RESEARCH PAPER TRUST IN FEELINGS PROJECT

RESEARCH PAPER

TRUST IN FEELINGS PROJECT

The underlying implicit processes of the human brain based on feelings and

absorbing new information

By

RIANNE SNOEKEN

University of Groningen

Faculty of Economics and Business

MSc Marketing Management

14

_{of June 2020}

Trust in feelings project

The underlying implicit processes of the human brain based on feelings and

absorbing new information

Master thesis

Master Marketing Management

Business department, University of Groningen

14th of June 2020

Student:

Author name: Rianne Snoeken

Acknowledgments

Dear reader,

This thesis has been made as the final research for my master studies (Marketing Management) at the University of Groningen. The title ‘The underlying implicit processes of the human brain based on feelings and absorbing new information’ captures my main interest in the field of marketing; psychological processes in marketing. This study has been a great way to explore this field a bit more, and by working on this thesis I have learned a lot about academic writing and conducting experiments.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank a few people. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ms. Anika Schumacher, for guiding me through the entire process. Her feedback, input and encouragement have been of great value. Finally, I want to express gratitude to the people I love for their continuous support and belief in me throughout the process. Also, I would like to thank them for proofreading pieces of my thesis and providing feedback on my writing.

Rianne Snoeken Haarlem

Management summary

Objective: This paper aims to investigate the underlying implicit processes under the already established relationship of reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion (confirmation bias). It is expected that automatic, unconscious processes, which are called implicit cognitive processes, follow into a consistency goal which mediates this relationship. Therefore, it is hypothesized that the consistency goal has a mediating effect on the relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

Methodology: The relation between reliance on feelings a pre-decisional information distortion was tested by manipulating the reliance on feelings condition by adapting the manipulation test of Martel et al (2019) and adapting and modifying the pre-decisional information distortion task of Russo (2008). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (high reliance on feelings-, low reliance on feelings-, and control condition). In the pre-decisional information distortion task, participants had to choose between two resort hotels following the SEP-method. To test the mediating effect on this relationship, a word identification test has been executed, adapted from Lowe et al (2008), and modified with consistency words of Chaxel (2016) and Russo (2008). Participants had to guess which (tossed up) word flashed by. This test was used to measure the consistency goal.

Conclusions: No significant relation has been found between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Also, no meditating effect of the consistency goal has been found on the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Therefore, based on this experiment, it cannot be concluded that any relation exists between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion, and the consistency goal does not mediate this (non-existing) relationship. The reason for not finding any effect could be that the original pre-decisional information distortion task has been modified into resort hotels and that those descriptions were too similar. Another reason could be that the manipulation did not exactly work as expected, and another reason could be that the mediation variable was not reliable and didn’t work as expected because of slow internet speed during pandemic (corona) times.

Table of content

1. INTRODUCTION ... 6

2. CONCEPTUAL/THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ... 8

3. METHODOLOGY ... 15

3.1OVERVIEW OF PRESENT RESEARCH ... 15

3.2EXPERIMENT:THE UNDERLYING PROCESSES (MEDIATOR) OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIANCE ON FEELINGS AND PRE-DECISIONAL INFORMATION DISTORTION ... 15

3.3PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN ... 16

3.4PROCEDURE/METHODS ... 17 3.4.1 Independent variable ... 17 3.4.2 Dependent variable ... 18 3.4.3 Mediator variable ... 18 3.5EXTRA QUESTIONS ... 20 3.6EXPECTED RESULTS ... 20 4. RESULTS ... 20

4.1DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLE ... 20

4.2SCALE DEVELOPMENT ... 21 4.2.1 Independent variable ... 21 4.2.2 Dependent variable ... 22 4.2.3 Mediator variable ... 22 4.3HYPOTHESIS TESTING ... 23 4.3.1 Hypothesis 1 ... 23 4.3.2 Hypothesis 2 ... 24 4.3.3 Extra analysis ... 26

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ... 27

6. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS... 29 7. LIMITATIONS ... 30 8. FUTURE DIRECTIONS ... 31 9. BIBLIOGRAPHY ... 32 10. APPENDIX ... 37 A. SPSS OUTPUT ... 37

1. Introduction

Feelings operate as summaries of the entire knowledge an individual has acquired about an issue (Pham et al, 2012), and may form a diagnostic pathway to evaluation in judgment and decision making (Pham et al, 2001).

Reliance on feelings can be beneficial, because individuals who have higher trust in their feelings (a) will have greater preference/judgment stability and consistency, (b) can predict outcomes of future events better, and (c) make better choices than individuals who rely less on their feelings (Lee et al, 2009; Pham et al, 2001; Pham et al, 2012; Bechara et al, 2005; Pham et al, 2014). Therefore, previous research argues that relying on feelings allow individuals to quickly recognize underlying patterns and in doing so, make better and more consistent choices. When individuals rely on feelings/emotions, they will use their thinking system 1 (automatic/conscious processing) (Tay et al, 2016; Berkowitz, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Leventhal, 1984, 1993; Zajonc, 1980, Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; LeDoux, 1996).

However, it is interesting that other previous research has shown that reliance on feelings may not only facilitate the recognition of true patterns but also makes us see patterns where there are none (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and therefore reliance on feelings may bias thoughts/decisions (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a; Martel et al, 2019; Pham et al, 2012). Therefore, I argue that reliance on feelings and the resulting ability to quickly recognize patterns may not always lead to better decision making, but sometimes leads us astray.

Russo et al, 2008; Rasjic et al, 2015; Frey, 1986) and serves to avoid information that conflicts with pre-existing beliefs (Kunda, 1990; Charness & Dave, 2017).

This background leads us to raise a specific question with regard to individuals who rely on feelings and how this influences how they obtain new information before making decisions. This raises the following question: “What influence does an individual’s relying on feelings have on pre-decisional information distortion?”

Previous research in this area has focused on cognitively mediated explanations (conscious/deliberated) for information distortion (i.e. reduction in dissonance – usually related to post decisional distortion (Chaxel, 2016); and desire for cognitive consistency – in the case of pre-decisional distortion (Russo et al, 2008; Chaxel et al, 2019; Chaxel et al, 2018; Kay et al, 2009)). In this research, I will focus on a motivational (automatic) process that is built on implicit cognition in the form of implicit pattern recognition.

To document this phenomenon, I examined the effect of reliance on feelings on pre-decisional information distortion. This relationship will also be tested in combination with the influence of the (implicit) consistency goal, which has been tested as a mediator. The consistency goal is an implicit activation of cognitive consistency, and I expect it to be the underlying effect of the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Earlier research has already shown the main effect (reliance on feelings → pre-decisional information distortion), and therefore my contribution will be the reason why it happens. So, I will show process evidence. Specifically, I will examine the influence of an individual’s reliance on feelings of participants (N = 314) on their amount of pre-decisional information distortion, and if the consistency goal positively or negatively influences this relationship.

system 1 thinking (Tay et al, 2016; Berkowitz, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Leventhal, 1984, 1993; Zajonc, 1980; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; LeDoux, 1996), and that this system happens automatically and unconsciously, and implies associative processing. Which in turn implies pattern-based processing. Thus, the implicit seeking of consistencies. Therefore, I belief that when individuals rely on their feelings, they will have an implicit (automatic/unconsciously) consistency goal, which in turn may create patterns and follows into pre-decisional information distortion (bias).

During an experiment in the form of a survey, I will focus on the relationship between an individuals’ reliance on feelings and if this positively or negatively influences (increases/decreases) this person’s pre-decisional information distortion. I will test this by adapting the design of a lexical decision task made by Chaxel (2016), which is modified from using restaurants into resort hotels. I have chosen for a feeling-based product (resort hotels), because I will test pre-decisional information distortion in relation with reliance on feelings. To test how the consistency goal influences this relationship, I will use an adjusted word identification task, set up by Lowe et al (2018), using the consistency related words mentioned in Chaxel (2016) and Russo (2008). This test only measures the consistency goal.

2. Conceptual/theoretical background

This paper is about pre-decisional information distortion. Pre-decisional information distortion is a form of the confirmation bias and can be described as “a process where individuals evaluate new information in favor of a preferred option by cohering the information to that preferred option”. Earlier research suggests that pre-decisional information distortion is an effect of the cognitive consistency goal. Which means that individuals want to cohere new information to an option they prefer and make all the information they obtain consistent to the option they prefer in the choice process. Therefore, they suggest that the goal of consistency/coherence drives pre-decisional information distortion and thereby may bias choice and judgment (Chaxel, 2015; Russo, 2008; Bond et al, 2006; Russo et al, 1998; DeKay, 2015; Russo et al, 1998; Lord et al, 1979; Koehler, 1993). But, in this research I do not look at the cognitive consistency goal, which is a conscious and deliberate process, but at the implicit cognitive processes (automatic/unconscious) which may be a result of an individual’s reliance on feelings.

Reliance on feelings – implicit cognition/learning, pattern-based processing

judgment and decision making (Pham et al, 2001). This suggests that individuals use all information (feelings) they have acquired earlier in their later judgment and decision-making processes.

Reliance on feelings can be beneficial, because individuals who have a higher trust in their feelings will have greater preference/judgment stability/consistency and can predict outcomes of future events better than individuals who rely less on their feelings (Lee et al, 2009; Pham et al, 2001; Pham et al, 2012; Pham et al, 2014). This is in line with the emotional oracle effect, which suggests that individuals who have higher trust in their feelings can predict outcomes of future events better than individuals with lower trust in their feelings (Pham et al, 2012). Pham et al (2012) states that it is mostly high trust in feelings that improves prediction accuracy rather than low trust in feelings that impairs it. However, the effect only occurs among individuals who possess sufficient background knowledge about the prediction domain, and it dissipates when the prediction criterion becomes inherently unpredictable (Pham et al, 2012). Bechara et al (2005) show that emotion-laden market signals, conscious or not, enable individuals to make better choices.

The SMH addresses “the possible physiological process, conscious or not, intervening between knowledge and behavior, between what one knows and what one does (actions), and suggests that emotions play a key role”. The central feature of the SMH is not that non-conscious biases accomplish decisions in the absence of non-conscious knowledge of a situation, but rather that emotion-related signals assist cognitive processes even when they are non-conscious (Bechara et al, 2015).

There are two types of cognitive/memory processes: explicit and implicit processes. This paper focusses on the implicit memory processes which are revealed in performance facilitation, often without content-specific retrieval intent by the learner and despite the lack of awareness of the original learning event(s) (Woltz, 2003). Those implicit learning processes take place on a daily basis without intent or conscious awareness, and play a significant role in structuring our skills, perceptions, and behavior (Hassin et al, 2005; Kihlstrom, 1987; Lewicki et al, 1987; Lewicki & Hill, 1987; Reber, 1967, 1993; Woltz, 2003; Fensch & Rünger, 2003), and are typically characterized by a set of automatic, associative, nonconscious, and unintentional learning processes (Barret et al, 2004; Makintosh, 1998; McLaren, 1994).

Therefore, I suggest that when individuals rely on their feelings, they make use of their thinking system 1, which happens unconsciously and automatically. System 1 processing implies associative processing and automatic pattern-based processing. Thus, individuals implicitly seek consistencies when they rely on their feelings to create a pattern, and therefore they will have greater preference/judgement consistency and make more consistent choices than individuals who rely less on their feelings. Therefore, I believe that individuals who rely on their feelings will have an implicit consistency goal.

are none (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), and therefore reliance on feelings and emotions may bias thoughts and decisions in a feeling- and emotion-congruent fashion (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a; Martel et al, 2019; Pham et al, 2012). Therefore, relying on feelings and the resulting ability to quickly recognize patterns may not always lead to correct predictions, but sometimes leads us astray and forms biases.

The paper focusses on a form of the confirmation bias, which can be described as “people seek, interpret, and use evidence in a manner toward confirmation his/her existing beliefs or hypothesis leading to systematic errors in judgment, which are called biases” (Charness & Dave, 2017). This means that people have directional goals which bias the accessing of relevant knowledge structure to arrive at the conclusion they want to arrive at (Chaxel, 2016; Kunda, 1990). As a consequence, ill-founded beliefs (biases) can persist, as contradictory evidence tends to be ignored, underweighted, or even misinterpreted as evidence in favor of existing beliefs (Rajsic et al, 2015; Jonas et al, 2001; Lord et al, 1979; Koehler, 1993). Previous research on the confirmation bias has mainly argued that the confirmation bias serves to reduce dissonance (Jonas et al, 2001; Russo et al, 2008; Rajsic et al, 2015; Frey, 1986), and serves to avoid information that conflicts with pre-existing beliefs (Kunda, 1990; Charness & Dave, 2017; Kunda, 1990). Increased commitment to a position (goal/decisions/conclusions) leads to a stronger confirmation bias, and the more dissonance one experiences if this direction is threatened (Jonas et al, 2001; Frey, 1986). Mele (2003) and Dunne (2016) states that some emotions may prime the confirmation bias, because an individual’s emotional state could prime the relevant processing systems to gather evidence in a biased fashion.

A form of the confirmation bias, which is regularly displayed by decision makers, and will be focused on in this paper, is typically referred to as information distortion. Information distortion means that people bias their evaluation of new information in favor of a preferred option (based on their feelings) by cohering the information to that preferred option (positive feedback loop) and ignore contradictory evidence or subject disconfirming evidence to critical evaluation (Lord et al, 1979). Therefore, the goal for consistency/coherence drives pre-decisional information distortion, because individuals want to see the separate units of information as consistent with each other. They want to see a pattern. This process may bias choice and judgment by matching their final choice to their initial leaning by creating a pattern (Chaxel, 2015; Russo, 2008; Bond et al, 2006; Russo et al, 2008; DeKay, 2015; Russo et al, 1998; Lord et al, 1979 Koehler, 1993). This is also called the halo effect (Russo et al, 1998).

was being made. Distortion can also occur when consumers make a choice, when no choice has been made (Russo et al, 1998) in risky choices and in riskless choices. All enhancing the leading option and degrade the trailing option (DeKay, 2015).

Earlier research already stated that individuals who rely on their feelings are more likely to fall prey to the confirmation bias and pre-decisional information distortion (Mele, 2010; Dunne, 2016). The explanation for this phenomenon could be that individuals want to see separate units of information as consistent with each other, and when they have created an option they prefer in their mind, they want to see all information consistent with this option. Individuals create a preferred option based on their feelings, and those feelings make them also able to quickly recognize underlying patterns, which will follow into seeing information as consistent with each other. Information which can be correctly linked to their preferred option will be added to the pattern that has been created, and information which contradicts with the pattern will be ignored. Therefore, I expect that reliance on feelings and the resulting ability to quickly recognize patterns (seeing information as consistent with each other and ignore contradictory evidence) may not always lead into better decision-making/predictions, but sometimes leads individuals astray, and creates pre-decisional information distortion. I expect that when individuals rely on their feelings, they may distort information before making decisions.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

H1. Reliance on feelings has a positive effect on pre-decisional information distortion.

The underlying process of the relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion

As stated above, when individuals rely on their feelings, they make use of their thinking system 1. This process implies associative, unconscious, automatic processes, and automatic pattern-based processing. This automatic pattern-pattern-based processing pattern-based on feelings may result in pre-decisional information distortion, because individuals who rely on their feelings want to see information as consistent with each other, and thereby create a bias. It is expected that implicit cognitive processes may be the cognitive process underlying this relationship. Therefore, I expect that an implicit consistency goal can be a mediator of the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

help to understand the structure of belief systems (Read & Simon, 2012), and the need to maintain a justification for a belief (Nickerson, 2008).

It already has been stated that when individuals rely on their feelings, they make use of their thinking system 1 (cognitive operations system). This is an automatic, intuitive, and experiential way of thinking, which is likely to give rise to affective reactions. This system is generated without much conscious effort and channels the available information through a subconscious pattern recognition based on similar past situations. Which is often described as “gut feeling”. Hereby, lower-order affective reactions are likely to be elicited, even if processing resources are not allocated to the decision-making task (Tay et al, 2016; Berkowitz, 1993; Epstein, 1993; Leventhal, 1984, 1993; Zajonx, 1980; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; LeDoux, 1996). This is in line with Shiv & Fedorikhin (1999) who state that affective reactions can occur relatively automatically without an active role of higher-order cognitive processes. Their affective-cognitive model suggests that when processing resources are constrained, choice is likely to be based on the affective reasons engendered. Therefore, consumers are more often mindless (affective) than mindful (cognitive) decision makers. Hence, the feeling-as-information theory assets that feeling states provide feeling-as-information that directs cognitive processing in important ways (Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1996).

When individuals rely on their feelings, they make use of their system 1 thinking (implies associative processing). Associative processing can also be described as implicit cognitive processes. Those processes are revealed in performance facilitation, often without content-specific retrieval intent by the learner and despite the lack of awareness of the original learning event(s) (Woltz, 2003). Those implicit learning processes take place on a daily basis without intent or conscious awareness, and play a significant role in structuring our skills, perceptions, and behavior (Hassin et al, 2005; Kihlstrom, 1987; Lewicki et al, 1987; Lewicki & hill, 1987; Reber, 1967, 1993; Woltz, 2003; Fensch & Rünger, 2003), and are typically characterized by a set of automatic, associative, nonconscious, and unintentional learning processes (Barret et al, 2004; Makintosh, 1998; McLaren et al, 1994).

Earlier research already suggests that explicit cognitive consistency can be a driver of pre-decisional information distortion. They state that consumers distort information in order to enhance the consistency between two beliefs: (a) their tentative preference (i.e., the leading alternative) and (b) their evaluation of incoming information (i.e., the next attribute) (Russo et al, 2008). The latter belief is what is distorted (Chaxel et al, 2019). The cognitive consistency they describe doesn’t happen automatically and unconsciously, but is a goal were individuals intentionally search for information which is consistent with information seen earlier (explicit cognitive processes and system 2 thinking). In this paper I focus on implicit cognitive processes, which means that individuals automatically and unconsciously undergo cognitive processes. It already has been suggested that implicit cognitive processes and system 1 thinking create patterns (consistency between units of information), and therefore are more likely to promote false content, which in turn may create biases (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a; Martel et al, 2019).

Therefore, it is expected that when individuals rely on their feelings they may automatically and unconsciously (implicit processes) create a bias. Pre-decisional information is the bias focused on in this paper. I state that when individuals rely on their feelings, they unconsciously and automatically (implicit processes) may create a pattern where new information is consistent with earlier seen information (information distortion). Therefore, individuals implicitly have a consistency goal which may create pre-decisional information distortion (see information as consistent with each other and filter out/ignore information which is inconsistent).

Therefore, I suggest that when individuals rely on their feelings, they make use of implicit cognitive processes, and thereby unconscious/automatically create patterns, even when there are none. They create those patterns because they want to see information as consistent with each other, which is called the consistency goal. By having this consistency goal, individuals may unconsciously create biases (link pieces of information to each other based on information they want to link and leave out information they do not want to link), which in this paper is the bias: pre-decisional information distortion. So, implicit cognitive processes may encourage pre-decisional information distortion. Therefore, I suggest that the relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion may be mediated by the consistency goal.

This leads to the following hypothesis:

Figure 1 – Conceptual model

3. Methodology

3.1 Overview of present research

This paper examines the impact of reliance on feelings on pre-decisional information distortion. In particular, I sought to provide evidence for the underlying process of this relationship. Which means that I focused on a motivational (automatic) process that is built on implicit cognition in the form of implicit pattern recognition which may create pre-decisional information distortion when individuals rely on feelings. The experiment that will be conducted in the form of a survey examines the effects of an individuals’ reliance on feelings by choosing between two hotel resorts and tests whether differences in the given instructions has an influence on the choice’s individuals made. After that the participants will undergo a word identification test to see if they have a consistency goal. The participants will be divided into three groups to measure if individuals who rely on their feelings have a higher consistency goal and distort more information.

3.2 Experiment: The underlying processes (mediator) of the relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion

This experiment examined whether individuals who got the instruction to rely on their feelings answered more consistently (by choosing one of the two hotel resorts) than individuals who were in the control- or reason-based (low reliance on feelings) conditions. This experiment also examines if individuals who rely on their feelings saw more consistency related words in the word identification test than the participants in the other two conditions. In particular, I

predicted that, if high reliance on feelings gives individuals a consistency goal which can follow into pre-decisional information distortion, I should observe more consistency between the choice between two hotel resorts which will influence someone’s feelings toward the resorts (low switching behavior between resorts), and more correctly guessed consistency words in the high reliance on feelings condition. Therefore, it is predicted that people who rely less on their feelings (reason/logic condition) would make more effort by comparing the two hotel resorts and therefore they could easily switch between hotel resorts if the other hotel resort sounds more appealing than the hotel resort they chose in the previous context. Besides that, when the participant who relied less on their feelings had to guess a word which flashed by, they will rely less on their feelings, and it must be more difficult to guess the correct words. The hypotheses that will be examined during this experiment are:

H1. Reliance on feelings has a positive effect on pre-decisional information distortion. H2. The cognitive consistency goal mediates the relationship between reliance on feelings on pre-decisional information distortion.

3.3 Participants and design

The sample existed of 424 persons, which were recruited by the researcher herself, who participated in exchange (if they wanted) to participate in a lottery to win a Bol.com gift card worth of 35 Euros. The experiment had three conditions (high reliance on feelings, low reliance on feelings, control). Participants were randomly assigned to a condition. The sample has been drawn, as explained in table 1, by sharing the survey on the researchers own social media channels, sending it to all her contacts through WhatsApp, sending all neighbors a letter, and posting the survey in Facebook groups. Besides that, the researcher asked her friends and family to distribute the survey with others. The data was collected between the 30th of April and 30th

of May. The aim was to have 300 correctly filled in surveys.

Table 1 – Data collection methods Own social

media channels

The survey will be spread on the social media channels of the researcher (LinkedIn, Instagram, Facebook). Her contacts will be asked to share the survey.

Letters Sending every neighbor (180 in the building the researcher lives) a letter with the question if they wanted to fill in the survey and the QR-code go to the survey.

Facebook groups

Posting the survey in the Facebook groups ‘Respondenten gezocht (onderzoek, enquête, vragenlijst, scriptie, afstudeer’, ‘Respondenten gezocht’ and ‘Vragenlijst/Enquête respondenten gezocht/ruilen

HBO/WO studenten’. Those are Dutch groups where students can swap surveys (the researcher fills in the survey for other students, and then they will fill in her survey).

3.4 Procedure/methods 3.4.1 Independent variable

Reliance on feelings. Reliance on feelings was manipulated using a manipulation task adapted from Martel et al (2019). Participants assigned to the high reliance on feelings condition received the following instructions: “In the following, you are asked to make a decision between two product options. Please make the decision based on how you feel about each of the options. Focus on your emotions and feelings towards each option.” Participants in the low reliance on feelings conditions, in contrast, were given the following instructions: “In the following, you are asked to make a decision between two product options. Please make the decision based on your reasoning. Focus on the logical reasoning of pros and cons of each option.” In addition, the control condition got the following instructions: “In the following, you are asked to make a decision between two product options. Information on the choice options are provided on the subsequent pages of this survey.”

At the end of the survey, the participants were provided with a manipulation check, which is also adapted from Martel et al (2019). They were asked to answer two questions: “At the beginning of the survey, you were asked to respond using your: 1 = Emotion, 2 = Reason” and “Please indicate the extent to which you used emotions/feelings or reason/logic when judging the description of the hotel resorts”. For the second question they were provided with a Likert scale (1 = None at all, 2 = A little, 3 = A moderate amount, 4 = A lot, 5 = A great deal). This is to check if participant indeed answered the questions based on what they were instructed to do.

3.4.2 Dependent variable

Pre-decisional information distortion. The relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion was tested by using the goal motivation priming experimental design of Russo (2008). This is a straightforward test of the effect of activating specific goals on information distortion. If a particular goal is a cause of information distortion, then increasing its activation should increase information distortion. Participants were told that the purpose of this study is to read and evaluate information that will help them in making decisions between two options, and that they will be asked to report which strategies they used to actually come to a decision (goals: be consistent, conserve effort, create separation, remember the options). Priming is subliminal, and therefore participants are not aware of it. They are also not aware of the real purpose of the study, and thus any impact of goal priming on information distortion cannot be an artifact of awareness.

Pre-decisional information distortion has been tested by adapting the decision task of Russo (2008), but the original task has been modified by using resort hotels instead of restaurants, therefore different information than in the restaurant task (original study) will be shown. The introduction to the choice explained that participants had to select one of the two resort hotels for a trip to Bali for two persons, and that information will be provided about these hotel resorts to help them make a choice (Appendix B). The five attributes (appearance, cocktail menu, hours of operation, hotel reviews from Trip Advisor, dinner menus) were descriptions that included all of the information about both resort hotels. The product ‘resort hotels’ has been chosen to stimulate emotions/feelings, because it is an affective product.

Participants were shown one attribute at the time. Per attribute, participants had to respond to the three queries that form the SEP-method (Russo et al, 1996; Russo, 2008): (a) evaluation of the attribute’s diagnosticity on a 1-to-9 scale (1 and 9 both favoring one resort hotel or the other, 5 favors neither resort hotel), (b) identifying which of the two resort hotels was leading at that moment, and (c) rating their confidence in that leading alternative. After responding to the last of the five attributes, participants had to make a final choice, accompanied by rating their confidence in the choice on a scale from 1 (absolutely uncertain), 50 (a complete toss-up) to 100 (absolutely certain).

3.4.3 Mediator variable

mentioned in Chaxel (2016) and Russo (2008) instead of the anxiety words of the original study. The words mentioned in the task will be used in the English version of the study (table 2) but translated in the Dutch version of the study (table 3). The answer options were all pronounceable and matched in length with the real words (Chaxel, 2016).

The word identification task exists of twelve words which will flash by so quickly that they are not consciously readable. Participants have to rely on their feelings to choose the right answer from a series of four answer options. The letters of the word that will flash by are completely tossed up.

Participants were told that the purpose of the study is to recognize and identify words that flash very briefly on their screen. While this word will appear too quickly to be consciously read, it will be registered subconsciously. Thereby, they should rely on their gut feeling when subsequently identifying the word they feel they have seen from a list of four answer choices. At the end the participants were asked if they could indicate if they could read the words which were quickly flashed on their screen, and how many words they could read.

Table 2 – Words + answers word identification task

*bold words are the real words which the respondents have to guess 1.Agreement 2.Assessment 3.Amusement 4.Alignment 1.Coherence 2.Confidence 3.Cognizance 4.Conference 1.Compatibility 2.Comparability 3.Computability 4.Combinability 1.Congruence 2.Confluence 3.Continence 4.Conference 1.Consistent 2.Concurrent 3.Convenient 4.Consultant 1.Fitting 2.Filling 3.Fishing 4.Fizzing 1.Above 2. Abode 3. Abide 4. Abate 1.Collection 2.Completion 3.Conviction 4.Correction 1.Underline 2.Undermine 3.Underdone 4.Undertone 1.Kitchen 2. Kinship 3. Kindred 4.Kingpin 1.Overcome 2.Overcame 3.Overtime 4.Overtone 1.Deepen 2.Demean 3.Deaden 4.Dealen

Table 3 – Words Dutch translation

2.Verzegeling 3.Verstekeling 4.Verzilvering 2.Boren 3.Boxen 4.Bomen 2.Verdrukken 3.Verbruiken 4.Verdrinken 2.Onderkoelden 3.Onderkruipen 4.Ondersteunen 2.Overdekken 3.Overzetten 4.Overtreden 2.Keulen 3.Keuren 4.Kuiken 3.5 Extra questions

At the end of the survey the participants will be asked a few more questions to get a complete overview about the participants and if the survey worked as it should have. The questions were about: age, gender, technical issues, reading check, participation in similar study, comments about the study.

3.6 Expected results

I expected the results of the study to be the following: - High reliance on feelings condition (1); - Low reliance on feelings condition (2); - Control condition (0);

- (3) < (1); (3) > (2); (1) > (2).

This means that participants who were instructed to rely more on their feelings would have a higher consistency goal and higher pre-decisional information distortion than the other two conditions. The low reliance on feelings condition is expected to have the lowest consistency goal and the lowest pre-decisional information distortion.

4. Results

This part of the paper consists of a short description of the sample, the scale development and testing the hypotheses. The survey had 424 participants, but some had to be excluded for the analysis, because of incomplete surveys and a failed attention check. There were a few technical issues, and special remarks. There were no star outliers. Participants fifty and 145 were outliers but can still be included in the analysis (Appendix A - table 2).

4.1 Description of the sample

participants varied between the fourteen and eighty-three years old (Appendix A – table 10). The biggest group of participants were Dutch, but there were also some foreigners.

4.2 Scale development 4.2.1 Independent variable

To create the IV (reliance on feelings variable) a new variable had to be computed. The high reliance on feelings condition got the value 1, the low reliance on feelings condition got the value 2, and the control condition got the value 0. To test if the IV manipulation really worked, a Chi-Square test has been executed. This test is significant (p = .002) (Appendix A – table 4). So, it can be suggested that participants (almost) exactly thought that they were in the condition they were in. But participants could only guess if they were in the high reliance on feelings condition or in the low reliance on feelings condition. So, the control condition was excluded in this measure. People in the control condition mostly indicated that they relied a little on their feelings (34,6%), but also a moderate amount (27,9%), and that they relied a lot on their feelings (26%). Therefore, it can be concluded that participants in the control condition mostly relied on their feelings by answering the questions. The high reliance on feelings condition mostly indicated that they relied on their feelings/emotions a moderate amount (33%) or a lot (38%). Therefore, it can be concluded that people in the high reliance on feelings condition mostly relied on their feelings. The low reliance on feelings condition mostly indicated that they relied a little (43,9%) or a moderate amount on their feelings (31,8%) (Appendix A – table 3). Therefore, it can be concluded that participants in the low reliance on feelings condition did mostly not rely on their feelings. This indicates that people in the high reliance on feelings condition mostly indicated that they relied on their feelings, after that the control condition, and the low reliance on feelings condition relied the least on their feelings. This is exactly what was expected: (0) < (1); (2) < (0); (1) > (0).

concluded that in this manipulation check the manipulation also worked exactly as it should have, namely (0) < (1); (2) < (0); (1) > (0).

Therefore, it can be concluded that the manipulation of reliance on feelings worked exactly work as planned, and is significant, and therefore a reliable manipulation of the IV.

4.2.2 Dependent variable

To compute the DV, the modified (resort hotels) experimental design of Russo (2008) has been used. To measure pre-decisional information distortion (DV), the absolute difference between a decision maker’s rating of each attribute and the unbiased value has been computed (a participant’s ID). The unbiased value (scale midpoint) was 5, and therefore this value was subtracted from a participant’s rating (1-9 scale) on an attribute. The absolute difference had a positive sign if the rating favors the leading option (resort hotel J) and had a negative sign if the rating favors the trailing option (resort hotel K). The mean difference for all attributes has been computed per individual and yields a single value for each individual (ID). This value should be positive to signal a bias in the evaluation of new information supporting the leading alternative (Chaxel, 2015; Russo, 2008). Distortion cannot be calculated when there was no leader immediately prior to an attribute, and therefore there could not be any distortion of the first attribute. Distortion has also not been calculated when the confidence rating of the previous attribute indicated that there was no preference between the two resort hotels (50-50, a complete toss-up) (Russo, 2008). The Cronbach’s Alpha showed that the DV is reliable (Cronbach’s Alpha = .797), and therefore a reliable variable (Appendix A – table 12).

The DV (pre-decisional information distortion) can also be created in another way, this is called the first-final choice mediation variable. To compute this DV the modified experimental design of Russo (2008) has also been used. The first choice is the participants choice for a resort hotel based on the first information they received, and the final choice is the participants choice for a hotel resort based on all/the last piece of information they received. The variables have been created as value 0 (first choice 1 & final choice 1 + first choice 2 & final choice 2 = first & final choice are the same) and value 1 (first choice 1 & final choice 2 + first choice 2 & final choice 1 = first & final choice are different). Value 1 is what has been distorted.

4.2.3 Mediator variable

summing up the correct answered consistency words (agreement, coherence, compatibility, congruence, consistent, fitting). The sum of the correctly answered consistency words together formed the mediator variable. When the variable for a participant has a six, this means that they correctly answered six of the consistency words. When a participant had a value of zero in the mediator variable, this means that the participant didn’t answer a single one of the consistency words correctly. The variable is not reliable, because it has a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.130 (Appendix A – table 14). In total, 89,2% of the participants answered five or six consistency words correctly (Appendix A – table 9). On average 5,41 words were guessed correctly. Between the different conditions there was not much of a difference between the amount of correctly guessed consistency words (Appendix A – table 7), also this table was not significant (p = .809) (Appendix A – table 8). This shows that this variable is not reliable.

4.3 Hypothesis testing

How the variables (IV, DV, mediator), which will be used by testing the hypotheses, have been computed are shown in paragraph 4.2.

4.3.1 Hypothesis 1

A one-way ANOVA analysis has been executed to test the main effect/interaction effect between the IV (reliance on feelings) and the DV (pre-decisional information distortion). The descriptives of the ANOVA table show that the high reliance on feelings conditions (1) is N = 103, the low reliance on feelings condition (2) is N = 107, and the control condition (0) is N = 104 (Appendix A – table 1). This means, that it is not a perfectly balanced design. The standard deviations are of a similar scale. The Homogeneity of Variances is used to test if the variances across the three groups are the same (H0) and shows that this test is not reliable (p = .992) (Levene statistic = .008) (Appendix A – table 15). Therefore, H0 cannot be rejected, and

therefore the condition of the Homogeneity of Variances is satisfied. The ANOVA table shows that there is no statistically significant difference between groups (F(2,311) = .180, p = .836) (Appendix A – table 13). Therefore, the H0 cannot be rejected, and it is suggested that there is no effect between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

A – table 16). This means that their first choice wasn’t the same as their last choice. 223 participants did not distort information. There is a 71% greater likelihood of being someone who does not distort information. The model shows that when individuals rely on their feelings, they distort less information, this is not in the predicted direction (b = − .896, p = .000) (Appendix A – table 16). Hence, the overall model is not significant (p = .663) (Appendix A – table 17), and therefore H0 cannot be rejected.

Therefore, based on the two tests, it cannot be concluded that there is a difference between individuals who rely on their feelings and the other conditions in who distorts the most information. This suggests that there is no relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

4.3.2 Hypothesis 2

*This hypothesis has been tested when all participants were included (N = 314) and also when some participants were excluded (N = 61). Some participants were excluded from the analyses because they answered in the survey that they could read the letter strings (measure of the consistency goal). This hypothesis has been tested with two different sample sizes to see if there was a difference between in outcomes when participants were able to read the letters strings and when they were not.

A mediation analysis with 10,000 bootstrap samples was performed (Preacher & Hayes, 2008), which tested the consistency goal as a potential mediator of the relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

The overall model, with all participants included, showed that there is no relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion (b = − .0382, t(312) = − .5246, p = .6002). Therefore, this outcome is not in the predicted direction. This test is also not significant (F(1,312) = .2752, p = .6002, R-square = .0009) (Appendix A – table 20), Also, when the test was performed when participants who answered that they could read the letter string in the survey were excluded (N = 61), the model showed the same results. The results were not in the predicted direction (b = − .2753, t(59) = − 1,5947, p = .1161), and also not significant (F(1,59) = 2,5430, p = .1161, R-square = .0413) (Appendix A – table 25). Therefore, this test shows that there is no relation between the of reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion (X does not predict Y).

showed that participants in the high reliance on feelings condition have a lower consistency goal than the participants in the low reliance on feelings- and control condition (b = − .0140, t(59) = − .1177, p = .9067), and this test showed also to be not significant (F(1,59) = .0139, p = .9067, R-square = .0002) (Appendix A – table 23). Therefore, the test without excluding participants showed to be in the right direction. Whereas the test where participants who could read the letter strings were excluded showed to be not in the right direction. Both tests were not significant, and therefore X does not predict M.

The overall model of the mediation effect (consistency goal), between X (reliance on feelings) and Y (pre-decisional information distortion) is not significant (F(2,311) = .1662, p = .8480, R-square = .0011). This shows that M does not predict Y controlling for X. Therefore, it can be concluded that the consistency goal does not mediate the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Besides that, this relation would also have not been in the predicted direction (b = − .0198, t(311) = − .2408, p = .8099 (Appendix A – table 19). This test shows also that X no longer predicts Y or is lessened predicting Y – path c’, because it is non-significant and also is not in the predicted direction (b = − .0374, t(311) = − .5133, p = .6081) (Appendix A – table 19). This means that there is no relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Those relations have also been tested when participants who answered in the survey that they could read the letter strings were excluded (N = 61). This test also showed that the mediation effect is not significant (F(2,58) = 2,5676, p = .0854, R-square = .0813) and both effects showed not to be in the predicted direction (Appendix A – table 24). Therefore, it can be concluded that there does not exist any relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion, and that the consistency goal does not mediate this relationship. The effect of the Bootstrap Confidence Interval shows that the confidence interval crosses zero, and that means that there is no difference between the total- and direct effect. Therefore, H0 cannot be rejected based on this test.

Regression has been executed, but now with two predictors (consistency goal and reliance on feelings). The overall model showed to be non-significant (F = .250, p = .779, R-square = .002) (Appendix A – table 22). Also, the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion showed to be non-significant (F = .250, p = .682, R-square = .002), and not in the predicted direction (b = − .013, t = − .410, p = .682) (Appendix A – table 22). The mediator effect is also non-significant (F = .250, p = .576, R-square = .002), and not in the predicted direction (b = − .020, t = − .559, p = .576) (Appendix A – table 22). This suggests that when the tests were significant, reliance on feelings lowered the consistency goal, and the consistency goal lowered pre-decisional information distortion. This is not what we expected. Both tests were also not significant, and therefore we cannot reject H0 and we cannot conclude that the consistency goal has a mediating effect on the reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion.

4.3.3 Extra analysis

5. Conclusion and discussion

The relationship between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion has already been established in earlier researches. However, little is known about the underlying (implicit) processes. This paper was intended to offer insight into this process.

Across the experiment, the already established relationship in other researches has not been found (reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion), and there is also no evidence that the consistency goal mediates this relationship. The current experiment has no significant relations and showed predictions in the wrong direction. The overall test showed that reliance on feelings creates lower pre-decisional information distortion, and the consistency goals also lowered pre-decisional information distortion. Only when individuals rely on their feelings, they may create a higher consistency goal. Therefore, I am the first to find a negative relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. When the main effect has been tested again (checking the difference between giving instructions about the difference conditions or not giving instructions) there existed a relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion which was in the predicted direction. This test showed that when individuals relied on their feelings, they distorted more information.

First, the present research showed that the manipulation did exactly work as expected: (0) < (1); (2) < (0); (1) > (0). This means that individuals in the high reliance on feelings condition relied more on their feelings than the other two conditions.

Secondly, the mediator variable was not reliable. Besides that, on average 5,41 words were guessed correctly, and almost 90% of the participants answered five or six words correctly. This study showed that more participants correctly guessed the words than was expected. Besides that, it was expected that participants in the high reliance on feelings condition guessed more words correctly, but now almost everyone guessed (almost) al words correctly. This suggests that there was not that much of a difference between the correctly guessed words in the different conditions, and also this variable is not reliable, and therefore not (perfectly) useful.

are explicitly instructed what to do (in this case rely on their feelings), those feelings could be made salient, and therefore the effect could disappear. To explain this effect an experiment of Schwarz & Clore (1983) has be used. They found that people use their momentary affective states as information in making judgments of how happy and satisfied they are with their lives in general. They found that when people are happy at the moment, they rate their overall life satisfaction higher. On the contrary, when they feel sad at the moment, they rate their overall life satisfaction lower. The participants in the experiment of Scharz & Clore (1983) were not aware of the fact that they rated their overall life satisfaction based on how they felt at that moment. Therefore, their feelings were not made salient. In this paper the feelings of participants were made salient, because they were aware/explicitly asked to rely on their feelings. Because individuals were explicitly asked to rely on their feelings, they were made salient of those feelings, and this could make the automatic effect disappear. Participants in this experiment were explicitly asked what to do, and therefore higher order processing resources could be activated, which resulted in blocking the automatic effect of actually relying on their feelings.

Fourthly, an ANOVA analysis has been conducted to test the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. This test showed that there is no effect between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. The relationship has also been tested with a different measure of the DV (first/final choice) with a Binary Linear Regression. This also suggested that there is no effect between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. It states that there is no effect, because the tests were not significant. When those tests were significant, they predicted a result in the wrong direction. Namely that when individuals rely on their feelings, they distort less information. Because the effect was in the wrong direction and the tests were not significant, I cannot conclude that when someone relies on their feelings, they distort more information, as I expected before I executed the study.

results are not significant, the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion showed to be in the wrong direction (reliance on feelings lowered information distortion), and the consistency goal also lowered pre-decisional information distortion. The test only shows that when individuals rely on their feelings their consistency goal increases. Unfortunately, this cannot be concluded, because the tests were not significant. Therefore, it can be concluded that based on this study the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion is not in the right direction (negative relationship) and also not significant, and the consistency goal does not mediate this relationship. Only when instructions are absent the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion positively occurs, but it cannot be concluded that it is true, because the relation is not significant.

6. Managerial implications

7. Limitations

The study does not show a significant effect between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion. Earlier research has already established that there is a relationship, therefore it is remarkable that this relationship has not been established in this paper.

Mediator variable. Tests showed that the mediator variable was not reliable. Therefore, this variable was not actually useful. But to still test the mediating effect, the variable has been used in the mediator analysis.

Mediator variable. The intention of the word identification test was that the words flashed by so fast that participants could not read it, and therefore they had to guess the right answer from a series of four answer options. But I expect that because of the corona virus the internet speed in most households had slowed down, because everybody was working from home. Therefore, the words did not flash by, but were shown slowly, and therefore participants could actually read it. Also, some participants mentioned this at the end of the survey, or they mentioned loading issues as a technical issue. Others told me in person that they could read the words which were supposed to flash by. Because the words were easily readable for most people because of the slow internet speed, the test did not work as it should have, and therefore it is not reliable. Even though it was not reliable, the variable still had to be used in the mediator analysis, otherwise this effect could not be measured.

It was difficult to exclude people who could read the letter strings, because some mentioned it in the comments, under technical issues or in person. Besides that, I expect that more people had those issues. Therefore, I choose to not exclude people who mentioned that they could read the letter string, because it was difficult to get a list of all people who had slow internet speed and could read the letters strings. Besides that, I expected that the sample became too small when I excluded everyone would could read it. The reason why I thought this was because participants guessed on average 5,41 of the six consistency words correctly which flashed by, and this is way higher than in the original word identification task of Lowe et al (2018).

Pre-decisional information distortion. In the pre-decisional information task participants has to answer questions about which hotel resort they preferred. Some participants answered in the comments (and told me in real-life) that the questions with K and J could be a bit confusing. When the survey was displayed on a laptop and when participants rotated their screen horizontally the scales were displayed normally. When they hold their phone vertically answering the questions became a bit more difficult. Because the descriptions of the hotel resorts were given as following: first hotel resort J and then hotel resort K, but the answer options when vertically displayed on a mobile phone, participants saw hotel resort K on top and J at the bottom. It was probably better if those answer options were reversed. It is not sure how this effected the tests, but it is imaginable that participants clicked the wrong answer because they were confused by the order of the answer options. I did not exclude those participants from further analysis, because some added those difficulties in the comments and others told me in real life, so it would be very difficult to search for everyone we (in)directly told me and exclude all of them.

Pre-decisional information distortion. The descriptions of the hotel resorts were modified from the original pre-decisional information distortion task of Russo (2008). In the case of Russo (2008) the pre-decisional information distortion effect could be established, but in this paper this effect could not be established. It is possible that the descriptions for hotel resort K and J were to similar, and therefore choosing the best option was too difficult for participants, which resulted in low results of pre-decisional information distortion.

The reason why participants filled in the survey is not sure. It could be that people filled in the survey without actively thinking about their answers, because they only wanted to complete the survey to participate in the lottery (BOL.com gift card of 35 Euros).

8. Future directions

In the future the mediation effect on the relation between reliance on feelings and pre-decisional information distortion could be measured under different circumstances (normal internet speed). The original (restaurants) pre-decisional information distortion of Russo (2008) should be used. The reliance on feelings manipulation also has worked in earlier researches, and it is not known why it did not work in this paper. For this measure future research has to find a solution.

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