Resisting reforms. A Resource-based perspective of collective action in the
distribution of agricultural input and primary health services in the Couffo region,
Benin
Dedehouanou, H.
Publication date 2002
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Citation for published version (APA):
Dedehouanou, H. (2002). Resisting reforms. A Resource-based perspective of collective action in the distribution of agricultural input and primary health services in the Couffo region, Benin.
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Inn chapters 3 and 4, extensive arguments were developed on the pervasive nature of the interventionn process in the distribution of agricultural input services. This is not to draw only on thee negative side of the reforms. In view of past experiences under strict monopoly, achievementss have been tremendous. To date, few private firms are involved in the so-called farmers'' organisations. However, it is unlikely that farmers in general will maintain a passive
'take-it-or-leave-it'' behaviour, as originally thought. As Williamson (1990) rightly claimed, the conceptss of institutional environment and institutional arrangement matter if an objective assessmentt of governance is the primary goal. The institutional environment is concerned with thee rules of the game in the sector. It should be noted here that rules are not exclusively defined byy the government sector, but also by communities at the local level (cf. Dèdèhouanou and Quarless van Ufford 1998). For instance, grassroots organisations such as saving and credit groupss and self-help groups define their proper rules of functioning within the agriculture sector. Thesee rules may impinge on or facilitate the agricultural policy reforms. The institutional arrangement,, though, refers to aspects of production. In Benin, for instance, the government used too have a dominant role in the delivery of agricultural inputs before the reforms. After the reforms,, the involvement of the private and local organisations increased.
Ass it will become clear later in the analysis, people's influence as well as policy impact cann only be assessed over time. This is to ascertain that when new policy measures are enacted, farmerss may contemplate their appropriation (the nurturing period that corresponds to false acquiescencee (Chambers 1992)). Then, their resistance is sharpened as soon as they unwrap the interventionn package (see Mongbo 1994), the rejection period. It should be noted here that farmerss are unlikely to reject policy measures that improve their livelihood. Nor are they acquiescentt to intervention measures that hollow out their decision-making on resource control andd access. This study endeavours to address agricultural reforms in the Couffo region.
Inn order to achieve the stated objectives, this chapter is organised into four sections. The firstfirst section will discuss performance of collective action in the distribution of agricultural input services.. The second section will provide a SWOT analysis of collective action in the distributionn of agricultural input services. The third section will sketch a synthesis of collective actionn in the distribution of agricultural input services, while the last section will draw some concludingg comments.
5.11 Performance of collective action in the distribution of agricultural input services Itt should be clearly stated that collective action is the performance variable that could be identifiedd by people's participation in GVs, farmers' purchases of inputs and cotton output. Thiss variable must also reflect on the resource-based perspective, focusing on how the mix of strategy,, structure, and core capabilities of various actors may lead to a more effective distributionn of agricultural input services.
5.7.77 Farmers*participation in the groupement villageois (GVs)
Throughoutt the period trom 1992 to 1996, the five sub-prefectures constituting the Couffo regionn have kept a stable relative pattern with respect to the number of GVs encountered, althoughh a steady increase of absolute membership was witnessed over the same period (see tabless 5.1 & 5.2). Indeed, the value of the annual median (M) increased between the growing periodss 1992/93 and 1993/94, but stagnated from 1994795 to 1996/97 (cf. annexe E). The reason off such stagnation may be attributed to a lagged response to the input price shock after the devaluationn of the CFA franc in 1994. It is also of interest to point out the differentiation
observedd at various territorial levels (sample of villages, sub-prefectures, the Couffo region and thee Mono-Couffo region in general).
Tablee 5.1: Evolution of the ratios of GVs to villages at different territorial levels in five sub-prefectures of the Couffo
region,, 1992-97 Samplee of villages Aplahouéé (66) Diakotomey(68) ) Dogbo(53) ) Klouékanmèè (60) Toviklinn (56) Couffoo region (303) Mono-Couffo o regionn (601) 1992-93 3 1.15 5 .91 1 .84 4 .87 7 .60 0 .68 8 .78 8 .44 4 1993-94 4 1.15 5 .95 5 .84 4 .89 9 .60 0 .71 1 .80 0 .41 1 1994-95 5 1.18 8 .97 7 .87 7 .91 1 .65 5 .75 5 .83 3 .32 2 1995-96 6 1.15 5 .97 7 .94 4 .65 5 .86 6 .45 5 1996-97 7 1.15 5 1.02 2 .91 1 1.00 0 .65 5 .88 8 .89 9 .51 1
Source:: compiled from secondary data (GVs, USPP, CARDER)
Tablee 5.2: Breakdown of a sample of villages according to per capita GV-membership within five sub-prefecturess of the Couffo region, 1992-97.
Sub-prefectures s (Numberr of villages) ) Aplahoué é (N=77 villages) Djakotomey y (N=77 villages) Dogbo o (N=66 villages) Klouékanmè è (N=88 villages) Toviklin n (N=66 villages) Total l (N=344 villages) 1992-93 3 (M=15%) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M --4 --4 1 1 4 4 3 3 !! 12 >M M 6 6 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 !! 12 1993-94 4 (M=15.50%) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M --4 --4 1 1 3 3 4 4 !! 12 >M M 6 6 1 1 2 2 3 3 --!! 12 1994-95 5 (M=13%) ) Noo ; 11 < 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 10 0 <MM ; --4 --4 1 1 4 4 4 4 ;; i3 >M M 6 6 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 11 1 1995-96 6 (M=13%) ) Noo « 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 10 0 <MM ; --4 --4 1 1 4 4 :: 4 !! 13 >M M 6 6 1 1 2 2 2 2 *" " !! 11 1996-97 7 (M=14%) ) Noo ; 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 9 9 <MM ; 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ,, 13 >M M 5 5 2 2 1 1 3 3 1 1 !! 12
Source:: Compiled ftom secondary data ('Secteur CARDER' and USPP, Union of producers for the five
sub-prefectures;; 1992-97 - INSAE/MPAE 1994) . Note:: M stands for the annual median, the per capita membership, which splits all villages with GVs into two groups
off equal number - No stands for the number of villages within the sample of each sub-prefecture without GVs. <MM stands for the number of villages in the sample of each sub-prefecture with GV-membership fewer than or equal too the annual median (M); >M stands for the number of villages in the sample of each sub-prefecture with GV-membershipp more than the annual median (M).
NumberNumber of GVs per village
Beforee discussing more generally membership and other features, it should be noted that mtra-regionall as well as intra-sub-prefecture differentiation is observed with respect to the creation andd nurturing of GVs. Table 5.1 gives the ratios of the number of GVs to villages at different territoriall levels between 1992 and 1997. The average ratios of the sample of villages are constantlyy higher than those at the sub-prefecture and regional levels. However, the difference betweenn the sample of surveyed villages and other territorial levels is not sharp. Although these ratioss show a homogeneous rather than a differentiated adoption of GVs at each territorial level,
thee empirical observation depicts a strikingly heterogeneous situation. The number of GVs rangess from 0 in at least one village for each sub-prefecture to 6 in one village of Djakotomey.
Wee shall point out that the number of GVs per village is indicative of whether or not conflictss are disturbing the village-level participation process, as the split of GVs frustrates furtherr village-level relationships with intervening public-sector organisations. Because of administrativee costs, the latter organisations hardly admit more than one GV per village. More often,, they encourage privileged relationships with initial GVs after exhausting attempts at conflictt resolution in villages where GVs split up.
Theree are two major reasons why the ideal of one GV per village does not live up to expectations.. The first and most obvious reason is people's non-involvement in the cotton sector, whichh makes the GV redundant. The second reason is conflict driven. As explained earlier, this mayy yield two options; the GV collapses or it splits up into parts. More often, the latter option followss the hamlet or village-quarter division. Obviously, perceived motivation to participate in thee formal organisations does indeed lead to the voice option, and hence more conflicts resulting inn GVs splitting up. As it will bee shown below, conflicts entail the exit option as well. Therefore, people'ss response to the organisational aspects of intervention, or put more crudely, farmers' reluctancee or adherence to intervention projects, may be inferred from the number of GVs in additionn to membership figures.
Att the prefecture level, Aplahoué scores relatively higher than the other four sub-prefecturess (see table 5.1). Toviklin is relatively well organised in GVs compared to Klouékanmèè and even Dogbo. The large number of GVs in Toviklin is puzzling, owing to its loww potential for agriculture development in general and cotton production in particular.
Att a high territorial level, the Mono-Couffo region as a whole seems to carry a low score comparedd to the Couffb region (see table 5.1).
Withh respect to GV size, there seem to be some distinctive features, viz. sub-prefectures with largee membership figures in GVs, those with small membership figures, and those with mixed sizess (see table 5.2). The first group is mainly represented in Aplahoué, where GV memberships rangedd from 155 members for the smallest in 1992 to 1500 members for the largest in 1996. This explainss why at least six out of seven villages score more than the median membership. The sub-prefecturee of Dogbo has few villages with large-size GVs. The second group is illustrated by Toviklin,, whose average membership remains well below 150 for the whole period from 1992 to 1997.. In fact, most of its villages are either below the annual median, or without GV-membership.. Djakotomey and Klouékanmè belong to the third group. If the former sub-prefecturee keeps a stable mix of both small and large sizes, the latter alternates large and small GV-sizess over the period.
5.1.25.1.2 Farmers' purchases of agricultural inputs
Thee persistent failure to operate some significant shift from the existing extensive agriculture to intensivee practices has inspired government effort to facilitate the distribution of agricultural inputss as the major means for transforming agriculture in Benin. Therefore, the extent of use of somee agricultural inputs is relevant to evaluate the degree of change and henceforth the shift fromfrom subsistence to market agriculture. Among several inputs, at least two are specifically designatedd for cotton production, seeds and sprayers. Indeed, fertilisers initially destined to cottonn crop are also used on a number of other crops; for instance, on maize, which is a staple food-cropp in the Couffo region. Insecticides, on the other hand, are sprayed on cowpea crops in certainn villages. However, the diversion of insecticides to other uses is to a lesser extent comparedd to that of fertilisers.
PeoplePeople 's participation in relation to the purchases of fertilisers
Tablee 5.3 indicates in relative terms the number of villages below or above the annual median of perr member quantity of fertilisers purchased between 1992 and 1997. Regarding GV-membership,, there are trends that villages and sub-prefectures with larger-size GV-membership purchasee more fertilisers per member than those with smaller-size GV-membership. By contrast, theree are unexpected trends that villages with less membership in GVs are purchasing more insecticidess than villages with more membership in GVs. These trends may probably be linked to thee diversion of fertilisers and insecticides to uses other than cotton production and to the backlashh effects of the devaluation in 1994.
Tablee 5 3 : Breakdown of a sample of villages following per GV-member quantity of fertiliser purchases in five
sub-prefecturess of the Couffo region, 1992-97.
Sub-prefectures s (Numberr of villages) ) Aplahoué é (N=77 villages) Djakotomey y (N=77 villages) Dogbo o (N=66 villages) Klouékanmè è (N=88 villages) Toviklin n (N=66 villages) Total l (N=344 villages) 1992-93 3 (M=23Kg) ) Noo ; 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 ^M M 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 12 2 >M M 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 12 2 1993-94 4 (M=53Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M --2 --2 3 3 6 6 1 1 12 2 >M M 6 6 3 3 --3 --3 12 2 1994-95 5 (M=50Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 10 0 <M M 3 3 --3 --3 3 3 3 3 12 2 >M M 3 3 5 5 --2 --2 2 2 ;; 12 1995-96 6 (M=61Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M 1 1 2 2 3 3 5 5 1 1 12 2 >M M 5 5 3 3 " " 1 1 3 3 12 2 1996-97 7 (M== 83 Kg) Noo ; 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 9 9 <MM ! 2 2 4 4 4 4 3 3 11 13 >M M 6 6 3 3 2 2 1 1 .. 1 2
Source:: Compiled mom secondary data ('Secteur CARDER' and USPP, Union of producers for the five
sub-prefectures;; 1992-97 -INS AE/MPAE1994)
Note:: M stands for the annual median (cf. annexe E or table 5.2)
Tablee 5.4 presents the evolution of per capita fertiliser purchases between 1992 and 1997. As for membershipp ratios, Aplahoué is at the forefront with the largest shares of per capita purchases of fertilisers.. The striking observation derives from that Aplahoué carries such a weight that the otherr four sub-prefectures are even under the average value for the entire sample. In addition, the samee relative importance is observed for the regional value of per capita fertiliser purchases. Tablee 5.4: Evolution of per capita quantity (Kg) of fertiliser purchases following different territorial levels in the
Couffoo region, 1992-97. Aplahoué é Diakotomey y Dogbo o Klouékanmè è Toviklin n Alll villages of the sample
Couffoo region Mono-Couffoo region 1992-93 3 11.7 7 4.1 1 2.1 1 5.5 5 2.1 1 10.5 5 5.5 5 2.9 9 1993-94 4 24.0 0 4.7 7 1.3 3 2.1 1 2.3 3 13.5 5 7.7 7 3.8 8 1994-95 5 16.0 0 3.1 1 .0 0 1.7 7 1.8 8 9.1 1 5.0 0 2.5 5 1995-96 6 24.4 4 4.5 5 .8 8 4.9 9 2.0 0 11.2 2 8.1 1 1.7 7 1996-97 7 36.3 3 10.8 8 5.5 5 8.1 1 2.5 5 16.6 6 13.9 9 2.6 6
Source:: compiled from secondary data (USPP; CARDER; INSAE/ MPAE 1994)
Note:: per capita quantity of fertiliser purchases is obtained by dividing the total quantity purchased by the total
Furthermore,, a stagnation of fertiliser purchases was observed in 1994, but the trend quickly reversed.. The subsequent arguments will be pursued below.
People'sPeople's participation in relation to the purchases of insecticides
Tablee 5.5 indicates in relative terms the number of villages below or above the annual median of perr GV-member quantity of insecticides purchased between 1992 and 1997. In fact, there is no clear-cutt pattern for the purchase of insecticides. It is instructive to stress that the cotton argumentt is ruled out given the observed trends before and after 1994. For example, the case of Klouékanmèè after 1994 is striking. Reports from CARDER ascribed the increased purchases of insecticidess inn this sub-prefecture to the diversion argument (CARDER-Mono 1997). Farmers of Klouékanmèè confessed that they usually divert insecticides destined to cotton fields to other uses suchh as pest management in cowpea and vegetable fields. The other striking feature of this table iss the declining trends of annual medians of per GV-member quantity of insecticides purchased betweenn 1992 and 1997. This inclination is more pronounced in table 5.6.
Tablee 5.5: Breakdown of a sample of villages following per GV-member quantity of insecticide purchases in
fivefive sub-prefectures of the Couffo region, 1992-97.
Sub-prefectures s (Numberr of villages) ) Aplahoué é (N=77 villages) Djakotomey y (N-77 villages) Dogbo o (N=66 villages) Klouékanmè è (N-88 villages) Toviklin n (N=66 villages) Total l (N=344 villages) 1992-93 3 (M== 0.601) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M 3 3 3 3 --4 --4 2 2 12 2 >M M 3 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 12 2 1993-94 4 (M== 1.791) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M --4 --4 3 3 4 4 1 1 12 2 >M M 6 6 1 1 --2 --2 3 3 12 2 1994-95 5 (M== 0.831) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 10 0 <M M 4 4 4 4 --1 --1 3 3 12 2 >M M 2 2 1 1 3 3 4 4 2 2 12 2 1995-96 6 (M== 1.401) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 <M M 2 2 5 5 2 2 1 1 2 2 12 2 >M M 4 4 --1 --1 5 5 2 2 12 2 1996-97 7 (M== 0.901) No o 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 9 9 <M M 3 3 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 2 13 3 >M M 3 3 1 1 1 1 5 5 2 2 12 2
Source:: Compiled from secondary data ('Secteur CARDER' and USPP, Union of producers for the five
sub-prefectures;; 1992-97)
Note:: M stands for the annual median (cf. annexe E or table 5.2)
Tablee 5.6: Evolution of per capita quantity of insecticide (litres) purchases following different territorial levels
inn the Couffo region, 1992-97.
Aplahoue e Djakotomey y
Dogbo o Klouékanmè è
Toviklin n Alll villages of the sample
Couffoo region Mono-Couffoo region 1992-93 3 .54 4 NA A NA A NA A NA A .20 0 NA A NA A 1993-94 4 .06 6 .08 8 .06 6 .11 1 .05 5 .30 0 .07 7 NA A 1994-95 5 .38 8 .08 8 .09 9 .16 6 .03 3 .14 4 .16 6 NA A 1995-96 6 .44 4 .07 7 .00 0 .18 8 .03 3 .17 7 .16 6 .05 5 1996-97 7 .37 7 .09 9 .06 6 .17 7 .03 3 .15 5 .16 6 .07 7
Source:: compiled from secondary data (USPP; CARDER; INSAE/ MPAE 1994) Note:: NA stands for no data available
Tablee 5.6 indicates the evolution of per capita quantity of insecticides purchased between 1992 andd 1997. As for fertilisers, the overall trends between different territorial levels are the same. However,, the drop in the purchases observed in 1994 persisted in contrast to the fertiliser case. Thiss may'be due to the persistence of alternative practices and ^parallel segment for insecticides inn the input market.
ComparingComparing trends of fertiliser and insecticide purchases through the GVs
Onee important observation concerning the purchasing trends of both fertilisers and insecticides, ass described above, is their divergent pattern. For instance, the calculated medians for fertiliser purchasess have steadily increased between 1992 and 1997 (see table 5.3), whereas medians for insecticidee purchases have stagnated (see table 5.5). A tentative explanation of the stagnation in thee purchases of insecticides may be traced back to the phasing-out of subsidy on agricultural inputss from 1992 onward and the compound effect of the currency devaluation in 1994. As to the devaluationn argument, the increase in the input price is twofold, further curtailing farmers' demandd for imported agricultural inputs. With respect to fertilisers, however, the apparent increasee in the purchases (cf. also table 5.4) challenges the subsidy and devaluation arguments. Onn the contrary, Koudokpon (1991) anticipated the increasing need for fertiliser inputs for diversee food crops. In addition, the drastic reduction or even suppression of parallel channels for substantiall imports of fertilisers from Nigeria in the 1990s is another explanatory variable (cf. LARESS 1996). Therefore, because of the limited supply from the so-called parallel channels, farmerss demand more fertilisers on the formal market, regardless of the financial constraints. Withh respect to insecticides, the stagnation of purchases observed is due to the retreat of cotton producerss and the entry of more marginal users such as cowpea and vegetable crop growers. The resultingg trends are location specific, the decline in the purchases of insecticides is mainly circumscribedd to the Lontty Savannah, while the increase is on the Plateau Aja and the alluvial zonee in Klouékanmè, where cowpea and vegetable crops are especially grown.
Withh respect to the trends observed, the sub-prefectures with a high profile in GV-membershipp keep the lion* s share in the increases in fertiliser purchases after the reforms, while purchasess in the other sub-prefectures stagnate. Aplahoué is such a high profile sub-prefecture, andd so is Djakotomey, though to a lesser extent With respect to insecticides, Djakotomey radicallyy shows a reversed trend as compared to that for fertilisers, whereas the other four sub-prefecturess embrace almost the same pattern as for fertilisers during at least half of the period underr consideration.
5.1.35.1.3 Farmers' participation and cotton output
Wee shall stress from the outset that the agricultural input services, as these operated both before andd after the reforms, have invariably been oriented to the promotion of cotton. It then makes littlee difference matching people's participation in collective action with their adherence to the cottonn goals. Below, the results of cotton production will be contrasted with people's participationn in farmers' organisations.
Accordingg to table 5.7, which gives the per GV-member cotton output between 1992 and 1997,, the sub-prefecture of Djakotomey illustrates reversed trends compared to the membership
figuresfigures in table 5.2. Over the period from 1992 to 1997, the number of villages producing more thann the annual medians is greater than the number of villages with GV-membership above the
correspondingg annual medians. Some contrasted trends are also observed in Dogbo. In the latter, whilee most of the GVs have a membership well above the annual medians, they produce less thann the corresponding annual medians.
Thee sub-prefecture of Klouékanmè, on the other hand, experienced drops in membership ass well as in cotton output figures during the period between 1992 and 1997. Similar patterns are alsoo observed in Aplahoué and Toviklin, though the two trends are in opposite directions. While
Aplahouéé keeps a high profile, with most villages (six out of seven villages) above the annual medianss of both GV-membership and per GV-member cotton output, Toviklin exhibits a low profile,, with most villages (five out of six for membership against six for cotton production) beloww both respective medians.
Tablee 5.7: Breakdown of a sample of villages following per GV-member cotton output in five sub-prefectures of the
Couffoo region, 1992-97. Sub-prefectures s (Numberr of villages) ) Aplahoué é (N=77 villages) Djakotomey y (N=77 villages) Dogbo o (N=66 villages) Klouékanmè è (N=88 villages) Toviklin n (N=66 villages) Total l (N=344 villages) 1992-93 3 (^i=332Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 =M M 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 4 4 12 2 >M M 5 5 3 3 --4 --4 --12 2 1993-94 4 (Nfc=360Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 =M M --2 --2 3 3 3 3 4 4 12 2 >M M 6 6 3 3 --3 --3 --12 2 1994-95 5 (M^^ 338 Kg) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 10 0 =M M --2 --2 3 3 3 3 4 4 12 2 >M M 6 6 3 3 --2 --2 1 1 12 2 1995-96 6 (Nfc=258Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 10 0 =M M --3 --3 3 3 3 3 3 3 12 2 >M M 6 6 2 2 --3 --3 1 1 12 2 1996-97 7 (M=350Kg) ) No o 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 9 9 =M M --1 --1 4 4 4 4 4 4 13 3 >M M 6 6 4 4 --2 --2 --12 2
Source:: Compiled from secondary data CSecteur CARDER' and USPP, Union of producers for the five
sub-prefectures;; 1992-97)
Note:: M stands for the annual median (cf. annexe E, or table 5.2)
Graphh 5.1 indicates the evolution of per capita cotton output according to three territorial levelss between 1992 and 1997. The results confirm that the sample of villages hold the lead forr cotton output in the respective sub-prefectures. The top line is that of Aplahoué, which leadss with a ratio of one to three the average per capita cotton output for the five sub-prefecturess taken altogether. More importantly, all four remaining sub-prefectures have lower perr capita cotton output compared to the group average over the period under consideration. But,, Toviklin and sometimes Klouékanmè show lower profile than the regional average.
Withh respect to GV-membership, cotton output is rather disappointing in Toviklin. Trie argumentt derives from the inter-connection between GV-membership, the promotion of cotton andd government intervention in agriculture. The sub-prefecture of Toviklin has a longstanding traditionn of good linkages with external actors. For instance, Toviklin seems very prolific in the nurturingg of farmers' organisations as compared to its counterparts (cf. table 3.5 in chapter 3; CARDER-Monoo 1996). But on the GV-membership side, this sub-prefecture drags behind. More importantly,, it carries the lowest figures relative to effective participation such as purchases of inputss and sales of cotton output compared to its counterparts.
Drawingg from tables 5.2 through 5.6, in certain sub-prefectures the ratios of per capita GV-membershipp overrate those of per capita purchases of agricultural inputs in general. This is to claimm that GV-membership has become a make-up for selling cotton produce, whereas the purchasee of inputs is not on the agenda. Conversely, in other sub-prefectures the ratios of per capitaa GV-membership underrate those of per capita purchases of agricultural inputs. This is to claimm that agricultural inputs outreach the cotton belt As it appears below, this aggregate view turnss out to be misleading as far as social processes are concerned. This prompts to the necessary crosscheckk with more micro-level information set. In other words, people's participation will be
discussedd not only in terms of their adherence to the organisational ideal, but also in terms of theirr evaluation of the process.
Graphh 5.1: Evolution of per capita cotton output at different territorial levels in the Couffo region, 1992-Legend:: 1= sample of villages; 2= Aplahoué; 3= Djakotomey; 4= Dogbo; 5= Klouékanmè; 6= Toviklin;
7== all five sub-prefectures; 8= Mono-Couffo region.
5.22 An analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) of
collectivecollective action in the distribution of the agricultural input services
Thee SWOT analysis will entail people's evaluation of the distribution of agricultural input services.. Two dimensions are considered, the first one dealing with the internal strengths and weaknessess of the distribution, and the second concerning itself with opportunities and threats fromm the external environment.
Inn chapters 3 and 4, it was argued that rural people make use of three different channels for agriculturall inputs. The formal channel has been extensively discussed and its underlying constraintss spelled out in chapter 4. It was also assumed that not all the blame should be put on thee government's agricultural policy reforms. Equally relevant in understanding the disappointingg results are the structural characteristics of rural people. Below, aspects relative to farmers'' perception of different input channels will be presented in the absence of quantitative measuringg of the breadth of the resources at stake.
5.2.15.2.1 Strengths and weaknesses of the distribution of agricultural input services
Farmers'' perception of the formal channel of the agricultural input market before and after the reforms s
Tablee 5.8 sums up respondents' critical perception of the functioning of the agricultural input markett at the sub-prefecture level before and after the reforms. We shall first clarify some conceptss that will be extensively used in this section.
Thee concept of revealed needs derives from that respondents are in a position to make thee choice to purchase agricultural inputs after evaluating their interests in the cotton scheme andd the set of alternatives they face. However, it is instructive to point out that the choice of cottonn is triggered not only by the credit on inputs, but also more importantly by the cash revenues,, which may be derived. More often, farmers resort to agricultural input not because off cotton, but because of the lack of alternative sources for agricultural inputs. Needs are said too be satisfied if farmers perceive no spatial, organisational and cost friction infringing on theirr access to agricultural inputs. In reality, there is always some friction, but farmers seem to overemphasisee primarily friction related to costs, and secondarily spatial and organisational friction.. Maintaining contacts, on the other hand, derives from the willingness of certain farmerss to try again after dissatisfaction. For those farmers who were initially satisfied, maintainingg contact is just a logical option.
Tablee 5.8: Distribution (%) of respondents according to their revealed needs, needs satisfied, and contacts with thee agricultural input services before (Be.) and after (Af.) the reforms in five sub-prefectures of the Couffoo region, 1996-97. Sub-prefectures s Themes s Revealedd needs Needss satisfied Maintainn contacts Aplahoué é (N=355) ) Be. . 95 5 87 7 93 3 Af. . 95 5 12 2 15 5 Djakotomey y (N=383) ) Be. . 95 5 93 3 93 3 Af. . 95 5 90 0 91 1 Dogbo o (N=319) ) Be. . 81 1 74 4 76 6 Af. . 81 1 70 0 71 1 Klouékanmè è (N=347) ) Be. . 88 8 86 6 86 6 Af. . 88 8 14 4 13 3 Toviklin n (N=233) ) Be. . 89 9 87 7 89 9 Af. . 89 9 37 7 38 8
Source:: Compiled from survey data, 1996-97.
Withh respect to the revealed needs, the difference between the five sub-prefectures is not that muchh noticeable; this ranges from 81 per cent of total respondents in Dogbo to 95 per cent in bothh Aplahoué and Djakotomey. The results illustrate that most respondents were not only aware off the formal agricultural input services, but they also revealed their needs for agricultural inputs att least once in the past.
Concerningg needs satisfied, large shares of respondents with revealed needs claimed satisfactionn before the reforms, though not all of them were satisfied. The level of satisfaction, however,, drastically declined after the reforms. The underlying rationale will be pursued in the nextt section.
Withh respect to respondents who maintained their contacts with the input services, their ratioss are commensurate with the levels of satisfaction in each of the five sub-prefectures. However,, striking is that the ratios of respondents who maintained contacts are greater than those off satisfied respondents. This suggests either coercion or a genuine willingness to try again.
Thee results in table 5.8 reveal a high exit option between the before and after situations. As such,, the results help explain the diverging trends between GV-membership in certain villages andd effective participation through purchasing inputs and selling cotton output. In general, more respondentss hardly adjust to new conditions brought about by the reforms because of widespread dissatisfaction.. However, fairly stable levels of satisfaction are observed before and after the reformss in two sub-prefectures, Djakotomey and Dogbo. The subsequent arguments will be developedd below.
Tablee 5.9 indicates people's perception of the distribution of agricultural input services at thee village level. It presents the distribution of a sample of villages in four quartiles according to thee revealed needs of respondents, and whether or not the latter were satisfied, and whether or
nott they maintained contacts with the formal distribution channels. Before discussing the results, wee shall clarify the use of quartiles (cf. annexe E). Within the row defined for each of the five sub-prefectures,, the four quartiles are arranged in ascendant order from the bottom up. The lowestt quartile corresponds to villages with negligible weight regarding the attribute under considerationn while the highest quartile refers to a high profile.
Tablee 5.9' Breakdown of a sample of villages according to quartiles of respondents for their revealed needs,
needss satisfied, and contacts with the agricultural input services before (Be.) and after (Af.) the reforms in fivefive sub-prefectures of the Couffo region, 1996-97.
Themess Ouartiles Revealed d Needs s Needs s Satisfied d Maintain n contacts s 75%<X<100% % 50%<X<75% % 75%<X<100% % 50%<X<75% % <KX<25% % 75%<X<100% % 50%<X<75% 50%<X<75% 25%<X<50% % 0<X<25% % Aplahoué é N=77 (5123) Be. . 7 7 7 7 7 7 Af. . 7 7 1 1 6 6 Djakotomey y N=7(55;46) ) Be. . 7 7 7 7 11 [ 7 66 ! -Af. . 7 7 7 7 7 7 Dogbo o N=6(53;46) ) Be. . 4 4 2 2 6 6 6 6 Af. . 4 4 2 2 5 5 1 1 Klouékanmè è N=8(43;57) ) Be.. ! 7 7 1 1 8 8 55 | 8 11 | -Af. . 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 Toviklin n N=6(39;37) ) Be. . 6 6 6 6 11 | 6 11 ! !! 6 1 -Af. . 6 6 1 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 1 !! 3
Source:: Compiled from survey data, 1996-97.
Notes-- N stands for the number of villages per sub-prefecture; (a;b) stands respectively for the average number off respondents per village in the sub-prefecture and the relative standard deviation; X stands for the first, second, thirdd and fourth quartiles.
Regardingg the revealed needs, in the samples of villages from Aplahoué, Djakotomey and Toviklinn both before and after the reforms respondents unanimously declared having expressed theirr needs for agricultural input services. In the other two sub-prefectures, Dogbo and Klouékanmè,, respondents also declared having expressed needs for inputs, but to a lesser extent. Yet,, all surveyed villages from both sub-prefectures are clustered in the highest two quartiles.
Withh respect to satisfied needs, respondents' perception in general is more unanimous amongstt the sample of villages from Aplahoué, Djakotomey and Dogbo compared to those in Klouékanmèè and Toviklin. More importantly, imanimity of views in all villages of the sample is moree pronounced before the reforms than after. The average rates of satisfaction per village are spreadd over three quartiles in Toviklin, while almost all villages of Aplahoué and Klouékanmè aree clustered in the lowest quartile, suggesting high rates of dissatisfaction during the post-reform eraa (cf. table 5.9). Respondents from villages in both Djakotomey and Dogbo strikingly expressedd indifference to the post-reform distribution of agricultural input services, contrasting withh the more general perception of dissatisfaction. These results seem to imply location-specific constraints,, as most villages of the last two sub-prefectures are located at the edge of the Couffo regionn and very accessible from the regional capital centre (Lokossa), while the other three are land-locked.. However, as it becomes clear below, reasons other than spatial friction are claimed byy most respondents to hinder the distribution of agricultural input services.
Concerningg people's willingness to maintain contacts with the formal input services, the observedd rates are commensurate with those of people' satisfaction. These results corroborate thosee found in table 5.8. More villages of Aplahoué and Klouékanmè exhibit a very low profile forr exit after the reforms compared to their counterparts in the other sub-prefectures.
People'sPeople's perception of the constraints impinging on the formal channel of the agricultural input market market
Tabless 5.10 and 5.11 translate people's perception of the constraints impinging on the distributionn of agricultural input services beforee and after the reforms.
Tablee 5.10: Distribution (%) of a sample of household-heads according to their perceived constraints on the
distributionn of agricultural input services before and after the reforms in five sub-prefectures of the Couffoo region (1996-97). Aplahoué é (N=355) ) Djakotomey y (N=383) ) Dogbo o (N=319) ) Klouékanmè è (N=347) ) Toviklin n (N=233) ) Couffoo region (N=1637) ) Noo constraint Beforee \ After 73 3 69 9 62 2 52 2 65 5 63 3 3 3 6 6 18 8 8 8 11 1 9 9 Spatiall Constraint Before e 2 2 1 1 1 1 After r 1 1 1 1 4 4 3 3 2 2 Costt constraint Beforee ! After 1 1 2 2 7 7 9 9 5 5 5 5 96 6 87 7 74 4 92 2 85 5 87 7 Organisational l constraint t Before e 26 6 29 9 29 9 39 9 29 9 31 1 After r --6 --6 4 4 _ _ 1 1 !! 2
Source:: compiled from survey data (1996-97)
Tablee 5.11: Breakdown of a sample of villages according to quartiles of respondents for their perceived
constraintss on the distribution of agricultural input services before and after the reforms in five sub-prefecturess of the Couffo region (1996-97).
Aplahoué é Djakotomey y Dogbo o Klouékanmè è Toviklin n 75%<X<100% % 50%<X£75% % 25%<X<50% % 0<X^25% % 75%<X<100% % 50%<X<75% % 25%<X£50% % (XX<£25% % 75%<X£100% % 50%<X£75% % 25%<X<S0% 25%<X<S0% 0<X£25% % 75%<X£100% % 50%<X<75% % 25%<X<50% 25%<X<50% 0<X=25% % 75%<X£100% % 50%<X<£75% % 25%<X£50% % <XX£25% % Noo constraint Be.. : 1 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 2 2 1 1 4 4 1 1 Af. . 7 7 7 7 6 6 ;; 8
ii 6
Spatial l constraint t Be.. 7 7 7 7 6 6 8 8 6 6 Af. . 7 7 7 7 6 6 :: 8ii 6
Costt constraint Be.. ! 77 ' 7 7 6 6 1 1 7 7 « « Af. . 7 7 7 7 3 3 2 2 1 1 !! 7 1 1 jj 5 1 1 Organisation n constraint t Be.. ! 3 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 2 2 1 1 5 5 2 2 3 3 3 3 Af. . 7 7 7 7 6 6 :: 8ii 6
Source:: compiled from survey data (1996-97)Duringg the pre-reform era, most respondents considered not having any constraints as inputs couldd be purchased on credit at the farm gate (cf. table 5.10). Recall that, during the 1980s the extensionn service, which usually distributed agricultural inputs, had a fair coverage with a ratio off one field extension officer to two villages (see table 4.2 in chapter 4). More importantly, the costt constraint on access to agricultural inputs was relieved through government subsidy and an overvaluedd local currency. Yet, respondents admitted that such a distribution system hinges muchh on the personal characteristics of each village-level extension agent. For instance, around 311 per cent of all respondents claimed that field extension officers lacked communication skills, andd used to keep a high profile before the agricultural policy reforms. This may explain why respondentss claim that organisational constraints were relevant before the reforms.
Duringg the post-reform era, the ratios of respondents who perceived no constraints on their accesss to inputs significantiy dropped. Regarding the cost constraint, people's allegation that it appliess with greater extent in the aftermath of the reforms (87 per cent of respondents) compared too the pre-reform situation (5 per cent of respondents) may be right; there is no evidence to the contraryy (cf. table 4.5 in chapter 4). The driving costs also subvert the roles of other relevant constraints,, organisational as well as spatial. Organisational aspects of the distribution, on the otherr hand, significantly improved during the post-reform period. However, it seems enigmatic howw the private firms at both the national and the regional level, and farmers' organisations at the locall level, have easily swept the organisational grievances of the pre-reform period away. Recall thatt the former cotton-biased agricultural credit remains after the reforms. In addition, discriminationn currently applies against non GV-members. Furthermore, most arrangements undulyy made with field extension officers on the basis of personal relationship have drastically beenn phased out (Tossou 1996). Consequently, it could be inferred that organisational constraints persist,, although these are obscured by the driving cost-effects of the reforms. The private outlets forr the sale of agricultural inputs are located only in the sub-prefecture capital centres, away from villagess with a high demand for inputs. Therefore, farmers who do not have the time, the contactss or the experience to make such a journey to the sub-prefecture centre are certainly compelledd to resort to the parallel channel of the input market.
Tablee 5.11 portrays the distribution of samples of villages following four quartiles of perceivedd constraints rates before and after the reforms. Whereas the rates of respondents per villagee of the sample sub-prefectures perceiving no constraint on the formal input market are distributedd over three and more quartiles before the reforms, these are clustered in the lowest quartilee after the reforms. Contrasting with expectations, for the perceived spatial constraint all villagess are clustered in the lowest quartile both before and after the reforms. Clustering in the lowestt quartile also applies for organisational constraints after the reforms, though the situation beforee the reforms is rather discriminating. The clustering of villages further applies to cost constraints.. Yet, both before and after the reforms the situations are quite incompatible. Whereas forr the rates of perceived cost constraints all villages are clustered in the lowest quartile before thee reforms, they are clustered in the highest quartile after.
Thee agricultural policy reforms brought about some unexpected institutional perversion withh people's increasing recourse to the community input system and the parallel channel Thee driving cost constraint implied by the reforms and the subsequent devaluation of the CFA francfranc are, among other things, the root-causes propelling people to resort to the parallel
channelchannel as well as the community input system.
Abovee all, household characteristics seem to influence the level of utilisation. For instance,, membership in a self-help labour party group may assist or hinder the utilisation of certainn agricultural inputs. As discussed in earlier chapters, some social networks and their culturall legacy may be specific to certain ethnic communities, but not to others. They may be spatiallyy determined as well, for instance, self-help labour party groups more or less hinge on landd availability for agriculture, hence on the population-land ratios. In the south of the
Couffoo region, the Plateau Aja zone, where population pressure is high, there are less
self-helphelp labour party groups with a vocation in agricultural works than in the north. The
complexityy of the social processes involved with spatial as well as economic factors is such thatt any single variable is unfit to capture their quintessence. For instance, perception obtainedd from one household-head may seriously diverge from that of the whole household, becausee of the plural decision-making units. Consequently, it might be instructive to keep sightt of these weaknesses.
5.2.25.2.2 Opportunities and threats from the external environment concerning the distribution of agriculturalagricultural input services
AA geographical explanation follows the involvement in cotton and the possibility of agricultural credit.. Villagers with specialisation in crops other than cotton may need to acquire by themselves inputss such as insecticides for cowpea and vegetables and fertilisers for grain crops. In addition too the specific strength and weaknesses deriving from the distribution of agricultural input servicess and farmers* personal characteristics, there are relevant features from the external environmentt that influence farmers' adherence to the reforms.
People'sPeople's perception of the parallel channel of the agricultural input market
Tablee 5.12 displays the rates of recourse to the parallel channel of the input market. The overalll rate of recourse for the sample of villages in all five sub-prefectures is moderate (54 perr cent). But, sub-prefecture-wise, the rate is low in Djakotomey (36 per cent) and Dogbo (466 per cent), moderate in Aplahoué (51 per cent), and high in Toviklin (70 per cent) and Klouékanmèè (73 per cent). Regarding people's perceived advantage of the parallel channel thee cost advantage is overriding. The rationale is that inputs from this channel are of dubious qualityy (Dèdèhouanou and Quarles van Ufford 2000). Yet, differences are observed from one sub-prefecturee to the other. Whereas the cost advantage leads people to recourse to this channell in Aplahoué (46 per cent), Djakotomey (23 per cent) and Klouékanmè (49 per cent), thee organisational advantage takes the lead in Dogbo (28 per cent) and Toviklin (35 per cent).
Tablee 5.12: Distribution (%) of respondents according to their recourse to and perceived advantages of the parallelparallel channel of the input market in five sub-prefectures of the Couffo region (1996-97)
Recoursee to the parallel channell of the input
market t Spatiall advantage Costt advantage Organisationall advantage Aplahoué é (N=301) ) 51 1 --46 6 6 6 Djakotomey y (N== 335) 36 6 --23 3 13 3 Dogbo o (N=273) ) 46 6 --18 8 28 8 Klouékanmè è (N=292) ) Toviklin n (N== 189) 733 70 11 2 499 33 233 35 Couffoo region (N== 1390) 54 4 --34 4 19 9
Source:: Computed from survey data (1996-97)
Note:: N stands for the number of household-heads surveyed. (%) is calculated in relation with the total number
off household-heads surveyed: Answers are exclusive and only respondents with affirmative recourse to the
parallelparallel channel are recorded for their perceived advantage.
Accordingg to table 5.12, the fact that the sub-prefectures with less cotton score high in farmers' recoursee to the parallel channel reveals the bias of the reforms towards cotton crop. It should be notedd that the issue of the parallel channel is not novel. However, this channel increasingly evolvedd after the reforms. This may be explained by the absence of formal sales outlets at the villagee and even commune levels. Apart from the seasonal distribution by private firms of pre-orderedd inputs at the sub-prefecture level, individual purchases in cash that were formerly guaranteedd by the field extension officers, have been phased out in the aftermath of the reforms.
People'ss perception of the community input system
Accordingg to table 5.13, the overall rate of recourse to the community input system is high for thee Couffo region, contrasting with the rate of recourse to the parallel channel (73 per cent againstt 54 per cent). The rate of recourse is moderate in only one sub-prefecture, Toviklin (57 perr cent), while it is high in the other four sub-prefectures. Concerning the perceived advantagee of the community input system, the cost advantage is paramount whereas distance andd organisational advantages are insignificant.
Thee community input system seems to be of marginal importance to the cotton scheme. Farmerss generally rely on the formal input services for seeds, insecticides and fertilisers. Yet, initiall land fertility and self-produced organic manure may prompt farmers to forego expensivee mineral fertilisers.
Concerningg the rationale for purchasing inputs through the parallel channel, the driving factorr is cost. Organisation matters as well, but to a minor extent. This confirms the conclusion drawnn above that local differentiation may result from concerns other than costs. For organisationall concerns, delineation is observed between villages from the Plateau Aja (four sub-prefectures)) and those of the Lonkly Savannah (Aplahoué). Equally relevant is the cost advantagee perceived by farmers within the latter villages as opposed to the former villages. Villagess of Aplahoué in the neighbourhood of Togo, with the trans-border informal trade, perceivee better opportunities from the parallel channel. It should be stressed that the cost constraintt argument between purchasing in Togo or in Benin is not always true. Farmers are very awaree of the trade-off between certified costly agricultural inputs and materials of dubious qualityy from the parallel channel. However, sou fertility decline, pest management and the quest forr new materials force them to resort to the parallel channel in the presence of high exchange-relatedd costs impinging on their access to the formal channel.
Tablee 5.13: Distribution (%) of respondents according to their recourse to and perceived advantages of
communityy input system in five sub-prefectures of the Couffo region (1996-97)
Recoursee to the communityy input system
Spatiall advantage Costt advantage Organisationall advantage Aplahoué é (N== 301) 84 4 _ _ 82 2 2 2 Djakotomey y (N== 335) 77 7 --75 5 2 2 Dogbo o (N=273) ) 72 2 --71 1 1 1 Klouékanmè è (N=292) ) 70 0 --66 6 1 1 Toviklin n (N== 189) 57 7 1 1 57 7 --Couffoo region (N== 1390) 73 3 --71 1 1 1
Source:: Computed from survey data (1996-97)
Note:: N stands for the number of surveyed household-heads; (%) is calculated in relation with the total number
off surveyed household-heads: Answers are exclusive and only respondents with affirmative recourse to the
communitycommunity input system are recorded.
People'ss utilisation of agricultural inputs entails a seasonal as well as a spatial variability. Concerningg the seasonal variability, climatic as well as occupational variations notably influencee people's demand and the supply channels. More importantly, there are growing
parallelparallel channels where unanticipated demand is high and supply is skewed. Regarding the
spatiall variability, the formal supply channel is cotton-related. Therefore, where demand is expressedd for inputs outside the cotton scheme, there is a likelihood of a growing parallel
channelchannel Contrary to expectations, distance constitutes a real friction to the parallel channel
althoughh cotton farm sizes may increase with distance from the sub-prefecture centre. At largerr distances from the formal input outlet, where relatively large farms exist, more recourse too the community input system may compensate for the formal channel.
Cashh earnings in the cotton sector influence people's utility functions and preferences to aa great extent. It was found that participation in farmers' organisations, the GVs, hardly influencess the purchases of agricultural inputs. Recall also that only cotton output is the top goall of farmers' involvement in the distribution of the agricultural input services. In the absencee of a reliable rural financial market, the cash-earning goal derives from a number of advantagess of the cotton scheme. In fact, this scheme guarantees yearly cash earnings for individuall farmers. In addition, cash earnings accrue to village communities for collective investmentt purposes.
5.2.35.2.3 Is integration of grassroots and formal farmers' organisations feasible?
Thiss sub-section will draw from the great potentials of grassroots organisations involved in securingg agricultural input services for their members in the Couffo region, and numerous conflictss impinging on their adaptation to the new strategy for the distribution of agricultural inputt services.
Itt was found earlier that, in the aftermath of the agricultural reforms increasingly higher numberss of farmers are dissatisfied. As a result, their recourse to the parallel channel as well as too the community input system has sharply escalated. We argue below that farmer's recourse to suchh alternatives derives from the failure to induce their loyalty to formal organisations.
Farmers'Farmers' structural characteristics
Ann extensive coverage of the existing local organisations and their variants in the Couffo region hass been drawn up to prepare the ground for the following discussion (cf. chapter 2). In essence, twoo broadly defined types of local organisations will be considered below. The first is a labour co-operativee type of organisation, namely the self-help group. The second, on the other hand, is moree oriented towards financial resources, the saving and credit group. Ass was already argued, memberss of both types of organisation are bound for their anticipated reciprocity to manage resourcess for production purposes. However, the delineating lines between those rural organisationss are hard to draw. This readily offers room for manoeuvre within the intricate processs of development intervention.
Theree is also no doubt that leaders play their part in the leverage required for collective action.. But, the present analysis draws from the decision-making process for collective action andd from the perspective of development intervention. As argued in the literature, the territorial levell of intervention matters as the resources and more importantly the institutions will differ fromm one level to the other (Hoffman 1989). Therefore, a comparative analysis of people's membershipp in different types of organisations might help explain the unavoidable overlap betweenn the various institutional goals.
Graphh 5.2 sketches people's participation in self-help and saving and credit groups. Regardingg people's membership in the self-help labour party groups, this apparently shows the samee picture as for GV-membership. It provides ground for understanding whether or not the interventionn process also triggers people's enthusiasm. The integration in the market through the cottonn scheme and the incentive to produce more cotton with minimal use of modern agricultural inputss have bearings on the differentiation between villages with relatively common backgrounds.. Such a process has been reported in Ghana, where many local organisations are createdd for furthering cocoa planting (Hansen 1992). However, it should be pointed out that the choicee for self-help groups in agriculture is biased towards the availability of resources of the landd type. Therefore, this organisation is more grounded in the Lonklty Savannah than in the highlyy populated Plateau Aja. Although land availability is higher in the alluvial zones of Klouékanmè,, villages from this zone have low profiles due to their hesitant involvement in the cottonn sector (cf. tables 5.1 through 5.7).
Withh respect to the local saving and credit groups, a reverse trend to that of the self-help
labourlabour party groups in general is observed. The cotton villages are relatively worse off because
off the seasonal nature of cash payments, which make the scheme odd for reciprocity. This processs may indicate a good balance as most saving and credit groups intervene in development investments,, especially agricultural investments in the absence of full-fledged rural financial institutionss (van den Brink and Chavas 1997; Lemarchand 1989).
Thee creation and nurturing of organisations appears to be spatially distributed for one reasonn or another. The case of Aplahoué highlights further people's involvement in organisations andd henceforth, collective action. The next two sub-prefectures, Djakotomey and Dogbo, score fairlyy below 50 per cent for both types of local organisations. The last two sub-prefectures, on thee other hand, score very low for self-help groups while exhibiting high scores for saving and creditt groups.
Givenn the relative importance of local organisations and their stated goals in the agriculturall sector, an inquiry into people's participation in both local and formal organisations willl enlighten the prospects for inter-organisational co-operation or competition.
IsIs integration between grassroots organisations and formal farmers' organisations a feasible solution? solution?
Ann applied definition of integration implies an association of initially differentiated organisationall interfaces, operating in the same line of activities or in complementary activities. Thee essence of integration supposes an institutional arrangement that administers originally dispersedd activities under the same organisational unit. The overlaps of membership between government-initiatedd GVs and the existing grassroots organisations, self-help and saving and
Thee prospects of integration will be considered by drawing from the evidence substantiated inn graph 5.3. The graph reads as follows. The calculated index is the ratio between the overlap in membershipp of the GVs and each type of the two grassroots organisations and the initial size of membershipp in the latter. From the graph, it can be derived that high overlaps exist in Aplahoué andd Djakotomey, while the other three sub-prefectures present low overlaps. For instance, despitee the concomitant low participation in self-help labour party groups and GVs in Toviklin, membershipp of the two groups hardly overlaps. This may suggest that both types of organisations aree involved in different agricultural activities. The case of the saving and credit organisations is evenn worse; these organisations exhibit a much higher profile compared to the self-help organisationss in Toviklin, Klouékanmè and Dogbo.
Itt should be acknowledged that the results displayed in the graphs represent only one shot off the organisational process and do little justice to its past and future outcomes. Furthermore, thee spatial differentiation observed may evolve in any direction. The underlying dynamics may certainlyy be influenced by both policy and people' structural characteristics.
Assessingg the overlaps of membership between locally and externally initiated organisationss is not novel. A great deal of the participatory literature claims an integration of an implicitt kind between local and intervention-led organisations (Hansen 1992). The interest and thee belief in the two local organisations improving or altering people's participation in GVs stems fromm some substantiated empirical evidence that they all share the same concerns, as their memberss try to realise agricultural production goals through adequate input services. Respondentss substantiate cases of local organisations providing financial support for their members.. The experiences are, however, flawed with many conflicts. The nature of these conflictss and their extent will be discussed below.
ConflictingConflicting strategies between formal and grassroots organisations
Thee figures on people's participation in both types of rural organisations inspire the relevant questionn of whether the choice is between participate or notl Or rather participate to what
extenfiextenfi The latter question is in line with the benefit to be obtained from participating in each
typee of organisation. Although most organisations are entrusted with some aspects of resource controll and output distribution, they may fundamentally differ in their approach to risk minimisation.. We argue here that there is room to foster the institutional environment for people'ss genuine efforts to adapt grassroots organisations to new goals, courses of action and resourcee allocation. The remainder of this section will document empirical practices in this respectt and the subsequent conflicts, focusing on the adaptation process within both local and formall organisations. In other words, the institutional constraints frustrating people's efforts to takee advantage of development opportunities will be discussed.
Regardingg the physical as well as the monetary flows, the national marketing board (SONAPRA)) determines how much to distribute and in which region (Badiane et al. 1997; Soule 1996).. This suggests clashes between formal and traditional claims on resource control and distribution.. However, the evidence substantiated earlier about the overlap between formal and locall organizations, and the claim that both types of organisation are usually run by the same leaders,, suggests some level of adaptation (cf. Vodouhê 1996). For instance, local organisations aree giving credit to their members for acquiring agricultural inputs, while the traditional ways of mediatingg conflicts are increasingly used within the GVs (see Box 5.1).
Drawingg from utility functions and preferences in Economics, people's membership in formal andd grassroots organisations may certainly be driven by the principle of multi-purpose choice. Forr instance, membership of self-help organisations combined with membership of a GV may helpp ensure performance in cotton output, henceforth good cotton revenues. In the same vein, membershipp of saving and credit organisations combined with membership of a GV may help ensuree a better use of cotton revenues through improved saving and investment channels. In addition,, the possibility of complementing inputs obtained through GV-channels for cotton withh those obtained from cash purchases for other crops may ensure an adequate diversificationn of farming activities.
Abovee all, household characteristics are reported to have bearings on the purchases and usee of agricultural inputs. For instance, membership of different social networks may assist or hinderr the entitlement to certain types of inputs. The integration process documented earlier exposess some weaknesses. More importantly, the possibility of integration between the GVs and thee so-called grassroots organisations is slim because of two obvious reasons. The first reason, whichh was stated earlier, derives from the difficulties to adapt the resulting organisations to two setss of rules and norms, modem and traditional. The second reason stems from the absence of explicitt articulation between both types of organisations. It should be pointed out from the outset thatt the debate is oriented towards the necessary adaptation of the intervening institutions to the existingg institutional settings of most rural communities and not the reverse. The agricultural policyy reforms are not necessarily flawed. Besides, no misapplication of the intervention measuress by farmers is claimed. Their transitory mistakes, so it seems, may certainly be internalisedd in their quest for fostering the local social and economic resilience. Furthermore, the pluralityy of decision-making units within households suggests that the results presented in tables 5.88 through 5.13 and graphs 5.2 through 5.3 may be scaled up or down, given the structure of intra-householdd decision-making with respect to the distribution of agricultural input services.
BoxBox 5.1: Innovative interactions between formal and grassroots organisations
Withh respect to grassroots organisations, at least in three villages out of the thirty-four surveyed, fannerss substantiate cases of saving and credit organisations giving credit to their members (a total off nineteen members received credit during the 1996-97 agricultural labour season). Although the numberr of cases and beneficiaries is apparently modest compared to the sample size, it rather illustratess that the so-called local organisations and the GVs share the same goal. In addition, those casess are relatively distributed over three different sub-prefectures. We know that collateral means aree relevant to credit. Striking, however, is the diversity of the means of collateral, ranging from oil palmm plantation to land resources. The contracting farmers also confirm their agreements in the presencee of a third party whose role is to guarantee fairness.
Twelvee cases of village-level conflicts have been documented for both grassroots and formal farmers'' organisations, six cases for each. Overall, twelve villages distributed over four sub-prefecturess are concerned with those conflicts. The six conflicting cases involving grassroots organisationss mainly concern default equity payment, while the other six, linked up with the formal organizations,, are equally distributed over two cases of default credit payment, two cases of default
contributioncontribution of labour or in kind, and two cases of leadership conflict. However, the process of conflictt resolution has not followed an even pattern. Contrary to expectations, members of local
organisationss have resorted more to external authorities, there have been two cases of local administrativee council and two cases of rural security forces or gendarmes, rather than relying on internall mediation. Only two cases of mediation have been initiated. Members of formal organisations,, on the other hand, have resorted more to mediation than to external intervention. Theree have been two cases of internal mediation and two cases of village elders stepping in the resolutionn of conflicts, and only two cases of external intervention.
Followingg both patterns of conflict resolution, success and failure are also commensurate withh the level of ambivalence. For external interventions, there are five cases when defaulters have endedd up with a loss of property rights on land or other valuable assets, and one case, which has not beenn successfully settled. To the contrary effects, internal mediation has achieved better outcomes fromm the villagers* point of view, two cases of exclusion from the group, one case of fine and two casess of negotiated agreements. The last conflict involving Kugbe, a grassroots organisation with a highh level of ramifications outside the village and even the sub-prefecture (cf. Vodouhê 1996), endedd with the organisation torn apart
Hiee fact that members of local organisations call in government representatives to settle their internall conflict is symptomatic of the disarray caused by the ambivalence of the superposition of twoo types of rules and norms. The co-existence of both formal and informal law regime seems symptomaticc of the distrust of external intervention. This observation perfectly accords with the claimm of Bierschenk et Olivier de Sardan (1998:38) mat local actors resort to institution shopping in thee process of conflict resolution. Accordingly, transparency is unlikely.
5.2.45.2.4 Evaluation of performance in the cotton sector
Overalll quantitative performance of the reforms has been disappointing according to farmers1 perception.. However, costs impinging on the distribution of agricultural input services are hard too define in operational terms, and are best understood in terms of qualitatively significant deviationss from the stated goals. For instance, overlap-membership assessment bears out survey dataa suggesting that high administrative, information and exchange-related costs bar farmers participatingg in saving and credit groups from acquiring agricultural inputs through the formal
channels.channels. Yet, it is difficult to get good quantifiable information on the scale and breadth of the
frustratedd demand.
Thee present sub-section endeavours to provide some hints on the mechanisms underlying thee pervasive nature of the alleged high costs, by using the framework presented in chapter 2, figurefigure 2.1. This figure sketches the different components of the post-reform situation of the
