Moving Right? The Influence of Right-Wing Populism on Immigration Rhetoric in France and the Netherlands

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Moving Right? The Influence of Right-Wing

Populism on Immigration Rhetoric in France and

the Netherlands

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities University of Amsterdam Author: Yasmin van Benthem Student number: 10524754

Main supervisor: prof. dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz Second supervisor: dr. M.J.M. Rensen July 2017

Figure 1 A cartoon illustrating how Dutch politics has changed in the run up to the 2017 national election (cartoon by Peter Schrank).

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List of figures

Figure 1 A cartoon illustrating how Dutch politics has changed in the run up

to the 2017 national election. Cartoon by Peter Schrank.

Source: The Economist, 11 February 2017. Page 01

Figure 2 Poll displaying the electoral course of the PVV from

September 2012 until March 2017. Source: Peilingwijzer 2017. Page 27

Figure 3 Poll displaying the electoral course of the VVD from

September 2012 until March 2017. Source: Peilingwijzer 2017. Page 27

Figure 4 The open letter Rutte published in several Dutch newspapers,

23 January 2017. Source: NRC. Page 30

Figure 5 The political advertisement Asscher published in the Volkskrant,

10 March 2017. Source: De Volkskrant. Page 31

Figure 6 The official first round results of the 2017 French presidential

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Abstract

This thesis provides an analysis of the influence of right-wing populism on the immigration-rhetoric of left- and right-wing mainstream parties in France and the Netherlands. In order to determine the extent of right-wing populist influence, a critical discourse analysis (CDA) is applied to several key political speeches (with regard to the French context) and newspaper advertisements (with regard to the Dutch context), in the run-up to the national elections held in both countries in the spring of 2017. The sources that were used for the discourse analysis were chosen from both left- and right-wing mainstream parties in the two countries, since this thesis specifically focuses on how the traditional parties have presented themselves

rhetorically in the run up to national elections. The comparative analysis between the Dutch and French elections illustrates some of the ways in which national socio-political contexts are adapting to wider European political trends. The focus lies, in particular, on the shift of mainstream parties to the right side of the political spectrum with regard to immigration policy, interrogating to what extent the traditional left- and right-wing parties in France and the Netherlands have been influenced by such a shift.

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Introduction

In the past few years, the European political landscape has witnessed the upsurge of a number of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe (Rooduijn 2013, 2). The right-wing populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), for example, is seen as one of the main

advocates of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU), while also Donald Trump’s shocking victory in the US presidential elections has emphasized the rise of right-wing populism in the West. Even in countries whereas right-wing populist parties have not been successful in claiming power in the government, far right parties are enjoying record popularity in the polls (Bröning 2016). Especially within the context of the recent terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic State (IS) on European soil, coupled with widespread anxiety towards what was present as a ‘massive wave’ of immigrants with a Muslim background, many right-wing populist parties have succeeded in mobilizing voters and have emerged as key players in the run up to the 2017 national elections, scheduled to be held in several European countries (Mudde 2016, 25). The Dutch general elections were seen by many observers as the first big test in 2017, where the right-wing populist Partij voor de Vrijheid (‘Party for Freedom’, PVV) of Geert Wilders, was closely following the country’s leading

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (‘People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy’,

VVD) in the polls. The Dutch election was then closely followed by Europe’s next big electoral test, which was held in April with the first round of the French presidential election, where the polls had predicted that the far-right Marine Le Pen of the Front National

(‘National Front’, FN) might be a possible candidate for the second electoral round. Nevertheless, even though the increasing electoral popularity of right-wing populist parties may have important consequences for the current state of liberal democracy in Europe (and for the European project in general), perhaps an even bigger ‘risk’ to Europe is the influence of these parties on the traditional political parties and mainstream policymakers (Ward 2017). Several human rights organizations have, for example, reported that mainstream parties have increasingly begun to copy the agendas of right-wing populist parties for fear of losing voters instead of courageously confronting these parties and defending policies based on rights (Ward 2017). This ‘shift towards populism’ seems to be mainly present in the field of immigration politics, with mainstream parties appearing to increasingly adopt more and more of the right-wing populist discourse on immigration. Centre-right Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte had, for example, published at the start of 2017 a much-debated open letter in several Dutch newspapers noting that people who “refuse to adapt and criticize our values”

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should “behave normally or go away” (VVD 2017). However, also in the run up to the French elections, a number of the mainstream right candidates attempted to copy Nicolas Sarkozy’s tough approach towards Islam and immigration in a ploy to attract FN voters.

This thesis therefore addresses the influence of right-wing populism on mainstream political parties and in particular on the rhetoric that they use with regard to the issue of immigration. The main goal is to examine whether mainstream politicians (both on the right and left side of the political spectrum) are following the path of right-wing populist politicians and are ‘swerving’ more and more to the right side of the political spectrum. Analysed is also whether this ‘strategy’ leads to failure or not (Wodak 2015, 35). This is done by analysing the immigration rhetoric of the main left- and right-wing mainstream candidates in the context of the 2017 Dutch and French elections, and comparing this to the rhetoric of their right-wing populist electoral opponents. The analysis is thereby mostly focused on Wodak’s

conceptualization of right-wing populism as a ‘political ideology’ in which the framing of certain ethnic or religious minorities as a ‘danger’ or a ‘threat’ to the nation is considered very important (Wodak 2015, 2). The topic of this thesis is quite relevant in its focus on

contemporary European politics, especially since it analyses how a European political trend such as right-wing populism emerges in two different national contexts.

The outline of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, the different definitions and conceptualizations of ‘populism’ are explained. This is important, since there are several different labels used to describe the parties on the further right side of the political spectrum (Mammone 2009, 173). The chapter will also further elaborate on the historical development of right-wing populism and the different categorizations that are used within the scholarly literature on populism. In chapter two, the focus will be on the methodology that is used to analyse the influence of right-wing populism, namely the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA). As a methodology, CDA can help to expose power relations and ideologies, which are ‘hidden’ in a certain way in all sorts of texts (Kendall 2007). Furthermore, the chapter will focus on the framework of critical geopolitics in which the methodology is embedded. A critical geopolitical framework is especially important with regard to the analysis of the thesis, since it also focuses for a large part on the impact of different geopolitical imaginations on politics in France and the Netherlands. The following two chapters – chapter three and four – will focus on the impact of right-wing populism on mainstream politicians’ rhetoric on immigration in the national contexts of France and the Netherlands.

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Chapter three will focus on the case study of the Netherlands. It will start with a historical overview of the Dutch immigration policies from the post-war period until present-day. The emphasis in this policy overview is in particular on the electoral breakthrough of the right-wing populist parties Lijst Pim Fortuyn (‘Pim Fortuyn List’, LPF) and the PVV and to what extent this has led to a policy change with regard to immigration policy in the

Netherlands. It will be followed by an overview of the socio-political context in relation to the Dutch parliamentary election of March 2017. In this chapter, it is argued that the mainstream political parties in the Netherlands – and especially the mainstream VVD and Partij van de

Arbeid (‘Labour Party’, PvdA) – have shifted more and more towards the right side of the

political spectrum. The chapter eventually finishes with a discourse analysis of the rhetoric that was used by the two mainstream politicians Mark Rutte (VVD) and Lodewijk Asscher (PvdA) in the run up to the parliamentary election and to what extent this matches with the immigration rhetoric used by their right-wing populist opponent Geert Wilders. CDA is therefore applied to two widely published political newspaper advertisements of Rutte and Asscher, which have been printed in several Dutch newspapers.

Chapter four looks at the influence of right-wing populism on the mainstream political parties in France. Special focus is thereby paid to the political representation of the traditional

Parti socialiste (‘Socialist Party’, PS) and Les Républicains (‘The Republicans’, LR) during

the French presidential election rounds of April and May 2017. This chapter will also start with a brief historical overview of the development of French immigration policy and to what extent this policy field has changed as a result of the electoral rise of the FN. It will then also focus on the socio-political context of the French presidential elections, which was considered to be one of the strangest presidential elections yet in France (Henley 2017a). As for the chapter on the Netherlands, the chapter on France will also end with a discourse analysis of the rhetoric used by mainstream and right-wing populist politicians on the electoral issue of immigration. To asses whether also the mainstream politicians in France are ‘swerving’ more towards the right side of the political spectrum, several political rallies of the main candidates in the run up to the election are analysed. Among others, the analysis focuses on, for example, François Fillon’s (LR) discourse on immigration in Nice and Marine Le Pen’s (FN) political rally in Lyon.

The concluding chapter of the thesis will summarize the findings with regards to the national case studies of the Netherlands and France. It will query whether – and to what extent – the increasing electoral popularity of right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands and France has influenced the rhetoric of mainstream parties on a divisive issue such as

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immigration. The findings of the discourse analysis together with a comparative analysis of two different national case studies may illustrate how a European political trend – namely right-wing populism – is developing on the national level and it also illustrates how important different geopolitical imaginations can be for the emergence of a pan-European electoral trend. The final part of the concluding chapter will also shortly discuss the outcome of the two national elections, asking whether the ‘right-wing populist’ rhetorical strategy has worked for certain parties or not.

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1. Right-wing populism: definitions and categorizations

Populism has become an increasingly important political phenomenon in twenty-first century Europe. In particular, the emergence of a variant of right-wing populism, with well-known and controversial political leaders such as Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, has shown that the populist surge has gained a lot of clout in the European political landscape. In order to understand this new dominant position of right-wing populist parties and politicians in the contemporary European political landscape, this chapter will focus on the specific

interpretations of the concept of populism. It looks at the conceptual difficulties surrounding the definition of the concept of ‘populism’ and at some of the attempts of authors to find a suitable definition to it. In addition, it will also look at the historical legacy of populism and the current form and content in which right-wing populism manifests itself today.

1.1 ‘Populism’: a contested concept

When analysing populism, one of the first things that occurs is the terminological confusion surrounding the concept of ‘populism’. Not only are there different definitions for the term ‘populism’, there is also a broader academic debate going on about the ideological ‘core’ of populist movements and the different labels that are used to describe the populist political parties of the right (Mammone 2009, 173). The definition of ‘populism’ that is most probably the most well-known among people is populism as a set of “political ideas and activities that are intended to get support of ordinary people by giving them what they want” (Cambridge Dictionary 2017). This definition is not very surprising since ‘populism’ comes from the Latin word ‘populous’, which means ‘people’ in English. The discussion surrounding populism concerns not only for a part what it exactly is, but also sometimes whether it exists at all (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 1). It has, for example, been defined within academic literature as an ideology, a movement or a syndrome, but some authors have also linked it to distinct political phenomena, like anti-immigration and xenophobia.

Also part of the difficulty characterizing populism is that it is often considered to be a (negative) label, which is seldom claimed by politicians or movements themselves and tends to deny any identification or classification with the Right/Left dichotomy (Laclau 2005, 4). Thereafter comes the challenge that it appears in different forms and in different contexts, which makes the conceptualization of it even more difficult. Whereas for example, extreme right-wing forms of populism in Europe often refer to anti-immigration and xenophobia, on the other side of the world in Latin America, it rather alludes to certain economic policy

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choices (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 2). There are thus many different interpretations possible of the concept of ‘populism’ and some authors have argued that it is indeed possible to create some kind of a definition that captures the ‘core’ of past and present manifestations of ‘populism’. Some of the most important attempts by authors within this field to define the ‘core’ of (right-wing) populism are mentioned below.

1.2 Different definitions of ‘populism’

One of the debates that often occur within scholarly literature on this topic is whether ‘populism’ or ‘right-wing populism’ can be seen as an ideological movement. One of the authors that offered a definition that has become increasingly influential within the study of populism is Cas Mudde. Mudde, who is a Dutch political scientist, defined populism as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and

antagonistic groups, the ‘pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, 543). Within this popular definition, populism is formulated as a thin-centred ideology instead of a real independent ideological phenomenon that is based on a set of beliefs or principles, like for example liberalism or socialism does. As Stanley pointed out, who has published a lot about populism in Central and Eastern Europe, populism should be regarded as a distinct ideology, because its thin nature makes it unable to stand alone as a practical political

ideology (Stanley 2008, 95). Populism simply seems to lack the capacity to formulate a wide-ranging and coherent program in order to find a solution to important political issues. It is also therefore that the party programs of right-wing populist parties are often very succinct and lack any explanation about the implantation and further financing of their political plans. This was, for example, largely the case with the Dutch PVV whose party program for the elections of 2017 consisted of only one short piece of paper (Het Financiële Dagblad 2016). ‘Populism’ in general thus seems to lack any core ideological features, but perhaps a more important element of its ‘core’ is the relationship between what is called ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’.

‘The people’ vs. ‘the elite’

As already mentioned in Mudde’s definition, populism is often defined as a concept centred on the antagonistic relationship of two particular groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’.

However, a lot of scholars have written about the vagueness concerning the notion of ‘the people’. Who is, for example, part of ‘the people’ and who is not? One of the authors that has also tried to define the ‘core’ of populism is Paul Taggart, a Professor of Politics at the

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University of Sussex. Taggart came up with the alternative term of ‘the heartland’ in order to describe the idealized version of the world populists often tend to hold on to (Taggart 2000, 3). While believing in this ‘heartland’, populism excludes things that it sees as alien (e.g. immigrants) or corrupt (e.g. the European Union) and gives meaning to ‘the general will of the people’. However, then again it is rather unclear whom this exactly refers to. Taggart has defined ‘populism’ in his identically titled book as “a reaction against the ideas, institutions and practices of representative politics which celebrates an implicit heartland as a response to a sense of crisis; however, lacking universal key values, it is chameleonic, taking on attributes of its environment, and, in practice episodic” (Taggart 2000, 5). In this definition, populism is at its core very hostile towards representative politics and only comes as an accompaniment to change, crisis and political challenges, which makes it also very reluctantly political in his view (Taggart 2004, 275).

If we look closer at defining this antagonistic relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ within the concept of right-wing populism, Ruth Wodak’s definition is also very

influential. She defined right-wing populism as “a political ideology that rejects existing political consensus and usually combines laissez-faire liberalism and anti-elitism. It is

considered populism because of its appeal to the ‘common man/woman’ as opposed to elites” (Wodak 2015, 7). She further argues that, in any case, right-wing populist parties frame certain ethnic or religious minorities as a scapegoat for most of the current woes and that this group is regularly framed as ‘dangerous’ or ‘a threat’ to the nation. This particular process and corresponding rhetoric of right-wing populist parties is what Wodak labels a ‘politics of fear’, which can often be associated with the ‘arrogance of ignorance’, meaning that these parties often appeal to a certain common sense and anti-intellectualism that provides them with simple and clear-cut answers to the fears and challenges a society is dealing with (Wodak 2015, 2). What is striking about the three above-mentioned definitions (of Mudde, Taggart and Wodak) is that the notion of ‘the people’ and what they want, referring here explicitly to ordinary citizens, is thus very important. The elite, on the other side, is framed as ‘corrupt’ and works against the general will of the pure people. It is therefore that some authors have argued that populists by definition cannot sustain themselves in power, since they are fundamentally anti-establishment in their core (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017, 12).

Left-wing populism vs. right-wing populism

But even though the relationship between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’ seems to be the core of most forms of ‘populism’, there also needs to be a clear distinction made between what is

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called left-wing and right-wing populism. Both forms of populism are also centred on the notion of ‘the people’, but while right-wing populism is mostly focused on ‘the people’ as a nation, in left-wing populism, ‘the people’ is mostly associated with the element of class (Kriesi 2014, 362). Left-wing political parties – or the ‘radical left’ as some call it – often hold issues concerning economic inequity and social rights as their main agenda. They can also be characterized as largely ‘anti-capitalist’ and often argue that the current political and economic woes are the result of the process of globalization. Also, left-wing populist claim that the so-called ‘political elite’ only looks after the interests of the business elite and therewith neglects the interests of the ‘common working man’, which is strongly populist in nature (March and Mudde 2005, 25). These left-wing populist parties gained great

prominence in the 1960s with the emergence of the Green parties and other ecological

movements in Europe. However, since the collapse of the USSR in 1989, the presence of left-wing populism in European politics seems to have strongly decreased, due to the fact that most of the successful radical left parties in the 20th century were strongly communist in nature (March and Mudde 2005, 24). Though, still today there are some successful social-populist parties in Western Europe, like the Dutch Socialistische Partij (‘Socialist Party’, SP), the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP) and to a certain extent also the Irish Sinn Féin, which all strongly reject the presence of capitalism and elitism in their societies. Also in Southern Europe, left-wing radical populism is becoming more and more visible in national politics with the rise of the Spanish Podemos and electoral victory of Syriza in Greece.

Right-wing populism on the other hand, can be recognized due to its commitment to authoritarianism and nativism, which is in its turn can be strongly linked to the idea that only the members of a particular ethnic nation should have the right to decide over things. All ‘other’ and non-native elements are thereby perceived as a real threat (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 62). Following Betz, right-wing populism can be first and foremost recognized in their rejection of individual and social equality and of political projects that seek to achieve it (Betz 1994, 4). Secondly, they are strongly opposed to the social integration of marginalized groups and the final characteristic according to Betz is their appeal to xenophobia (or racism). It are precisely these three characteristics that are used by right-wing populist in order to create public feelings of anxiety and to appeal to populist elements of the ‘common men and women’ and their ‘common sense’. What is also characteristic for the rise of contemporary populist movements is the strategic use of the (social) media, since right-wing populist politicians are intentionally out to provoke and create scandals by violating the publicly accepted norms (Wodak 2015, 19). Also the fact that the ‘new’ far right is very much

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single-issue orientated is relatively new for this type of populism (Pelinka 2013, 11). Right-wing populists thus hold a very defensive agenda, which is mostly aimed at transforming the society as it once was before the processes of globalization, mass migration and

Europeanization had started – a process that is in their eyes for a large part to blame on the much hated elite.

The ‘populist’ notion of citizenship

According to Brubaker, citizenship is a universal and distinctive feature of the modern political landscape. It can be used as a tool to publicly define a set of persons as ‘members’ and therewith also designate all other non-citizens or aliens and contains an ideologically charged distinction between citizens and foreigners (Brubaker 1992, 21). The state is therewith perceived as a bounded entity or citizenry and populists often use this

conceptualisation to claim they are expressing the will and interests of their nation. The fulfilling of certain civic integration requirements is therefore nowadays considered to be very important in several European countries when it comes to accessing naturalisation and

eventually the element of citizenship. Immigrants are therefore often obliged to meet certain language requirements before they can enter the country or in some (national) cases claim things like permits or even citizenship (Wodak 2015, 89). Through this way, European countries have the ability to determine who is allowed to stay ‘inside’ their country and who does not. The rules for immigration differ from country to country in Europe and each country can thus decide on its own whether an immigrant is allowed to have access to things like working permits or citizenship. Examples of countries in Western Europe that require sufficient language skills as a necessary element for (a) entering the country; (b) getting a work permit and (c) having access to citizenship are countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Wodak 2015, 89). According to Wodak, such

definitions allow for a plethora of interpretations, since the connection of citizenship to language can lead to the creation of new sorts of categories. It can lead, for example, to a categorization of new ‘real’ citizens who are contrasted against an ‘other’ – a group that is distinguished on the basis that it lacks certain features which are considered important in order to become an ‘authentic’ citizen (Wodak 2015, 89).

1.3 The historical development of right-wing populism

Throughout history, populism has appeared in different places and times and also in different forms, movements and styles (Taggart 2000, 5). In order to understand the current

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phenomenon of right-wing populism, it is therefore important to have a clear understanding of the different forms in which right-wing populism has already emerged, since nineteenth-century American populism and present-day populist mobilization in Western Europe have a number of things in common (Betz 2013, 215). Following Mudde and Kaltwasser, we can identify three important waves of populism that have emerged from the nineteenth century onwards until today (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 495). The first wave of populism can be traced back to the end of the nineteenth century with the occurrence of the Russian Narodniki and the People’s Party in the United States. The Russian Narodniki can be sub-classified as ‘intellectual agrarian socialism’ as it consisted of a relatively small group of urban middle class intellectuals who believed in the moral superiority of the peasantry (Laclau 2005, 6). However, while the Narodniki was successful in educating the peasantry on their crucial role in the socialist revolution and also strongly inspired some of the Eastern European agrarian populist movements of the 20th century, it had further achieved little in its time period. Another important populist political party that was prominent in this time was the US People’s Party. For a few years, this party played a major role in opposing the existing order in the United States and aimed for a better and ‘real’ democracy (Pelinka 2013, 5). Also in Europe, these types of agrarian populist parties gained ground in the post-war period with parties like the Dutch Farmers Party and the French Union for the Defence of Merchants and Artisans. However, in contemporary European politics, this type of ‘agrarian populism’ seems to be hardly present anymore.

The second wave of populism can be placed in the 1930s, in the run up to the Great Depression. This wave of populism was extremely influential in Latin America with perhaps the Argentinian populist politician Juan Domingo Péron as most well known example (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 497). This particular type of fascist populism was termed ‘Peronism’ and can be characterized by its ability to delegitimize democracy in Argentina (Wodak 2015, 9). These types of populism that had emerged in Latin America, shared a particular view on the role of the state in the economy and all of them also preferred a model that stated that Latin American countries should become more self-sufficient through the local production of industrialized goods. However, while the model was quite successful in the short term, it eventually created a growing state expansion and a huge fiscal deficit, leading to a severe financial crisis in these countries (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 497). The current form in which this form of populism manifests itself at the moment in South America, is through a strict rejection of neoliberalism – it can therefore be characterized as a type of left-wing populism.

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The third wave Mudde and Kaltwasser mention is the wave of ‘xenophobic populism’, which can be mostly applied to Western Europe (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 498). It is also this wave of populism that we are mostly experiencing in contemporary European politics. The origins of xenophobic populism can be placed in the 1980s, as the storyline of the “invasion” started to emerge among anti-immigrant groups (Mamadouh 2012, 387). These groups were mostly reacting to the economic crisis that emerged after the second oil crisis (1979) and the rising unemployment that a lot of Western European countries were struggling with. It is also in this particular timeframe that extreme right parties such as the French Front National (and later the Italian Northern League and Austrian Freedom Party) became

prominent with their discourse of ‘migrants stealing our jobs’ (Mamadouh 2012, 388). According to Betz, the current form in which right-wing populism establishes itself can be compared to the 19th-century ‘agrarian populism’ as emerged in the United States. He argues, for example, that contemporary right-wing populist parties in Europe promote themselves – just like their American ancestors – as advocates of the interest and concerns of ordinary people against the dominant economic and political elite (Betz 2013, 215). He goes further by stating that where the American populists of the People’s Party tried to ‘defend’ their Catholic heritage, the current extreme right does basically the same with charging that Islam is

incompatible with the Western ‘Judeo-Christian’ values. Characteristic for the populist parties that emerged in Europe in the past 20 years is thus that most of these parties arose in a climate of intensifying neoliberal globalisation. It is also therefore that most of the right-wing populist parties are largely focused on the perceived threats that are posed by immigration (in

particular by the extremist fundamental Islam) and the unequal burden that was caused by neoliberal austerity (Hogan and Haltinner 2015, 521).

1.4 The different categorizations of ‘right-wing populism’

The right-wing populist parties across Europe cannot only be categorized as the type of populism that is – in contrast to left-wing populism – based on the generalized claim to represent ‘the people’ on the basis of a perceived nation. Also within the phenomenon of right-wing populism itself, different categorizations can be made. In her book The Politics of

Fear, Wodak distinguishes four different political imaginaries in which various types of

right-wing populism can be divided (Wodak 2015, 2). The first sub-categorization she mentions is the fact that some right-wing populist parties gain support through an ambivalent relationship with a fascist or a Nazi-past. An important example of this sub-category is the French Front National, of which its founder, Jean-Marie Le Pen, had strong links with older traditions of

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far-right politics and is known as a careful defender of the former Vichy-regime (Judt 2005, 745). The second sub-categorization is the category of right-wing populism that strongly focuses on a perceived threat from Islam. Parties like the Dutch PVV and the Swiss People’s Party may be included to this category. Some parties can also be distinguished on the basis that they restrict their propaganda to a perceived danger to their national identities from ethnic minorities and migrants – think, for example, of the British UKIP – and some parties also endorse a traditional Christian conservative-reactionary agenda, a type of right-wing populism that often occurs in the United States (Wodak 2015, 2). It is thus important to note that there is not one single form of ‘right-wing populism’, but that right-wing populist parties can be categorized by different political imaginaries.

De Lange and Mudde have also argued that there is a wide range of terms that are used to describe this particular type of populism, including terms such as ‘extreme right’, ‘right-wing populism’ and ‘populism’ (De Lange and Mudde 2005, 479). However, it is crucial to note that these terms often suffer from conceptual slippage. The term ‘extreme right’ is probably the most commonly used term to describe this type of political parties. However, the term itself remains rather vague and only seems to refer to the political position of these parties, namely on the furthest right position of the political spectrum. The category that includes all the labels that focus on the national or ethnic element of these parties – such as ‘anti-immigrant’ or ‘nationalist’ – is also slightly problematic, according to De Lange and Mudde. They namely argue that there are (ethno-) nationalist parties that are not per se extreme right (e.g. the Sinn Féin) or right-wing parties that consider anti-immigration elements as irrelevant (De Lange and Mudde 2005, 479). Also the definition of the term ‘populism’ is rather broad, considering the different forms, categorizations and definitions that were already mentioned in this chapter. There is thus not one single form or definition of ‘populism’ and every study related to it is combined with a specific framework and content. The type of right-wing populism that is studied in this thesis is mostly linked to the type of populism defined by Wodak, namely the type of right-wing populism that mobilizes a ‘politics of fear’ with an ‘arrogance of ignorance’. This type of populism is strongly centred on the right and focuses on the populist parties that can be recognized by their strong rejection of immigration and in particular of the presence of Islam in the contemporary European societies. Even though, this type of right-wing populism has been present since the 1980s, its current rising popularity is interesting to study, since it nowadays also forces the mainstream political parties to retreat from core principles such as tolerance and diversity (Shuster 2016). Also, important political events such as the Brexit and the democratic victory of Donald

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Trump during the most recent American elections have shown that the international wave of far-right politics has reached a new level of normalisation within the western world (Vieten and Poynting 2016, 536). But what can exactly explain the success of this current wave of right-wing populism in Western Europe?

In this thesis, the interaction between populism and the extreme right is addressed by looking at how right-wing populist discourses have influenced mainstream political parties and politicians in the national contexts of France and the Netherlands. The type of populism that thereby is analysed is the phenomenon of far right parties that are currently growing in the polls, namely the type of parties that proclaim themselves as the defenders of an

‘indigenous’ Christian Europe and which aim to ‘fight’ fundamentalist Islam (Vieten and Poynting 2016, 536). The study will thereby include an analysis of the two largest far right populist parties at the moment in these countries, namely the French Front National and the Dutch PVV and the mainstream left-wing and right-wing parties of these countries. The aim is thereby overall to investigate to what extent right-wing populist rhetoric can be found in today’s policies, focusing in particular on immigration policies. How this is done from the methodological point of view, will be addressed in the next chapter.

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2. Methodology: critical discourse analysis

This chapter develops the critical discourse analysis, the research method that will be used in this thesis to analyse the impact of right-wing populist discourses on French and Dutch immigration policies. It starts with a brief overview of the key notions and most relevant approaches within CDA to study the influence of right-wing populism. Thereafter, the research method, its relevance and the type of sources that will be used in the analysis are discussed. Lastly, I focus on the framework of critical geopolitics and the importance of geopolitical imaginations for the analysis, which can help to indicate how deep right-wing populist discourses are infiltrated into the immigration rhetoric in France and the Netherlands.

2.1 Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis has entered the mainstream linguistic and social science research as a methodology that is not only interested in the use of language, but also in the social and political dimension that it behind it (Reisigl 2013, 75). It is mainly concerned with the role that discourses can play in the (re)production and challenge of dominance, which is defined here as the exercise of social power by certain groups in society (Van Dijk 1993, 249). The component of ‘critical’ in CDA thereby means that it does not take things for granted and actually tries to expose the power relations and ideologies that are ‘hidden’ in the analysed texts (Kendall 2007). Especially within contemporary European politics, in which the media has become more and more important as a source of political information, it has become much easier for right-wing populist parties to spread their discourses to wider audiences (Ellinas 2009, 216). Social media thus can create opportunities for smaller political parties to get their messages to the voters, which otherwise would have been much harder for them, due to their lack of organisational and financial resources. It is therefore rather important that CDA-researchers are aware of the social structures in which the discourses that they study are embedded, because these social contexts can on the one hand not only shape and affect the discourse in question, but they have also the ability to influence the social and political reality (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 92). Socio-political contexts are thus very important when it comes to using CDA as a methodology.

As a methodology, CDA is also quite diverse with different approaches that each has their own theories and methods. It is therefore often described in scholarly literature as an interdisciplinary approach, due to the fact that it frequently crosses disciplinary boundaries when analysing the dialectical relationship between discourses and other objects (Fairclough

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2010, 5). And even though there is not one single framework developed yet to analyse discourses in general, there are a few key notions that can be attributed to most forms of CDA. These are the notions of:

• Discourse: this forms the central category of every discourse analysis

• Context: this means all that comes ‘with the text’, such as the properties of the environment of the discourse

• Social problems: CDA is very much problem-orientated and always starts with the orientation of a social problem that includes a linguistic dimension (Reisigl 2013, 85) The notion of discourse is thus an important subject in all forms of discourse analysis, even though there are different theoretical conceptions of it within CDA (Reisigl 2013, 77). One of the most well known conceptualizations of ‘discourse’ and the conceptualization that will also be mostly used in this thesis is that of Norman Fairclough, one of the founders of CDA. In Fairclough’s approach, three interrelated dimensions can be found. The first one is the semiotic aspect of a written or spoken ‘text’. The second one is the fact that there is a specific ‘discursive practice’ involved; the third is the involvement of a certain social-cultural context that in its turn can be linked to the ‘discursive practice’ (Reisigl 2013, 78). The social aspect is thus considered to be very important in Fairclough’s approach. Another CDA-approach that is quite similar to this and also stresses the importance of the societal context is the discourse-historical approach (DHA), which was largely developed by Wodak and het co-researchers. Most importantly, DHA focuses on texts in which certain political discourses are present. It thereby attaches great value to the socio-political and historical context that is behind the political party or social issue in question (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 91).

In essence, CDA can thus be very appropriate as a methodology to critically analyse the influence of right-wing populist discourses on immigration policies, since it allows for the understanding of how discursive strategies are used to legitimize control by powerful groups in society (Van Dijk 1993, 254). This can be the case in all sorts of texts, varying from official policies to speeches and political debates. The type of CDA-approach that is used in this thesis will be most similar to Fairclough’s approach in which the three interrelated dimensions are central. This approach will also put particular emphasis upon the ‘common sense’ assumption of which people are generally not consciously aware and which treats authority and hierarchy as natural (Fairclough 2001, 2). The approach will also contain some elements of Wodak’s DHA, though less attention will be paid in this case to the historical context of the discourses.

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‘Coded’ discourses and immigration policies

In contemporary Europe, all sorts of discriminatory utterances have become ‘coded’ in different types of rhetoric, varying from official policies to political speeches and television debates. This is done in order to avoid sanctions related to discrimination or other negative things (Wodak 2015, 50). As a result of this, it has become much easier for right-wing populists to communicate their ‘message’ and to address a wider audience. This particular discourse can be recognized primarily by its popular ‘rhetoric of exclusion’, which is constituted by a division between what is often described as ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Wodak 2003, 133). Complex social-economic issues are thereby reduced to simple answers and easy slogans, which in its turn lack any real solutions for these issues. Right-wing populist politicians thereby also use the strategy to define the ‘other’ negatively, while attaching, sometimes quite unnoticed, all kinds of positive features to the ‘in-group’. It is therefore rather important to critically examine the language that was used by mainstream politicians in order to broaden the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Because it is, to cite Wodak, one thing to say that politicians use a rhetoric that discriminates or alienates certain groups in society, it is another thing to actually prove this (Wodak 2003, 132).

In this thesis, CDA will specifically be applied to French and Dutch immigration policy and in particular to the rhetoric of (mainstream) politicians on immigration, which is often quite complex and can be open to many different interpretations (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999, 85). Studying the language with regard to immigration policies can help to investigate how immigrant-receiving countries define who, in their view, belongs to their ‘nation’ and in what terms (Mavroudi and Nagel 2016, 178). This is possible, since the language that is used by the legislators or politicians to describe ‘immigrants’ in election time is often very

significant. The country in question can, for example, be described as a ‘country of

immigrants’ or rather as a recipient of unwanted ‘guests’. Analysing the linguistic features in the discourses on immigration during the latest elections can thus help to indicate to what extent the ‘rhetoric of exclusion’ has actually become present within this policy field in Europe. The study will therefore specifically focus on the notion of citizenship and

integration, which have played a very prominent role during the most recent Dutch (March 2017) and French (April/May 2017) elections. These two immigration-related themes will be analysed on the basis of newspaper advertisements (in the Dutch case) and political speeches (in the French case). The fact that different electoral material is analysed with regard to the Dutch and French contexts is related to the quite distinct national campaigning styles of the two countries. Whereas in the Netherlands politicians mostly campaigned through the use of

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newspaper advertisements and TV appearances, in the French case the campaigning took often place at public political rallies, where the politicians spoke directly to their audiences. The CDA of the Dutch case study thus consists more a textual discourse analysis of the actual advertisements, while the analysed speeches in the French context derived from audio-visual texts (taped video recordings of the rallies, accessed on YouTube). Alongside CDA, in

examining these different immigration discourses in detail, a framework of critical geopolitics will be used in order to critically analyse the (linguistic) policy choices that were made. A more detailed description of this critical geopolitics-framework is set out below.

2.2 Critical geopolitics: a framework for analysis

The right-wing populist discourses that are related to the topic of immigration often perform issues of national identity and sovereignty, which are important features of geopolitical imaginations (Mamadouh 2012, 378). A critical geopolitics framework can therefore be useful to analyse these particular narratives. One of the key authors in the field of (critical) geopolitics, Gearoid Ó Tuathail, defined critical geopolitics as “a problematizing theoretical enterprise that places existing features of power and knowledge in question” (Ó Tuathail 1999, 107). Critical geopolitics is thus for a large part concerned with the process in which states are actively ‘making space’ through all sorts of policies and practices. Spatial

representation is thereby also a very important subject of critical geopolitics, since it shows how statesmen and politicians can write geography around national and international politics and therewith contribute to the creation of a ‘geopolitical order’. Whereas critical geopolitics started of in the 1980s as a reaction to the ‘culture of interventions’ (among others as direct criticism against the Reagan policies), nowadays it tends to be much more focused on the link between geographical specifications of cultural identity and the invocation of specific

geographies of danger (Dalby 2008, 415).

What is quite similar of the framework of critical geopolitics and the methodology of CDA is that they both focus on the narration techniques that are used in order to expose the involved (social) power structures. Combining critical geopolitics with CDA can therefore be useful in the analysis of right-wing populist discourses, since these discourses are for a large part based on unequal power relations between the well-known distinction of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Spatial representation and the connotations that people have with a specific geographical space are thereby important and the study of right-wing populist discourses in Europe thus calls to a great extent for a critical geopolitical lens. Nowadays, more and more immigrants are being framed as ‘threats’ to the national security and critical geopolitics becomes rather

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important, because it needs to perceive how nations as ‘imagined communities’ are

reproduced in the context of everyday life (Müller 2010, 10). Geopolitical imaginations such are ‘our nation’, ‘invasion’ and ‘aliens’ are thereby frequently used in this context in order for the ‘powerful’ group to reach its political goal (Mamadouh 2012, 380). These specific

geopolitical imaginations will be further analysed with regard to the Dutch and French context in chapter three and four of this thesis.

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3. The Netherlands: from ethnic minority policy to

assimilationist immigration policies

During the post-war period, the Netherlands has, just like many other countries in Western Europe, experienced a period of large-scale immigration. This chapter discusses the development of the Netherlands as a ‘country of immigration’ as well as the politics of immigration that correspond with this development. The first paragraph will provide a short overview of the broad changes that have taken place with regard to Dutch immigration policies. It will specifically focus on the development of the civic integration policies, which had changed at the turn of the millennium from ‘open’ and ‘multicultural’ to strict

immigration policies. The second paragraph introduces the context in which the most recent Dutch parliamentary election of 2017 is discussed – together with an analysis of the most important parties for the research of this thesis, which are the PVV, the VVD and the PvdA. The paragraph also shortly focuses on the public debates surrounding Dutch immigration and citizenship laws and how discourses can be used as places where relations of power are exercised. The third paragraph contains a critical discourse analysis of the rhetoric that is used by mainstream parties and to what extent this is influenced by the phenomenon of right-wing populism. The Netherlands forms an interesting case study, since the country had radically changed its ‘open’ immigration policies in the 2000s and therewith set a policy-trend for the rest of (Western) Europe.

3.1 Dutch immigration policy: a brief historical overview

The development of Dutch immigration policy throughout the years can be characterized by a great discontinuity. Following the important political developments that have taken place in the Netherlands, new policy narratives had emerged, with each having its own different way of defining or conceptualising the process of integration (Scholten 2011a, 75). However, three major changes can be distinguished with regard to these policies, namely the Minorities Policy (1980s), the Integration Policy (1990s) and the so-called Integration Policy New Style (2000s). These three important ‘periods’ in the development of Dutch immigration policy will be briefly explained below.

The Minorities Policy (1980s)

The first groups of post-war immigrants that the Netherlands had witnessed in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly post-colonial migrants (e.g. from the former Dutch Indies, Surinam and

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the Antilles) who had come to the ‘motherland’ to work or study and the so-called ‘guest workers’ (e.g. from Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco), who were recruited by the Dutch government for labour in order to meet the growing demands of the booming post-war

economy. This often concerned jobs in heavy sectors like textiles, mines and shipbuilding (Judt 2005, 337). However, the settlement of these post-colonial and foreign workers was not really recognized by the Dutch authorities as a permanent matter, nor were there efforts to promote the integration of these immigrants into Dutch society (Entzinger and Scholten 2015, 65). The Netherlands had not considered itself to be a country of immigration until the late 1970s. The ‘phase of denial’ ended, however, in the 1980s, when the Dutch authorities had realized that these post-colonial and foreign workers had actually come to stay in the Netherlands. As a result of this, Europe’s most prominent multiculturalism policy was pursued in which the Dutch government envisaged ‘emancipation’ for designated ‘ethnic minorities’ within their own state-supported infrastructures (Joppke 2007, 5). This precise ‘multicultural model’ was based on the belief that the cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities should be the key to their integration into Dutch society and showed some similarities with the former Dutch system of ‘pillarization’ through which the Dutch were governed from the 1920s to the 1960s (Scholten 2011b, 68). The policy became known as the ‘Ethnic Minorities Policy’, which was officially launched in 1983 and became mostly applied to the Turks, Moroccans, Southern Europeans, Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, Roma, Sintis and certain categories of refugees who were living in the Netherlands (Vasta 2007, 716). These groups were supported with special labour market programmes and training courses in order to have these people ‘integrated’ into Dutch society. A certain space was thereby left for these groups to develop their own cultural, religious and linguistic institutions. However, quite soon critique emerged with regard to the issue of integration and the

corresponding immigration policies. The debate about the topic of ‘Dutch identity’ and what it exactly meant to be Dutch thereby became important, leading to a wide dissatisfaction among the Dutch people with the state of immigration policies at that time (Van Reekum 2016, 32).

The Integration Policy (1990s)

By the late 1980s and 1990s, the policymakers in the Netherlands had slowly realized that the Ethnic Minority Policy had failed to reach its goals. The Dutch non-EU immigrant

unemployment rate had, for example, been much higher then that of native people, the high school dropout rates among immigrant children were 2.5 times higher than for native Dutch

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children (especially for children with a Moroccan or Turkish background) and residential segregation had also become extremely high in the Netherlands (Joppke 2007, 6). It was therefore that in the early 1990s, the Minorities Policy was reframed into the so-called Integration Policy. This policy framework was much more focused on the socio-economic participation of individual immigrants instead of the cultural emancipation of minorities, which were no longer considered a task of the government (Bertossi, Duyvendak and Scholten 2015, 67). This shift in ‘policy attitude’ was also visible in the Dutch civic

integration policies, which were also strongly revised at the end of the 1990s. With the Wet

Inburgering Niewkomers (‘Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers’), which went into force

in 1998, immigrants were now obliged to participate in a civic integration programme and to pass a corresponding examination within a specific timeframe. With these programmes, the government hoped that the immigrants were provided with enough knowledge of the Dutch language and society whereby he or she could easily participate on the Dutch labour market (Staatsblad 1998(261), 4). The ‘new’ citizens were thereby subjected to what Tonkens and Duyvendak call the ‘culturalization of citizenship’, meaning that they are dealing with new ‘feeling rules’ that render belonging and ‘feeling at home’ as important requirements to integrate (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016, 3). Adhering to certain (Dutch) norms thereby became important and especially immigrants were expected now to demonstrate these feelings of attachment to their ‘new’ country of residence.

The Integration Policy New Style (2000s-present day)

However, the biggest changes with regard to Dutch immigration took place at the turn of the millennium, when more and more anti-immigration and anti-asylum voices appeared in Europe and the West. In the Netherlands, it was especially the popularity of the right-wing populist LPF, which triggered the call for stricter immigration policies in the Netherlands. The party was founded three months prior to the 2002 Dutch elections and did extremely well in the polls, leaving the established parties in a state of confusion (De Lange and Art 2011, 1234). The party’s increasing popularity took place in the context of the September 11 attacks in the United States and Paul Scheffer’s much-debated essay Het multiculturele drama (‘The multicultural drama’), which was published in 2000 and which criticized the current state of (cultural) integration of immigrants in the Netherlands (Scheffer 2000). Within the public debate that emerged during this period, it was especially the integration of immigrants with a Muslim background that formed the topic of a heated debate, leading to an increasing

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Inburgering, was then adopted in 2006, which obligated immigrants to pass the civic

integration exam within a fixed term (Staatsblad(2006), 11). Immigrants could now be fined if they did not succeed to pass the exam in time. Another major policy change that this law brought about was the role and responsibility of the Dutch state. The ‘integration courses’ were now opened up to the principle of the free market, meaning that the civic integration of immigrants was no longer a primary responsibility for the Dutch state, but for the individual migrant him/herself (Bonjour 2013, 841). The Dutch government now only granted

integration courses to asylum migrants and religious workers, which meant that migrants who had come to the Netherlands through family reunification were responsible for their own civic integration. The law was then changed in 2013, stating that residence permits now could also be withdrawn when immigrants don’t pass the exam during the specified timeframe, which was also shortened with the period of half a year (Rijksoverheid 2013).

3.2 Context: the new (right-wing) face of mainstream political parties

On 15 March 2017, the Dutch people went to the polling stations to elect all 150 members for the House of Representatives, which is also known in Dutch as the Tweede Kamer. The polls had already predicted that the ‘main battle’ to win the most seats would be fought between the conservative liberal VVD and the Dutch nationalist and right-wing populist PVV. The

international media had closely followed the potential victory of the latter, since Brexit (the decision made by a majority of the British people to leave the European Union) and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States had affirmed the presence of a strong right-wing populist sentiment in the Western world. The elections in the

Netherlands were therefore often labelled in the media as the first real ‘test’ to measure the contemporary state of the right-wing sentiment in Western Europe, ahead of the French presidential vote, which would be held in May 2017, and the 2017 German national elections of September (Said-Moorhouse et al. 2017). Even though several polls in the Netherlands had suggested three weeks prior to the elections that the PVV had a real chance to end up as the largest party in the Netherlands (figure 2 and 3), it was already unlikely that Wilders would actually enter government, due to the Dutch electoral system in which coalitions need to be formed.

The PVV was founded by Geert Wilders in 2006 and can be classified as a right-wing populist party, due to its critical stances on Islam and its resistance against immigration and what they call the ‘Islamization of the Netherlands’ (PVV 2017). However, despite its successes as a strong anti-immigration party with controversial views on Islam and the

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Qur’an, Wilders’ PVV was not the first party in the Netherlands to have taken such a strong stance on the integration of immigrants with a Muslim background. During the 1990s, Frits

Bolkestein of the VVD was already aware of the widespread dissatisfaction that was present among the Dutch electorate with regard to issues concerning (labour) migration and the European project and tried to politicize these issues for electoral gain (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 401). However, due to a difficult coalition at the time with the social democrats – who traditionally had a large immigrant-voting base – it was quite difficult for Bolkestein to actually move the VVD into this particular direction. It was the right-wing populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who eventually filled the ‘electoral gap’ with his LPF-party. Fortuyn founded the LPF three months prior to the general elections of 2002 and from the

Figure 2 Poll displaying the electoral course of the PVV from September 2012 until March 2017 (source:

Peilingwijzer 2017, http://nos.nl/artikel/2159429-peilingwijzer-pvv-en-vvd-nu-even-groot.html).

Figure 3 Poll displaying the electoral course of the VVD from September 2012 until March 2017 (source:

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moment it was founded, it was presented as a real right-wing populist party, which dared to address issues like immigration and the multicultural society without mincing their words (Akkerman 2006, 341). Fortuyn had also already spoken before Wilders of the dangers of an ‘Islamization’ of Dutch society, which in his view would leave little room for “Western” core values and posed a real threat to what he called the “original culture” of the Netherlands (Fortuyn 2002, 13). Even though the LPF had gained great electoral successes during the elections of May 2002, which were held shortly after an environmental activist had murdered Fortuyn, the LPF collapsed the same year as a result of great internal problems. With the foundation of the PVV in 2006, Geert Wilders was the next to try to fill the ‘electoral space’ that was left by the LPF. Wilders used the LPF’s experience as a warning for his own party development and made slightly better choices than Fortuyn when it came to party

organisation, recruitment and training. As a result of this, the PVV became institutionalised and could develop itself as the successful anti-immigration party that it is today in the Netherlands (De Lange and Art 2011, 1230).

The PVV was, however, not the only party that made use of populist rhetoric during the most recent elections. Its direct opponent the VVD, under the leadership of Mark Rutte, also made use of populist rhetoric in an apparent bid to woo PVV voters (Henley 2017b). In an open letter that Rutte had published in several Dutch newspapers (figure 3), he addressed several issues, varying from misbehaviour to Dutch norms and values. The rhetoric that he thereby used to deliver his message was criticized by many, arguing that it contained some of the populist rhetoric that is also frequently used by Wilders (NRC 2017). Rutte talked for example in the letter of “people who had come to our country for freedom, but who refuse to adapt and criticise our habits and values”, further referring to a group in society that “harass gays, whistle at women in short skirts or brand ordinary Dutch people racists” – which are generally considered to be the main integration issues with regard to second and third

generation immigrants in the Netherlands (VVD 2017). About this particular group Rutte said in his letter, “behave normally, or go away”, leaving completely in the middle what ‘normal behaviour’ exactly is in his view. Even though Rutte did not mention the PVV by name, it was quite clear that his letter was an attempt to win over voters from the PVV. The VVD thus also tried to adapt to a more populist rhetoric in order to win votes during the most recent Dutch elections of 2017.

The liberal-conservative VVD is, however, not the only party who moved further right on the political spectrum. The social democratic PvdA has also been responsible for stricter immigration policies. Under its previous leader, Diederik Samsom, the PvdA was largely

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responsible for the controversial ‘refugee deal’, which decided that all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greece (starting from March 2016) will be returned to Turkey. With this EU-Turkey deal, Samson and Rutte (who was already Prime Minister of the Netherlands at the time) tried, together with several other European countries, to come up with a solution for the ‘migrant crisis’ that was at a height in 2015 and 2016. Even though the deal seemed at first sight a breakthrough in a never-ending negotiation process on the

European level, several human rights organisations had actually criticized this deal for being in violation with the principle of non-refoulement and the lack of Turkey to provide effective protection to the asylum seekers and refugees on its territory (Amnesty International 2016, 5). This deal also showed that even the social democratic parties in the Netherlands had moved towards the direction of stricter immigration policies. Thus, even though the ‘electoral gap’ that was left by the LPF has been largely maintained by the PVV, each of the centre-right parties in the Netherlands – and to some extent also the social democratic parties – has tried to claim some of this electoral space (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel 2008, 405).

3.3 Discourse analysis: the influence of right-wing populism in the Netherlands

Immigration policy forms a policy field that is rather sensitive and open for interpretation. In this section, an analysis is made of how mainstream parties present themselves in terms of political correctness with regard to the issue of immigration. In January 2017, the VVD launched its electoral pre-campaign called Normaal. Doen. (‘Act. Normal.’), which focused mostly on the question ‘what kind of country does the Netherlands want to be?’ (VVD 2017). It was supported with an open letter of Mark Rutte that was published in many national newspapers stating that ‘those who don’t respect our values should leave’ (figure 4). The VVD’s main candidate further stated in a paragraph that:

“We feel a growing inconvenience when people abuse our freedom to fool around

here, while they have come to our country for that freedom. People who don’t want to adjust, criticize our habits and reject our values. Those who harass gays, or whistle at women in short skirts, or brand ordinary Dutch people racists. I understand very well that people think: if you so fundamentally reject this country, then I’d prefer you to leave. I namely have that feeling too. Act normal or go away.” (VVD 2017).

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The mainstream right-wing VVD is thus legitimising their tighter immigration policy by drawing on fundamental ‘Dutch values’ and ‘normal behaviour’, which emphasizes that the VVD makes use of a specific moral stance to legitimize the process of ‘Othering’ and to a certain extent also more restrictive immigration and integration measures. Rutte continued:

“We should never think that this

behaviour is normal in this country. The solution is not to tar everyone with the same brush, or insult or expel whole groups. (…) The solution is primarily an issue of mentality. We will need to make it crystal clear what is normal, and what is not normal, in our country. We must actively defend our values.” (VVD 2017)

The passage of the open letter quoted above reveals the course that Rutte and the VVD wanted to head during the elections of 2017. He also finished with an open question: “The coming times are

determining for the course of our

country. There is only one question: what kind of country do we want to be?” (VVD 2017).

There thus seems to be a rather distinct stance with regard to the issues of integration and immigration. Instead of aiming the pre-election campaign on creating more solidarity (or their core principle of ‘liberty’) in the Netherlands, the VVD aims its message quite primarily at a particular group in Dutch society that doesn’t behave or acts ‘normal’. Or in short: those who don’t meet the (cultural) Dutch integration norms, according to the VVD. The VVD’s recent rhetoric of Rutte’s open letter can be categorized by the topos of burden or weighing down, which means that if a person, institution or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish those burdens (Wodak 2015, 53).

Figure 4 The open letter Rutte published in several Dutch newspapers, 23 January 2017. Source: NRC.

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Rutte therefore finishes his letter by directly demanding what needs to be changed in terms of behaviour:

“Let’s make sure that we continue to feel ourselves at home in our beautiful country.

Let’s keep it clear what’s normal here and what’s not. I’m sure that we will get this done. (…) Let’s work together to make this country even better. Because for real, we are a very beautiful country. I wouldn’t want to live anywhere else. Do you?.” (VVD

2017)

If we compare this political message to the message of the social democratic PvdA, there is only a small difference in rhetorical style visible. Whereas Rutte’s political message was mostly aimed at ‘normal behaviour’, PvdA-party leader Lodewijk Asscher took a different course (figure 5). In a similar open letter published in De Volkskrant (a medium-sized centrist newspaper), Asscher said the following about immigration and integration:

“I don’t ignore problems with integration. I don’t want to ignore that some parents let

their children misbehave, that they don’t speak the language and that they don’t know what their children are doing on the streets. Who is wrong, needs help. Whoever doesn’t want to, needs to be addressed.” (De Volkskrant 2017)

Moving Right? The Influence of Right-Wing Populism on Immigration Rhetoric in France and the Netherlands