From Dissidents to Decadents -
Poland and Bulgaria’s
Struggles for Democracy
by Vasil Stefanov
Rijksuniversiteit Groningen – International
Relations and International Organization
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Contents
Introduction & Methodology ……… 2
Background ……… 9
Chapter 1: Poland ………. 13
Chapter 2: Bulgaria ……….. 33
Conclusion ………. 57
Bibliography ………. 62
Appendix
BCP – Bulgarian Communist Party
BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party (successor of BCP)
MRF – Movement for Rights and Freedoms
PZPR – Polish United Workers’ Party
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Introduction
Throughout its long history, the European continent has been marked by dynamic social -and political changes. Some of the world’s most powerful empires have emerged on its terrain, and its land has been soaked with the blood of their downfall. National borders, religious beliefs, and ruling dynasties have been subject to multiple transformations. Alliances have often been short-lived and only made in the name of deterring an emerging danger, rather than symbols of deep-rooted friendship and cooperation.
The 20th century certainly managed to live up to these standards, unfortunately in quite
a negative light. The two world wars in the first half and the repressive communist regimes of the second half were attestations of the most horrific sides of the human race. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the unanticipated breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 paved the way for a new dawn in Europe and the relations between its states and people. A new future of greater cooperation seemed to be in the making.
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Two such countries, which recently joined the European Union are Poland (2004) and Bulgaria (2007). Despite their common membership today, the paths of these states vary considerably. Their experiences during the years of communism carry certain differences and the consequent transition has been marked by specific characteristics for each. The role of the civil society in Poland and Bulgaria during the years of authoritarian rule are often said to be in striking contrast. One can examine the relationship between state and society to derive various points of divergence, which would later prove essential in the breakup of the system. In the past two decades, the citizens of Poland and Bulgaria, as well as other ex-socialist states in Europe, have been constantly faced with the high costs of transforming dually the political and economic landscape. The path set by most post-communist governments has been one of “chasing the West”. Much of the public debate, however, has been rather on the question of “why are we so far behind”.
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The study of societies transitioning from authoritative to liberal regimes is an extremely broad and controversial field within political science. Yet, it is becoming ever more popular and significant as new democracies emerge in all corners of the globe. Part of the difficulty concerning the study of transition is that it can be approached from a multitude of perspectives. Economists, politicians, historians, sociologists, and psychologists are only some of those who have a stake in researching the topic. With regards to the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, it is important to note that these countries were undergoing simultaneous transitions encompassing all aspects of social life. The pace and effectiveness of the transition to a market economy casts its shadow on the political dialogue between parties. It also presupposes changing public attitudes, which consequently effect voting behavior. New versions of interpreting the nation’s historical past (and most notably its communist one) emerge. I believe that a multidisciplinary approach can prove to be a useful tool in gluing together the complementary particles in this perplexing puzzlecalled transition.
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as European states emerging on the global stage from behind the Iron Curtain was clear – open up your markets, free prices, and place priority inthe value of capital over labor. The rest should follow naturally. A congruent transition plan suited for the particular needs and features of the local population was rarely considered.
Methodology:
My theoretical approach to this topic will be a combination of critical theory and historical sociology. One of the fathers of critical theory and the Frankfurt School, Max Horkheimer definesits goal as “seeking human emancipation in circumstances of domination and oppression”. (Horkheimer, 1937) Critical theory diverts fundamentally from traditional theories in its ontological interpretation of reality. It denies the possibility of a purely objective reality in social sciences, since the object of analysis is embedded in a historical and social process. (Bohman, 2012) Hence, historical contexts shape the actors, and vice versa.
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censorship on expression coming from the state apparatus. When discussing class relations and the demand of the proletariat for representation through trade unions (as will be the main theme in the chapter on Poland’s revolution), Marxist theory can provide the necessary framework of analysis. This does not indicate any personal ideologicalpreferences or beliefs, rather a framework in which to categorize the socio-political changes going on at the time. Having our current knowledge of how events unfolded, it may seem rather peculiar to refer to Marxism for explaining the downfall of the communist system, but let us not forget that when the seeds for these changes were emerging, the underlying theme (at least for the political elite) was to refine socialism and take it to the next level – not to devour it. Hence, it is more reasonable to look at such events using theoretical lenses applicable to the particular time period.
The core of this piece will address the relationship between social groups and the state. The state, as a monolithic entity of power under communism is well known for its tendency to subvert any form of independent social activity stemming from below. Much of the focus on political transitions has traditionally fallen on interpreting the changes geared from above. Prominent authors in politics and international relations like Kenneth Waltz (Man, The State,
and War) and Karl Polanyi (The Great Transformation) have systematically addressed issues
from a state-centric perspective. It has been only rather recently that greater attention has been put on determining efforts from below – or so to say in common terminology “grassroots initiatives”. Alternative approaches, like feminism and anti-globalizationhave been gaining greater recognitionwith the socio-political critiques of Naila Kabeer (“Globalization, Labor
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been written on local autonomy and self-government – concepts that are mildly hinted at by the Polish trade unions as early as the 1970s.
My analysis would inevitably draw on historical sociology as well. We cannot come to understand the socio-political picture of today’s post-communist countries without moving back in time to see how events unfolded. The clear distinction that historical sociology makes lies in its understanding of the endogenous and the exogenous. Contrary to some more static theoretical approaches, it suggests that the two constantly re-shape and modify each other, much like what Horkheimer distinguished in critical theory. (Bhambra, 2011) In this light, I will look at how communist ideology shaped certain classes of society and their values, which in turn defined the outlook of the nation. After the break-up of the single-party rule and the centrally planned economy, such values and interpretations have come to the surface and have haunted central and eastern European societies in their quest for a better future. Today’s democracies are the product of yesterday’s struggles, and inevitably carry its scars and outlines. Meanwhile, even the most advanced societies need to engage in introspective dialogue as a means of purifying the relationship between their political, economic, and civil institutions.
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Horkheimer defines his theoretical approach further by listing its objectives as “explaining what is wrong with current social reality (in my case being at the point of transition), identifying the actors to change it, and providing clear norms and achievable practical goals for social transformation”.(Horkheimer, 1937)Critical theorists, such as Theodor Adorno (“Dialectic of Enlightenment”), Herbert Marcuse (“Critical Theory and Democratic
Vision”), and Jurgen Habermas (“Theory and Practice”), who helped devise the methodological
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Background:
In his famous “Communist Manifesto”, Karl Marx refers to man as having become an appendage of the machine, capable of carrying out only the most simple and monotonous of
tasks. This was written during Europe’s industrial revolution in the 19th century, as a response
to the harsh working conditions and the high human costs hidden behind the rapid development of the West. A century later, half of the continent would embark upon the project of realizing his vision of a classless socialist society, in which workers would not be the subjects of exploitation. What it managed to create over the following decades was a highly centralized and coercive system, isolated from the rest of the world, in which the average man was, at best, an appendage of the machine.
In February of 1945, the leaders of Russia, the UK, and the US met at a conference in Yalta to discuss the division of post-war Europe. The result would be a partition of the continent into two distinct spheres of influence – a liberal western one and a communist eastern, under the dictation of Joseph Stalin. This decision crushed any hopes of self-determination, a notion that had been voiced highly in the interwar period and had been at the heart of national liberation movements in their struggles against dominant empires since the beginning of the
20th century. With much of the infrastructure and economies of smaller states destructed by
the war, they became increasingly vulnerable to ideological claims and promises of grandeur. Such were certainly not shortin the voices of communist propaganda.
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would be loyal to Moscow. Poland and Bulgaria were not spared such fate. For the Poles, this period in history had a territorial component to it as well. Its eastern half was annexed by Russia and for compensation it was given parts of eastern Germany. The tradition of partitioning Poland between Russia and Germany would define its foreign policy for a long time and set the spark for the self-determination efforts of the Poles during different stages in history. In the immediate post-war years, the predominant sentiment among the population was an anti-Communist one and the national interest was seen as one of avoiding Soviet subjugation, argues Adam Bromke, the late Polish activist, political scientist and university lecturer from Warsaw. “With their state dismembered, the Poles’ last line of defense became nationalism.” (Bromke, 1962) The Allied forces also became seen as foes, since they succumbed to Stalin’s wishes and undermined Poland’s chances for sovereignty and democracy. This inevitably planted sentiments of isolation within the Polish public, considering themselves betrayed by all sides, but making them internally stronger as a community.
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of 1944, Russia declared war on Bulgaria and paved the way for the Fatherland Front to come to power.
One prominent figure in the Fatherland Front was the leader of the Bulgarian Peasant Union (BPU) – Nikola Petkov. However, as a member of parliament from 1946, he began voicing support for parliamentary democracy and was quickly labeled as a counter-revolutionary by the communist wings of the front. In August of 1947, a show trial was staged against Petkov, and under falsified claims, he was soon given a death sentence. It was carried out the following month. Dr. Vesselin Dimitrov, lecturer in Eastern European Politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, suggests that in these early years of communism, the only opposition to the regime could have come from the peasantry. However, “their backbone had been broken by the elimination of Petkov and their party in 1947”. (Dimitrov, 2001) The newly formed People’s Republic of Bulgaria would closely begin to follow the Soviet Stalinist model in nurturing its communism.Through nationalization of private property, collectivization of arable land, and the brutal elimination of any possible opposition in the first years,a campaign of fear was in the making.
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balance for the authorities. Whereas Poles were inclined to look to the left and right of their borders for national threat, Bulgarians had every reason to find it in their own backyard. The monarchy had allied the nation with the losing sides inboth world wars, resulting in the loss of land to its neighbors as well as burdening the economy with reparations. The intimate friendship with Germany proving rather unfruitful, tightening relations with Russia did not seem as quite the worst thing. In contrast to Poland, Russia had a significantly higher status of admiration among Bulgarians.
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Chapter 1: Poland
In this chapter, I will guide you through the key events in Poland’s communist history, in which its civil society has played a role. The primary area of focus will be the strikes and protests, for which the country was so famed around the continent. My goal will be to determine the conditions that ignited such a reaction from the public, as well as the manner in which the society organized itself. Upon formulating these crucial preconditions, I will also analyze how the authoritarian state reacted in these critical periods. Finally, I shall attempt to synthesize the relationship between the state and the civil society (mainly embodied in the Solidarity trade union), and how these strikes and protests impacted both sides. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the first (and in my opinion most crucial) years after the fall of the communist regime and the strategy for transition to democracy. The main question that I will try to answer is, in what ways Polish civil society was responsible for bringing about these changes, and to what extent was Solidarity prepared to govern in a democratic framework.
I.
First sparks of tension
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Poznan, disagreeing with the low wages and poor working conditions. The government, pressured by the USSR, decided to take the bold step of summoning tanks and army personnel to disperse the crowd. (Bromke, 1962) The result – tens of dead and hundreds of injured. The violent outcome of these strikes served to raise awareness for the need of reform in the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), namely to move away from Stalinist forms of repression. As a result, a new leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka was elected, promising the liberalization of society from terror. (Bromke, 1962)
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Despite initial gains in the direction he had promised, Gomulka forced the country into another period of major decline, from the mid-60s onward. The deteriorating economic situation and repressions led to the ‘March events of 1968’, seen by many historians as the official birth of a civil society movement in Poland – later to be named “The 68’ Generation”. (Eisler, 2008) The main difference in this case was that at the center of the protests against the communist regime were university students, sparked by the decision to ban a popular theater play, depicting the struggle of Poles against the Russian occupation. In the following months, the PZPR responded with a crackdown campaign on intellectuals and students, much of it with an anti-Semitic rhetoric. As a result, thousands of Jewish students and intellectuals were driven into immigration. (ibid.) Poland’s international reputation was, according to Eisler, significantly dented when the facts of these events, reminding of the recent horrors of WWII, spread around the world. (ibid.)
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II.
A man of the people?
Edward Gierek was the newly appointed head of state, challenged with the task of raising the living standards of Poles. His plan for modernizing the industry and encouraging the production of consumer goods yielded rapid results. (Piekalkiewicz, 1981) This success was, however, built on the back of high loans from western governments. With the impact of the oil crisis in 1973, this form of development was no longer sustainable for Poland, andthe leadership was pressed to increase prices once again. (ibid.) In the latter half of the decade, a number of new opposition groups, among which the Solidarity trade union, were beginning to emerge in the underground. The PZPR was increasingly losing credibility amongst the population, after so many failed governments. Many Poles could no longer stand the constant uncertainty they lived in for decades by riding this economic roller coaster.
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were growing. What they were little aware of was the soaring foreign debt and the new crisis to follow, which were the price paid for this rapid economic stabilization.
III.
The Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II – Poland’s spiritual wings
One event in 1978 brought unseen enthusiasm to the demoralized Polish public. The Archbishop of Krakow – Karol Wojtyla was elected as Pope (John Paul II) in the Vatican. (Ash, 2002) For one of the most renowned Catholic countries, this proved to be a source of great pride, especially in such difficult political and economic times. The influence of the Pope on Polish society was immediate. In a visit to his home country, shortly after his appointment, John Paul called for the establishment of new, independent institutions and movements, deviating from the central party line. (ibid.) His words resounded highly with the people and sent shivers down the spines of the leaders. Nevertheless, the regime could not plunge into an open negation of this new phenomenon, as this would have proven to be sheer political suicide. Religion had persistently remained as a higher influence on people than political ideologies, and it was argued to be the backbone of the Polish civil society. Ash pontificated that “the visit of the Pope to Poland showed the world that Poland is not a communist country – just a communist state”. (ibid.)
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position in society and even influencing voter behavior”. (Enriquez, 2002) Bogdan Szajkowski, a professor of political science at the University of Exeter, referred to the papal visit as “a psychological earthquake”. (Szajkowski, 1985) He points out that the Church had established itself over the communist period as a “mediator between society and the state”. (ibid.) To a great extent, it offered a realm of refuge for the troubled civilians. No matter how aggressively the government tried to truncate the roots of Polish national identity and plant the seeds of communist ideology, the Church would always stand as a firm reinforcement of the people’s true self and inner values. Despite not being in the position to fully influence decision-making or subvert the use of force against protesters, the religious institutions maintained a high level of public trust, if only by a means of outspoken criticism against brutality. Ash suggests that despite not being able to mingle directly in the political developments, “the Church could attempt to create the social conditions in which the Party would be compelled to reform itself”. (Ash, 2002) This powerful role automatically gave the infant civil movements a strong ally in the years to come.
IV.
Solidarity – from the shipyards to the Gdansk Agreement
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only a few days and proved short of organizational capacity. The sit-in strikes, which began in the shipyards of Gdansk a month later, showed for the first time a capability towards coordinated efforts. (ibid.) The initial demands included the re-employment of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Walesa, who were considered to be unlawfully removed from their jobs in the factory. The strikers also appealed for “the erection of a monument in memory of the victims of December 1970, guarantees against reprisal for strikes, pay raises of 2000 zlotys, and the same family allowances as for the militia”. (ibid. pp.115) Although the government conceded to most of the demands within a few days, the protests had already spread to a number of other cities. The central striking committee decided that out of solidarity (upholding the true principle behind the trade union’s name), the strikes should continue until a broader
national agreement was reached. By August 18th, 156 enterprises were involved and the strike
movement “became transformed into an attempt to initiate by method of direct non-violent action, an important system reform”. (ibid.pp.116)
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right to assemble freely and demand democratic changes. (Modzelewski, 1982) Out of this first crucial step towards dismantling socialism, the Solidarity trade union was born.
The Gdansk Agreement was to be the first big breakthrough in Solidarity’s efforts. In retrospect, it is also a unique document for its time and place in history. Signed after nearly a month of strikes, it was to be the first ever form of concession from the authoritarian state towards its civil society in any member of the Eastern Bloc. It was only possible as a result of the accumulated efforts of all the previous strikes and riots over the decades and the regime’s failure to cope with them. The agreement officially ratified the existence of Solidarity and opened the door for duality in the socio-political life of the country…at least on paper.
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interests of the state”. (ibid.) Determining these national interests, of course, remained in the scope of the party’s ideology, arming itself with a legitimate veto power against any opposition from below.
V.
Failed promises, conspiracies, and martial law
On the economic side, Gierek and his cabinet had little room to maneuver. They had no alternative other than to incorporate a mechanism to raise wages and ensure adequate supplies of food on the market, in order to reverse the mounting public dissatisfaction. There was also to be an increased investment in health services and medicines. The regime promised to open publicly the discussion on economic reform and to invite the trade unions for discussing potential laws on workers’ self-government. (Ash, 2002) Here again, what would normally seem like a genuine commitment to improve living conditions and liberalize society turned into a twisted political game. Suspicions arose that the government was supportive of the agreement “in order to share the burden of a faltering economy with the trade unions”. (ibid.)
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enthusiastic about entering into a dialogue with the communist party and negotiating reforms, many radicals were completely skeptical of and opposed to such a relationship. Bronislaw Misztal, from the Polish Academy of Sciences, explains this tactic of the ruling elite as a way of “exhaustion of the masses to undermine the emotional foundations of the movement”. (Misztal, 1985)
Solidarity proved rather resilient in these critical stages andvery quickly became much more than a trade union. It became an alternative socio-political space in the realm of a monolithic arena directed by the PZPR. It gave a voice to the millions of frustrated, regardless of their age or place of residence – a channel through which to vent at least some degree of their inbuilt anger. The figure of nearly 10 million members (or over a quarter of the population) within the first year of the union’s existence speaks for itself about the growing enthusiasm. (Donovan, 2005) It is a testament of the citizens’ desire to voice their demands for change and break the collective veil of fear.
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regarding it exist, but none goes too far in its certainty of matters. I might suggest looking into Edwina Moreton’s “The Soviet Union and Poland’s Struggle for Self-Control”, as well as Przemyslaw Gasztold-Sem’s “The Road to Martial Law: Polish Communist Authorities vs.
Solidarity” for further clarification on the debate. Rather, what I find more essential for my
research is the role that Solidarity continued to play in Polish society.
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Solidarity’s future actions did not benefit the movement. It also sent out a discouraging message to its millions of followers.
Eventually, on top of this internal power struggle, the moderates emerged victorious. Walesa became the undisputed leader for the trade union. (Ash, 2002) Bronislaw Misztal argues that if the radicals had managed to seize control, they could have been successful in driving Solidarity forward and achieving the practical results that were expected by the population. (Misztal, 1985) Instead, the proposed course of action – negotiating with the authorities, would prove inefficient over the course of the following year. The challenge ahead of Solidarity, adds Bielsiak, “had always been translating its hegemonic influence from the realm of popular consciousness to the sphere of political reality”. (Bielsiak, 1985) Otherwise, this fundamental historical advantageof the Polish civil society over the rest of the countries in the Eastern bloc would not amount to any material or spiritual gains. It appears as if the Poles, as early as 1980, had prematurely given birth to democratic attitudes and expectations that would not be visible in the rest of the socialist states for at least another decade. This unique characteristic put them both at an advantage and a disadvantage. The disadvantage was that, just like all other countries, they too would have to wait until 1989 to disband the communist regime, in order for their democratic values to mature. Meanwhile, their experience of struggle against the regime gave the Poles a strategic advantage to make a more expeditious transition than the rest.
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1968, and 1970. All of them were sparked by a crisis in the leadership that had driven the public into an unbearable state of mind. (Misztal, 1985) All of them had ended with a mixture of police brutality and empty promises from the ruling elite, only to lead to a new cycle of apathy and upheaval. Misztal argues that this cycle had begun to change by the revolts of 1980 and that we should look at the emergence of Solidarity in a different context. (ibid.) By the late 1970s, class antagonisms had begun to emerge like never before, breeding the ground for a Marxist scenario of a revolution from below. Meanwhile, according to the scholar, “the political elite began to run short of instrumental measures with which to exert pressure”. (Misztal, 1985) In other words, the gap between the Party and society had widened to a greater degree than ever before.
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give up any political power, this could have signaled for nothing less than another episode of forceful repression.
The martial law would last for two years, until 1983. During that period, many Solidarity activists, campaigners, and regular members would lose their freedom and end up behind bars. In the first months of this crackdown, the government would successfully crush the backbone of the trade union using the army and the riot police. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008)This move was little anticipated due to the recent revival of civil consciousness, the influence of the Pope, and the legitimization of Solidarity under the Gdansk Agreement. However, as Ash points out, the enthusiastic opposition in Poland had grossly “underestimated the authorities and their willingness to use force, thinking instead in a simple dichotomy of power versus society”. (Ash, 2002) In all honesty, there is no particular reason to believe that the authorities would have refrained from using their only means of consolidating power, as they had done on numerous prior occasions. They had no higher power to be accountable to other than the USSR, who would welcome such a move. Meanwhile, the communists had proved time and time again that they held no sympathy for the rights and even lives of civilians. Had the oppositional movements had any access to weapons, the story might have been quite different, but as it stood, no coup or revolution in its literal sense were ever being planned, despite that being used as a forged claim by the regime to legitimize its use of force.
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be content with keeping their hands outside the reach of power, where they were inevitably headed for by 1981. Its top leadership might have been jailed and its offices sealed, but instead of retrieving in fear, many of the dissident activists went underground to operate and keep the union functional. (Bartkowski, 2009)They understood the importance of what had been achieved so far and were not ready to undermine all the efforts and legacy of their fellows who lay unjustly in the cells.
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VI. A dream long awaited – the opening up of Poland
By the end of 1988, the PZPR was aware that it could not carry alone the burden of the suffocating economy. It was faced with over 60 percent annual inflation and increasing foreign debt. (Regulski & Wawrzynski, 1989) Meanwhile, the radical reforms that had been enacted were still at an early stage to determine their effectiveness. The citizens had no patience left however, and the government knew that well. Even western governments that had been friendly to Poland retracted their economic aid to the regime, calling for the legalization of Solidarity. (Donovan, 2005) If it did not want to be faced with a new wave of protests and strikes, the leadership had to act immediately. The party made the bold decision to “re-engage with Solidarity, re-legalize the trade union, and open negotiations on a possible political transition”. (Bartkowski, 2009)
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perhaps the most important – the minds of the people. No matter what reforms they promised, there was simply no way that they could sell the propaganda this time around. Bartowski identifies Solidarity’s great experience in self-organizing and the restless attitude of its activists as the key components of their mobilizing success. (Bartowski, 2009)
The landmark elections of June 1989 shocked analysts and even Solidarity members themselves. The movement won a sweeping victory, claiming 99 out of the 100 seats in the
Senate and all of the 161 seats that were up for grabs in the Sejm. (The Warsaw Voice, 2012)
Two months later, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, one of the intellectual leaders within Solidarity, was appointed as the country’s first freely elected Prime Minister. He formed a coalition cabinet with the Peasant Party and the Democratic Party. The door towards a democratic transition was now officially open and the new leaders were summoned to the task of guiding those from the strikes and street proteststhrough it and to a new secure home. This passage would prove to be the real uphill climb for Solidarity.
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As was the case in all CEE countries after 1989, Poland’s GDP declined sharply in the first 3 years and the country experienced high levels of inflation. (Jackson, Klich & Poznanska, 2005) Coupled with that, the unemployment rate soared from 6.5% to 16.4% by 1993. In some rural areas, it was as much as 25%. (Gardawski, 2002)Industrial production fell by over 30% between 1990 and 1992. (Kramer, 1995) As one can derive from such figures, the relationship between Solidarity leaders and its supporters would become significantly different compared to the pre-1989 period. Furthermore, as Hanna Suchocka (PM of Poland 1992-93) tells us, it is a mistake to take into consideration only that part of Polish society identified with Solidarity and to assume that the legacy of the past would disappear quickly. (Suchocka, 2002) The ball was now in Solidarity’s court and the longer it took for the reforms to yield results, the more strenuous its relationship with the public would become.
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The outlining proof of Solidarity’s failure to establish itself as the consolidator of democratic changes, were the parliamentary elections in 1991. One year after Walesa had stepped up as Poland’s first freely elected president, the country held its first fully-free parliamentary vote. The result was a radically fragmented Sejm, with as many as 29 parties and interest groups gaining representation. (Millard, 1992) Part of the reason for this was a peculiarly low threshold under the electoral law, but even this could not account for the incredibly even distribution of the vote. The highest result, for the Democratic Union (an outgrowth fraction of Solidarity), was a meager 12.31%. Solidarity came ninth with just over 5%. (ibid.)
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new democratic Poland would be built, while having to clean up the economic mess left from its predecessor.
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Chapter 2: Bulgaria
Bulgaria is often depicted in European history as having had its own distinct brand of communism. Despite not being a member of the USSR, it is no enigma that this Balkan country’s economic and social policies were closely modeled on the Soviet method. Ever since the de-Stalinization period that swept through the Eastern bloc during the 1950s, Bulgaria was ruled by Todor Zhivkov, who would go on to become the longest serving communist leader on the continent. The country rarely made the international news in the courageous ways that Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia did through the cataclysmic upheavals against their respective regimes. The passivity of the Bulgarian civil society is a commonly attributed characteristic, not just from foreign observers, but amongst its population as well. This is often said to be one of the main setbacks in its transition to democracy over the past two decades.
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I.
The beginning
After the Stalinist coup of September 1944, repressions of an unseen scale begun in Bulgaria. The political, economic, and cultural elite of the country were literally wiped out. (Badzhakov, 2011) Three years later, political opposition to the leadership was banned, drafting in constitution, the monopoly of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP). (ibid.) By nature, the most expected source of opposition in this stage should come from the peasants, whose land is being appropriated by the authorities. In Bulgaria, this role had to be played by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU). However, their active leader Nikola Petkov, who was also a member of parliament from 1946, was sentenced to a death penalty in a politically manipulated trial for espionage and the spreading of counter-communist ideology. (Dimitrov, 2001) Dr. Vesselin Dimitrov, a reader in East European politics at the London School of Economics, claims that the backbone of Bulgaria’s peasants had been broken by the elimination of Petkov and their party in 1947. (ibid. pp.30) In the same fashion, the working class was de-unionized at a very early stage and the formation of a homogeneous and broad middle class was made virtually impossible. (ibid.) These early characteristics of Bulgaria’s social topography may serve as one of the historical explanations for the lack of a coordinated dissident movement in the decades to come.
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formed armed brigades on local levels in order to defend themselves from the forced collectivization and the reign of terror. (ibid.) On a broader level, they coordinated their efforts and voiced their criticism through a privately run radio station ‘Goryani’. Initially there were 173 members, but by 1953 they estimated over 3 thousand. Ivanov adds that “there may have been as many as 50 thousand assistants and affiliates to the movement who were not formally registered, fearing arrests and execution”. (ibid. pp.113)
The overall impact of the Goryani can be disputed on various levels. The author embraces the fact that the movement remained active all the way up to 1953. This in itself is remarkable, keeping in mind that most similar grassroots initiatives in the other socialist countries could not last for more than two years. (Ivanov, 2011) However, their main drawback was that “they could not organize well into a coordinated opposition structure due to their heterogeneity and broad background”. (ibid. pp.111) The Goryani were comprised of people from all sorts of professional and ideological backgrounds – anarchists, fascists, nationalists, agrarians, out-of-line communists, etc. The only factor which united them was the fear for their lives and property. Ivanov emphasizes continuously the fact that they acted only in self-defense and never openly confronted the regime, thus never posing a true alternative or threat to the new regime. (ibid.)
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Korean War) that could set off a domino effect and topple the communist regimes. (Ivanov, 2011) Realizing that no foreign help would come, the movement gradually weakened.
Despite being outspoken critics of the new regime and predominantly anti-communist, I believe the Goryani may have actually done the BCP a favor with their existence. As Ivanov points out, the emergence of an armed contingent of rebels meant that the structures of State Security (Bulgaria’s communist secret services) had to grow quickly in size, number, and territorial capacity. (ibid.) In a way, this acted as an early rehearsal for what to do in critical situations. At the same time, the communists were able to fortify their repressive structures during the early years of their leadership. These structures would be essential for the BCP’s future monopoly in the nation.
II.
Post-Stalinism – The Beginning of Zhivkov’s Era
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General Secretary of the Communist Party by Todor Zhivkov (only 43 at the time). It is no secret that this move was centrally directed from the Kremlin. (Bulgaria, 2012) Two years later, the Bulgarian Communist Party held its famous April Plenum, where Chervenkov was criticized for his policies and officially removed from the higher echelons of the leadership.
The Stalinist model was denounced, as had been done at the Soviet Union’s 20th Communist
Party Congress two months earlier. (ibid.) Many political prisoners were released and a new economic five-year plan was launched, which would be geared towards raising living standards. (ibid.)
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marionettes. Meanwhile, such a softened stance from the authorities caused confusion and division among the intellectuals. Those who didn’t interpret it as a sign of liberalization saw it as a form of cynical demagogy. The artistic guild would internally split up into opposing fractions – a very welcome news for the newbie leader, especially since he had achieved this without ever reverting to force. Hristova makes a similar claim by pointing out that “it is difficult to achieve unity and coherence among artistic intellectuals due to their individualistic and creative character, and this works in favor of the regime”. (Hristova, 2005, pp.200)
Zhivkov’s regime was certainly alarmed by the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Amidst a fear of a possible spillover effect, the leadership was quick in denouncing the actions as ‘barbaric’ and the works of ‘bandits’ working against the revolution. (Dimitrov, 2001) Meanwhile, it tightened its control over censorship, reducing any possibility of internal criticism and autonomous political organization. By professing its unconditional loyalty to Moscow, the BCP ensured the public that it would receive substantial economic benefits. The leadership championed itself as “the model disciples of the Soviet Union – a position which made them highly unpopular in other satellite countries”. (Brisby, 1960, pp.37)
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who were often willing to revise and censor the content according to the socialist ideology. Their role was to control, contain, and report any diverting opinions and attempts to publish provocative materials. Between 1960 and 1962, the Soviet Communist Party frequently requested updates from their Bulgarian counterparts on the situation with the intellectuals, as there were concerns over dissenting views spreading around the continent. (ibid.)
The fall of Khrushchev in 1964 brought the hope of a parallel regime shift in Bulgaria, as had always been the consequence until then. (Hristova, 2005, pp.253) When this did not happen, it was not followed by protests or open dissatisfaction. Instead, Bulgarians understood that socialism is there to stay, Zhivkov is there to stay – they would have to adapt. Hristova argues that this adaptability of Bulgarian society over the centuries can be seen as both a trait which sustained their existence in difficult times, but also created a tendency towards mass conformism. (ibid. pp.270)
III. The Economy
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in an attempt to “redress the balance of the economy”. (Brisby, 1960, pp.38) What this demonstrates, is a certain cautious attitude of the regime, foreseeing the imminent bereavement and making preemptive adjustments. Accounts suggest that at any stage prior to the 1980s, the Bulgarian economy needed not worry about a possible shortage in the supply of raw materials. (Jackson, 1991) Marvin Jackson, an author of numerous publications on the history of economic affairs and in Eastern Europe, indicates that “probably no other country enjoyed such stimulus from Soviet supplies of energy and raw materials combined with an equally generous Soviet willingness to accept its manufactured goods as Bulgaria”. (Jackson, 1991, pp. 206-207) These close economic ties may have indeed stipulated the stability of Bulgaria’s Communist Party over the years.
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BCP a considerably smoother terrain on which to rule, in comparison to many other socialist states.
IV. Cultural Revolution or ‘Revival’?
After a rather uneventful decade in regards to socio-political turbulence, the first half of the 1980s was characterized by a declining energy supply, soaring foreign debt, and a deteriorating agricultural sector. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) Nonetheless, Hristova writes that Bulgaria still remained one of the more economically stable countries in the socialist bloc, and its trade relations with the Soviets were not gravely affected. (Hristova, 2005, pp. 341) The events of 1980 in the Gdansk shipyards and the emergence of Solidarity were certainly worrisome news in the ears of Zhivkov and his entourage. So he opted for his strongest trump card – “flirting with the intelligentsia”, as Hristova amusingly puts it. (ibid.) This tactic had been tried numerous times and had proved relatively successful. He appointed his charismatic daughter, Lyudmila, as a minister of culture. She would open up the door for a period of cultural renaissance in the country. Many of the previously repressed artists were rehabilitated
(much like in 1956) and called forth to promote the cultural events to mark Bulgaria’s 1300th
anniversary in 1981. (Hristova, 2005, pp. 341) Lyudmila Zhivkova’s untimely death that same year saw the abrupt end to this wave of liberalization.
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fascism. (Hristova, 2005, pp.339) They also saw it as an attempt to import Poland’s Solidarity model. As in other similar cases, this did not stop the book from going into circulation in the underground. However, it failed to reach out to the masses and to serve as a reviver of the public consciousness. The book would gain iconic status only after 1989, when political changes were already in the making. (ibid.)
Instead of a revival of the public consciousness, what occurred was a strikingly different “revival process”. It began towards the end of 1984, and was exclusively directed by the communist authorities and the State Security apparatus. The target was the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria, as well as all other Muslim groups. The plan was to assimilate them into a ‘Bulgarian identity’, by forcefully changing their names and forbidding the marking of Muslim religious holidays. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) Teaching in Turkish was also banned. This was no small sector of the population – as much as 10%. (Büchsenschütz, 2000, pp.104) The exact reasoning behind such a step remains bewildering, and the only possible explanation may lie in a desire of Zhivkov to divert the public attention from the economic situation by tapping into nationalist sentiments.
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(ibid.) The demonstrations, which had been on the whole peaceful until then, turned quite violent very soon. Citizens of three northeastern towns, which were next on the list for conversions, blocked the roads so that the authorities could not enter. After three days of unsuccessful negotiations, tank brigades were ordered to break the blockades, resulting in over 30 deaths. (ibid., pp.107) Later the same year, numerous incidents with bomb explosions occurred, killing several innocent civilians. Right away, the acts were linked to the Turkish minority and the BCP declared that fighting internal terrorism was on its agenda. (Büchsenschütz, 2000, pp.105) They had managed to create a problem where there hadn’t been one previously. The ethnic and religious division had produced a cleavage, denting the image of a country which had prided itself on ethnic tolerance and had saved its Jewish population during WWII.
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The authorities in both countries were extremely surprised and unprepared for the effects of this agreement. In the matter of months, over 320,000 Bulgarian-Turks gathered all their belongings and crossed the border into a country that most of them had never lived or even visited. (Büchsenschütz, 2000) The Bulgarian leadership coined the cynical term ‘The Grand Excursion’ to describe the mass exodus. Whole towns and villages in eastern Bulgaria were completely abandoned. This would have dire effects on the economy, since many of these regions were key agricultural suppliers for the nation. Furthermore, the exodus happened exactly before the harvest period, when their labor was most needed. On the other hand, Turkey was also not prepared to host such a high number of refugees and did not have the means to integrate them sufficiently. Many of them could not even speak fluent Turkish, since they had grown up in Bulgaria. They quickly became a community without a true identity, and a number of them would opt for returning to Bulgaria once the communist regime fell.
The experiment with assimilating Bulgarian-Muslims proved to be one more miscalculated move in Zhivkov’s struggle to hold on to power and regain public support. It created social division on an ethnic basis and agonized the minorities, planting the seeds for separatist movements to emerge. Despite concealing efficiently its breach of human rights to the outside world, it soon caught up with the regime. International bodies like Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch became active in revealing the crimes. (Büchsenschütz, 2000) Nonetheless, the masterminds of this plan were never put on trial.
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Zhivkov. The reasons for this are quite clear. While the process was going on, very little information was being released to the public. The one that was presented was quite distorted – suggesting that most ethnic Turks willingly cooperated and were even eager to regain their Bulgarian identity. It was not until after the fall of Zhivkov that the true facts emerged and were condemned. (Hristova, 2005) Likewise, when the exodus began in the summer of 1989, the leadership continuously stressed that these people were leaving the country at their own will, portraying them as traitors. (ibid.) This prompts me to question, how could 300 thousand people be so “eager” to change their identity at one moment, yet emigrate with the very first chance they got? Unfortunately, the average Bulgarian in those times was not accustomed to examining, analyzing, and questioning. Only very few intellectuals who were aware of the implications and immorality of such a violation of rights and had closer access to the objective truth could have asked themselves this. The problem was that they did not do enough to spread the facts, to change the public perception, and to ignite a dialogue about what was happening. Whether this was out of fear, disbelief, or unawareness is debatable.
V.
The Gorbachev Era & The Birth of Civil Organizations
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geared towards remodeling the face of communism. For the Zhivkovites, this signaled change – an idea they had never been comfortable with.
One of the characteristic policies of Gorbachev was the rebalancing of trade within the COMECON in order to make the terms more equal. The new leader would also retract a significant amount of the financial subsidies that the Soviets had supplied their fellow states with. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) For a country like Bulgaria, which relied heavily on Russian support, this was not welcome news, especially in times of economic hardship. Zhivkov’s regime was seen as too conservative and outdated from Gorbachev’s point of view, and despite not enforcing any structural changes at the top, a more isolationist attitude from the Soviets would have a profoundly weakening effect on the Bulgarian regime.
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The first independent civil organizations in Bulgaria appeared in 1988. Those included the Union for Protection of Human Rights, the Committee for Defense of Religious Freedoms, the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, the free trade union ‘Podkrepa’, and the ecological movement ‘Ecoglasnost’. (Hristova, 2005) Despite their sudden growing number, these organizations were not the ideal grassroots movements, since their scope was fairly limited. As an example, ‘Ecoglasnost’ had initially only 101 registered members. (Aleksandrieva & Karakachanov, 2009, pp.8) There were many strong supporters, but few were willing to apply for membership, as people still did not feel secure to be a part of non-Party structures. The movements were not born out of dissident efforts, but out of the Communist Party’s new platform, which in turn was motivated by the external shifts in Moscow’s policies. Unlike Poland’s Solidarity, they lagged behind significantly in membership and public confidence. Regardless, they were still important for raising public awareness on important issues and tearing down partly the veil of censorship.
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they only served to exacerbate the internal division between anti-communists and communist-reformists.
Perhaps the most influential among these movements was ‘Ecoglasnost’. It was formed by well-known public figures, primarily from the artistic sphere, as a response to the mounting ecological crisis facing the northeastern town of Rouse, which by 1987 was subject to frequent gassing and chemical dumping in the Danube River, coming from a factory in a nearby Romanian town. (Hristova, 2005) It would be fair to claim that ecological concerns had been put to the forefront since the Chernobyl disaster of 1986. People from northeastern Bulgaria, who were geographically closest to the affected region, felt particularly vulnerable and were frustrated by the government’s silence and misinformation on the issue. (ibid.) It was also the only topic on which a larger proportion of citizens could agree and voice their anger. The former professor of East European History at the University of Oxford, Dr. Richard Crampton, argues that the ecological platform had a solid basis for uniting the opposition since it was oblivious to social classes or political preferences. (Crampton, 1990) I would certainly agree with his remark. However, it would be fair to add that this oblivion to social classes and political preferences impedes a movement from driving forward significant changes. Perhaps Ecoglasnost (like most of the other new ‘dissident’ organizations in Bulgaria) did not have true aspirations to enter the political arena, or to even question the fundamental pillars of socialism.
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set up a national ecological conference in the summer of 1988, where Ecoglasnost and the media were present. (Crampton, 1990, pp.24) In some ways, the government demonstrated to the public a political will to at least acknowledge the existing problems, but it failed to commit with a strategic plan to alleviate them. Soon after, the events of the Turkish exodus occurred, and in many ways, this served to divert the public attention away from the ecological discussion. Crampton testifies for this, writing that “the impact of Ecoglasnost was muted and overshadowed by the mounting confrontation between the regime and the Bulgarian Turks”. (ibid. pp.25)
VI. The End of an Era
By 1989, it was becoming evident that socialism was economically unsustainable. Bulgaria had accumulated a foreign debt of $10 billion. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) The dissident movements in the country had been gaining increasing support from western governments and media. (ibid.) Within the Party, more and more divisions were emerging as well. Although this information has not been well documented and internal discussions were often kept in secret, numerous accounts of BCP members suggest that agents close to Zhivkov, mainly in Petur Mladenov and Alexander Lilov’s circle had been conspiring against him long before his fall. (ibid.)
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central parks. Foreign media and NGOs were invited, and it did not escape their eye when police forces used violence against a peacefully gathered civilian crowd. Even some of these journalists became caught up in the confrontation and reported of being harassed by the authorities. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) No longer would the Bulgarian regime be able to resort to the use of force and rely on covering up the truth consequently. Despite the repressions of the
Ecoforum, the green movement showed no signs of stepping back, and organized a mass rally
the following week. It was held on November 3, and assembled over 10,000 supporters in the heart of the capital. (Hristova, 2005, pp.356) For the first time, the emblematic chants ‘demokratzia’ (democracy) were heard. (ibid.) It was becoming obvious that more and more people were gradually letting go of the oppressive chains that had bounded them to silence for decades. The wave of openness and detachment of politics from society that was sweeping the socialist countries had reached Bulgaria as well.
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VII. The UDF – ‘Dissidents’ turned Politicians
On December 7, thirteen opposition movements united to form the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), headed by the philosopher and dissident Zhelyu Zhelev (author of the provocative book ‘The Fascism’). (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) Two weeks earlier, the opposition had gathered a rally of over 100,000 supporters (exact figures do not exist, may be up to 150,000) to denounce the repressive policies of the BCP. This rally gave wings to the UDF and a green light to challenge for a new political order. (Bakalov, 2008) However, the coming weeks showed an internal division within the UDF concerning quite central topics. Much like in the case of Solidarity, it became evident that two opposing camps existed within the formation. There were those who favored legitimate change through amending the constitution and through dialogue with the communists, among whom was the leader Zhelev. (ibid.) On the other hand were the radical revolutionaries, calling for direct confrontation and the forceful ousting of the BCP. Their weakness was that they were less in number and lacked a strong guiding figure. Zhelev managed to convince the majority in the UDF that constructive dialogue would be best for an effective and smooth transition in Bulgaria. (ibid.) As a result of this, the national roundtable talks were scheduled for January of the following year. Just like in Poland, so too in Bulgaria the radicals were not able to leave a considerable mark on the transition process.
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(Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) For the period that they lasted, these talks became more important than what was going on in the national assembly. They were broadcasted live on national television, in order to demonstrate transparency. (ibid.) On January 14, the UDF organized another gathering in front of the parliament building, in order to keep up the political pressure on the BCP. Again the turnout was as high as the previous one. (Melone, 1994) Inside the building, Petur Mladenov denounced Zhivkov’s methods of governing (despite being a long-serving minister under him) and Andrey Lukanov made it clear that “socialism should not be regarded as dead, but only renounced in its Stalinist forms”. (ibid. pp.263) The important decisions that were reached as a result of the talks were to move away from the one party system, a change of constitution, breaking the link between the BCP and the leading institutions, courts, army and police, and the scheduling of free parliamentary elections. (ibid.) A landmark resolution was passed, in which both the communists and the opposition denounced the repression of the minorities under Zhivkov’s regime. (Melone, 1994) It was in the best interests of the new BCP leaders to show the public that they had split completely from the previous regime.
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seats in parliament. (Baeva & Kalinova, 2002) This made Bulgaria the only Eastern European country to vote in power the ex-communists at the first free elections. The arguments for this can be many. Baeva and Kalinova claim that the UDF’s aggressive propaganda focused exclusively on blaming the communist past may have contributed to this low vote. (ibid.) Another factor may be that the UDF was able to gain support only in the big cities, while the BSP maintained its nationwide constituency through the already operating regional structures. (ibid.) Beyond the mixture of reasons that lead to these election results, one thing was clear. The Bulgarian public was not prepared for a 180 degree turn towards a democratic and capitalist form of government and there was a large proportion of the population that was not willing to draw the sword on the socialist ideology.
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who were meant to represent them, with opinion polls showing less and less faith in the democratic institutions.
VIII. Summary
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The lack of a broad and homogenous middle class in Bulgaria undermined the possibility of a stable and constant opposition. Neither were the peasants able to serve this role. The Communist Party was aware from its very coming to power that it would have to deal with the task of disassociating these social groups in order to arrange for itself a smoother leadership and it certainly succeeded. The transformation of the nation from a primarily agrarian to an industrial one was among the key components. A more condensed urban population enjoying a modernized lifestyle with secure jobs gave the ruling elite unquestioned freedom. It would only feel its throne in jeopardy after 1980, when the economy started crumbling.
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Conclusion
Upon examining in detail the cases of Poland and Bulgaria during socialism, a number of disparities become evident. Nonetheless, I was surprised to discover certain similarities as well, where I would not have imagined finding such. Some of my preconceived notions were also dispelled. One example is the common portrayal of Solidarity as an almost faultless and strongly united movement. As the facts have shown, the trade union had its shortcomings, especially in its political agenda and performance. It was also internally eaten up by its own members, fighting for position, influence, and ideology.
The differences between Poland and Bulgaria begin from the very early stages of communism, right after the Second World War. Surprisingly in that period, the Bulgarian opposition seems more active, demonstrated by the relentless efforts and endurance of the
Goryani. Such a militant resistance to the new leadership is not present in Poland, or at least
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democracy after the War. Yalta was virtually a decree of isolationism for Poles and an ideal breeding ground for nationalism. Poles knew enough about the horrors of totalitarianism from past experience and the collective memory carried its attestation. Bulgarians knew it in the memory of Ottoman occupation, but having conceded two wars alongside the Germans, it did not seem like quite the worst idea to be allied to one of the winning powers. In fact, the admiration for Russia as a liberator from Ottoman rule was openly professed.
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The economy played its part as well. In this piece, I have not gone in depth to present and analyze economic figures, since it was an interdisciplinary approach and the scope of the work certainly did not allow me to do so, but some important elements were touched upon. The main difference that stands out is the fluctuation of the Polish economy versus the relative stability of the Bulgarian one. Frequent price increases and unchanging incomes, followed by the shortage of consumer goods crushed one government after another. The patience of the people was pushed to its limits. Meanwhile in Bulgaria, previously poor agrarians became industrial workers (save the few who became prisoners), urban population grew, and production and export remained high. The close links and loyalty to Moscow paid off for most of the time. It was not until the last decade of Zhivkov’s rule that serious deficits would emerge and be felt by the public, but compared to the case of Poland, this was not nearly enough to fuel public grievances. Both Poland and Bulgaria experienced significant economic hardships in the early post-communist years with high inflation, declining GDP, and rising unemployment. The reaction of the public was the same – losing trust in political parties and institutions, resulting in highly fragmented voting behavior and constant changes from the left to the right, and vice versa. This suggests that continuously, systematic factors have played a higher role than psychological elements, dispelling the argument of some analysts that Bulgarian passivity and lack of opposition is somehow ingrained genetically – a rather absurd claim in my opinion.
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backing of the Catholic Church. The Orthodox Church in Bulgaria did not serve as the mediator between society and politics, as was the case in Poland. The regime in Bulgaria pushed towards atheism, upholding ideological claims to the forefront. Although the population did not renounce its religious beliefs, it pushed them down to the deepest private sphere of their lives. In Poland, Catholicism remained such a strong force, that the Communists could not dare to subvert it, and rather opted for levering it on its side. The figure of Pope John Paul II further emancipated the self-confidence of Poles.
The independent organizations in Bulgaria emerged as late as 1988. They were many in number, and small in membership. The attempt of the UDF to unite all of them into one structure and run for parliament was completely logical, but proved ineffective. The practical tasks that lay ahead outweighed the visionary ambitions of the union and contributed to its failure. The internal divisions between radical revolutionaries and moderate reformists marred the status of both Solidarity and the UDF in the transition period. In both cases, scholars seem to agree that if the radicals had taken control, the paths for both countries would have been vastly different. Would a more confronting approach of de-communization and expulsion of all previous political elites have been beneficial? Perhaps so.
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enough to be represented in parliament. I do, however believe, that the legacy of the past does not disappear, and both countries are now and will be in the future, faced with difficulties to overcome. Corruption and social inequality remain among the biggest problems in both countries, and civil movements and organizations are becoming ever more important in the global age of decentralization of politics. This is why one must be aware of and understand both the achievements and shortcomings of the historical movements that have preceded their generation, in order to gain inspiration and to avoid disillusionment.
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Bibliography
Aleksandrieva, Liliana & Alexander Karakachanov (2009). “Independent Movement
Ecoglasnost”, Ciela Publishing, Sofia, 2009
Ash, Timothy Garton (2002). The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980-1982 (3rd edition), Yale
University Press.
Badzhakov, Momchil (2011). “The Bulgarian Dissidence With and Without Quotations”, from compilation of working papers on national academic conference The Opposition Against The Communist Regime in Bulgaria, New Bulgarian University, 23-24 March, 2011.
Baeva, Iskra & Evgenia Kalinova (2002). The Bulgarian Transitions: 1939-2002, Paradigma 2002.
Bakalov, Ivan (2008). “November 18, 1989 – What Happened at the First Democratic Rally and
its Aftermath”, e-vestnik.bg, November 18, 2008
Bartkowski, Maciej Ph.D.(2009). “Poland’s Solidarity Movement (1980-1989)”, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict – working papers, December 2009.
