Thesis Final Version
Regionalism and Subregionalism Applied:
A Mekong Case Study on Different Levels of Regional Integration Written by: N.S. Tideman S2317532 Thesis supervisor: Ruben Gonzales Vicente Word count: 14.993Table of Content Part I • Introduction --- P.3 • Relevance --- P.6 Part II • Literature Review --- P.10 o Theoretic Framework --- P.10 o Regionalism --- P.12 o Subregionalism --- P.14 o Integration along the Mekong --- P.17 o Regionalism --- P.17 o Subregionalism --- P.21 Part III • Analysis of the Beneficial cooperation and tensions in the GMS --- P.29 • Beneficial cooperation --- P.29 o Economic growth --- P.30 o Reduced possibility of conflict --- P.32 • Tensions --- P.34 o Resource management --- P.34 o Hydropower --- P.37 o Hegemonic struggle --- P.41 Part IV • Conclusion --- P.44 • Bibliography --- P.47
PART I
Introduction and Relevance
Introduction
As long as we have lived in it, we have always divided our world in regions. This of course depends on how we define a region in the first place. The easiest way to define a geographical region would be through the natural boundaries that can be identified. It is more difficult to agree on definitions in the case of socially constructed regions based on common identities or common social and economic goals. In the majority of regions that we can think of, be they on a national, sub-national or intra-national level, there is a combination of socially created identity structures and geographical connections (Louhglin & Keating, 2013). The Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) is one of those examples. The Mekong River is at the heart of this region and it is a vast water network that flows trough the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The area GMS is home to around 326 million inhabitants of which a large majority depend on the river as their economic lifeline (Asian Development Bank, 2018). The area is known for its immense diversity in wildlife and rich soils that produce the livelihood of millions of inhabitants of the region. This shared trans-boundary river inevitably leads to a certain extent of regional integration among nations within the region. A geographic tangible factor such as the Mekong River can be a powerful drive for both countries and individuals along the river to feel a sense of connection. As a result, there can be a level of regional integration. When speaking of integration, we can look at economic and political integration but these are always connected to a certain extent (Balassa, 1962). Within this paper, we will mainly try to define the economic dimension of integration but we will also discuss the political consequences of this connectivity. The exact definition of the terms regionalism, subregionalism and regionalization shall be defined later. In any case, we will expand on the term integration. This goes along the lines
of the structure of this thesis, which will make the comparison between regional (state level) and subregional (Sub-state) level integration. On a state level, this entail that a state actively chooses to cooperate on a single or a set of issues or goals in the form of bilateral or multilateral agreements. For subregional integration this definition also covers sub-national actors for which cross boundary cooperation can apply. An example could be the various NGOs that are working together on certain issues, which by itself results in a form of regional integration. These definitions shall be further developed in the theoretical framework.
On an international level integration can be seen through various international organizations and programs that are being created by states and other parties of interest. The goals of these international institutions can vary, as they are mainly focused on the interest to ensure economical cooperation, resource management and the preservation of the common good (Hensergerth, 2009). The Greater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS program) is an example of an economically oriented institution that has been created in accordance with the interests of the states along the Mekong river (Asian Development Bank 2011). Other organizations, such as the summit at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which has a broader aim of increasing integration along the Mekong to ensure both economic growth, cooperation and sustainable resource use. (Chheang, 2010). Other examples of these state driven integration projects shall be discussed later in this thesis. Besides the more obvious large scale programs that are top down driven, from state to population, there are also non-state actors that drive integration within the GMS. The standard study of regionalism is mainly focused on the states as the main actors in the creation of regions (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). However, it is fair to say that there is a large proportion of non-state actors that create integration on a subregional level which can be influential to region building as a whole. Even though this area of regionalism is gaining more momentum, it has often been a rather neglected side of the study of how regions are constructed. This paper will build on the definition of subregionalism as provided in the book The New International Relation of Sub-regionalism: Asia and Europe by Taga and Igarashi (2019). This definition includes the notion that below state level there is a sprawling network of individuals, trade routes, construction projects and civil society as a whole that impact the integration of the
region (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). Within the GMS we can see that subregional integration is strengthened by the presence of the Mekong river, which we will discuss more detail in this paper.
However, with these two scales of integration there are bound to be tensions. The main reason why countries wish to cooperate on a larger scale is to solve issues that are not solvable by a singly entity. At the same time, it is also possible that the very process of countries and parties integrating can lead to conflict (Paul, 2012). With the case study of the GMS there are some very visual examples of tensions that cannot be simply resolved by a single actor. The most pressing issue is water management and the construction of hydropower dams that are beneficial for one party but often have negative consequences for those further down the river (Kittikhoun & Staubli, 2018). Since the water provided by the Mekong is finite, this is a That is rather unique force for integration in the Mekong region. This reality requires multiple parties to interact with each other and come to terms with the consequences of their actions.
These interactions have different effects and consequences on a regional and a subregional level respectively. On a regional level, states interact in different ways. With regards to resource management and hydropower dam building in the Mekong region, states have formed international organization such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) (Kittikhoun and Stabulli,2018). Institutions created with this goal are effective to different degrees. This becomes troublesome if one of the parties is neglecting its responsibilities or is simply not contributing to cooperation, as is often the case with China in their construction of hydropower dams in the upper stream of the river (Middleton & Allouche, 2016). The regionalization that is accompanied by these kinds of issues is usually defined on a state level because the tensions are between different countries across different borders.
However, the consequences of these tensions are often much more impactful on a local scale as they directly influence the lives of people living along the Mekong. Especially in the GMS, subregional actors have proven to be important factors in how a region integrates on a resource management and economic level (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). Coming back to the example of hydropower dams, actions guided from civil society and NGO’s that cross various borders are becoming more present and effective in creating attention for their concerns (Heikkila, Gerlak
& Wolf, 2014). This shows, in a practical sense, that both on a regional and a subregional level actors deal with various tensions in different ways.
The questions that this thesis will answer is: to what extent is regional and subregional integration is happening along the Mekong river and what are the tensions that arise with it? Of course regional and subregional integration cannot be separate from each other as both will happen at the same time and are highly affected by one another. However, it is valuable to highlight the different factors that play a role at these two different levels of integration and what the benefits and conflicts of interest are at these ‘layers’.
To accomplish this, it is important to understand the general literature regarding regionalism and subregionalism and what sets the two apart. This will be further developed in the theoretic framework, which will be applied on the case study of the Mekong river in the GMS itself. The next section of this thesis will be focused on how these two theoretical approaches apply to the case study of the Mekong and how integration happens along the river on two different levels of regionalism. Finally, the beneficial results of integration and the way that tensions arise within the GMS, will be highlighted to determine what the consequences and reactions are on the two different levels of regional integration. Relevance of the topic How to exactly classify a region is still a topic of much debate within the academic field. Over the past few decades there has been a shift in what the important factors are to look at in regional integration. Initially, the field of regional studies was influenced by the notion that regionalization was regarded as the main mechanism to solve interstate conflicts and problems. However, the field has been increasingly criticized of being overly Eurocentric as the majority of studies that have been constructed in the 20th century examined how states moved towards the ‘ever closer union’ that is the European Union (EU) (Acharya, 2012). This has led to the field of regionalism to be skewered towards a EU focus and the belief that the example of the creation of the EU is in some way universally applicable with regards to other regions. Even
though many scholars currently agree that each regional integration project is unique, there is still a vast underrepresentation of studies explaining the driving factors of regionalization and regionalism in other regional integration projects.
Besides the Eurocentric skewedness that plagues the field of regionalism, there is also a tendency to specifically focus on countries and international institutions as the sole actors in regional integration. Similar to the previously made point, there is a lack of research that focuses on the factors driving regional integration on the sub-national level (Taga & Igarshi, 2019). Even though there is an increased value being applied to the subregional integration process, as is characterized by studies such as Taga & Igarshi’s work on subregionalism in the EU and the Mekong region (2019) or Dosch & Hensengerth’s work on subregional cooperation in the Mekong Basin (2005), the vast majority of research on regionalism is still on inter-state cooperation and state driven top-bottom institutions.
With this said, this thesis will provide a worthy addition to the research on regional integration along the Mekong river within the GMS. This will entail that it contributes to non-Eurocentric research on regionalism, which will decrease the overall bias towards the supremacy of the EU method of regional integration. Additionally, it will ensure a broad overview of how regionalization takes place on different levels, both inter-state regionalism as sub-state subregionalism. Previous research in this field and on the GMS case study has not combined these two dimensions as a side-by-side examination on how regional integration takes place.
Moreover, this case study will identify how different beneficial forms of cooperation arise within the region compared to the tensions that this level of integration has. How actors on different levels attempt to deal with these conflicts, such as resource management, hydropower dams and hegemonic conflicts, will be extensively studied. In current academic literature this is not often done on a comparative scale which emphasizes the importance of actors on different levels of regional integration.
Finally, this extensive case study will provide an interesting look at how a tangible geographic occurrence of trans-boundary river influences these two levels of regional integration. This is especially valuable in current times where a changing climate is very likely to
have an impact on the resources which the river can provide. This is due to a combination of factors. First, climate change is causing the loss of permanent ice in the Himalayas, the source of the Mekong river, which will decline the overall influx of water from the source in the form of smelt water (Maurer, et all. 2019). Another aspect of climate change that will influence the resources, or the value of these resources, provided by the Mekong, is the increasing possibility of droughts in the Lower Mekong Basin (Thilakarathne & Sridhar, 2017). This will increase the value that the water of the Mekong provides for millions of people within the GMS. How states and non-state actors deal with these tensions that will only increase in the near future as climate change intensifies, is a valuable assessment.
Second, with the economies in South East Asia and China growing, the need for energy derived from hydro-power will be growing as well. This will cause nations to divert water from the Mekong river for its own energy purpose, which will impact the ability of downstream nations to use the water for their purposes.
One could argue that a higher level of integration is necessary for these conflicts of interest to be dealt with, nevertheless, it can also be that the response will be the exact opposite and actors involved in the region will attempt to satisfy their own benefits before considering cooperation. This combination of factors makes this case study into the different levels of regional integration along the Mekong river in the GMS a valuable addition. This is not the first research that attempts to analyze this process, but it is unique in the way that it looks at both levels side by side.
PART II
Literature Review & Theoretic Framework
Literature ReviewThe literature review of this thesis will be constructed in two parts. The first section will be dedicated to the general theoretical framework of regionalism and subregionalism and what these approaches entail. This will also include a review on how these theories are generally applied and what the overall strengths and weaknesses are when implementing these methods. The second part of the literature review is designated to see how past academic research on regionalism and subregionalism has been used on the specific case study of the Mekong river within the GMS. By looking at both the regional and the subregional research that has been done, it will be possible to create a coherent overview of what the difference between these two levels of regional integration is in terms of a practical case study. Theoretic Framework As mentioned the theoretic framework aims to explain the difference between the approaches of regionalism and subregionalism. First it is valuable to have a general definition of what is meant by regionalism. However, within the academic field of regionalism this is a fairly debated subject and there have been many attempts to create a clear definition over the years.
One earlier definition that we can look at is provided by Nye (1968) which is “a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of interdependence”.
With this definition it is immediately clear that regionalism as a theory has originated in a very state centric manner. Over the decades there have been definitions that attempt to encompass a broader field of possibilities to understand what a region might be.
An example is the definition provided by Fawcett (2004) which is “We need to refine regions to incorporate commonality, interaction and hence the possibility of cooperation. From another perspective, regions could be seen as units or “zones,” based on groups, states or territories, whose members display some identifiable patterns of behavior. Such units are smaller than the international system of states, but larger than any individual state; they may be permanent or temporary, institutionalized or not. Another approach likens a region to a nation in the sense of an imagined community: states or peoples held together by common experience and identity, custom and practice…” (Fawcett, 2004).
This second definition already includes a much broader spectrum of what can be classified as regionalism or regionalization as it includes numerous additional possibilities of actors that can be identified. This will be a helpful basis for our understanding of subregionalism explained in the following section.
A final general note which can be made before we delve deeper in both regionalism and general and subregionalism, is the difference between regionalism and regionalization. In the academic field these two terms can be separated to a certain extend. Regionalization is the term that addresses the level of integration that is happening within a region on the basis of political and economic interaction (Paul, 2012). The economic aspect of regionalization can for example be measured by the level of capital, goods and people that move along the border freely. One could say that it is the practical side of regional integration. Regionalism on the other hand, can be seen as the political process leading up to the moment when states get into an official regional agreement (Paul, 2012). It is the political ideology which leads the progression of regional integration. These two concepts are always developing side by side, nonetheless, they are very different subjects of study. This paper shall combine these two processes when looking at different levels of regionalism and the term regional integration will be used to describe a combination of these two definitions.
With these general notions regarding the academic field of regionalism, we shall now look at regionalism and subregionalism respectively. This will be done to create the understanding regarding the difference between these levels of regional integration.
Regionalism
The first of the two levels of regional integration that we shall discuss is regionalism on a state level. This is the more classical interpretation of regionalism in accordance with the first definition in the previous section. As stated by Nye (1968), this vision of regionalism is focused on a number of states that have a level of interdependence with a geographical link. Still, when studying states as actors in regional integration, much has changes since the early days of Nye’s definition (1968).
As explained by Hurrell (1995) in his piece on the resurgence of regionalism in world politics, there are two different kinds of regional integration projects that can be studied between states. On the one hand there are the state driven institutions that aim to influence economic integration in order to improve trade and growth in general. On the other hand, we can see larger integration projects with a political drive and a general tendency to refrain from conflict along its member states (Hurrel, 1995). Once again with these diverging definitions there is a level of interconnectedness between the two constructions. Many political institutions are also looking to integrate economically and vice versa, even though this sometimes happens unintentionally or even unwillingly. A term that defines this process is functionalism. This basically describes a process of how states integrate with one another. It can additionally also be applied to non-state actors. The essential principle is that states within certain region attempt to achieve a common goal to fulfill their shared interest. To realize this multiple parties will sacrifice a certain degree of their sovereignty with the expectation that this will be advantageous in the long run (Morgenthau, 2017). However, as one goal is being developed, other common interest or shortcomings arise which calls for a higher level of integration. An example of this is the European Union, which started as an economically oriented entity and slowly developed into a larger and more encompassing institution that covers many different policy areas. This is just one example of
many scenarios where regional, or even global, integration took place with a functionalism driven process.
One way of looking at economic integration is by terms of Balassa’s (1962) well known different layered theory. This explains economic integration through various levels of connectedness. One can list the different states of integration as free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, economics unions and total integration (similar to a state itself). This is an improving ladder of integration which of course also spills over into the political field. This once again highlights a functionalist driven process, as economic integration can lead to political cooperation on a regional level as these are always linked to a certain extend.
These five ‘levels’ or integration proposed by Balassa (1962) are one way of looking at the interdependency of a region. They do have the flaw that it is relatively aligned with the the process of the development of the EU (Hurrell, 1995). This does not mean that it cannot be valuable to look at the region along the Mekong river and the GMS through this lens to determine how economically and politically integrated it is on a larger level. In a sense, with his view it will be possible to determine how the borders function between the different states along the Mekong river. We will explain this in the next section when we apply the regional integration theories on the Mekong case study.
Limiting this case study merely to the various levels of regional integration proposed by Balassa (1962) would not be illuminating enough. What these various levels provide is a broader understanding of how states choose to interact with each other and what types of agreements they make and bind themselves to. To get more in depth to research regional processes, it is possible to analyze the institutions that are created in order to facilitate integration. We will therefore examine the various institution in the GMS, such as the GMS program and the MRC, to determine what their goals and functions are with regards to regional cooperation. To look at these multilateral agreements, we will use the framework of Paul (2012) in his book on international relations theory and regional transformation. This explain why a state in some regions choose to cooperate, while in other regions, a state is in almost permanent conflict.
In short, regionalism as a theory on state integration looks at how states interact with each other and when they decide to cooperate to achieve larger common goals if there is a shared interest. This is achieved and measurable in different ways. One of the most accessible ways is by studying the multilateral agreements that form regional institutions. We will look at the literature regarding the application of these factors in the following chapter but first we shall look at subregionalism as a separate theoretic approach to regional integration. Subregionalism The second of the two approaches of regional integration that shall be used in this case study is that of subregionalism. So far we have already sketched a good basis of what the difference between regionalism with a state centric lens entails and what regional integration with a sub-state lens encompasses. It is not possible to separate the study of regionalism and subregionalism, however, as there are certain aspects of regional integration that are not being studied when only having the lens of regionalism (Hamanaka, 2015). The reason why subregionalism is important is simply due to the fact that regional integration does not only happen on a state level (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). So first it is valuable to have a definition to identify what subregionalism is and what it can be used for as a theoretic methodology.
With this thesis we will build on the work of Taga & Igarshi (2019) on subregionalism in the Mekong region and in Europe. As with regionalism, subregionalism is a theoretical approach in which the exact definition is often debated. As said by Hamanaka (2015), the field of subregionalism is “chaotic” with concepts being explained without having a concrete definition or definition that are purposefully broad to ensure a wider reaching research. Because the terms regionalism and subregionalism are often used interchangeably by scholars, we shall highlight the distinction.
One popular way how the term subregionalism is used, is to simply define a smaller region within a larger state driven regional project. This is exemplified by research projects such as Dosch and Hensengerth’s (2005) research on state integration in the Lower-Mekong Basin. This is the more common approach that academics use with regards to subregionalism, but it is fairly limited. This is due to the fact that it remains a fairly state centric or state driven view on
regional integration projects. It is still valuable to determine this type of subregionalization as it can be much deeper than larger regional projects. Additionally, it makes it possible to make a comparative study of how different subregionalization projects on a smaller scale interact with one another or how a subregionalization project interacts with a larger regional integration process (Hamanaka, 2015). However, the difficulty with this definition is that is becomes difficult to determine which regionalization project is a subregional project, as there is usually a larger project which we can compare it to (Hamanaka, 2015). Additionally, this perspective on subregional integration processes still has the limitation that it is mainly state focused.
As described previously, another way to look at subregional integration is on a sub-state level. With this perspective there can still be a certain issue on the agreement on how to define this phenomenon and which actors belong to this category of regional integration. One definition that can be applied is that proposed by Söderbaum and Taylor (2009) in their work on micro-regions in Africa. They decided to opt for the concept of micro-regions instead of subregions to minimize confusion with the previously mentioned perspective on subregionalism, but in this thesis we shall incorporate this definition into the strand of subregionalism. The definition they used was twofold. They stated that a micro-region, or subregion in this case, needs to be on the sub-national level, so below the state level and have a crossborder relationship.
This would work as definition in order to study subregional integration and to determine which actors fall within this process. Taga & Igarshi (2019) add to this definition that these integration processes do not need to be of a crossborder nature but can also happen within certain bordered regions as long as it is on a subnational scale. This leave a broad spectrum of different actors which can influence the subregionalization process, but for the sake of limiting the scope of this thesis we will stick with the most important actors provided by the work of Taga & Igarshi (2019) on subregionalization.
In order to apply the theoretical approach of subregionalism on our case study it is important to know what actors of subregional integration we will study. As mentioned we will determine these actors on the research provided by Taga & Igarshi (2019). A few of the more important actors for subregional integration are civil society in the form of citizens protest and
NGO’s, local governments and local policies, and businesses (Taga & Igarshi, 2019). In the following section we shall see how these actors influence subregional integration along the Mekong river within the GMS.
Integration Along the Mekong
Now that the theoretical framework with regard to regionalism and subregionalism is determined we can see how these two approaches differ from one another. It is still a widely debated topic with regard to what the exact definitions are. Nevertheless, it is possible to make a rather clear outline. Once again, it is not possible to view these two levels of regional integration separately from each other, but it is clear that it is possible to make a distinction between the two and that different actors can be studied in each approach.
This brings us to the following section of this thesis: the application of a regional and a subregional lens on the integration processes along the Mekong river in the GMS. Before we determine what forms of positive integration and what tensions and conflicts arise from this regional integration process, we shall first highlight the current literature that applies to this case study. Regionalism Along the Mekong First of all, we shall look at how state driven ‘classical’ regional integration takes place along the Mekong river in the GMS. We will look at the different levels that states interact with each other in order to achieve common goals. Within this section we shall look at the state driven integration projects that are happening along the Mekong.
The first level of integration that we can look at on this level of regional integration is with the ever more integrated ladder of Balassa (1962). In this way we can determine the overall level of economic integration within the GMS. For this we have to look at a larger overarching regionalization project. For the GMS, which is the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN). ASEAN as an institute has a special summit to further the common interest along the Mekong. However, there is an elephant in the room, because China which plays a key role in the Mekong region is not part of ASEAN (Chheang, 2010). Nonetheless, ASEAN has signed a free trade agreement with all its member states which means that there are no tariffs between the
states involved (Leu, 2011). Cambodia was the last of the countries within the GMS to sign the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). Currently there is no harmonized exterior border with regards to tariffs, which has resulted in a policy that goods are tracked and taxed on their base of origination (Lue, 2011). As of now there have been talks to take the next step on the ladder of economic integration, and move towards a ASEAN customs union (Webster, 2019). This would result in a common held tariff for external markets which would effectively make the ASEAN trading block one of the largest markets in the world.
The free trade agreement does have a large influence on the states within the GMS, but it is not in place due the presence of the Mekong. It is noteworthy because except for China, all the states in the GMS are included under the AFTA. However, when compared to ASEAN some scholars might argue that the GMS is a subregional project as it is of a smaller scope. This was also highlighted as one of the shortcomings of defining subregionalism as simply a smaller regional integration project as mentioned by Hamanaka (2015). Nevertheless, it is still worthwhile to understand that both these regional integration projects from a state driven perspective are happening before focusing on the GMS exclusively.
Looking more specifically at the countries along the Mekong River within the GMS, there are also various agreements that can be looked at through the lens of state driven regional integration. Over the past few decades there have been multiple bilateral or multilateral agreements within the region. Often these were instituted to promote economic growth and reduce poverty, especially among the poorer countries in the GMS, and to reduce the development gap between GMS countries (Verbiest, 2013). An example of such an agreement, which has been mentioned before in this paper, is the GMS program which was instituted in the 1990’s around the same time that the AFTA was implemented (Asian Development Bank, 2011). The participating countries were the six countries of the GMS, with the Chinese province of Yunnan representing China (Verbiest, 2013). When this program was initiated there was still suspicion and wariness among the GMS countries which was due to the many conflicts that the region experienced. Because of this, the program was focused on the implementation of various infrastructural projects, which were seen as bottom up approaches (Verbiest, 2013) to
neutralize nation level tension. In the beginning the aim was therefore to achieve a economic connection between states to ensure an increased degree of integration.
With the latest summit of the GMS program the 10-year cooperation program strategic framework was adopted by the member states (Asian Development Bank, 2011). Within this framework the emphasis was put on the three “c’s” of connectivity, competitiveness and community. With this ten year plan the initiative was to continue on the focus of physical connectivity and additionally ensure an increased perception towards sustainable resource management along the Mekong (Asian Development Bank, 2011). This is especially needed in the case of a river which provides vital resources to the people in the region, it is of the utmost importance that cooperation takes place in order to prevent conflict.
Which brings us to a second state led project along the Mekong river. The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is an example of a regional institution which attempts to limit conflict over resource management. The MRC has a long history and can be seen as one of the earliest regional institutions along the Mekong. It originated in 1957 as the Mekong Commission, and was initially focused on the creation of dam projects and irrigation systems (Kittikhoun & Staubli, 2018). Eventually, it moved towards a focus of sustainable water management instead of project management. This shift happened during the 1990’s and was achieved with the aim to increase the preservation of the Mekong basin (Verbiest, 2013). One of the major issues that this regional project is facing, is that its members consist only of Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Myanmar and China are merely “dialog partners” and not full members (Verbiest, 2013). The discussion regarding proper water and resource management becomes increasingly difficult when the countries at higher elevated sections of the Mekong are only marginally participating. The increase in dams within China’s Yunnan province has caused tensions within the region for that exact reason (Anh, 2016). As a consequence of China’s water and hydropower practices, countries lower down the river have measured a decrease in water in the Mekong during the rainy period (Hecht, et all. 2019). Therefore, Institutions that ensure sustainable water practices along the Mekong are becoming increasingly more important. The limited interaction with China for these last two institutions for regional integration does come as a difficulty in ensuring effective cooperation along the Mekong river. This brings
us to the next regional institution in the GMS: the Lancang Mekong Cooperation (LMC). The LMC is unique within the region because it is a China led institution with regards to trade, resource management and hydropower along the Mekong, with Lancang being the Chinese name for the Mekong river (Su, 2018). With the ever-growing need for electricity in China and the rest of the region, numerous dam building projects have been completed and announced in the future. Besides focusing on increasing trade networks between the Yunnan province and the rest of the GMS, the LMC is discussing how water is being influenced by the Chinese dams with regards to water output for the rest of the river (Middleton, & Allouche, 2016). It is important that there is an effective platform on which the countries involved in the GMS can discuss these matters. Nonetheless, there are also numerous points of critique to be made for the functioning of the LMC. It can be argued that the reason why China neglected to participate in the institutes that were already present in the region, is because China wants to formulate these debates in the context of their own institute and not in a Western nation-backed ASEAN summit (Su, 2018). One could almost say that LMC is a direct attempt to oppose western influences in the GMS, which we will discuss in a later chapter. In spite of these reasons, it is still useful to have a platform on which the GMS states can debate further integration projects along the Mekong river.
There are of course more institutions that lead to an increase in regional integration from a state driven perspective in the GMS. The ones that we discussed so far are just a few of the more influential agreement that have the most impact along the Mekong river and the states involved. There is a certain transition noticeable over the past decades in that more of the agreements attach in their multilateral declaration a statement of achieving sustainable development objectives and respectful river management (Dang, et all. 2018). However, the main goal for most state driven agreements is still to reduce poverty and limit the development gap between different states. Sustainability and resource management only become a concern when there is a noticeable impact from other states’ neglectfulness. This is expected to increase when the resources provided by the river will be further reduced.
There is a whole different level of how integration process happen on a state level through multilateral agreements as discussed above, compared to how this is experienced on a subregional and subnational level. Subregionalism Along the Mekong Regional integration does not only take place on an interstate level. As said before, these two processes are always linked together and often one directly influences the other. However, as stated, there is also another way to look at state level subregionalism. We shall briefly examine this along the Mekong river before we delve into the study of subregionalism below the national level.
What we shall identify as interstate subregionalism in this case will be state driven regional integration projects that are below the level of the GMS. This limitation is applied to reduce confusion, as with this term the integration project along the GMS can be seen as a subregional project compared to ASEAN, as is the case with the research such as Dosch, J., & Hensengerth’s (2005) work on sub-regional security projects. The example that we will look at with this definition on subregional integration, is with regard to geographic separation and energy needs. Middleton and Allouche (2016), in their work on powershed, highlight where the largest needs for electricity that is generated along the Mekong, is situated. They conclude that the areas where the energy demand is the highest is at the Southern Coast of Vietnam, the urban region around Bangkok in Thailand, and the Southern Coast of China. The energy that is generated by the river on their territory is not enough to satisfy this demand. Therefore, they rely on imported electricity from regions along the Mekong that have a lower demand which result in cooperation and economic integration on a subregional scale between states.
There are other examples of where this type of subregional integration takes place along the Mekong. However, due to the scope of this thesis, we shall focus on the second definition of subregionalism that has been mentioned before. This definition is in line with the definition that Taga and Igarashi (2019) work with on their research on subregional integration along the Mekong and in Europe. This definition is that subregional integration happens on a
below national level and therefore does not involve states as the main actors. The non-state actors that we shall focus on in the Mekong are local governments, civil society and companies and NGO’s. Local Governments
One noteworthy example on local governments playing an active role in subregionalization comes together with the first definition that we mentioned. This is the example of Yunnan representing China’s interest in all the previously discussed international organization regarding GMS integration (Su, 2012). This is however still a Chinese driven approach, as the goal is to ensure that Yunnan, which is relative poor province in China, to become connected with the larger trading network that the GMS has to offer. Yunnan as a land locked region does not have a harbor for trading, for which the initiative to rescale several national institutions into regional operations by the Chinese government has started in the 1990’s (Su, 2012). This effectively means that the Yunnan province achieves a higher level of autonomy in order to cooperate and integrate more efficiently with the rest of the GMS.
This has mainly been motivated by the Chinese central government to close the development gap that is present within Yunnan compared to the rest of China, and to connect Yunnan to a larger trade network (Su, 2012). Additionally, it was accomplished in order to increase trade from Guangxi province through Yunnan with a heavy emphasis on infrastructural projects, partially funded by the Chinese and local governments, and partially funded through loans from the Asian Bank of Development and GMS program funds (Su, 2012). One can argue that it is still a state driven practice that is initiated by the Chinese central government. However, it does ensure a higher level of autonomy for these two Chinese provinces. Additionally, they are becoming more involved in the regionalization project along the Mekong and and disintegrated to a certain extent from mainland China, which we can see as a rise of subnational importance, and in this case even regional integration (Tubilewicz & Jayasuriya. 2015). This is the largest example of how local governments take over regional integration
within the Mekong integration process and in this case how a local government can even act like a small state.
Some argue that local governments in the GMS are not as well developed as European states to play a role in regional integration (Taga & Igarshi 2019). With the exception of Yunnan province, this might be conceivable. However, within the Mekong region there is another regional actor which is arguable more active compared to its European counter part. We shall not make this into a comparative case between Europe and the GMS, but the actor that is being referred to in this instance is that of civil society. Where states and local governments are seen as officially planned formal integration projects, civil society is often characterized as the informal process of subregional integration (Hamanaka, 2015). While it is argued that the civil society within Asia and the GMS is less active due to a lower level of democracy, there have been many civil society driven processes within the Mekong to highlight the peoples’ concern with free market driven and neoliberal development projects (Igarashi, 2011). Therefore, we could argue that from this perspective civil society in the GMS is more active compared to other regions, despite its difficulties in participating in a less than democratic society.
Civil society
The following section will highlight certain civil society movements within the GMS which can be categorized as subregional integration. However, due to many of this movements being organized against a certain conflict of interest between the citizens and the state or a large company, this will be further looked at in a later section of this thesis. Civil society within the Mekong region is developing a cross border identity that can be seen as an active actor which influences integration within the region. Actions and actors from civil society often have the position as an alternative look to integration, moving against state centric and market focused neoliberal programs that often do not fulfill the needs of the people (Igarashi, 2019). As such, the civil society perspective to integration can truly be seen as a bottom up approach to regionalization.
There are various ways to look at who civil society influences subregional integration. It is often stated that civil society is a less formal way of integration compared to the state driven
‘planned’ regional projects on a larger scale (Hamanaka, 2015). Within civil society as an actor that influence regional integration we can also make a certain distinction between levels of formality. The less formal form of regional integration on a civil society level simply exists out of local trade routes on a smaller scale. Within the Mekong region this form of small scale trade between communities of fisherman and locals living along the river has been especially active and it is often cross boundary in nature (Saichan, 2019). These types of crossborder regional integration took place long before official state driven regional integration processes had started. Even in times when conflict happened on an interstate level and the official borders were closed off, there was still an active trading network between the local communities along the Mekong river (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). Even now when the states are cooperating to ensure a higher level of integration and borders that are increasingly accessible, there is still a large trade network that does not abide by the official ports of entry. The opening of borders can even have a negative impact on communities living along these trade routes. As we see with any large infrastructural projects, old trade routes will be abandoned in favor of these larger highways which can have devastating effects on the locals that have become dependent on the older modes of trade and transportation (Saichan, 2019). However, it can of course still be advantageous for locals when borders are being opened on a state level, but this tendency of local trade does show that on a subregional level integration which takes place relatively independently of the interstate level.
So now that we have discussed the more informal matter of subregional integration driven by civil society, it is time to look at the organized level of civil society on this level. We can categorize this as active civil society. There are two different kinds of strands of active civil society action with regards to subregional integration. On the one hand we have the before-mentioned actions by civil society which is issue-oriented and often aimed against a certain phenomena bigger than just one issue. On the other hand, in some countries we have civil society action through the development of democratic elections and citizen participation for the process of regional integration (Igarashi, 2019). The first type of civil society is more active within the Mekong region, but there is also a clear increase in citizen participation leading to something which can be called a participatory regional system (Igarashi, 2019).
The issue-oriented actions committed by civil society can be seen as a counter weight or a correction for the state driven process of integration along the Mekong. This is done by the creation of civil society driven NGO’s. There is extensive collection of NGO’s that are issue driven that have been created over the last few decades, of which their topics of specialization range from legal support, human rights, gender equality, fishery and perhaps the most active kind of NGO along the Mekong, environmental protection (Igarashi, 2019). A specific example of an environmentally driven NGO is The Foundation for Ecological Recovery (FER), which criticizes the continuous funding of dams by large scale regionalization projects that are often funded by the Asian Bank of Development (Kittikhaun & Staubli, 2018). This NGO has been created in Thailand with a research based initiative but quickly expanded to other states along the GMS. Its activities are expanding from only environmental protection for the Mekong river to address many other unsustainable practices, such as polluting coal plants within the Mekong region (Kittikhaun & Staubli, 2018). This makes it a good example on how these civil society initiatives expand and evolve to reflect an ever more integrated region.
Another example of a trans boundary NGO is the Mekong Energy and Ecology Network (MEE Net) which was constructed in 2008. This is a similar organization compared to FER as it shares the goal of more sustainable infrastructure projects and a limitation of large scale dams that damage the general population (Igarashi, 2019). They try to increase the level of democracy, sustainability and transparency in the development of energy networks within the GMS. This project to ensure socially justified development of energy networks along the Mekong is unique due to its active aims to create a crossborder network which also include various other NGO’s with shared goals and values (Igarashi, 2019). We see that this type of interaction is becoming more active within the region leading to a strong perspective of what civil society can achieve on a subregional scale.
The next example is what takes transboundary civil society initiative to the next level. It is the Save the Mekong Coalition (SMC). The MSC is not a typical NGO, but it is a large collective of river or water based NGO’s with environmental sustainable goals, that combine their efforts to raise awareness for the risks that the Mekong is undergoing at its current development rate and they attempt to pressure politicians to apply more sustainable
alternatives (Igarashi, 2019). The NGO’s that are joining this coalition are not just based in the Mekong region, they are from all over the world which increases their reach enormously.
We will return to the various civil society initiatives as discussed above in the following chapter as they also reflect on how tensions are handled that arise from the economically oriented regional integration projects that are implemented by states. However, we will first look at the final aforementioned subregional actor that is of importance for the regional integration process along the Mekong. Companies The last actors that we shall look at are companies that work along the Mekong region. The GMS is a sprawling economic network which is growing constantly due to large scale integration projects on a state level. This is noticeable in the economic activity of large companies within the region. Even though a large number of companies are state owned enterprises (SOE) within the region due to a form a state capitalism, these companies can still have a large impact on subregional integration. There are various sectors that have thrived on economic growth in the region. We will look at two broad sectors, trade and hydropower. Together these two sectors also influence the construction sector focused on infrastructure development, therefore these effects shall also be noted. The first sector that shall be discussed is trade. The reduction of tariffs on a state level with the AFTA has greatly improved the prospect for trade in the whole of Southeast Asia (Leu, 2011). The accessibility of open borders is one aspect that has greatly impacted the fertility of the trade industry, which in term also ensured a steady increase in the overall level of production of fabricated goods (Stone & Strutt, 2010). However, this lowering of tariffs is definitely not the sole cause for an increase in economic trade networks within the Mekong region. A second factor is the aforementioned focus of states to improve integration by constructing large scale infrastructural projects. These projects are driven from a state perspective on integration and are the result of various integration efforts such as the GMS program and the Chinese driven LMC which where mentioned in a previous chapter of this thesis (Asian Development Bank 2011; Middleton & Allouche, 2015). Given the nature of these
projects, they are often crossborder operations and require infrastructure companies which requires a high level of integration along its planning and workers that originally come from a different country than that where they are working in (Stone & Strutt, 2010). Even though these factors often directly flow from government driven policies, it is especially noteworthy to determine what happens when those policies are implement on a local scale and what the results are from this large scale projects. The human rights, environmental standards and local communities that are damaged as a result of companies within this sector is often what the NGO’s of the civil society attempt to combat.
The second sector that we will discuss in which large companies affect the regional integration, is with regards to hydropower. Within the growing economy of the GMS hydropower is becoming increasingly important as energy source (Middleton & Allouche, 2016). This has been a very profitable process for those companies constructing and owning the dams. The dams themselves are often owned by SOE companies within the region, but they also impact subregional integration on a local scale (Middleton & Allouche, 2016).
We will delve deeper into the consequences of these dams for the people living in the region in the following chapter on tensions that arise with certain integration projects within the Mekong region. In this section we shall highlight how these hydropower projects can also lead to a subregional form of integration. One clear example is how China’s state owned enterprises operating in the hydropower industry, are predominantly active on a crossborder basis within the GMS (Tubilewicz, & Jayasuriya, 2015). An example of this is the various dam building projects that Chinese SOEs are currently constructing in Laos, backed by enormous investments by Chinese banks. These construction projects are often helmed by Chinese workers and after the dams’ completion the ownership (toch?) and control system in many cases remain in the hands of the Chinese (Tubilewicz, & Jayasuriya, 2015). This is of course a rather dubious form of integration but besides the enormous impact on infrastructure and income in the region, people working on this dam also contribute to the integration on a local level within the region where such a project is being realized.
In both these cases of economic integration, the companies involved impact the region as either a direct or indirect consequence of state driven integration practices. However, these
practices have very direct impacts, for the better or the worse, on the subregional level where the actual projects are being realized. Which brings us to the following chapter in this thesis, which looks at what the consequences are of the regional integration and how actors on a regional and subregional level deal with it.
PART III
Analysis
Analysis of the Beneficial cooperation and tensions in the GMS
The final part of this thesis will look at the actual consequences of the regional integration processes, both on a regional and a subregional level. This will be divided in a section which looks at the things that have happened due to integration that can be categorized as beneficial, and a section that describes the tensions as a result of the integration process. For the beneficial consequences it shall be established to what extent these affect actors on a state level and on a sub-state level. A similar approach will be applied to the tensions that are created as a result of this integration process. In this part of the analysis we shall determine what the cause is of the possible area of conflict and how each actor on the two levels of regional integration attempts to deal with these phenomena. Beneficial Cooperation This first section of the analysis is focused on the benefits or the advantages that have arisen as a consequence of an increased level of integration along the Mekong. With this implementation we shall examine what the beneficial consequences are for both a regional and a subregional level. First, we need to have a short section on what we can exactly see as beneficial consequences of regional integration. This is a rather debatable standard as many supposed benefits can also be attributed to negative consequences of integration. However, in order to ensure a certain level of comparability, we will look at three positive effects that can be seen as a result of the increased level of integration on a regional and subregional level. For each of these benefits it shall also be argued why they can be considered a positive effect.
Economic Growth
The first element that we shall define as being positively affected by the increased level of integration, is economic growth. This is immediately a sensitive topic with regards to the level of benefits it has created. This is due to the nature of the economic growth that has been achieved, which as side-effect has increased the inequality levels in the region and which can arguable be blamed for a large proportion of environmental degradation in the GMS. However, in first instance we shall highlight economic growth as a beneficial consequence of the increased integration because it has resulted in an overall reduction of poverty within the GMS (Warr, 2015). We situate this transition into economic growth as a result of a higher level of integration because economic growth can be attributed to a facilitated trade process. The state driven approach to increase integration by focusing on large scale infrastructure processes has greatly increased the level of production output within the GMS (Stone & Strutt, 2010). This increase in overall production and trade can be attributed to the state driven policies that have been mentioned before in this thesis. On the hand this is through larger integration projects such as ASEAN with AFTA that effectively reduced tariffs within the region (Leu, 2011). On the other hand, the more localized state driven projects along the Mekong, such as the GMS program and the LMC, have increased trade efficiency and economic growth specifically in the GMS. This is due to the aforementioned focus on large scale infrastructure projects that increasingly integrate the country’s trade network with one another (Warr, 2015).
The resulting increase in economic growth has different effects on both levels of regional integration. On a state level the very direct result is an increase in GDP. Since the late 1990’s the overall level of GDP within the GMS has multiplied more then 6 times and was at 757 billion US dollars in 2017 (Open Development,2018). Some countries have experienced much more growth than others. Especially Thailand has experienced an enormous surge in GDP growth. Thailand was also the only country to be categorized as an “upper-middle-income” country in 2017, whereas the other 4 GMS countries (excluding Yunnan province) are categorized as “lower-middle-income” (World Bank, 2019). Even though there are still major developments gaps between the different countries within the region, the countries that still
have a lower GDP are estimated to have a much higher percentage of growth (Open Development, 2018). In the long term the overall inequality between countries is expected to diminish. However, increased inequality as side-effect of economic growth is still recognized as a problem, as many state driven integration projects along the Mekong, including the GMS program and the LMC do include chapters on the insurance that the growth experienced should be inclusive growth (Leu, 2011)(Biba, 2018). As of now this has been marginally successful as inequality is still increasing. Whether this economic growth had good or bad effect, at the minimum it has led to a reduction of overall poverty, which has always been the main promise of economic development.
Now we shall look at the subregional consequences of the economic growth. The economic growth has contributed to the first Sustainable Development Goal, which is the eradication of poverty (SDG, 2019). Of course it differs per country but he economic growth has resulted in many sectors such as the agricultural, industrial and service sector, to increase exponentially within the Mekong region resulting in a steep increase in employment (Warr, 2015). However, the local trade routes along the borders that have been around for a long time before the state driven integration started have suffered from the larger scale infrastructure projects and the focusing of trade in official trade routes (Saichan, 2019). It is always the case with these large scale development and structural changes that certain groups will suffer whilst others gain from it.
Even from this short examination, it already apparent that the economical gains also have numerous side-effects that are difficult to define as positive effects of regional integration process. However, due to the extreme level of poverty in this region, the reduction of it will definitely be seen as beneficial. Especially the levels of extreme poverty that were present in the region have been reduced enormously (Warr, 2015). This does not mean that poverty has been completely eradicated and there are of course still countries that struggle with poverty more than others. However, overall there has been a positive effect on poverty reduction that can be linked to economic growth resulting from regional integration.
Reduced Possibility of Conflict
A second beneficial consequence of the regional integration processes is an overall reduction in armed conflict. Similar to European integration, one of the reasons why countries in Southeast Asia decided to create ASEAN was as deterrent for armed conflict (Anthony, et all. 2006). Indeed, even though the integration region along the Mekong took primarily place on an economic level, there has been a significant drop in armed conflicts between states (Beeson, 2014). Again, this has had an impact on both a state level and a sub-state level of regional integration.
From a state perspective, the increased economic interdependence resulted in less armed conflict. Before economic integration within the region was being implemented, there were often conflicts. Historically, these conflicts were freedom fights against the colonizers and they were later followed by civil wars between the state and insurgent rebel groups (Anthony, et all. 2006). A prominent example is the Vietnam War, which also spread into other states within the region and caused a long process of uncertainty between the bordering states (Brown, 2017).
The initial increase in cooperation was therefore also met with some uncertainties. Especially at the start of the ASEAN and the GMS program, the states were wary of a focus on increased cooperation through economic integration (Taga & Igarashi, 2019). Nonetheless, it has been exactly the focus on economic integration that has led to an overall reduction in conflict between states. There are still internal conflicts that have a crossborder effects, of which an example is the Myanmar civil war, which is the longest internal conflict currently still active in the world (South, 2013). However, even though Myanmar has been severely criticized for their negligence in the Rohingya Genocide which is currently still ongoing, the severity of the civil war and the crossborder consequences of this conflict have been declining over the past decades, since regional integration in the region has been increasing (Werlemen, 2019)(South, 2013). At least from a state perspective the international conflicts have been reduced by the attempts to increase regional economic integration, as one would expect from the mutual dependency that economic integration naturally leads to.
From a subregional perspective there are similar arguments to be made. However, one has to imagine how different these conflicts are and how different they are being experienced from a civil society or an individual perspective. As mentioned in the previous section, the overall level and intensity of armed conflicts had decreased. However, there are still internal conflicts and civil wars, such as the Myanmar Civil War, that disrupts civil society (South, 2013). From a civil society perspective there have been strives to ensure a higher level of legal protection during such conflicts. The integration of various NGO’s within the region have been an influential actor with regards to the publication and reduction of breaches of human rights in conflicts within the region (Igarashi, 2019). This of course does not mean that there are no longer infractions on human rights, quite the contrary. The aforementioned Rohingya Genocide has shown that there are still devastating obstructions to human rights and certain minority groups in the current increasingly integrated region (Werlemen, 2019). However, the international publicity on the atrocities that are being committed here is also an effect of integration, as this is largely provided by INGOs, which are both regional and international in nature (United Nations, 2018). The international exposure of these conflicts was much more difficult to imagine previously. While this does not mean that the current violations of human rights are less severe, it does provide a much needed possibility for civil society to make a bigger impact whenever something of this nature happens.
These are just some examples on how the regional integration influences and decreases the likeliness of armed conflict within the region. There are still various conflicts on a domestic level that have not been resolved, even if integration within the region in tighter than before. However, one could argue that a higher level of integration could reduce the likelihood of conflict on both an international and domestic level as well. It is always risky to use the example of the success of the EU on this front as it might sound Eurocentric. Nevertheless, it is simply one the best examples of regional integration that has truly been successful in the reduction of armed conflict. One can only dream that similar results might be possible in other regional integration projects that suffer from conflicts.
From this viewpoint, it would be desirable if the future of the Mekong is one of an increasingly interconnected region. However, there are definitely still some serious and possibly
growing tensions within the region. It is even argued by some that the Mekong river basin could be one of the few places in the world where an armed conflict over resources could arise, which could even lead into a global conflict. Which brings us to our next section of this thesis. Tensions The next part of this thesis is dedicated to the examination of how possible tensions have arisen for actors on a regional and subregional level and how these actors deal with them respectively. A similar structure as in the last section shall be used. We shall look at three areas of tensions or conflicts of interest and examine how each area affects both levels of regional integration and how the actors in these levels attempt to deal with them. What we will see is that actors on different levels of integration are affected differently by various tensions and that these actors have certain ways to perhaps reduce these tensions within the GMS. There are various scenarios where the actions of actors on one level of regional integration negatively impact actors on the other level, which causes a certain hierarchical tension. Due to the level of integration within the region there will be some conflicts of interest that overlap each other.
Resource management
The first area where tension can be found is that of resource management within the region. This area falls back to how well the resources that are provided by the Mekong within the GMS are shared among the parties interested. Even though the various hydropower dam projects severely impact the resource supply in many areas of the Mekong, we shall refrain from mentioning this too extensively as the next section shall be dedicated to this conflict of interest. With resource management we shall look at the main resources that are present in the Mekong river. This encompasses fish and fisheries, various natural resources and water from the river itself. For all of these resources there is a simple reality that they are finite, which can be troublesome with a transboundary river because the actions of one actor can limit the availability of these resources for another actor.
