign non-executive board members.

Pearson R correlation

(14)

TABLE 6

Ratio of foreigners grouped by governance system Governance system Ratio foreign

corporate board members

Ratio foreign executive members

Ratio foreign non- executive members

Anglo-Saxon 29,2 19,4 35,0

Germanic 23,2 23,3 24,0

Latin 19,5 12,9 22,6

TABLE 7

Ratio of foreigners grouped by country

Country Ratio foreign

corporate board members

Ratio foreign executive members

Ratio foreign non- executive members

Ireland 18,01 5,44 26,40

United Kingdom 36,69 28,68 40,67

Denmark 11,98 6,46 14,15

Germany 13,52 20,18 11,50

Luxembourg 59,75 54,17 60,61

The Netherlands 44,29 45,76 43,14

Sweden 20,25 18,46 24,97

Belgium 28,99 20,60 32,30

France 21,41 14,97 26,25

Italy 10,97 5,40 11,68

TABLE 8A

Descriptive statistics hypothesis 1

Paired Samples Statistics

19,3873 50 21,58807 3,05301

34,9646 50 19,99278 2,82741

Ratio of foreign executive members Ratio of foreign

non-executive members Pair

1

Mean N Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

(15)

TABLE 8B

Paired samples t-test hypothesis 1

Paired Samples Test

-15,57727 22,14811 3,13222 -21,87170 -9,28285 -4,973 49 ,000 Ratio of foreign

executive members - Ratio of foreign non-executive members Pair

1

Mean

Std.

Deviation

Std.

Error

Mean Lower Upper

95% Confidence Interval of the

Difference Paired Differences

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

TABLE 9A

One-Way ANOVA test hypothesis 2

ANOVA Ratio of foreign corporate board members

3002,291 2 1501,146 3,822 ,023

95836,567 244 392,773

98838,859 246

Between Groups Within Groups Total

Sum of

Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

(16)

TABLE 9B

Post Hoc Test hypothesis 2

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign corporate board members Scheffe

6,05903 3,37081 ,201 -2,2428 14,3608

9,76481* 3,53218 ,023 1,0656 18,4640

-6,05903 3,37081 ,201 -14,3608 2,2428

3,70578 2,85092 ,431 -3,3156 10,7272

-9,76481* 3,53218 ,023 -18,4640 -1,0656

-3,70578 2,85092 ,431 -10,7272 3,3156

(J)

Governance System Germanic Latin Anglo-Saxon Latin Anglo-Saxon Germanic (I) Governance System

Anglo-Saxon

Germanic

Latin

Mean Difference

(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 95% Confidence Interval

The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

*.

TABLE 10A

Descriptive statistics hypothesis 3

21,8567 76 21,52639 2,46925

3,6404 76 13,97540 1,60309

Ratio of foreign shareholder representatives

Ratio of foreign employee representatives

Pair 1

Std. Error Mean

(17)

TABLE 10B

Paired samples t-test hypothesis 3

18,21637 19,04976 2,18516 13,86332 22,56943 8,336 75 ,000 Ratio of foreign

shareholder representatives - Ratio of foreign employee representatives Pair

1

Mean

Std.

Deviation

Std.

Error

Mean Lower Upper

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

TABLE 11A

Descriptive statistics hypothesis 4

23,2888 112 27,09096 2,55986

23,9863 112 24,09487 2,27675

1

Std. Error Mean

TABLE 11B

Paired samples t-test hypothesis 4

-,69751 23,53940 2,22426 -5,10504 3,71001 -,314 111 ,754 Ratio of foreign

1

Mean

Std.

Deviation

Std.

Error

Mean Lower Upper

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

(18)

TABLE 12A

Descriptive statistics hypothesis 5

Group Statistics

112 23,1566 22,35272 2,11213

85 19,4508 17,20952 1,86663

Governance System Germanic

Latin Ratio of foreign corporate

board members

N Mean Std. Deviation

Std. Error Mean

TABLE 12B

Independent samples t-test hypothesis 5

Independent Samples Test

4,800 ,030 1,27 195 ,206 3,70578 2,91984 -2,05275 9,46430

1,31 195 ,190 3,70578 2,81876 -1,85341 9,26497 Equal

variances assumed Equal variances not assumed Ratio of

foreign corporate board members

F Sig.

Levene's Test for Equality of

Variances

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

Mean Difference

Std. Error

Difference Lower Upper 95% Confidence

Interval of the Difference t-test for Equality of Means

TABLE 13A

Descriptive statistics hypothesis 6

12,8988 85 17,94315 1,94621

22,5617 85 19,38030 2,10209

1

Std. Error Mean

(19)

TABLE 13B

Paired samples t-test hypothesis 6

-9,66288 17,68006 1,9177 -13,4764 -5,84938 -5,039 84 ,000 Ratio of foreign

1

Mean

Std.

Deviation

Std.

Error

Mean Lower Upper

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)

TABLE 14A

One-Way ANOVA test hypothesis 7

ANOVA Ratio of foreign corporate board members

3002,291 2 1501,146 3,822 ,023

95836,567 244 392,773

98838,859 246

Between Groups Within Groups Total

Sum of

(20)

TABLE 14B

Post Hoc test hypothesis 7

Multiple Comparisons Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign corporate board members Scheffe

6,05903 3,37081 ,201 -2,2428 14,3608

9,76481* 3,53218 ,023 1,0656 18,4640

-6,05903 3,37081 ,201 -14,3608 2,2428

3,70578 2,85092 ,431 -3,3156 10,7272

-9,76481* 3,53218 ,023 -18,4640 -1,0656

-3,70578 2,85092 ,431 -10,7272 3,3156

(J)

Governance System Germanic Latin Anglo-Saxon Latin Anglo-Saxon Germanic (I) Governance System

Anglo-Saxon

Germanic

Latin

Mean Difference

(I-J) Std. Error Sig. Lower Bound Upper Bound 95% Confidence Interval

The mean difference is significant at the .05 level.

*.

TABLE 15

Pearson R Correlation test hypothesis 8

Correlations

1 ,348**

,000

171 171

,348** 1

,000

171 247

Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N

Ratio of foreign nomination

committee members Ratio of foreign executive members

committee members

Ratio of foreign executive members

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

**.

(21)

TABLE 16

Pearson R Correlation test hypothesis 9

Correlations

1 ,773**

,000

171 171

,773** 1

,000

171 247

Pearson Correlation Sig. (1-tailed) N

Ratio of foreign nomination committee members

Ratio of foreign

non-executive members

committee members

Ratio of foreign non-executive

members

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

**.

TABLE 17A

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign corporate board members

Model Summary

,587^a ,345 ,320 16,52973

Model 1

R R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

Predictors: (Constant), varLatin, varLuxembourg, varIreland, varSweden, varNL, varBelgium, varDenmark, varItaly, varGermany

a.

TABLE 17B

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign corporate board members

ANOVA^b

34082,876 9 3786,986 13,860 ,000^a

64755,983 237 273,232

98838,859 246

Regression Residual Total Model 1

Sum of

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign corporate board members b.

(22)

TABLE 17C

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign corporate board members

Coefficients^a

36,686 3,018 12,156 ,000

7,607 4,476 ,115 1,699 ,091

-23,168 4,268 -,378 -5,428 ,000

7,584 4,730 ,099 1,603 ,110

-10,440 4,076 -,168 -2,562 ,011

23,068 8,799 ,146 2,622 ,009

-24,711 4,344 -,392 -5,689 ,000

-18,675 4,772 -,255 -3,914 ,000

-16,431 4,476 -,248 -3,671 ,000

-15,279 4,037 -,363 -3,785 ,000

(Constant) varNL varGermany varBelgium varItaly

varLuxembourg varDenmark varIreland varSweden varLatin Model

1

B Std. Error Unstandardized

Coefficients

Beta Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign corporate board members a.

TABLE 17D

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign corporate board members

Excluded Variables ^b

.^a . . . ,000

varUK varFrance varAnglo varGermanic Model

1

Beta In t Sig.

Partial

Correlation Tolerance Collinearity

Statistics

Predictors in the Model: (Constant), varLatin, varLuxembourg, varIreland, varSweden, varNL, varBelgium, varDenmark, varItaly, varGermany

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign corporate board members b.

(23)

TABLE 18A

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Model Summary

,540^a ,291 ,265 20,20671

Model 1

R R Square

Adjusted R Square

a.

TABLE 18B

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign executive board members

ANOVA^b

39806,147 9 4422,905 10,832 ,000^a

96769,784 237 408,311

136575,9 246

Sum of

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members b.

(24)

TABLE 18C

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Coefficients^a

28,683 3,689 7,775 ,000

17,075 5,472 ,219 3,120 ,002

-8,507 5,217 -,118 -1,630 ,104

5,628 5,782 ,062 ,973 ,331

-9,570 4,982 -,131 -1,921 ,056

25,484 10,756 ,137 2,369 ,019

-22,220 5,310 -,300 -4,185 ,000

-23,238 5,833 -,270 -3,984 ,000

-10,222 5,472 -,131 -1,868 ,063

-13,711 4,935 -,277 -2,778 ,006

1

Coefficients

Beta Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members a.

TABLE 18D

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign executive board members

.^a . . . ,000

1

Beta In t Sig.

Partial

Statistics

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members b.

(25)

TABLE 19A

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign non-executive board members

Model Summary

,542^a ,293 ,267 18,99669

Model 1

R R Square

Adjusted R Square

a.

TABLE 19B

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign non-executive board members

ANOVA^b

35508,842 9 3945,427 10,933 ,000^a

85527,190 237 360,874

121036,0 246

Sum of

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign non-executive members b.

(26)

TABLE 19C

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign non-executive board members

Coefficients^a

40,674 3,468 11,727 ,000

2,467 5,144 ,034 ,480 ,632

-29,172 4,905 -,430 -5,947 ,000

6,052 5,436 ,071 1,113 ,267

-14,570 4,684 -,212 -3,111 ,002

19,932 10,112 ,114 1,971 ,050

-26,527 4,992 -,380 -5,314 ,000

-14,274 5,484 -,176 -2,603 ,010

-15,701 5,144 -,214 -3,052 ,003

-14,423 4,640 -,310 -3,109 ,002

1

Coefficients

Beta Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign non-executive members a.

TABLE 19D

The effect of corporate governance systems and countries on the ratio of foreign non-executive board members

.^a . . . ,000

1

Beta In t Sig.

Partial

Statistics

a.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign non-executive members b.

(27)

TABLE 20A

The effect of the ratio of foreign nomination committee members on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Variables Entered/Removed ^c

Ratio of foreign nomination committee members^a

. Enter

varLatin,

varAnglo^b . Enter

Model 1

2

Variables Entered

Variables

Removed Method

All requested variables entered.

a.

Tolerance = ,000 limits reached.

b.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members

c.

TABLE 20B

The effect of the ratio of foreign nomination committee members on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Model Summary

,348^a ,121 ,116 22,59212

,434^b ,188 ,174 21,84129

Model 1 2

R R Square

Adjusted R Square

Predictors: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members

a.

Predictors: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members, varLatin, varAnglo

b.

(28)

TABLE 20C

The effect of the ratio of foreign nomination committee members on the ratio of foreign executive board members

ANOVA^c

11866,858 1 11866,858 23,250 ,000^a

86258,253 169 510,404

98125,111 170

18459,129 3 6153,043 12,898 ,000^b

79665,982 167 477,042

98125,111 170

Regression Residual Total Regression Residual Total Model 1

2

Sum of

Predictors: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members a.

Predictors: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members, varLatin, varAnglo

b.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members c.

TABLE 20D

The effect of the ratio of foreign nomination committee members on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Coefficients^a

14,657 2,416 6,066 ,000

,316 ,066 ,348 4,822 ,000

21,733 3,018 7,202 ,000

,340 ,064 ,373 5,309 ,000

-12,886 4,105 -,245 -3,140 ,002

-12,616 4,005 -,244 -3,150 ,002

(Constant) Ratio of foreign nomination

committee members (Constant)

committee members varAnglo

varLatin Model

1

2

Coefficients

Beta Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members a.

(29)

TABLE 20E

The effect of the ratio of foreign nomination committee members on the ratio of foreign executive board members

Excluded Variables ^c

-,139^a -1,923 ,056 -,147 ,983

,260^a 3,728 ,000 ,276 ,991

-,139^a -1,940 ,054 -,148 ,999

.^b . . . ,000

varAnglo varGermanic varLatin varGermanic Model

1

2

Beta In t Sig.

Partial

Statistics

Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members a.

Predictors in the Model: (Constant), Ratio of foreign nomination committee members, varLatin, varAnglo

b.

Dependent Variable: Ratio of foreign executive members c.

(30)

TABLE 21

Results of the tested hypotheses

Hypothesis Accepted Results if not accepted H1: Anglo-Saxon ratio foreign

executives = ratio foreign non- executives

No Ratio foreign non-executives > ratio foreign executives

H2: Anglo-Saxon ratio foreigners >

Germanic and Latin ratio foreigners

No Anglo-Saxon ratio foreigners > Latin ratio foreigners

Anglo-Saxon ratio foreigners not significantly > Germanic ratio foreigners

H3: Germanic ratio foreign

shareholder representatives > ratio foreign employee representatives

Yes

H4: Germanic ratio foreign non- executives = ratio foreign

executives

Yes

H5: Germanic ratio foreigners >

Latin ratio foreigners

No No significant difference

H6: Latin ratio foreign executives = ratio foreign non-executives

No Ratio foreign non-executives > ratio foreign executives

H7: Latin ratio foreigners < Anglo- Saxon and Germanic ratio

foreigners

No Latin ratio foreigners < Anglo-Saxon ratio foreigners

Latin ratio foreigners not significantly

< Germanic ratio foreigners H8: Positive correlation between

ratio foreign nomination committee members and ratio foreign

executives

Yes

H9: Positive correlation between ratio foreign nomination committee members and ratio foreign non- executives

Yes

(31)

TABLE 22A

Relationship composition nomination committee and entire board

27,4301 171 19,22034 1,46982

25,7463 171 26,40962 2,01959

Ratio of foreign corporate board members

Ratio of foreign nomination committee members

Pair 1

Std. Error Mean

TABLE 22B

Relationship composition nomination committee and entire board

Paired Samples Correlations

171 ,688 ,000

Ratio of foreign corporate board members & Ratio of foreign nomination committee members Pair

1

N Correlation Sig.

TABLE 22C

Relationship composition nomination committee and entire board

1,68380 19,18185 1,46687 -1,21183 4,57943 1,148 170 ,253 Ratio of foreign

corporate board members - Ratio of foreign nomination committee members Pair

1

Mean

Std.

Deviation

Std.

Error

Mean Lower Upper

t df

Sig.

(2-tailed)