“#Itsmydam”: An analysis of Ethiopian
and Egyptian discourses surrounding the
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
ELOISE FREIIN VON GIENANTH
Eloise von Gienanth
August 2020
MSc International Development Studies
Student number: 12768766
University of Amsterdam
Supervisor: Dr. Tefera Negash Gebregziabher
Second reader: Dr. Yves van Leynseele
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ... 8
1.1BACKGROUND ... 8
1.2RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVES ... 9
1.3MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS... 11
1.4THESIS STRUCTURE ... 12
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 12
2.1HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY ... 13
2.2HYDRO-POLITICS ... 14
2.3HYDRO-HEGEMONY ... 16
2.4ADAM AT THE EPICENTER OF COUNTER-(HYDRO-)HEGEMONY? ... 20
2.5CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNTER-HYDRO-HEGEMONY ... 21
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY ... 23
3.1UNITS OF ANALYSIS ... 23
3.2RESEARCH LOCATION... 24
3.3DATA COLLECTION METHODS ... 25
3.3.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews ... 25
3.3.2 Focus group ... 26
3.4SAMPLING... 26
3.5DATA ANALYSIS ... 27
3.6RESEARCH ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY ... 28
3.7QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH ... 28
Trustworthiness ... 29
Authenticity ... 30
3.8OTHER LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH ... 31
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING THE NILE DISPUTE ... 32
4.2LEGAL FRAMEWORKS... 34
4.3THE GRAND ETHIOPIAN RENAISSANCE DAM ... 36
CHAPTER 5: THE GERD IN EGYPT ... 38
5.1COERCIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ... 40
5.2NORMATIVE COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ... 40
5.3HEGEMONIC COMPLIANCE-PRODUCING MECHANISMS ... 41
a) Securitization ... 41
b) Knowledge construction ... 43
c) Sanctioned discourse ... 43
CHAPTER 6: THE GERD IN ETHIOPIA ... 45
6.1DECONSTRUCTION ... 45
6.2CONSTRUCTION ... 47
6.2.1 Socio-economic development ... 48
6.2.3 International support ... 51
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS ... 52
7.1SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ... 52
7.2THEORETICAL REFLECTION ... 55
7.3SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ... 56
Abstract
Despite the popularity of the hydro-hegemony framework in transboundary water-conflict analysis, counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have not yet been sufficiently explored. This study aims to address these gaps by exploring the counter-hegemonic discourses that Ethiopia has employed against Egypt alongside its construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). The study thereby makes use of a critical hydro-politics lens under consideration of Gramsci’s work on counter-hegemony. Using content analysis of Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media items and semi-structured interviews with governmental actors and citizens, this study examines how these discourses impact Ethio-Egyptian relations. Results show which narratives Egypt has circulated to maintain its presumed hegemony over the Nile, namely securitization, referring to its ‘historical’ legal rights, and framing Ethiopia as deliberately taking unilateral measures to threaten its water supply. Ethiopia contests these claims and constructs own narratives to gather support for the GERD by framing it as central to the country’s socio-economic development, linking national pride to the Dam and creating positive sum-outcomes for other riparians. Results moreover show that these discourses are informed by each respective countries’ geopolitical interests, such as creating national unity amidst domestic struggles. Both countries further use notions of ‘cooperation’ to pursue their goal of maintaining or gaining power over the waters of the Nile. Lastly, some of the weaknesses of the hydro-hegemony framework are shown.
Keywords: Ethiopia, Egypt, hydro-politics, hydro-hegemony, water governance, transboundary water conflict
Acknowledgements
This year certainly presented challenges to us that went far beyond of what we had anticipated. Fortunately, I have been able to count on numerous people that supported me during this time. First, I want to thank Dr. Tefera Negash Gebregziabher for his continued guidance, understanding and valuable feedback throughout the process of writing this thesis. I can sincerely say that I have learnt a lot from these insights. I would like to thank Dr. Yves van Leynseele for acting as my second reader. Furthermore, I want to sincerely thank all the kind people in Addis Ababa, and especially at Addis Ababa University, without whom this thesis would not have been possible. Both those who directly participated in this study and those who brought me in touch with relevant individuals were of tremendous help during my stay in Addis. I would like to thank my parents, to whom I owe my deepest gratitude for their support during my studies. To Carlo and his family, as well as to Sofia and Chiara: Thank you all, not only for providing me with space during the writing process, but for making me feel at home (and for all the fun self-isolation nights!).
List of abbreviations
DoP – Declaration of Principles GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GERD – Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam HAD – High Aswan Dam
IPoE – International Panel of Experts
METEC – Metals & Engineering Cooperation of Ethiopia NBI – Nile Basin Initiative
SGCC – State Grid of China Electric Power Equipment and Technology Co. USBR – United States Bureau of Reclamation
List of figures
Figure 1: Forms of Interaction over Transboundary Water Resources Figure 2: Water resource control strategies and tactics
Figure 3: The ‘pillars’ of hydro-hegemony Figure 4: The ‘circle of hydro-hegemony’
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND
The Nile river has been an essential component in the political, economic and cultural shaping of all its eleven riparian nations. With increasing population growth and climate-change related risks such as desertification, deforestation and soil loss, these nations’ dependence on its waters have rapidly increased. Riparian relations have moreover been strained since the announcement of the unilateral construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile in 2011 (Gebreluel, 2014, 25). The $4.7 billion hydro-electric power dam has caused considerable controversy and tensions, possibly permanently altering relations in the Horn of Africa.
For Ethiopia, from where 86% of the Blue Nile originates, the project promises socio-economic development and has become a symbol of national prestige. Although the country has shown comparatively high GDP growth rates since the beginning of the millennium, approximately 70% of its population still do not have access to electricity (Worldbank, 2018). The GERD, whose supposed projected capacity is 6,000 megawatts, could double national electricity production and promises to solidify Ethiopia’s role as the biggest power exporter of the African continent upon its completion (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 17; Gebreluel, 2014, 25). As Ethiopia’s population has just reached 110 million, the GERD is hoped to ensure increased energy production, agricultural irrigation and economic growth (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 15). Increased energy production would both provide electricity to the millions of households currently living in the dark and enable Ethiopia to sell power to neighboring countries similarly struggling with power shortages. The Dam has furthermore become a symbol of national pride amongst Ethiopians, who contributed to its financing by buying bonds through a lottery (Tesfaye, 2016).
Down-stream riparian Egypt has been the most vigorous opponent to the Dam. As it relies on the Nile for approximately 90% of its water supply, Egyptian leaders have claimed the project might drastically reduce the Nile’s flow, potentially leading to water shortages down-stream. Egypt, which has been considered the more powerful riparian for centuries, and whose population has just reached 100 million (World Bank, 2020), is projected to face increasing water scarcity in coming years (World Economic Forum, 2019). Egyptian politicians such as its Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation have claimed that Egypt could lose up to one million jobs and billions in economic production annually in the case of drought (BBC, 2018).
Since the establishment of the GERD project, its construction has therefore been vehemently contested by Egypt. Studies on the Dam’s impact have shown that, depending on the speed with which the Dam is filled, it can likely be operated without significantly harming Egypt’s water supply (German Bundestag, 2020). The contentions thus do not merely represent a fight over natural resources, but the culmination of competing geopolitical interests.
The Dam has been considered a game-changer for the region not only because of its projected electricity production, but because it is believed to, as argued by some scholars, challenge Egypt’s hegemony over the waters of the Nile (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 444; Cascão, 2009, 248; Tawfik Amer, 2015, 6; Gebreluel, 2014, 32). This hegemony has been maintained through various factors, such as Egypt’s relative political and economic power, as well as its proclaimed “historical rights”; these are based on the 1959 Agreement for the Full
Utilisation of the Nile Waters. The Agreement bestowed Egypt and the Sudan, but no other
riparian state, with legal rights over water allocation of the River Basin while prohibiting upstream countries from developing infrastructure on the Nile (Turton, 2000; Cascão, 2009; Tawfik Amer, 2015). Up until the construction of the GERD, this supposed hegemony was hardly challenged. It has thus been argued that Ethiopia has moved from ‘veiled’ to ‘overt’ contest of Egypt’s hegemony over the Nile by constructing the GERD (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12).
The two countries’ relations have been moving along the lines of conflict and cooperation for over a decade. Both Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and his Egyptian counterpart President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have alternated between war-mongering and seemingly peaceful rhetoric. The topic has evoked strong reactions in both countries, with large-scale online campaigns either supporting or contesting the Dam’s construction. In this context, it is important to examine the narratives Ethiopia has created to contest Egypt’s presumed hegemony over the waters of the Nile, and how it has attempted to increase its own influence in this dynamic.
1.2 RELEVANCE AND OBJECTIVES
This research makes use of a critical hydro-politics lens to examine the discourses that have been circulated both within Ethiopia and Egypt and to assess how the narratives affect Ethio-Egyptian relations. Critically examining these narratives is important in several respects:
The Nile basin countries have a combined population of close to 500 million people who are dependent on its waters (Nile Basin Water Resources Atlas, 2017). Tensions between its most populous and powerful states, Ethiopia and Egypt, can permanently alter political configurations in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, the GERD is a central component of Ethiopia’s national development plan, which is hoped to lift its population out of poverty. As both countries are struggling with domestic turmoil, achieving socio-economic development or, as Egypt claims, losing sufficient water supply, could become a decisive factor for the future of the two states. Public mass media further has incomparable impact on the perception of these hydro-political dynamics, both among citizens and international actors. Examining the narratives that have been created within mass media is important to understand the GERD’s impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations. Furthermore, as this topic is so timely, not much literature has been published on the media depiction of the GERD in both countries and in international media. The societal relevance of this study is therefore undeniable.
To analyze Ethiopian and Egyptian discourses, this research will moreover make use of the framework of hydro-hegemony. This framework has attained considerable popularity among scholars of transboundary water conflict. The hydro-hegemony framework posits that states rarely resort to ‘water wars’, not because they prefer cooperation, but because of power imbalances between riparian states; non-hegemonic states are therein assumed to comply with hegemonic orders as they are discouraged by the hydro-hegemon’s superior power position. Ethiopia has been claimed to challenge Egypt’s hydro-hegemony by constructing the GERD. Counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have so far been under-researched (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 454). This study will thus contribute to the academic literature by critically examining Ethiopia’s assumed counter-hegemonic strategies in the Nile Basin. Application of the frameworks in addition makes evident some of the strengths and weaknesses of the hydro-hegemony framework.
Due to the plethora of aspects that play into the hydro-political dynamics in the Nile Basin, an important step to take is to precisely define the scope of this study. The impact of the GERD on Ethio-Egyptian relations occurs at different levels: political, economic and social. Actors involved range from governments, non-governmental actors to media and citizen-level. Ethio-Egyptian relations are furthermore informed by the two state’s relations with other riparians, such as Sudan. Both states each enjoy support from external actors, such as the Arab League (in the case of Egypt), China and a number of different donors around the globe. In addition, there have been several factors that have impacted negotiations between Ethiopia,
Egypt and the Sudan on the filling of the GERD. An example of this are the talks between the three nations hosted by the United States and the World Bank in Washington D.C. from 2019 to 2020. Analyzing all these complexities would by far exceed the scope of this study. Therefore, this research uses the hydro-hegemony and counter-hydro-hegemony frameworks as a lens to analyze popular narratives within Egyptian, Ethiopian and international media items in the English language published between February 2018 and April 2020.
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUB-QUESTIONS
The research will answer the following research question and sub-questions:
How do the narratives that Ethiopia and Egypt have created in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam affect existing relations between Ethiopia and Egypt?1
SQ 1. What narratives in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are Ethiopia and Egypt using to increase their power and influence over the waters of the Nile?
SQ 2. What are the points of contention and cooperation between Ethiopia and Egypt? SQ 3. How is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam framed within Ethiopia’s political economy, who creates these narratives and how is it perceived by Ethiopians?
1 The research question and sub-question 1 were changed due to the challenges presented by the Sars-CoV-2 outbreak. Initially, the research question was ‘How do Ethiopia’s strategies of water governance in relation to the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam affect existing relations between Ethiopia and Egypt?’. As not enough interviews could be conducted due to the pandemic, the methodological focus shifted towards content analysis of media items (see Chapter 3: Methodology). Therefore, the research question was changed to focus on popular narratives circulated within media of both countries.
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework derived from literature relevant to this study and provides the conceptual framework through which the case study will be analyzed. Chapter 3 presents the methodology used for this study, such as the data collection and analysis methods. Chapter 4 will then provide important contextual information on the historical formation of riparian relations on the Nile, the legal frameworks that have shaped riparian relations on the Nile, and a brief timeline of the GERD’s construction. The following chapters 5 and 6 will present the findings of this research. Chapter 6 first apply the hydro-hegemony framework on Egypt. Then, the narratives on the GERD that have been circulated by Egyptian media will therein be critically analyzed followed by an application of the counter-hydro-hegemony framework on Ethiopia’s case. Chapter 7 entails conclusions and theoretical reflections and answers the main research question, as well as providing suggestions for further research.
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter investigates the theoretical literature by focusing on the conceptualizations on hegemony and hydro-politics. The chapter mainly draws on Gramsci’s work on counter-hegemony and the literature on hydro-counter-hegemony, from which a framework of hydro-hegemony is developed as a conceptual apparatus to guide the research process. As counter-hegemony could be exercised on many different levels and spheres, this study focusses on the aspects of ideational power as mentioned in the hydro-hegemony framework. At the same time, it incorporates Gramsci’s idea of a ‘war of position’, therein assuming a ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’, as discussed below. Counter-hegemonic strategies in river basin contexts have so far been under-researched and “explicit consideration of the non-hegemonic actor(s) offers valuable insights into the process and outcome of transboundary water interaction” (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 28). By combining Gramsci’s work with the hydro-hegemony framework, this study uniquely presents a framework through which to study transboundary water conflict.
The chapter is structured as follows: The first section discusses Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony and counter-hegemony. The second section examines the understanding of the concepts of water governance and hydro-politics that provide the basis of
the framework. The last section connects the concepts by presenting the counter-hydro-hegemony framework, as well as discussing the research gaps that this study addresses.
2.1 HEGEMONY AND COUNTER-HEGEMONY
Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony is concerned with explaining the survival of capitalist class rule. He observed that the ruling classes’ power is maintained either through domination or hegemony, the former is coercive, the latter is consensual. Concluding that the bourgeoisie maintains its power by organizing consent rather than force, he raised the question of what the most appropriate strategy for a proletarian revolution would be under these conditions (Im, 1991, 124-24). Gramsci’s examination of how the bourgeoisie maintains their power through political, economic and ideological organization has led to two common interpretations. Some literature suggests that this occurs on an ideological level, such as via mass indoctrination. Others in turn have emphasized the material basis of hegemony, referring to the necessity of certain economic conditions for the creation of hegemony (Hall, 1991, 6; Im, 1991, 124). These interpretations have been expanded by explanations on the inter-relatedness of these different spheres, specifically on how economic leadership within society leads to ideological and political leadership - to organize consent among the subordinate class, its member have to validate bourgeois ideology in their everyday lives (Hall et al., 1977, 53). This requires the formation of ideological unity, which can only be achieved when the ruling class represents the universal interests of the entire society and realizes them on a material level (Przworski, 1980, 24; Im, 1991, 126, 132-33). The economic base must therein be structured in the following way: to maintain the proletariat’s consent and the necessary investment to reproduce the capitalist mode of reproduction, the ruling class has to make some sacrifices as to realize the subordinate classes’ interests (Jones, 2006, 47-48; Przeworski, 1980, 30; Im, 1991, 130). This compromise can on the other hand not touch the nucleus of the bourgeoisie’s economic activity, so that the capitalist mode of production can continuously be reproduced (Jones, 2006, 47-49; Im, 1991, 128-29). Thus, the ideological superstructure has to be compatible with the economic structure. A hegemonic phase then occurs at the passage from (economic) structure to (ideational) superstructure (Im, 1991, 130). The hegemonic system is to be understood as a historical bloc comprised of political, ideological and economic spheres, as a “complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble” (Gramsci, 1977, as quoted in Im, 1991, 136; Hall, 1991, 7). Gramsci then sees the state as pivotal in this relation, as its role is to
maintain favorable conditions for the previously described compromise between dominant and subordinate classes (Hall, 1991, 6; Im, 1991, 134-35).
Gramsci considered hegemony to be always constructed and contested by alternative hegemony (Hall, 1991, 5; Hall et al., 1977; Im, 1991, 142). As he himself has not explicitly written on counter-hegemony due to prison censorship, the concept has been interpreted in different ways. Some scholars under previously explained materialist interpretations have emphasized the difficulties of establishing counter-hegemony within the existing capitalist system. Others have argued that counter-hegemony can be established through the ideological or cultural rise of anti-capitalist forces (Im, 1991, 126). Gramsci asserted the “need to construct a new intellectual and moral order, that is, a new type of society and hence the need to develop more universal concepts and more refined and decisive ideological weapons” (Gramsci, 1977, 388). This order, constructed by the counter-hegemonic bloc led by the proletariat, needs to be established before winning governmental power. Counter-hegemony is thus seen not as another hegemonic order, but as ideological, political and economic preparations for overthrowing capitalism or bourgeois hegemony (Hall, 1991, 7; Im, 1991, 142). These preparations must firstly include the dismantling of the bourgeois historical bloc, which is comprised of its economic base and the ideological superstructure. At the same time, a new alternative bloc that allows for the abolishment of the capitalist mode of production must be established (Hall, 1991, 7; Im, 1991, 142). The emphasis here lay in the latter’s construction, not the mere destruction of capitalism. Such destruction alone, which Gramsci referred to as a ‘war of movement’, might not be fruitful under the constraints of bourgeois rule. Therefore, he considered a ‘war of position’, a “dialectic of destruction and construction”, the most appropriate strategy (Im, 1991, 143; Hall, 1991, 7). The proletariat must thus destruct the bourgeoisie’s economic and political base by constructing its own economic and political base, and its historical bloc has to be disarticulated through the articulation of a proletarian historical bloc (Hall, 1991, 3; Im, 1991, 143-44). This notion of a ‘war of position’ will provide the lens through which this study examines Ethiopia’s tactics in contesting Egypt’s presumed hegemonic position on the Nile.
2.2 HYDRO-POLITICS
This study was conducted with an understanding of water not merely as a natural resource, but also highly political and social. Much of the scientific literature on the topic has historically been dominated by a narrow field of disciplines, such as economics, international
law or engineering (Blatter, Ingram and Doughman, 2000, 32; Sneddon and Fox, 2006, 182). This has led to a tendency to analyze hydro-politics on the level of inter-state relations. One of the first definitions of hydro-politics was for example “a systematic study of the nature and conduct of conflict and cooperation between states over transboundary water resources” (Elhance, 2000, 202). Hydro-politics in the Nile Basin in particular have been noted to “very clearly highlight the complex historical interplay of colonial legacies, superpower rivalry in the Cold War era, interstate relations, and domestic politics in shaping and circumscribing inter-state conflict and cooperation over transboundary water resources” (Elhance, 1999, 54). Other literature places water within the context of environmental issues, with resource scarcity potentially triggering conflict (Turton, 2000, 14; Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Postel, 2000; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Water has been noted to have characteristics that make it particularly prone to conflict - it is scarce, it’s unevenly distributed, it is of primary importance and it is being shared (Frey, 1993). Water has also been embedded in the field of cultural studies literature, and notably within the field of security studies (Turton, 2002, 15; Falkenmark and Lundqvist, 1998). Although this study does focus on inter-state conflict, it recognizes the multi-scalar character of hydro-political dynamics, such as non-state actors. Further, it will enrich the current canon of hydro-political literature through application of Gramsci’s conceptualization of counter-hegemony. There are a number of points that should be taken into consideration by students of hydro-politics. As transboundary rivers by their nature do not respect national boundaries, they create complex webs of hydro-political, economic and security interdependencies, confronting states with a number of dilemmas (Elhance, 2000, 203). These interdependencies can hinder state’s ability to unilaterally pursue its interests, be it national security or sovereignty, territorial integrity, domestic stability or economic growth (Elhance, 2000, 206). Such complexities can be amplified in river basins, as they can be seen as crucial for competing interests such as environmental conservation, livelihood resources and economic development (Sneddon and Fox, 2006, 182). As water is vital for a plethora of aspects, be it the maintenance of ecosystems, food production or national security, it is difficult to measure what constitutes ‘legitimate’ demands. As Waterbury puts it, “riparian claims typically combine incommensurables: human survival, economic growth and national security” (Waterbury, 1997, 281). Questions on the distribution of water can be considered practical as well as political, as “the (historical) accumulation of water shapes both access and authority, with differences in access to water in turn co-shaping social identities and forms of citizenship” (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 4-6). Studying water distribution must therefore not only focus on the biophysical distribution of water, but can also involve the distribution of voice and authority on water
resources. It thus requires not only an examination of quantities of water, but also of the laws and norms that have shaped water access; as well as the distribution of water-related risks, such as pollution, contamination and water pressure (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 7; Dinar, 2000, 380). Further, it requires consideration of the norms through which different actors are able to exercise agency and justify their actions, as unequal water distributions are part of broader structures of social, economic and political dominance unique to each basin (Zwarteveen et al., 2017, 7; Elhance, 2000, 202).
2.3 HYDRO-HEGEMONY
Previously described literature often stems from an understanding of water as a source of conflict or cooperation and has consequently predicted ‘water wars’. Research in recent years has shown that despite such predictions, states rarely resort to going to war over water resources (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 446; Wolf, 2004). The hydro-hegemony framework posits that states do not refrain from ‘water wars’ because they cooperate but because of power imbalances between riparian states. Tawfik Amer thus considers its key contribution “not the explanation of transboundary hydro-political interactions by reference to power, but it is the illustration of how this power is exercised” (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 4). The absence of ‘water wars’ is explained through non-hegemonic states’ compliance with hegemonic orders as they are discouraged by the hegemon’s superior power position. Further, Zeitoun and Warner emphasize that “the absence of war does not mean the absence of conflict”, as silent water conflicts often underlie apparent ‘cooperation’ (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 436). In the hydro-politics of the Nile, the concept of hydro-hegemony has previously been explored by authors such as Williams (2002:1192), who posits that “downstream Egypt's interest in cultivating a hydrological hegemony to coerce upstream-state co-operation in preserving its extant water uses stems precisely from fear of being unable to free-ride on future upstream storage”. The first systematic analysis of the theory was then established by Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
To establish the hydro-hegemony framework, Zeitoun and Warner have combined Frey’s (1993) and Yoffe et al.’s (2001) work into one coherent framework. Frey has explored the political context of conflict and cooperation in river basin contexts by establishing a model of conflict-potential. It is therein assumed that three elements are decisive for the eruption of a ‘water war’. These are the water’s or hydro-project’s importance to the nation, its relative military power and its riparian position (Frey, 1993, 66-67). Conflict is defined here as “when an actor attempts to exert power over another actor to overcome that actor’s perceived blockage of the first actor’s goals and faces significant resistance” (Frey, 1993, 66). The framework leads the author to conclude that the most stable riparian relations will be achieved when the upstream nation is the most powerful and has little interest in utilizing the water. Conflict might arise when both up- and downstream nations are interested in the water while the downstream nation is the most powerful (Frey, 1993, 66-67). Yoffe et al. have brought an alternative contribution to the field with the identification of historical indicators of freshwater conflict and cooperation (Yoffe et al., 2001). The authors established variables within a database of historical water-related events, such as government type, basin water stress, climate or spatial proximity. The results have shown that no single indicator could accurately explain water conflict by itself. The most relevant indicators for water conflict were rapid changes in institutional or physical changes such as internationalization or large dams (Yoffe et al., 2001).
Figure 1: Forms of Interaction over Transboundary Water Resources, adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
Applying the concept of hegemony in river basin contexts, Zeitoun and Warner distinguish between three possible situations that arise from different riparian relations (see Figure 1). When some sort of cooperation exists, control can be shared. Alternatively, it can be consolidated (in the hegemon’s favor), or contested, when riparian states compete over the water resources. A ‘positive hydro-hegemony’ emerges when riparian states share the water, which leads to the most stable situation. Situations of contested control, ‘negative hydro-hegemony’, would lead to instability among riparian nations (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 444).
The following stylized figure adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006) summarizes the strategies and tactics used by hydro-hegemons to achieve consolidated control, which are explained in the following section.
Figure 2: Water resource control strategies and tactics, adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
Drawing on the work of Lustick (2002), the authors distinguish between three different tactics states use to achieve their desired outcomes in transboundary river basins. They may resort to ‘resource capture’(A) in the form of land annexation, land acquisition or the construction of large hydraulic plants. Alternatively, they may make use of ‘containment strategies’(B) by integrating its competitors or contain them through utilitarian, normative, coercive or hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms. Lastly, the integration strategy (C) entails seeking compliance from co-riparians by offering incentives, which then results in more equitable distribution of water resources and hence shared control (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 445-46). To carry out these strategies, the hegemon can rely on several tactics such as military force, which is not commonly used in conflict over water resources, or covert action such as political undercover operations. Alternatively, it may exercise pressure or coercion through political threats (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 446-47). A riparian state could also use ‘utilitarian compliance-producing mechanisms’ by offering incentives to its co-riparians. Another tactic the authors have distinguished is the hydro-hegemon’s ability to institutionalize their power position through the use of treaties that work in their favor (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 447).
Consolidated control (A)Resource capture
(B)Containment (C)Integration
(1)Military Force (2)Covert Actions (3)Coercion-pressure
(4)Active Stalling (5)Incentives (6)Treaties (7)Securitization (8)Knowledge construction
(9)Sanctioning the discourse
International Support - Financial mobilization - riparian position Goal
Strategies
Tactics
Lastly, the hydro-hegemony framework entails ‘hegemonic compliance-producing mechanisms’. Such mechanism could be used by the hegemon in the form of securitization of water issues, thus silencing counter-hegemonic voices by creating the belief that the issue is a matter of national security. Further, discourse may be sanctioned; knowledge can therein by constructed, deeming discourse in the hegemon’s favor politically acceptable and counter-hegemonic discourse unacceptable. Consequently, certain aspects of riparian relations can be emphasized, while other aspects are concealed (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 448-49).
A riparian state’s ability to use these tactics and strategies is determined by its relative power. Such power can be its geographical position and its material power. The latter includes international support, and its ability to mobilize financing (Zeitoun and Warner, 2006, 449-450). Apart from these, a state can “level the rules of the game” through its bargaining and ideational power (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 31-32). Bargaining power refers to the leverage power or ability to define political parameters of negotiations, and depends on relations between the concerned parties. Further, a riparian state can create narratives, storylines, or knowledge structures and impose sanctioned discourse to control perceptions on transboundary waters within its own country and across borders, which is referred to as ideational power. This power can for example be used for securitization of water conflict (Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010, 32).
Zeitoun and Warner had presented the different forms of power in the form of ‘pillars’ (Figure 3). The different spheres in which hydro-hegemons are presumed to base their power
Bargaining Material (incl. riparian position) Ideational Riparian position Power • 1stdimension (military/ economic) • 2nddimension (active stalling/ incentives) • 3rddimension (securitization /sanctioned discourse) Exploitation potential • Infrastructure • Tech. capacity
Figure 3: The ‘pillars’ of hydro-hegemony, adopted from Zeitoun and Warner (2006).
Figure 4: The ‘circle of hydro-hegemony’, adopted from Menga (2016).
(material, bargaining and ideational) are shown as three separate pillars. Menga has since suggested a reconceptualization of this design (Figure 4). Instead of separate ‘pillars’, Menga’s
circle of hydro-hegemony emphasizes the inter-relatedness of the different types of power in
river basins (Menga, 2016, 410). This inter-relatedness is important to consider, as a riparian might for example only be able to make use of its riparian position when it possesses sufficient bargaining power. This contribution is thus valuable to the context of this study and has thus inspired the conceptual scheme (see conceptual scheme).
The next section puts the various but interrelated theoretical discussions on hegemony, counter- hegemony, and power relations in the context of transboundary rivers through what I termed a ‘counter-hydro-hegemony framework’. Such a framework is applied to investigate the hydro-politics of the Nile in the context of the GERD in Ethio-Egyptian relations.
2.4 A DAM AT THE EPICENTER OF COUNTER-(HYDRO-)HEGEMONY?
This thesis investigates the politics of the Nile with specific reference to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the way Ethiopia portrays the Dam project and how this plays out among the riparian states. The hydro-hegemony framework is applied to examine the narratives being circulated by Egypt to maintain its presumed hegemonic position over the Nile. The counter-hegemonic conceptualization is then used to examine the presumed counter-hegemonic narratives that have been created by Ethiopia. Gramsci had in mind a counter-hegemonic strategy of ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’, which implies the necessity to articulate Egypt’s ‘historic bloc’ through the articulation of a new, Ethiopian bloc. Under this assumption, this thesis closely examines Ethiopia’s strategies of ‘construction’ and ‘deconstruction’. Inter-state relations and Ethiopia’s assumed counter-hegemonic strategies are complex and occur at various different levels. To facilitate the process, this study focuses on aspects of ideational power. This aspect in particular has to be explored since out of the different forms of power within the hydro-hegemony framework, ideational power relates most to what Gramsci had in mind in his work on hegemony. Deconstruction is thus assumed to entail the contestation of Egyptian narratives surrounding the Nile, while construction relates to the construction of Ethiopian counter-hegemonic narratives. Important contributions to this have been made for example by Cascão (2008), who have previously examined Ethiopia’s counter-hegemonic strategies on the Nile. This thesis will add to existing literature by closely examining
the narratives Ethiopia has created in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam under consideration of Gramsci’s work.
2.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF COUNTER-HYDRO-HEGEMONY
The conceptual scheme of counter-hydro-hegemony combines the hydro-hegemony framework and Gramsci’s idea of a dialectic of construction and deconstruction into one coherent framework. The three spheres on which both the hydro-hegemon and counter-hegemon base their power (ideational power, bargaining power and material power) are shown as inter-related. This formation, inspired by Menga’s circle of hydro-hegemony, makes evident the way in which these three types of power mutually reinforce each other. The framework will be used in the following way: firstly, the hydro-hegemonic tactics presumed to be used by Egypt through its ideational power is analyzed. Second, the tactics that Ethiopia is presumed to be using with its ideational power, namely the ‘dialectic of construction and deconstruction’ is analyzed.
The conceptual framework developed here is relevant in the following respects. Firstly, the hydro-hegemony framework centers power imbalances at the center of transboundary water conflict. Gramsci’s work on counter-hegemony adds an interesting lens through which to study the narratives Ethiopia and Egypt have created to increase their power in the Nile Basin. Secondly, not only the academic literature but many interviewees during the fieldwork of this study as well as several media outlets have directly referred to Egypt as the ‘hegemon’ of the Nile waters. As this framing seemed prevalent among study participants, it makes sense to include it in the theoretical framework.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
This research relies on qualitative methods as it pays particular attention to the meanings that participants ascribe to their environment, such as the socio-cultural and historical significance of the Nile River Basin and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Qualitative research allows the researcher to “see through the eyes of the people being studied”, which allows for a deeper understanding of the socio-historical context in which the relevant events occur (Bryman, 2012, 399). Initially, the focus of the research methodology were in-depth interviews with governmental and non-governmental actors, researchers and citizens. Unfortunately, the data collection was hampered by a range of issues. Firstly, as the topic of this research is highly politically sensitive, finding suitable participants proved to be difficult. When reaching out to different organizations and international actors, several replied that they could not provide me with an interview opportunity due to the chosen topic. In personal conversations with Ethiopians, I was told that officials, as well as citizens in general, may not want to talk about the issues at hand due to its sensitivity, or be suspicious of me as a foreign researcher. I was therefore advised to build a network of respondents who would bring me in contact with further participants. Building a network of respondents took time and unfortunately, the outbreak of SARS-CoV-19 during our data collection phase forced me to leave the field several weeks earlier than planned. As I had several interviews with important actors, such as the Nile Basin Initiative planned, the amount of primary data collected is smaller than initially intended. Therefore, the focus of the research methodology shifted from in-depth interviews to the qualitative content analysis of Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media items. The primary data collected in interviews and focus groups will be supplemented and triangulated with content analysis of media items from Ethiopian, Egyptian and international news outlets.
3.1 UNITS OF ANALYSIS
While recognizing the multi-scalar character of hydro-politics, this study focusses on inter-state relations. The unit of analysis is therefore Ethio-Egyptian relations, and the political and power dynamics between the two states.
3.2 RESEARCH LOCATION
The data of this study was collected in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa2. Although I
initially planned to visit the GERD itself, which is located close to the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, this idea soon proved unfeasible. This was due to the fact that special permissions are required to visit the Dam site, which are difficult to obtain. Therefore, all interviews were conducted in the capital, as most relevant organizations and actors reside there.
Ethiopia, located in the Horn of Africa, has a rapidly growing population of approximately 110 million, making it the second most populous country of the African continent (CIA, 2020). Moreover, it is considered the only country on the continent that has never been colonized by Europeans (Hart, 2016). Although Italy has attempted to invade the country in the 1890s and again in the 1930s, the Italians were ultimately defeated by Ethiopia. Ethiopia is now a federal parliamentary republic, and notably works under ethnic federalism. The population is comprised of over 80 ethnic groups, of which approximately 34% are of the Oromo group, 27% are of Amhara descent, 6% are Somali and 6% are Tigrayan (Council of Foreign Relations, 2018).
Abiy Ahmed, Prime Minister since 2018, has undertaken numerous reforms since the start of his term in office. These reforms reached from a liberalization of the economy, ending a state of emergency, releasing political prisoners to ending its border-conflict with Eritrea (Deutsche Welle, 2020; The Economist, 2019). One of the fastest growing economies of the world and the fastest growing in the region, Ethiopia’s GDP is mainly accounted for by its industry, including construction and services (World Bank, 2019). The government aims to reach lower-middle-income status in 2025 through its Growth and Transformation Plan, which focusses mainly on expanding its manufacturing and agricultural sectors (National Planning Commission, 2016). As 70% of its population still lacks access to electricity (World Bank, 2018), the government moreover aims to provide hydro-power to its entire population by constructing the GERD. The Dam is at the same time hoped to solidify Ethiopia’s role as the biggest power exporter of the African continent (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 17; Gebreluel, 2014, 25).
Although his reforms have gained Abiy international praise and even a Nobel-peace prize, his popularity within the country has since been contested. Ethiopia not only struggles with a
lack of jobs for its rapidly growing youth population, but particularly with conflict between ethnic groups. These conflicts, partly resulting in violent clashes, have also led a reduction of its economic growth rate (World Bank, 2019). The long-awaited elections in the country set for August 2020 were postponed due to the outbreak of Covid-19 (Reuters, 2020).
3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHODS
To further understand the narratives that have been created within Ethiopia and Egypt, this has made use of qualitative content analysis. In contrast to quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis enables more fine-grained analysis of and sensitivity to the content and context of themes (Bryman, 2012, 553). As Hsie and Shannon posit:
“qualitative content analysis goes beyond merely counting words to examining language intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number of categories that represent similar meanings […] qualitative content analysis is defined as a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns” (Hsie and
Shannon, 2015, 1278).
The purpose of the content analysis was therefore to capture prominent narratives surrounding the GERD, the Nile and Ethio-Egyptian relations within Ethiopian, Egyptian and international media. Following a large-scale review of publicly available news items, thirty articles most relevant to understanding how the GERD is framed in both Ethiopia, Egypt and international media in the time frame from February 2018 and April 2020 were selected (for list of these media items, see Appendix 2). Within each category of items (ten Ethiopian, ten Egyptian and ten international items), different popular news outlets provided insights into popular framings of the GERD and Ethio-Egyptian relations.
3.3.1 SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS
Semi-structured in-depth interviews with relevant actors were moreover conducted to gain insights into inter-state relations and the significance of the GERD. Interviewees included
a foreign diplomat, a student from the University of Addis Ababa, two professors, as well as a PhD-Researcher from the same university and two foreign researchers who are experts on the topic. The purpose of the interviews was to gain an understanding of political processes that have led to the construction of the GERD, different aspects of Ethio-Egyptian relations both in the present and in the past, as well as other background information. These interviews were conducted individually and usually lasted for approximately one hour and a half.
3.3.2 FOCUS GROUP
To understand the impact of the GERD on Ethio-Egyptian relations, it makes not only sense to review government policies, but to also gain an understanding of the public’s perception of the project. Therefore, this research, particularly the third sub-question, are also concerned with Ethiopian’s perception of the GERD, as well as the socio-cultural significance of the Nile within Ethiopia and Ethiopian’s perception of Egypt. Focus groups allow the researcher to witness individuals’ interaction with each other, thus allowing for a deeper understanding of how they collectively make sense of issues around them (Bryman, 2012, 503). The focus group with four students was organized with the help of a professor from the University of Addis Ababa and lasted for approximately one and a half hours. During the discussion, a fellow student from the University of Amsterdam assisted and took notes to facilitate transcription. Of the four, all participants were Ethiopians, in their twenties and three were male. At the beginning of the focus group, the purpose of the research was explained, as well as how the data collected would be used within the research project. After the discussion, participants were invited to add any points of interest to them or ask questions.
3.4 SAMPLING
Key informants of this research were firstly found through purposive sampling, as participants with relevant knowledge were likely to provide insights on specificities of Ethio-Egyptian relations. During the first stage of the data collection phase, a network among researchers and professors at Addis Ababa University could be established. Apart from interviewing these individuals themselves, they provided other relevant contacts to governmental and non-governmental actors, thus this stage was followed by snowball sampling. Third, I had personal conversations and in-depth interviews with citizens from
different demographics to gain a better understanding of public perceptions of the GERD and its relevance for individuals in their specific contexts. Some of the students I had met on the campus of Addis Ababa University additionally agreed to a focus group discussion. These groups of students were chosen based on their interest and expertise in the topic, as they were all Master’s or PhD students in water-related fields at Addis Ababa University. As these students were from relatively similar demographics, additional focus groups with different or mixed demographics could have provided further opportunity for triangulation. As I unexpectedly had to leave the field earlier than planned, only one focus group discussion was conducted. It will thus rather serve the purpose of triangulation.
3.5 DATA ANALYSIS
Qualitative content analysis with the help of the atlas.ti software was used for transcription of the focus group, interviews and media items. Qualitative content analysis is useful for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. Hsie and Shannon have distinguished three types of this type of qualitative content analysis: conventional, directed and summative content analysis. Conventional content analysis is considered appropriate when existing theory or literature is limited (Hsie and Shannon, 2015, 1279). Although the data analysis of this research is guided by the framework of ‘counter-hydro-hegemony’, it follows no further preconceived categories. Therefore, conventional content analysis allows for the development of concepts deriving from the data. In contrast to the grounded theory approach, which allows for the development of theories, content analysis tends to be restricted to the creation of concepts or models. This is due to the difficulties in inferring theoretical relationships between concepts from merely coding a limited amount of text data (Hsie and Shannon, 2015, 1281). The process follows inductive category development: firstly, the researcher reads all data repeatedly to obtain a sense of the whole, and highlights parts of the texts to derive codes. These codes form the basis of the coding scheme, and are then clustered into meaningful categories. The researcher then may identify relationships between categories, and infer conclusions on the data provided. The transcription of the focus group, interviews and media items have all undergone this process.
3.6 RESEARCH ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY
All research conducted under consideration of the ‘do no harm principle’ and the Safety Guidelines provided by the Graduate School of Social Sciences. I have sufficiently informed all participants of these ethical standards, including their right to anonymization, informed consent and the possibility to end the interview at any moment they wish. Although I have not interviewed individuals on possibly traumatic events or similar, the role of a researcher requires acknowledgement of individuals’ circumstances and the (political) sensitivity of the research topic, such as Ethio-Egyptian relations. To carefully develop an understanding of these contexts, I have appropriately discussed my research methods with my supervisor and others who are knowledgeable of the local context. My safety was ensured as appropriate by maintaining regular contact with my supervisor and the other students in this location, and by occasionally accompanying each other to interviews and short trips. The data has been anonymized and safely stored on different data storages throughout and after the entire research process.
Reflecting on my collection, analysis and interpretation of data is indispensable for the reliability of my results. As a researcher, I am therefore required to reflect on my own biases. My understandings of water resource distribution and hydro-politics may stem from a liberal perspective, and my knowledge of the Nile is only informed by the socio-historical particularities and contexts of Ethiopians lives to a certain extent. As I have only conducted research in Ethiopia and not in Egypt, I may have further developed biases in relation to the GERD’s impact on Ethiopians and Egyptians. I have thus attempted to bear these aspects and the general subjective component in concepts such as ‘hydro-hegemony’ in mind throughout the research process by carefully considering my own subjectivity.
3.7 QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH
The following sections will discuss the quality of the research under consideration of the quality criteria for research by Lincoln and Guba (1985) as adapted in Bryman (2012). These criteria, namely authenticity and trustworthiness, were adapted particularly to qualitative research. As Lincoln and Guba have suggested the possibility of multiple accounts of social phenomena, these are more suitable for quality assessment than original criteria of validity and reliability from quantitative research. Qualitative research is concerned rather with the
“contextual uniqueness and significance of the aspect of the social world” (Bryman, 2012, 392), and as the GERD itself is an unprecedented project, aspects such as replicability seem unsuitable for such a quality assessment.
TRUSTWORTHINESS
Trustworthiness is comprised of four criteria, namely credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Bryman, 2012, 390). If one assumes a multiplicity of social realities, research results will only be accepted by others if they are deemed credible. Apart from the data collection having been carried out with transparency and within ethical research standards, triangulation will be used to confirm the validity of results. This step is especially important as I was not able to conduct as many interviews as initially planned. Apart from using multiple methods of data collection such as discourse and content analysis of public speeches and media items, I also attempted to gain a better understanding of local contexts in the field. I did so by triangulating respondents’ answers with other interview partners, for example asking them if they agreed to a certain point previous interviewees had made. Another factor that may have affected credibility was the language barrier. Although all interviews were conducted in English, some interviewees’ accents or way of phrasing things may distort the initial statement they wanted to make. Although I always asked respondents if I had correctly interpreted their responses, some information might have been lost in translation. Another factor that may have impacted participants’ responses was their perception of me as an outsider researching this politically sensitive topic. When I for example asked interviewees about the possibility of negative consequences of the GERD on the lives of Egyptians, some appeared to suspect me of defending Egypt and explicitly assured me they do not hold harmful intentions for Egyptians. Reactivity during interviews may have therefore distorted outcomes to a certain extent. Further, credibility is also in issue with regard to the content analysis of media items. As noted by Bryman, even when credibility in mass media outputs is not high, it is often the uncovering of distortions that are of interest to content analysis (Bryman, 2012, 553). I consider making evident the particular and subjective, even distorted, narratives in mass media an important part of this study. In addition, I have aimed to increase the representativeness of the content analysis by choosing articles from each respective country’s most popular news outlets and triangulate them to gain a coherent sense of common perceptions on the topic. Another aspect to consider is that the media items collected were all published in the English language. This may on one
hand provide a limited or distorted view of discourses circulated within the two countries. On the other hand, it provides interesting insights into what images Ethiopian and Egyptian media outlets want to convey to the outside, which is of importance to the interpretation of the findings.
Secondly, due to the previously mentioned contextual uniqueness of the GERD, transferability of this research to other contexts may be low. Thick description, that is, rich accounts of the context, are nevertheless provided to allow the readers to determine the applicability to other contexts themselves.
Third, ensuring dependability of the research entails transparency about how properly the research procedures have been followed (Bryman, 2012, 392). To fulfil this criterion, records of the previous and adapted research questions, interview transcripts, respondent lists and fieldwork notes have been kept. This process was audited by my supervisor in order to keep track of the proper following of this procedure, as well as enabling him to assess the degree to which theoretical inferences I make can be justified.
Lastly, confirmability is concerned with the extent to which the researcher has attempted to work with objectivity, that is without letting his or her personal values impact the outcome of the study. I have made it a priority to critically analyze the data collected for this study from while bearing in mind my own biases. My position as an outsider has nevertheless likely impacted, as previously mentioned, interview responses. Further, as I have mainly spoken to Ethiopians and few Egyptians, this may have impacted my own perceptions of the situation. A point to consider in this regard is nevertheless that qualitative content analysis is concerned with the subjective interpretation of the content of text data. Ultimately, subjectivity can provide valuable insights during data analysis, while bearing in mind personal biases.
AUTHENTICITY
The criterion of authenticity is comprised of five sub-criteria, which are concerned with the degree of practical relevance for actors involved in the study, such as serving as an impetus to members to engage in action to change their circumstances (Bryman, 2012, 393). As decisions on the GERD are mainly made by policy-makers and heads of state, common citizens, at least as individuals, have arguably little space to change such dynamics. Nevertheless, the study is of practical relevance, thus hopefully policy-makers of different levels will take notice
of this study. Moreover, citizens may feel motivated to reflect on their perception of the GERD within Ethio-Egyptian relations.
Ontological authenticity refers to the degree to which the research helped members to arrive at a better understanding of their social milieu (Bryman, 2012, 393). This study aimed to explore narratives employed by media and political actors in shaping discourses around the Nile and the GERD, therefore hopefully it will enable some insights for individuals to reflect on these discourses and their impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations when shared with the public.
Educative authenticity is concerned with whether the research has helped members to appreciate better the perspectives of other members of their social setting (Bryman, 2012, 393). One aim of this study is the exploration of narratives and perspectives creating conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt. Hopefully, members of both countries will receive insights into each other’s perspectives and aspects that have led to the rise of such conflict. As such, educative authenticity will hopefully be increased by distributing the study’s results among different individuals of both countries. The final chapter of this thesis will provide points which should be considered by readers in order to contextualize some of the conclusions.
Lastly, ensuring fairness in qualitative research entails fairly representing different viewpoints among members of the social setting (Bryman, 2012, 393). As it would have exceeded the scope of this study to collect data from both Ethiopia and Egypt, the views presented by interviewees of this study are Ethiopian. Further, the SARS-Cov-19 outbreak and the political sensitivity of the topic hampered the data collection phase, therefore the number of interviews was not as high as intended and only represent the views of participants who were mostly male and educated. All these issues have affected the quality of this research and need to be taken into consideration both during data analysis and assessment of the study’s quality.
3.8 OTHER LIMITATIONS TO THE RESEARCH
Methodologically, I consider the scope of this research could be its greatest limitation. An analysis of inter-state relations in addition to the application of the theoretical framework within the given parameters is an ambitious endeavor. An advantage of such a broad angle is that it creates an overview about popular narratives and how these are contested. On the other hand, there are various aspects to this topic that could not be explored in greater detail. The
topic of this research could for example be explored with a large-scale analysis of media items and a greater number of interviews in the two countries under study. Alternatively, a more in-depth analysis of singular narratives mentioned in this study, and interviews with Egyptians, likely would have provided valuable insights, though this would have exceeded the scope of this study.
CHAPTER 4: CONTEXTUALIZING THE NILE DISPUTE
The following chapter provides the contextual information that is vital for understanding riparian relations on the Nile and the GERD’s impact on them. The first section gives a brief history of the Nile and riparian states, as an analysis of the GERD has to be situated in this context. The second section then explains the legal frameworks that have shaped hydro-politics in the Nile Basin. Knowledge of these frameworks is detrimental to understand Ethiopia’s and Egypt’s stances on the GERD. Lastly, an overview of the GERD’s construction and its bi- and trilateral negotiations is provided.
4.1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NILE
The Nile is the longest river in the world, stretching almost 6700 kilometers into the Mediterranean Sea. Passing through arid lands, deserts, tropical forest and other landscapes, it has sustained diverse ecosystems and cultures for millennia (Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 2). Its main tributaries are the White Nile, which begins in Central Africa, and the Blue Nile, Tekeze/Atbara and Baro-Akobo, which originate in Ethiopia and contribute approximately 86% of the Nile (Arsano, 2007; Abtew and Dessu, 2019). The tributaries merge in the Sudanese capital Khartoum. The eleven riparians sharing the Nile’s waters are Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda3. Because of the Nile’s unparalleled value for riparian nations, their
wrangling for power over its water reaches back hundreds of years. This can firstly be seen in downstream riparian Egypt’s attempts of gaining power over the upstream territories. During the first half of the 19th century, Egypt began asserting autonomy from the Ottoman Empire and
the nation’s leaders started their quest for Egyptian expansionism upstream of the Nile into Uganda, Ethiopia and the Sudan. According to Arsano,
“Egypt wanted to control Ethiopia primarily because Ethiopia controlled the headwaters of the Blue Nile, Atbara and Baro-Akobo, which together constitute 86 per cent of the annual flow of the Nile. This emanates from a perception that Egypt would not feel secure as long as another powerful country controlled the most important sources of the Nile waters, which happens to be the nation’s lifeline” (Arsano, 2007, 200).
Egypt’s concerns about Ethiopia’s control over its water supply, mentioned above, would become a common thread in hydro-political dynamics between the two countries. Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali would later state: "The national security of Egypt which is based on the waters of the Nile, is in the hands of other countries. ... The next war in the region will be over the waters of the Nile" (Hultin, 1995). The Egyptian invasion during its quest expansionism led to the battles of Gura and Gundet in 1875 and 1876, which were both won by Ethiopia (Arsano, 2007, 201). Losing the Ethiopian-Egyptian war did not mark the end of Egyptian attempts in gaining control over the river. As it had not been able to gain power over its territory, Egypt’s strategy shifted towards the technical utilization of the waters. Approximately one hundred years after the war, it announced the construction of the High Aswan Dam (HAD). The construction of the HAD has been cited as the beginning of the development of Egypt’s ‘hydraulic mission’ and as the decisive moment in solidifying its full technical control over the river (Cascão, 2009, 247). The hydro-politics of the Nile Basin signified at this point the competing interests between global powers, namely the USSR and the United States. Constructed between the 1960 and 1971, the HAD was financed with the help of Soviet funding. During the same period, the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) undertook studies on potential hydropower sites on the Blue Nile in Ethiopia (Cascão, 2009, 254; Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12-13; Abtew and Dessu, 2019, 23). The fact that these studies were conducted with American assistance in response to the Soviet support of Egypt’s Dam has been cited as a reason for Egypt’s distrust of the Ethiopian dam plans (Tawfik Amer, 2015). Whereas Ethiopia was not yet able to pursue its ‘hydraulic mission’, Egypt’s construction of the HAD satisfied its industrial power demand, contributed to its agricultural expansion plans and helped control floods. The fact that Ethiopia was not able to realize the USBR’s plans until decades later can be explained by several factors. The USBR’s studies recommended the construction of several major dams on the Blue Nile (Tawfik Amer, 2015, 12-13). Despite its
advantageous position by contributing 86% of the Nile waters, Ethiopia lacked the financial resources to implement these plans. Weak institutions, internal conflict and a lack of prioritization of the water sector added to this inactivity (Cascão, 2009, 254; Waterbury, 2002, 68). Ethiopia only shifted towards a market-oriented economic model in the 1990s, which brought about economic growth and a stabilization of the economy (Cascão, 2009, 254). Meles Zenawi’s rule and improved donor relations finally paved the way for the realization of plans to construct large hydraulic projects on the Blue Nile. The GERD was a central component of Zenawi’s vision of a new Ethiopia, which has been considered “unparalleled in its ambitions in Africa” (Verhoeven, 2013, pp. 4-10). The GERD should thus be analyzed under consideration of these aspects: Egypt has historically been wrangling over power over the Nile. Previous Egyptian leaders have repeatedly emphasized the security paradigm over its waters. Ethiopia, which had previously been unable to utilize the resources due to financial, political and institutional reasons, may thus be able to permanently change power relations in the Basin through the GERD’s construction.
4.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Legal aspects of the distribution of the Nile waters have had particular impact on Ethio-Egyptian relations (Cascão, 2008, 26). The following section explains which legal frameworks shaped inter-state relations on the Nile. The first treaty to be discussed is the 1929 Nile Water
Agreement. This treaty was signed between downstream Egypt and Great Britain on behalf of
Sudan and other British colonies in the basin. 48 billion m3 of water per year were therein
allocated to Egypt and 4 billion m3 per year to Sudan (Cascão, 2009; Turton, 2000). No Nile
water was allocated to upstream countries. The Agreement was not acknowledged by Ethiopia, which was excluded from the negotiations, and later contested by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda after their independence in the 1960s (Cascão, 2009; Arsano, 2007, 203). Thirty years later, these water allocations were renegotiated – the 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the
Nile Waters granted Egypt 55.5 billion m3 and Sudan 18.5 billion m3 of water per year (Tawfik
Amer, 2015). No water was therein, again, allocated to any upstream nation. The negotiations were held exclusively by the two downstream nations while benefitting Egypt’s plans to construct the High Aswan Dam (Cascao, 2009, 245). The 1959 Agreement further prevented Ethiopia from diverting the Nile’s flow or constructing hydraulic projects on the water. The upstream nations were, again, not considered in the Agreement, and have contested it ever
