Adopting inclusivity? : the EU and political islam since the Arab spring : an analysis of EU policy and praxis towards political islam in Egypt, Tunesia an Morocco

(1)

Masters Programme: MSc Political Science – European Union in a Global Order

Thesis Module: The European Union and its Immediate Neighbours: Practices of Policy-‐ Making and Policies in Practice

Supervisor: Andrey Demidov

Adopting Inclusivity? The EU and

Political Islam Since the Arab Spring

An Analysis of EU Policy and Praxis Towards Political Islam in Egypt,

Tunisia and Morocco

(2)

Abstract

Since 2011, the EU has attempted to make substantive changes to its policy in the MENA region, as well as its policy towards Islamist political groups. This thesis presents two core findings. Firstly, the EU has attempted to reconstitute its approach towards Political Islam in the region. Both in EU discourse as well as praxis, the EU is actively attempting to promote and implement a policy of inclusiveness in which it engages with the full spectrum of

political actors, including Islamist political parties and groups. Secondly, the ability of the EU to implement this policy of inclusion is variable across Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. The reasons for this are that the EU’s ability to implement this policy of inclusion is dependent upon factors that have occurred to a large extent, independently of the EU. Most

significantly, the EU has been affected by the complex and differing local political contexts in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Further to this, the EU has found itself often constrained by the differing positions of its member states, which as illustrated earlier, can limit the EU’s freedom of action. Ultimately, this empirical analysis is indicative of the complex nature of EU policy making. The empirical findings have theoretical implications in that they illustrate that the clear distinction between norms and interests has collapsed in EU decision making. Rather than an EU driven by a coherent normative or realist nature, we paint a picture of EU policy making in which the normative, realist and institutional narratives coexist to varying degrees across cases, showing the EU to a be a flexible and reactive actor.

(3)

1. Introduction

1. 1. Historical Context of EU Policy towards Political Islam

While Islamism is certainly not a new phenomenon, it has rarely been the political force it is currently today, and certainly not prior to the Arab Spring. The advent of modern Islamism occurred in 1928, with the birth of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Since then, Islamism – the manifestation of political Islam, has changed considerably (Chamkhi, 2014). In the wake of the Arab Spring, several formerly repressed and isolated Islamist movements, which had for the most part stayed away from the protests, won elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. This new found political power has forced moderation upon many Islamist parties, who have reconsidered key tenets of traditional Islamist ideology and accepted norms such as

pluralism, secularism and minority and human rights (ibid). As well as these more moderate Islamist political parties, which were all inspired by Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood , many other less moderate Islamist groups and parties emerged onto the political scene. Of these, by far the most dynamic and powerful are the Salafist groups, which while traditionally shunning politics, have been forced to enter the political arena in order to fill the void left by the newly centrist moderate parties (Al-‐Anani and Malik, 2013). These parties, previously far less significant in their impact on politics in the region, have now become key players in their respective countries – in Egypt for example, Islamists won 67% of the vote in the 2011 election (Al Jazeera, 2012). Despite the diverse nature of Political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), they have traditionally been viewed as homogenous in the eyes of the West (Crowder, Griffiths and Hasan, 2014). Islamist movements have been treated with great suspicion by Western politicians and academics, who cite its rejection of democracy, women’s rights, religious freedom and support of the Palestinian cause as reasons for caution (ibid). The suspicion does of course go both ways, Islamist movements have been repressed firmly by the autocratic leaders of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Studies have shown each of these countries have historically received European Union (EU) support in reward for cooperation on security, economic reform and migration (Cavatorta et al, 2008; Behr, 2012, 2013). Subsequently one can conclude that the EU and Political Islam are certainly not natural bedfellows by any means.

(6)

1. 2. Relevance of the Research Topic

As such, the societal relevance of this topic is clear. The increasingly influential nature of Political Islam in the region is of significance the EU’s democracy promotion and stability oriented goals. As well as this, the Salafist parties have often retained their anti-‐western rhetoric, their groups blur the lines between political parties, social movements and terrorist organisations and their spiritual leaders are often key players in radical Islamic circles. It is therefore one of the aims of this thesis to decipher what policy approach the EU has taken in response to the increasing political importance of Political Islam since the Arab Spring. Academically, this thesis will aim to fill a discursive void, in which while there have been an un-‐ending number of studies critically analysing the EU’s response the Arab Spring, there have been few that focus specifically on its response to the rise of Political Islam (Behr, 2013; Wolff, 2015). However, these articles fall short of any substantive empirical specificity and fail to really tell us what EU policy towards political Islam is. These studies analyse EU policy towards Political Islam in its entirety, treating the region as a homogenous bloc and failing to account for its complex nature, in which each country is unique. As such, there is a discursive gap that my thesis seeks to fill, allowing me the opportunity to make a contribution to the literature on the EU and Political Islam. Not only does my thesis attempt to decipher what EU foreign policy towards political Islam is, it will attempt to analyse the factors that have conditioned this policy.

1. 3. Research Questions

In light of the Political Islam’s successes at the ballot box and newfound power in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco – one would expect the EU to have developed a response or policy to dealing with this phenomenon. While the EU did initiate several new instruments and policy reconfigurations in the wake of the Arab Spring, it is unclear how these relate specifically to Political Islam, if at all. This is particularly puzzling given the power these groups have acquired in their respective countries, where they are now undoubtedly some of the key players. As such, this thesis will investigate what the EU’s policy toward these groups is and has been since 2011, remembering that not having a policy is itself a policy position. Thus the first research question this thesis seeks to answer is, what is the EU’s policy toward Political Islam in the MENA region since the Arab Spring?

(7)

More important than this however, is an examination of the factors that have conditioned this policy or policies. It is here that I will seek to examine the normative, realist,

institutional and contextual linked factors that have contributed to EU policy and thus will give us a greater understanding of what factors condition EU policy making in the MENA region as a whole as well as towards Political Islam. The second research question is thus, what factors have conditioned the implementation of this policy towards Political Islam?

1. 4. Research Design

The research design that this thesis employs is a qualitative, comparative, case-‐oriented method. The comparative method is widely used in political and social sciences during the investigation of an institution or a macropolitical phenomenon (Della Porta, 2008: 202), such as the EU’s policy towards Political Islam. Such a study is a method of depth rather than breadth, with the aim of providing a full analysis of the complex factors that are operative within the subject researched, in this case the EU’s policy towards Political Islam (Kothari, 2004). The research here is guided by the objectives of searching for complexity over generalizability, in which we have selected three cases to focus our research in order to provide an in-‐depth understanding of the overall research topic (Marsh and Stoker, 2010: 255). As such, within this method there is a chosen trade-‐off between prognosis and explanation, in which we have chosen explanation.

The justification of this is that by focusing on a few cases, one can undertake an exhaustive study of the processes and factors applicable to the research subject (Kothari, 2004: 113). This is particularly important where EU policy towards Political Islam is concerned. The MENA region generally has long been viewed in academia as incredibly diverse and

complex. MENA polities and regimes have radically differing social, economic, strategic and political domestic characteristics (Pace and Cavatorta, 2010). Since the Arab Spring, the region has only become more heterogeneous and fragmented (Alcaro and Haubrich-‐Seco, 2012). Thus far however, the little academic research on the EU’s policy towards Political Islam has treated the region as homogenous, failing to adequately account for the vast differences between countries and failing to provide any substantive empirical specificity (Behr, 2013; Wolff, 2015). By choosing a case-‐oriented comparative method, this thesis fills the shortcomings of prior research by providing in depth empirical analysis that accounts for the region and cases’ complexities.

(8)

The cases selected for study here are Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. These cases share important characteristics that allow easy justification of their selection. Most importantly, the cases were selected for their shared relevance to the theoretical problem proposed, their shared relevance to the phenomena studied, that they are empirically invariant and that they reflect the degree of availability of data available for the study of EU policy towards Political Islam (Della Porta, 2008: 212-‐213). While a theoretical problem has not been proposed per se, the cases reflect the underlying theoretical assumption of the thesis in that the EU operates in a diverse and volatile environment, which these cases show. They are all relevant for the EU’s policy towards Political Islam in that each of the countries have significant Islamist forces engaged in the political processes of the country, evidenced by the electoral victories of Islamists in each case in elections since 2011. As well as this, each case is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and have signed association

agreements with the EU, meaning it is logical to expect that their would be some kind relationship between the Islamist political forces in the country and the EU. They are

empirically invariant in that while diverse they are all countries, all members of the ENP and have all signed association agreements with the EU. Finally, they reflect the degree of data available in that they are the only countries where Islamists have won elections while also being part of the ENP and having signed Association Agreements with the EU. Finally, each case is independent of one another in that there is unlikely to be significant overlap in the study of each.

1. 5. Hypotheses and Driving Arguments

At its simplest, there are two main hypotheses put forward in this thesis. Firstly, the EU has adopted an inclusive approach towards Political Islam since the Arab Spring, in which the EU has attempted to engage with the full spectrum of Islamist actors in the political sphere. Secondly, the implementation of this policy has been most powerfully conditioned by local political context. These two hypotheses are tested through an analysis of the EU’s policy towards Political Islam in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

Ultimately, the driving argument behind the thesis is that in such a complex political setting such as the MENA region, EU policy is first and foremost flexible, abandoning dogma in favour of flexibility. Thus the EU does not adhere to any normative or realist nature. As such it will be argued that each of the aforementioned factors intertwine to form a complex web

(9)

of conditions. Fundamentally the EU is not guided by ideology, but is a reactive actor that is enabled and constrained by first and foremost, local political context. As well as to a smaller extent each of its normative, realist, institutional dynamics. Based on contingency, each of these factors are important in conditioning EU policy and while some may be present more than others dependent on the case, this does not imply that the EU is one of these as a constant, but that they coexist to varying extent based on local political context.

1. 6. Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of Political Islam

Before this analysis proceeds however, it is important to conceptualise and operationalise Political Islam. Political Islam is diverse in its make up, goals, aims and beliefs, among other things (Al-‐Anani, 2012). At the most basic level; the broad aim of Political Islam is the integration of politics and Islam, as well as Islam with all spheres of life. Political Islam is by no means a monolith; there is huge variance within the broad aim of integration of Islam and Politics. Some groups wish to establish a transnational Islamic State, based on third generation Sharia law, while others seeks to establish a ‘Civil state’, in which law simply uses sharia as its point of reference (ibid). As well as the established Islamist parties, which occupy the moderate ground in Political Islam, there have been a wide array of new Islamist actors, ranging from ultra-‐conservative to reformist and moderate to extremist (Hamid, 2011). These more moderate, established Islamist groups have been conceptualised by some as ‘post’ or ‘neo’ Islamists, in that decades of repression and the need to compete for the popular vote has forced them to break with traditional Islamist values and accept a somewhat secular state, human and minority rights as well as political pluralism (Crowder, Griffiths and Hasan, 2014; Chamkhi, 2014).

On the other side of the spectrum, Salafist groups have emerged as the second largest type of Islamist group, who advocate rigid application of Sharia law, entailing strict gender segregation, restricting women rights and religious freedoms as well as often explicit rejections of democracy in favour of theocracy (Shehata and Dorpmueller, 2012: 55-‐60). Within Salafism there is great variance, some groups are represented through

institutionalised political parties, while others are merely the sum total of gatherings around popular local sheikhs (Wilson Center. 2016).

(10)

Political Islam is operationalised here by focusing on Islamist organisations that are distinct from the wider Islamic community, in that they seek to create a political order that

integrates the Islamic and political spheres through political means (Mandaville, 2007: 20). As such, the study will most likely focus on Islamist political parties, non-‐participatory groups engaged in political activities and social movements in which it would be feasible to expect the EU to contact, engage with or have any kind of relationship with. Examples of such groups are the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-‐Nour in Egypt, Ennahda and the Reform Front in Tunisia or the Justice and Development Party (PJD) and Adl Wal Ihsane (AWI) or Justice and Charity in Morocco. Thus, this thesis will not look at purely militant or terrorist Islamist groups, such as Ansar Al Sharia in Tunisia, or Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, this thesis will not analyse EU policy towards individual Islamist sheikhs or clerics, or informal Islamist groups based at the mosque, in order to make clearer the blurred line between religious and political Islam.

1. 7. Thesis Structure

The thesis will proceed as follows. Firstly, we briefly explain and justify the research design used, followed by the applied methods. Secondly, the literature review and theoretical framework will seek to identify and analyse the dominant narratives of normativity and realism while introducing the concept of institutional governance. As well as this, the chapter will introduce the notion of post-‐normativity, which underpins the overarching arguments of this thesis. Following this, we illustrate that the EU has attempted to

reconstitute its approach towards Political Islam in the region. Both in EU discourse as well as praxis, the EU is actively attempting to promote and implement a policy of inclusiveness in which it engages with the full spectrum of political actors, including Islamist political parties and groups. After this, we analyse the implementation of this policy across the cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, finding that implementation has been largely dependent on local political context. Finally, the summary discussion links these empirical findings to the theoretical debate presented in Chapter Three.

(11)

2. Methodology

2. 1. Secondary Data Collection

Two types of qualitative data are used and collected in the thesis. The first it attained simply through desk research and will focus on secondary published data. The data will be collected from various places such as publications of state, government and local government,

publications of foreign government and international bodies, technical and research

journals, books magazines and newspapers, publications of academics, universities and field experts as well as public records and statistics (Kothari, 2004: 111). Each piece of data has been scrutinised before use to make sure it is adequately suitable for use within the given context. Collecting data in such a way allows one to collect a broad range of different types of data from a broad range of sources, which is linked to the objectives of the thesis to provide an exhaustive and total analysis of the EU’s policy towards Political Islam.

2. 2. Primary Data Collection

As well as qualitative secondary data, 5 telephone and 3 personal Interviews support the analysis of the thesis. The reason for this, like above, is to allow for a broad and in depth collection of data. The interviews followed a semi-‐structured character, in which the first few questions remained consistent in each interview. After this, the interviews were

unstructured, in that they allowed the flexibility in the approach to question, in which there is freedom to include supplementary questions, omit certain questions where the situation required and often change the sequence of questions (Kothani, 2004: 97). The advantage of such an approach is that it allows for the interviewer to try and glean as much information from the respondent as possible. The telephone interviews were necessary due to the logistical constraints encountered during the interviewing process, related to geography, time and cost. Interview sampling was guided by the relevance of the position of the respondent in that only respondents working in departments or institutions to some extent responsible for the EU’s policy towards Political Islam. In order to provide consistent depth of information across the three cases, a representative from the EU delegations in each of Cairo, Tunis and Rabat was interviewed.

(12)

3. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

An amalgamation of both a theory chapter and literature review, the raison d’être of this passage is to analyse the narratives of normativity and realism, identifying the conceptual and empirical weaknesses of both, while at the same time recognizing those assertions and arguments which are worth keeping. We do this while also introducing two other emerging narratives in the studies of EU-‐MENA relations, institutional post-‐normativity and

institutional governance. What we are left with is a conceptual framework which contains a slightly watered down version of each narrative, and which seeks to make previously incompatible concepts come together to explain EU policy and practice as the result of a complex and polylithic interplay between synonymously existing narratives.

The proceeding analysis identifies two core weaknesses, which are shared by the normative and realist narratives, and therefore are not taken forward into the overarching theoretical framework. Firstly, the assumption of unitary actorness that underpins both narratives is found to be overbearingly reductionist, in that the assumption does not paint a holistic picture of EU policy or praxis. Secondly, both the normative and realist narratives suffer from an assumption that the EU is driven by a single omnipotent ethos, which drives all EU behaviour. Like the first identified weakness, this is a reductionist affliction and fails to account for the policy differentiation that has been identified across numerous convincing studies of EU-‐MENA relations to the extent that EU (Borzel and Van Hullen, 2014;

Dandashly, 2015). As will be seen in the ensuing chapter, these weaknesses are particularly obvious when analysing the narratives in relation to EU-‐MENA relations. This in part is due to the extremely complex nature of the region, in which each country has unique and difficult political conditions that make employing a singular guiding ethos impossible. Each country in the region varies to some extent in its societal make up, level of stability, system of governance, geopolitical significance and receptivity to normative reform for example. These environmental complexities force pragmatism on the part of the EU, in which dogmatic, one-‐size-‐fits-‐all policy is practically impossible.

The overarching theoretical framework presented therefore subscribes most strongly with the assumptions of post-‐normativity, in which one argues that the EU is ultimately a reactive and flexible actor, which is aware of the context it operates in and for the most part seeks to

(13)

make the best out of very unfavourable political conditions (Cavatorta and Pace, 2010). The emphasis here is that the contextual political environment the EU operates within is the defining variable of EU foreign policy, in which the EU must make difficult policy choices based on factors which it often has little or no control over. Underpinning these choices are both the normative and realist narratives, which have an ever-‐present foundational position in EU policy and praxis.

3. 1. The Normative Narrative in EU Foreign Policy

The value or idea based narrative is best captured by Manners’ much maligned concept of Normative Power Europe. Analysis of the concept will proceed as follows. First, it is

necessary to explicate the core assumptions and assertions of the theory. We then find that there is substantial evidence of Normative Power Europe in EU discourse and rhetoric. As well as this, there is also evidence that this discursive evidence has to some extent

translated into EU practice. We then explore the critiques of Normative Power Europe – firstly analysing the notion that the EU applies norms in the MENA region inconsistently and then the idea of asymmetrical bilateralism. While the evidence of both is compelling,

inconsistent norm application on the part of the EU is best explained by contextual complexities, such as the unreceptive authoritarian nature of some pre-‐2011 MENA

countries. When analysing asymmetrical bilateralism, we find that rather than being caused by an EU without normative ambitions, it is caused by a Normative Power Europe concept that wrongly assumed unitary actorness and fails to account for the EU’s member states’ and their material interests.

3. 1. 1. Normative Power Europe – Core Argument

The fundamental assertion of Normative Power Europe is the idea that the EU is a sui

generis and exceptional actor in international politics; in that it is predisposed to act in a

normative way, prioritizing ideational and value based objectives over the pursuit of material interests (Manners, 2002). Manners draws specific attention to peace, liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the five primary norms that the EU is built upon, but also that guide its behavior in international relations (ibid). This assertion is evidenced where Manners’ points to the enshrining of these norms in foundational EU discourse, such as the European Charter on Human Rights (ibid, 241).

(14)

According to Manners, there are three factors that are inherent and unique to the EU that account for this normative predisposition. These factors are the EU’s historical context as a product of both World Wars and thus a peace project, it’s hybrid-‐institutional make up and its hybrid political-‐legal constitution (ibid, 240-‐242). As such, Normative Power Europe has an almost fatalistic view the EU, in which it is destined to act in a normative way. This exceptionalist view of the EU is powerfully encapsulated where Manners writes that ‘the central component of normative power Europe is that it exists as being different to pre-‐ existing political forms, and that this particular difference pre-‐disposes it to act in a normative way’ (ibid, 242). Manners had since unsuccessfully attempted to reconstitute Normative Power Europe in a way that downplays this EU exceptionalist argument

(Manners and Diez, 2007). However, the above small excerpt from the original Normative Power Europe article illustrates without compromise that this is the central component of the theory and as such it necessary to proceed using the earliest version of the concept. 3. 1. 2. Evidence of EU Normativity

It is not difficult to find discursive evidence of the normative principles outlined by Manners in EU policy in the MENA region. In its first communication on the ENP, the Commission made it clear that relations with partner countries were not only dependent on political, economic and institutional reforms but also of the ability of member states to adhere to a catalogue of shared values (Johansson-‐Nogues, 2007). Further to this, each of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco have signed Association Agreements with the EU which contain legally binding human rights clauses, stipulating that the foundation of the relations between the EU and these countries is based on respect for human rights and democratic principles (European Union, 1998, 2008, 2004).

As such, if the EU or the partner country fails to adhere to these norm based clauses; the other country has the legal right to suspend the association agreement. The link to

Normative Power here is powerfully evidenced where Manners asserts that the EU places universal norms and principles at the centre of its relations with the world, as well as conditional upon them (Manners, 2002: 241). It is therefore no less than a fact that on paper, norms and values form the very basis of the EU’s relations with Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco.

(15)

As well as in mere discourse, there is also evidence that the EU promotes norms in its practice in the MENA region. Manners here highlights the EU’s campaign to abolish the death penalty worldwide, which has become central to the EU’s human rights policy (ibid, 251). This has been reflected in EU policy with Morocco, in which the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) is currently attempting to build a nonpartisan parliamentary coalition in order to overturn the country’s retentionist status1. Further to this, the EU has actively attempted to promote the norm of free and fair elections through its widespread use of electoral observation missions. While opportunities for such missions in the MENA have been restricted historically, since 2011 the EU has conducted five such missions in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria and Libya (European External Action Service, 2016). This is a sound example of the way in which the EU’s commitment to norms has translated into action on the ground in the MENA region, and paints a picture of an EU with genuinely normative ambitions.

3. 1. 3. Inconsistent Norm Promotion?

However, there is also powerful evidence that questions the EU’s commitment to norms and values. Unfortunately, the centrality of norms in EU relations with Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco has been limited to the realms of paper and spoken word. While it would be incorrect and unwise to discount the existence of normative motivations completely, the point here is to question the idea that the ENP is driven solely by normativity or has a normative nature. It may be a fact that norms and values are enshrined in a huge myriad of EU documents with the cases at hand, association agreements being just one example. But it is also a fact that the EU has never activated the human rights and suspended an

association agreement, despite very regular opportunities to do so with each of Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. Further still, it is also a fact that the EU signed association agreements committing Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco to upholding democratic principles while each were ruled by staunchly autocratic regimes. Such evidence appears to reduce the EU’s

commitment to these ‘essential elements’ clauses as little more than disingenuous. Further evidence of poor practical commitment to norms and values can be found when analysing early ENP documents. In her study of the early ENP, Johansson-‐Nogués draws attention to the gross gap between the 2004 ENP strategy papers and the first wave of action plans, which despite making very concrete references to normative action in the

(16)

original strategy document, only included vague commitments to normative reform, with general language and very little mention of exact measures for democratic reform

(Johansson-‐Nogues, 2007: 189). Scholars have further questioned the EU’s normative motivations by pointing out the inconsistent references made to democracy across individual ENP action plans, which do not conform to the levels of democracy in each partner state (Bosse, 2007; Borzel and Van Hullen, 2014). Specific attention can be paid to Ben Ali’s Tunisia, which was subject to a scathing ENP country report but whose subsequent action plan contained only a small and vague section on fundamental freedoms and human rights, with little concrete reform initiatives (Bosse, 2007: 51). While this allows Bosse to conclude that the EU commitment to norms varies from country to country (ibid), this conclusion is too strong.

As has been illustrated throughout this chapter so far, evidence both supporting and detracting from EU normativity is inconsistent. Rather than the EU’s commitment to norms and values varying from country to country, it is far more convincing to argue that rather variance can be found in the ability of the EU to implement normative reforms in each country. As such, Bosse’s argument is overbearingly critical in that is fails to understand that normative reform is dependent on far more than the EU’s commitment to values and norms but instead relies on a myriad of factors exogenous to the EU, such as the structural

conditions on the ground in Tunisia, which under Ben Ali were unreceptive to normative reform. A comparable case is contemporary Lebanon. While the EU remains committed to normative reform in the country, the fact that the country is suffering from the fallout of internal sectarian conflict and spill over from the Syrian civil war has meant that the EU has been unable to implement any substantive normative reform (European Commission, 2015b). Thus, any failures on the part of the EU to implement normative reform in these countries is less about the EU’s normative ambitions and more about the context of Tunisian and Lebanese politics at the time.

However, such argumentation does powerfully question the validity of Manner’s Normative Power conceptualisation, which is equally too strong in its portrayal of the EU as a

normative actor. It is therefore necessary to question the Normative Power argument that the EU is predisposed to act in a normative way at all times and as such question the

(17)

this argument, reducing the role of normative motivations to a foundational rather than definitional factor. Thus, norms do not drive EU policy solely but they are an ever-‐present foundation and as such, their influence cannot be discredited completely.

3. 1. 4. Asymmetrical Bilateralism – Negotiating Member States’ Interests

Final critique of the Normative Power Europe conceptualization can be found in the way in which its fatalistic portrayal of the EU as a normatively motivated actor incorrectly implies altruism on the part of the EU. This misguided interpretation of EU foreign policy is

identified by Haukkala, who employs the logic of ideational hegemony to argue that the EU has cleverly framed its own interests such as market liberalisation as shared or common interests (Haukkala, 2008: 1608). In each of the institutions tying the EU to its southern neighbours, be it the Union for the Mediterranean, EuroMed or the ENP, the EU has framed market liberalization as in the interests of the overall neighbourhood. Importantly, it does this while maintaining a protectionist Common Agricultural Policy, refusing to open up its markets in the only sector that the EU’s southern partners may have a substantive chance of competitiveness (Lehne, 2014). This is an example of the asymmetrical bilateralism which underpins EU relations with these states, whereby the EU employs its economic and cultural clout to coerce reforms in the neighbourhood, while reforming little, if at all, itself

(Haukkala, 2008). The example of the reluctance of the EU to open up its agrarian markets is indicative of the overall thesis of this paper that the EU’s relations with the MENA region is influenced by a complex web of factors, such as in this instance its agriculture-‐reliant Southern Member states and their economic and commercial interests.

It is important to point out that this inability to account for the way in which member state interests influence EU policy and practice in the MENA is in a large part down to Normative Power Europe’s implicit assumption of the EU as a unitary actor. Throughout the Normative Power literature, little mention is made of the EU’s institutional makeup or member states (Manners, 2002, 2006), which both influence the behaviour of the EU massively. In her analysis of the EU’s response to the Arab Spring, Balfour draws stark attention to the member states as the primary cause of lackluster and weak policy, especially in the

application of conditionality and sanctions (Balfour, 2012: 29-‐30). This is an argument that is echoed when looking at the response of Ashton to uprisings in Tunisia in Egypt, which was often an attempt to reflect incredibly diverse member state positions and as such reflected

(18)

weak, lowest common denominator policy (Howard, 2011). The influence of member states on EU policy is therefore not particularly difficult to see, but is entirely neglected by

Manner’s assumption that the EU is a unitary actor. While it is necessary to accept that norms form the foundation of EU policy and praxis, it is not necessary to accept the idea that the EU is unitary actor. An attempt to elaborate on the impact of member states and the EU’s member states will be made in the institutional governance chapter.

This point is not intended to illustrate the absence of normative principles in EU-‐MENA relations, but show that the preeminence afforded to them by Manners is misguided, as is the assumption of unitary actorness. As Johansson-‐Nogués points out, norms and values are an important part of EU foreign policy and are likely to remain so ((Johansson-‐Nogues, 2007: 185). However, the over simplistic position of pre-‐eminence given to norms and values by Manners does not paint an exhaustive picture of the EU’s policy toward the MENA and as such, the Normative Power Europe literature does not accurately conceptualise the EU in its entirety. That said, policy occurs at the levels of both rhetoric and practice and while the normative element has certainly been lacking in practice, its ever-‐presence in EU rhetoric paints a picture of EU policy that has genuinely normative ambitions, but is constrained by the myriad of other factors at play, such as realist, material interests, and the institutional governance of the EU.

3. 2. The Realist Narrative in EU Foreign Policy

Both the normative and realist narratives share two fundamental assumptions that serve as their greatest explanatory weaknesses. Firstly, scholars from both fields attempt to explain EU foreign policy as grounded in a core, predictable and omnipotent ethos or nature. The two oppositional narratives share this nature-‐based assumption, which serves to clip the wings of both narratives by failing to account for the fact that the EU is neither consistently normative or consistently realist. Secondly, both narratives share in their assumptions that the EU is a unitary actor in international relations, which as illustrated above does not paint an exhaustive picture of the EU’s institutional complexity. While there is difference in this assumption in that Manners makes no mention of either member states or EU institutions while realist scholars see the EU as a unitary agent of its member states (Hyde-‐Price, 2006, 2008). There is a core similarity in that each notion fails to account for the EU’s complex institutional make up. The analysis of the realist narrative proceeds as follows. First, the

(19)

core assumptions of the theory will be described. Secondly, the argument that EU policy merely represents the lowest common denominator of member state policy will be

analysed, where we argue that while there is powerful evidence of material interests in EU policy, such a principal-‐agent depiction of the EU’s institutions is too simple. After this, we analyse the notion that EU-‐MENA relations are based on the EU’s geopolitical

considerations, which is found to place too great an importance on geopolitics. Despite this, there is powerful evidence of the existence of realist motivations in EU policy in the region, so it is found that like norms, realist motivations also play an important, coexisting

foundational role.

3. 2. 1. Realist Assumptions

Realist portrayals of the EU are based on several dogmatic notions of the wider international system. Realist or realist scholars firstly assume that the international system is one based on the principle of anarchy, whereby there is no overarching authority (Waltz, 1979, 1993). Further to this, a statist assumption is made that states are the primary actors in

international relations and thus little concern is paid to domestic politics (Hyde-‐Price, 2006: 221-‐223). Realists assume that all states are functionally similar in that they act rationally in their pursuit of materialistic interests, commonly framed as hard power (ibid). These

assumptions are made without the EU in mind and traditionally, realist thought has been of little significance to studies of the EU. However, in attempt to contribute to studies on the true nature of the EU, Hyde-‐Price posits several ‘motive-‐forces’ that drive member state behaviour in the international system and thus define the nature of the EU. Touching upon these as briefly as possible – these are that member states are engaged in security

competition, will seek to maximize security and power along zero-‐sum relative gains cost benefit analyses, that EU cooperation is driven by milieu shaping on the part of the EU’s larger powers and that the EU is the repository for member states non-‐power or security related, second order concerns (ibid). When looking at these goals holistically, realists paint a picture of the EU in which it is at the complete behest of its larger member states, while being primarily driven by material, power based interests. Given this portrayal, it is not difficult to see realism’s reductionist similarities with the normative narrative, in which EU policy and practice is over-‐simplified to represent a single omnipotent ethos while the EU’s institutional complexity is unaccounted for.