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Co-assessor: E. van de Mortel Studentnumber: S2794950 E-mail: m.k.walda@student.rug.nl Master’s Thesis

MSc Business Administration Organizational & Management Control

June 2016 Word count: 12,057

The Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation:

A Systematic Review of the Accounting Literature

by

M.K. Walda

ABSTRACT

Purpose – Providing extrinsic rewards is a commonly used method to intrinsically motivate and subsequently improve performance of individuals. In the period 2002-2015 numerous articles have been published concerning this topic. The purpose of this study is to consolidate the findings of these articles, establish connections and identify gaps in management accounting literature. Furthermore, this study contributes to the way corporations and managers should motivate and improve performance of their CEOs, managers and employees.

Methodology – This study has selected articles of 10 different accounting journals based on three steps: (1) selection based on keywords, (2) forward and backward snowballing, (3) screening on the basis of abstract and finally full-text. This resulted in 35 relevant articles. Subsequently, the relevant articles are classified based on research methods, topics, settings, theories and results.

Findings – Based on the classification framework a number of key findings emerged: studies on monetary incentives primarily applied an economical theory; the large majority of studies were performed in the USA; a large part of the studies contributed to industries in general; and the study identified positive, negative and neutral effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION ... 2

2 LITERATURE REVIEW ... 3

2.1 Economics ... 4

2.2 Psychological and behavioural theories ... 5

2.2.1 Overjustification effect ... 5 2.2.2 Goal-setting theory ... 6 2.2.3 Self-determination theory ... 6 2.2.4 Behaviourist theory ... 8 3 METHODOLOGY ... 9 3.1 Data collection ... 9

3.1.1 Step 1: selection based on keywords ... 10

3.1.2 Step 2: selection based on backward and forward snowballing ... 10

3.1.3 Step 3: screening... 10

3.2 Data analysis ... 12

4 FINDINGS ... 13

4.1 Characteristics of relevant articles ... 13

4.2 Overview of results of relevant articles ... 16

4.2.1 Monetary incentives ... 16

4.2.2 Non-monetary incentives ... 19

4.2.3 Monetary and non-monetary incentives ... 20

5 DISCUSSION ... 21

5.1 Interpretation of characteristics ... 21

5.1.1 Application of theories ... 22

5.1.2 Focus of country and industry ... 22

5.2 Effects on intrinsic motivation and performance ... 23

5.2.1 Positive effects ... 23

5.2.2 Negative effects ... 24

5.2.3 Neutral effects ... 24

6 CONCLUSION ... 24

6.1 Theoretical implications and future research recommendations ... 25

6.2 Practical implications ... 25

6.3 Limitations... 26

REFERENCES ... 27

APPENDIX A – Examples abstract selection method ... 32

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1 INTRODUCTION

Total compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) of multinationals has risen dramatically over time. CEOs of these firms earned about $2.5 million on average in 1992; 20 years later average pay was three to four times higher (Lazaer & Gibbs, 2014, p. 294). Similar patterns hold for mid-size and smaller firms. This trend can be considered as a form of extrinsic rewards or performance pay for CEO’s. In the past, the trend is often approached more broadly by empirically researching the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. In order to combine the results of the empirical studies, researchers performed a number of meta-analysis (Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Cameron & Pierce, 1994; E. L. Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Tang & Hall, 1995; Wiersma, 1992). This has led to different literature streams and theories which we clarify in the next chapter. As the publication years of the aforementioned references implicate, the reviews are rather outdated. Over the years, numerous articles have been published concerning this topic. However, as far as we are aware, there are no similar meta-analysis or structured literature reviews conducted based on articles published in recent years. Furthermore, the references listed originate from psychological and behavioural journals and did not include the streams of management accounting. This ‘literature gap’ triggered us to research the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation based on existing management accounting literature published during the period 2002-2015.

Since the 1970s until today, numerous experiments have researched the effects of rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance which were also used to conduct meta-analysis and structured literature reviews. Some of them argue that negative effects of rewards are pervasive (E. L. Deci et al., 1999). Counterparties argued that those negative effects are limited (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). The major point of disagreement in the various meta-analysis concerns what has been termed ‘performance-contingent’ rewards (Pierce, Cameron, Banko, & So, 2003). According to Deci et al. (1999, p. 628), performance-contingent rewards are “those given specifically for performing the activity well, matching some standard of excellence, or surpassing some specified criterion.” According to their analysis performance-contingent rewards, on average, led to decreased intrinsic motivation (E. L. Deci et al., 1999). Another meta-analysis, published by Cameron, Banko, & Pierce (2001), suggested that the performance-contingent category was being formulated too broad. Reward procedures, that produce positive effects, were combined with rewards that produce negative effects. By reorganizing the experiments according to the actual procedures, Cameron et al. (2001) detected negative, positive, and no effects of performance-contingent rewards.

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3 and identifying gaps in management accounting research. Besides the importance from the theoretical perspective, this study can also have a great contribution towards the managerial perspective. In the beginning of the introduction we mentioned the excessive rise of CEO compensation. By analysing the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance, this study can contribute to the way corporations and managers should motivate and improve performance of their CEOs and employees. These objectives are covered by the following research question: ‘What is found in accounting literature regarding the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation

in the period 2002-2015?’.

In order to prevent ambiguity concerning the concepts of the research question, we make use of the definitions proposed by Gagné & Deci (2005). Extrinsic motivation comes from outside the individual, and results from the expectation of receiving a monetary or non-monetary incentive (Gagné & Deci, 2005). By contrast: “Intrinsic motivation involves people doing an activity because they find it interesting and derive spontaneous satisfaction from the activity itself” (Gagné & Deci, 2005, p. 331). It is important to notice that intrinsic motivation may enhance performance. Individuals who are enjoying their task are tempted to spend more time in developing their skills in an activity, which can result in a higher performance (E. L. Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harackiewicz & Sansone, 1991; White, 1959). Therefore, this study considers a high level of intrinsic motivation of individuals as a desirable effect for corporations.

In this study, the theories concerning the concepts of the research are described first. The subsequent section specifies the methodology and domain of the research. We indicate the types of articles included in the structured literature review and also justify the way in which the articles are selected. Thereafter, we develop the framework to be used for classifying the articles included in our review. This is followed by an interpretation of our results in the findings-section. The final sections of this article discus the results and present the conclusions and implications of our research.

2 LITERATURE REVIEW

In this literature review we look at the theories developed in the academic community regarding the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. The description of these theories forms an explanation on what has been found in the literature before 2002. In this way, we are able to compare the theories and related findings from before 2002 with the period 2002-2015.

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4

2.1 Economics

Within the field of economics we only present the agency theory because this theory gives a clear view on the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation from an economical perspective. Presenting other theories within this field would not lead to different perspectives.

The agency theory describes a relationship between a party (the principal) who delegates work to another party (the agent) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973). In this type of relationship the principal will try to minimise the agency costs. This can be done by specifying, monitoring and rewarding, and policing the agent’s behaviour. By contrast, the agent wants to maximise rewards and reduce principal control (Fleisher, 1991). The agency theory has two assumptions about individuals. First, individuals are fully rational and have well-defined preferences and beliefs that conform to the axioms of expected utility theory (Sarah E. Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Second, each individual is motivated solely by self-interest (Baiman, 1990). This self-interest can be explained in a utility function which consists of the elements, wealth (monetary and non-monetary incentives) and leisure. According to the agency theory, we may assume that individuals will shirk on an activity unless it contributes to their economic wealth (Sarah E. Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Non-contingent incentives generally do not satisfy this criterion. This theory suggests that extrinsic rewards are very important in the motivation and control of performance because individuals strive for increases in health (Verbeeten, 2008).

The origin of the agency theory from a management perspective is going back to the 1960s and 1970s (Eisenhardt, 1989). Eisenhardt (1989) mentioned in her article that the real origins can be found in the works on economic risk analysis where it began by addressing a common issue in organisations. In its modern form, the agency theory largely originates from the work of Mitnick (1973) and Ross (1973). Following the principles of those authors, the theory was used and adapted by a variety of streams such as sociology (Shapiro, 1987), management (Eisenhardt, 1989) and in organisational settings (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).

Limitations agency theory

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5

2.2 Psychological and behavioural theories

In this paragraph we give a description of the following theories: goal-setting theory, overjustification effect, self-determination theory (SDT) and behaviourist theory. In the description we maintain a chronological order because some theories build on each other. In addition, it gives a clear timeline of how the psychological literature stream has developed over time.

2.2.1 Overjustification effect

This effect can be described as follows: in case rewards are given to people for tasks which they already like to engage in, the participation in these tasks is found to increase in frequency. However, when these rewards are withdrawn, the frequency of participating in these tasks goes down to a level that is lower than the original level (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; Lepper & Greene, 1975).

The initial findings in this area goes back a long way. Research conducted by Lepper and Deci in the 1970s revealed that when initial interest in a task is high and extrinsic rewards are (1) not contingent on task engagement or completion, (2) salient, (3) tangible, (4) expected, and (5) lacking in information about participants’ competence, extrinsic rewards are likely to undermine subsequent intrinsic motivation for the task. This finding led to a paradox since it seemed unimaginable that rewarding enjoyable activities would diminish intrinsic motivation. In order to explain why extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation the so-called ‘overjustification effect’ was put forward. The explanation of the overjustification effect is still commonly used in psychology textbooks (Franzoi, 2009; Griggs, 2009; Lilienfeld, Lynn, Namy, & Woolf, 2010) and a number of parenting and education books (Bronson & Merryman, 2009). A recent study by Peters & Vollmer (2014) concluded that future research should continue to identify the conditions under which overjustification-effects will and will not occur. This indicates that there is still a need for new evidence and insights.

Limitations overjustification effect

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6 2.2.2 Goal-setting theory

The goal-setting theory put forward that individual goals are the primary determinant of, and immediate precursor to, effort (Locke & Latham, 1990). A more recent, underlying premise of Latham (2004) is that conscious goals affect what is achieved. The theory claims that individuals will be more motivated and perform better when goals are specific and challenging. In other words, if managers or employees know what they are aiming, they are able to put more effort in their task, which subsequently increases performance (Locke & Latham, 1990).

Limitations goal-setting theory

A drawback of the theory is related to the complexity of a task. Locke & Latham (1990) argue that complex tasks are often difficult to measure which in turn leads to somewhat vague goals.

2.2.3 Self-determination theory

Central to the SDT is the distinction between autonomous motivation and controlled motivation. Autonomy involves acting with a sense of volition and having experience of choice. Intrinsic motivation is an example of autonomous motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005). In contrast, being controlled involves acting with a sense of pressure. The use of extrinsic rewards in the early experiments was to induce controlled motivation, as mentioned in the overjustification effect. According to Gagné & Deci (2005) SDT suggests that autonomous and controlled motivations differ in terms of both their underlying regulatory processes and their accompanying experiences, and it further postulates that behaviours can be characterized in terms of the degree to which they are autonomous versus controlled. SDT is a macro-theory consisting of five subtheories (Vansteenkiste, Niemiec, & Soenens, 2010): cognitive evaluation theory (CET), organismic integration theory (OIT), causality orientation theory (COT), basic psychological needs theory (BPNT), and goal contents theory (GCT). Each of the subtheories was developed to explain a set of motivationally based phenomena that emerged from research in the past. In order to provide both historical perspective and a full understanding of the present state we cover each of the five subtheories.

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7 extrinsic reward, overall motivation will decrease because intrinsic motivation for the activity was supplanted by extrinsic rewards (Edward L. Deci, Cascio, & Krusell, 1975; Edward L. Deci, 1975).

OIT is the second subtheory and addresses the process of internalization of various extrinsic motives. More specifically, it focusses on the continuum of internalization which extends from regulation, to introjection, to identification, and to integration. These regulation forms differ in their relative autonomy, with external regulation being the least autonomous form and integrated regulation the most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation (Ryan, 2009). Research in this area found evidence that the more autonomous the individual’s motivation, the greater their persistence and performance at a task or activity (Ryan, 2009). Furthermore, OIT put forward that internalization and integration is facilitated by contextual supports for autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Explicitly individuals are more willing to internalize and integrate a practice or value when they experience choice with respect to it, efficacy in engaging in it, and connection with those who convey it (Ryan, 2009).

In contrast to the first two subtheories, COT focusses on individual differences in global motivational orientations and applies the dynamics of behavioural regulation to an understanding of people’s personality-level functioning (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010). This means that individuals differ in how they typically perceive the source (autonomy-, control-, and impersonal-oriented) of their behavioural initiation. Briefly, an autonomy-oriented person is correlated with intrinsic motivation (Sheldon & Kasser, 1995), whereas a control-oriented person is related to external motivation (Sheldon, Turban, Brown, Barrick, & Judge, 2003), and an impersonally-oriented person is associated with amotivation and depression (E. L. Deci & Ryan, 1985). Importantly, COT proposes that each of the three causality orientations exists to varying degrees within each individual which resulted in interesting findings. For example, Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman (1992) found that the association between self-report and behavioural assessments of intrinsic motivation was stronger among autonomy-oriented individuals compared to control-oriented individuals.

The differences found between the causality orientations in COT perhaps brings us the most important element of SDT, the concept of psychological needs (Sheldon et al., 2003). As stated by Deci and Ryan (2000; 1991), the concept of innate psychological needs is a fundamental part of SDT, and is very important in understanding and making predictions about the motivation and behaviour of an individual. According to SDT there are three universal and evolved human needs: (1) autonomy, wich refers to free-choice and ownership of behaviour, (2) competence, wich refers to being effective and mastering new skills in the process, and (3) relatedness, wich is about feeling connected and sympathy towards others (Vansteenkiste et al., 2010).

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8 intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, which are essential in CET and OIT, respectively. Although intrinsic goals lean towards autonomous motivation and extrinsic goals towards controlled motivation the content of the goals can be empirically crossed (Sheldon, Ryan, Deci, & Kasser, 2004).

Limitations SDT

SDT has two general limitations which relate to the above-described substheories. First, the performed research within this theory is mainly focussing on the use of monetary incentives. Although this type of incentive is undoubtely an important factor in today’s business context, this focus overlooks the possible role of non-monetary incentives (J. Kunz & Linder, 2012). Besides, primarily testing the effects of monetary incentives can cause unintended framing effects (Liebig, Meyermann, & Schulze, 2006), it also deprives the possibility to compare the pros and cons of using monetary or non-monetary incentives. Second, past research using SDT is lacking for a business context. A number of studies assessed the available evidence from psychology and education research in order to mimic business situations (e.g. Sarah E. Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; A. H. Kunz & Pfaff, 2002). However, an educational context may not lend themselves well to most business situations. A contrasting factor arises from the fact that managers and employees work to earn a living and students or pre-school childeren do not (J. Kunz & Linder, 2012).

2.2.4 Behaviourist theory

Behavioural psychologists sharply disagree with the argument that extrinsic rewards undermine intrinsic motivation. In the past, two meta-analysis are conducted which formed the basis for a powerful response from the behaviourist tradition (Cameron & Pierce, 1996; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996). These articles concluded that rewards were undermining behaviour in mainly rare and easily avoidable situations (i.e. when they are tangible, expected and not contingent on performance). Usually it had no effect on intrinsic motivation, and could even increase creativity.

Limitations behaviourist theory

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9 harmful to motivation to perform a task. Cameron, Banko, & Pierce (2001, p. 1) clearly stated that: “Rewards given for low-interest tasks enhance free-choice intrinsic motivation. On high-interest tasks, verbal rewards produce positive effects on free-choice motivation and self-reported task interest. Negative effects are found on high-interest tasks when the rewards are tangible, expected (offered beforehand), and loosely tied to level of performance. When rewards are linked to level of performance, measures of intrinsic motivation increase or do not differ from a non-rewarded control group.” Deci, Koestner, & Ryan (2001) tried to search for rapprochement in their article by stating that there are ways of using even tangible rewards that are less likely to have a negative effect and may, under limited circumstances, have a positive effect on intrinsic motivation. However, they also mentioned that the use of rewards as a motivational strategy is clearly a risky proposition.

3 METHODOLOGY

The literature review shows that the relationship between extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation generated a great deal of interest, research, and debate. To answer questions in areas with a large number of studies the use of a structured literature review has substantial appeal (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). In order to analyse the articles in a structured manner, we used elements of Shields (1997) classification scheme which he has used in the 1990s to classify management accounting research. Since we are mainly focussing on journals in this area, we are confident that this classification scheme is most suitable. In addition, before the application we conducted a pilot study to adapt the classification scheme to fit our structured literature review. According to Ginsberg & Venkatraman (1985) an analytical review scheme is necessary for systematically evaluating the contribution of given body of literature. Moreover, by employing a transparent and reproducible procedure the quality of the systematic review has been improved (Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003). Generally, the review process consists of three parts: data collection, data analysis, and data synthesis (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010). The remainder of this chapter gives an overview of how the data collection and data anaylsis took place. The results of the data analysis and data synthesis are covered in chapter 4 (findings) and chapter 5 (discussion) respectively.

3.1 Data collection

This structured literature review examined top journals from the area academic accounting. In order to select the academic accounting journals we used the ranking based on the study performed by Bonner, Hesford, Van der Stede, & Young (2006). Bonner et al. (2006) summarized the findings of sixteen studies that have ranked academic accounting journals and showed that five journals rank consistently as the top accounting journals. We extended our structured literature review with journals based on a management accounting review performed by Van Helden (2005). The 2002-2015 volumes of the following ten international accounting journals are examined: Accounting, Auditing and Accountability

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10 (CAR), European Accountability Review (EAR), Financial Accountability and Management (FAM),

Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR), Management Accounting Research (MAR), and The Accounting Review (TAR).

3.1.1 Step 1: selection based on keywords

The first selection of articles is based on the following keywords: extrinsic rewards and intrinsic

motivation. Besides these main keywords, we also used synonyms (e.g. extrinsic motivation, performance-pay, incentives, crowding-out, crowding-in, crowding theory, tangible rewards) in order

to increase our research domain. The websites of the selected journals offer a sophisticated search engine which we used to select the articles. The hits that we have found using these keywords are listed in table 1 as ‘number of hits per journal’.

Table 1 – Selected articles according to journals

AAAJ AOS CAR EAR FAM JAE JAR JMAR MAR TAR Total

Number of hits per journal

423 321 539 182 239 406 494 79 162 441 3286

Number of articles selected based on abstract

4 2 3 4 1 4 4 12 1 2 37

Number of articles selected based on entire content

3 2 3 4 1 4 4 11 1 2 35

3.1.2 Step 2: selection based on backward and forward snowballing

Forward and backward snowballing was used in order to find relevant articles which were not found with the search engines. With backward snowballing the reference list of the already selected articles were used to identify new papers to include (Wohlin, 2014). Forward snowballing refers to identifying new articles based on those articles citing the article in the domain (Wohlin, 2014). The citations of the articles were examined by using Google Scholar. Both snowballing techniques still needed to fulfil the basic criteria such as, language, publication year, and publication in the selected journals. Unfortunately, it turned out that both snowballing techniques have not resulted in unique articles outside the database search.

3.1.3 Step 3: screening

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11 researcher bias. As an alternative, we selected articles based on a thorough analysis of the abstract with three predefined criteria. The first two criteria determined whether or not the abstract appoints at least one type of incentive (monetary and/or non-monetary incentive) and at least some form of motivation and/or performance. The last criterion determined whether or not the relationship between the variables, appointed in criterion 1 and 2, is examined. Appendix A provides two examples of how the abstracts are screened.

In the final phase of the selection method, we systematically assessed the articles based on the entire content. In some cases, articles failed to meet the above mentioned criteria. Figure 1 gives an overview of the selection procedure and the subsequent screening of abstracts and articles. The in-depth analysis of the abstracts resulted in a total of 37 unique articles. After the assessment of the entire content, 35 articles have shown to be relevant for this study.

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3.2 Data analysis

After completing the data collection, we grouped the relevant articles. In order to do this, we used a classification framework as guideline under the results. The classification is based on the same framework as used by Shields (1997). First of all, we performed a pilot study of 15 articles to adapt this framework to fit our structured literature review. The five classification groups which were described by Shields (1997) are discussed below.

As stated by Shields (1997) and Van Helden (2005), we made a distinction between the following research methods: analytic, archival research, case-study, experiment, literature review,

reflection, and survey. By identifying the research method, advice can be given about the appropriate

method that can be used for further research. The pilot study indicated that relatively many articles are combining different research methods; in particular case studies are often combined with another research method to analyse the collected data. If two research methods are adressed, each counts for one half. This counting method is also used for the classification according to countries.

Our pilot study showed that there are three major topic related groups: monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives and a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives. These topics represent the type of extrinsic reward that is used in the concerning article. Besides these broad topics, all of our articles are grouped by a more specific subtopic. The subtopic makes clear which type of monetary incentive (e.g. cash bonus, stock-based compensation) and/or non-monetary incentive (e.g. autonomy, team-based incentive) emerges in the article. In case the articles did not specify the topic, we grouped them as ‘not specified’. Finally, some articles are classified in the group ‘others’ because of their unique perspective.

According to Shields (1997), classification based on settings can be done by industry or activity. The pilot study showed that most settings can be differed based on country and type of industry. In this way we can improve our understanding of national and sectoral influences on our topic. Starting point of the classification based on countries is the location of the research. Our pilot study indicated that this location is almost always identical to the location where the author works. However, when survey, case study or archival data is used from a particular country, we referred to this country as location of the research. The classification of the industries is based on the Dutch ‘Standaard Bedrijfsindeling’ which in turn is based on the activity classification of the European Union (NACE) and of the United Nations (ISIC) (“Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 2008, version 2014,” 2014).

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13 We could use Shields’ (1997) method by summarizing the results of the most important articles included in the structured literature review. However, because we only have 35 relevant articles, we summarized the results from every article. In paragraph 4.2 we discuss the results of the relevant articles based on the topic and subtopic in which they are grouped.

4 FINDINGS

The previous chapter provided information about the data gathering of this structured literature review. We indicated that we selected articles from 2002-2015 from ten academic accounting journals. These articles are classified based on research methods, topics, settings (country and industry), theory, and results. Paragraph 4.1 shows the characteristics of our relevant articles. Where after paragraph 4.2 gives an overview of these articles’ findings based on their topics and subtopics.

4.1 Characteristics of relevant articles

Table 2 classifies the articles according to the different research methods that are used. This table shows that an experiment is undeniably the most common research method followed by survey, analytic and archival research. Interesting is that 11 out of the 12 experimental studies have been performed with students from universities. Furthermore, 9% of the articles are categorised as literature reviews and 7% as case studies. Another interesting insight is that case studies, in which semi-structured interviews play a major role, are combined with another research method (e.g. analytic, archival, experiment) for most of the time (75%). Finally, only little attention is paid to reflective articles (3%) in which researchers critically discuss the findings of another study.

Table 2 – Classification of articles according to research methods

Research method Reference number1 Number of articles Percentage of total

Analytic 8, 12, 18, 27, 32 4 11 Archival 1, 2, 8, 9, 11, 14 4 11 Case study 9, 18, 29, 31 2.5 7 Experiment 3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20-22, 24, 31, 34 13.5 39 Literature review 4, 23, 26 3 9 Reflection 33 1 3 Survey 5, 11, 14, 19, 24, 25, 28, 30, 35 7 20 Total 35 100

Notes: if two research methods are addressed, each research method counts for one half. 1see Appendix B for bibliographic details and complete classification data.

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14 a look at subtopics it becomes clear that most articles (32%) are written about cash bonuses. Another large group (16%) is not specifying the type of (non-)monetary incentives.

Table 3 – Classification of articles according to topics and subtopics

Topic and subtopic Reference number1 Number of articles Percentage of total

Monetary incentives 22 63 Cash bonus 1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 22, 27, 31, 32 9 26 CEO-compensation 2, 14 2 6 Stock-based comp. 19, 26, 28 3 8 Team-based incen. 16, 17 2 6 Not specified 4, 20, 33 3 8 Others 12, 18, 29 3 8 Non-monetary incen. 6 17 Autonomy 21, 25 2 6 Formal control 10, 30, 34 3 8 Others 11 1 3

Both incentive types 7 20

Cash bonus 6, 7 2 6

Not specified 23, 24, 35 3 8

Others 8, 9 2 6

Total 35 100

Note: 1see Appendix B for bibliographic details and complete classification data.

Table 4 gives an overview of the countries to which the research is related. As explained in paragraph 3.2, our starting point is the location of the research. However, when data is used from a particular country, we referred to this country as location of the research. 64% of the research concerns the USA. However, it is important to indicate that most of the journals in our structured literature review have their in origins in the USA. Besides this, only one article (reference number 27) focused on possible cross-national differences of incentives. The remaining articles are spread across 8 different countries, with the Netherlands as a major outlier (12%).

Table 4 – Classification of articles according to countries

Topic and subtopic Reference number1 Number of articles Percentage of total

Australia 9, 30 2 6 China 27 ⅓ 1 Germany 24, 32 2 6 The Netherlands 5-7, 27, 35 4⅓ 12 New Zealand 29 1 3 Switzerland 23 1 3 Taiwan 18 1 3 United Kingdom 25 1 3 USA 1-4, 8, 10-17, 19-22, 26-28, 31, 33, 34 22⅓ 64 Total 35 100

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15 When we take a look at the type of (sub)industries in table 5, it becomes clear that most of the researchers contributed to the general literature (60%) and were not focussing on a specific industry. The table shows that we specified the public sector into government, healthcare, university and ‘not specified’ which refers to the public sector in general. Moreover, it is clear that consultancy, financial services, and retail are not investigated very often; only in 5% of the cases.

Table 5 – Classification of articles according to (sub)industries

Type of (sub)industry Reference number1 Number of articles Percentage of total

Consultancy 24 1 3 Financial services 31 1 3 General 1, 3-8, 10, 12, 13, 15-17, 20-23, 26, 32-34 21 60 Manufacturing 9 1 3 New economy 19, 28 2 6 Public sector 6 17 Government 29 1 3 Healthcare 14, 15 2 6 University 30 1 3 Not specified 2, 35 2 6 Retail trade 1, 18, 27 3 8 Total 35 100

Note: 1see Appendix B for bibliographic details and complete classification data.

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Table 6 – Classification of articles according to theories

Theory Reference number1 Number of articles Percentage of total

Economics 16 45 Agency theory 5, 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 22, 25 28, 29, 32 11 32 Economic theory 6, 14, 18, 26 4 11 Self-sorting theory 1 1 3 Psychology2 3 9 Activation theory 15 0.5 2 Goal-setting theory 16 1 3 SDT 15, 24 1.5 4

Both theory streams3 13 37

Agency theory 3, 4, 9, 20, 23 5 Economic theory 2, 10, 11, 13, 17, 34 6 Goal-setting theory 4, 10, 13, 17, 31, 35 6 Cognitive theory 3, 4, 20, 23 4 SDT 2, 10, 13 3 Other psychological 4, 11, 31, 34 4 No theory 27, 30, 33 3 9 Total 35 100

Notes: 1see Appendix B for bibliographic details and complete classification data. 2if two psychological theories are addressed, each theory counts for one half.

3despite two or more theories are addressed, each theory counts for one. For this reason, no percentages are calculated for sub-theories

In the following sections we use the classification of the relevant articles in other to group and analyse their results. This improves our understanding of current and future research in the following sections.

4.2 Overview of results of relevant articles

As indicated in the methodology section, in this paragraph we discuss the results of the relevant articles based on the addressed topics and subtopics mentioned in the previous paragraph.

4.2.1 Monetary incentives

Cash bonus

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17 attractive. Therefore, the studies concluded that firms should use care when they are developing an incentive-based performance system for attractive tasks which are complex in nature.

Bouwens & Van Lent (2006) stated that cash bonuses do not directly improve motivation and performance of employees. However, the selection of better employees is enhanced when a company offers higher cash bonuses. The selection of better employees is even more enhanced if the performance measures are less noisy, i.e. are measuring the performance of a task more precisely (Bouwens & van Lent, 2006).

Kuang & Moser (2009) emphasized the importance of combining a cash bonus with effort-inducing features. Practically this means that employees are giving guarantees in exchange for their reward. This finding is in contrast with the statements of the standard agency theory. Presslee, Vance & Webb (2013) revealed that cash bonuses are leading to higher performance when employees are able to influence the difficulty of the performance objectives.

CEO-compensation

Two studies (i.e. Adams & Ferreira, 2008; Eldenburg & Krishman, 2003) researched the effect of monetary incentives on CEO’s, grouped as the subtopic ‘CEO-compensation’. Adams & Ferreira (2008) found evidence that small cash bonuses increased attendance records of CEO’s during meetings. This finding is consistent with the conventional view that cash bonuses, related to performance, increase effort (Eldenburg & Krishman, 2003). Evidence is not in line with the idea that small cash bonuses crowd out CEO’s intrinsic motivation for attending meetings. However, the cross-sectional distribution of meeting fees, revealed in Adams’ & Ferreira’s (2008) study, suggests that firms may be aware of possible crowding out effects of extremely low cash bonuses.

Stock-based compensation

Stock-based compensation is a type of monetary incentive that is often used by new economy firms. Three studies (i.e. Ittner, Lambert & Larcker, 2003; Merchant, 2006; Murphy, 2003) investigated its effect on motivation and performance. Merchant (2006) concluded that offering lower-level employees restricted stock-based compensation, does not affect their motivation because they are not able to influence the value in a measurable way. However, Merchant (2006) indicated that owning company stock can have positive culture as well as positive employee retention effects.

Team-based incentives

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18 only tested group output from being an additive production function which means that group performance is the sum of all the individual outputs.

Guymon, Balakrishnan & Tubb (2008) extended the research on team-based incentives by changing the definition of group output from being an additive production function to a conjunctive production function; “group output is the lowest individual output times the number of members” (Guymon, Balakrishnan & Tubb, 2008: 2). They concluded that in case of a conjunctive production function the findings of Fisher, Peffer & Sprinkle (2003) do not sustain. The results of Guymon, Balakrishnan & Tubb (2008) also contributed to the goal-setting literature by providing support for setting group goals rather than individual goals.

Not specified

Besides these larger groups of articles which are specifying the type of monetary incentive, we have another set of articles which discuss monetary incentives in general. Bonner & Sprinkle (2002) found that, on average, explicit performance objectives enhance the effect of monetary incentives on motivation and performance. They suggest that organisations should develop monetary incentives in conjunction with explicit performance targets in order to motivate employees. Furthermore, Bonner & Sprinkle (2002: 337) indicated that elements of accounting settings can “attenuate the positive effects of monetary incentives on performance by altering either the effect of incentives on effort or altering the effect of incentives-induced effort on performance.” For example, monetary incentives’ objective is to increase individual effort and subsequently overall performance. However, in case individuals lack requisite skills they are not able to improve their performance. Besides this effect, individuals may also not increase their effort under monetary incentives because they are aware of the fact that effort increases will not lead to performance increases and consequent rewards (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). As an alternative, individuals can be given responsibility to select their own monetary incentive contract. In which high-skilled individuals are more likely to choose performance-based pay, thereby recuperating the incentives-effort relation (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002).

In another study by Kackelmeier, Reichert & Williamson (2008) a puzzle experiment was conducted in which they used monetary incentives to manipulate the amount of quantity and creativity. They found that quantity incentives lead participants produce significantly more puzzles, and creativity incentives generated a higher level creativity. However, in a review article by Sprinkle (2008) the results have been opposed because of its simplicity. Sprinkle (2008: 381) stated: “Such studies often not achieve a fundamental objective of research.”

Others

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19 interrelated tasks, also generated changes in the employees’ motivation allocation between different tasks.

Ho, Lee & Wu (2009) concluded with their case-study that while lower minimum performance levels reduce the incentive for employees to keep motivated after the minimum requirement is accomplished, the hurdle rate motivates some employees to increase their effort in order to avoid losing their job.

4.2.2 Non-monetary incentives

Enhanced autonomy

One of the non-monetary incentives discussed in articles is enhanced autonomy. Kuang & Moser (2011) researched the effects of wage negotiation on motivation and effort of employees under an output-based contract. Their results show that employee effort is lower with negotiation than without negotiation. This finding is in line with the standard economic view that, in absence of informational benefit, negotiation has no effect on employee effort (Kuang & Moser, 2011). Mannion, Goddard & Bate (2007) investigated the effect of enhanced autonomy with senior hospital managers. Their study proved that these type of employees are primarily motivated by enhanced autonomy.

Formal controls

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20 4.2.3 Monetary and non-monetary incentives

Cash bonus

Brüggen (2011) investigated the influence of perceived own ability on monetary and non-monetary incentives (career concerns). Results showed that employees with low perceived ability are not sensitive for career concerns as an incentive because they are aware of the fact that high ability employees can easily outperform them in their effort. However, in case cash bonuses are given next to the already existing career concerns, low ability employees are showing much more effort in performing their task. Brüggen & Moers (2007) revealed the importance of non-monetary incentives by manipulating social incentives in a way to be consistent with the firm’s objectives. They found that social incentives can reduce the so called ‘crowding out effect’ created by cash bonuses. Furthermore, they found experimental evidence that participants who were offered cash bonuses on one task significantly reduced their effort on the task without cash bonuses. This finding is consistent with the agency theory.

Not specified

Kunz & Pfaff (2002) provided good and bad empirical evidence for the agency theory. Many experiments, like mentioned in the literature review, succeeded in proving detrimental effects of monetary incentives. Therefore, it is bad news for the agency theory that the ‘hidden costs of incentives’ do indeed exist. However, it is good news that the literature on crowding out effects is not contradictory to the agency theory. Additionally, Kunz & Pfaff (2002) stated that these effects are easily avoidable in real life situations and showed that four conditions need to be met before the undermining effect of intrinsic motivation can occur. Kunz & Pfaff (2002) also had some interesting findings about intrinsic motivation. They argued that a large number of jobs are by nature not interesting enough to foster intrinsic motivation. In these type of jobs, the downsides of extrinsic rewards must be precluded because of the individual’s initial lack of intrinsic motivation. Besides, even if all jobs were intrinsically interesting, an influential norm exists in the business world, namely extrinsic payment (i.e. salary). Tasks are considered to be more valuable and interesting if they provide a higher compensation. Kunz & Pfaff (2002) concluded that in practice the danger may not be a crowding out effect, but rather the unfairness that predominates when an extrinsic reward is not given.

Kunz & Linder (2012) performed an experiment with a non-monetary incentive (i.e. affiliative reward) and monetary-incentives. They concluded that the affiliative reward exhibited a positive moderating effect between intrinsic motivation and the willingness to put effort in task. Contradictory, monetary incentives seemed to crowd out norm-based motivation and leaving intrinsic motivation and work effort unaffected.

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21 performance is positively significant. This finding is also in line with the goal-setting theory because it states that monetary incentives may not be helpful to stimulate effort when objectives are ambiguous or hard to measure.

Others

Chen, Dikolli & Jiang (2015) analysed how the negative relation between career concerns and the managers’ intrinsic motivation can be weakened. They concluded that by increasing the sensitivity of performance-measures, which determine monetary incentives, will shift managers’ attention towards his or her task.

Chenhall & Langfield-Smith (2003) examined the combined effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives on intrinsic motivation and trust. They found that providing a non-monetary incentive and offering employees non-monetary rewards enhanced intrinsic motivation.

5 DISCUSSION

In the previous chapter we showed some interesting findings related to the characteristics of our relevant articles. Subsequently, we gave an overview of the results based on the articles’ topics and subtopics. This chapter discusses these findings and gives an overview of the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation and performance. Paragraph 5.1 gives an interpretation of the indicated characteristics by looking at the main cross-sectional relationships. Paragraph 5.2 commences on the different effects which are caused by extrinsic rewards.

5.1 Interpretation of characteristics

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22 5.1.1 Application of theories

The interpretation of the characteristics revealed a notable result regarding to the application of theories by our relevant articles. A substantial majority of the studies (47%) primarily relied on an economic oriented theory and from those studies almost 66% used the agency theory. This subparagraph reflects on this finding.

In chapter 2 we discussed several theories of different disciplines in order to illustrate what has been found on the topic of our study. However, the aforementioned statistics show that our reviewed accounting journals were hindered by a focus on a single research discipline. In a research by Merchant, Van der Stede & Zheng (2003) this narrow focus of accounting literature was already revealed. Merchant et al. (2003, p. 280) concluded: “The research progress on organizational incentive systems is being hindered because so much of this research is parochial, single discipline or paradigm-focused.” In fact, Merchant et al. (2003) used research on intrinsic motivation as an example to illustrate the potential of interdisciplinary research in accounting. A more recent study by O’Dwyer & Unerman (2014) confirms our finding that there is still a lack of study-level interdisciplinary within accounting research.

Relevant articles which relied on the agency theory mainly emphasized the measurable value of extrinsic rewards, for example by measuring the increase in performance of individuals. While the inclusion of psychological/behavioural theories could explain the value of intrinsic motivation. Some of the relevant articles already showed that combining theories can greatly enrich the interpretation of the results (e.g. Bayley & Fessler, 2011; Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 2003; Kachelmeier, Reichert & Williamson, 2008; Kunz & Pfaff, 2002; Verbeeten, 2008). However, as a more recent article by O’Dwyer & Unerman (2014, p. 1229) observed: “In accounting there is still a tendency for a relatively small number of theoretical or disciplinary areas to dominate.”

5.1.2 Focus of country and industry

Two more cross-sectional relationships are found, concerning the country and industry-focus of the research. As mentioned before, almost all of the studies were performed in the USA which may cause an incomplete view of the outcomes. Especially since the use of extrinsic rewards varies tremendously by country and certainly by continent. Merchant et al. (2011) for example found these differences between Chinese, Dutch and US firms. A study by Jansen, Merchant & Van der Stede (2009) also revealed that the effects of the use of extrinsic rewards in US firms are dissimilar to Dutch firms. The domination of studies performed in the USA will therefore be taken into account in our conclusions about the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Second, we found that more than half of the reviewed articles did not focus their research on a specific industry. The same reasoning of the previous setting can be applied. Hence, the relatively narrow focus on industries causes an incomplete view of our conclusions.

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23

5.2 Effects on intrinsic motivation and performance

Paragraph 4.2 gave an overview of the results of the relevant articles according to their type of incentive and (sub)topics. In the following three subparagraphs we use this overview in order to discuss the main findings concerning the positive, negative and neutral effects of extrinsic rewards on motivation and performance that we have indicated.

5.2.1 Positive effects

Four articles showed that the use of monetary incentives, explicitly cash bonuses, improves the selection of intrinsically motivated and better performing employees (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bouwens & Van Lent, 2006; Brüggen, 2011; Kuang & Moser, 2009). Bouwens & Van Lent (2006) argued that higher cash bonuses attract more intrinsically motivated and better performing employees. Kuang & Moser (2009) supported this view by emphasizing the importance of combining a cash bonus with effort-inducing features. Brüggen (2011) and Bonner & Sprinkle (2002) claimed this is due to self-knowledge of employees with low perceived ability. These type of employees are aware of the fact that high ability employees can easily outperform them in their effort (Brüggen, 2011) and the opposite is the case with high ability employees. In order to utilize this train of thought, Bonner & Sprinkle (2002) advised firms to give employees the responsibility to select their own monetary incentive contract. This advice is in line with the findings of Presslee, Vance & Webb (2013) which indicated that in case employees are able to influence the difficulty of the performance objectives, cash bonuses are more effective.

Another important factor which leads to a positive effect on intrinsic motivation and performance with incentives has to do with clear and measurable objectives. Three articles found that explicit performance objectives enhance the effect of monetary incentives on intrinsic motivation and performance (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Bouwens & Van Lent, 2006; Verbeeten, 2008). This is in line with the notions of the setting theory. A finding of Verbeeten (2008) is also consistent with goal-setting theory which states that monetary incentives may not be helpful to stimulate effort when objectives are ambiguous or hard to measure (i.e. qualitative tasks). Based on these findings we can therefore conclude that monetary incentives are most effective when objectives are clear, measurable and feasible for employees.

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24 motivation. These findings indicate that the frequently heard crowding effect is not an insurmountable problem.

5.2.2 Negative effects

Studies by Fessler (2003) and Bailey & Fessler (2011) showed that cash bonuses are less effective at increasing motivation for a complex or attractive task. Fessler (2003) even proved that cash bonuses can undermine intrinsic motivation and subsequently degrade employee performance. According to Christ et al. (2012) this primarily occurs when extrinsic rewards are used as preventive controls. This arises from the directive character of preventive controls, whereby employees are feeling controlled which can undermine intrinsic motivation, as mentioned in the SDT. The unfolding negative effect caused by preventive controls, is supported by a study conducted by Pop-Vasileva, Baird & Blair (2011) among teachers in a university. They encountered the increased pressure on teachers caused by preventive controls. Next to identifying negative effects of using extrinsic rewards, both studies also proposed solutions. First, Christ et al. (2012) proved that detective controls can be just as effective as preventive controls, but without undermining intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, greater care should be taken in developing an incentive-based performance (Fessler, 2003).

5.2.3 Neutral effects

Most of the studies found positive and negative effects with the use of extrinsic rewards. However, a small amount of articles indicated a neutral effect. Kuang & Moser (2011) found that negotiation about the contract as a non-monetary reward has no effect on motivation in the absence of information asymmetry between firm and employee. Merchant (2006) demonstrated a neutral effect with stock options as a monetary-reward. He found that lower-level employees are not motivated by stock options because they are not able to affect the values of those instruments in any measurable way.

6 CONCLUSION

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25

6.1 Theoretical implications and future research recommendations

This study shows that accounting literature has a narrow focus when it comes to the application of theories on our research topic. A substantional majority of the reviewed studies relied on an economic oriented theory. This results in a view primarily based on a cost-benefit perspective, whereby potentially important psychological approaches have been disregarded. In chapter 2 we showed several (sub)theories which have been able to make a contribution to our relevant articles. We think there is much to be gained with the application of psychological and behavioural theories in accounting literature on this topic. Therefore, we would recommend researchers to combine approaches of both economical and psychological/behavioural theories. The classification of relevant articles shows the domination of studies performed in the USA. This narrow focus gives an incomplete view of the outcomes because the use of extrinsic rewards varies tremendously by country (Jansen et al., 2009; Merchant et al., 2011). Moreover, a large part of the studies contributed to businesses in general and did not focus on a specific industry. The same reasoning of countries can be applied here, the general focus leads to an incomplete view of the diversity in industries. Based on these findings we would recommend researchers to perform studies (e.g. case studies) in different countries and industries in order to broaden the knowledge on the possible unknown diversity.

Besides the findings based on the characteristics of the relevant articles, we also identified different types of effects on intrinsic motivation. We found that the use of extrinsic rewards can result in increased (i.e. positive effect) as well as decreased (i.e. negative effect) intrinsic motivation. Particulary noticeable is that the articles do not demonstrate that monetary incentives cannot work due to negative effects on intrinsic motivation. Instead, articles often propose conditions under which a negative effect, positive effect or a neutral effect is likely to occur. These ‘practical’ conditions that can be used by corporations are discussed in the following paragraph.

6.2 Practical implications

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26 have to deal with the incentives in the development phase in order to decrease the feeling of control (i.e. preventive controls). Finally, we found that detrimental effects on intrinsic motivation can be reduced by combining a monetary with a non-monetary incentive.

6.3 Limitations

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27

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