The national traditions according to populist parties and their consequences for Euroscepticism

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The national traditions according to

populist parties and their consequences

for Euroscepticism

MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Bernadet Neven Student Number: 10547339 Main Supervisor: dr. R.J. de Bruin

Second Supervisor: dr. A. van Heerikhuizen

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Preface

In front of you, you have the thesis “The national traditions according to populist parties and their consequences for Euroscepticism”. This has been written by a qualitative testing method. The thesis is written within the framework of my graduation for the master European Policy at the University of Amsterdam. From March 2017 until January 2018 I have worked on this research.

Together with my thesis supervisor, Robin de Bruin, I conceptualized the research question for this thesis. After a lot of improving the question and the content of the thesis, I managed to answer the research question. During my research, my supervisor, Robin de Bruin, helped a lot. With many meetings and feedback, this is the end result.

Hereby, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Robin de Bruin, a lot with the great guidance and support during this process. At the same time, I would like to thank my friends and family for brainstorming with me about this topic and for supporting me morally during this writing process.

I wish you a lot of pleasure reading this thesis.

Bernadet Neven

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Abstract

Euroscepticism is of all times. It had its ups and downs, but Euroscepticism already occurred since the beginning of the European cooperation. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, Euroscepticism had many peaks, for example with the Big Bang in 2004 and the euro crisis in 2008. Partly thanks to the rise of populist parties, the EU finds itself in heavy weathers these days. Populist parties always think that the national history and traditions of their own country is most important, but is this also the main cause of Euroscepticism? In this thesis, this question has been researched on the basis of three populist parties: Front National from France, Alternative für Deutschland from Germany and Partij voor de Vrijheid from the Netherlands. A first important thing that immediately comes forward in the existing literature, is the fact that there are several types of Euroscepticism. In this thesis, one will find out that national histories and traditions are definitely not the only driver of Euroscepticism; other events also contribute to Euroscepticism, such as the euro crisis.

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According to The Telegraph populism is rising in Europe and the main driver of this populism is Euroscepticism. Populism is not very new in Europe, however, the combination of a rise in populism and Euroscepticism is relatively new. Eurosceptics are citizens or politicians who present themselves as critical to the European Union. The EU takes, according to Eurosceptics,

the power away from their national government and poses a threat to national sovereignty.2

However, one must be careful with the term Euroscepticism. Where Euroscepticism is adopted in the context of national political debates, it assumes a meaning which must be understood to the different national traditions and experiences of European integration which frames these

debates.3_{Although we must be careful with the term, many common factors contributed to the}

fact that people became Eurosceptic. Take for example the refugee crisis as The Telegraph also mentioned: how the EU is handling this crisis is disapproved by a lot of European citizens. Populistic parties used this disapproval to gain popularity in several countries and spark Euroscepticism. However, the handling of the refugee crisis is obviously not the only reason that made many Europeans Eurosceptic. Another factor could be, for example, the national history of the countries. In this thesis, I will research this factor by questioning whether national history is used against the EU, according to populist parties. These parties argue that every time European integration will be expanded, the national states have less influence in the EU. In this thesis it is important to research the perception of these parties when it comes to national history and traditions. How do they use these history and traditions against the EU. Since the EU is too big to research every country, the thesis will focus on three countries: France, Germany and the Netherlands.

1_{Ashley Kirk. 2017. How the rise of the populist far right has swept through Europe in 2017.}

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/10/24/rise-populist-far-right-has-swept-europe-2017/. Accessed on: October 24th_{, 2017.}

2_{Euractiv. 2013. Euroscepticism: more than a British phenomenon.}

http://www.euractiv.com/section/med-south/linksdossier/euroscepticism-more-than-a-british-phenomenon/. Accessed on: July 12th_{, 2017.} 3_{Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are.}

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how-successful-they-are. Accessed on: May 17th_{, 2017.}

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2 But first of all, what is populism exactly? According to the dictionary, populism is “a political approach that strives to appeal ordinary people who feel that their concerns are disregarded by

established elite groups”.4_{The book of Anselmi goes further than this; populism is a demand}

for more democracy on the part of citizens. Anselmi argues that populism refers to a complexity

of phenomena which are key to democracy.5_{More important is the definition of radical}

right-wing populism, because I will research this type of populism in my thesis: “The new radical right-wing parties share an emphasis on ethno-nationalism rooted in myths about the distant past. Their program is directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically

homogeneous and by returning to traditional values.”6_{Although all three definitions are slightly}

different, all are telling us that citizens and the populist party as well are dissatisfied with the national ruling; they want to go back to the old days. The nation must be strengthened and the country needs to return to the old, traditional values. Therefore, the number populist parties is rising in Europe; populism is a big issue nowadays, especially in the Western countries. Populist

parties bond together to get their “sovereignty” back and reduce the power of the EU. 7_{This has}

been done by, for example, organising a European counter summit for populist parties. One was

held in Koblenz at January 21st_{of last year, where many European populist parties came}

together and informally launched the election campaigns in several European countries. Especially the elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany were a focus point during this summit. In January, the popularity of Front National (hereinafter FN) in France has risen after

the influx of refugees and the terrorist attacks in this country.8_{The party had a big chance to}

win the elections in France. The party has a conservative, Eurosceptic and nationalist voice. However, this voice was not the one to win in May of this year. Germany has the same sort of party; Alternative für Deutschland (hereinafter AfD). Angela Merkel took a bold step by vowing to welcome one million refugees in her country, but it fired back on her. Since then, the anti-immigrant party Alternative für Deutschland has assumed a more nationalistic platform

strongly opposed the influx of migrants.9_{In its neighbour country, the Netherlands, one of the}

populist parties is called Partij voor de Vrijheid (hereinafter PVV); the Freedom Party. The

4_{Oxford Dictionary. 2017. “Populism”. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/populism. Accessed on:}

January 7th_{, 2018.}

5_{Manuel Anselmi. 2017. Populism: An Introduction. London: Routledge, p. 2.}

6_{Jens Rydgren. 2007. “The sociology of the Radical Right”. Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 242.} 7_{NOS. 2017. Wilders, Petry en Le Pen presenteren zich als ‘leiders nieuwe Europe’.}

http://nos.nl/artikel/2154091-wilders-petry-en-le-pen-presenteren-zich-als-leiders-nieuwe-europa.html. Accessed on: June 13th_{, 2017.}

8_{CNN. 2016. How populism could shake up Europe: a visual guide.}

http://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/03/europe/populism-in-europe-visual-guide/. Accessed on: May 26th_{, 2017.} 9_Ibid.

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3 party has proposed registering Dutch citizens’ ethnicity and banning Islamic schools, and can be seen as the Dutch Front National. FN, AfD and PVV are not the only populist parties in the European Union. However, this thesis will focus on these three parties, since they drew a lot of media attention, due to the recent national elections. Furthermore, as already said, all three parties are radical right and thus arguing that the traditional values need to come back, as states in the definition of Jens Rydgren. Although almost everybody in the Netherlands and France was convinced that Geert Wilders and Marine le Pen would be the biggest winners in their countries, however it turned out to be different. AfD however, did not win the election as well but is new in the German politics and the biggest win for them is that they are the third biggest party in the country and is therefore for the first time in the Bundestag.

In this thesis I have chosen these three countries, since the three countries have more or less the same point of view about the European Union, however, their populist parties do not agree at all. Moreover, when taking national traditions into account, the German, French and Dutch presidents and Prime Ministers who worked on the European integration were also very important for the national history. Respectively Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle and Willem Drees are being called the Fathers of the country and did a lot for the rebuilding of the countries in many ways. For many inhabitants of the three countries these three persons are absolute heroes, but interesting in this thesis is the question whether the populist parties are also content with the history of these persons in their countries, because the Fathers are not only Fathers for their country but also for the European integration and the following European Union, which turned out to be a political disaster according to, especially, populist parties. This feeling of a political disaster for the EU is a form of Euroscepticism. This is not a phenomenon that has occurred since the past few years. However, since the Maastricht Treaty, there is more Euroscepticism in Europe. The Big Bang in 2004, for example, made many people in European countries Eurosceptic; according to many, the European Union became too big and too political

with this enlargement of the Union.10_{However, not only the politicians are the ones with strong}

opinions; the ignorance of EU citizens is a cause for Euroscepticism as well. Thereby, since the migration crisis of the past few years, Euroscepticism only rose more. Probably because of anxiety and big cultural differences towards the refugees. Although the countries already had a lot of migrants in their country due to the colonial past, the crisis was a turning point for many citizens. According to many Europeans the borders need to get closed for these immigrants.

10_{Kopecký, Petr. 2004. “An Awkward Newcomer? EU Enlargement and Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic”.}

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4 Populist parties always argue that they will keep the national traditions intact. However, the question remains what the national traditions are according to populist parties and thereby, which consequences they have for Euroscepticism? This will be researched in this thesis by examining the national traditions within the three populist parties of these countries. To come to an answer, the thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter, several types of Euroscepticism will be researched. This is important, since none of the countries has the same form or arguments when it comes to Euroscepticism. One country could be against the EU on the basis of economic arguments, the other could be against the EU because of their nationalistic thoughts. In this chapter, British Euroscepticism comes into play as well, because Euroscepticism at the island is totally different than Euroscepticism at the continent. In the second chapter, the colonial past will be researched. Since the beginning of the colonial era France and the Netherlands were proud of these overseas territories. In the countries, there was less resistance to migrants from the colonies than there is nowadays for all the migrants in the countries. Is there a real difference for these countries when talking about the migrants of the former colonies and the migrants of other countries as Morocco and Turkey? These first two chapters will be introductory and therefore descriptive in nature. The research will be done by means of existing literature. After these chapters, the thesis will research the national past. It investigates the opinion of FN, AfD and PVV when talking about the national histories of these countries. To give this insight, the chapter is divided into three cases. All three cases contain a former leader of the country and their policy through the eyes of the populist parties. The general question is whether the ideas of the populist party is in accordance with the ideas and legacy of the former leader of the country. The first case focuses on Charles de Gaulle and the ideas of Front National. The second case is about Konrad Adenauer and the views of Alternative für Deutschland. The third case is about Willem Drees and the Partij voor de Vrijheid. These cases will be researched by checking the party lines of the parties, many newspapers and interviews and several speeches of the party leaders. The last chapter examines the former threats and alliances. In this chapter, the Russian Federation and NATO will be discussed. Russia is traditionally a threat for Europe, especially for countries as Germany and the Netherlands. However, the three populist parties would like to strengthen the ties with the Russian Federation. This is also the case with NATO, but then the other way around. NATO is traditionally an alliance with Europe, Canada and the United States, but the populist parties would like to reduce the power of NATO. How do these two views of the populist parties relate to the national traditions? In this chapter, the research will also be done through literature and by checking the programme parties, newspapers and interviews and speeches of the party

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5 leaders. At last, the conclusion gives an answer to the research question posed in this introduction.

2. Different types of Euroscepticism

The central question in this thesis is if and to what extent national history is used against the EU, according to the three populist parties mentioned in the introduction. To come to an answer, we first need to know what Euroscepticism is and how it can be divided into different forms. In this chapter different types and forms of Euroscepticism will be described and France, Germany and the Netherlands will be divided over these different types. Furthermore, the British case will be described shortly in this chapter, because it is an extraordinary form of Euroscepticism and important in this thesis, because due to this kind of Euroscepticism the Brexit occurred in 2016. It is important to know their arguments and feelings when it comes to the EU, not only to show that the Brexit might have been inevitable, but also to understand even more that Euroscepticism has all kinds of forms. Great Britain has always been a stranger in our midst; according to a recent British article, the Brexit is the first domino which could topple the entire

political project of the “United States of Europe”, as many Brits the EU are calling.11_{As will}

be shown in this chapter, the Brits see themselves as “the other”, which means that they do not feel very European. This is one of the reasons why they voted against the EU in June 2016. According to recent definitions Euroscepticism expresses the opposition towards European integration. When following this definition, Euroscepticism is one of the biggest challenges today. Not only in Great Britain, but also on the continent. Radical Eurosceptics are frightened for the economic effects concerning EU enlargement as well as for the national sovereignty of

the states.12_{Even in the north-western countries on the continent, Euroscepticism has a strong}

influence on the citizens. The question is: why is the Euroscepticism present in these developed countries? A possible argument for Euroscepticism in these developed countries might be the idea that Europe is an invention of bureaucracy searching to form a bureaucratic and

undemocratic superstate or, according to Eurosceptics, a dictatorship.13_{In this chapter the}

11_{Matthew Ellerly. 2016. Across Europe Euroscepticism is on the rise, and is here to stay.}

http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/10/08/across-europe-euro-scepticism-rise/. Accessed on: May 16th_,

2017.

12_{Monica Condruz-Băcescu. 2014. “Euroscepticism across Europe: Drivers and Challenges”. European Journal of}

Interdisciplinary Studies 6(2): 53.

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6 evolution of Euroscepticism will be researched. Because Euroscepticism evaluated over time, one can speak now of several types of Euroscepticism. These types will be researched as well, thereby dividing the three populist parties over these kinds of Euroscepticism. Furthermore, I will examine the British Euroscepticism shortly as well, thereby questioning how this is related to the Euroscepticism on the continent.

2.1 Evolution of Euroscepticism

Since the foundation of the European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC) there have been negative feelings about Europe, because this European project was based on supporting the integration process economically and therefore the citizens of the member states have not been important for years. However, the term Euroscepticism reached the continent only in the 1990s. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU started to be lacking more legitimacy due to more influences the EU institutions got. But not only lacking legitimacy can

be assigned to the EU; the institutions were having a democratic deficit as well.14_{This has led}

to a gap between citizens and the political elite, which gave ultimately rise to Euroscepticism. The concept has become increasingly problematic for the Union when the Netherlands and

France rejected the European constitution.15_{Nowadays it seems that the more ambitious the EU}

actions are, the more the scepticism of citizens become critical for the political class. Citizens have never had the opportunity to reintegrate with the European Union, and therefore they do not know as much about the EU as they probably know about the national politics. The EU institutions and its integration process is now too far away for them and this is ideal for populism, because they can spread the negative word about the Union through their rank and

file.16_{Clearly visible in Figure 1 are the enlargements of Euroscepticism since the entry into}

force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

14_{Ibid, p. 54.} 15_Ibid. 16_Ibid.

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7 Figure 1. The Evolution of Euroscepticism since the TEU

This Treaty was the first benchmark, but in 1999 with the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, Euroscepticism rose again. In this Treaty the European Union made several adjustments that needed to enable the EU to function more efficiently and democratically in order to

cooperate in a better way with the coming enlargement.17_{This is probably an argument for}

some Europeans to become Eurosceptic since this could be more prove to a political union instead of the economic union it used to be. Another noticeable growth in Euroscepticism is 2002 when the euro was incorporated in twelve member states. For many Europeans, it was guessing what the outcome in this Union would be. And according to many Eurosceptics the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a disaster. This is also seen in Figure 1, because Eurosceptical feelings did not drop enormously after the start of the EMU. Moreover, since the beginning of the euro crisis in 2008, Euroscepticism has increased a lot. Thereby, this increase is more pronounced in the Eurozone countries compared to the non-Eurozone countries. The

17_{European Parliament. 2017. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties.}

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.3.html, Accessed on: May 22nd_{, 2017.}

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8 euro crisis has prompted the Europeans to reconsider their attitudes towards the EU and the

integration process from a utilitarian perspective.18

The evolution of Euroscepticism made sure that there are several types of Euroscepticism these days. This is due to the fact that every European or member state have different arguments and opinions when it comes to the EU. If, for instance, a European citizen argues that the EU lacks democracy, his neighbour will argue that the EU never should have incorporated the euro in 2002. This means that they have a different Eurosceptical view. In the next section, the differences in Euroscepticism will be further explained, with dividing the three populist parties over the different types of Euroscepticism.

2.2 Differences in Euroscepticism

The term Euroscepticism was invented on UK soil, but came to the continent in the nineties,

due to the debates of the Maastricht Treaty.19_{As already said in the Introduction, but very}

important, Euroscepticism must be understood against the background of the different national traditions and experiences of European integration. This means that Euroscepticism in France is not the same as Euroscepticism in Germany or the Netherlands. One can distinguish several types of Euroscepticism, as stated in Figure 2 below. Although FN, AfD and PVV can be compared with each other, the parties are different when it comes to the origin of Euroscepticism. In her latest election programme, Marine le Pen argues that she will regain the freedom of the French destiny by restoring the French sovereignty. Furthermore, she aims to transform the Common Agricultural Policy into French Agricultural Policy and guarantees that

the criteria for subsidies will be set by France and no longer by the EU.20_{This means that, when}

it comes to the different types of Euroscepticism, FN prefers more sovereignty: it is better that many decisions will be left with the national politics. AfD, on the other hand, prefers a more economical Euroscepticism. The party is no longer willing to accept the enforcement of the

18_{Loredana Radu, Elena Negrea-Busuioc and Alina Bargaoanu. 2014. “The rise of Euroscepticism in Times of}

Crisis. Evidence from the 2008 – 2013 Eurobarometers”. Romanian Journal of Communication and Public

Relations 16(1): 12.

19_{Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering. 2004. “Introduction: Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European}

Political Debate”. European Studies: A Journal of European Culture 20(1): 17 – 18.

20_{Front National. 2017. Election programme ‘144 Engagements Présidentiels’. Statement 1 and 126. Election}

programme ‘144 Engagements Présidentiels’. http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/144-engagements.pdf. Accessed on: June 13th_{, 2017.}

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9 euro rescue package, therefore they call for an end to the so-called “euro experiment” and its dissolution. According to AfD, the introduction of the euro has been a political project and all warning messages were ignored by the European officials. The eurozone was to become the most dynamic and innovative economic zone in the world, however, according to the German party, the currency is not viable without ongoing massive wealth transfers into the member

states that do not meet the standards of the currency union. 21_{PVV claims that the EU does not}

bring prosperity and jobs, but only many payments to Brussels and therefore it costs prosperity

and jobs instead22_{, which means that Euroscepticism of PVV is, just as AfD, based on the}

economic criteria. On the other hand, the party is also related to the sovereign criteria. In a statement in 2010, party leader Geert Wilders stated the following: “We can be a member of the European Economic Area like Norway, or a member of the European Free Trade Association like Switzerland, in order to remain the economic advantages. Without being a member of the EU and the eurozone, we are again the boss of our own rules, like of who is

coming in the country, immigration and our own currency.”23_{This means that the party would}

like the Netherlands to withdraw from the EU in order to get their own sovereignty. Because the Dutch party is strongly against immigration of Muslims, it is necessary that the borders will be closed and therefore the Netherlands needs to de-Europeanise.

21_{Alternative für Deutschland. 2016. Programm der Alternative für Deutschland.}

https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf . Accessed on: June 12th_{, 2017.}

22_{Geert Wilders. 2014. Nederland moet zich bevrijden van de EU.}

https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/7614-pvvopinie100514.html. Accessed on: June 14th_{, 2017.} 23_{Geert Wilders. 2010. Wilders wil Nederland uit de EU.}

https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article.html?id=5540:wilders-wil-nederland-uit-eu. Accessed on: July 3rd_{, 2017.}

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10 Figure 2. Types of Euroscepticism.

Type Explanation

Euroscepticism based on economic criteria

Quantifies pragmatically the major benefits and costs arising from EU membership, resulted or not from a cooperative process.

Euroscepticism based on the criteria of sovereignty

Considers that, at EU level, cooperation should not be a challenge to national sovereignty. These Eurosceptics support supranational cooperation in matters that the state cannot manage alone (such as environmental issues and the fight against organised crime) but wish to preserve national skills for socio-cultural policies.

Euroscepticism based on democratic criteria

Perceives the current institutional structure of the Union as inadequate in terms of representation and democratic participation of citizens.

Euroscepticism based on political criteria

Assesses EU action based on the doctrine of belonging to a political family; analysts believe that the dominant form of this disproof is social.

Source: Condruz-Băcescu, p. 55.

Although Figure 2 shows several kinds of Euroscepticism, and FN, AfD and PVV are very much Eurosceptic, nor the countries of these parties or other continental member states have actually withdrawn from the EU. Great-Britain did only 1.5 years ago and this is mainly due because of the Eurosceptical attitude of, apparently, more than half of the population. In the next section, the British Euroscepticism will be defined and explained, thereby linking it to continental Euroscepticism.

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2.3 British Euroscepticism compared to continental Euroscepticism

According to Harmsen and Spiering, British Euroscepticism had a sense of “otherness” in

relation to the continental Europe and its economic and political integration.24_{The English}

dictionary defines a “Euro-sceptic” as “a person who opposes closer connections between

Britain and the EU”.25_{However, British Euroscepticism must be understood as not simply an}

opposition to the institutional forms of Europe, but it is rooted in a deeper sense of seeing themselves as a different entity. The sense of otherness is also linked to a feeling of solidarity

with a wider community of English-speaking nations.26_{Moreover, the use of this term must}

only be understood as more embedded within the British political and historical context. The term is attached to the anti-integrationist position which has found expression in both the

Conservative and Labour Parties throughout the post-war period.27_{Moreover, there is a}

complex series of political, economic and cultural factors which can be seen as distinguishing Britain from the continent, which makes the Brits more Eurosceptic than others in the EU. The sense of otherness was best captured in a 1952 speech of Sir Anthony Eden that a British membership of a “federation on the continent of Europe” was something “we know in our bones

we cannot do”.28

The island’s Euroscepticism is one of the reasons the country came to the Brexit. The Brexit campaign and UKIP’s rhetoric harkens back nostalgically to a time before joining the EU, when the Westminster parliament was sovereign, society was predominately white Anglo-Saxon, the factories still provided well-paying and secure jobs for workers in the Brits and

Britain remained a major economic and military power in the Commonwealth.29_{Many voted in}

favour of Brexit, because it was an opportunistic move to register discontent with either the EU

or the national government.30_{This sort of Euroscepticism can be defined as hard}

Euroscepticism:

24_{Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, p. 13.}

25_{Cambridge Online Dictionary. Eurosceptic.}

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/eurosceptic?q=Eurosceptic. Accessed on: June 14th_{, 2017.} 26_{Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering, pp. 16 – 17.}

27_{Harmsen and Spiering, p. 16.} 28_Ibid.

29_{Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: Economic have-nots and}

cultural backlash. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2818659. Accessed on: September 1st_{, 2017.}

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“Where there is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their countries should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.”31

Another form of Euroscepticism, is soft Euroscepticism. This can be defined as the following:

“Where there is NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national interest’ is currently at odds with the EU trajectory.”32

Both principles are important here because eventually, both Euroscepticism will give the negative spirit in the European Union. However, most important in this thesis is the hard Euroscepticism that is mainly seen in, for example, the populist parties. Hard Euroscepticism is seen more and more after the Brexit. Within hours after the Brexit, FN leader Marine le Pen

and PVV leader Geert Wilders were demanding referendums in their own countries.33

According to many, the EU must not sit back but listen to its citizens and respond to their

concerns, particularly on the repatriation of powers from Brussels.34

2.4 Conclusion

Since the beginning of the EEC, there have been negative feelings about Europe, because the European project was based on supporting the integration process economically instead of socially. Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU started to be lacking more legitimacy and as seen in Figure 1, Euroscepticism has known many ups and downs from that period on. Because European citizens never had the opportunity to reintegrate with the

31_{Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart. 2008. Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism.}

Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 2.

32_Ibid.

33_{Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are.}

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how-successful-they-are. Accessed on: May 17th_{, 2017.}

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13 European project, they now do not know much about the EU. The EU institutions and its integration process is now too far away for them and this is where populism comes into play, because the populist parties can spread the negative word about the Union through their rank and file. Because of the development of Euroscepticism since the beginning of the European project, there are now several kinds of Euroscepticism. The Germans, for example, are Eurosceptic since the euro crisis. This has led to an election programme wherein AfD is claiming that Germany needs to withdraw from the euro and get their own mark back. Germans are tired of paying the debt of other countries with their money. According to FN, France would like to have its sovereignty back. This is only possible if the country withdraws from the EU. This is not very strange, since France is a very nationalistic country. Therefore, it is very hard for the French to give its sovereignty to another institution. However, since the victory of Macron in May of this year, France seems far away from withdrawing from the EU. When taking PVV into account, the party claims that the EU only brings many payments to Brussels and therefore it costs prosperity and jobs. This means that Euroscepticism of PVV is based on the economic criteria. But not only the economic criteria is important for the party; the sovereign criteria is as well. The party wants to be the boss of its own rules, when it comes to immigration and the currency. This means that the party would like the country to withdraw from the EU in order to get their own sovereignty back. A whole different form of Euroscepticism is what Great-Britain has. British Euroscepticism is rooted in a deeper sense of seeing themselves as a different entity; the sense of otherness. This feeling ensured the Brexit in 2016. It is a little bit the same form as the sovereignty form on the continent, however, British Euroscepticism has a complex series of political, economic and cultural factors which can be seen as distinguishing Britain from the continent.

3. Migration processes

Many of the political parties in the EU member states that are in favour of withdrawing from the EU are either anti-immigration or Islamophobic. Especially for populist parties, migration is one of the most common issues to become Eurosceptic, since migration and the rise of (radical) Islam are two issues on which the EU and national governments work intensively

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together.35_{However, the flow of migrants coming to the European Union is not a new}

phenomenon; there has always been migration and it has evolved over the years. Migratory flows such as the flows of asylum-seekers, labour migrants or migrants due to decolonization processes, all of these migration processes are associated with various problems. This includes terrorism, criminality and social unrest and therefore migration and asylum issues have become

important topics of contemporary security politics in the EU.36_{Migration is thus an evolvement}

over the years and one can therefore argue that it is embedded in the national traditions of the countries. First, especially France and the Netherlands in this case had to deal with migrants coming from their (former) colonies. However, the European institution had little to do with it, since decolonization processes was not linked to Europe. Another important migration process is labour migration; with labour migration, I mean migration from North-African countries, but also Spain and Italy. Due to the fact that there were at least two European countries involved, Europe has somewhat to do with this kind of migration. The last migration process is the refugee migration; not only today’s crisis, but also the crisis in 90s is important here. Due to the Dublin Regulation and the Schengen Agreement, the EU is definitely involved in this migration process. What is questioned in this chapter is to what extent the three populist parties blame the EU when it comes to migration processes? What is striking, for example, is the fact that France and the Netherlands are proud about their colonial history, but at the same time they do not want migrants in their country nowadays. In my opinion, this is a bit strange and very paradoxical. This chapter will research the three migration processes through the eye of the populist parties and thereby answering the question whether these processes are a cause of Euroscepticism or not.

3.1 Decolonization migration

Despite differences in history with regard to migration, all of the European countries face issues related to migration and integration. Especially in France and the Netherlands many migrants from former colonies are now inhabitants of France and the Netherlands. Although colonial ties

35_{Will Carter. 2016. A Guide to Europe’s Key Eurosceptic Parties, and how Successful they are.}

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/brexit/2016/08/guide-europe-s-key-eurosceptic-parties-and-how-successful-they-are, Accessed: May 17th_{, 2017.}

36_{Sarah Léonard. 2010. “EU border security and migration into the European Union: FRONTEX and}

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15 are no longer a determining factor in Europe because of the increasing mobility, standardised social relations, convergent politics of immigration and globalised markets, it is important to mention the migration process after the decolonization in this chapter.

When it comes to integration of immigrants in European countries, the demand for recognition is very important. This allows immigrants to emerge from the political sidelines and fully integrate within state structures. In France, the treatment of North African immigrants by local and national authorities has been guided by a fear of Islam since the 1990s. At the same time, the French notion of secular “republican citizenship” is incompatible with an attachment to religious and ethnic identity and this has made Islam a serious struggle in France. This was especially the case after students of North African origins began to wear Islamic clothing in schools and of course nowadays with the war on terror. When it comes to the Dutch case, it is different. Where the ideal Frenchman is a real republican, the ideal Dutchman does not exist.

The pillarization in the Netherlands during almost the whole 20th_{century is the outcome of the}

multicultural attitude that controlled the country especially during this century. This pillarization goes hand in hand with the multicultural attitude. Many citizens from former colonies are migrated to the Netherlands and are more likely to be seen as compatriots than migrants from other countries. This is because, for example in the Netherlands, these migrants

are part of the Kingdom for a long time and they speak Dutch.37 _{According to PVV, the natives}

have the right to stay in the Netherlands. Other migrants are guests and need to learn to behave

according to the rules the Dutch know; the right of the first.38_{Striking is that PVV does not}

have an opinion about the pillarization as a whole during the 20th_{century. One might say that}

this is because the EEC did not have anything to do with it. Moreover, PVV did not exist during the pillarization, thus it is not necessary for them to have an opinion about it.

In the next section I will discuss labour migration, thereby questioning again whether this migration process is a cause of Euroscepticism according to the populist parties or not.

37_{Ibid. p. 83.} 38_Ibid.

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16

3.2 Labour migration

After the Second World War, more specifically in the 1950s and 1960s, European countries competed for cheap labour to rebuild their economy and their society after years of destruction

because of the destroying wars.39_{From the 1960s on, labour migration rose in Europe due to}

the booming economy during this decade. Not only North-Africans, but also Italians and Spaniards came to northwest-Europe. Due to the entry into force of the customs union in 1968, which was the fundament of the single market. This is one of the reasons why Italians and Spaniards came to northern European countries. The 1980s marked a real turning point in the relationship between the European countries and immigrants. In 1986 the Single European Act (SEA) entries into force, where Europe was defined as follows: “an area without internal

frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.”40_From

then on, together with the Schengen Agreement states coordinated their policy of immigration

and cooperated to protect a common border from flows of immigration.41_{This meant that the}

era marked the shift from temporary economic migrants to the permanent settlement of

immigrant populations and their political participation.42_{Furthermore, due to the collapse of}

the Berlin Wall in 1989, many East-European migrants came to West-Europe as well. After the Big Bang in 2004, the East-West migration poses the biggest European change since the fall of

the Berlin Wall. Nowadays, especially the United Kingdom has these migrants in the country.43

However, although many East-Europeans are located in the UK today, the Netherlands did have some debates about labour migration from East-Europe. In one of the debates, in 2011, PVV reacts to the Report of the Temporary Commission “Lessons from recent labour migration”. Herein is concluded that the migration of East-Europeans to the Netherlands is underestimated

and that the influx of these migrants was not steered in the right direction as well.44_{“As one of}

the few parties, we were from the beginning against opening up the labour market for

39_{Ibid. p. 82.}

40_{The Single European Act. 1986. Article 8a.}

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:a519205f-924a-4978-96a2-b9af8a598b85.0004.02/DOC_1&format=PDF. Accessed on: May 24th_{, 2017.} 41_{Riva Kastoryano. 2010, p. 80.}

42_{Ibid. p. 83.}

43_{OECD, 2000, Trends in International Migration. https://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/2508596.pdf. Accessed}

on: June 11th_{, 2017.}

44_{Overheid.nl. 2011. “Parlementair onderzoek Lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie”.}

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17

European states.”45_{According to the Dutch party, labour migration causes troubles such as}

harassment, less shelter and repression on the labour market. PVV wonders why the government expected a limited influx of labour migrants when the labour market opened up in

2007.46_{According to Clingendael Magazine FN has capitalized on the anxieties of the French}

society towards globalization, the economic and financial crisis as well as the disappointment

with the current European project, ever since the electoral breakthrough in 1982.47_Identity,

citizenship, French suburbs and “laïcité” (disestablishment) are seen by the right-wing

politicians as republican symbols under threat by immigrants.48_{However, FN is in contrast to}

refugee migration not really against labour migration. The party argues that the French have to keep in mind that Islam could be a threat, especially since the War on Terror and the assaults in 2015 and 2016. Nevertheless, this threat is more coming from asylum seekers, or returned foreign fighters, than that it comes from labour migration.

When looking to Germany, the demands by Turks for dual citizenship introduced clear distinctions between nationality, citizenship and identity. The eventual recognition of a Muslim community by the public authority was not lost on those seeking full integration of Turkish immigrants into German society. Debates and arguments about religion in Europe concentrate on the relationship between church and state in order to interpret and acknowledge diversity

with regard to Muslim immigration.49_{However, this diversity is not acknowledged by many}

citizens and (populist) parties. AfD got in the latest election a lot of votes from past non-voters (1.2 million). In many ways, this is an anti-Merkel vote, reflecting opposition to her controversial “Willkommenspolitik” towards immigrants in every form. This apparently not only pushed some voters of mainstream parties to switch but also mobilised previous non-voters. 85% of the voters want stronger national borders; AfD has profited from the fact that

immigration was the number one issue in these elections.50_{AfD is a young party, but has a}

strong opinion about immigration and this is reflected on the voters. However, just as FN, AfD

45_{PVV. 2011. “Inbreng debat over het Rapport van de Tijdelijke commissie Lessen uit recente arbeidsmigratie”.}

https://www.pvv.nl/index.php/component/content/article/46-sietse-fritsma/4836-inbreng-debat-over-het-rapportvan-de-tijdelijke-commissie-lessen-uit-recente-arbeidsmigratie.html. Accessed on: January 12th_{, 2018.} 46_Ibid.

47_{Sarah Wolff. 2016. “Immigration; an issue in the French presidential campaign”.}

https://www.clingendael.org/publication/immigration-issue-french-presidential-campaign. Accessed on: January 12th_{, 2018.}

48_Ibid.

49_{Riva Kastoryano, p. 82.}

50_{Cas Mudde. 2017. “What the stunning success of AfD means for Germany and Europe”.}

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/24/germany-elections-afd-europe-immigration-merkel-radical-right. Accessed on: January 12th_{, 2018.}

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18 has more to say about the refugee migration, than about labour migration. For example, stronger national borders is number one priority because of the immigration policy with respect to refugees.

Therefore, I will discuss refugee migration in the next section, thereby questioning again whether this migration process is a cause of Euroscepticism according to the populist parties or not.

3.3 Refugee migration

In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam conferred law-making powers in the field of migration in the EU. It provided the legal basis for the realisation of the call by the European Council in the

Tampere Conclusions to develop a common EU asylum and migration policy.51_{This policy}

was part of a broader project of turning the EU into an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). At the Tampere European Council in 1999, the EU Heads of State and Government declared that the EU needs a comprehensive approach to migration. This approach needs to

address political, human rights, issues in countries and region of origin.52

Since 2007 the European migration regime has undergone substantial reforms in terms of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). This includes the Dublin Regulation, the Asylum Directives, the European Refugee Fund and European Asylum Support Office. Under the Dublin Regulation, an asylum-seeker must claim asylum in the first EU country they enter. This means that a huge number of migrants will not go further than Italy or Greece, which is something the populist parties in France, Germany and the Netherlands support. They rather do not want any asylum seeker from Syria in Europe, however, when they are not in their country it is fine as well. In an interview with news site Nu.nl PVV claims that the Netherlands does not have to give shelter for the refugees coming from Syria: “The refugees who register in the Netherlands have made a trip through different safe countries (via Turkey, Greece, through

51_{Alan Desmond. 2016. “The Development of a Common EU Migration Policy and the Rights of Irregular}

Migrants: A progress Narrative?”. Human Rights Law Review 16(2): 247.

52_{Sandra Lavenex and Rahel Kunz. 2008. “The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations”. Journal}

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19

Europe to the Netherlands), so they are not on the run for war and abuse.”53_{However, due to}

the fact that many (Syrian) refugees enter the European Union through Greece the past few years, both the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice decided in 2011 to suspend all the transfers back to Greece on grounds that migrants’ fundamental rights

could not be guaranteed.54_{For similar reasons, transfers to Italy, Hungary, Poland and Malta}

have also been suspended for short periods. The EU tried to address this situation with Dublin Regulation II, which includes new safeguards, a requirement for states to assess the rights implications of a Dublin transfer before they remove someone to another member state and an “early warning mechanism” intended to prevent the degeneration of member state’ asylum

systems.55_{However, in 2015 a total of 4.7 million people immigrated to one of the EU member}

states and among the 4.7 million there were an estimated 2.4 million citizens of non-member

countries and some 19 thousand stateless people.56_{Because of these enormous numbers, the}

Dublin system came under growing pressure. Therefore, the Commission proposed a permanent relocation scheme which would effectively bypass the Dublin rules in cases of emergency situations.57

The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon affected a number of important institutional and legislative changes which are for relevance in the field of migration policy. According to Hampshire, the Lisbon Treaty changed the institutional rules of the game. Therefore, the expectation was that the empowerment of supranational institutions would result in greater harmonisation and more liberal policies, because the institutions have traditionally taken a

pro-migrant approach.58_{However, since there are more migrants coming to Europe the last few}

years, the opposition towards immigration grows as well. The public opposition towards immigration is not new, but since the EU embarked on its migration project in the late 1990s immigration has become an increasingly salient issue and public attitudes have hardened across many member states. As Euroscepticism and negative public opinion on immigration have increased, national governments have reasserted their authority in the recently communitarised

53_{Nu.nl. 2015. Dit zijn de vluchtelingen-standpunten van de politieke partijen.}

http://www.nu.nl/politiek/4146863/vluchtelingen-standpunten-van-politieke-partijen.html. Accessed on: September 1st, 2017.

54_{James Hampshire. 2016. “European Migration Governance since the Treaty: Introduction to the Special}

Issues.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 42(4): 538.

55_Ibid.

56_{Eurostat. 2017. Migration and migration population statistics.}

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics. Accessed on: May 17th_{, 2017.} 57_Ibid.

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20

policy process.59_{The politicisation of Europe and immigration at the domestic level has}

reinforced member states’ resistance to further harmonisation. Migration is one of the political priorities of the Juncker Commission, with its main aim to approach the issue in a comprehensive way. The Commission’s migration agenda defines immediate measures needed to prevent human tragedies and to strengthen emergency responses. However, large numbers of and negative publicity about migrants in the past few years, caused a lot of sympathisers for withdrawing from the European Union, especially when looking at the populist parties as FN, AfD and PVV. This is not strange, because looking at Figure 3, these three countries are in the top five of countries who have agreed to relocate migrants from Greece and Italy. Furthermore,

the three countries are as well in the top five of approved asylum applications in 2015.60

Therefore, these countries adopted a lot of migrants, especially Germany who had to relocate 662.680 refugees, in 2016 only. France had 61.830 refugees in that year and the Netherlands

14.775 refugees at a total of 1.038.810 refugees in Europe who need to be relocated.61_{A lot of}

resistance came along with this relocation, because of anxiety and the big cultural differences

between the national culture and the cultures of the refugees.62_{With this resistance there is in}

some way also resistance to Brussels, where the officials made plans to relocate the refugees within the Member States without asking the citizens.

59_{Ibid, p. 544.}

60_{BBC. 2016. Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven Charts.}

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911. Accessed on: May 17th_{, 2017.}

61_{Werkwijzer vluchtelingen. 2017. Aantallen & herkomst.}

http://www.werkwijzervluchtelingen.nl/feiten-cijfers/aantallen-herkomst.aspx. Accessed on: June 14th_{, 2017.}

62_{RTL Nieuws. 2016. Nederlander worstelt met vluchteling: angst en twijfel.}

https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nederland/politiek/nederlander-worstelt-met-vluchteling-angst-en-twijfel. Accessed on: June 14th_{, 2017.}

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21 Figure 3: EU member state migrant quotas

Populist parties make grateful use of the fact that Brussel plays a large role in the relocation of

migrants and designate the scapegoat to Brussel to spark Euroscepticism. Therefore, the EU

only fades away for many citizens: “Code red now applies for the European Union” is the

headline of the Dutch newspaper NRC in the beginning of 2017.63_{However, according to the}

authors of this article only the political parties in the EU are complaining about the European project, so do they drag the European citizens with them into the Eurosceptic position? They probably do. As already stated, for many citizens the EU is an institution which is too far away to know something about it. Therefore, when a politician argues that their country need to withdraw from the EU or Brussels needs to have less power, many people take this for granted and side with these politicians. Due to the Refugee Crisis among other things, populist parties

63_{Stéphane Alonso and Tijn Sadee. 2017. Voor de Europese Unie geldt nu ‘code rood’.}

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2017/02/01/voor-de-europese-unie-geldt-nu-code-rood-6510117-a1544058. Accessed on: June 14th_{, 2017.}

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22 as Front National, Alternative für Deutschland and Partij voor de Vrijheid have risen because of their position to immigrants. Many citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands stand completely behind these populist parties because they have an absolute and clear opinion about this crisis and immigrants in general. This means that the populist parties are the ones that can take care of these immigrants and not the EU and therefore the party members of these parties are becoming Eurosceptic as well.

3.4 Conclusion

Migration has occurred in Europe for centuries. However, since colonial ties are no longer a factor of immigration because of the increasing mobility and globalised markets, many other migrants come to the EU. From the 1960s, labour migration rose in Europe due to the booming economy during this decade. Due to the entry into force of the customs union in 1968, which was the fundament of the single market, not only North-Africans came to Europe, but Italians and Spaniards as well. Because of the entry into force of SEA in 1986, the era marked the shift from temporary economic migrants to the permanent settlement of immigrants. Furthermore, the collapse of the Berlin Wall introduced East-European migrants in West-Europe. Where colonial migration was a real matter of the country itself, labour migration is already a bit of a European matter. The three political parties are not that eager when it comes to labour migration. However, only PVV has a real opinion about it, namely that the Netherlands had to pay more attention when it comes to labour migration; FN and AfD are only warning for the refugee migration. Since the past few years, migration has become one of the causes for European citizens to become Eurosceptic. When looking at the election programmes of FN, AfD and PVV, one might say that they have a more severe immigration policy than ever. Due to their speeches about immigrants in Europe, the parties create anxiety in their country and because citizens become anxious, people listen more and more to the party leaders in order to get more hold and hope and less anxiety.

Where migration in Europe is something that occurs with the national tradition of colonialism, it is a problem for Europeans nowadays. During the colonial past, people were proud of the colonies and the migrants it brought with them, but this kind of nationalism lies behind them and people feel more anxiety to immigrants than that they feel the need to integrate them in the country.

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23

4. Using national past

According to the authors of the article “Can the EU survive populism?”, the European Union is caught between nationalists (the populists) and internationalists (the liberals). Furthermore, they argue the following: “The EU as an organisation could suffer great damage from the populist wave. The Union’s purpose, European integration, is a transnational project built on the principles that populists most oppose: shared sovereignty, supranational authority,

compromises between different interests and mutual tolerance.”64_{The Eurozone and the}

migration crisis have accelerated trends of polarisation and fragmentation, as already seen in the previous chapters. This is in some ways also due to the populist parties, because populists accuse the elite of being alienated from the people and of being arrogant, incompetent and selfish. According to populists, the elite has no idea what ordinary people want and focus only

on their own interests.65_{However, one might say that not only the elite focus on their own}

interests, but the populists are doing the exact same thing, and therefore arguing that the elite is alienated from the people might be two-faced.

Although populists claim that they are revolutionary and that they want to give the national pride back to the people in the country, the question not only remains whether they are doing what the citizens really want, but also whether these parties really focus on the national pride and history. In this chapter, the national histories of the countries will be researched through the eyes of the three populist countries. Here, the question is whether the three parties appeal to this history and whether this can be seen in their election programmes or interviews and other such materials. To research this, this chapter contains three cases in which the national history will be researched, as well as the contemporary national thoughts. First is the case of Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle. How is the party of Marine le Pen arguing the case of the Algerian Independence War and does she agree with the decisions made by Charles de Gaulle as a president? The second case is Alternative für Deutschland vs. Konrad Adenauer and his “Westbindung”. AfD is accused of trying to get rid of this Westbindung; do they not agree with this phenomenon and Adenauer's policy at all? The third case will be Partij voor de Vrijheid vs. Willem Drees. Prime Minister Drees was very much pro-Europe; he helped to start the ECSC

64_{Heather Grabbe and Stefan Lehne. 2016. Can the EU survive populism?}

http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/14/can-eu-survive-populism-pub-63804. Accessed on: May 24th_{, 2017.}

65_{Matthijs Rooduijn, Sarah de Lange and Wouter van den Brug. 2014. “A Populist Zeitgeist? Programmatic}

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24 back in the time. Partij voor de Vrijheid is against the European Union nowadays, can it then be stated that they are negative about Drees as well? The reason that these three men will be researched through the eyes of the three populist parties is because these three men can be seen as the founding fathers of the nation. They all wanted the same things: the country had to become united, as far as this was possible for West-Germany, and the economic prosperity of the three countries had to be improved. They can be best described in the national history and therefore the chapter will examine whether there is some common thread seen in the political decisions made by the founding fathers and the populist parties.

4.1 Front National vs. Charles de Gaulle

Front National (established in 1972) emerged in the 1983 – 1984 elections as, in that time, a “petty-bourgeois” party, which is the social class between the middle and the lower class. Like many European radical right parties, FN moved from pro-integrationist nationalism to

increasingly structured opposition to the EU in the late 1980s.66_{Since the 1990s, the position}

of FN on Europe is underpinned both by the promotion of the nation and by the rejection of immigrants. Since her election at president of Front National in 2011, the leader of the party (Marine le Pen) has steered the party according to the “dédiabolisation” strategy, which means de-demonization. Marine le Pen has put forward some supposedly left-wing economic and social positions. Nowadays FN has progressively made its mark as one of the main opponents to the European Union in both the French and the European politics. FN is strong against the European elite. However, while it has been difficult for the radical right to form stable coalitions at the European level, at every opportunity since the 1980s FN has actively participated in the

creation of parliamentary groups and the development of formal partnerships.67_{For the new}

party leadership, EU elections and the choice of European partners provides an opportunity for forging alliances for a domestic de-demonization strategy and to assert the new president’s

leadership on this question at the EU level.68

66_{Emmanuelle Reungoat. 2015. “Mobilizing Europe in national competition: The case of the French Front}

National”. International Political Science Review 36(3): 303.

67_{Ibid, p. 299.} 68_{Ibid, p. 301.}

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25 In this section, the leadership of Charles de Gaulle will be researched. This will be done by examining the Algerian Independence War of 1954 – 1962 and how de Gaulle handled several issues during this period. Thereby, the comparison with Front National will be made and at the end there will be concluded if there is a common thread in the decisions that have been made.

4.1.1 Charles de Gaulle

When looking at Charles de Gaulle, he once declared the following:

"All of my life, I have had a certain idea of France. This idea is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me naturally imagines France, like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I have the feeling that Providence has created her either for complete success or for exemplary misfortunes. If in spite of this, mediocrity shows in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, not to the genius of the land. But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France is not really herself unless in the front rank; that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.69

In line with this, FN has said something similar in its election programme of this year. FN states here that France needs to find its freedom and control of its destiny by restoring the sovereignty

of the French people.70_{When looking at the statement of Charles de Gaulle, you might say that}

FN agrees with his argument about French greatness. According to de Gaulle, this greatness could only be achieved by a politics of grandeur or by a politics that tried to carve out an equal

and independent role for France among the great powers.71_{The politics of grandeur aimed at}

strengthening the moral and political unity of France. De Gaulle believed that foreign policy entails an attitude of self-regard. This self-regard was both a cause and a consequence of

69_{Cited in D.J. Mahony. 2000. De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur and Modern Democracy. London:}

Transaction Publishers, p. 3.

70_{Front National. 2017. “144 Engagements Présidentiels”. Number 1, p. 3.}

71_{Reed Davis. 2011. “A Once and Future Greatness: Raymond Aron, Charles de Gaulle and the Politics of}

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26 grandeur. De Gaulle’s drive for grandeur was guided by the spirit of promoting French sovereignty and grandeur, amass French military power and enhance French diplomatic prestige.72

De Gaulle had a very specific vision of the Europe he wanted to build, namely, an intergovernmental organisation centred on France and Germany but including the Six. France blocked hereby British membership in the EEC in order to show that France did not accept the indefinite postponement of a political Europe and the supremacy of the US in Western Europe. De Gaulle's EEC policy was a function of his distinctive policy regarding NATO, nuclear

weapons, the Cold War and nationalism, which followed from his geopolitical vision. 73_After

a period behind the scenes de Gaulle’s return to power was in May 1958, due to the Algerian Independence War that had begun in 1954. The origins of this War can be traced to the last day of World War II in Europe. Nationalists in Algeria had associated themselves with American anti-colonialism and organized celebratory marches. These marches quickly turned into bloody clashed between Algerians and Frenchmen. Here, French forced massacred ten thousands of

Algerians.74_{This meant the beginning of many years of War in the French region. The military}

rebels supported de Gaulle with the understanding that he would preserve Algeria, but de Gaulle never had this intention. Moreover, de Gaulle found a way to separate Algeria from France while restoring the military to obedience to civil authority and dealing with the one million

colons of European origin.75_{Therefore, de Gaulle decolonized the oversees region of France,}

then restore the political stability and third he had to establish the foundation of his external policy. Charles de Gaulle wanted to transform France into the spokesman in the developed world for the aspirations of the nations in the Third World. France tried to achieve the better things in life brought by a higher standard of living. Therefore, they had to decolonize the colonies, because colonised countries, in the long run, cost a lot and the question for France

then was if this fits in the higher standard of living they had in mind.76_{According to Charles de}

Gaulle, decolonize Algeria was the greatest service he had rendered France in his career.77

However, according to the French citizens, the loss of Algeria was not what they expected.

72_{Andrew Moravcsik. 2012. “Charles de Gaulle and Europe: The new Revisionism”. Journal of Cold War Studies.}

14(1): 54.

73_{Ibid., pp. 55, 56.}

74_{Matthew Connelly. 2001. “Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: the Grand Strategy of the Algerian}

War for Independence”. International Journal Middle East Studies. 33(2): 222.

75_{Irwin Wall. 2002. “De Gaulle, the ‘Anglo-Saxons’, and the Algerian War”. Journal of Strategic Studies. 25(2):}

119, 120.

76_{Ibid., p. 121.} 77_{Ibid., p. 120.}

The national traditions according to populist parties and their consequences for Euroscepticism