An ecological approach to social interaction: theory, methods, and empirical investigations

AW ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL INTERACTION: Theory, Methods, and Empirical Investigations

by

Charles R. Lemery

B.Sc., University of Victoria, 1978 M.A., University of Western Ontario, 1983

A,Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

A C C E P T E D

EACULTY

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY . . ... ... --- in the Department of Psychology ~>a t p ffiSQ ~ 0* ^ 0 0 u p a c c e p t this th e s i s as c o n f o r m i n g

to the required standard

Dr. ^(Tlma^TSupervisor (Department of Psychology)

/---Dr. R.B-T7May, Departmental Member (Department of Psychology)

-j „ . - - ... -

-Dr. P.^puncan, Departmental Member (Dept, of Psychology)

Dr. T.R. Warburton, Outside Member (Department of Sociology)

Dr. Baker, External Examiner (Director, Center for Theoretical Psychology, University of Alberta)

© CHARLES R. LEMERY, 1990 University of Victoria

All rights reserved. Thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by mimeograph or other means, without permission

of the author.

ABSTB&fJ

The purpose o£ this research was to s t u d y the genesis o£ a social interaction as a whole, ecological process. In the currently existing literature there is a distinct absence o£ theory and methods that can be applied to such a problem. The reason £or this appears to be that social interaction has been studied from one of two points of view, one of these stresses the representational, cognitive aspects o£ social knowing; the other stresses the behavioural aspects of social interaction. Bach of these approaches proves to be methodologically abstract, characterized by a strong subject-object d u a lism such that neither, on its own or in combination with the other, is able adequately to grasp the concrete complexity of objective social Interaction. It is argued here that this d u a l i s m is the result of the

represent a t i o n a l 1st theory of perception that both

approaches hegemonically adopt. Despite Its wide acceptance representatlonalism is h i g h l y problematic for epistemology, evolution, general psychology, and the understanding of social Interaction In particular. Modern direct realism

(Gibson, Leontyev, etc.), on the other hand, provides a

parsimonious and coherent alternative to representatlonalism as a basis for the d evelopment of research in social

interaction. The present research attempts to Incorporate J.J. Gibson's ecological psy c h o l o g y and Leontyev's activity theory Into an ecological theory that regards and

process that develops over time as a functional integration of behaviour, perception, and cognition. This ecological theory yields the following hypotheses:

1) People can come d i r e c t l y to know (i.e., learn)

information about social interaction if they are given the opportunity to do so.

2) Over time, social i n t e r a c t a n t s ' behaviour, perception, and cognition will, as a single process, converge upon certain "Main Events" in the interaction they are

learning. These Main Events (social affordances) function to a l l o w collective learning of social c o o r d i n a t i o n s .

3) A referential, a bstracting function of cognition will emerge as learning proceeds. Interactants will develop

interpretations of the meaning of the interaction; but, regardless of the content of these interpretations, the actual Main Events to which the cognitive content of different percelvers refers will tend to be the same.

Support was established for these hypotheses by

employing a mlcrogenetlc, Vygotsklan method o l o g y in a series of six replicative investigations. The findings are

presented and discussed in relation to the theory,

hypotheses, research on social knowing and interaction, and future applications.

Examiners

Dr. ^W.yiJoJ^nan, Supervisor (Department of Psychology)

Dr. R/&?/{fey, D^pa^menta.l Member (Department of Psychology)

Dr. P „ Duncan, Departmental Member (Dept, of Psychology)

Dr. T.R. Warburton, Outside Member (Department of Sociology)

D r . W ^ J . Baker, External Examiner (Director, Center for Theoretical Psychology, Uni v e r s i t y of Alberta)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over the £our-year hist o r y o£ this research there have have been ma n y who have gen e r o u s l y and repeatedly

contributed. Of these, Charles Tolman and Jennifer Mullett must be slngled-out at the outset.

Charles Tolman is the £lnest credit to his

disclpllne--an individual whose scientific dedication and sophistication are w oven into personal integrity,

appropriateness, c\nd kindness. His many years o£ devotion toward a human science o£ psychology have given this man the humble "glow" that comes from living within one's labour. Charles Tolman is an inspiration and a model of excellence. To thank him for all he has done is to thank humanity for

its continued inquiry into the nature of Itself. Jennifer Mullett gives new meaning to the word

"friend." Her giving has permeated e v e r y part of this work. In terms of this thesis, Jennifer has "seen it all." And throughout, she has remained the essence of personal Integrity and compassion. She believed when I could no longer. Jennifer Mullett is the touchstone of kindness, truth, and hope. The river of her soul runs mighty.

The author's good fortune, however, does not stop here. Of the ma n y other personal contributions, those of Rob

Lampard, Bead Piekkola, and Bruce Hurn stand out. Each of these fine individuals has given both to the work itself and to its author. What comes from all of this is much more than my thanks, it is my devotion.

I wish to express m y gratitude also to the internal members of m y committee, Dick M a y and P a m Duncan. Their blend of rigour and kindness provided the confidence I

needed to procede to formal presentation of this work. They read the work when it needed to be read and gave their time and effort to the task of its completion. P a m Duncan and Dick May are a great credit to their field and department,

for both remain true to p s y chology and to its students.

I a m also in debt to the sound contributions provided by outside member Rennie Warburton and external examiner

Will i a m Baker. These fine individuals combined constructive criticism with a spirit of acceptance, both of which were necessary to this thesis.

My thanks go to the countless Individuals who

participated in the research and gave their thoughts and opinions. They are what this study is really about.

The last expression of acknowledgement is reserved for my family. M y daughter was born as I entered the M.A. program at Western, and m y son as I entered the Ph.D. program at U.Vic. These two "troopers" kn o w what it is to

hear a father whine and stew--£or years. So ma n y times Lyra and Tyler have reminded their poor father that his work and his life must be united. These children have guided me with the wis d o m of sages and the kindness of angels. M y thanks to them Is m y love for them.

My wife, Carol, has been so involved in all of

this— before, during, and a£ter--that it is impossible to even think of the thesis or Its author without her immediate presence. It is no secret that this work would never have been attempted, let alone completed, without her. Carol goes way beyond "support" to an actual "living" of the task. She is m y beloved companion in life. My soul owes itself to this timeless woman. Carol

is.

DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this thesis to my parents— Douglas James and Marguerite Hazel L e m e r y — for their continual d emonstration that living must come from within one's

TABLE OF CONTENTS E a g & TITLE PAGE/CERTIFICATE OF E X A M I N A T I O N ... i A B S T R A C T ... i i A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S ... lv D E D I C A T I O N ... vli TABLE OF C O N T E N T S ... viii LIST OF T A B L E S ... Xil LIST OF F I G U R E S ... xiv LIST OF A P P E N D I C E S ... ... xv CHAPTER 1 -- O V E R V I E W ... 1 CHAPTER 2 — THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL

INTERACTION AND KNOWING:

HISTORY AND I S S U E S ... . .. 8 I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 8 Helder's Theory of Social Perception

and Phenomenal C a u s a l i t y ... 9 The Historical Background Leading to

Helder ( 1 9 5 8 ) ... 13 Social Perception Research After Helder (1958):

The Waxing of the Social Cognitive V i e w 15 The Representationalist Basis of Social

Perception Theory and R e s e a r c h ... 17 R e p r e s e n t a t l o n a l i s m ... 18 R e p resentatlonalism and Methods for

Researching the Process of Social

K n o w i n g ... 25 Summary of the Influence of

R e p r e s e n t a t l o n a l i s m ... ... 31 Reviving the Whole Process of Social

K n o w i n g ... 32 Chapter Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s . . . ... 37

P.age

CHAPTER 3 -- THE BEHAVIOURAL APPROACH TO

SOCIAL I N T E R A C T I O N ... 39

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 39

The Study of Overt Social B e h a v i o u r ... 39

Chapter Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s ... 45

CHAPTER 4 — ECOLOGICAL PERCEPTION AND C O G N I T I O N ... 47

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 47

Direct R e a l i s m in Relation to R e p r e s e n t a t l o n a l i s m ... 48

Criticisms of Direct R e a l i s m ... 52

J.J. Gibson's Theory of Ecological P e r c e p t i o n ... 58

S u m m a r y ... 53

Perception and C o g n i t i o n ... 64

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 64

Cognition in Light of Direct Perception,.,. 65 Shaw and Hazelett (1 9 8 6 ) ... 68

L eontyev ( 1 9 8 1 ) ... . 75

L eontyev and the G i b s o n l a n s ... 82

Chapter Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s ... 86

CHAPTER 5 -- AN ECO L O G I C A L THEORY OF SOCIAL I N T E R A C T I O N ... 88

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 88

Implications of Ecological Theory for the Study of Social I n t e r a c t i o n ... 89

An Ecological Th e o r y of Social Interaction: Th e o r y and Conceptual H y p o t h e s e s ... 91

T h e o r y ... 31

Conceptual H y p o t h e s e s ... 91

Chapter Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s ... 9 4 CHAPTER 6 -- ECOLOGICAL M E T H O D O L O G Y ... ... 96

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 96

Ecological M e t h o d o l o g y in G e n e r a l ... 97

Page

Explanation and D e s c r i p t i o n ... 97

Substantial G e n e r a l i z a t i o n ... 105

Conclusion Regarding the Ecol o g y of Social I n t e r a c t i o n ... ... Ill Microgenetic M e t h o d o l o g y ... 113

Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s ... 118

Methodology for Studying Social I nter a c t i o n ... 119

I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 119

M e t h o d s ... 120

Characteristics in Light of Genotypic Methodology. ... 123

Conceptual and Empirical H y p o t h e s e s 125 Chapter Summary and C o n c l u s i o n s ... 127

CHAPTER 7 <■- EMPIRICAL I N V E S T I G A T I O N S ... 129 I n t r o d u c t i o n ... 129 Empirical S t u d i e s ... 132 Pilot 1 ... 132 P r o c e d u r e ... 132 Results and D i s c u s s i o n ... 134 Pilot 2 ... 135 P r o c e d u r e ... 135 R e s u l t s ... 135 D i s c u s s i o n ... 138 Study 3 ... *... 141 S u b j e c t s ... 143 S t i m u l u s ... 143 P r o c e d u r e ... 145 Condition 1 ... 145 Condition 2 ... ... 146 Results and D i s c u s s i o n ... 147 Study 4 ... 150 S u b j e c t s ... 151 P r o c e d u r e ... 152 Conditions 1 and 2 ... 152 Condition 3 ... 153 R e s u l t s ... 153 Quantitative F i n d i n g s ... 153 Qualitative F i n d i n g s ... 172 D i s c u s s i o n ... 178 Studies 5 and 6 ... 183

£a&£. CHAPTER 8 -- GENERAL D I S C U S S I O N ... 3.88

F O O T N O T E S ... 200

R E F E R E N C E S ... 205 A P P E N D I C E S ... 219

xll LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 Percentage Agreement At Three Levels

of Accuracy Pilot 2 ... ... , .... 1 7 2 Data Summary Pilot 3 . , .... ... 148 3 chap2 4 Quantitative Data

S u m m a r y ... 151 4 t-test Analyses of the Number of Events (NE)

in Conditions 1 and 2 Study 4 ... 156 5 t-test Analyses of the Number Events Agreed

(NEA) Conditions 1 and 2, Condition 1,

and Condition 2 Study 4 ... 158 6 t-test Analyses of the Percentage Events

Agreed (PEA) Conditions 1 and ? 3 Condition 1, and Condition 2

Study 4 ... 160 7

A, B, C

Chi-Square Analyses of Agreement Between Main Events and Main Referential Events

Study 4 ... 165 8 Multivariate Analysis of Variance

(Repeated Measures) of Ratings of Performance Acrosr Trials for

Conditions 2 and 2' Study 4 ... 168 9

A,B,C

Analysis of Variance of Ratings of Performance Across Conditions 2, 2', and 3 at Trial 3 and Paired Comparison

t-tests of Simple effects Study 4 ... 171 10 Raw Data and Descriptive Statistics

Condition 1 Study 4 ... . 241 11 R a w Data and Descriptive Statistics

laJils.

Baas.

12 R a w D a t a a n d D e s c r i p t i v e S t a t i s t i c s

C ondition 2' Study 4 ... 243 13 R a w D a t a and D e s c r i p t i v e S t a t i s t i c s

Condition 3 Study 4 ... 244 14 Ratings o£ Performance Condition 2

Study 4 ... 246 15 Ratings of Performance Condition 2'

S t u d y 4 ... 247 16 Ratings of Performance Condition 3

L I S T O F F I G U R E S

F i g u r e Esse.

LIST OF APPENDICES Appendix

Eaflfi.

E S tudy 4 Raw Data and Descriptive Statistics of Number of Events, Number Events Agreed, and Percentage Events Agreed (Tables 1 0 - 1 3 ) ... 240

F Study 4 Raw Data and Descriptive S t a t i s t i c s of R a t i n g s of P e r f o r m a n c e (Table 1 4 - 1 6 ) ... 245

OVERVIEW

The purpose o£ this overview Is to Introduce the

essential aspects of the thesis and to outline briefly the primary content and sequence of subsequent chapters in order to provide a basis for understanding at the outset.

Detailed arguments for ideas presented here will thus be articulated later in the main body of the text.

It would be difficult to overestimate the Importance of social interaction to human life. Indeed, a n y notion of human development would be incomplete if it were ignored. On the slightest reflection, a nonsocial human existence Is almost unimaginable. Contemporary research in social

psychology, however, has not yet offered a coherent,

comprehensive understanding of social Interaction. We note its impacts and s i g n i f i c a n c e — even Its n e c e s s i t y — but when it comes to understanding social Interaction Itself, we find separate, even polarized, portions of theory and empirical investigation that indicate we have barely begun the task.

Philosophers of science stand united in believing that scientific understanding of a phenomenon comes from act u a l l y studying it. And of course the more thorough the study of the phenomenon in its complexity, the more thorough the understanding is expected to be.

Over the course of the last fifty years social

interaction has been approached and investigated In two basic ways. The most prevalent and well-known of these is cognitive, which stresses the interpretive, inferential, and rational aspects of social interplay. This has been the jtudy of social thinking. The other approach is

behavioural, which underscores the overt behavioural

interrelations found Jn social interaction. This has been the s t udy of social behaviour.

Each of these research traditions has encountered the phenomenon of social interaction with a particular

theoretical and empirical approach in mind. Each approach views the process of social interaction to have a primary na t u r e — be it cognitive or behavioural. And thus, when

faced with the phenomenon of social interaction itself, each approach endeavours to study and understand those aspects of the process which bear directly upon this presumed primary nature, to the exclusion of other aspects of potential

importance to scientific understanding.

At first glance, this state of affairs appears typical and nonproblematic--two theoretical approaches are being applied to the same phenomenon and should eventually lead to a more thorough understanding of social Interaction in the

long run. However, there is little to indicate that this eventu a l i t y is even being approached, let alone realized.

Studies that have investigated social thinking and behaviour have repeatedly found their relations to be tenuous,

unpredictable, and thus not particularly useful in terms of advancing scientific understanding. In simple terms, there appears to be no reliable relationship between what people are thinking and what t h e y are doing when engaged in social

I nteraction.

The main consequence of this finding has been a separation in which social thought and behaviour are

investigated in parallel, representing a theoretical and empirical discontinuity. For the most part this separation has been accepted because it is based upon empirical

evidence: social thinking and behaviour atfi. relatively separate processes. If this is the case, however, it means that social interaction itself is not a unitary phenomenon, but rather it is composed of at least two aspects that are largely unrelated. How can this be so? W h y would this be so?

Most of us would agree that when we are engaged in any social lnteraction--say chatting over a c o f f e e — we are both thinking and behaving at the same time. Even though our research tends not to c o n f i r m that what we are thinking corresponds well with what we are doing, it must be admitted that the two activities do occur together in the process of social interaction. Indeed, while social interactants are

engaging in the most complex cognitive activities imaginable (e.g., language, attribution, expectancy, schematizing,

etc.) they are, at the same t i m e , engaging in the most complex behavioural interrelations imaginable with other interactants (e.g., interactional synchrony, turn-taking, postural relations, and m a n y other rapid and precise coordinations). This Immensely complex coordination of

thought and action appears to characterize even the simplest of social interactions, and it is hard to imagine having any sort of social interaction without this coordination.

Simply, it seems impossible to have a social interaction that does not involve both thought and behaviour. As such, both thought and behaviour a ppear to be necessary to social

interaction.

We all k n o w that the appearance of such necessity is not sufficient to establish necessity Itself. However, this constant conjunction of thought and behaviour brings into question how it is that these aspects which appear

Inseparable in social interaction itself are, upon scientific examination, rather separate.

On the one hand, this separateness can (and haL been) accepted as a prevalent empirical fact. On the other hand,

one can doubt this fact or its prevalence based on simple introspection. However, it remains for the latter position

to demonstrate empirically the inseparability of which it s p e a k s .

The overriding purpose of this thesis is to perform such a demonstration. I believe that social thought and

behaviour have been investigated as. U L they are separate and that this mode of study has Interfered with attempts to view them as integrated aspects of a single phenomenon. Guided a priori by different theories of the primary nature of social

interaction, both the cognitive and the behavioural

approaches have selectively studied different and limited portions of the phenomenon to the point that it appears separated and abstract. Indeed, in a search for primacy, I believe both approaches have failed to investigate social interaction in its objective c o m plexity— a complexity of humbling proportions. Our scant understanding of social

interaction in this complexity reflects the degree of

thoroughness that we have applied to the phenomenon. Thus, we do not have at. i i t e g r a tsfl-.undeEgtanfllnq .of..social

interaction because we have not really studied it as an integrated, unitary p r o c e s s . In a nutshell, we have not really studied social interaction itself.

In science, it is often the case that processes are taken apart prematurely, before they have been studied in their complexity. Such partitioning runs the risk of arbitrariness and is usually motivated by a desire for

imminent explanation in terms of "the primary causes" or "nature" of the process (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984). In the s tudy of social interaction, its sheer complexity demands that we are in no position to seek ultimate

explanations, nor might we ever be. Rather than searching for a p r i m a r y nature of social interaction by partitioning the process into separate cognitive and behavioural

components, it seems more useful to attempt to study the process Itself and let any partitioning be the result of such s t u d y rather than its method. In social psychology, this appears never to have been done.

This thesis is an attempt to study social interaction not as social thinking nor as social b e h a v i o u r , _ b u t a s a unitary process that Involves both and m o r e . It is in just this sense that the study is termed "ecological"— the

interrelations a mong aspects of the process are the focus of study, not their primacy. In this sense, the investigation

is constructive and inclusive rather than refutational and exclusive. P r i mary causes are deferred so that the process of social Interaction Itself may be studied in a way that allows its interrelations to be demonstrated.

In Chapter 2, a h i s tory of the cognitive approach to social knowing v/ill be presented. Here, an articulation of the main influences at the core of this approach (i.e., the representatlonallst theory of perception) will be presented

and critically examined. Chapter 3 will present the behavioural approach to social interaction. It will be argued that both approaches are Inadequate to the task of studying social interaction as a unitary process.

In Chapter 4 an alternative theoretical framework for understanding relations between thought and behaviour that finds its foundations in the ecological p s y chology of James J. Gibson, Leontyev, and others will be examined for its usefulness in guiding the present investigation. Chapter 5 will be devoted to articulating this utility and presenting the beginnings of an ecological theory of social

interaction.

Chapter 6 will present a discussion of the methodology required for investigating phenomena as ecological processes

in general and the specific development of empirical hypotheses and methods employed in the present study. A documentation b. J report of empirical findings and their

immediate theoretical implications will constitute Chapter 7.

Finally, Chapter 8 will be an overall discussion of the thesis as a whole and its implications for further

C H A P T E R 2

THE COGNITIVE APPROACH TO SOCIAL INTERACTION AND KNOWING: HISTORY AND ISSUES

Introduction

This chapter outlines the development of the cognitive approach to social interaction. At the outset, the seminal research of Helder is reviewed, wherein it will be shown that Heider, in spite of his concern with investigating social interaction as a unitary process, set the stage for the cognitive approach by stressing the primacy of social inference. This is followed by an examination of the

historical roots of Helder's research in twentieth century psychology (e.g., Gestalt psychology). The subsequent

waxing of the cognitive approach to social knowing will then be addressed.

The bulk of the chapter will be devoted to the

representationalist theory of perception that stands at the foundation of Helder's work and cognitive social psychology in general. In this section, representatlonalism will be c ritically d i s c ussed as a theory of perception, with specific reference to its parsimony and coherence. The

influence of re p r e s e n t a t l o n a l i s m upon methods used to study social interaction and knowing will then be examined. It will be concluded that this influence has led research away

the primacy of cognitive factors in the process, to the exclusion of, for example, social behaviour.

The final section of the chapter will outline the

renewed interest in the whole process of social interaction demonstrated by certain recent researchers (e.g., Newtson/. While the general intentions of this revival are in some accord with the present study, the form and breadth it has taken leaves much to be desired in terms of theory and •method.

The chapter closes with the conclusion that an examination of the behavioural approach to social interaction and of Gibson's ecological psy c h o l o g y are necessary to the eventual task of studying the process of social interaction.

Heider's Th e o r y of Social Perception and Phenomenal Causality

In recent years, social perception t h e o r y and research has shown a rekindled interest in the relations between social behaviour, perception, and cognition (Baron, 1980a & b; Bassili, 1976; McArthur & Baron, 1983; Newtson, 1973, 1976, 1980; Newtson & Enquist, 1976; Newtson, Hairfleld, Bloomingdale, & Cutino, 1987). This development does not represent a new direction In social psychology, however, but

rather is a new look at an old and neglected issue in the field.

In the early days of social perception research, well before the cognitive revolution in social psychology

(Zajonc, 1968; Markus & Zajonc, 1985), researchers were very much concerned with the interdependence of social behaviour, perception, and cognition (Helder, 1944; Helder & Slmmel, 1944; Asch, 1952) and thus sought to explore their potential i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . Helder and Slmmel (1944), for example,

conducted such an Investigation in a series of three studies that involved observation of a film of three geometrical figures moving in relation to each other. It was found that observers cons i s t e n t l y segmented the film into units of

meaningful action (e.g., chasing, hiding, etc.) between the figures and showed considerable agreement on particular units. It was also reported that nearly all of the 114 subjects in the three studies Interpreted the movements of these figures (with considerable agreement on particular units)

as. li.

A characteristic feature of this organization in terms of actions is the attribution of the origin of

movements to figural units and to motives. It has been shown that the attribution of the origin Influences the interpretation of the movements, and that it

depends in some cases on the characteristics of the movements themselves, in others on surrounding objects. The way in which actors are judged is closely

connected with this attribution of origin. (p. 259) F o l l o w i n g this r e s e a r c h an d further c o n s i d e r a t i o n , Helder concluded that:

It is an important p r i n c i p l e ...that man grasps reality, and can predict and control it, by referring transient and variable behaviour and events to relatively

unchanging underlying conditions, the so-called

dispositional properties of his world. (1958, p. 79) The naive factor analysis of action permits man to give meaning to action, to influence the actions of others as well as himself, and to predict future actions. (1950, p. 123)

And, In reflecting Helder's conclusions, Weary, Rich, Harvey, and Ickes (1980) state:

According to Helder, then, attribution processes are inextricably intertwined with perceptual processes and are oriented toward the establishment or identification

of constancies or dispositional properties (i.e., relatively Invariant relations between phenomenal percepts and distal s t i m u l i )...Helder's theory of social perception and phenomenal causality represents

an analysis of the causal stream which begins with an examination of the higher constructive (i.e.,

inferential) processes occurring within the perceiver. (pp. 40-41)

Although Heider found the examination of the "higher constructive" processes the most intriguing aspect of the whole process of social knowing, it is clear that he was aware of the potential interdependence of social behaviour, perception, and cognition. And this awareness continued throughout his professional life:

Experience teaches us that we are involved with relevant life t h i n g s . . .These things are (mostly)

in the distance, but we get information about them through something that touches us. And this bridge between the immediate influence on us and the

objects that are d i s t a n t — that is attribution. I see something (or something is given in experience) and then I make a bridge to what is most relevant and i m p o rtant— namely, the dispositional

characters, the more stable characters of the

environment, the abilities and intentions of other persons which are relatively stable. (Heider, 1976, p. 4; initial bracketed material added for clarity)

whole process of social knowing, however, virtu a l l y no research in the field has carried this "torch", at least until recently. The context of this thirty-year omission and Its eventual revitalization is found In examining the rise and eventual revolutionary dominance of the cognitive approach to social psychology; a dominance to which Heider, by stressing the primacy of social inference, contributed substantially.

The Historical Background Leading to Heider (1958) in the wake of the S-R approach which dominated

psychology in the first half of this century, there came a concern with internal factors residing in the so-called "black box" between the stimulus and response. This

concern, which characterized the work of Tolman (1932) and Woodworth (1918), among others, also epitomized the Gestalt school of psychology pioneered by Wertheimer and his

colleagues (Wertheimer, 1912, 1923; Koffka, 1936; Koehler, 1929). The Gestaltists rejected the p a s s i v i t y of

behavlouristlc man and sought to understand the basic manner in which human beings perceive and represent their world. They found that such representations were based on

perceptual and cognitive principles of form and organization which, they thought, went beyond the structure of the distal

s t i m u l u s and thus s er v e d to h i g h l i g h t the c o n st r u c t i v e n a t u r e a n d p r i m a c y of s u c h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s .

L a t e r G e s t a l t i s t s (e.g., Asch, 1946, 1952; Lewin, 1946, 1951; Helder, 1944) r e a s o n e d t h a t s u c h p r i n c i p l e s of

p e r c e p t u a l a nd c o g n i t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n m a y be a p p l i e d to the s o c i a l realm. In r e f e r r i n g G e s t a l t p r i n c i p l e s to social p s y c h o l o g y , Lewin, Helder, Asch, an d oth e rs laid a strong f o u n d a t i o n u p o n whi c h s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y has been based for the last f o r t y years. This, however, was just the

f o u n d a t i o n ; s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s in the field have ser v e d to e s t a b l i s h c o g n i t i o n per se as the sine qua non of social p s y c h o l o g y (Markus & Zajonc, 1985).

F r o m these beginnings, the 1950's work on perceptual defense (also known as the "New Look" In perception)

stressed the mutable, motivational, and constructive nature of perception, which exalted further the primacy of mental representations of stimuli over the stimuli themselves

(Berlyne, 1957; Bruner, 1951, 1957; Bruner & Goodman, 1947; Bruner & Krech, 1950). In spite of the methodological flaws for which the "New Look" was eventually criticized, the

basic conclusion that perception and cognition are primarily inferential In nature and part of a single process of

cognitive transformation of highly selective stimulus Input has prevailed (Erdelyl, 1974).

Following the "New Look" came the long-awaited publication of Heider's book, The Psychology of

Interpersonal R e l a t i o n s , in 1958. In this ncv' classic work, Heider outlines his theory of naive psychology with its focus on the perception of social objects and phenomenal causality coimplicated in the whole process of attribution and social knowing. As was mentioned previously, however, in spite of this more comprehensive approach to social

knowing, Heider stressed the richness and primary importance of the inferential aspects of the whole process. This

underscoring did much to nurture what was to become a virtually exclusive concern with social inference.

Social Perception Research After Helder (1958): The Waxing of the Social Cognitive Vi e w

Armed with Heider's a t tribution theory and highlighting of social Inference and also faced with the rise of an

information-processing vi e w of cognition (e.g., Miller,

Galanter, & Pribram, 1960), subsequent researchers in person perception and attribution (Jones & Thlbaut, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & McGillis, 1976; K e l 1y, 1967, j.972) have directed their attention toward social inference per se as a deliberate, rather "cool" and rational

information-processing phenomenon (see Markus & Zajonc, 1985; W e ary et al., 1980).

During the twenty or so years following Heider's (1958) book the cognitive approach to social psychology flourished, as exemplified by the birth of the area now known as "social cognition" (e.g., Higgins, Herman, & Zanna, 1981; Nlsbett & Ross, 1980; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979;

Stotland & Canon, 1972; Zajonc, 1980). Indeed, from today's vantage, there has been nothing short of a cognitive

revolution in social psychology. The present-day prominence of the cognitive approach to social psychology is expressed in Markus and Zajonc's (1985) recent review of the field:

This adoption of the cognitive view among psychologists has been so complete that it is extre m e l y difficult for most of the workers to conceive of a viable alternative. The result is that one can no longer v i e w today's social

psychology as the study of social behavior. It is more accurate to define it as the s t udy of the social mind. (p. 137)

Amidst this fervour for investigating the inferential aspects of social knowing, however, the concern that Heider and Asch had for a more comprehensive understanding of the whole process had unfort u n a t e l y been left behind by

Weary et al., 1980). So prevalent has been the Influence of social cognition and inference that the term, "social

knowing" has become equivalent to "social cognition." Whereas Helder originally s a w "social knowing" as the

interplay of behavioural, perceptual, and cognitive factors, the cognitive approach became exclusive in its focus on inferential factors per se. The following section argues that the neglect of a more inclusive approach is, in the main, the result of the representationalist theory of perception that is assumed by research on social knowing.

The Representationalist Basl'* of Social Perception Theory and Besearch

For the purposes of the present study, it is important to ask why it is that the inferential aspect of the whole process of social knowing dominates the perceptual and behavioural (stimulus input) aspects. Certainly, Gestalt Psychology, Heider, the "New Look" and the cognitive

revolution were and continue to be strong influences. However, there is an even more prevalent reason for this dominance. In brief, research on social knowing is

dominated (as is the bulk of psychological research in general) by a representationalist theory of perception, the assumptions of which are incorporated into both the

theoretical and empirical practices of the field. Before examining the influence of representationalism upon social knowing research, it is necessary to outline Its

characteristics as a theory of perception.

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m

R e p r e s e n tationalism (also known as representative realism, a form of indirect realism; Hirst, 1967)

distinguishes itself as a theory of perception by assenting that perception is an inferential process. According to the theory, inference is necessary because the perceiver cannot come into direct contact with the perceived object or event, but rather must rely on sensory input that in some way

represents it. This sensory representation or sensum is incomplete and imperfect. Thus, the senses mediate between the perceiving subject and the perceived object in such a way that their contact is indirect. As perceivers, our direct contact is with the se n s u m itself, not with the object. As Hirst (1972) conveys it:

In what is loosely called "seeing a table," light rays reflected from the table strike the eye, cause chemical changes in the retina, and send a train of impulses along the optic nerve to the brain. The resultant

brain act i v i t y is then said to cause the mind of the percipient to be dir e c t l y aware of private sensa (Locke

the table...The essential point is that perceiving proper is the direct awareness of sensa; perceiving external objects is redefined as perceiving sensa caused by them, and so all our awareness is strictly limited to sensa. "Represent" is usually interpreted in accordance with the doctrine of primary and

secondary q u a l i t i e s — that is, the sensa resemble the object in spatiotemporal properties but not insofar as colors, sounds, smells, and other secondary qualities are concerned. (p. 80)

Goldstick (1980) offers his characterization:

.. .a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s t . or representative r e a list— ...is one who insists that a l l .. .knowledge is mediate rather than immediate, the external objects being

perceivable only indirectly and by means of perceiving d i rectly some thing in the mind...(p. 2)

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m m a y be characterized as the philosophical v i e w that everything known about the external world is known by i n f e r e n c e ...(p. 3)

(underlining used for Italics)

Thus, the sensa (or mental representations) partially represent p r i mary qualities of the object and also Include secondary or psychological qualities not present in the

object. The sensa we d irectly perceive are therefore incomplete and psychologically enriched representations of perceived objects. Perception becomes indirect and

i n f e r e n t i a l .

The main thrust of r e p resentationalism is that we cannot d i rectly know and come into mental contact with the world, but, rather, are faced with reconstructing

a.

imperfect and experientially augmented s e n s o r y data. According to Tolman (1986a):

...representationalism...states that the object of our perceptions is never the actual mind-independent thing but rather some representation caused by it in our nervous system, for example a retinal Image...the perceiver never has access to the actual thing except through his representation of it... (p. 4)

R e p r e s e n tationalism has been firmly entrenched in psychology since its beginnings as a science (e.g., In the work of Galileo, Descartes, Locke, Kant, and later, in

Helmholtz's theory of perception, etc.). The obvious major implication of this doctrine for psychology is a strong subject-object dualism.

This fundamental separation of humans from their world has profound Implications for our conceptualizations of

perception and human evolution. Indeed, it raises the issue of the very nature of the relationship between humans and

their e n v i r o n m e n t s : To w h a t e x t e n t are we a pa r t of the

wor l d we live a nd e v o l v e in? The a n s w e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m of f e r s is tha t we ar e o n l y i n d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h the wor l d t h r o u g h our c o n s t r u c t i v e , " e n r i c h i n g " i n f e r e n c e s and arc thus in a p o w e r f u l s e n s e s e p a r a t e f r o m it.

Michaels and Carello (1981), Goldstick (1980), and Tolman (1986a) have pointed out that representationalism makes very problematic h o w cognition, which appears to guide action, evolved in a world that cannot be d irectly known. Furthermore, these researchers reason that humans' mental constructions of an only indirectly knowable world pertain to an unnecessarily complex, even incoherent, v i e w of human evolution. R e p resentationalism jeopardizes the connection between cognition and its perceptual foundation such that cognition loses its basic function as a guide to action in. the w o r l d . Represe n t a t i o n a l i s m thus removes the

action/perception basis of cognition and replaces this with an indirect and tenuous connection between cognition and the world. In terms of human evolution, it is hard to imagine a cognitive sy s t e m that functions as a guide to action in the world and, at the same time, does not find its very basis in such action. Once perception is viewed as indirect, the adaptive basis and e v o l u tionary role of cognition comes into q u estion— the potential o b jectivity of human cognition about the world is replaced by an Inferentlally-based cognition

that is not able to assess its own objectivity. These

considerations make it difficult for representationalism to offer a coherent explanation of the evolution of human cognition in the world.

With regard to perception itself, representationalism is on no firmer ground than in the case of evolution. As

Tolman (1986a) states:

...representationalism does not actually achieve its theoretical goal of a final explanation for perception. When it formulates its theory of the representation,

it leaves unexplained how that representation is perceived. Its Insistence that perception requires representation would se e m to require a representation of the representation. But how is the second

representation perceived? We are led necessarily to some sort of infinite regress which will always fail to complete the explanation. (pp. 7-8)

Hirst (1965) adds to this the skepticism Inherent in the representationalist position:

If, as it claims, our perceiving is strictly awareness of the mental ideas or sense-data, it is difficult to see how we can break out of the circle of sense-data and observe external objects. How can we tell what

there are such o b j e c t s ? If we t r y to v e r i f y the e x i s t e n c e of the t a b l e b y t o u c h i n g it, we s i m p l y o b ta i n mo r e s e n s e - d a t a — t a c t i l e o n e s — an d if we see our hands t o u c h i n g the t a b l e we ar e o n l y h a v i n g v i su a l data. W h e n e v e r we t r y to peer a r o u n d the b a r r i e r of

ideas we just ge t m o r e ideas. T h i s d i f f i c u l t y

u n d e r m i n e s the a n a l o g i e s a n d e v i d e n c e for the theory. (p. 18).

In its assumption that perception is exclusively based on mental representations, representationalism actually undermines its goal of explaining perception. As such, representationalism collapses perception and cognition into one subjective system (Tolman, 1986a) and thus gives us no way of perceiving the world other than through our

constructive and inferential representations of it. In spite of its theoretical deficiencies, however,

representationalism has been the most widely adopted theory of perception in psychology. As Wilcox and Katz (1984) put

it:

...according to it [indirect realism], the percelver comes to know the world 'indirectly,' or 'mediately' by

using a collection of atomic elements to reconstruct the world through some form of quasi-ratlonal Inference or schematism. Virtually every modern theory of

'unconscious inference' (Helmholtz 1867), 'schema formation' (Bartlett 1932), 'hypothesis testing'

(Gregory 1977), 'perceptual atom theory' (Julesz and Schumer 1981), Sanalysis by synthesis' or later the

'perceptual cycle' (Neisser 1967, 1976), 'assimilation/ accommodation' (Piaget 1963) and uncountably many

variations of these. (p. 152; initial bracketed material added)

And, this adoption has often been rather unconscious and implicit and thus has functioned to a considerable degree as an unquestioned hegemony. As Hirst (1967) states:

...representative realism h a s ... traditionally been part of the widely accepted interactionlst or dualist account of the relation between mind and body. (p. 81) The classic form of this general view was the

representative realism...of Descartes and Locke, which is still maintained in principle by m a n y scientists. (p. 80)

Not all who accept that theory realize that they are saddled with representative realism. (p. 81)

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m gives the perceiver only indirect contact with the world which necessitates the primacy of

inference in the perceptual process. As the above

In general psychology, in social psychology, however, the adoption of representationalism has been particularly pronounced; and we are reminded of Markus and Zajonc's

\ (1985) redefinition of social psychology as, "...the study of the social mind." (p. 137)

The concepts and methods employed by researchers of social knowing strongly reflect this representational foundation. Following is an examination of this influence.

Representationalism and Methods for Researching the Process of Social Knowing.

Upon examining the ways in which social knowing has been investigated over the years, it becomes apparent that there are certain common characteristics to these methods; characteristics that, as stated above, are strongly

Influenced by the representationalist vi e w that social knowing is an inferential, constructive process.

The most pronounced of these commonalities is the practice of giving subjects the task of perceiving social information that is separate from them. The form of this separation is twofold. In the first sense, subjects are in fact physically separate from the Information they are asked to perceive— they are neither behaviourally nor personally

Involved. Typically, subjects read a written scenario or view a videotape and are asked perceptual questions about

p e o p l e a n d / o r s i t u a t i o n s prese n t e d . The oth e r sense of this s e p a r a t i o n is i n f o r m a t i o n a l . The i n f o r m a t i o n p r e s e n t e d in w r i t t e n or v i d e o f o r m is u s u a l l y r e s t r i c t e d so that

p e r c e i v i n g s u b j e c t s are no t in a p o s i t i o n to k n o w the w h o l e m e a n i n g of w h a t is g o i n g on. This p r a c t i c e is often

a c c o m p a n i e d b y a d d i t i o n a l I n f o r m a t i o n ( u s u a l l y in schematic, i n t e r p r e t i v e form) o f f e r e d b y an e x p e r i m e n t e r in an a t t e m p t to a s s e s s th e i n f l u e n c e of this s u p p l e m e n t a l i n f o r m a t i o n up o n s u b j e c t s ' p e r c e p t i o n of the w r i t t e n or v i d e o s t i m u l u s

i n f o r m a t i o n .

A typical example of this research p aradigm can be found in the often-cited work of Zadney and Gerard. Zadney and Gerard (1974) had subjects v i e w a videotape of two people in a room of a house who were engaged in a discussion of the use of drugs, the police, and burglary while also apparently exploring the room. In order to test the effects of

prescribed cognitive structures upon subjects' perception of this p o t e n t i a l l y ambiguous stimulus, subjects were presented with one of three different schemas to use in their

Interpretations of the stimulus: either the two interactants on the videotape were two burglars, two students who were waiting for a friend, or two friends who were involved in hiding their illegal drugs.

The results indicated the influence of th.se schemas on both the interpretation and recall of the stimulus. For

example, subjects who were given the "burglar" schema recalled more objects or comments in the stimulus that pertained to burglary than those in the other two

conditions. The conclusion offered was that schemas

influence the stlirilus information that will be perceived and r e m e m b e r e d .

Since the time of Zadney and Gerard's study, other studies have attempted to investigate the extent to which both initial encoding and retrieval of stimulus information are affected by schemas (e.g., Ostrom et al., 1980; Llngle & Ostrom, 1S79; Ebbeson, 1980; Cohen & Ebbeson, 1979).

However, regardless of this issue, the conclusion is that schemas have profound effects upon social knowing and are primary to the whole process.

This influence of schemas upon social inference has been repeatedly demonstrated in the field, and is accepted here. However, the conclusion, drawn from this b o d y of research, that inference is the primary cause or essence of social Interplay is strongly questioned. The argument against this primacy is methodological. In particular, the methods used for Investigating cognitive social Inference have done well in demonstrating its effects and richness (per Heider) but, in their specificity, have failed to incorporate social Inference into the very process in which it r e s i d e s — social interaction itself.

When one is engaged in social interaction, it is evident that inference is involved. However, other factors also present themselves as legitimate aspects. For example, behavioural coordination and the perception of objective

information in the interaction may be involved. The methods used to Investigate social Inference have done little to explicate just how this Inference relates to social

interaction as a whole process. In a quest for w h y this has been the case, the representationalist theory of perception presents itself.

We have seen that representationalism views perceivers as profoundly separate from what they perceive (a strong subject-object dualism). It is this very d u a l i s m that

underlies and gives form to the conceptions and methods that have been used in research on social knowing.

Wh e n we assume this separation of subject and object, it becomes unimportant to study the whole process of social knowing. Since social perception and cognition are

e x c l u s i v e l y based on our representations of the social world itself, why study the social world except as it is

represented and enriched?

For example, Zadney and Gerrard (1974) see it as u n n e c e s s a r y to involve d irectly their subjects with what they are "perceiving." Moreover, their measures refer much more to subjects' interpretations (i.e., representations) of

what is going on rather than to the objective aspects of the social stimulus environment (see Footnote 1). Indeed, if we cannot dir e c t l y perceive the social world, these

methodological characteristics seem to follow. However, Zadney and Gerrard do not provide evidence for this implicit assumption although it provides the ve r y basis of their

study, in a nutshell, if, as in.-thls

study, you

s e p a r a t e . Zadney and Gerrard (1974) offer their perceivers only restricted representations of and limited access to what they are asked to perceive and, in doing so, ensure that they base their perceptions on these inferential

r ^ . r e sentations— it is necessary to enrich and inferentially Interpret that which you are asked to "know" and are not in a position to examine in detail.

The result of this hegemonic acceptance of

r e p resentationalism is the now almost universal vi e w that social knowing is primarily inferential and constructive in nature and, as such, should be studied as part of higher level cognitive social constructions. Since, according to this view, social perception and cognition are primarily

inferential processes, the importance of overt social behaviour and objective aspects of the social environment has been g r e atly diminished by the focus on h o w such

objective aspects are cognitively constructed and r e p r e s e n t e d .

To someone viewing the above explanation with

skepticism, the obvious alternative is that it Is not the representationalist base of research on social knowing that has led us to the conclusion that social knowing is

primarily an inferential process, but rather the objective findings over the course of decades of research, in short, we are inductively led to this conclusion by empirical r e s e a r c h .

This alternative explanation would hold if it were the case that this empirical research in fact allowed

investigation of behavioural or different perceptual views of the process of social knowing. However, research on social knowing has employed methods (and of course

conceptualizations) that preserve and maintain the central dualistic a s s umption of representationalism and are thus self-confirming. In short, the view that social knowing is primarily an inferential, constructive process is accepted because the w a y in which we study the process literally dictates this v i e w — we find that social knowing is

Inferential because we study the process as if it is, in fact, exclus i v e l y inferential.

It is a c o n t ention of this thesis that the

perceivers toward c o n structive. Inferential perception b y virtue of. In one v a v or another, not giving perceivers s ufficient opportunity to perceive and/or report on "the

information g i v e n ” in the social s t imulus environment.

Indeed, one of the main assumptions of representationalism Is that the information given in stimuli (social or

otherwise) Is sparse and thus must be augmented by outside information (usually in the form of perceivers' already established social cognitive c o n s t r u c t i o n s ) In order to be

"known." In a more general sense, representationalism assumes that the world of primary qualities is not

Informationally rich and so must be augmented or

"psychologized" by perceivers' constructions. Here we see one of the m a n y ways In which representationalism

deemphasizes the objective stimulus In favour of how that stimulus Is represented and enriched by perceivers. In the next chapter, I will re v i e w the behavioural approach to the study of social Interaction, which shows clea r l y that there Is much more potential Information In the complex

coordination of social behaviour than the representationalist framework seems to allow.

S.ummarv..of the Influence of R e p r e s e n tationalism The separation of the social perceiver from the social