Combating Islamic Radicalization that Leads to Violent Extremism in Albania and Kosovo

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Combating Islamic Radicalization that Leads to Violent Extremism

in Albania and Kosovo

Marios Kefalas S2020181 Master thesis September 2017 Intake

Leiden University

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I would like to begin by expressing my deepest gratitude to all those people who have made this last year possible, and who have supported me in many ways throughout this process. Firstly, my parents, Eugenia and Modestos for supporting me financially, emotionally, and with unconditional love. I would also like to thank my sister Kalliopi for supporting me, as well as my friends and family in the United States (Kellie, Mike, Emily, Ada), in Greece (Eleni, Kelly, Vasilis), and in The Netherlands (Alex, Sophia, Marios). I would also like to thank Professor Yasemin Irepoglu Carreras from the University of California Riverside for being a mentor to me and helping me during the application process for the Master’s Program at Leiden.

I am very grateful to study at the University of Leiden and to be surrounded by a very helpful and experienced staff. This thesis would not have been possible without the guidance, commentary, and support of my supervisor, Professor Liesbeth van der Heide, as well as the helpful feedback from my second reader, Professor Myriam Benraad. To all these people, thank you for everything.

Abstract

In this thesis, I examine the phenomenon of Islamic radicalization and extremism, and its impact on the Balkan countries of Albania and Kosovo. Through understanding the nature of the rise and spread of Islamic extremist ideologies in the 1990s, I evaluate what measures both countries have taken to counter the causes of this phenomenon by combating radicalization that can lead to violent extremism. This focus on counter-radicalization by both countries is a change from traditional counter-terrorist strategies that use repressive measures, such as incarceration of extremists, towards soft measures aimed at strengthening society to prevent radicalization. This thesis evaluates the 2015 counter-radicalization strategies or Albania and Kosovo to determine their respective objectives and what intended programs both strategies aim to create. It also evaluates the implementation process up to the year 2017 to determine whether the strategies have been implemented so far successfully, if the objectives have changed, or if Albania or Kosovo have strayed from their counter-radicalization strategies.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Chapter 1.1: Islamic Radicalization, Violent Extremism and the Balkans

In recent years, one of the greatest threats to global security was the rise of Islamic extremist ideology indoctrinating young people across the world to take up the call for Jihad (Walraven, 2017). While the threat of Islamic terrorism plagued many countries within the last couple of decades, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) created a new form of extremism which fought for the creation of an Islamic state across the Muslim world (Byman, 2015). Since its first territorial gains, thousands of people from across Europe and the rest of the world traveled to Iraq and Syria to fight for this cause, living openly in a society which was built upon these violent and extreme ideologies (Byman, 2015). To get to Syria and/or Iraq, many of these foreign citizens became members of international terrorist organizations and once in the Islamic State, received training to eventually conduct acts of terrorism in their home countries (Walraven, 2017). While many died on the battlefield, thousands returned to their countries of origin and continued to actively be a part of the networks of terrorists and extremists (Walraven, 2017). Many of these returnees did not disengage and partook in terrorist attacks, while others focused on recruiting young people to join ISIS and assist them to travel to Iraq or Syria (Byman & Shapiro, 2014, pg. 2). The influence of extremist ideologies, which existed for over a decade in the Balkans, was exposed by the rise of ISIS in 2014, which prompted governments to re-examine their counter-terrorist, counter-radicalization, and counter-violent extremist (CVE) strategies to combat this new threat. Countries in the Balkan Peninsula, such as Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo, were similarly plagued by this phenomenon, where religious and ideological belligerency suddenly became an issue in a region where religious communities coexisted peacefully following years of ethnic conflict (Shtuni, 2016, pg. 1).

While the overall number of Islamist terrorist attacks in the Balkans was less than that of Western Europe, Balkan countries fell victim to many deadly attacks and became vital for Islamic terrorist network activities (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016, pg. 30). Recruitment of individuals into terrorist organizations, establishment of terrorist cells, and proliferation of drug and weapons smuggling have all flourished since the late 1990’s due to a lack of strong central governments in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Kosovo (Kagioglidis, 2009, pg. 21). Since the rise of ISIS, Kosovo had the highest number of foreign fighters per capita in Europe (Gall, 2016), and radicalized

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individuals garnered more attention in media, schools, and mosques, causing fear in this unstable, new country (Gall, 2016). Other Muslim majority countries in the region, such as Bosnia & Herzegovina and Albania had similar problems with high numbers of foreign fighters, prominent extremist organizations, and influential extremist individuals (The Soufan Group, 2015). Similar to their European counterparts, this threat urged Balkan governments to strengthen existing counter measures and create new policy, strategies, and programs to counter new threats of violent radicalization (Gall, 2016). The strengthening and implementation of such strategies, policies, and programs, however, proved difficult for these governments, since the ideologies had been deeply embedded in small pockets of the population through Islamist organizations established in the 1990s (Counter Extremism Project, 2018).

While many researchers have recently taken an interest in studying Islamic terrorism and radicalization in the Balkans, the region remains deeply understudied with the majority of research neglecting to focus on strategy formation of state governments. Most research conducted focuses on the phenomenon of Islamic violent extremism, while giving limited insight into the actions of governments. This thesis evaluates the strategies taken and measures enacted to counter the sources of violent radicalization in Albania and Kosovo. The research examines the strategies to combat radicalization leading to violent extremism of two Albanian and Muslim-majority countries in the Balkan Peninsula by evaluating independently the measures against this threat and the progress of their implementation in the years following.

Chapter 1.2 Research Question/ Sub Questions

To what extent have Kosovo and Albania been able to properly implement their respective counter-radicalization strategies?

(1) How can we use the Realist Review (Gielen, 2017) to determine the objective(s) of each respective strategy?

(2) Has the implementation process been successful in terms of reaching objectives, or has implementation veered from the initial goals?

Chapter 1.3 Academic Relevance

The academic relevance of this thesis is to further examine a global phenomenon which has, since the rise of ISIS in 2014, been a large focus for the political and security fields in academia. While

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the subjects of terrorism, Islamic extremism, and foreign fighters have been thoroughly evaluated by scholars, the subject of Balkan states dealing with radical returnees after the demise of the ISIS lack exhaustive evaluation in current academic literature. Within the Balkans, the rise and influence of extremist ideologies, coupled with the factors causing people turn to these ideologies, remain the greatest focus of scholars who have studied the area (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Janková, 2014). Thus, by taking a strategy centered approach of evaluation, this thesis gives a thorough and comprehensive view of the initiatives and programs used to combat radicalization leading to violent extremism in the Balkan region.

Chapter 1.4 Societal Relevance

Across the world, thousands of people have fallen victim to being indoctrinated by Islamic extremist ideologies that condemn tolerance and peace between faiths and encourage violence as an obligation (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). As a result of this rise, European societies has fallen victim to many terrorist attacks, which threaten European security and regional stability (Antenore, 2016). The Balkan Peninsula lies in the heart of Europe, with European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states surrounding this region with diverse ethnic and religious populations. It is an area that has seen many deadly wars and genocide in the past, but has made much progress towards cooperation and peace in the last two decades (Tziampiris, 2009). Despite this progress, relations between religious and ethnic communities remain extremely delicate (Venetis, 2015). This fragility of relations between states and communities allows for Islamic extremist ideologies to take root by spreading propaganda to attract battle hardened individuals who were dissatisfied by the peace resolutions and current status of their states (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). This rise of violent ideologies, the exodus of many individuals to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and the return of many of these foreign fighters, increases the risk for this volatile region of returning to chaos and conflict. Understanding the objectives of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as the changes of the goals during the implementation process can assist in future learning on how strategic aims can change when combating radicalization.

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Chapter 2: Body of Knowledge and Theoretical Framework

Chapter two provides insight into the background of Islamic extremism in both Albania and Kosovo. It begins by outlining the rise of the ideologies in the Balkans, which was introduced first in Bosnia & Herzegovina during and after the Bosnian War in the 1990s. It then describes the establishment of Wahhabi and Salafi charities, initially in Albania and then Kosovo, as well as emphasizing the magnitude of the influence these charities and radical individuals had on Albanian communities in the Balkans. It then describes what exactly these ideologies propagated across the Balkans, making them appealing to specific communities in both Albania and Kosovo. Next, the chapter examines existing literature on the counter measures and tactics put in place by both Albania and Kosovo to counter the influence of these ideologies in the early 2000s. Chapter two then continues by explaining the realist review, describing what it is and how various scholars have now applied it to the field of CVE. Following this description, an explanation on how the realist review will be applied to the context of counter-radicalization in Albania and Kosovo is provided.

Chapter 2.1 Background

Islamic extremism in the Balkans is a relatively new phenomenon which gained its momentum in the 1990s, following the demise of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflict that resulted from it (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 208). Mujahedeen from Afghanistan initially flocked to Bosnia & Herzegovina after rising ethnic tensions between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians in the republic resulted in the outbreak of the Bosnian War (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 209). Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, Hamas, and Hezbollah set up operations throughout the country, infiltrating Bosnian military ranks (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 209). As a result of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995 and the cessation of the conflict, many from these groups stayed in the Balkans and created various terrorist networks in all other states with significant Muslim populations such as Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, and FYR Macedonia (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 210). These groups were able to garner attention from marginalized Muslim populations in the Balkans, with Albanians being targeted for recruitment as well, due to rising tensions in Albania and Kosovo (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159). Albanians in the Balkans make up the largest percentage of the population of Muslims in the region, accounting for fifty-two percent of the community (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159; Zaimi, 2016, pg. 81). The distribution of Albanians is rather spread out with majority populations in Albania and present-day Kosovo, while significant Albanian minority-majority

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regions exists in Montenegro, Serbia, and FYR Macedonia (Öktem, 2011, pg. 160). Both Albania and Kosovo were plunged into conflict following the collapse of communist regimes, which was used to the advantage of Islamic extremist organizations in creating a stronghold in the Balkans (Zaimi, 2016, pg. 80).

2.1.1 Albania

In 1967, Albania was declared as the world’s first atheist state under the regime of Enver Hoxha, which resulted in years of harsh measures suppressing the Muslim community in the country until the collapse of the communist government in 1992 (Öktem, 2011, pg. 161). Despite the downfall of the old regime and new relations with the West, Albania remained a severely underdeveloped country with the central government in Tirana unable to provide services, education, and infrastructure to the rural areas (Richardson et al., 2017, pg. 89; Zaimi, 2016, pg. 84). The weak central government provided an opportunity for Wahhabi and Salafi Islamist organizations to gain influence in the country by funding the construction of over one hundred and forty mosques and schools primarily in the rural north of the country, filling the role of providers for the local communities (Deliso, 2007, pg. 47). Due to the lack of imams in Albania, conservative imams were brought over from Saudi Arabia and any Albanian individuals wanting to study theology were given grants to study in Saudi Arabia at Wahhabi or Salafi institutions (Richardson et al., 2017, pg. 89; Perry, 2016, pg. 22). This was done to ensure the spread of the ideology for future generations, making Salafi and Wahhabi ideology a part of Albanian Muslim identity (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 16). Mujahedeen from across the Middle East and North Africa came to Albania and were granted citizenship and refuge in these rural areas acting as charity workers for the organizations, thus characterizing Albania as an Islamist safe haven (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 15).

This turn back to Islamic roots was welcomed by the government of President Sali Berisha, an anti-communist conservative, who saw this establishment of Islamic charities as an opportunity to reinvigorate the economy (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31; Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). In 1994 the Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank was created to fund many projects across the country, its majority stockholder, however, was Osama bin Laden, who used the Islamic Bank as a way to fund terrorist cells in the country (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31). This however, was ignored by Berisha, and later in 1994, Osama Bin Laden visited Albania after, what scholars argue, an invitation from Berisha was sent to him (Deliso, 2007, pg. 31). Albania, under Berisha, further continued its move towards the Middle East, with the abolishment of Visa’s for citizens of Arabian countries and the joining of the

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Organizations for Islamic Conferences (OIC) (Deliso, 2007, pg. 30). This move of trying to tie Albanian nationalism and reconstruction with Islamic rebirth by Berisha was brought to an end, after a civil war erupted in 1997 following mass corruption exposure and Ponzi schemes by government officials (Deliso, 2007, pg. 38). The overthrowing of Berisha was used as an opportunity by the United States, the Albanian-American Lobby, and other western states to establish a new, pro-Euro Atlantic government to eliminate terrorist cells in the country (Deliso, 2007, pg. 39). US government aid to Albania increased dramatically and eventually the new government in power began expelling all known Islamists (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 16). Despite the expelling of known foreign Islamists, many Mujahedeen during the civil war were able to raid military barracks and take weapons and blank passports and flee to neighboring Kosovo and FYR Macedonia (Deliso, 2007, pg. 37). While most of the know foreign Islamists fled after the Islamic organizations were shut down, Albanian radicalized individuals remained and kept open communication with the networks outside Albania allowing for the Salafi and Wahhabi ideology to spread and the Islamist movements to continue (Deliso, 2007, pg. 45). A year after the Albanian civil war, Albanian Islamists were present alongside Iranian, Chechen, Bosnian, and Arab foreign fighters in the skirmishes between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the military of Yugoslavia (Deliso, 2007, pg. 45; Shtuni, 2015).

2.1.2 Kosovo

The rise of radical Islamist ideologies, such as Wahhabism and Salafism, occurred differently than it did in neighboring Albania. While Islamist organizations entered Kosovo following the Bosnian War, their influence did not start to rise until after the Albanian civil war (Deliso, 2007, pg. 41). Mujahedeen and newly radicalized Albanian individuals joined the ranks of the KLA, providing weapons stolen from Albania during the civil war to attempt to gain influence within the KLA (Deliso, 2007, pg. 41). This rise of Islamic extremism in Kosovo took a militant tactic as opposed to Albania’s initial ‘charity/humanitarian’ one (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 212). Mujahedeen and other Islamist leaders attempted to tie Islamism to Albanian nationalism, relying on the rising tensions between Kosovo Albanians and the Yugoslav army to increase the appeal of their movement (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 212). This tactic aimed to frame the conflict in Kosovo as one over religion instead of ethnicity, with the worldwide Muslim community traveling to Kosovo to help protect the small Muslim enclave from ‘atheist’ or Christian Yugoslav forces (Venetis, 2015).

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Following the NATO bombings and the cessation of the Kosovo War in 1999, faith based charities from across the Middle East set up shop across Kosovo (Shtuni, 2016, pg. 7). One of the largest charities, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya (SJRC), funded the construction of ninety-eight schools, as well as Mosque reconstruction (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). Other organizations such as the Islamic Endowment Foundation built thirty Koranic religious schools and over one hundred mosques, while charities such as the World Assembly for Muslim Youth gave out grants for Kosovo Albanians to attend Salafist Theological Universities in Saudi Arabia (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). Many of these charities, such as the SJRC, had ties to Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2), which sought to create local terrorist cells in Kosovo, as well as establish an Albanian Salafi and Wahhabi movement through the educating of Kosovo Albanians in the Theological Universities in Saudi Arabia (Centre for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016, pg. 2).

This new rise of radical terrorist groups put pressure on Western states who, after the war with Yugoslavia, had taken up the duty of rebuilding and governing Kosovo through the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). The United States, the EU, and NATO began large scale initiatives towards combating the terrorist cells and Islamist organizations within Kosovo, bolstering Kosovo Force (KFOR) police presence and special operations in the country (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). By 2006, the United States increased aid to the UNMIK to $72 million to combat rising Islamism and terrorism, in addition to sending more support to KFOR (Woehrel, 2005, pg. 18). Despite these efforts to combat Islamist influence in Kosovo, less than ten years later in 2014 Kosovo has the highest jihadist recruitment rate per one-hundred thousand people, at sixteen, which was eight times that of France and sixty percent more than that of Libya (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). The high number of ethnic Albanians in the Balkans who have joined ISIS has alarmed the governments of Kosovo and Albania, prompting both states to re-examine existing terrorism legislation, as well as put an emphasis on new counter-radicalization measures to combat the sources of violent extremism in each country.

2.1.3 Ideologies: Salafism, Wahhabism, and Takfirism in the Balkans

Following the demise of Communist regimes in Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as the outbreak of the Albanian Civil War in 1997 and then the Kosovo War from 1998-1999, Islamic extremist ideologies entered and spread roots within each country (Gibas-Krzak, 2013). Mujahedeen from across the Muslim world flocked to the Balkans to fight alongside their suppressed Muslim

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brothers and Islamic ‘charities’ funded reconstruction and educational grants for individuals wanting to study Islamic theology (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Kagioglidis, 2009). The extent of the influence exerted by the Islamist ‘charities’ in the 1990s became evident in both countries with the rise ISIS and the creation of an Islamic State in the Middle East. The high numbers of ethnic Albanians traveling to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters, becoming entangled in international terrorist networks, and returning to further spread the ideologies or carry out attacks in the Balkans or abroad, showed this phenomenon was heavily underestimated by authorities.

Islamic extremist ideologies encourage those who adhere to the ideology to actively partake in various activities deemed necessary to live fully within the guidelines of the ideology. The activities often include giving one’s life to become a martyr through terrorist attacks and another is fighting abroad with other pious individuals in a conflict as foreign fighter (Malet, 2013). A foreign fighter, in this case, refers to a person who has left their country of origin to partake in Jihad in Syria and Iraq, along the side of ISIS (Knudsen, 2017). Similarities between the local population and the fighter are few, often sharing one or two characteristics, which in this case is ideology and religion (Malet, 2013). For these individuals, to partake in Jihad is to become part of something greater, to respond to what they often see as criminal actions against the Muslim community, even if the conflict is not exactly about religion (Malet, 2013).

Most Jihadists and radicalized individuals follow the Islamic teachings of Jihadi Salafism and Wahhabism, which are extremely conservative forms of Sunni Islam (Janková, 2014). Both of these ideologies campaign for all Muslims following these doctrines to fight opponents of Islam but at the same time aim to purify the Islamic community (Janková, 2014). Salafism and Wahhabism used to have a great appeal to some in the war-torn Balkans during the 1990s, due to visiting Jihadists’ success in portraying ‘atheist’ dictatorships as trying to destroy Islam in the region (Venetis, 2015). The sub-sect of Salafi-Takfiri1_{, flourished among these groups in the}

Balkans where war and poverty made many turn to terrorist groups to ‘liberate’ their countries (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). It called upon true believers to condemn and take action against fellow apostate Muslims for abandoning Islam (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016). This was an invasion of an unusual

1_{According to Shahriyar Rahimi and Abdul Amir Jorfi (2016): The Salafi-Takfiri sub-sect of Salafism was an}

extremist offshoot of the highly conservative Salafi movement. It refuses to consider itself fully a part of the Muslim community, claiming all other Muslims not adhering to the ideology to be an act of Takfir (apostasy). Despite this, members often partake in international conflict across the Muslim world to spread the ideology and ‘purify’ the Muslim communities. Salafi-Takfiri ideology, unlike Salafism and Wahhabism, allows for the killing of innocent people, rejects the rules of Jihad, and promotes suicide as an act to kill one’s enemies.

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form of Islam which sought to control aspects of life for Muslims in the Balkans (Qirezi 2017). As mentioned in Chapter One, following the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars, religious institutions and charities from the Arabian Peninsula funded the reconstruction of mosques (Racimora, 2013) and the establishment of Salafi and Wahhabi schools (Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017). Some foreign fighters from the Middle East during the Yugoslav wars also remained in the Balkans to help create a foothold for jihadism (Byman & Shapiro, 2014), which, as some claim, has failed due to the Euro-Atlantic favoring of states (Tziampiris, 2009). Muslim majority countries in the Balkans like Kosovo and Albania remain committed to this move towards the west, with Albania becoming a member of NATO in 2009 and both Kosovo and Albania pursuing membership of the European Union (US Department of State Country Reports, 2016). Both countries have strived to build a diverse society, due to many Albanians and minorities in each country adhering to Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, something that radical Islamists reject as they attempt to make these Islamic extremist ideologies part of Albanian nationalism (Öktem, 2011, pg. 166).

Overall the academic sources on Salafi-Jihadi and Wahhabi ideology in the Balkans remain limited as well, with Albania and Kosovo being the least examined cases. Attention on this issue remains concentrated in Bosnia & Herzegovina due to the prominence of Mujahedeen individuals and Wahhabi and Salafi organizations during the Bosnian War from 1992-1995 (Tziampiris, 2009). While the number of Mujahedeen involved in conflicts in Albania or Kosovo dwarfed that of Bosnia & Herzegovina (Tziampiris, 2009), their influence remains just as dangerous for these countries and the region (Venetis, 2015).

Chapter 2.2 Existing Literature

Following years of combating terrorist cells throughout the region, today, the Balkans remain a great source of jihadist activities and are a major transit center for foreign fighters traveling to and from conflict zones such as Syria and Iraq (Soufan Group, 2015). While many foreign fighters from the Balkans have died in Syria and Iraq (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017), veterans that have returned are feared and pursued by authorities for their newly learned skills (Walraven, 2017). Many have the potential to carry out attacks in Europe or their home countries, or have the ability to promote Jihad to others by acting as recruiters in Mosques, through communities, or in online chatrooms (Byman, 2015). Albanian individuals from both Kosovo and Albania have been involved in terrorist attacks outside the Balkans, including an attack at Frankfurt Airport in 2011 and another previous attempted attack in the United States in 2007 (Gibas-Krzak, 2013, pg. 217).

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These attacks resulted in the strengthening on counter-terrorist measures in both Albania and Kosovo but despite these new policies, these efforts could not dissuade individuals from joining radical Islamic groups or terrorist organizations (Zaimi, 2016, pg. 90).

When the Islamic State made significant territorial advances in Syria and Iraq between 2014-2016, a high number of radicalized Albanians from both Kosovo and Albania flocked to join ISIS (Shtuni, 2015, pg. 2). As a result, the governments of Kosovo and Albania re-examined their approaches to combating radicalization in their own specific ways. In 2014, Kosovo reevaluated its existing penal code to categorize people traveling to Syria and Iraq as threat to security and constitutional order, leading to immediate arrests of some forty people who attempted to travel (Center for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016). In 2015, the government reinforced once again this strong reactive stance against violent extremism through the passing of the law that prohibited Kosovo citizens from joining armed conflicts outside the country (Center for Research, Documentation, and Publication, 2016). This stance however, created fear among those who left and wanted to return home, due to long prison sentences of some ten years being given to anyone who returned (Speckhard, et al., 2018, pg. 3). The measures, as a result, were adjusted by the government of Kosovo to improve proactive soft measures to deal with the issue of radicalization, and include civil society stakeholders (Shajkovci, 2015, pg. 2).

Towards the end of 2015, the Office of the Prime Minister of Kosovo drafted the “Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism, 2015-2020.” This strategy was created to be a comprehensive response to radicalization in Kosovo by addressing the many push and pull factors that influence people to turn towards Islamist ideologies (Office of the Prime Minister, 2015, pg. 5). In the strategy, the government of Kosovo first defined what it considers violent extremism and radicalism to clarify what the strategy aims to combat and reduce. Violent extremism is defined as “extremism which involves the use of violence; including but not limited to terrorism” (Id., pg. 8). It then defined radicalism as, “the process of approving extremist religious beliefs and in some cases converting into a violent extremist” (Id., pg. 8). Following the definitions, the strategy then justified its focus on radicalization, since radicalization can lead to violent extremism and eventually terrorism (Id.). The measures in this strategy diverged from the tradition repressive techniques of the counter-terrorist policy, and included soft measures, investments in local communities as well as inclusion of non-governmental actors. The strategy charged the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) with many responsibilities to combat

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radicalization including giving lectures at mosques and community centers, as well as creating a counter-narrative for those who are at risk of joining (Shajkovci, 2015, pg. 2). Other measures included social media account takedown policies on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, as well as Google redirecting specific keywords to counter-narrative pages (Speckhard, et. al., 2018, pg. 6).

Albania, similarly to Kosovo, initially reformed existing counter-terrorism policies to include banning travel to Syria and Iraq and reforming the Penal Code, leading to the arrests of returnees (Hide, 2015, pg. 43). Other measures included arresting any individuals linked to the ‘charities’ established in the 1990s, as well as the closure of all the illegal mosques built throughout the country (Richardson, et al., 2017, pg. 100). These measures however did not address the grievances of the Albanian Muslim community, who ever since the rise of the communist regime in the 1940s, felt the government in Tirana was unable to represent them, and could therefore not trust it even in a post-communist era (Hide, 2015, pg. 1; Perry, 2016, pg. 22). Since then there have been many calls by civil society and international organizations for the Albanian government to take a more proactive role in combating Islamic radicalization by addressing the push and pull factors associated with it (Hide, 2015, pg. 11).

To address the issue of the hundreds of Albanian students being educated in Salafi and Wahhabi institutions abroad, the government of Albania found it imperative to open an Albanian Islamic Theological University in the country, as a means to control the curriculum and narrative to prevent radicalization (Kagioglidis, 2009, pg. 26). The government has also made much use of the Albanian Islamic Committee to monitor imams and individuals in the community, while also providing psychological assistance and counter-narrative for individuals at risk of radicalization (Richardson, et al., 2017, pg. 101). However, despite the progress being made in a short amount of years, the Albanian government still needed to focus on more preventative measures for all the different stages of radicalization as well as for those who have returned to disengage and possibly de-radicalize (Hide, 2015, pg. 11).

In 2015, Albania, like Kosovo, drafted the “Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” with the objective of combating radicalization early on, before turning into violent extremism (Council of Ministers, 2015). In the strategy, the government defined specific terms to clarify what the strategy aims to prevent or counter. The strategy defined radicalization to violence as, “a decision to forgo political processes or nonviolent methods of fostering change in favor of adopting violent methods to bring about change” (Id., pg. 4). This was done to clarify

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that the strategy aims to identify and counter radicalization to prevent it from turning into violent extremism. It later defined counter-radicalization as, “a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from resorting to terrorism” (Id., pg. 5). This would be done by focusing on resilience, which it also defined as “factors, ideas, institutions, issues, trends, or values that enable individuals and communities to resist or prevent violence” (Id., pg. 5). Through these measures, the objective of the strategy is to prevent and reduce the number of radicalized individuals by using new “soft” methods not used in Albania’s current counter-terrorism strategy.

Within the limited scope of academic sources that have explored the phenomenon in question, scholars have yet to fully evaluate in detail the strategies and counter measures of the Albanian and Kosovar governments towards these extremist ideologies. For example, most academic work focuses on the emergence and diffusion of the ideologies in the Balkans (Venetis, 2015; Racimora, 2013; Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017; Shtuni, 2015; Byman & Shapiro, 2014), while others have given significance to the specific teachings of Wahhabism and Salafism in the region (Rahimi & Jorfi, 2016; Qirezi, 2017; Janková, 2014), or have taken a general approach on the appeal of these ideologies and Jihad (Malet, 2013). Very few scholars discuss the strategies, their objectives, and implementation process of Albania and Kosovo with non-governmental organization (NGO) and think-tank reports providing most insight into this gap of knowledge. Sources that do provide insight concerning the CVE initiatives of the two states are often limited in detail due to no clear and full descriptions of how the programs are being enacted being provided to scholars by the relevant stakeholders (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 4). Thus, the spread of these ideologies and causes of the foreign fighter phenomenon remain in focus, while academic sources fail to fully evaluate government action and to take a policy/strategy centered approach to analyze the relevant measures.

Chapter 2.3 Theoretical Framework: The Realist Review

To evaluate the CVE policies of Albania and Kosovo, I will be using the theoretical perception of the Realist School of Thought in International Affairs, which is contextualized to combating violent extremism. The realist approach puts emphasis on the importance of context in CVE strategy, claiming that one initiative is not applicable to all cases, and the same exact measures in different situations can have different functions, application, and even results (Velduis, 2012, pg. 4). The success of the objective of each CVE measure is dependent of how well the strategy or

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programs are tailored to the context (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 3). Despite this, the realist review is not specifically concerned with if a method works, but rather why it works in each respective case by looking at how it is enacted (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 2) The theory looks into the specific mechanisms used in strategy application, specifically in the areas of dis-engagement or de-radicalization (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 16). The functions of the different methods of intervention in each respective case are individually evaluated in detail (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 16). It looks to organize the complexity of the social programs created by strategy and simplify the mechanisms of the programs in the specific context (Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 4). However, one of the greatest gaps of the realist review is that there is no existing systematic outline of techniques used to evaluate counter-radicalization strategy and programs (Feddes & Gallucci, 2015, pg. 4). This lack of a systematic overview of analysis made the evaluation of the programs and strategy difficult.

Thankfully in the years following Gielen (2017), provided a method of evaluation to apply the realist review to CVE initiatives and programs. The goal of the realist review is to create a theory to evaluate the functions of policies, initiatives, and programs to understand how they function in respective contexts. It can be used to assist in policy or strategy recommendation, and differs from the traditional question of “what works” in CVE initiatives, to the new question of “what works, for whom, in which context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 2; Veldhuis, 2012, pg. 4). Gielen states, “the realist review is specifically meant for those interventions and programs where evaluation is lacking, which is the case for CVE” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 4). While CVE policy is a very broad field, it can be divided into two areas of focus; policy (or strategies in this case) concerned with counter-terrorism or focused on counter-radicalization (Id., pg. 1). This is done to conduct a more specific and thorough evaluation on the respective measures of each subfield. Gielen states that there are no solid methodological rules for the realist review, but more than often, the methods of the Cochrane Reviews, which are used in the medical field, are applicable (Id., pg. 4).

The Cochrane Review follows a six-step method: Describing the scope of the review, searching for past studies, judging the data, isolating the data, synthesizing the data, and disseminating the results (Id., pg. 4). Gielen describes in detail the how each step can be conducted, putting emphasis on steps one, three, and four, which I will discuss in my methodology chapter within the context of the case studies of CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo. In regard to counter-radicalization, Gielen claims most prior reviews found that the CVE policies/initiatives of

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countries focus primarily on four categories: community resilience, exit programs, family and network support, as well as counter-communication (Id., pg. 10). These programs can then be organized into three levels of initiatives, primary, secondary, and tertiary (Id., pg. 9).

Primary CVE initiatives focus on radicalization prevention, safeguarding of communication, CVE program awareness, and assistance with psycho-sociological problems (Id., pg. 9). Secondary CVE initiatives draw attention towards the first noticeable signs of radicalization in individuals, calling for intervention and family involvement, usually combining legal and soft measures such as therapy (Id., pg. 9). Unlike the first two initiatives, the tertiary level of initiatives concentrates on working with extremist individuals on de-radicalization, and focuses on rehabilitation and disengagement for those who have taken part in an armed conflict abroad, usually including involvement of the justice and policing system (Id., pg. 9). (See Figure 1).

Figure 1: (Gielen, 2017, pg. 9)

Through the use of the realist review, one can be able to comprehensively evaluate complex CVE programs and strategies to better understand the objectives of a state’s counter-radicalization strategy. The methods provided by Gielen aim to emphasize the relevant mechanisms, context, and sometimes outcomes of existing CVE policies to fully understand and answer the question of “what works, for whom, in which context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 14). I will use this theoretical framework to evaluate the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo in regard to counter-radicalization leading to violent extremism. Through these methods of reviewing the policies and

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their implementation, I aim to evaluate the strategies original area(s) of focus as well as their objectives and their implementation to determine if the objectives have changed from the creation of the strategies.

In chapter two, the history of extremist ideologies in the Balkans was outlined to give emphasis on how Wahhabi and Salafi ideologies garnered influence in many regions of Albania and Kosovo. Through the establishment of charities and NGOs in the aftermath of the Albanian Civil War (1997) and the Kosovo War (1998-1999), terrorist organizations turned these two countries into safe havens for terrorists and radicals. After pressure from the United States and European countries, both Albania and Kosovo began long counter-terrorist campaigns against these organizations by expelling individuals and arresting others. Despite this, the ideologies had an appeal to some extremely loyal groups, due to the ideologies addressing grievances and organizations providing more to communities than the central governments. To counter the influence of these ideologies and the radicalization of individuals, in 2015 both Albania and Kosovo drafted counter-radicalization strategies. By applying the theoretical framework of realism through the realist review, the objectives of both respective strategies are analyzed to understand if Albania and Kosovo’s strategies focus more on creating programs to bolster resilience, family and network support, exit-programs, or counter-communication. This categorization is done to create a thorough evaluation which will determine if both countries have implemented the strategies to reach their intended objectives, or if their respective objectives have changed during implementation.

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Chapter 3 Research Design & Methodology

Chapter three describes the research design of the thesis aimed at evaluating the objectives of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as their implementation. It explains how the theoretical framework, described in chapter two, will be applied to the two specific contexts, as well as what methods of research will be conducted. The chapter goes into specific details of methodology used, data collected, and addresses any limitations to this thesis.

Chapter 3.1: Research Design

Islamic extremism in Albania and Kosovo is a very complex problem, which thrives among small but loyal groups of people located in mainly rural, underdeveloped communities, affected by the wars in the 1990s (Beslin & Igrijatijevic, 2017). Many of these radicalized individuals from both countries have been involved in terrorist attacks abroad and within the Balkans, and have also joined international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. This alarming rise of individuals leaving for Syria and Iraq has forced the governments of both countries to reevaluate their strategies in countering Islamic radicalization and terrorism (Venetis, 2015). Both states have placed a new emphasis on counter radicalization to address the causes of radicalization leading to violent extremism. This emphasis and reevaluation of existing measures follows years of harsh counter-terrorist policies which were unsuccessful in disengaging and de-radicalizing individuals, making it difficult for those wanting to disengage to return from abroad and seek assistance (Hide, 2015; Shtuni, 2015).

The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo created in 2015. The realist review, presented by Gielen (2017), aims to organize and analyze the strategies to better understand what the areas of focus are, as well as the objectives of the proposed measures. The review will clarify the overall objective of the strategies of Albania and Kosovo, to determine if resilience, family and network support, exit programs, or counter-communication is the main area of focus. Next, reports from international organizations, NGO’s, and think-tanks will be used to evaluate the strategy implementation in the years following. The reports discuss the implementation progress of measures, while also critiquing lack of progress in an area, as well as critiquing moves by each respective government that stray from the strategy (i.e. strengthening of counter-terrorist measures, while neglecting the implementation of the 2015 strategies).

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The use of qualitative analysis is appropriate due to the nature of the evaluation, which analyzes the original goals and focus of the strategies and then the application process up until 2017. The research conducted is based on document analysis of the national strategies and international organization, think-tank, and NGO reports on the implementation. A multiple holistic case study design is used to analyze the CVE strategies of both states which are then categorized into Gielen’s four categories; community resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication. Each state is looked at individually and in depth, using the theoretical framework of the realist review to further explore both cases.

Through the use of the realist review I aim to understand “what works, for whom, under what circumstances, and how?” (Gielen, 2017). As mentioned in chapter two, the six steps of the Cochrane Review are used to limit the extent of the CVE policy review of both states, to provide a more thorough evaluation of the strategies. Step one of the Cochrane Review aims to clarify the scope of the review of CVE strategy. According to Gielen, CVE initiatives can be divided into two focus areas, one concentrating on counter-radicalization and the other on counter-terrorism. Gielen states most CVE initiatives of countries focus on resilience, exit programs, family & network support, and counter-communication (Gielen, 2017, pg. 9), thus the strategies of both states will be categorized into these four areas to determine the main focus of the national plans. Counter-radicalization is chosen because it has been the new focus of both Albania and Kosovo in combating the grievances associated with Islamic radicalization. Similar to counter-terrorism, counter-radicalization can be both reactive and proactive in practice, but unlike counter-terrorism it includes more soft measures and delegates responsibility to the community and non-state actors to combat extremism. The phenomenon in question focuses around radicalized individuals who are active members of Islamist groups in Albania or Kosovo or are from these countries but have traveled abroad to join Islamist groups. Counter-terrorism policies were enacted by both governments in the early 2000s, and then again bolstered following the rise of ISIS (Zaimi, 2016). These measures however, did not address the grievances associated with Islamic radicalization, such as marginalized Muslim populations, underdevelopment and poverty in Jihadist ‘hot-spot’ municipalities, de-radicalization, and disengagement. Lastly, the steps of the counter-radicalization plans will be grouped into the three levels of CVE initiatives, the primary, secondary, and tertiary. This provides further insight into all relevant stakeholders in each initiative and what action is necessary by the stakeholders on each level.

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Step two of the Cochrane Review focuses on looking for existing studies on the specific phenomenon in question. The results of the assessment of existing literature shown in chapter 2 indicate that the realist review has not been applied to analyze the CVE policies of Kosovo and Albania. Steps three and four are grouped together due to the fact that judging and extracting all data applicable to this study can be done together in order to assess its relevance and find any patterns that help answer the research question. The last two steps (five and six) of the Cochrane Review, namely synthesizing data and disseminating the findings, focus on combining and evaluating the results of each case and analyzing the patterns, or lack thereof, to best understand “what works, for whom, in what context, and how?” (Gielen, 2017, pg. 8).

The Cochrane Review

Steps Description

Step 1: Scope of the

CVE Review To determine the scope of the review, we look into relevant contexts,

mechanism, and patterns of outcomes which can be related to CVE. In this case, we look into counter-radicalization policies.

Step 2: Searching for

Primary CVE Studies To see if a similar review has been carried out, one must look for existing

reviews on CVE policies for the relevant case(s).

Step 3: Quality

Appraisal Assessment of the relevance of the CVE review, as well as an assessment of

the thoroughness in which it can answer the research question.

Step 4: Extracting and

Synthesizing Data Looking for relevant contexts, mechanisms, and patterns in the outcomes of

the CVE initiatives.

Step 5: Realist

Synthesis Evaluating the results of each respective case analysis, to answer “what

works, for whom, in what context, and how?”

Step 6: Realist

Recommendations Disseminate recommendations in the policy area.

Table 1. Steps of the Cochrane Review (Gielen, 2017)

Chapter 3.2 Methodology

As mentioned above, the research for this thesis will be conducted using a qualitative research design, specifically the multiple holistic case study design. Through this design, I aim to evaluate the objectives and implementation of the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo, which are the units of analysis for research. The justification behind the selection of these two countries is the variety of common characteristics shared by both states and linked events

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which saw the rise of Islamic violent extremism. Both Albania and Kosovo are neighboring, independent countries2, with a similar ethnic and religious make-up3, a common history, and similar experiences with Islamic violent extremism and radicalization. Albanians constitute a majority in Albania and Kosovo, as well as fifty-two percent of the total Muslim population in the Balkans (Öktem, 2011, 159). This phenomenon of Islamic radicalization has plagued Albanian majority areas the most, infiltrating ethnic conflicts in the 1990s and creating a jihadist breeding ground in Europe (Öktem, 2011, pg. 159).

Chapter 3.2.1 Data

The methods used to conduct the research for this thesis is within-case analysis of the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo to examine the objectives and implementation of counter radicalization measures in each state. Through document analysis of the national strategies, as well as think-tank, NGO, and international institution reports on the implementation from 2015 to 2017, I examine how each country pursues their respective CVE objectives, and if the implementation has veered from the original objectives. This is done to evaluate how specific initiatives are in practice in each particular case, and what has changed from the original focus of the national strategies.

The document analysis was conducted using online scholarly databases such as SAGE Journals, JSTOR, Taylor & Francis Online Database, and Google Scholar, while the strategies were retrieved through the Government of Kosovo Official Website and the Government of Albania Official Website. Reports on the initiatives by think-tanks, NGOs, and international organizations were accessed through Google and the websites of the respective organizations. Key words searched in all the databases included (de)radicalization, counter-radicalization, disengagement, rehabilitation, CVE, violent, extremism, measures, exit programs, counter-communication, resilience, family support, foreign fighter, terrorist, counter-terrorism, Islamism, Salafi, Wahhabi, Takfiri, Jihadi(st), policy, strategy, initiatives, Kosovo, Albania(n), and Balkans.

2_{While Kosovo has not been fully recognized as an independent country by all members of the United Nations, the}

government in Pristina acts independently and separately from that in Belgrade. Laws are passed through an elected legislative body, policy is shaped through this body, and laws are enforced through a judicial and policing system (CIA World Factbook, 2018).

3_{According to the CIA World Factbook, the 2011 censuses of Albania and Kosovo claim ethnic Albanians consist of}

82.6% and 92.9%, respectively, of the total population, and the majority of citizens identify as Muslim in each country (CIA World Factbook, 2018).

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The ‘snowballing method’ was also used to find any appropriate literature on this phenomenon or policy mentioned in the bibliography of reports or other scholarly sources. All information, such as population statistics, historical background information, or policy/program descriptions, found during the research phase was cross verified among various sources based on desktop research to increase the internal validity of the research, thus assuring the information mentioned is accurate. While I cannot read Albanian, the policies and reports from both Albania and Kosovo are made available in English on the respective websites. The units of analysis in each case are the CVE strategies concerned with countering radicalization, specifically in the four categories mentioned by Gielen: resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication, as well as the reports on the application of the strategies. The units of observation are both the countries of Albania and Kosovo with the purpose of understanding how the implementation process has gone and if the areas of focus have shifted from the formation of the strategies in 2015.

Chapter 3.3 Feasibility/ Limitations

Overall the feasibility of the research for this thesis was attainable due to all necessary documents analyzed being available online in various databases. While I do not speak, read, or understand Albanian, both the governments of Kosovo and Albania have made their policies and program descriptions available online in English. Similarly, think-tank, NGO, and international governing bodies like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have their reports available online in English. Gielen’s theoretical framework can be used, due to the realist review being a very versatile systematic review of social programs using the principles of realism, which does not in itself have specific steps. The categorization and steps of the Cochrane Review to analyze the initiatives and measures have been contextualized through Gielen’s work to fit the field of CVE, which is then used to analyze counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo.

The largest limitation of this research is the result of the methodological approach focused on document analysis; counter-radicalization initiatives, priorities, and application are examined through strategic plans, NGO, and international organization reports, which limit the scope of analysis. The inability to organize interviews with relevant stakeholders and actors of the programs and strategies limited the scope of the research to document and desktop research. Interviews with experts such as government officials, individuals working in the de-radicalization programs, NGO

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representatives, and the police, could offer a different perspective of the issues of radicalization or bring up less known concerns, difficulties, or other strategies not fully described in the documents. Another limitation of the research can be the differences in the development of each country’s CVE initiatives. Based on this research, it is evident that Albania’s strategy is not as extensive and thorough on its goals and implementation as the strategy of Kosovo. Also, a low number of reports on the country’s de-radicalization and dis-engagement programs can mean that the programs are still not fully operational, that there is a lack of institutional reports on the issue, or that CVE priorities are elsewhere and do not focus on tertiary level programs. As mentioned above, I do not speak or understand Albanian, limiting the ability to verify or further evaluate discussions on the policy plans through media analysis. Furthermore, the research may be bias due to the selection of government, think-tank, NGO, and international organization documents.

In chapter three the research design was explained to clarify the objectives of the evaluation. This thesis aims to apply the realist review to the counter-radicalization strategies of Albania and Kosovo to determine the main objectives of each respective strategy. The review will explain if both countries either focus on strengthening resilience, family and network support, exit programs, or counter-communication, which is reflected in the measures/steps of each strategy. This categorizing of the measures/steps will then be evaluated against the progress reports by international organizations, NGOs, and think-tanks to see to what extend the strategies have been properly implemented. The reports are examined in depth to determine what measures have been implemented from 2015-2017. Reports critiquing the lack of implementation or focus on new objectives will also be examined. Through this research, the question of “what works, for whom, under what circumstances” (Gielen, 2017) can be answered for both Albania and Kosovo, due to both countries implementations of the strategies reflecting their respective capabilities.

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Chapter 4: Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the evaluation of the CVE strategies of Albania and Kosovo, as well as their implementation from 2015-2017. The first two subchapters (Chapter 4.1 & 4.2) organize the strategy of Albania and Kosovo into the four categories resilience, exit programs, family and network support, and counter-communication, to determine the strategy’s main areas of focus and objectives, as discussed in chapter three. While Gielen does not give a clear definition of what exactly defines a strategy or program under resilience, exit program, family and network support, or counter-communication, she provides factors from previous evaluations on measures that help organize the programs into categories.

The category of resilience, according to Gielen, can include any program concerned with preventing radicalization of an individual, group, or a community. It can involve mentoring, assisting youth in work or school, bolstering education, monitoring behavior, and or community engagement (Gielen, 2017, pg. 7). The exit-program category is concerned with programs that help already radicalized individuals to de-radicalize, disengage, rehabilitate, and reintegrate back into society. They often include the involvement of religious and community leaders, psychological professionals, civil society, and family and friends (Id., pg. 12). The classification of measures under network and family support contains any programs focused around the family and peers of someone radicalized or at risk of radicalization (Id., pg. 7). This support revolves around early identification, response, maintaining a positive environment, and how to deal with radicalized individuals, such as returnees, to disengage, deracialize, and reintegrate (Id., pg. 13). Lastly, the category of communication includes measures or programs that produce a counter-narrative to radical ideologies, block radical content online, create information campaigns on radicalism, and bolster communication between authorities and the community (Id., 2017, pg. 14).

By organizing the measures into these four categories, we can determine the main areas of focus for each strategy and their respective objectives. The subsequent subchapter (Chapter 4.3) evaluates the implementation progress of the abovementioned measures. The aim of this analysis is to conclude if the strategy was implemented as intended, by working towards its goals or if certain objectives or areas of focus were given priority over the others.

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Chapter 4.1: Albania

In 2015, the Council of Ministers created the Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism with an aim of reducing the high radicalization numbers in the less developed regions of the country. The ten-point plan outlines the various steps the government intends to take with the help of civil society, local municipalities, and NGOs to address the push and pull factors of Islamic radicalization. In the chart below, each step of the strategy is organized into the four categories described in the realist review. The steps are categorized by the common characteristics of programs in each category. Through this categorizing the area of focus of the Albanian strategy can be determine.

Step Measure/Objective Resilience Exit

Programs Network & Family Support Counter-Communication 1. Encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and

promote values of tolerance through education

ü ü

2. Address socio-economic drivers of radicalization through vocational education and training (VET)

and employment services

ü ü

3. Build trust and confidence and increase community safety through community policing

ü

4. Empower civil society to build community resilience

ü

5. Propose a creative and innovative communication strategy to complement the Albanian National

Strategy

ü

6. Influence attitudes and behaviors towards violent extremism through contextualized campaigns and

other communication initiatives

ü

7. Develop expertise on CVE through research and information sharing

ü

8. Enhance capacities of practitioners and frontline workers

ü ü

9. Evaluate policies: apply and share lessons learned ü

10. Develop partnerships at the regional and international levels

ü ü ü

Table 2. Overview of the Albanian National Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (Council of Ministers, 2015)

Chapter 4.1.1: Resilience

According to the characteristics of programs focusing on resilience (Gielen, 2017, pg. 7), the Albanian National Strategy primarily emphasizes the strengthening and creation of measures to enhance community and individual resilience towards radicalization. These primary initiatives center around raising awareness and preventing radicalization before it begins. While some steps

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of the strategy can be classified under multiple categories, all the steps of the strategy, with the exception of steps five and six, focus on resilience building.

Step one, “encourage critical thinking, civic participation, and promote values of tolerance through education,” aims to develop the resilience of schools throughout the country by expanding the “School as a Community Center” initiative (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 9). This initiative includes training staff to monitor and respond to signs of radicalization and expanding curricular and extracurricular activities to incorporate debate teams, religious and civic education, sports and arts teams, and any other activities the Ministry of Education and Sports believes will prevent radicalization in youth (Id., pg. 9). The goal of this step is to include possible at-risk youth in community and school programs, to give them a sense of belonging and limit feelings of alienation which make young individuals susceptible to recruitment.Step two of the plan aims to address the socio-economic causes by expanding vocational training in “hot-spot” areas and create employment opportunities to reduce Albania’s high unemployment rate (Id., pg. 10). This step in the strategy aims to combat the economic factors which affected many people to join Islamist organizations.

Step three of the strategy builds upon the prior Seven Year Strategy (2007-2013) that the Albanian Police created to begin a community policing program (Id., 2015, pg. 11). This is a turn from the traditional repressive strategy used in counter-terrorism strategy, which aims to build trust and collaboration with the community to prevent and detect radicalization and violent extremism (Id., pg. 11). Step four includes the assistance of civil society organizations to help in building community resilience by creating programs to encourage civic participation (Id., pg. 11). Other objectives of this step include the creation of information campaigns on preventing violent extremism and radicalization as well as informing the public of the other initiatives such as vocational training and extracurricular activities (Id., pg. 11).

Step seven targets long term prevention and resilience through the advancement of expertise and data on combating radicalization and violent extremism. By conducting research on trends throughout the country, and sharing the relevant information among local and national authorities, this step will assist in providing effective response in radicalization prevention as well as helping local authorities to bolster effective resilience initiatives (Id., pg. 14). Similar to step seven, step eight increases support for frontline workers, including teachers, social workers, and police, in assessing and assisting at risk individuals (Id., pg. 15). This includes training classes,

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creation of guidelines, and providing any necessary materials to ensure these stakeholders can identify and intervene in cases of radicalization or extremism (Id., pg. 15).

Step nine of the strategy is concerned with the evaluation of these new initiatives and programs to assess the effect of each individual measure of the national strategy on “hot-spot” communities (Id., pg. 15). This proposed step aims, through the evaluation, to learn from the success and failures of each step in the strategy, apply successful methods to all municipalities, and share the lessons learned to increase effectiveness (Id., pg. 15). Lastly, step ten has the goal of developing regional and global partnerships to share research data on causes of radicalization, as well as train relevant actors in the Western Balkans to combat both radicalization and violent extremism (Id., pg. 16). As mentioned before, significant Albanian populations exists outside of Albania and Kosovo in Serbia, Montenegro, and FYR Macedonia. These populations are heavily interconnected with one another despite being in different countries, and radical ideologies can quickly spread among these Albanian majority areas, making the need for a comprehensive regional strategy based on collective data necessary.

This strategy puts an emphasis on proactive localized efforts to strengthen individual and community resilience with a goal to prevent radicalization and violent extremism from emerging and spreading (Id., pg. 3). The steps of the strategy concerned with resilience aim to empower at-risk youth, families, as well as the community since these groups are the forefront of combating radicalization. These measures include action from civil society, religious and cultural institutions, as well as educational networks to address the many causes of radicalization to prevent these extreme ideologies from garnering support in Albania.

Chapter 4.1.2: Exit Programs

The area of the strategy that receives least attention is exit programs. According to the evaluation of the strategy, only step two of the plan mentions briefly providing assistance to those already radicalized. In a sub-bullet of the objectives of step two, “address socio-economic drivers of radicalization through vocational education and training (VET) and employment services,” it is stated that the strategy aims to create job training programs and provide assistance for violent extremist offenders undergoing rehabilitation and reintegration (Council of Ministers, 2015, pg. 10). Despite this small provision, no substantial strategy or tertiary initiative exists concerned with reintegrating and rehabilitating violent extremist offenders or returned foreign fighters from ISIS territory (Bogdani et. al., 2016, pg. 7).

Combating Islamic Radicalization that Leads to Violent Extremism in Albania and Kosovo