Paula Stein – 10769854 – paulaulyssa@gmail.com
Between unity and diversity:
On agonistic democracy in a multicultural society
Gordon Arlen and Eric Schliesser Thesis for the bachelor of political science
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Introduction
During the sixties a new diagnosis became fashionable. More and more attention was given to the social and cultural inequalities penetrating society and the failure of neoliberalism and its focus on legal equality to give a constructive answer to this problem (Jansen 2016). Especially the voice of minorities, be it ethnic, religious, LGBTQ+-member or disabled people, became more prominent. Against this background multiculturalism as a theoretical field extended. Different ideas on how inequalities must be resolved arose from debates about what a multiculturalist society must look like. Possible strategies ranged from affirmative action and social recognition to minority rights. These theories were often based on an idea of clearly demarcated groups with fixed identities. For example, in order to recognize a certain identity there must be a clear picture of what defines this identity. This assumption has received criticism from amongst others an anti-essentialist perspective, arguing that in reality culture and identity are hybrid, overlapping and always in flux. It is this debate between multiculturalism and anti-essentialist criticisms that this thesis will focus on.
Although this discussion between identity-politics and anti-essentialism can be abstract, it has crucial implications for practical strategies. When one assumes there to be a clear identity, say for example a ‘black identity’, than fighting for equality will probably exist in empowering this identity and the characteristics that are associated with it. However, if the post-structuralist criticism targeting multiculturalist theories is right, it follows that these strategies (that meant to liberate) in reality restrict people and work to the disadvantage of minorities. Nevertheless, if there is no real political alternative that anti-essentialism itself can offer, it will only go at the expense of the power of minorities. Therefore, it is of great importance, both practical and theoretical, to look at political strategies that do not make the mistake of assuming unified cultures but do leave chances of real change and liberation.
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In order to gain a profound understanding of the clash in multiculturalist literature that this thesis concerns, the position of identity-politics will be represented by Charles Taylor and his theory of recognition. He describes how racism and colonialism can lead to a form of self-hatred by devaluating cultures people identify with. Therefore, it is a vital human need to see one’s identity being recognized by society (Taylor 1994). Although the focus of this thesis is on this specific theory, it will be argued that the assumption behind his theory (namely that there are clearly demarcated identities to recognize) is common in other multiculturalist theories as well. For example, another theorist vulnerable to the same criticism would be Will Kymlicka and his theory of group differentiated rights. According to him, since minorities are powerless with regards to the disadvantages they experience because of their belonging to a certain group, there should be group-rights to rectify their disadvantaged starting position (Kymlicka 2002). However, in order to grant people these minority rights there has to be a limited group of people who are counted as members combined with a clear image of what these people need and their demands. Thus, although Kymlicka comes with a different solution, he draws on the same assumption as Taylor and the post-structuralist criticisms employed in this thesis have a broad academic relevance.
This current of multiculturalist thought and the assumption founding their proposals for solving inequality are open to substantial criticisms from a post-structuralist and anti-essentialist position. The argument is that in reality cultures and identities are not as rigid as multiculturalism depicts them to be. Cultures interact with each other and transform over time. Moreover, there are many inner-group differences that come together in a social group. By denying these inner-group differences one is at risk of strengthening one dominant group definition, while at the same time marginalizing other group members. For example a feminism only serving interests of white women. However, it can also be a clever politically strategic tool to speak in name of a clear simple group identity. When this is not possible anymore, one is at
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risk of falling into an aporia where the power of minorities is decreased and systematic change impossible. This thesis will examine to what extent agonistic democracy as modelled by Chantal Mouffe can redeem us from this situation. It is argued that in an agonistic democracy anti-essentialism can indeed be combined with strong and collective action which is important in a multiculturalist society.
Let it be clear that in this thesis the term ‘multiculturalism’ is used in a way that it does not only refer to the co-existence of diverse cultural or religious groups in society, but takes on the role of an umbrella term comprising different kinds of political and moral demands of marginalized groups over different social identities (Song 2017). These may include, indigenous people, ethnic or religious minorities but also LGBTQ+ issues, gender, class or disabilities. The main focus of this thesis will be on cultural diversity, but other forms diversity and marginalization are seen as related and are discussed too. Thus, a broad conceptualization of multiculturalism is taken as a starting point.
I will begin by discussing Charles Taylor and his theory of recognition, followed by three post-structuralist arguments against the assumption of a demarcated identity underlying his theory. It is argued that from these criticisms a problem arises which appears to constrain us between on the one hand the desirability of a multiculturalist emancipatory strategy and on the other hand the impossibility of speaking in name of one defined group. Then, Chantal Mouffe and her theory of agonistic democracy are discussed and finally this thesis will end with an argumentation on why this political model forms a solution to the problem mentioned before.
Taylor’s theory of recognition
In order to shape a clear picture of multiculturalist theory and the assumption that often drives this field, the first section will elaborate on Charles Taylor’s theory of recognition. Taylor first published his theory of recognition in 1994 and ever since it has been one of the most influential theories in the field of multiculturalism, although also met by much criticism. The basis of his
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philosophy is a communitarian perception of society and the subject. This entails that the subject is constituted by her social environment and cannot be seen apart from this context (Taylor 1995; Song 2017). An individual is always shaped by a social situation and interaction with fellowhumans. Taylor follows this communitarian line of thought and argues for an ontological holism. Subjects are dependent on the context they live in and, in contrast to atomism, one cannot understand an individual apart from this social situation (ibid.).
Taylor’s communitarian view on human nature leads him to see the construction of identity as something for which one is dependent on a social practice. Identity is about self-definition and how one sees oneself. However, too often this identity is understood as something we define alone, as an authentic core we need to find deep within ourselves. According to Taylor, this notion of identity as a monologue is a misconception (Taylor 1994). In contrast, personal identity is a constant dialogue we carry on with our significant others. These are the people constituting the small circle of dear ones around us that make us into who we are. Even the language we use in this process of self-definition is through and through social and acquired in contact with these significant others. The dialogical relation that constructs us as persons will last our whole life and identity must be seen as an ongoing process (ibid.).
The circle of significant others belongs to the so called intimate sphere. But identity formation and its social character goes further than this. It is a negotiation with a more comprehensive culture and community in general as well. The realm behind the significant others is what Taylor calls the public sphere (idem: 37). In defining this sphere he recognizes what feminists often argue; namely that these spheres are tightly connected. The intimate sphere must not be seen as a private apolitical sphere, but as deeply influenced by the public and political. This ‘public sphere’ that Taylor compares with the intimate sphere is where social recognition plays an essential role. The idea of recognition can be observed in for example the black liberation movement and the feminist movement (idem: 26). Recognition of one’s group
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identity and culture must not be seen as a courtesy, but as a vital human need. In order to have an undistorted relation to oneself and to be able to function well, one is dependent on recognition. This can also mean being treated differently exactly because of one’s culture. For example, aboriginals as a group with native self-government must have powers others do not possess. A form of misrecognition can be very harmful and one is at risk when there are negative stereotypes in society concerning one’s group and culture devaluing you as a person. An example is the racist image of people of color that has been and still is as dominant in Dutch culture as in Taylor’s Canadian context. In this way one is stigmatized by the dominant culture. That is: the other. An important aspect of misrecognition for Taylor is the internalization of negative images. Society mirrors back an identity and when this is a harmful one this can lead to self-hatred (idem: 25). Thus, misrecognition can be a penetrating form of oppression whereby the oppressor spreads certain ideas that interpellate the mind of the oppressed, imprisoning someone in the gaze of the other. Hence recognition is not something to give to groups out of generosity or sympathy but is a basic human need; a necessary condition to be able to thrive as a full human agent. Taylor argues in favor of a presumption of the equal worth of different cultures, to help decrease the psychological abuse of inflicted self-hatred. “The claim is that all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings (idem: 66).”
In order to give a clear idea of the form a multiculturalist argumentation can take, this section has specifically focused on Taylor’s theory of recognition. However the criticism that will follow in the next section can be applied to a plurality of other multiculturalist theories. In this sense Taylor is an example of a bigger problem or weakness that characterizes the dominant type of multiculturalism. This type advocates for empowerment of cultures, working on the assumption that there are clearly demarcated homogeneous groups to be empowered. When Taylor argues in favor of recognition, he takes for granted that there is a defined group to
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recognize, a black authentic identity which can negate the stereotype. There is a picture of who this group is, who belong to the group and what it needs, namely a certain special treatment. There must be an exact idea of who is considered as ‘black’ or ‘disabled’ in order to grant these groups special treatment. Thus, a definition of a group with clear limits is assumed This is a condition that must be met in order to grant a group recognition and group rights but often involves processes of exclusion and inclusion.
In a way it can be convenient to work with clearly defined identities. For example, representation becomes easier when it is evident who one is trying to represent. One can speak in name of a group with apparent characteristics and interests, which makes it apparent who and what one is emancipating. Thus, to some extent essentialism can be very strategic and make empowerment easier and more effective, for it is structured and workable. This is also the reason why some people argue in favor of ‘strategic essentialism’: acknowledging that there are no ontological essential identities, yet legitimizing restricted forms of essentialism simply because it makes emancipation strategically easier. Hence, this practical side of clearly defined identities is an obvious advantage. However, there are also some problems adhesive to this assumption dominant in multiculturalism that are difficult to surmount. These will be discussed in the next section.
Anti-essentialist criticism
Taylor’s theory of recognition and similar theories reasoning from well-rounded cultural identities have received substantial criticism. In this paragraph I will elaborate on three points of critique. These three arguments are based on the general criticism that multiculturalism approaches cultures as rigid demarcated categories, while in reality they are complex and fluid. The first mentioned approach can lead to a claim of cultural essence which is often an unjust simplification that privileges one definition of that identity over others. In this way the ascription of group rights or recognition risks exclusion of people who do not ascribe to the
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dominant characterization. The three specifications of this argument that I will expand on are the hybridity of culture, the intersectionality of identity and the transformation of culture over time.
Hybridity
First of all, multiculturalism has received substantial criticism arguing that culture is more hybrid than this strand of thought acknowledges. Hybridity is a term originating in the discipline of urban studies and migration in the early twentieth century (Ackermann 2012:7). In the 1980’s the term was given new meaning in the field of post-colonial and literary studies. As Ackermann describes: “They argued that since no culture has been left untouched by the global circulation of people, artefacts, signs and information, culture these days is hybrid per se, constituting a locale of conflict between representations of identity and difference (Ackermann 2012: 12).” Thus, cultures always interact and it is an illusion to see them as a ‘mosaic’ of different, mutually exclusive groups. The most prominent thinker on the subject of hybridity is Homi Bhabha, who will be the focus of the rest of this section. His work was revolutionary in its post-structuralist analysis of the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized being resistant in placing all power over discourse in the hands of the colonizer. According to Bhabha, the colonizer could never fully succeed in defining the colonized, since discourse is always characterized by ambivalence and fragility. And it is exactly this last point where the oppressed find space for resistance.
Bhabha analyzes how on the one hand the colonizer tries to fix a strong power hierarchy through discourse and on the other hand the colonized reclaims this same discourse. In order to legitimize penetrating asymmetrical power relations the colonizer shapes an image of herself1
1In order to challenge a deeply rooted but unfounded convention, throughout this thesis nouns that include both
males and females are referred to as female. I am aware that in colonial societies men were situated more often in the powerful position of the colonizer, but for the sake of consistency I chose to still refer to ‘the colonizer’ as female. Besides, women too were part of the colonial system and colonizers as a group.
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and, in opposition to this, an image of the colonized who is as different as possible. This is necessary since it is difficult to explain brutal oppression of people that belong to the same group as you. A difference in power must be explained by an otherness that maps out the group of people marked by inferiority (Bhabha 1985: 153). However, the gap between the dominator and dominated should not be too wide; there must be a mutual interdependence between the two cultures, a form of mimicry. For example, Bhabha discusses education programs in India that were meant to teach the natives English in order to serve as teachers and translators, spreading the discourse and authority of the West. For it was also necessary that the colonized imitated and took on the culture of the colonizer. The colonizer needs a domesticated other that is dependent on her yet is marked by difference (Bhabha 1985).
It is in the interest of the powerful that this articulation of difference and mimicry is stable and creates a fixed meaning and therefore stable power relations. However, according to Bhabha, this is never the case. The opposition between dominator and dominated is always agonistic, shifting and splitting (idem: 152). Likewise the space in which cultural identity is shaped is characterized by ambivalence and the subject is never simply in place. An important aspect here is the process in which the colonized takes the culture of the colonizer and shapes it to her own taste. One example is a colonizer who sees a native with a string of textile from overseas around his neck. He is filled with wondering and incomprehension about what kind of meaning is given to this familiar object around this black neck. By taking over the culture of the powerful and giving it new meaning, the colonized can reclaim the image that the colonizer sketches of them, which is a form of power shift and resistance. The rigid identities that the powerful try to sketch are unmasked as partially hollow forms, empty concepts; and ambivalence becomes transformed into uncertainty. This challenges universal values and the authoritative discourse by empowering hybridity. Colonized cultures were seen as ontological existing categories. The moment this discourse becomes hybrid, these categories are revealed
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as merely constructs and so the power legitimation crumbles. The power of the colonizer and the fixed identities it aims to shape are no longer absolute (ibid.).
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis of hybridity and colonialism is that cultures are always interlocked, and interact. There is a complex relation between the dominant culture and other cultures marked by relations of power. After one or two generations people who originally may have come from Indonesia are not necessarily ‘Indonesian’ anymore. Their culture has taken over aspects of the Dutch culture and reshaped them. Also, Dutch culture (to the extent that we can actually speak in these categories) will have evolved itself. This idea of the hybridity of culture contests Taylor and his theory of recognition, since it problematizes the idea of a mosaic of distinct cultures co-existing. From Bhabha’s perspective the existence of transparent boundaries between different cultures would be illusionary and there would not be such demarcated separated groups to recognize. Also, the recognition of multicultural identities would reproduce an identity constructed by an unequal power relation.
Intersectionality
A second point of criticism is that people’s identities are not constituted by one dominant aspect or culture but by “(…) mutually reinforcing vectors of race, gender, class, and sexuality (Nash 2008: 2).” One person does not belong to only one explicit social group. A person is her or his ethnicity, culture, class, gender, sexuality and more, and there is not necessarily one aspect decisive for one’s self-definition. This problematizes Taylor’s model of recognition since he takes for granted clear divisions between different cultural groups that can be acknowledged. An individual, however, cannot simply be placed in one of these but will be part of multiple cultures in different ways. Intersectionality is not only relevant for individual cases but also for the formation of groups and their homogeneity. Taylor wants to grant groups recognition of a certain culture but what if this culture is divided over other ranges of identity? There are cultural majorities and minorities in which women are subjugated, but also forms of feminism that
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exclude blacks or only worry about the problems of upper class women. Recognition of one dominant definition of a group identity can stimulate exclusion instead of empowerment. Thus, it is vital when emancipating one group to be cautious not to uphold someone else’s subordination (Collins 1993: 25).
Another risk of a non-intersectional approach of identity is that one vector of identity is prioritized over others. This is the problem at stake in the criticism employed by Nancy Fraser on theories of recognition. Fraser, herself a Marxist thinker, calls the exclusion of material economic inequality in identity politics ‘a problem of displacement’ (Fraser 2000). Often theories of recognition see cultural harm as free-standing apart from struggles for redistribution. Either they ignore how material factors influence cultural inequality and simply deem it as unimportant. Or they see distributive injustices merely as a consequence of misrecognition. The latter group, called culturalists, would argue that if misrecognition is resolved unjust redistribution is resolved. Fraser is of the opinion that this is an absolute illusion. Marketization has spread through all societies and has a logic of its own apart from culture (ibid.). Thus, Taylor’s theory of recognition is flawed in the sense that he does not see the importance of material factors and also how these can interlock with cultural injustice.
Another risk of a non-intersectional approach is the exclusion or oppression of another axis of identity, denying the wide range of differences within a category of ‘blacks’ or ‘women’ (Nash 2008: 89). Kimberlé Crenshaw, who introduced the term ‘intersectionality’, makes a similar point. In her article Mapping the Margins she criticizes feminist and anti-racist politics for their one-dimensional view, ignoring intra-group differences. She analyzes the specific experiences of violence of women of color that are not taken into account due to this perspective. Creshaw recounts that when she asked the police for data for her article on the number of arrests per racial group, she was told that they would not provide these statistics. On the one hand, representatives of various minority communities were against the provision of
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these data, because they were scared it would strengthen stereotypes that could be used to defend racial profiling. On the other hand, feminist activists were concerned that violence against women would be portrayed as a minority problem. Thus in both cases they disregarded one axis of oppression in order to maintain their stable group identity, reproducing one form of oppression while aiming to solve another (Crenshaw 1991: 1252-1253). In this sense the intersectionality of identity and culture is an important factor to take into account in battles for liberation.
Transformation of culture
The third argument I would like to elaborate on briefly is that culture, instead of being stable over generations, is always open to change. By extending the right for recognition of a culture over multiple generations, Taylor assumes that the next generation will take-over almost exactly the same cultural identity as the previous generation. This forms a paradox in Taylor’s theory of identity. On the individual level identity is formed in a dialogue with one’s environment and significant others thus always having a dynamic character. However, this is not extended to the general level of cultures themselves. These are stable over generation and not in the state of flux in which individual identities are. However, cultures are not this static but always in a process of evolution. One only has to think about the importance of a shared history in the formation of culture. Over time culture adapts to all kinds of situations, encounters and internal struggles and this shapes the character of a culture. Two examples are how the culture of people from previously colonial countries changes over generations and the transformation that women’s movements and their demands have undergone, from the reevaluation of an essential womanhood to the deconstruction of gender norms and a rather intersectional approach.
As Bhiku Parekh argues, culture is a complex and unsystematic whole and never static or able to stably settle (Parekh 2000: 144). Culture develops over time but often slowly and in parts. This makes it easier for individuals to adjust their identity. However, there can also be
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adjustments over which a community has no control and that will be rapid and intensive. Cultural formation is linked to the previous two aspects of hybridity and intersectionality too. Following hybridity, culture transforms through interaction with other cultures. This can be in the form of a clash between different cultures but also the take-over of other cultural aspects. The necklace and sacrament that Bhabha discussed were complex example of this process. Furthermore, change is often motivated by dissatisfaction with the dominant culture (Parekh 2000: 144). This relates to intersectionality in terms of intragroup differences and inequalities. These can serve to provoke the dominant culture or maybe even split up. In this sense culture is never without contestation and always open to transformation.
An aporia arises
These three arguments problematize the idea of rigid identities underlying Taylor’s theory of recognition. They mostly come from an anti-essentialist post-structuralist brand of theory (except for Fraser but I am of the opinion that her argument is also relevant from an anti-essentialist perspective) that goes against the idea of clearly defined structures in social reality. Following these three arguments culture and identity should be approached as fluid, unsettled and interwoven instead of referring to categories or essences with transparent boundaries. It follows that one should not and cannot speak in name of these categories implicating a certain essential identity. Since exactly these categories are part of the oppression, they should not be reproduced when aiming at liberation. Thus, political strategies that refer to a certain ‘black identity’, ‘native identity’ or ’womanhood’ are not an appropriate option. The concept of resistance that arises can often be found in small provocations of meaning and resignification; for instance the piece of fabric hung around the neck of a native in Bhabha’s theory. Another example is the transsexual in the bus that Judith Butler discusses as a form of provocation of gender norms (Butler 1988). These are deconstructive strategies following the belief that social rules and cultural institutions can be debased through resignification. However, when changing
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the system is dependent on these small symbolic provocations, this concept of resistance holds the risk of being politically paralyzed. As said before, collective mobilization or forms of strategic essentialism that refer to a clear simple identity and demands can be very effective. However, this is not possible anymore from the viewpoint of these criticisms.
So now a kind of aporia arises. On the one hand we do not want to refer to an essentialist image of culture and identity since, in reality, these do not exist and run a high risk of reproducing other mechanisms of exclusion. This became clear in the analysis of Taylor, his theory of recognition and the criticism he received. On the other hand, however, we do want to be able to actually change the system of oppression and find a politically strategic way to fight it. This strong kind of resistance and change is not possible from the anti-essentialist view advocated by the criticisms discussed above. Thus, the aporia stems from legitimate post-structuralist criticisms that keep us from using political solutions claiming defined identities. But then we find ourselves in a position where strong actions or institutional designs against inequality become impossible, leaving us kind of politically paralyzed. I am of the opinion that a model of agonistic democracy inspired by Chantal Mouffe can lift us out of this predicament. It is possible to scombine anti-essentialism and unfixed social relations with strong (collective) action. The next section will discuss Chantal Mouffe and her model of agonistic democracy. Next is an argumentation of why this will elevate us from aporia and why it is suitable for a multiculturalist society.
Chantal Mouffe and agonistic democracy
In this section I shall discuss Chantal Mouffe’s post-structuralist theory of agonistic democracy. One of her first works after her Marxist period, coauthored with Ernest Laclau, was Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy. Although it is a dense and abstract book it is crucial to discuss some
ideas laid out in this work since they form the basis of her characterization of the political sphere. Later work of Mouffe on agonistic democracy mainly tackles liberalist theories but
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Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is aimed at the classical left; its economic determinism, how
it perceives agents of change and its trust that society can be completely intelligible and mastered (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 2).
According to Mouffe and Laclau the social sphere is a symbolic order constituted through discourse. This ‘order’ is characterized by a radical anti-essentialism. There is nothing in reality to which discourse can be linked in a way that it is granted a status of necessity. From the make-up of objects there cannot be deduced a fixed and unambiguous meaning. This applies to the social order and all the elements that it contains such as social identities. It means that discourse never has a necessary character nor are social orders economically determined or formed by a historical necessity as traditional Marxists argue. Instead, the social and it’s identities are characterized by contingency, precariousness and unfixity (idem: 86, 96). This anti-essentialism also makes the ‘social order’ always open to change and makes it one alternative amongst others. Concerning discourse there will always be a precarious form of fixation: it is just “a moment of a stable articulatory structure” (idem: 96)
Since identities are also constituted by this precarious discourse one cannot speak of a unitary subject that is transparent or unambiguous. Again, anti-essentialism is crucial in this argumentation. Subjects do not have a rigid internal identity but instead derive their identity through difference with other identities. As we will see with her interpretation of Carl Schmitt in Mouffe’s later work relationality is always a defining characteristic for her. Still, this relationality does not form a closed system and identities are politically negotiable. Besides, the subject is constituted by multiple subject positions since people are always situated in and constituted through multiple discursive structures (idem: 115). Because the discursive is characterized by an overload of meaning and relationality identities too are not unitary nor stable.
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A final conclusion from this book that I would like to emphasize in relation to intersectionality is that social movements should not focus on one restricted social agent such as the worker in traditional Marxism. According to Mouffe and Laclau, for a movement to succeed it should involve a plurality of social actors and different social categorizations. In this way people can form a chain of equivalence and constitute a collective story that can unmask unequal power relations (ibid.).
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy lays the foundation of Mouffe’s characterization of
the political. Since the social sphere and the discourse that constitutes it are by definition precarious and complemented with a constant flux of overdetermination, politics will never be stable. Also, discourse is always instituted by power relations and hegemony (Mouffe 1995: 33). This causes Mouffe, as a true postmodern, to reject any claim of neutrality or universality. Instead, she suggests that it is necessary for democrats to recognize the undecidable character of the political. The believe in a universal rational consensus is an illusion that serves only to mask a particular hegemony (Mouffe 1994: 1544). Another important aspect of ‘the political’ is that power relations are inerasable from politics and have a constitutional function.
Apart from undecidability and constitutive power, the political is also inherently interwoven with pluralism. Mouffe’s pluralism is not empirical in the sense that it factually states that in contemporary liberalist society different visions of the good life can be recognized. Instead pluralism is at the center of modern democracy on a conceptual and normative level (idem: 1534). Pluralism is ineradicable and valuable in itself. According to Mouffe however, there should be limits to pluralism in a democratic society in order to be able to challenge subordination. Here, Mouffe targets both liberalism and extreme postmodernism. Both these kinds of pluralism, blindly emphasizing heterogeneity, do not give enough attention to the power relations that construct social positions in society. Instead, one must distinguish between differences that exist but should not and differences that do not exist but should (Mouffe
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1994:1535; Mouffe 1995: 39). Secondly, an extreme conception of pluralism does not recognize the importance of the creation of a collective ‘we’ identity and citizenship. Following Mouffe this is an important step in a democratic model. At this point the constant friction in Mouffe’s theory between pluralism and a common political identity becomes visible. She values pluralism and a wide range of different identities in society while still wanting a central political sphere with common principles where power relations can be contested, order in chaos.
In some ways Mouffe’s conception of the political is quite similar to Jacques Rancière’s idea of ‘politics’. He begins by distinguishing the order of police from the order of politics which latter aim is to disrupt the former. The order of police aims at preserving the present order (Rancière 2001). This is through dictating what is counted as sensible and what is not. Thus, a consensus is established that is presented as natural and evident. This consensus also holds that there can be no void since this would mean that there is a gap in the order of definitions and instead the order is total. It dictates what kinds of saying, doing and being are appropriate and what is visible (Rancière 2001; Pirsoul 2017: 3). In a sense this can be compared to Mouffe’s idea of discourse since this also sets the boundaries of what can be politically demanded. Rancière too emphasizes the conflictual character of politics (although he emphasizes conflict outside the state). Politics aims at questioning the order that the police is trying to stabilize. It discloses the subject that the system does not want to be seen or heard such as indigenous people, workers or non-cis people. Politics provokes these boundaries of what can be seen, heard or voiced and makes new acts or beings visible. Thus, Racière states that the essence of politics is dissensus (Rancière 2001). This also means that the sensible is relocated and alienated from itself through disclosure of things that the police order did not recognize. This sounds comparable to a politics of resignification. However, Rancière focusses, just as Mouffe, more on collective action than on discourse. However, Mouffe has more to say about the constructive role the state can play.
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Mouffe combines multiple theoretical traditions such as republicanism, conservatism but also liberalism. This last one can be surprising since her most devastating critique is aimed at Rawls and Habermas, two canonical liberalist thinkers. Her main problem with these thinkers is that they argue in favor of a procedural model of democracy that is claimed to be neutral and in which different conceptions of the good life can coexist peacefully as equals. Denying the antagonism and power relations that characterize this social context for the sake of ‘neutral’ institutions only masks inequalities and forces conflict and passions to go elsewhere, e.g. to populist right wing parties. Due to their defective conception of the political, philosophers such as Rawls and Habermas are asking themselves the wrong question. Mouffe proposes the following approach to arrive at a new model of democracy.
“But if we accept that relations of power are constitutive of the social, then the main question of democratic politics is not how to eliminate power but how to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values. To acknowledge the existence of relations of power and the need to transform them, while renouncing the illusion that we could free ourselves completely from power, this is what is specific to the project of “radical and plural democracy” that we are advocating (Mouffe 1999: 753).”
Thus, instead of trying to deny the original character of the political we should accept it, work on this assumption and think about how to construct it in a democratic way.
This criticism of deliberative and liberal models of democracy as denying the true character of the political is a common starting point for philosophers advocating agonistic democracy. For example, James Tully argues that so called “neutral” institutions and constitutions always privilege dominant groups or majority groups over others (Tully 1999).
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This is the reason why he is in favor of a form of recognition inspired by Taylor that focusses more on autonomy and independence. One could say that this connection with multiculturalism would cause his theory to be a more obvious choice for this thesis. However, Tully preserves aspects of deliberative democracy that I think contradict a model of agonistic democracy and anti-essentialist identities marked by power. Tully still aims at an intercultural dialogue based on principles of reciprocity and reasonableness that may not be transcendent but are of an immanent status and condition democracy (Tully 1995). Thus, there is still a divide between social struggles that count as reasonable and those that don’t (Wenman 213:162). This is a concession to deliberative democracy that loses touch with the idea of the undecidable and open character of politics in agonistic democracy. Therefore, I chose Mouffe and her model of agonistic democracy over Tully’s.
Mouffe makes a distinction between ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. ‘The political’ is the dimension of antagonism that can be recognized in all forms of social relations but can take many forms. ‘Politics’ is a combination of practices, discourses and institutions that organizes a society but is always open to conflict since it is part of ‘the political’ (Mouffe 1999: 754). Where ‘the political’ is originally about conflict, pluralism and difference, ‘politics’ aims at creating a unity through the construction of an ‘us’, a collective identity. Since identity is always relational for Mouffe this ‘us’ is contrasted with a ‘them’. This distinction is greatly influenced by Carl Schmitt. According to Schmitt collective identities are structured by a we/they relation. Thus, every identity is the affirmation of an ‘other’, difference, or outside and often this relation is hierarchal. However, a we/they relation is always at risk of taking on the form of an antagonistic friend/enemy relation. This risk is especially high when the other is seen as a threat to the identity of the ‘we’. However, Mouffe argues that there are more forms in which a we/they relation can exist. The question arises; what kind of we/they relation does agonistic democracy need? Mouffe aims at a relation that would make a political association with
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different identities possible. This would be a relation between adversaries that perceive of each other’s demands, although incompatible, as legitimate (ibid.). This must be combined with an acknowledgment of a shared symbolic space and association.
A unity of a ‘we’ is also constructed through a common dedication to what Mouffe calls ethico-political principles (Mouffe 1995: 36). In a pluralist society these principles are freedom and equality, not because these are transcendental principles but because they are claimed to regulate contemporary society. Adherence to these two values forms a minimum of authoritative consensus that is necessary to manifest conflict in a common political space. However, the principles can and probably will be interpreted in very different ways. This makes it a conflictual consensus supporting multiple conceptions of citizenship (Mouffe 1999: 16). Thus, Mouffe understands citizenship as a political identity constructed through identification with the political principles of a pluralist society, namely liberty and equality. Through ethico-political principles agonistic democracy offers a common discourse to which democratic demands of equality can be connected. In this way a chain of equivalence between different fights for liberation will be formed (Mouffe 1995: 38).
The ethico-political principles and the creation of a non-homogeneous ‘we’ are responsible for a common ground in a world of chaos. Still, we should not see pluralist democracy as working towards a point of resolution of conflict. In this sense its realization would be its disintegration since such a reconciled society is not possible nor desirable because it would eliminate pluralism (Mouffe1994: 1544). Instead, agonistic democracy makes power and exclusion visible so they can be manifested in a democratic terrain of contestation. “Such a project recognizes that the specificity of modern pluralist democracy - even a well-ordered one - does not reside in the absence of domination and violence, but rather in the establishment of a set of institutions through which power relations can be limited and contested (idem:
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1537).” Giving up the dream of total harmony also means giving up the dream of total emancipation, there can only be partial ones.
Institutions of agonistic democracy
Earlier, it was concluded that the post-structuralist criticism of multiculturalist theory leads to an aporia where constructive collective action becomes difficult and social change is dependent on small symbolic provocations. As I will later argue, Mouffe and her theory of agonistic democracy are able to solve this problem. In order to make this argument more concrete it is important to say some things about the institutional design that fits this theory. Mouffe gives a broad frame for this (a liberal democracy with guiding ethico-political principles and agonistic citizenship) but is not specific on the exact make-up. It must be a parliamentary partisan system but these parties must embody real choices between real alternatives instead of incorporating the same status quo (Mouffe 2005). How exactly agonistic democracy differs from the system we have now, and what kind of institutions will result in a more diverse range of parties remains unclear. I think that this lack of detail is somewhat problematic since it remains up for grabs what practical steps should be taken to transform our current democracy into an agonistic democracy and how the latter will differ from our present system. However, in my opinion two characteristics are absolutely essential in order to accomplish a well-functioning agonistic democracy: an emphasis on contentious politics and a decentered democracy.
First of all emancipation must not only be possible in the official political sphere of parliament but also outside of this “public” domain. ‘The political’ runs through all social relations, so it would not make sense to restrict emancipation to the central ‘public sphere’. Furthermore, the state can be expected to be in the hands of established powers so in order to confront hegemony it is important that it is challenged from the outside. Here, contentious politics can form an outcome. This strand of literature focusses on collective action outside of
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the institutional setting, such as demonstrations, strikes and civil disobedience (Tarrow 2014: 2). Instead of analyzing single examples of social movements the focus lies on episodes of contestation, how they come into existence and what they realize (idem: 6). Great importance is given to relational mechanisms amongst collective movements, their allies and their interaction with the government. Charles Tilly, the social scientist who inspired this field of contentious politics, also wrote about the significant contribution of contestation to episodes of social change (Tilly 1997). Not only can actors, through smart negotiation, see their demands realized but also realign alliances and rivalries (idem: 15). Thus, when we look at this from a perspective of agonistic democracy contentious politics can bring new political claims, that have not been accepted before, to the arena of ‘politics’ and therefore expand the ground for a representative democracy.
Yet, contestation beyond the political arena is not enough; it is essential to also broaden and deepen democracy and in this way to extend this political arena. Only focusing on the central (state-level) political sphere of parliament will not give people enough space to contest hegemony. Political apathy and alienation from mainstream politicians can only be solved when democracy is decentralized and more demands can be channeled. For example, Nancy Fraser proposes that a stratified society needs a contestation of a plurality of public spheres instead of one overall public (Fraser 1990: 12). This can also form an opportunity for people from minorities or subordinated groups to come together in a public sphere where deliberation can take place as a starting point for collective action challenging the dominant hegemony. A clear example of this would be the mini-publics, most popular with advocates of deliberative democracy, but proposed by Manon Westphal as a tool for agonistic democracy. Mini-publics are institutions that engage citizens to collectively discuss an established topic. In order to make this idea agonistic one could for example use a form of ‘positive discrimination’ where previously unacknowledged demands or voices receive more speaking time. Also, the goal must
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not be to reach a consensus but to “ (…) bring about situations in which the status quo is called into question and new spaces for political debates open up (Westphal 2018: 20).” In this way mini-publics serve to contest dominant political powers. An important addition to this institution is that the initiation of a mini-public must be in the hands of the public in order to be able to challenge hegemony. Finally, to grant the mini-publics more definitive power one could make it mandatory to discuss the points made by the mini-public in parliament (idem: 21). In what follows I will elaborate on why this form of agonistic democracy, that is inspired by Mouffe, could form a solution to the aporia we encountered before concerning multiculturalist theory.
Agonistic democracy and multiculturalism
Previously, it was concluded that post-structuralist criticism of multiculturalist theory led to an aporia concerning political action. The problem was that on the one hand one does not want to speak on behalf of an essentialist image of identity and culture; groups are in reality more diverse and hybrid and speaking from an essentialist identity often reproduces inner group inequality. On the other hand, one does want a political strategy that can accomplish systematic change and can have a collective character. The post-structuralist thinkers discussed were not able to accomplish this through their emphasis on resignification and symbolic provocation.
A model of agonistic democracy as sketched above answers to both of these demands. First of all it draws on an anti-essentialist foundation and therefore identity is approached as contingent and open to change. Mouffe does have a somewhat more rigid view of identity than some other anti-essentialist thinkers due to her emphasis on relationality but these relationalities can intersect and do not have the character of necessity. Also I think a conceptualization of identity in terms of a we/them relation is accurate in the context of multiculturalism, since often minority cultures are perceived as ‘the other’ (Fowers & Davidov 2008). But maybe even more
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important, the forms of identity that exist in an agonistic society are always open to contestation. This makes it difficult for one limited social actor to define the meaning of one single identity or culture. Inner group differences, divides or disagreements can be fought out and the status quo challenged. The denial of an identifiable essence of ‘blacks’, ‘Moroccan’ or ‘Islamic’ and an essence on the individual level makes identities fluid and the possibilities for redefinition endless. Besides, pluralism is strengthened, through the pluralist conception of citizenry in an agonistic model. As Joseph Carens argues: with a multiculturalist society comes a need to allow multiple understandings of belonging and citizenship (Carens 2000: 161). In agonistic democracy this is materialized through ethico-political principles which are open to a range of different interpretations. Furthermore, in a multiculturalist society it is crucial to recognize that a multiplicity of cultures can all come together in one person and thus that identity is hybrid. In agonistic democracy a subject is always constituted by multiple subject positions; therefore, identity is approached as complex and intersectional. Personal identity can have multiple (probably even contradicting) cultural facets, such as Dutch, Indonesian or European, thus fulfilling this need of a multiculturalist society. Finally, an essential part of multiculturalism is readdressing the inequalities between a majority culture and minority cultures (Rattansi 2011: 12). This contestation comes to the fore in a model of agonistic democracy since, as we saw with the mini-publics, there are important institutions aimed at challenging hegemonic powers by privileging marginalized voices. In an agonistic democracy it becomes therefore impossible to have one stable majority culture to which other cultures are asked to assimilate and fit in.
Of course a theoretical anti-essentialist standpoint does not automatically mean that in practice demands or claims will be essential. A case that can serve to illustrate how anti-essentialism may be brought into practice is educational policy in Cyprus (Zembylas 2011). In his article Zembylas evaluates a new educational policy in Cyprus meant to stimulate the peaceful co-existence of rivaling ethnic groups. The author criticizes this policy for its holding
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tight to the idea of two conflicting rigid ethnic identities what, according to him, actually works counterproductive for peaceful co-existence. Instead educational policy should be made from an anti-essentialist antagonistic point of view. From this perspective, aims of education would be problematizing otherness and we/them relationships and talking about the history behind conflict and identities (ibid.). In this way two social groups that at first were seen as irreconcilable are depicted as contingent and the shared history of violence and trauma can be dealt with openly. Emphasis is shifted to “(…) political engagement and its potential to inform and transform the formation of our political communities.” This example illustrates that with agonistic democracy and its institutions also comes a shift in democratic culture and how citizens perceive politics and identities. For Mouffe, this was accomplished by the common believe in ethico-political principles. But education can also play an important role in teaching this attitude.
Hence, agonistic democracy is able to leave claims of essentialist identities behind itself. The second important point was that there must be opportunity to substantially challenge subordination or hegemonic culture with the possibility of collective action. Agonistic democracy can do this, for example, through the chains of equivalence where multiple fights for liberation concerning ethnicity, culture, class, gender and sexuality can be fought together and in alliances (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). I think that here we should compare collective action based around common demands or identities with the temporary consensus that Mouffe discusses. These coalitions between individuals with different struggles are strategic and are effective when it comes to forming a power block in the common political space for the challenge of hegemony. Besides, the idea of agonistic citizenship and the common principles of liberty and equality make these battles for cultural emancipation an element of the bases of the model of democracy and democratic culture. Thus, collective action is a cornerstone of this model. Yet, these associations are of a temporary character and open to contestation; when one
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liberation movement confines another’s fight for liberation, or when inner-group differences are repressed, then this can be expressed in contestation and can lead to a new contemporary consensus that could form the basis of new political action. For example, when feminist action reproduces prejudices concerning Islamic women concerning their being repressed because of their headscarf, there is room to contest this dominant feminism, maybe construct a new dominant interpretation of what feminism contains and make new alliances.
A case of collective contentious politics concerning multiculturalism is the unrest in the
Schilderswijk in The Hague in 2014 (a neighborhood with an exceptionally high percentage of
people with an immigrant background) (Verloo 2017). Here a pro-Gaza demonstration got out of hand, which was followed by a counterdemonstration by people scared of “islamization”, that was confronted in its turn with a counter demonstration. In her article Verloo analyzes a localized network of professionals that ‘brought agnostic democracy into practice’ by mediating between different polarized groups using diverse tactics such as communicating with the police and organizing a soccer match for youth during the counterdemonstration in order to keep them from demonstrating (ibid.). In my opinion Verloo pays not enough attention to the political role these mediates have and the role hegemony plays in a state apparatus, since she rather frames them as administrative figures, which does not suit an agonistic perspective. However, her article does show the importance of a decentered governing network, in particular concerning the prevention of violence. Besides, her article illustrates beautifully how a conflict is often shaped by the different interpretations conflicting actors give of the occurring events. In this case: struggles for representation verses a thread to the identity of the country (ibid).
So with a combination of anti-essentialism and collective action Mouffe’s theory of antagonistic democracy allows for a political system that is able to solve the clash between multiculturalism and anti-essentialism. I think it is necessary, however, to keep in mind one discrepancy concerning Mouffe’s theory: a constant friction between pluralism and unity and chaos and
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order. Especially in her later work the emphasis shifts to restraining antagonism and composing order. For example, in On the Political she actually begins to speak in terms of ‘taming’ conflict, seeming to contradict her earlier work, where deliberative democracy is actually attacked for trying exactly this. The friction between chaos and order is also a problem that Mark Wenman discusses in his analysis of agonistic democracy. According to him, where in Hegemony and
Socialist Strategy the emphasis lies on challenging hegemony, later on Mouffe seems to care
more about order and stability. I would say that this is somewhat of an overstatement, since the original aim of the ethico-political principles is not order but the creation of a common frame, language and political space to manifest conflict. After all a state will need a minimum of common consensus in order to function and a shared form of life in order to be able to discuss a conflict.
However, it does lay bare a constant paradox in Mouffe’s theory: politics is always intertwined with conflict, pluralism and power, but still a bottom-line of consensus and common ground in the form of principles must exist. This friction between unity and order versus pluralism and chaos is a difficulty encountered by almost all theories of agonistic democracy. Above, Tully was mentioned who I thought committed too much to a fixed order and therefore came into conflict with the principles of agonistic democracy. Bonnie Honig, another important advocate of a disruptive conception of politics, also observes this twofoldness:
“The theories that displace conflict, identify politics with administration and treat juridical settlement as the task of politics and political theory I call virtue theories of politics. The theories that see politics as a disruptive practice that resists the consolidations and closures of administrative and juridical settlement for the sake of the perpetuity of political contest I call virtue theories of politics (Honig 1993: 2).”
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However, we must not see this divide as a case of either/or, a choice between two options, in contrast, one cannot do without the other. Instead, Honig states that they are two sides of the same coin; two impulses inherent to politics. Democracy is constituted by both practices of settlement and practices of unsettlement and the struggle between these two will always be present. They form a friction that must be acknowledged and a model of agonistic democracy does exactly this (Honig 1993: 205).
This friction between plurality and unity can also be seen in multiculturalist theories in the combination of a common citizenship shared by society on the one hand and a diversity of cultures and corresponding identities on the other hand. There is always the question of where to draw the line of what kind of differentiation can be claimed in the name of religion or culture. As Ali Rattansi writes: “It follows that there is no room for full-blown cultural relativism in multiculturalism, and indeed any perusal of the writings of multiculturalists will reveal that none of them is guilty of the wholesale cultural relativism of which they are often accused (Rattansi 2011: 4).” Mouffe denies the existence of transcendental principles and her political theory is anti-foundationalist. This is part of the reason why pluralism is so important to her. Yet, there is this basis of Western liberal ethico-political principles that restricts pluralism and to which all citizens are bound. This friction between diversity and anti-foundationalism versus unity and restriction is in my opinion inherent to agonistic democracy and each political thinker concerning herself with this model must make a choice on where to draw the line. This choice is almost always problematic since it is a normative commitment placing some values above others in a theory where this moralism is not really legitimized. However, where normally contradictions in a philosophical theory are automatically seen as a problematic point of weakness, I think that in a theory where conflict, pluralism and the impossibility of harmony are core-principles these kind of discrepancies are permitted. In a sense the content of this theory fits a philosophical method that allows some level of contradictions.
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Conclusion
This thesis began by laying bare an important clash between multiculturalist theory and post-structuralist criticism. Charles Taylor and his theory of recognition were taken as an example of this multiculturalist strand of thought. It became clear that his theory was able to concretely call for action but that its argument started from a common assumption of this current of multiculturalism. This was the assumption that there are clearly demarcated rigid cultures recognizable in society which can be criticized from a post-structuralist point of view. Three arguments originating in this perspective were discussed: the hybridity of culture, the lack of an intersectional approach and the importance of cultural transformation. In conclusion, culture and identity are rather fluid and open to change instead of transparent demarcated groups. Now an aporia arose. On the one hand we do not want to speak in name of an essentialist identity that does not exist and run the risk of reproducing inner-group subordination. However, we do want to be able to undertake strategic political action that can bring substantial change and this was not possible from the anti-essentialist point of view discussed.
My thesis argued that Mouffe and her theory of agonistic democracy could form a solution to this problem satisfying both demands. Mouffe starts from an anti-essentialist positon and arrives at a conception of the political as characterized by pluralism, undecidability, conflict and constitutive power relations. She concludes that a model of democracy should not aim at erasing conflict and power, but at constituting these relations in a way compatible with the democratic values of liberty and equality. An agonistic model of democracy does exactly this and creates a political arena where conflict between adversaries can be guided by common ethico-political principles. When the importance of contentious politics and a decentered democracy are recognized this model forms a solution to the clash between classical multiculturalism and anti-essentialism. On the one hand identity is anti-essentialist and always open to contestation. On the other hand, political (collective) action is an important part of
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agonistic democracy, drawing power to subordinated cultures. Yet, associations between different fights for liberation can always be contested and redefined when different mechanisms of exclusion interlock. In conclusion, through a combination of unity and plurality and chaos and order agonistic democracy can form a solution to one of the most important difficulties concerning multiculturalism.
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