J.H. (Henk) Vierdag s2109522
MAIR: Global Conflict in the Modern Era. Thesis
‘Non-Proliferation or Non-Conformation: an assessment of factors leading to the Iran Deal’ Supervisor: Vineet Thakur
2018-08-10 Word Count: 15366
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Abstract:
This thesis seeks to explain the motivations behind the transition from sanctions to negotiations in the context of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) or the ‘Iran Deal’. Firstly, an elaboration on two-level negotiation theory is offered. Consequently, and in line with the underlying assumptions of the reviewed literature, three factors are assessed in
order to provide an answer to the main research question ‘What factors best explain the coming about of the Joint Plan of Action?’ These are historic events that shaped relations,
the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed, and the respective political leadership. This question is highly relevant and topical, as where President Obama in both of his election campaigns openly sought diplomatic rapprochement with Iran, President Trump campaigned the promise to withdraw from the JCPoA and re-impose sanctions. The findings of this thesis
show that rationality is not a durable approach to international decision-making. Ineffectiveness of the sanctions did not prevent them from being continued or even aggravated. Rather, a determining factor in the case of Iran seems to be the leadership of
both countries. These two factors gave the political momentum to realise the start of negotiations.
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Table of Contents
List of abbreviations ... 4
Introduction ... 5
Literature Review ... 7
Position within broader theoretical framework ... 12
Methodology ... 14
Historical events that shaped relations ... 17
Abdication of the Shah ... 17
The Coup of 1953 ... 18
The Iranian Revolution ... 19
Hostage Crisis ... 20
Bombings in Beirut ... 21
Air Flight 655 ... 21
A context of sanctions ... 23
Sanctions on Iran ... 27
Unilateral sanctions in the 1980’s and 1990’s ... 27
The Bush administration ... 30
The Obama administration ... 32
U.N. Multilateral sanctions ... 34
Impact of sanctions ... 37
Economic impact ... 37
Political impact ... 39
Political Leadership ... 42
U.S. President Barack Obama ... 42
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani ... 43
Conclusion ... 46
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List of abbreviations
CISADA - Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability and Divestment Act
ILSA - Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
ITRSHA - Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012
JCPOA - Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
NCRI - National Council of Resistance of Iran
NPT - Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons
UN - United Nations
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Introduction
“Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate”
- John F. Kennedy (1961)
The imposition of international sanctions has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War. Since the turn of the millennium, especially, multilateral sanctions saw a sharp increase (Annan and Mahbubani, 2016). This would lead one to think that international sanctions are a proven, highly effective instrument of international politics, in service of international peace and security. The track-record of this instrument, however, does not fulfil this expectation (Annan and Mahbubani, 2016). On the contrary, some instances show that sanctions may work counterproductive (Annan and Mahbubani, 2016).
A particular persistent foreign policy interest for the U.S. is the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. First, Iran was the target of U.S. sanctions due to its support of terrorism and after the year 2000, sanctions were imposed due to Iran’s nuclear program. This program even made the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) impose multilateral sanctions on the country, but the U.S. is still the ‘architect and the principal advocate of the sanctions regime’ (Tarock, 2016, P. 1418). The sanctions are intended to limit Iran’s power projection in the region and curb its hostile and threatening conduct (Katzman, 2018, P. 1).
Hailed as a major, yet controversial, foreign policy victory, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) was concluded after almost two years of negotiations that started with the interim agreement, the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) (Zengerle, 2015). The significance of the ‘Iran Deal’ is that it has no precedent. It was unimaginable given the recent, harsh rhetoric of political leaders of both Iran and U.S., and the overall poor diplomatic relations between Washington and Teheran.
This may lead to the conclusion that the sanctions were effective in impacting Iran, which pressured or rewarded the country into negotiation. Curious in this conclusion, however, is the timing of the negotiations after decades of aggregating sanctions under various U.S. administrations, Democrats as well as Republicans. This conclusion, thus, seems oversimplified and is therefore unsatisfactory. Moreover, the various direct causes for the sanctions, such as the support of terrorism by Iran and its missile and nuclear program, seem
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to serve a similar, more abstract purpose: ensuring American dominance in the region and the pursuit of its interests.
Enticed by scepticism regarding the altruistic nature of the JCPoA, this thesis analyses factors that played a significant role in the signing of the interim agreement and the
consecutive Iran Deal. As such, the guiding research question of this thesis is ‘What factors best explain the coming about of the Joint Plan of Action?’
This episode of U.S. – Iran relations will be placed in a historical context, before analysing direct factors that led to the transition from sanctions to negotiations. Before doing so, the subsequent chapter will review negotiation literature and will advocate its applicability to the topic of international sanctions. Moreover, the literary genealogy of two-level international negotiation will be critically review in order to justify the choice for the analysed factors. The reviewed literature will then be placed in a broader theoretical framework.
The purpose of this thesis is to add to the existing literature and understanding of international negotiations in general, and of the JCPoA negotiations in particular. The relevance of the topic under scrutiny resides in its controversial nature, the severe ramifications, and the unprecedented occurrence of the Iran Deal. This relevance is underlined by President Trump’s decision to withdraw unilaterally from the JCPoA in May 2018 (Holbruch, 2018). Due to the dynamic nature of international negotiations and
sanctions, a holistic approach is advocated for by acknowledging the importance of different perspectives, values and interests.
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Literature Review
“We can have fully rational agents making decisions in a world with uncertainty, or completely informed agents that are not fully rational, or both”
- Coralio Ballester and Pénelope Hernández (2012)
Foreign policy and national security policy of the U.S. did not radically change when the Bush administration made way for the Obama administration. Like his predecessor, for instance, Obama detained and interrogated suspects of terrorism overseas, held these suspects without trial in military confinement (even if they were U.S. citizens), and kept open the controversial, extraterritorial prison of Guantanamo Bay (Glennon, 2016, P. 1). Moreover, Obama engaged in a military attack in Libya without congressional approval and in the absence of an imminent threat to the U.S., increased the number of drone strikes in Pakistan and did not prosecute those who committed (the torturous act of) waterboarding (Glennon, 2016, P. 2). Thus, although Obama’s electoral campaign revolved around ‘Change’ and he has been heralded as a messiah by some (Obama 2008, and Chumey, 2013), not every interpretation of his policies per se reflects that image. The more remarkable, as such, is the radical shift in policy Obama showed from his predecessor’s policy on Iran’s nuclear
programme. Where at the end of the Bush administration and at the beginning of the Obama administration sanctions on Iran were still increasing, Obama left the office in 2016 with the Iran Deal in place (Clawson, 2015).
One could argue along the lines of the rational actor model, which would explain that the consistency of policy is a consequence of unchanged threats. Thus, any (rational) policy response would be the same (Glennon, 2016, P. 74). Sanctions are based on a cost-benefit calculus, which entails a rational assessment from the sending and receiving country (Rezaei, 2012, P. 75). Simple reasoning would read that if costs exceed benefits, the target country would comply. If they do not comply, costs are apparently lower than the benefits, thus increasing the sanctions is justified. The radical shift in policy on Iran would thus be a logical manoeuvre, one that the previous administration also would have made if the President Bush was allowed a third presidential term. This explanation is comprehensible, but also unsatisfactory. It treats decision making as a mathematical equation that, if calculated correctly, would lead to the same solution. The explanation foregoes, however, factors such
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as identity of decision makers, emotions, perceptions, incomplete information, and differing views within one administration. Rationality resides in the eye of the beholder, thus
subjective (Seliktar, 2011). The assertion that a continuation of external threats
automatically leads to a continuation of policy lacks empirical backing. People, thus decision-makers too, are only partial rational in choosing their course of action. For the remaining part, they are emotional (Ballester and Hernández, 2012, P. 28). Furthermore, decision-makers employ heuristics, rather than a ‘strict rigid rule of optimization’, for practical
reasons, but also due to limited cognitive capabilities (Ballester and Hernández, 2012, P. 29). An optimal solution is seldom reached because rationality is ‘bounded’ (Ballester and
Hernández, 2012, P. 29). The rational actor model, thus, should be rendered partially credible, at best.
Another take on explaining policy outcomes can be found in the government politics model. Briefly put, this approach includes everything the rational actor model excludes (Glennon, 2016, P. 80). Policy does not reflect a single take on a solution to a problem, it reflects an aggregation of separate decisions shaped by ‘compromise, conflict and confusion’ (Glennon, 2016, P. 80). The government politics model does include identity, preferences, perceptions and political philosophies (Glennon, 2016, P. 80). Where the rational actor model purports a straightforward reality, the government politics model acknowledges a complex world with various influencing factors to policy. Comparing the two approaches leads to the conclusion that neither account is satisfactory and that they have opposing assumptions. The rational actor model includes few factors, while the government politics model includes many; the former emphasizes external threats and the latter internal dynamics. Both approaches certainly have a predicting value, but both approaches also constitute a myopic take on policy analysis that needs to be complemented.
It is therefore interesting to look at other, more encompassing approaches to decision-making. In the literary realm of international negotiation, Daniel Druckman (1977) elaborates on the ‘Boundary Role Conflict’. In this two-level approach, two models of negotiation are merged into a dual role for the negotiator; that of bargainer and
representative, respectively. The former can be linked to the (rational) unitary-actor-models and the latter to the (dynamic) bureaucratic (governmental) politics (Druckman, 1977, P. 651). Level I refers to the interaction between the negotiating parties, e.g. states, and Level II refers to the interaction within the negotiating parties. This dual-role for the negotiator
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means he or she monitors the responsiveness between the opposing party and its own party, as well as the responsiveness between the negotiator and its own party (Druckman, 1977, P. 639). As such, there is a dimension between and within the negotiation parties distinguished, which together comprise the setting and context of international negotiation. Despite the fact that the dimension within the party is referred to as ‘representative’, there certainly is bargaining going on within this dimension as well; interagency bargaining (Druckman, 1977, P. 652). As a classical example of interagency (or intra-entity) bargaining Druckman (1977) notes arms-control issues between defence ministries and foreign ministries (P. 652). The negotiator-as-representative, then, functions as an arbitrator who attempts to build a package acceptable to both his or her own party and any opposing parties (Druckman, 1977, P. 653).
Robert Putnam (1988) furthers the debate on two-level negotiations by his writing on the entanglement between diplomacy and domestic politics. In doing so, he criticizes the state-centric genre in literature on the domestic-international linkage, as ‘on nearly all important issues central decision makers disagree about what the national interest and international context demand’ (Putnam, 1988, P. 432). Domestic groups and/or coalitions pressure national governments, while national governments seek to satisfy domestic demand without causing (too) adverse implications on the international stage (Putnam, 1988, P. 434). It constitutes a balancing act between interdependency and sovereignty (Putnam, 1988, P. 434).
Cross-level interaction may lead to opportunities and challenges, to confusion and understanding. Rational moves on one level may seem irrational on the other (Putnam, 1988, P. 434). However, actors keen on certain cross-level interaction may anticipate on or even provoke realignment in order to achieve otherwise unattainable outcomes (Putnam, 1988, P.434). This assumption of and emphasis on interaction between different levels is a point of discrepancy between Druckman (1977) and Putnam (1988), as the former models the domestic and international processes as separate and regards this is as a topic for investigation (Putnam, 1988, P.434). As such, Putnam’s (1988) writing acknowledges a more dynamic nature of two-level negotiations.
Considerable attention in Putnam’s (1988) article is devoted to the importance of ‘win-sets’ and the described two-level interaction (P. 434). A win-set for a Level II
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is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents- when simply voted up or down’ (Putnam, 1988, P.437). He uses this relationship to argue against the assumption of a chief negotiator who has no policy preferences of his or her own, but exclusively seeks an
agreement that is attractive for his or her constituents (Putnam, 1988, P. 436). Ratification is highly important, as it is the requirement for any Level I agreement to be concluded
(Putnam, 1988, P. 436). Moreover, any suggested amendment to a Level I agreement in essence is a rejection, since the new agreement has to be ratified at Level II again (Putnam, 1988, P. 437).
Putnam (1988) mentions two reasons why the contours of win-sets at Level II are crucial for understanding agreements at Level I. Firstly, larger win-sets are more likely to lead to Level I agreement, because the win-sets of respective negotiating parties have to overlap in order to make an agreement possible (Putnam, 1988, P.437). Smaller win-sets, as such, lower the chance of overlap, thus the chance on agreement. This does not imply that smaller win-sets are by definition a disadvantage in negotiation. Indeed, the second reason Putnam (1988) brings forth, suggests this very point. The relative size of the respective win-sets has consequences for the distribution of joint gains (Putnam, 1988, P. 440). If one side’s own win-set is (perceived) larger than that of the other, opposing Level I negotiators can take advantage thereof. This increases the other side’s prospect of steering the negotiations in a more favourable direction, by arguing that certain agreement falls outside his or her own Level II win-set and therefore cannot be accepted (Putnam, 1988, P. 440). Level I negotiators are often misinformed on this matter and that relaxing the assumption of perfect information allows for uncertainty, which affects the understanding of two-level negotiations (Putnam, 1988, P. 452). Uncertainty works both ways. On the one hand downplaying one’s own win-set can be an advantage, as this pressures the opponent to make additional concessions (Putnam, 1988, P. 452). On the other hand, uncertainty about the opponents’ ratification probability of a certain agreement may provoke additional concessions (Putnam, 1988, P. 453).
Another important factor in negotiations is the role of the chief negotiator (Putnam, 1988, P. 456). Assuming the chief negotiator has no independent policy views is a significant simplification of two-level negotiations (Putnam, 1988, P. 456). Indeed, international
negotiations give rise to opportunities for chief negotiators to consolidate his or her domestic standing, to use the negotiations as a means to realise a shift in domestic policy,
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and to act in accordance with his or her own view on the national interest (Putnam, 1988, P. 457). This implies that the chief negotiator practically has a veto over possible agreements he or she opposes, even if ratification is possible (Putnam, 1988, P. 457). Furthermore, the chief negotiator can differ in views from his or her constituents (Putnam, 1988, P. 458). This means that the real win-sets and the overlap in the respective parties’ win-sets are actually much narrower than previously suggested in this thesis (Putnam, 1988, P. 457). Accordingly, the position of the executive is an important factor to consider.
In advancing the literary debate on two-level international negotiation analysis, Alexander G. Nikolaev (2007) uses the aggregate insights from Druckman and Putnam in his book ‘International Negotiations: Theory, Practice and the Connection with Domestic Politics’. Nikolaev (2007) too recognizes two levels in international negotiation, in which he names Druckman’s Level I ‘inter-entity’ and Level II ‘intra-entity’ (P. XIV).
Nikolaev (2007) specifies his understanding of the concept of ‘interest’ (P. 71). To tackle any confusion arising out of the many definitions on this concept, Nikolaev (2007) follows Keohane in distinguishing two categories of interest (P. 71). The first being objective interests and the second being myopic self-interest (Nikolaev, 2007, P. 71). The former refers to interests with a fundamental character, such as survival and security, whereas the latter refers to ‘governments’ perception of the relative costs and benefits to them of alternative courses of action with regards to a particular issue’ (Nikolaev, 2007, P. 71). He consequently offers two different motives underlying the distinctions made; objective interests are based on the ‘values of a certain society’, whereas the myopic self-interests are deemed more situational (Nikolaev, 2007, P. 72). Thus, according to Nikolaev (2007)
interests are a function of a value and/or the situation. Furthermore, objective interests and myopic self-interests can be in conflict with one another. This was arguably the case when the U.S. orchestrated the coup d’etat in Chile that brought Pinochet to power. The U.S. values of democratization and sovereignty were overruled by the interest of containment.
If one critically reviews Nikolaev’s (2007) writing on interests, one could conclude that the interests motivated by central values in a certain society are part of the DNA of that society, which would render them primordial or otherwise exogenously given. However, this would be an unjust and misleading conclusion, as values and interests are intersubjectively constructed (Wendt, 1992. This sheds a different light upon Nikolaev’s aforementioned theorizing, namely that rather these values and interests are highly prioritized within a
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certain in comparison to other values and interests. The fact that a value or interest is highly prioritized and deemed fundamental, does not prevent it from being a social construct in which ‘social change is both possible and difficult’ (Hopf, 1998, P. 181).
The aforementioned paragraph is underlined by the emphasis Nikolaev (2007) places on ‘perception’ (P. 72). He rightly explains that perceptions are formed according to the information they receive, their ability to process that information, and their previous beliefs (P. 72). As this differs per person different perceptions of interest are possible, within the same situation. Furthermore, Nikolaev (2007) places ‘values’ at the heart of interests, effectively implying that interests are the course of action to be taken in order to achieve the desired goal; to uphold the value. This, in turn, implies that shared interests are the basis of any cooperation (Nikolaev, 2007, P. 73). Cooperation without shared values is possible, as well as conflict while having the same values. This gives rise to a broad understanding of the concept of ‘interest’, including rational as well as emotional motivations at its basis.
Position within broader theoretical framework
The communication perspective described by Nikoalev (2007) is similar to what Alexander Wendt (1992) describes in his article ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. In this article, he emphasizes the historical processes and social construction of the international state system by debunking the notion of an exogenously given system with fixed identities and interests of states (Wendt, 1992). In doing so, he responds to and contradicts proponents of
mainstream theories, particularly Kenneth Waltz and Neorealism (Waltz, 1988, and Wendt, 1992). Despite the historical process of social interaction between entities described by Wendt (1992), he follows Waltz’s (1988) emphasis on the interaction between unitary states. As such, he foregoes the constituting role domestic historical processes have in shaping the state identity in and relations with international society. Christian Reus-Smit (1999, P. 199) elaborates on the academic realm of social constructivism and distinguishes three types: systemic, unit-level, and holistic. Wendt can be categorized under the systemic constructivist label due to his emphasis on the international level when explaining the construction of state identity and interests (Reus-Smit, 1999, P. 199). The unit-level, conversely, predominantly focusses on the domestic dynamics constructing the identity of the state (Reus-Smit, 1999, P. 199). Consequently, the realm of holistic constructivism
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marries the unit-level and systemic level, when explaining the construction of state identity and interests. It ‘treats the domestic and international as two faces of a single social and political order’ (Reus-Smit, 1999, P. 199). As such, the reviewed work on international negotiations should be placed within the realm holistic constructivism.
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Methodology
“We cannot construct meaningful causal explanations without good description; description, in turn, loses most of its interest unless linked to some causal relationships” - King, Keohane and Verba (1994)
The most important factors that have come forth out of the previous chapter are the two-level dimension, limited rationality, chief executive, interests and perceptions, and the historical, constructive processes that are at the base of social entities, actions or events. The described factors of negotiations apply to sanctions as well. Both have an inter- and intra-level, and one party wants something out of the other party. This could be direct value such as currency or goods, but also a change of conduct. Moreover, negotiations and
sanctions can involve two or more parties. The differing element is level of cooperation. They can arguably be seen as two ends of a continuum.
Against this theoretical background, three themes have been selected to answer the research question of this thesis ‘What factors best explain the coming about of the Joint Plan of Action?’ These themes are the historic events that characterized the relations between the U.S. and Iran, effectiveness of sanctions, and the political leadership in Washington and Teheran. This latter theme arose out of the analysis on the effectiveness on sanctions. As such, the section on the effectiveness of sanctions has a deductive character and subsequent section an inductive character.
The framework of this research is single-case based. This entails that one case is selected in which the relationship between the dependent variable and independent
variables will be sought after, using literary sources. The dependent variable is the transition from sanctions to negotiations, which culminated in the signing of the JPA.
The case selected for this thesis is appropriate for several reasons. The interest the U.S. has in the Middle East, together with the hostile relationship in the recent decades with Iran make the analysis of the JCPoA negotiation relevant and interesting. In May 2018, U.S. President Trump announced the U.S. will ‘no longer abide by the Iran deal’ (Holpunch, 2018). It is therefore informative to gain proper understanding of the causes that led to the JCPoA in the first place. Two very important issues for the U.S., for example, is maintaining the free flow of oil and the maintenance of freedom of navigation in the Gulf region (Neumann, n.d.).
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Any disruption of these matters would have adverse effects on the U.S. and world economy, thus the U.S. has to remain the dominant actor in the region. A nuclear Iran would undercut this dominance significantly, if not entirely. Furthermore, events throughout (recent) history affected the relationship between the two countries, creating mutual suspicion. The U.S. backed coup d’etat of 1953 and the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 are convincing examples thereof. More recently, the ‘axis-of-evil’ rhetoric of George W. Bush during the 2002 State of the Union speech captures this sentiment nicely (State of the Union Address, 2002). Thus, the prospect of undercutting U.S. dominance and the hostile posturing between the two countries gives rise to questioning the true value underlying the interest the U.S. has in the JCPoA. The first is to curb the Iranian nuclear programme and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and ensure its adherence to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). An Iran that possesses a nuclear weapon is on (nuclear) parity with the U.S., which would be a risky development from the perspective of the United States. Nuclear parity between Iran and the U.S. decreases the leverage the latter has on the former. Any threat or applied pressure by the U.S. on Iran would be evaluated and interpreted with Iran’s nuclear capacity in mind. As such, pressure and threats are less effective. Furthermore, the post-World War II (nuclear) era demonstrated that the initial period after the acquisition of nuclear parity, states show increased adventurism, which could lead to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East (Kahl and Waltz, 2012).
The historic events are analysed and briefly explained to indicate their significance. This knowledge will help interpret the context of the event. This context is important for the subsequent analysis, and considering the literary and theoretical foundation of this thesis, a requirement. The interaction between the U.S. and Iran throughout history reinforced certain beliefs they held about each other creating a stable concept of each other and the issue at stake (Wendt, 1992, P. 405).
The section on the effectiveness of sanctions includes a brief elaboration on general theory on sanctions, followed by an analysis of the sanctions of the U.S. and the U.N., respectively. This section is divided into the following parts: U.S. unilateral sanctions in the 1980’s and 1990’s, U.S. sanctions under the Bush Administrations, sanctions under the Obama administrations, and U.N. multilateral sanctions. The section will be concluded by a discussion of the effectiveness of these attempts to contain Iran’s nuclear program (Laub, 2015).
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Logic compels one to hypothesize that only effective sanctions are retained, while ineffective sanctions will be changed. Curious in the case of the sanctions on Iran is what the impact of the sanctions was, compared to the intended goals. Furthermore it is expected that an agreement so painfully obtained and still so controversial, serves a higher or another purpose simultaneously (Hafezi, Charbonneau, Irish, and Mohammed, 2015). Following the effectiveness of sanctions, the role of the respective Presidents is discussed. In a concluding chapter, a discussion will be given about the findings of this thesis and an answer to the research question will be given.
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Historical events that shaped relations
“The past is linked to the present and it is reasonable to assume that the present will be connected to the future” - Larry Crump (2010).
Although the UNSC sanctions were imposed in 2006 and the JCPoA was adopted in October 2015 after two years of negotiation (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 2015), more historic events and developments affected Iran’s relationship with the broader international community. The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 is commonly regarded as a watershed moment in the relations between Iran and the U.S., but also for Iran itself as a country. Prior to the revolution, under the rule of the Shah, Iran and the United States were allied. Since Ayatollah Khomeini seized the leadership of Iran, the country’s relationship with the international community have become antagonistic, particularly with the United States of America.
These events arguably contributed to the coming about of these very sanctions and
negotiations. Maloney (2015, P. 19) explains, the nineteenth and twentieth century history of Iran displays a ‘powerful narrative… fusing economic grievances with resentment toward foreign intrusions and perceptions that the state betrayed the country’s values’.
Understanding this sentiment is key in understanding Iranian politics, as it shaped Iran’s institutions, ideological perspectives and grievances (Maloney, 2015, P. 19). For the U.S. as a negotiating party, this sentiment is important as it (ideally) helps drafting a suitable policy and response towards Iran. For the researcher this sentiment helps to assess and make sense of U.S. policy and the negotiations in general.
Abdication of the Shah
During World War II, Iran under Reza Shah adhered to a policy of neutrality, which initially suited British interests in the region well (Bakhash, 2016, P. 318). The Shah had trade relations with the chief belligerents and the British wished to maintain good relations with the Shah as they were dependent on Iranian oil (Bakhash, 2016, P. 318). Iran, in turn, was dependent on German technology and knowledge to facilitate its industrial development
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July 1941, British (and Russian) interests changed and they expressed their concerns about ‘German fifth column activities’ along the Russian – Iranian border (Bakhash, 2016, P. 323). The Shah did attempt to accommodate the British, e.g. by expelling members of the German community in Iran and monitoring others (Bakhash, 2016, P. 321). When the Shah did not want to accommodate the British any further, it became apparent that Iranian neutrality was in conflict with British interests. The British needed an Iranian corridor as a supply route. As such, the British worked their way toward abdication of the Shah, but did (eventually) appoint the son of Reza Shah as his successor. On September 16, 1941 the Shah left for exile to South Africa where he stayed until his death three years later (Bakhash, 2016, P. 330). The Coup of 1953
The exile of Shah Reza paved the way for the liberal nationalist Muhammed Mossadeq to return to the Iranian political stage, who was elected Prime Minister in 1951 (Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004, P. 4). Mossadeq wanted to nationalize the Iranian oil sector, which were to be an affront to the British who had great interests in the industry. The post-war Truman
administration wished to keep Iran in the Western camp for purposes of Soviet containment, even at the expense of significant British interests (Alvandi, 2014, P. 15). Despite Truman’s objections, Mossadeq discovered a plot by the British MI6 –Operation Ajax- to overthrow the Prime Minister due his ambitions to nationalize the oil industry (Alvandi, 2014, P. 15, Ruehsen, 1993). This led to a stop in diplomatic ties with London and a closing of the British embassy in Teheran.
The CIA was less positive than Truman and feared that the domestic instability Mosaddeq’s ascendance caused, would be exploited by the Soviets (Alvandi, 2014, P. 16). Important to note is that where during World War II Russia and the allied forces cooperated against Nazi Germany, after the war they became adversaries. The U.S. strategy pursued was subject to differing opinions, between successive administration, and different agencies and departments. This is illustrated by the discussion within the CIA on whether the U.S. should support Anglo-French ‘colonialism’ and the fact that the Eisenhower administration was prepared to do what the Truman administration was not: to take over the British network of agents in Iran and finish the plot to topple Mossadeq (Alvandi, 2015, P. 16). The Shah was initially reluctant to cooperate with the CIA, fearing a backlash of Mossadeq’s popularity (Alvandi, 2014, P. 17). He succumbed to US pressure to cooperate and signed the royal
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decrees necessary to remove Mossadeq. After a chaotic and violent CIA operation, Mossadeq was toppled (Alvandi, 2014, P. 17). The conduct of the CIA and Eisenhower changed the image of the U.S. It replaced the British as the perceived ‘colonial power’, creating deep suspicion between the two countries (Abrahamian, 2001, P. 213).
As the Mossadeq episode shows, the strategic value of Iran for the United States was tremendous, in terms of Soviet containment as well as oil resources. This explains the U.S. support for the Shah regime and the great lengths it was prepared to go in securing U.S. interests (Soltani and Amiri, 2010, P. 200). The episode further clarifies the suspicious sentiments present in the Iranian society towards foreign influence in their country. U.S. ambassador Loy Henderson in Teheran during the coup worried that a widespread impression that the U.S. was involved in internal political developments in Iran would damage the Shah’s legitimacy and U.S. interest over the long run, ‘even if those
developments might be to Iran’s advantage’ (Alvandi, 2014, P. 18). Henderson, in effect, warned for a negative perception.
The aftermath of the coup heralded an era of repressiveness by the Shah, in order to ‘impress the U.S. government from which so much is expected’ (Abrahamian, 2001, P. 212). The repression was justified by comparing it to a cast placed around a broken leg, ‘to prevent harmful movement until the fracture has been healthily rejoined.’ (Abrahamian, 2001, P. 212). The (long-term) consequences of this radical U.S. policy in Iran, by means of the Shah, were likely worse than the architects of the coup ever could expect. Indeed, if these consequences were known on forehand, they probably would have opted for a different, less repressive strategy. The dictatorship that the Shah’s monarchy actually was, removed the secular political parties and stained the Iranian army with its association to the Shah, the CIA and the MI6. Under the rule of the shah, liberalism, socialism and nationalism was virtually decimated (Abrahamian, 2001, P. 214). The success of the coup of 1953
paradoxically jeopardized U.S. interests in Iran. The Iranian Revolution
The Iranian revolution began with demonstrations in October 1977, continued with protests in January 1978 and climaxed in February 1979. At least two interests of Khomeini can be identified in the Iranian Revolution, which have a certain overlap. Ramazani (2005) argues that the revolution is part of an Iranian struggle for independence that is as old as the
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country itself, but also a means to guarantee ‘Iran’s freedom from American domination’ (P. 215). Vast numbers took it to the streets in a response to Ayatollah Khomeini’s call to immobilize military units suspected of preparing a coup d’etat (Abrahamian, 2009, P. 15).
The Shah’s hard-line strategy backlashed, decimated the monarchy’s image and made the Iranian people demand change. The Shah made attempts to become a leading figure in this call for change. In a television broadcast, for example, he apologized for some excesses of his rule and tried to comfort the Iranian people by saying ‘I have heard the message of your revolution’ (Buchan, 2013, P. 425). However, Ayatollah Khomeini was already leading this movement and had an interest in a narrative in which the Shah’s repressiveness, as well as the heroic deeds of the revolutionaries, were exaggerated. For instance, under the Shah the Iranian standard of living was increased more than under his predecessor or under the rule of Khomeini (Buchan, 2013, P. 418). The legitimacy of the Islamic Republic partly depends on this narrative (Buchan, 2013, P. 418).
Hostage Crisis
In 1979 Iranian Revolutionary students held hostage 52 Americans for 444 days at the U.S. embassy in Teheran, which still leaves its imprints on the (hostile) relationship between Iran and the U.S. today (Ramazani, 2005, P. 213). Many revolutionaries, having the 1953
experience fresh in mind, believed that the U.S. was plotting a scheme to overthrow the Islamic regime (Gasiorowski, 2015, P. 115). These concerns were shared by the hostage takers of the Iranian Hostage Crisis (Gasiorowski, 2015, P. 115). The hostage was also a protest against the fact that the Shah was admitted to the U.S. to receive cancer treatment, another (perceived) evidence of foreign intrusion (Ramazani, 2005, P. 213). Ayatollah Khomeini incited students against the U.S. before they took over and praised their efforts and achievements afterwards, which made that the hostage was attributed to the state of Iran (Ramazani, 2005, P. 214). As a means of retaliation, the Carter administration broke diplomatic relations with Teheran and imposed a total embargo on U.S. exports to and imports from Iran, as well as prohibiting U.S. citizens to travel to the country or conduct any financial transactions (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2354). The sanctions did not achieve the intended effect and the Carter administration decided to launch a military rescue mission that ended in tragedy. Due to a sandstorm in the American helicopters crashed in the Iranian desert, costing the lives of eight U.S. servicemen (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2354). Painful, in
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this light, is to note is that Iran celebrates the hostage taking every year and uses the opportunity to voice anti-American rhetoric (Amanpour, 2009). The crisis ended after
President Carter left office and under President Reagan the Algiers Accords were negotiated, which released the hostages and lifted the imposed sanctions (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2354). The hostage at the American embassy was, in fashion with previous sentiments, a response to (perceived) foreign influences in Iran.
Bombings in Beirut
During the Lebanese Civil War from August 1982, The United States had marines stationed in the capital Beirut as part of an international peacekeeping mission. On April 18th and 23th of
October 1983, suicide bombers killed respectively 63 and 241 U.S. marines (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2354). The October attack was the deadliest attack since 1945 and let to the exit of the U.S. marines out of Beirut (CNN Library, 2017). What made the attacks even more hurtful for the U.S. is that the U.S. marines ‘lost friends in combat without having been able to bring any meaning to their death’ (Friedman, 1984).
The Shiite terrorist group Hezbollah claimed responsibility for the attacks, a group which the U.S. accused Iran of supporting. As such, the U.S. state department branded Iran officially a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ in January 1984 (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2355). Air Flight 655
Another significant event that shaped the U.S. – Iran relations, is the downing of Iranian Air
Flight 655. On July 3rd, 1988 the passenger plane departed Teheran for Dubai, when it was
shot by U.S. navy vessel the USS Vincennes, killing all 290 people on board. The event is not as well-known as the Coup of 1953 or the Hostage Crisis, but it is important in understanding the mutual distrust between the countries (Fisher, 2013). The incident has a prominent place in the Iranian collective memory, but ‘Americans who rely on the U.S. mainstream media would have to be forgiven for never having heard about it’ (Hammond, 2017). Moreover, the U.S. media is accused of depicting an incomplete and selective account of the event, which makes that ‘Americans seeking to understand U.S. – Iran relations today fail to grasp a key historical event that has helped define that relationship’ (Hammond, 2017).
The mainstream U.S. narrative is that Air Flight 655 was accidentally shot down by the U.S. navy vessel (Fisher, 2013). This happened in the context of the Iran-Iraq war in
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which the U.S. supported Saddam Hussain. The U.S. contends the USS Vincennes was in international waters, that Air Flight 655 flew outside of its commercial routes and the U.S. navy vessel had mistaken the Airbus 300 for a much smaller and faster F-14 fighter jet, as it failed to identify itself (Fisher, 2013 and Hammond, 2017).
For the U.S., thus, it was a mistake made in the heat of the battle to which Iran was at least partially to blame for. It did turn out to be a turning point in the war, as Iran believed it was a deliberate attack and a declaration of the U.S. that it ‘had decided to openly enter the war on Iraq’s side’ (Fisher, 2013). This Iranian belief combined with the increased use of chemical weapons by Saddam Hussain led to the signing of a U.N. cease fire (Fisher, 2013). It also gave rise to another Iranian belief, namely that the U.S. cannot be trusted and is
fervently committed to the destruction of the Iranian Islamic state (Fisher, 2013). This belief, as Fisher (2013) further explains, is common among Iranian hard-liners and has had
immediate consequences for the nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran. It led to the Iranian sentiment that if the U.S. is prepared to shoot down a passenger plane, how could they be trusted in negotiations?
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A context of sanctions
“Sanctions are serious business, and only by improving their effectiveness can we hope to see them used better in the future” - Kofi Annan (2002)
This section elaborates on sanctions imposed on Iran, both U.S. unilateral as U.N.
multilateral. Sanctions are an attempt to assert power over another country and power is the ability ‘to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants’ (Nye, 2009, P. 160). The purpose of this section is to illustrate the academic debate of sanctions and characterize the international approached adopted towards Iran. What follows is an elaboration on the effectiveness of sanctions and a discussion of the Iran case. Consequently, the effectiveness of the sanctions on Iran will be evaluated.
By the end of the 1990’s, the world witnessed an absolute and relative increase in multilateral sanctions, compared to unilateral sanctions (Kaempfer, 1999, P. 37). The superpower standoff that dominated international politics during the Cold War made consensus within the UNSC difficult. Zero-sum thinking prevailed and imposing sanctions meant that the sanctioned county could turn to the rival camp (Cashen, 2017). Sanctions would then be worse for the imposing country. After the Cold War, new consensus was found within the UNSC and comprehensive sanctions were increasingly imposed (Cashen, 2017). Some even refer to the 1990’s as ‘The Sanctions Decade’ (Cortright and Lopez, 2000). This development went rather fast, as by the end of the Cold War, only Rhodesia had been sanctioned by the UNSC (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999, P. 37). One decade later, the UNSC imposed sanctions on Iraq, Libya, and seven other countries (Kaempfer and
Lowenberg, 1999, P. 37). These numbers are significant, but seemingly modest compared to the U.S. track record. Between 1993 and 1996 alone, the U.S. sanctioned thirty-five
countries (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999, P. 37). Unilateral sanctions, thus, were still a popular foreign policy tool, despite the increase in multilateral sanctions. Remarkable, considering the literature on economic sanctions already available at that time, stressing the (increasing) ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions (Galtung, 1967, Lindsay, 1986, Atterbury, 1996, Morgan and Schwebach, 1997, Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1999).
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Various factors account for the relative increase in multilateral sanctions, but one important factor is that unilateralism has become less effective for great powers, the U.S. in particular. Already in the 1990’s, the relative power distance between the U.S. and the rest of the world decreased. Due to the rise of other great powers and developed economies such as China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Russia and other former Soviet countries, sanctioned counties easier find substitute products and alternative markets (Attenbury, 1997, P. 337). Joseph Nye (1990) wrote about this ‘Changing Face of Power’ and ‘Power Diffusion’ at the beginning of the decade in Foreign Policy magazine. He advocated for different
interpretations of ‘power’ due to increased international interdependency (Nye Jr, 1990, P. 165). In 2006, Nye Jr reiterated his concept of ‘Soft Power’ and clarified that sanctions are ‘hard power’, because of their coercive nature.1
The principle of sanctions is depriving the target country value and the impact depends on the share of trade they are able to affect. If the trade volume affected of a sanctioned country is low, there will be a lower degree of interdependence which will result in a lower impact. Conversely, if more countries are involved with and supportive of
sanctions imposed, the trade volume affected is larger and the sanctions will have a higher impact (Kaempfer and Lowenberg, 1997, P. 38). More countries supporting the sanctions means a higher trade volume affected, which makes effective sanctions more likely.
Another important factor in the effectiveness of sanctions is ‘mitigation’, on the side of the sanctioned country. A rather straightforward conception of the effectiveness of sanctions would read that a sanctioned country can only endure a certain weight of
sanctions before it succumbs to the pressure and accommodates the sanctioning countries. This conception foregoes that this breakpoint is not fixed, but stable at best. A sanctioned country could, for instance, get used to the sacrifices and do without certain commodities, restructure the domestic economy and ‘absorb’ the sanctions by finding or manufacturing substitutes, or absorb the sanctions by finding substitute commodities through third parties and alternative markets (Galtung, 1967, P. 387). The sanctioned country either accepts the hardships or finds ways to mitigate them.
This account of sanctions is rational, yet dogmatic. It assumes one country can sanction the other country into submission. Mathematically put, more sanctions equate
1‘Soft power’ is the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through attraction rather than coercion or payments’
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higher impact, which leads to more success. More success entails getting to make the
sanctioned country do to a larger extent what the sanctioning country wants. This, however, upholds a rather material account on sanctions. It foregoes the principle of ‘adaptation’; getting used to life under hardships (Galtung, 1967, P. 388). The breakpoint, as such, moves along with the (increasing) sanctions, making the desired effect more difficult to achieve than initially expected (Galtung, 1967, P. 389).2 This poses the dilemma for the sanctioning
country of increasing sanctions in search for this breakpoint, or not. This decision depends, for instance, on the generation of revanchist sentiments among future generations, prospect of missing out on future trade, or having to aid the rebuilding of the sanctioned country (Galtung, 1967, P. 388). As this shows, it is often a dilemma between short-term gains and long-term achievements.
Moreover, psychological aspects may play a role in the effectiveness of sanctions. Despite any deprivation of value on the side of the sanctioned country, opposite effects from those intended may occur. This may occur in the case of sanctions that are collective in nature rather than specific, low or even negative identification with the sanctioning country, and a firm belief in one’s own goals over those of the sanctioning country (Galtung, 1967, P. 390). Collective sanctions, for example, affect both the guilty and the innocent, which may lead to either fragmentation or consolidation of the political regime targeted. Thus, (collective) sanctions are questionable in terms of their effectiveness, but also in terms of morality.
The rise of ‘smart sanctions or ‘smart power’ is a response to these practical and moral objections on sanctions. Smart sanctions refer to targeted sanctions, rather than more traditional, comprehensive sanctions (Lenard, 2015). These latter sanctions ‘crippled
national economies and exacted dire humanitarian tolls, all while proving disappointingly limited in their effectiveness at altering foreign leaders’ behaviour’ (Lenard, 2015). Smart power, as Nye Jr (2009) explains, is the combination of hard and soft power (P. 7). Rather than getting other states to do something they do not want to do, smart power attempts to align (perceived) interests and make the sanctioned country want the same as the
sanctioning country (Nye, 2009). The best strategy to go about this is dictated by ‘contextual
2 The moving breakpoint is, in effect, an argument against notions based on the rational actor model. It
acknowledges a constantly ongoing, mutually constitutive relationship between society and sanctions, rather than fixed entities and values.
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intelligence’, which refers to an ‘intuitive diagnostic skill’ (Nye, 2009, P. 161). Still, hard power has its merits, but some abstract goals such as democracy and human rights are ‘not best handled with guns’ (Nye, 2009, P. 161).
Chong (2015) elaborates further on the concept of smart power. The objectives of these sanctions entail ‘generating society and the unrelenting search for cleaner forms of global power projection’ (Chong, 2015, P. 233). Immediately two possible interpretations arise; that of an optimist and that of a pessimist. The former would emphasize ‘cleaner forms’ and the latter ‘power projection’. The term society can refer to thicker and looser forms of social cohesion. It minimally entails a degree of common vision and a prospect to cooperation, despite (initial) mistrust (Chong, 2015, P. 234). Society, thus, implies some overlapping interest.
Smart power refers to the right balance of hard and soft power, not a mere combination of the two (Chong, 2015, P. 236). Similar to ‘contextual intelligence’, Chong (2015) argues that smart power is ‘an operational art no one has decisively authored the doctrine for’ (Chong, 2015, P. 237). Important catalysts in the debate on smart power was the transition from the Bush administration to the Obama administration, controversies over the ethicality of the Iraq War or ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, and prisoner maltreatment in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay (Chong, 2015, P. 233 & 244). Bad publicity in today’s age of information makes that these events undermine the very goals they were set out to achieve: global power projection. Altruism and solidarity demanded smart power, pragmatism made decision makers comply. The pessimist was right, but the optimist can be happy.
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Sanctions on Iran
“The question, then, is not whether to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, but how” - Barack H. Obama (2016)
Unilateral sanctions in the 1980’s and 1990’s
From the the very beginning in 1968, Iran has been signatory to the Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Iran’s nuclear programme started under the Shah in cooperation with the ‘Atom’s for Peace’ programme of President Eisenhower (Bruno, 2010). Western powers cooperated on Iran’s nuclear development program, but this support erode. They did not trust the ambitions of the Shah, partly due to the successful nuclear test from India in 1974 (Bruno, 2010). The Iranian Revolution, for one, deteriorated the relations even further.
For most of the time since 1979, the U.S. has had sanctions imposed on Iran (Clawson, 2015, and Maloney and Takeyh, 2011). The first sanctions were in place due to and during the Hostage Crisis, subsequent sanctions were imposed due to Iran’s nuclear and missile programme, concerns about the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, and Iranian sponsoring of terrorists (Clawson, 2015). The unilateral sanctions included bans on import of Iranian oil and freezing of Iranian government assets, but also complete trade and investment bans and travel restrictions (Clawson, 2015). U.S. sanctions expanded by
pressuring other countries and organizations to comply. The U.S., for instance, opposed World Bank loans to Iran and foreign companies were pressured not to invest in the Iranian oil industry (Clawson, 2015). It has been a standard response to provocations from Teheran. Additionally, it has been a way to temper Iranian geopolitical aspirations and to further U.S. interests in the Gulf region (Maloney and Takeyh, 2011, and Torbat, 2005, P. 407). Indeed, the Iran policy adopted by the U.S. was aimed at containing the Islamic Republic (Torbat, 2005, P. 409). Under the consecutive U.S. administrations, Democrats and Republicans, unilateral sanctions on Iran intensified despite harsh criticism from the international community (Clawson, 2015).
From the first imposed sanctions onwards, the U.S. adhered to a ‘dual-track’ strategy. This strategy implied to ‘open the door to negotiations’ while also ‘increasing the
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costs to Iran of holding the hostages’ (Maloney and Takeyh, 2011). Interesting to note, is that this dual-track strategy resembles two camps, personified by two individuals in the Carter administration: Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who favoured negotiations and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski who favoured coercive measures (Maloney and Takeyh, 2011). Shortly after leaving office, President Carter stated in an interview that from the very beginning of the crisis he feared the Iranians would assassinate the hostage takers one by one until the Shah was returned to Iran (Kifner, 1981). This is a valuable insight, as it uncovers the variety of perspectives and perceptions of respective individuals within an administration affecting the course and outcome of a diplomatic crisis.
President Carter prohibited U.S. exports to Iran, the sale of Iranian oil and froze Iranian assets. Except for the trade embargo, sanctions were relieved when the hostages were released, twenty minutes after President Reagan was sworn in (Scott, 2015). President Reagan re-imposed sanctions after the bombing of the U.S. marine compound in Beirut in
1983 and designated Iran as ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ (Blakemore, 2018).3 These sanctions
targeted financial and trade relations with Iran and included i.a. a prohibition on foreign aid and financial assistance (Torbat, 2005, P. 410). Under President Reagan and Bush Sr., respectively, the sale of dual-use items, so items that could be used both for civilian and military purposes, was prohibited (Torbat, 2005, P. 410, and Blakemore, 2018).
Over the course of 1985 and 1986, the Reagan administration covertly sold arms to Iran in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages in Lebanon. The sales revenue was used to aid the Contra insurgency in Nicaragua. This was in violation of the ‘Boland Amendment’, a piece of legislation pushed by Democrats in U.S. Congress that prohibited aid to such groups (Craig, 2017). Moreover, the deal was opposed by Reagan’s Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger (Craig, 2017). The affair was revealed to the public in 1987 and became know as the ‘Iran Contra Affair’ or ‘Iran gate’ (de Galan, 2017). The significance of this affair is that exemplifies the pragmatism of the U.S.
government by contradicting American policy, and the internal division and opposition within and between governmental branches.
3 President Carter lost his re-election campaign from Ronald Reagan. The failed rescue operation that cost the
lives of eight U.S. soldies and the fact that the crisis was not solved under his tenure is often said to have prevented Carter’s re-election (Scott, 2015).
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The Clinton administration imposed economic sanctions on Iran in 1993 and expected that U.S. allies would support their initiative by boycotting trade in Iranian oil (Torbat, 2005, 409). First the allies refused to comply because the U.S. themselves were still buying 20 percent of Iran’s oil in order to sell it to other countries (Torbat, 2005, P. 409). However, after imposing a full embargo on Iran, effectively accommodating the allies’ objections, the allies still refused to support the U.S. sanctions (Torbat, 2005, P. 409). The allies had significantly deeper trade relations with Iran, making sanctions costlier for them than for Washington. Germany, for example, had four times the U.S. trade volume with Iran and Japan twice the U.S. volume (Torbat, 2005, P. 409). To make matters worse for the U.S., the French oil company Total took over a $600 million oil project from the American Conoco, which was not allowed to execute the project anymore due to the sanctions. This
‘backfilling’4 made that Iran was able to find alternative buyers and investors for their energy
sector, effectively nullifying the effect of U.S. sanctions (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2357, and Blakemore, 2018). In addition to the economic argument, the U.S. allies did not expect the sanctions to make Iran change its behaviour. The EU, for example, preferred a policy of ‘Critical Dialogue’, which entailed retaining economic and diplomatic relations with Iran, but also criticizing its behaviour (Torbat, 2005, P. 409).
The U.S., however, went beyond pressuring foreign governments to comply with their unilateral sanctions. With the adoption of the Iran and Libya Sanctions (ILSA) of 1996, the U.S. Congress approved legislation that would allow President Clinton to impose sanctions on foreign companies, in addition to American companies, that invest in Iran or Libya (Grey, 1996). Despite the fact that under this legislation the U.S. imposed no sanctions on foreign companies, the sheer adoption of this legislation has been received as a breach of sovereignty overseas (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2352, and Grey, 1996). Moreover, sanctions on Iran were now codified in U.S. law.
4 ‘Backfilling’ refers to the practice of, in this case, non-American companies moving into U.S. sanctioned
countries in order to take over the U.S. contracts of American companies that had to abandon these contracts in order to comply with their governments’ sanctions.
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The Bush administration
At the beginning of the Bush administration, rapprochement between Washington and Teheran seemed forthcoming. The Clinton administration started engagement efforts with Iran, which the Bush administration attempted to continue. However, President Bush found no answer to these efforts from the Iranian President Khatami (Hadley, n.d.). The ILSA were to be extended in August 2001 and Bush attempted to negotiate a two-year extension instead of a five-year extension (Farrar, 2011, P. 2363). Moreover, Iran helped the U.S. in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks and Iran supported the Afghan opposition preferred by the U.S. that led to the election of Afghan President Hamid Karzai (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2363, and Hadley, n.d.).
Yet, the ILSA was extended by the original five-year term due to a Congressional veto, and Bush demonised and alienated Iran in his ‘axis-of-evil’ speech (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2363). After Saddam Hussain was toppled in Iraq in 2003, Teheran and Washington initially sought to cooperate again in order to bring stability to the country (Hadley, n.d.). Iran, however, supported and sponsored Shiite extremists in Iraq, which was conflicting with U.S. efforts in the country (Hadley, n.d.). Furthermore, there were indications that Iran was sponsoring terrorists in Afghanistan in order to target U.S. soldiers and provide refuge to members of Al-Qaeda (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2363).
After September 2001, it is important not to evaluate the U.S. – Iran relations solely in the context of bilateral, historic events. It is difficult to underestimate the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. and what it did to the American worldview. George W. Bush worded this view quite accurately, shortly after the attack: ‘Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists’ (Bush, 2001). Moreover, suspicions about a covert Iranian nuclear program that existed throughout the 1990’s were confirmed in 2002, after the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) revealed the nuclear facilities of Natanz and Arak (NTI, 2018). This placed Iran under increased surveillance of the IAEA, dubbed the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog (Hadley, n.d., and Laub, 2015). The IAEA asked for more transparency from the side of Iran and to avoid a referral to the UNSC, Teheran complied in 2003 (Hadley, 2017, and NTI, 2018).The EU-3 (EU and Germany, Britain and France) and Iran issued a joint statement. In this statement, Iran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA and suspend all uranium enrichment activities, which
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culminated in the Paris Agreement of November 2004 (Hadley, n.d.). This directly addressed the main concern of the U.S. and allies: the uranium enrichment capacity of Iran.5 Iranian
commitment to the agreement changed. Hard-liner Mahmoud Ahmedinijad was elected president in August 2005 the Iranian regime announced a continuation of its uranium enrichment (Hadley, n.d.).
Furthermore, Iran continued to be an important sponsor of terrorist groups in the region, such as Hezbollah and Hamas (Hadley, n.d.). Counterterrorism was a top priority for the U.S. national security, together with nuclear non-proliferation (Hadley, n.d.). As such, it would seem that Iran placed itself in the limelight of the U.S. ‘Global War on Terror’. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, made that the Bush administration was too
preoccupied to develop a formal, unilateral Iran strategy (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2363). In the first years of the Bush administration, the U.S. predominantly adopted a rhetorical approach and continued the road taken by its predecessor. Although U.S. Congress adopted legislation in 2006 to have the President act upon indications of violations of the law, no firm was ever sanctioned under ILSA (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2363).
5 Enrichment of uranium itself is not a problem, it is even allowed under the Treaty on non-proliferation and
the IAEA. Low enriched uranium can be used for energy and medical purposes, but high enriched uranium is required fort he construction of nuclear weapons. This explains the emphasis put on the enrichment process and the transparency thereof, instead of having a nuclear program in general (Uranium Enrichment, 2018).
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The Obama administration
Obama assumed office in 2009 after a Presidential campaign that promised ‘change’ (Nagourney, 2008). Remarkable, in that light, is that the Obama administration continued and even intensified the sanctions inherited from the Bush administration (Clawson, 2015). Initially, however, President Obama opted for a renewed diplomatic dialogue in order to change Iran’s behaviour, so to deter Iran from acquiring (nuclear) weapons of mass destruction (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2364). Obama’s administration offered Iran aid for a peaceful nuclear program and for integration of Iran in the global economy (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2364). President Obama even recorded a ‘greeting’ for the Iranian New Year economy (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2364). Even when Iran seemed to have responded to the greeting with celebrating a successful missile test able to reach Israel and U.S. bases in the Middle East, and when allies condemned the brutal crackdown of demonstrations during the 2009 Iranian Presidential elections, Obama was reluctant in condemning the violence
(Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2365).
In March 2009, the Obama administration sent a private letter to Ayatollah Khomeini, prior to the Iranian Presidential elections. The letter was aimed at ‘unfreezing U.S. – Iranian relations and opening the way for face-to-face talks’ (Tait and MacAskill, 2009). It was an actual attempt to improve relations, but also a symbolic gesture to break with the ‘axis-of-evil’ rhetoric from the Bush administration (Tait and MacAskill, 2009). The letter emphasized that the Obama administration did not seek a change of regime in Teheran, but rather a change in behavior (Tait and MacAskill, 2009).
Again, the significance of uranium enrichments became apparent by the response to President Obama’s letter five months later. Teheran replied with a negotiation proposal which ignored the uranium enrichment question (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2364). Instead, Iran staunchly rejected any compromise on the nuclear issue and reiterated its right to having a nuclear program (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2366). When the first IAEA inspections verified in 2003 that Iranian nuclear activities stopped, it turned out they merely suspended it (Albirght and Stricker, 2015). One The U.S. revealed to the world that Iran was running a secret uranium enrichment program in Qom (Cannon Farrar, 2011, P. 2366, and Albright and Sticker, 2015). The site was estimated to have 3.000 centrifuges, making it too large for a ‘pilot plant’ and too small for civilian power purposes (Borger and Wintour, 2009). This
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amount centrifuges is, however, sufficient to make a nuclear warhead within 12 months (Borger and Wintour, 2009).
In 2010 the Obama administration adopted the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, And Divestment Act (CISADA), which was an amendment to the ISA (Gordon, 2013, P. 983).6 The newly adopted legislation targeted the Iranian trade in banks,
automobile industries (Blakemore, 2018). The sanctions also targeted the petroleum industry petroleum, making it difficult for the government to meet the Iranian domestic demand (Blakemore, 2018). The U.S. expected that this would put pressure on Iranian leadership and make them more likely to comply with U.S. demands (Gordon, 2013, P. 983). Like ILSA, CISADA put pressure on foreign companies to comply with unilateral U.S. sanctions (Gordon, 2011, P. 983). Contrary to what the Bush and Clinton administrations were not prepared to do under ILSA, the Obama administration did impose penalties on foreign companies trading with the Islamic Republic (Gordon, 2011, P. 983).
In August 2012, the Obama administration adopted the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act (ITRSHA), effectively severing previous restrictions (Gordon, 2013, P. 984). For instance, the scope of the sanctions was expanded to sanctioning owners of ships that transported Iranian oil and participation in joint ventures in the Iranian energy sector, including those active outside of Iranian territory (Gordon, 2013, P. 984).
Thus, the Obama administration made attempts to break with the past and open a new chapter of diplomatic relations with Iran. However, Teheran did not reply in fashion and the Obama administration, too, reverted to a hostile policy; a policy adhered to since the Iranian Revolution (Hugh, n.d.).
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U.N. Multilateral sanctions
As becomes clear, various (alleged) reasons have been used to impose sanctions on Iran. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, Iran was the target of mainly U.S. sanctions due to its support of terrorism and to limit Teheran’s power projection in general (Katzman, 2018, P. 1). From 2000 onwards, Iran was targeted predominantly due to its nuclear program (Katzman, 2018, P. 1). Relations between Iran and the international community deteriorated even more when President Mahmoud Ahmedinijad was elected in 2005 (“Timeline Nuclear
Programme”, 2013). In April 2006, the Iranian regime announced a continuation of its uranium enrichment (Hadley, n.d.).
Before the end of the year, the UNSC began imposing a progressive sanctions regime, effectively building up the pressure (Laub, 2015). Parallel to U.S. unilateral sanctions and over the course of seven UNSC resolutions, nearly spanning a decade, a multilateral sanction regime that has been binding on all U.N. members was in place. The series started with UNSC Resolution 1696, which was adopted in July 2006 (S/RES/1696). This resolution did not impose sanctions yet, but underlined the findings of the IAEA and emphasized Iran’s
obligations under the NPT (S/RES/1696). It demanded suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities including research and development (“US Sanctions Against Iran”, 2010). The most significant fact of the resolution is that the UNSC requests an IAEA report by
August 31st of that year on compliance with the NPT and IAEA provisions (S/RES/1696). If
Iran fails to do so, the UNSC indicates to warns that it will adopt appropriate measures under Article 41, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter (S/RES/1696). These measures include
interruption of economic relations and is binding on all member states (U.N. Charter, 1945). The U.N. Charter thus enables the UNSC to impose multilateral sanctions on a country and is able to enforce cooperation on its members.
The ultimatum was not met by Iran and the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1737, which set out to restrict Iran’s imports and exports of sensitive nuclear material and equipment (Davenport, 2017). The following two resolutions, 1747 and 1803, made existing sanctions more stringent and targeted more and more specific entities (Davenport, 2017). Noteworthy is that Indonesia abstained as from voting on Resolution 1803. They were not convinced more sanctions would change Iran’s behaviour (Farrar-Wellman, 2010).
