Political Party Assistance: The Downfall of Dominance?
A comparative analysis of party assistance in Serbia and Georgia
Political party assistance (IPA) is one of the most common forms of democracy assistance practiced by Western providers, despite little being known about its effects. This paper
demonstrates through a comparative assessment of Serbia and Georgia that, when administered in the right way, IPA can be an effective tool in the pursuit of short term political objectives, such as the overturning of a dominant party system. The longer term effects of IPA on a party system’s democratic credentials are, however, far less certain. Moreover, this study highlights that, under certain conditions, IPA can regress the consolidation of democracy and cause long term damage to a party system.
Josh Margrie-Rouse
S2587882
International PoliticsFirst Reader: Dr. S.P.A Chauchard Second Reader: Dr. O.B.R.C. van Cranenburgh
Word Count 10,000 Submitted 15/6/20
One-party dominance can be detrimental to democracy in a number of different ways: Quality of representation is diminished, particularly amongst minorities; the leading party is not kept in check by an effective opposition; with election outcomes not in doubt ill-performing
governments are unlikely to be toppled at the ballot box, causing a lack of accountability. All of these factors can contribute to the delegitimisation of democracy (Greene 2007; 2010; NIMD 2017).
International efforts to address this issue through democracy assistance are many and varied (Carothers 1999;2009), but one common intervention is support targeted at political parties and party systems, known as international party assistance (IPA) (Svasand 2014). Indeed, for many donor countries this is the primary method with which they seek to assist democratic
strengthening across the developing and post-communist world. Despite this, there is no clear evidence to suggest that IPA has had a transformative effect in the areas it seeks to address, in particular one-party dominance. One reason for this is that its effects are notoriously difficult to measure, likely to be long-term, and tightly interlinked with many other factors, making
definitive conclusions tricky (Carothers 2006; Savasand 2014). Another reason is that the issue has been largely ignored by both academics and practitioners. Those that have studied its effects have so far found limited evidence of positive effects resulting from IPA, whilst even
practitioners have been accused of lacking knowledge about its effects due to insufficient monitoring and evaluation (Carothers 2006; Svasand 2014;). Considering the significant public spend on IPA (Bader 2010) and general cynicism towards democracy assistance as a whole
(Carothers 1999; 2015 Diamond 2008), this is surprising. Despite such scepticism towards IPA, in her critique of global democracy assistance practices, Sarah Bush designates IPA as one of the few “un-tame” methods of intervention (Bush 2015), whilst democracy assistance providers continue to expand its employment.
This paper therefore seeks to address the lack of academic and policy knowledge of its effects, by conducting a comparative analysis of IPA programmes on two dominant party systems. In doing so it will demonstrate that IPA may be able to influence specific political outcomes, such as the overthrow of dominant parties, by diminishing the regime’s incumbency advantages. It will also show that lasting positive change to party systems is harder to come by even when dominance is defeated
Theoretical Framework
IPA has been largely ignored in academic literature, with only one existing book length study investigating the concept in depth (Carothers 2006; Svasand 2014). This is likely due to the methodological difficulties of measuring causal factors present in most areas of democracy assistance, as well as a lack of publicly available data caused by the failure of democracy
promoters to impartially evaluate the impact of their work (Bush 2015; Carothers 2006; Svasund 2014). Furthermore, whilst there are limited empirical studies inferring linkages between IPA and dominance (Spoerri 2015; NRC 2007), these tend to concentrate on much broader concepts than those of interest in this paper, such as democracy promotion and regime change (Spoerri
2015; Carothers 2006), meaning the specific mechanisms involved remain unclear and under-researched.
Existing literature on one-party dominance is primarily concerned with the factors that either produce it, or those that sustain it. The latter is of most interest to this study since it can shed light on which mechanisms are most important to maintaining a monopoly over power, and thus those which must be tackled to prevent it. Most prominent among this strand is Kenneth
Greene’s work (2007;2010), whose in depth analysis of party politics in Mexico and a
cross-national quantitative study found that one party dominance is primarily linked to the ability of dominant parties to control state infrastructure, combined with their ability to raise the cost to potential members of the opposition (through the threat to career prospects, lost patronage earnings, or physical intimidation and violence), which he labels “hyper-incumbency”
advantages (Greene 2007:297). This helps to enforce what TJ Pempel describes as a “virtuous cycle of dominance” (Pempel 1990: 16), which enables the incumbent to retain their grip over power. Whereas raising costs for opposing incumbents may have the effect of reducing the size and popularity of an opposition party, establishing a financial advantage for the dominant party is likely to reduce the comparative campaigning and electoral strength of opposition parties. All of the above theories highlight weaknesses in opposition parties in comparison with incumbents as a potential cause of the persistence of one-party dominance. This therefore suggests that external assistance targeted at closing the capability gap between incumbents and their opposition may be an effective method to tackle one-party dominance. Importantly, these theories are only applicable in circumstances where the regime allows sufficient space for the
opposition to operate electorally, and provides an opportunity for them to challenge the incumbent, even if they are at a significant disadvantage. It is therefore these type of hybrid or semi-authoritarian contexts which this paper will concentrate on.
Conceptually, IPA, or support directed specifically to improve political parties and wider party systems, can be considered to be a subset of democracy assistance, i.e. support tailored to the political scene by specialist providers, mostly with the blessing of the recipients. Democracy assistance is in turn a subset of democracy promotion, which can be understood as any activity intended to promote the diffusion of democracy, whether welcome or unwelcome (Bader 2010).
Most existing democratisation theories, such as GDP growth , regional trends in democratisation, and openness to trade, cannot be applied to dominant party systems that are ostensibly
democratic and retain the possibility of competition (Mcfaul 2007), making them irrelevant to this study. The impact of international intervention on democratisation, whilst understudied, provides a mixed picture. Whilst traditional consensus states that foreign intervention has only limited impact on democratisation (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Pridham 1991), recent work has shown that it can be effective when used in support of existing domestic drivers of change (Mcfaul 2007; Carothers 2006). Since the regime type of interest to this study is a hybrid or semi-authoritarian regime, it is important to review the impact of democracy assistance in these contexts. Evidence suggests that assistance can only be effective with sufficient state capacity in place to process it (Wolff 2012), and that a hybrid regime may be an especially suitable
has different effects on hybrid regimes, concluding that more research is needed into the effect of party support in the hybrid context, which this paper will attempt to rectify.
Support, specifically targeted at political parties and party systems (IPA) is less well understood. IPA can consist of a number of different methods of intervention, the most prominent being: support to improve party electoral campaigning effectiveness; support to improve internal party organisation; training to improve party performance within legislatures; and support for the party system (Carothers 2006). Carothers’ in depth review of IPA concludes that is an “absence of [...] transformative effects of party aid” (2006: 163), a view generally supported amongst the
literature (Svasand 2014; Bader 2010; Burnell & Gerrits 2010). Despite this, many believe that IPA can be effective at achieving short-term political outcomes (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011; Bush 2015) that “directly threaten dictators’ survival” (Bush 2015: 68). This may then make it particularly effective in tackling hybrid regimes such as those present in dominant party systems. There is however, little empirical evidence to date demonstrating this link, which this paper hopes to rectify. Similarly more evidence is needed to demonstrate which mechanisms of IPA are influential in driving change, and their impact on the specific
circumstances of a dominant party system (Carothers 2006; Svasand 2014). In cases where a political outcome such as regime change was achieved, there is also a lack of clarity about the impact of IPA on other aspects of the party system such as internal democratisation.
Since parties are currently the best form of representation (Svasand 2014, Lipset 2000), and political parties in developing democracies are judged to be weak (Carothers 2006) then support
to strengthen political parties should be central to overall democratic development. In particular, parties have the ability to directly challenge incumbents within the existing rules of the game in a way that civil society does not (Svasand 2014; Carothers 2006). Likewise, political parties are necessary to consolidate progress made in areas such as electoral reform, the rule of law, or institutional strengthening. Support for parties is therefore likely to be crucial in dismantling a dominant party system.
Since IPA can be targeted at singular parties, or even a group of opposition parties, at the expense of the incumbent, campaign support for opposition parties could be used as a tool to support a particular electoral outcome. Drawing on one-party dominance theory, which suggests that levelling the resource playing field between incumbents and opposition parties may be an effective method of dismantling dominant party systems, one might expect IPA targeted at opposition parties, but not the incumbent dominant party, to reduce one-party dominance. Whilst there remains doubt over the ability of IPA to produce “transformative effects” on the overall quality of a democracy or party system strength (Carothers 2006: 163), IPA can be expected to be effective at producing a particular political outcome, such as an electoral outcome. In particular, support aimed at improving opposition electoral campaign capacity may be a particularly effective mechanism for reducing one-party dominance.
Research Design
There is no clear distinction on what qualifies as one-party dominance. Some believe the concept applies only when a single party wins a supermajority of votes in three consecutive elections
(Svasand 2014). This definition is however unsuitable for this study since the definition of supermajority differs throughout the world, whilst this system does not account for parliaments elected under proportional voting systems, where coalitions are often formed. These systems, which are increasingly popular globally, can still become dominant party systems if the largest party (and therefore the leading party) within the coalition remains constant for an extended period of time. For the purposes of this investigation I will therefore use a wider definition of one-party dominance, which accounts for the centralisation of power by one party for an extended period of time (Svasand 2014). This will be achieved by assessing the identity of the leading party within the study countries over time, and the extent to which there exists a viable opposition party. Reversion from a dominant party system will be thus indicated by electoral victory by an opposition party.
IPA is delivered in many different ways but can generally be sorted into five categories: Assistance for electoral campaigning; assistance aimed to strengthen the parties internally and make them more effective and accountable; training for parties to better fulfil their legislative functions; assistance to strengthen the party system as a whole; and indirect assistance, not necessarily aimed at political parties, but which has a knock-on positive effect in party
capabilities, such as improvements to the rule of law or electoral reform.This study will examine the effects of all of these used in the selected countries and will attempt to trace the effects of each variety on the target political system. Since one-party dominance is only one area of democracy that IPA providers are hoping to effect, it is also important to observe changes to the party system in question, most of which can be expected to develop over a longer period of time.
Other objectives of IPA, which this study will analyse include: Internal party democracy, party institutionalisation, development of programmatic policy platforms, inter party cooperation, and transparency of party financing.
This study has selected the following two cases for analysis: Serbia and Georgia. Serbia has been described as “….one of the great success stories of political party assistance and democracy assistance generally” (NRC, 2007:37). The prominent role it plays in the narrative amongst practitioners justifying the continued practice of IPA makes close study of the mechanisms involved between the support for opposition parties in these states and the eventual regime change that took place, worthy of further consideration and comparison. In contrast, Georgia has been cited as an example of failed international political party support, despite being one of the biggest democracy assistance funding recipients per capita worldwide (Bader 2010; Zielys 2013; Jonavicius 2013). The inclusion of a divergent case in this comparative study is necessary, since previous study of democracy assistance has tended to focus on the successful examples to the exclusion of those efforts that have failed to produce a result (Bader 2010). By analysing a failed example alongside a purported success, any inferences drawn will be more illustrative about the types of contexts and interventions that can be effective at reducing one party dominance. In particular, this case will improve the study’s external validity, since it is believed that examples of failed democracy assistance are more common than successful instances (Bader 2010), meaning that lessons learnt from failed implementation may be more applicable than those few successful examples. These two cases offer similarities in terms of chronology and geography, and yet offer differing outcomes. By studying two similar examples, I hope to extend the study’s
external validity by drawing on commonalities and differences across apparently similar contexts to discover which mechanisms were responsible for specific outcomes.
The period of analysis will cover the duration of IPA implementation in the selected countries until the most recent point that data allows. This will allow for a medium-term assessment, allowing for even slow moving political changes that may have been caused by international intervention. The analysis is however limited by the relatively short time period in question, with IPA having been delivered in both countries for a little over two decades. We cannot thus be sure that all outcomes of IPA will yet be apparent.
This study will qualitatively analyse the two chosen cases using process tracing to draw inferences that will help to answer my research question. In this instance quantitative analysis would be unsuitable due to the large number of intervening variables which might affect my dependent variable. Whilst large scale quantitative analyses may indicate trends, they “must be complemented by case study evidence that more closely examines the effectiveness of particular democracy promoting programs” (Knack 2004: 262). Measuring the effects of IPA is notoriously difficult, even for those practitioners employing it (Carothers 2006). Using process tracing on a limited number of case studies may provide a solution to this problem. By comparing two different cases, each of which experienced one-party dominance and received IPA, this paper traces the commonalities and differences between them to examine possible reasons behind the divergent outcomes. The data used in this study is secondary source material, consisting of a
variety of practitioner evaluation reports, independent reviews, news reports, and in depth academic studies.
Case Study: Serbia
Prior to 1997 opposition parties in Serbia were largely viewed by Western actors as unreliable, overly nationalist and politically unviable, which in part contributed to the decision not to establish party assistance earlier in the decade (Birch 2002). However after the opposition coalition Zajedno secured an electoral breakthrough in the 1996 regional elections the
international community saw this as their opportunity to seize the momentum, and democracy promoters began to set up in the country. This assistance rapidly increased in the wake of the 1998 NATO bombings (Spoerri 2015). The bulk of this assistance would be made up of IPA, which was implemented in the following ways:
Training of leaders and party members
Training was directed at both party leaders and specifically selected party members. Party leader training was focused around the use of polling data for political messaging. Training was also provided to party members, who were taught campaign techniques including media skills, member recruitment and generation of grassroots volunteering and activism. Due to the visa restrictions most training was carried out outside of Serbia until NDI began pioneering a ‘Regional Trainer’ programme which involved selecting party members to educate in basic campaign skills, so that they would then be able to pass on this knowledge to those in their party and coalition. (Spoerri 2015).
Donors also provided grants to parties within the Alliance for Change (AC, the most recent opposition coalition), and its successor the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DoS) to provide material objects. These funds were sometimes significant, with money provided to the AC covering office rental, furniture, office equipment, electoral materials, advertising, media equipment, communications kit and transport costs (Spoerri 2015).
Uniting the opposition
Democracy promoters immediately made the coalescence of as many moderate opposition forces as possible around a single leader a priority area of their assistance. Armed with polling data, they led an evidence based approach to persuading the members of the alliance to unite behind DSS leader Vojislav Kostunica as their presidential candidate. Kostunica was not an immediately obvious candidate: Vehemently and publicly against Western intervention, strongly nationalistic, and relatively low profile in comparison to Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djindic, he was considered to be only a mildly capable politician (Gordy 2000; Birch 2002). However poll data indicated that: “Koštunica’s newness, coupled with his brand of moderate nationalism, made him the ideal opposition candidate. Support began to gel behind him firmly and broadly enough to make him seem the potent challenger for whom so many Serbian voters had been longing” (Mcfaul 2005: 9). Officials thus repeatedly underlined the credentials of Kostunica, both internally, backed by polling evidence, to members of the alliance, and publicly in order to provide him with
international legitimacy. They reinforced this requirement for unity through conditionality. For example, American material assistance was provided, not to any individual party, but to the alliance as a whole, requiring them to remain an entity in order to benefit from the funding.
(Spoerri 2015). This was followed up with work from providers on developing a common platform for the alliance, centred on the democratisation and liberalisation of Serbia, the repeal of repressive laws, and the tackling of corruption. The American CIPE also worked with a group of leading Serbian economists to develop a set of concrete economic reforms, to bolster the DoS’s economic credentials (Spoerri 2015).
Indirect IPA
In addition to these measures, another group of actions were put in place that contributed to the downfall of Milosevic, but which weren’t direct party assistance. These can be considered ‘indirect’ party aid, which are “democracy aid programmes other than direct party aid, because their primary objective is something other than party strengthening; whatever effects they have on parties are essentially side benefits” (Carothers 2006: 90).
One of the most celebrated aspects of the 2000 Yugoslav Presidential Election was the impact of civil society and its organisation against the regime. This was spearheaded by the youth
movement Otpor!, who coordinated a massive Get Out The Vote campaign, designed to raise the turnout in the election, and in turn hand the advantage to the DoS. US and American diplomats delivered cash payments to the fledgling movement, whilst democracy promoters provided material assistance to pay for offices, staff, and a huge media campaign for the movement (Spoerri 2015). IRI worked with Otpor to hone their GOTV campaign, learning lessons from a similar movement in Slovakia, tested their media output on focus groups, and trained them in the intricacies of local campaign techniques (Bunce & Wolchik 2011).
Learning from previous attempts by Milosevic to steal elections (most recently the 1996 mayoral elections won by Zajedno), democracy promoters were keen to ensure that DoS had a system in place to verify the election results should the regime try to falsify the results. With independent observers such as the OSCE and the Serbian CeSID prohibited from observing the elections, the DoS conducted a cross-country Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) to verify the results. IRI thus trained thousands of DoS officials in election monitoring (estimated to be as many as 40,000), helping them to identify any indications of fraud. Two representatives were then to be posted at each polling station across the country to observe proceedings, participate in counting, and then immediately communicate official verified vote totals as soon as they were available. Working with CeSID (who received election monitoring training and funding from NDI), DoS were then able to channel the verified results to the public immediately via independent TV channels (Birch 2002; Spoerri 2015).
American and European donors made a concerted effort to support independent media in a rapidly closing space. The ‘Ring Around Serbia’ project was an attempt to establish radio
transmitters in a number of neighbouring states that would be able to broadcast Serbian language news outside of the control of the state (Gordy 2000; Spoerri 2015).
UN sanctions, first imposed in the early 90s, and later strengthened when international opinion finally turned against Milosevic from 1998 onwards, began to cripple the Serbian economy. Almost all foreign investment to Serbia was prohibited, whilst the EU imposed a blanket ban on
selling oil to the regime. This was complemented with selective asset freezes, visa restrictions and eventually the creation of an EU ‘whitelist’ which allowed only businesses that could prove their disassociation with the regime to do business with the EU (Spoerri 2015). This economic contraction was further exacerbated by the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, which put the country’s infrastructure under strain, causing up to $100bn in damage (BBC 1999) as well as killing an estimated 500 civilians (HRW 2009). The effects of these international actions were exacerbated by pork projects provided to compliant opposition-friendly targets. In the winter of 1999 the EU targeted DOS held regions, providing energy supplies directly to opposition municipalities. Their “Energy for Serbia” programme, “to supply heating fuel to Serbian towns, which are run by democratic forces in order to alleviate harsh winter conditions” ran to some 8.8m Euros (European Commission 2000). The project was soon expanded to provide funding for schooling, transport, and infrastructure for opposition held regions, in an effort to influence voting decisions in favour of the DOS in the upcoming elections (Carothers 2001; Spoerri 2015).
IPA effects on downfall
The outcome of these various interventions is difficult to quantify, however there are a number of indications that international support for political parties was at the very least an influential factor in the downfall of Milosevic.
Closing the material and skills gap
The material assistance and finance provided to the DOS helped them to reduce the resource gap between the opposition and the regime. IPA funds paid for campaign rallies and advertising, and
most noticeably, through the many leaflets delivered across Serbia. This helped them to raise their profile across Yugoslavia, providing an opportunity that would previously not have been available to them (Spoerri 2015; Birch 2002). In turn this flood of publicity is likely to have helped convince voters that the DOS were realistic challengers to the regime, thereby making it more likely that they would vote for them. In addition the training provided by IPA actors allowed DOS to take advantage of these equalising factors, pressing home their advantage with slick campaigning and a get out the vote campaign partially administered through the DOS (Birch 2002).
Opposition Unity
One of the most remarkable aspects of the 2000 Yugoslav presidential election was the extent of unity shown by the opposition to unite against Milosevic’s regime. Some argue that the
international community’s success in this area has been overstated (Spoerri 2015; Carothers 2002). In particular, a number of attempts had been made to form opposition coalitions in the past, long before IPA providers arrived in Serbia. Additionally, not all leading opposition figures joined the DoS. Perhaps the most high profile opposition figure, Vuk Draskovic declined to join the grouping, and instead put up his own candidate for election. Yet to use this as evidence of the lack of importance of opposition unity is to overlook the fact that Draskovic had tarnished his anti-regime credentials by leading his party into coalition with the regime only a year before the election. There were even rumours swirling that he had struck a deal with Milosevic prior to the election (Birch 2002). The fact that the opposition garnered enough votes to defeat the regime, even without Draskovic’s SPO, who only eventually managed 3.8% of the eventual vote,
demonstrates that his snub was inconsequential. Likewise, it is wrong to downplay the influence of IPA in the formation of the coalition. Whilst it is true that many opposition coalitions had formed in the past, none had carried sufficient to challenge Milosevic. IRI polling may have made the difference on this occasion, providing opposition leaders the evidence they needed that Kostunica was the right candidate to back if they wanted to win, convincing heavyweight figures such as Milan Djindjic to stand aside for the greater good (McFaul 2005).
Non IPA Factors
It is certainly true that other factors outside of IPA were also influential in the regime's defeat. Chief amongst them is the election monitoring operation operated through the use of PVTs at polling stations. The opposition’s ability to immediately broadcast verified results was to prove crucial in rejecting Milosevic’s attempt to steal the election and in catalysing the protests that managed to bring his regime to an end (Birch 2002; Spoerri 2015). Whilst forming an integral part of the end result, this would however have been an irrelevance had the DoS not been equipped to secure this victory in the first place. For example, the opposition had successfully detected and managed to overturn electoral fraud in the local elections in 1996, long before international electoral monitoring support was in operation. For these reasons, despite playing a crucial role in the outcome of the election, electoral monitoring cannot have been the most important factor in the opposition victory.
Another oft-heralded factor is the huge GOTV operation spearheaded by the youth group Otpor! . Again, this was an important factor in generating the high turnout that would be needed to
overturn the incumbent. The momentum generated by the movement would also prove a crucial factor in the successful street protests following the election (Carothers 2001). Nevertheless the popular movement could only ever play a supporting role to the actions of the elites that drove them (D’Anieri 2006). A number of large scale protests, particularly those in 1991, had applied pressure on the regime in the build-up to the 2000 election. And yet none so far had seriously threatened the position of Milosevic. This demonstrates that, whilst being an important
mechanism to capitalise on electoral momentum, popular uprisings must be driven by effective political actions amongst elites to be successful.
Support for the independent media was another overestimated cause of Milosevic’s defeat. The ‘ring around Serbia’, whilst symbolic, was built too late to make a difference, with most
transmitters not operational until after the election. Those that were up and running concentrated their transmission to North Belgrade, and in areas where support for DOS was already strong, rendering the project’s effects superfluous (Spoerri 2010).
Others point towards the gradual drop in support over the preceding years as evidence that an SPS electoral defeat was inevitable (Birch 2001). The failings of the regime did not necessarily guarantee support for the opposition however. As Bunce & Wolchik highlight: “A survey conducted in December 1999 found that less than one-quarter of all respondents in Serbia thought that the opposition would be able to form a coalition in the coming election” (2011:96). Indeed, according to contemporary news reports these sentiments were widespread only months before the election: “The opposition parties are so discredited that the mention of their leaders
brings a snort."(Guardian 2000). That voter attitudes towards the DoS were to swing so dramatically in their favour is indicative not just of Milosevic’s reduced popularity but, more significantly, of renewed voter confidence in the opposition parties. IPA efforts in uniting the opposition and boosting their legitimacy and that of their platform therefore appear to have borne fruit.
The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, combined with the NATO bombing campaign and sustained sanctions against the regime also played a part in the election (McFaul 2005). This drove Serbia to the financial brink, impoverishing many of its population. However instead of driving a wedge between the populace and the regime, the NATO intervention combined with non targeted sanctions may have helped to foster an anti-Western sentiment that Milosevic was able to exploit by passing the blame for Serbia’s domestic problems onto outside actors. This also made it difficult for opposition leaders to criticise him without drawing allegations of a lack of patriotism (Birch 2002; Spoerri 2010). In the long term however, the opposition were able to exploit the perilous economic situation by proposing a thorough set of reforms. They were able to do this through the support of IPA providers, working with Serbian think tanks, helping to draw up a united economic platform as an alternative to the status quo.
Finally, Milosevic himself must shoulder a large part of the burden for his defeat. The Yugoslav presidency was, up until the Summer of 2000, decided by the Yugoslav Parliament. Milosevic however, pushed through constitutional amendments ensuring the 2000 election would be put to the people instead, perhaps in an effort to circumvent rules regarding the maximum length of his
presidential term (Bunce &Wolchik 2011). This calculation would ultimately open the door for the opposition to organise and bring about his downfall. Perhaps even more surprisingly, when faced with popular protests Milosevic opted to relent and resign, without attempting to use violence to put down the protests (Birch 2002). These decisions undoubtedly played a huge role in the resulting regime change, as this set of actions provided an opportunity to the opposition that they would not ordinarily have expected to exist. As highlighted above, however, this was far from a foregone conclusion. Without a concerted and united challenge from the DoS, regime change would likely not have occured. Even the lack of violence was not solely a result of Milosevic’s benevolence, indeed it is widely believed that Zoran Djindic negotiated a deal with the regime’s security forces to this end, likely the same men who would engineer his assination three years later (D’Anieri 2006; Birch 2001; Spoerri 2015).
Long term results and other independent variables
The aftermath of the Bulldozer Revolution saw Serbia initially revert to a relatively regular transfer of power between various parties and coalitions (Spoerri 2015). Moreover, and in contrast to the Georgian situation, no single party was able to dominate the party system. In recent years, however, international observers and domestic activists have raised concerns about the erosion of democracy by the ruling SNS party (European Commission 2019; Freedom House 2020). According to the European Commission: “There is an urgent need to create space for genuine cross-party debate and conditions for meaningful participation by the opposition in the parliament” (European Commission 2019: 5). The closing democratic democratic space has been further exacerbated by the decision of the major opposition parties to boycott the upcoming
general election scheduled for 21 June 2020 (Al Jazeera 2020). As a result, despite the
installation of a competitive party system in the first decade post-Milosevic, Serbia appears to be threatened with one-party dominance once more. With regards to the questions this thesis seeks to answer, it can be seen that in the Serbian example IPA was initially successful at tackling one-party dominance, enabling the regular transfer of power between parties and effective opposition parties to hold the executive to account. This situation has not however proved long-lasting, which may be explained by the lack of development in other areas of democracy in the last two decades.
Despite the initial transition to competitive elections, IPA has failed to spark a fundamental transition towards stronger, more democratic parties. Internal democracy in particular has shown little signs of improvement, with “high concentration of power among the party presidents and higher authorities which often have discretion rights to decide about the lower levels in
hierarchical organization of parties” (Vujovic 2016: 123). As a result, parties have remained personality driven and lack a solid connection with voters, whilst the dictatorial nature of party leaders was strengthened by constitutional amendments which required parliamentarians to place their mandates in the hands of their parties (Spoerri 2015). This top-down leadership was
evidenced by a lack of meritocracy: “in the ten-year period following regime change, just two major parties experienced a change in party leadership” (Spoerri 2015: 161)
Of particular concern is the less-than-transparent party financing process (European Commission 2019). A lack of state resources combined with low party membership fees saw many parties
turn to organised crime, corruption, and tycoons as a source of financing (CSD 2004). Whilst attempts were made to address this with new legislation in 2011, concerns still remain,
particularly over the blurring of state and party lines (European Commission 2019). This is likely to contribute towards the ability of the current regime to establish itself as the dominant party, and thus reverse the gains made by IPA practitioners during the Bulldozer Revolution (Greene 2010).
Another problematic development has been the lack of integration of the nationalist parties into IPA programmes. Despite their embrace of democratic practices in the wake of the revolution, including regular acceptance of electoral defeat, IPA providers neglected to work with nationalist parties SPS and SRS until 2008, instead solely concentrating on moderate parties, particularly those in Government (Spoerri 2015). This stance may have produced a number of unintended consequences: First, moderate parties were encouraged to work together and present a united policy front, at the expense of policy development and ideological distinctiveness. Spoerri alleges that policies such as LGBT liberalisation were suppressed on the advice of IPA providers (2015). As a result, Serbia was left with many politically indistinct parties with which to oppose the nascent populist SNS party (born out of the SRS, and thus having received no IPA) when it arose in 2008; Second, IPA practitioners continued to provide substantial funding to civil society organisations for GOTV activities exclusively in support of their partner parties. When these funds began to dry up, parties were left without the skills and experience to perform GOTV campaigns effectively themselves (Spoerri 2015). Those who had not received such support, the right wing SRS, SPS, and SNS parties, had been forced to professionalise these structures
organically during this time, giving them an advantage over those parties reliant on civil society once funding was not as readily available (Spoerri 2015).
Case Study: Georgia
IPA before the Rose RevolutionDemocracy promoters in Georgia did not place party assistance work at the heart of their
attempts to support democratic transition in the months and years preceding the Rose Revolution. Rather, efforts were primarily concentrated on support for civil society combined with
diplomatic pressure for any transition to play out peacefully (Foresti et al. 2010). As such, this paper will focus only briefly on the Rose Revolution itself.
The primary aspect of IPA delivered to pre-revolution Georgia intended to support opposition party capacity was the focus of NDI on persuading four prominent opposition groups (UNM, NRP, UD, and the Traditionalist Party) to unite into a coherent opposition coalition. These attempts were to be unfruitful and short lived (Bader 2010). IRI and NDI both held training programmes, including the trainer of trainer operation which had been developed in Serbia, with political parties from across the spectrum, although primarily with the six largest parties. In contrast to the Serbian example, however, the regime CUG party also consistently received support from both NDI and IRI. These training sessions were primarily focused on campaign skills, communications, and message development. Parties also had access to IRI’s opinion polling, which was again available to all parties and intended to support parties with their message development and responsiveness to voter priorities (Bader 2010).
Outside of IPA provision, democracy promoters concentrated on support for civil society. IRI spearheaded several large GOTV operations. Most importantly perhaps was the establishment of the youth movement Kmara!, mirrored on, and supported by, Otpor!, but funded by the George Soros Foundation (USAID 2005). Civil society was also trained in readiness for the expected electoral irregularities. As such, American funding was used in support of local election
monitoring organisations, with the establishment of a widespread PVT operation to be conducted on polling day (USAID 2005). As in Serbia, these actions were backed up by diplomatic pressure from the US government. US Secretary of State James Baker visited Georgia prior to the election and pressed the importance of peaceful elections, and argued for the acceptance of the PVT and reform to the election commission to allow members of the opposition to sit on the committee (USAID 2005).
Effects of IPA on Rose Revolution
The available indicators suggest that the effects of IPA were, at best, limited. The primary IPA intervention in the build up to the revolution was the attempt by the NDI to unite the opposition ahead of the 2003 election (Bader 2010). An important aspect of the revolution that placed Shevardnadze under considerable pressure to stand down was the remarkable show of public unity between the UNM and the Democrats in support of the PVT results (USAID 2005). NDI can however claim no responsibility for this, as their attempts at fostering unity had failed, and no electoral pact had been reached, as recorded by USAID: “These two parties were not united coming into the election. They were, in fact, rivals for many of the same votes” (USAID 2005: 7). Whilst the potential benefits of the campaign support provided to opposition parties cannot be
totally ignored, the fact that the regime CUG party was also able to benefit from such assistance when it already possessed significant incumbency advantages is likely to have offset any
significant benefit gained. Tellingly, USAID research into the causes of the revolution makes no mention of this assistance in its account (USAID 2005). Considering the tendency of donors to often overstate their impact, this is significant and suggests electoral benefits for the opposition can be considered minimal (Svasand 2014; Carothers 2006). Indeed, the IRI themselves admit that they “did not undertake any extraordinary activities which particularly increased the likelihood of regime change” (Bader 2010: 137). Considering that IRI were the only providers apart from NDI operating in Georgia, this emphasises the lack of impact of IPA on the
revolution. Other factors, such as the impact of the grassroots movement Kmara!, and the NGO led PVT operation, are often cited as significant factors in the downfall of the regime (Bader 2010; USAID 2005; Foresti et al. 2010), whilst international pressure and diplomacy is also likely to have played a part (USAID 2005). IRI estimate that their GOTV campaigns may have increased turnout by as much as 30% amongst young people, for example (IRI 2004). Though important examples of the influence of democracy assistance and democracy promotion, these factors cannot reasonably be considered to be IPA within the classification used in this study.
Post Revolution Interventions
Whilst IPA efforts cannot reasonably be considered to have played a critical role in the downfall of Shevardnadze’s dominant regime, in the wake of his resignation and the electoral landslide of Saakashvilli’s UNM party, IPA providers increased their assistance provision. On top of the
existing American presence, providers from Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, as well as the EU and the OSCE stepped in to set up aid programmes (Bader 2010).
Training and Technical Assistance
The most common form of assistance provided to Georgian parties is training and technical assistance to improve party capacity. This can cover a number of topics, including message development, and responsiveness to voter requirements, however campaign efficiency is the most common form of training (Foresti et al. 2010: Bader 2010). Providers also train party members with academic based sessions covering general political theory, ideology, and the market economy. These generic sessions are supplemented by tailored support, intended to meet parties needs as they arise, which is primarily informed through polling data (Bader 2010). A wide range of parties have been assisted, including the regime UNM.
Programmatic development and Internal Party Democracy
Some providers run sessions aimed at party leaders designed to enhance party building through internal reform and democratisation, and move away from personality driven politics, although these types of courses are not as common as other formats (Bader 2010). An example of this type of support was the OSCE’s VoteMatch programme, which asked parties to respond to a set of ideological questions, thereby encouraging them to think about their political priorities and demographic targets (NIMD 2012).
Providers have sought to improve relations between parties and improve cooperation between party leaders. They have also acted as brokers between parties to settle differences and forge alliances. Additionally they have initiated networking opportunities for party leaders on the international stage, either with ideological sister parties, or at EU level for example within the European People’s Party (Foresti et al. 2010).
Non IPA Interventions
A significant proportion of democracy assistance in Georgia since the Rose Revolution has sought to improve the democratic structures supporting the party system. Significant efforts have gone into training for improvement of Parliamentary capacity. The EU, for instance, working jointly with the UNDP and WFD, are currently providing more than $2m towards a programme intended to “establish the Georgian Parliament as a credible institution” (UNDP 2014; WFD 2020). In addition democracy promoters have also provided much focus on election monitoring, support for youth and women’s NGOs and support for independent media (Foresti et al. 2010). Following the revolution however, many civil society leaders joined Saakashvili’s government, leaving their former organisations weakened in the eyes of donors. Providers likewise began to switch their focus away from NGOs towards bolstering Saakashvili’s regime and their
established contacts (Boonstra 2010).
Effects of IPA on dominance in Georgia post revolution
The defeat of Shevardnadze promised an opportunity to reject the dominant party system seen under the previous regime. Almost immediately however, Saakashvili’s regime made moves to
strengthen his position of authority with constitutional amendments expanding presidential powers. Despite also creating the role of Prime Minister to theoretically transition towards a semi-presidential system, in practice Georgia became a ‘super-presidential’ system, with Saakashvili retaining supreme power (Bader 2010). The UNM commanded dominance
throughout the first decade after the Rose Revolution through commanding electoral victories, (noted by international observers as “irregular”) and a crackdown on key opposition figures (Freedom House 2009). By 2009, the lack of space in which opposition parties had to operate was widely accepted, and the playing field was heavily tilted in Saakashvili’s favour (Freedom House 2009), demonstrating that the UNM were the new dominant party.
Saakashvili was constitutionally prohibited from standing again in the 2013 presidential elections, which provided an opportunity for the opposition to challenge against his
comparatively unknown successor. This election however followed on the heels of the 2012 parliamentary elections which marked the beginning of UNM’s downfall. Challenged by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili and his Georgian Dream party, Saakashvili initially reacted by revoking Ivanishvili’s citizenship, but eventually reversed his decision under
considerable pressure from the US government (Nichol 2012; UNDP 2016). Georgian Dream would go on to defeat UNM in the parliamentary elections, and again in the presidential polls the following year. This was a prominent moment in Georgia’s democratic history and, according to the UN “sealed the country’s 20-year long journey to free and fair elections” (UNDP 2016).
It is however difficult to pinpoint the reasons behind this transition. There is no doubt that
Saakashvili’s regime had been coming under sustained pressure since 2007 and its crackdown on opposition demonstrations. This was followed by a humiliating conflict with Russia, which damaged international perceptions (Nichol 2012). Saakashvili was therefore under huge pressure to deliver upon his promises of democratic development (Freedom House 2009). “Ahead of the October 2012 elections senior U.S. officials explicitly tied the free and fair conduct of the October parliamentary elections, and a subsequent constitutional transfer of power in Georgia, to Georgia’s future in the Euro-Atlantic community” (Nilsson 2013: 20). It is thus likely that Saakashvili’s decision to accept the election results was heavily tied to external democracy promotion pressures. Another factor that was likely to have played a part was the
semi-coalescence of opposition parties behind the Georgian Dream movement. This analysis has found no explicit link determining this to be the work of democracy assisters, but it would be a surprise were practitioners not encouraging opposition cooperation. This does however have to be tempered with the fact that democracy promoters continued to work closely with the UNM, which makes their wholehearted support for a partisan front against Saakashvili unlikely. One factor which did make a difference in the 2012 and 2013 elections was Ivanishvili’s considerable wealth, which alone accounted for half of Georgian GDP (Nilson 2013). He was able to use this to close the resource gap and fund a comparable campaign to that of the incumbents. It is also the case that Georgian Dream was a brand new party, conceived only in 2012, and so providers had very little time to work with them. Whilst it cannot be said that IPA played no part in the transfer of power away from UNM, on this occasion its role appears to have been, at best, secondary.
Georgian Dream Incumbency
The Georgian Dream (GD) coalition has retained power in Georgia since electoral victories in 2012/2013. One democratic positive to have emerged from this transition is the continued existence of the UNM, who, in contrast to previous Georgian opposition parties, maintained a proportion of their support base and continued to provide a challenge in opposition to the incumbents. The presence of a realistic and prolonged opposition party offers promise towards genuinely competitive multiparty elections. More recent events however, seem to indicate the entrenchment of GD as Georgia’s third dominant regime in as many decades. GD has
comfortably won every election held since 2012, despite complaints of vote rigging from the opposition. In the most recent parliamentary election GD won more than 75% of the available seats, giving them the power to make constitutional amendments, just as the UNM had
consistently done before them. In the 2018 presidential election, OSCE monitors reported that GD candidate Salome Zurabishvili enjoyed “an undue advantage” due to “misuse of state resources, further blurring the separation of party and state” (OSCE 2018), one of the primary techniques used by dominant parties to maintain their dominance (Green 2010). Indeed, the NED recently warned of reports from civil society, complaining of:“‘the dire state of affairs’ and ‘democratic backsliding and state capture,’ as well as the ‘concentration of power in the hands of the ruling political party, thus dangerously undermining the balance of power and the viability of institutions.’ (NED 2019). It is therefore unlikely that one party dominance has yet been defeated in Georgia.
Despite the wide array of IPA techniques used in Georgia it is clear that parties are still largely suffering from the weaknesses Carothers bemoans as “the standard lament” (Carothers 2006). Most Georgian parties are institutionally weak, internally undemocratic, and non-programmatic: “A culture of constructive, issue-based political negotiation has not yet taken root [...] Currently, political debate in Georgia tends to focus more on polemics than facts and evidence. Legislative agendas are often driven by personalities rather than policy platforms or constituent priorities” (IRI 2016: 7; Bader 2010; Foresti et al. 2010).
That is not to say there have been no improvements. The Conservative party for instance briefly installed party primaries for candidate selection in line with IRI guidance, an attempt at internal democratic development. This experiment was short lived however, and success stories of this type are few (Bader 2010). The Christian Democrats are another party noted as having benefited from assistance, in particular the networking opportunities they have been offered with
international ideological partners. Foresti et al. note however that this is due likely “because they have a certain level of capacity and capability in place” (2010: 14). Indeed, the ability of parties to capitalize on assistance for their long term benefit is doubtful. Whilst some parties report polling to be useful during election campaigns “there is very little evidence that focus groups or survey results have informed any party programmatic choices and positioning” (Foresti et al. 2010: 14). Part of the reason for this may be generic training sessions, and short-lived
programmes without follow-up sessions (Foresti et al. 2010). Part may be down to the inability of the party themselves to consider their long term future.
One of the most challenging features of the Georgian political party landscape with which providers have had to contend has been the short-lived nature of many of the parties. Party volatility has been such that of the six parties that received the bulk of IPA prior to the Rose Revolution, only the UNM currently has seats in Parliament, whilst the majority no longer exist. Indeed the same fate has befallen many IPA recipient parties, with those not opting to fold often instead merging with other parties (Bader 2010). In this case it is likely that any structural internal gains would likely be lost. In this turbulent environment it is thus difficult for providers to adopt a long term approach to partners, since they would not be able to guarantee that any recipient would continue to exist for the long term.
This may perhaps explain why providers have been so willing to work with the incumbents, even when they already enjoyed significant incumbency benefits. In fact, both the CUG and the UNM during their respective stints in power, may have received more assistance than any other party (Bader 2010). IRI in particular, established deep links with UNM whilst in power, and were accused of partisanly favouring them, particularly in terms of funding, over all other parties. This has been attributed to the advanced internal development of the regime party (Bader 2010). Considering the lack of a unified opposition and the dominance enjoyed by the regime this is particularly damning.
Indeed, the campaign finance imbalance has been a particular restraining factor in the
implementation of a regular transfer of power in Georgia. This is enabled by campaign finance rules that allow a combination of private and public funding for parties. “The ruling party spent
GEL 20 million in the 2008 Presidential Election. The candidate representing all of the
opposition parties combined spent around GEL 0.5 million” (Foresti et al. 2010: 4). The regime is able to use a mixture of carrot and stick, including tax authorities and the police, to coerce businesses to donate significant amounts of funding, whilst opposition parties receive next to nothing (Bader 2010).
Conclusion
The short- to medium-term outcome of IPA programmes in Serbia is a positive one in terms of tackling the dominant party system. The overthrow of Milosevic, and installment of a relatively regular transfer of power afterwards is evidence of this. Through consistent support, primarily concentrated on electoral campaigning efficacy, aid providers helped opposition parties to level the playing field; decreasing the material, structural and skills advantages of Milosevic’s SPS party, which proved influential in the transfer away from a dominant party system. However longer term outcomes of IPA were not so positive. This is demonstrated by the lack of progress made on internal party democratisation, programmatic policy development, and transparent party financing. Furthermore, there are indications that some aspects of aid programming may have damaged the consolidation of democracy in Serbia, such as the suppression of party ideological development, and a situation of aid reliance for basic political operations. Indeed, there now appears to be a re-emergence of a dominant party system, led by a party that was excluded from IPA provision.There is some evidence to suggest that stagnation in party development of the opposition caused by IPA intervention may have inadvertently contributed towards this. The SNS offers an interesting counterpoint. It didn’t receive IPA support until after it had internally professionalised, forcing it to organically develop effective campaigning methods that were enough to repeatedly secure electoral victory. It is possible that this situation was engineered by the selective nature of IPA provision in Serbia.
In Georgia, a mixture of structural and political issues combine to make the party assistance environment a hostile one, in particular the lack of party institutionalisation, extreme
fractionalisation, and uneven party funding. These challenges do not, however, appear to have been dealt with effectively by providers, with their choice of partners certainly questionable at times. These failures have contributed to the contemporary party scene, which, whilst
demonstrating certain areas of progress over the last two decades, reflects almost no progress in terms of internal party democracy, programmatic policy approaches, and party financing. In addition, the threat of the regime Georgian Dream party establishing a third cycle of one-party dominance in as many decades appears very real, suggesting that IPA’s effects on dominance in Georgia has not been substantial. In the Georgian example, IPA appears to have had little positive substantial effect on any of the variables examined in this study.
Outcomes of democracy assistance in general, and IPA in particular, are notoriously difficult to measure, and even more difficult to generalise (Carothers 2006). It is thus important to stress that this study can only draw on indications of positive and negative effects, or more definitively, the lack of them. So too is it difficult to generalise the incidences witnessed in these cases, since the domestic political factors are unique to their situation, as was the treatment received. Serbia in particular appears to be a special case in terms of the vast array of diplomatic, economic, and democratic tools that were used for the specific purpose of overthrowing Milosevic (Carothers 2006). Inferences therefore can only be drawn with caution.
With the example of Serbia, this paper has demonstrated that IPA can be an effective tool in establishing favourable conditions for a short-term political outcome, such as the overthrow of a dominant party system. By uniting the opposition behind a common, and credible platform, and
providing them with material and skills assistance, democracy providers may be able to level the playing field and reduce the incumbency advantages held by a dominant party. However in both cases other factors, such as election monitoring, diplomatic pressure, and civil society activism, were also shown to be influential in the defeat of dominant rulers. It must be stressed however, that these factors are irrelevant without a capable and credible alternative at the ballot box. This may therefore be a beneficial area for practitioners to target in particular when trying to reduce dominance.
Longer-term advantages of the IPA provision examined here are less certain. In both cases, one party dominance appears to have reasserted itself (and in the case of Georgia, may not have ever disappeared). Moreover there does not appear to have been a beneficial impact from IPA in Serbia or Georgia on internal party democracy, party funding, or policy development. Indeed IPA, administered in the wrong way, may sometimes detract from efforts to further these areas, as evidence from Serbia appears to suggest. The lack of positive effects on long term party system health can partly be put down to the fact that, in both cases, the majority of the assistance provided has been directed towards increased party campaign effectiveness, rather than
specifically targeted to improve internal party dynamics. Another reason for this, particularly in Georgia, is the inhospitable party system in which IPA practitioners were operating.
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