Explaining deterrence failure under power parity
Bachelor project 11: Deterrence and Compellence in International Politics Student name: Timon Osinga
Student number: 1663275
Thesis supervisor: Dr. Huib Pellikaan Date: 17 June 2019
2 Contents
Introduction p. 3
Section 1: Theoretical Framework p. 4
- Power Parity p. 4
- Power Preponderance p. 4
- Deterrence Theory p. 4
- Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers p. 5
- Concepts p. 6
Section 2: Methodology p. 8
- The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison p. 8
- Deterrence and Compellence p. 8
- Cases p. 9
- Variables p. 9
- Classification p. 10
Section 3: Case Studies p. 12
- The Berlin Blockade 1948 p. 12
- The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea 1950 p. 15
- The Taiwan Strait crisis 1954-1955 p. 18
- The Quemoy crisis in 1958 p. 21
- The Berlin Deadline Crisis 1958-1959 p. 24
- The Berlin Aide-Memoire crisis in 1961 p. 27
Section 4: Analysis p. 29
Section 5: Conclusion p. 31
3 Introduction
Most studies of conflicts in international relations focus on wars between factions of similar strength and power. The primary explanation is that they comprise of and lead to structural changes in the international system (Mandelbaum, 1988a, p. 1). In this context, weaker states are condemned to submit to the wishes of an adversary or align themselves with another great power (Mandelbaum, 1988b, p. 195). However, there are many historical cases in which a weaker state, sometimes under threat of annihilation, challenges the stronger state’s deterrent posture and chooses to engage in war with a stronger adversary.
T.V. Paul’s book Asymmetric Conflicts: War initiation by Weaker Powers (1994) aimed to address this gap in the literature by assessing whether four variables - a limited aims/fait accompli strategy, great power support, offensive capabilities and domestic power structure - were determining factors in the decision of weaker states to initiate war against a more powerful adversary. He concluded that these variables were all significant albeit some more than others. His research thus explains why weaker states initiate wars against stronger states. This thesis aims to apply Paul’s findings to assess to what extent they also explain why states in a situation of power parity choose to defy the adversary’s deterrence and pursue their goals through military means. It will assess whether Paul’s four variables were determining factors in six cases from George & Smoke’s book Deterrence in American foreign policy: theory and practice (1974), which is an attempt to study American deterrent efforts after WWII. This research goal leads to the following research question: What factors explain why states defy deterrence in situations of power parity? This analysis may add to the literature and theory on deterrence while it may also provide policymakers with the ability to evaluate the likeliness of deterrence success in a symmetric conflict situation.
To that end, the first section details the theoretical framework of war initiation and deterrence theory, followed by the methodological approach. The next section assesses the relevance of four variables by analysing six case studies. The final section analyses the findings and suggests the implications for deterrence theory.
4 Section 1: Theoretical framework
Power parity
The overwhelming scientific thought on preventing war between great powers is that an equilibrium of power preserves peace, as otherwise the stronger power will attack the weaker (Haas, 1953, p. 448). It contends that balance of power prevents stronger states from upsetting the status quo because it lacks certainty of success (Singer, Bremer & Stuckey, 1972, p. 24). Although the theory has strength in identifying why great powers rarely engage in full-blown conflict, it is short on explaining why great powers often engage in conflicts of lesser scale.
Power preponderance
An alternative hypothesis suggests that preponderance of great powers preserves peace because a state is more likely to be deterred by a preponderant than an equal power (Weede, 1976, pp. 409-410). Policymakers often refer to this hypothesis of ‘peace through strength’ and point out historical cases that a country ill-prepared for war will be threatened by aggressive states. However, this is often contradicted by the observation that arms build-up might provoke an arms race (Wallace, 1982, p. 38).
Deterrence theory
Whereas the theories above are system level theories, the principal theory for this research is the decision level deterrence theory. Morgan defined deterrence (as cited by Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 496) as: “the threat to use force in response as a way of preventing the first use of force by someone else”. It assumes that states’ decisionmakers are rational actors who aim to maximize utility (Lebow & Stein, 1989, p. 2081). Following the expected utility model (De Mesquita, 1985, pp. 157-161), decisionmakers make choices based on their expected costs and benefits, equal to winning or losing a war and a continuation of the status quo. This depends on the attacker’s and defender’s relative strength, the value the attacker weighs on changing the defender’s policies versus his own possible policy changes, and the relative strength of other states which will potentially
1 See for instance Jervis, R. (1989). Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence. World Politics, 41(2), 183-207; and Achen, C. H., & Snidal, D. (1989). Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies. World politics, 41(2), 143-169 for critique on the rational assumption of deterrence.
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intervene. Following this model, deterrence will fail if the expected gains of using military means to attain policy objectives exceed the potential costs.
Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers
In his study Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (1994), T.V. Paul aimed to explain why militarily and economically weaker states initiate war against stronger states. Paul used six cases to test whether four variables explain the initiation of war by weaker states against a superior opponent: (1) Employment of a limited aims/fait accompli strategy; (2) Support of a great power ally; (3) The possession of short-term offensive capabilities; and (4) Domestic power structure. He used an intervening variable ‘time pressure’ to link the four independent variables.
He concludes that all four variables were, to a certain degree, of influence in explaining why weaker states initiated war against a stronger adversary (Paul, 1994, pp 167-172). The decisionmakers’ calculations were most heavily influenced by the expectation that a strategy of limited aims/fait accompli would be successful in achieving political and military goals. The guarantee of great power support was also of critical influence in convincing decisionmakers to pursue their goals through military means. In all six cases these two factors were a determining factor in war initiation. The possession of short-term offensive capabilities was a determining factor in four cases, so it played a moderate role. Domestic power structure was a critical factor in three cases and a moderate factor in the remaining three cases. Domestic power structure thus exacted a moderate to strong influence on initiating war.
The intervening variable ‘time pressure’ was valid for every case and for different variables, pushing decisionmakers to exploit a narrow window of opportunity to attain their political goals. Decisionmakers were forced to act quickly in all cases because they believed a limited aims/fait accompli strategy and reliance on alliance support warranted quick action. In four cases, the short-term advantages of their offensive weapons applied time pressure to decisionmakers. The domestic power structure also faced time pressure to initiate war four times.
Although Paul’s research might offer a valuable expansion for deterrence theory (Mor, 1996, p. 236), critics emphasize a major error in his operationalization (Peterson, 1996, p. 117). In analysing his results, he applies a value of 1-10 indicating approximate
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presence of each variable in every case (Paul, 1994, p. 168), but he does not offer any explanation for these numbers.
Figure 1:
Recently, he acknowledged that these values were applied arbitrarily2. Nevertheless, while his operationalization is flawed, his framework of variables remains useful for further analysis. This requires the development of a revised operationalization, which will be detailed in the methodological section.
According to Paul, deterrence theory has two main problems in explaining why some states choose to use military means to achieve their policy objectives (Paul, 1994, p. 9). Firstly, it does not account for considerations of the initiator other than a complete military victory. Secondly, the theory does not consider other strategies than a massive military assault.
This research aims to address these issues by investigating why states in a situation of power parity use military means to achieve their objectives, defying the defender’s deterrent efforts. This requires a qualitative approach to assess whether factors were relevant in individual cases of symmetric deterrence.
Concepts
In order to apply the theoretical framework properly, several concepts need to be adequately defined. The ‘defender’ is defined as the state making the deterrent threats aimed at preserving the status quo. The ‘initiator’ is defined as the state that first launches a military attack. A ‘symmetric conflict’ is defined as a conflict between two states who are in a situation of power parity. ‘Power’ is defined using the common ‘power as control over resources’ conception of power (Hart, 1976, pp. 289-291). This assumes that the
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state with the most resources has the most persuasive power and is more capable of inflicting great harm on an opponent. The sources of power are demographic, economic and military.
8 Section 2: Methodology
The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison
To answer the research question, the method of structured, focused comparison will be utilized (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 67-73). This enables the study of historical events to generate useful knowledge about significant problems in foreign policy, allowing the researcher to extend his findings about a certain phenomenon into a broader theory.
The method is ‘structured’ because the researcher poses general questions which reflect the research objective. The questions are subsequently posed to each case under study, enabling systematic comparison. The method is ‘focused’ because only certain aspects of the cases are under examination.
A valid comparative case study research requires the researcher to: (1) clearly identify the ‘class’ of events of which a case must be an example; (2) produce a well-defined research objective with corresponding research strategy; and (3) utilize variables of theoretical interest to explain the observations.
Deterrence and compellence
To satisfy the first requirement, the distinction between deterrence and compellence needs clarification. A situation of deterrence is a threat by state A, designed to prevent state B from taking actions it is considering. The sanctioned threat is employed only when state B undertakes the action state A aims to prevent. In a compellence case, state A attempts to force state B to comply with its demands. The sanction is applied until state B complies with its demands (Schelling, 1960, pp. 195-199). So, it requires B to change its behaviour, or to undo an unwanted action.
While the two terms refer to conceptually different uses of threats, Huth and Russett make a relevant observation: “a single historical case may include both types of policies…. the case can be validly used to test propositions on deterrence even when it includes examples of both deterrent and compellent behaviour” (1990, p. 475). Therefore, while some cases in this study may include compellent behaviour, carefully selecting the aspects of deterrence safeguards the case’s validity.
9 Cases
George and Smoke’s book is an authoritative work detailing eleven deterrence attempts in American foreign policy (Tarr, 1975, p. 1086). The choice of cases for this research is based on two criteria; it must be a case of deterrence and it must be a situation of power parity. Due to space limitation, six cases will be chosen for analysis.
All chosen cases are examples of power parity where one state applied deterrence while another state used military means to achieve its objectives. Since the defender state is making a threat to prevent the initiator from taking action, these cases are all cases of deterrence and not compellence. By assuring that all cases are examples of symmetric deterrence, the results allow for the expansion of deterrence theory.
The following cases will be analyzed: The Berlin blockade, the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, the Taiwan Strait crisis, the Quemoy crisis, the Berlin deadline crisis, and the Berlin aide-memoire crisis. Other cases in George & Smoke such as the Cuban Missile crisis present either a case of compellence rather than deterrence, or an asymmetric rather than symmetric conflict. For every case, George & Smoke’s distinction between attacker and defender state will be utilized.
Variables
As previously mentioned, Paul admitted on April 23rd, 2019 that the values in his
operationalization (see figure 1) were selected arbitrarily. While this problem with assigning weight to each variable per case undermines the validity of his conclusions, it leaves the explanatory value of his framework of factors unaffected. Thus, Paul’s four independent variables will be tested for relevance in all cases to answer the research question. The intervening variable ‘time pressure’ will not be tested because it does not individually influence the decision to initiate conflict, it links the independent variables. Therefore, it is always present and thus irrelevant.
The first variable is the use of a strategy of limited aims/fait accompli. This is one of three strategies3 initiators can employ to pursue objectives using military means (Paul, 1994, p. 24). The distinguishing factor of a limited aims strategy is that it seeks to achieve limited political and military goals, using limited military means. This minimizes the risk of a heavy response from the adversary (Warrington, 1994, p. 2). A limited aims strategy
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does not require the annihilation of the enemy’s forces. Rather, it seeks to quickly seize small portions of territory to secure future negotiations (George, Hall & Simons, 1971, p. 17). By confining the offensive to a limited geographic area, against selected military targets and with restricted objectives, it is assumed that the defender will not escalate the conflict.
The second variable is alliance support. A potential initiator may be more inclined to strike if it enjoys great power support because it limits the chance of escalation. A potential initiator may also be motivated to strike if the defender lacks credible alliance support because this reduces the defender’s retaliatory power (Paul, 1994, p. 31). States also tend to initiate war in the initial years of an alliance, when commitments and responsibilities are not yet clearly defined (Ostrom & Hoole, 1978, p. 232). If the defender is in a newly formed alliance, the initiator may also be tempted to test the credibility of the alliance (Morrow, 2000, p. 78).
The third variable is the possession of offensive weapons, which offers a potential initiator the opportunity to inflict heavy damage quickly (Paul, 1994, p. 30). The potential initiator will recognize that the relative advantage of these weapons is only short-lived, because the defender might acquire superior weapons in the future (Morrow, 1989, p. 512). This creates a narrow window of opportunity in which these weapons can be used effectively. Offensive weapons can be used to inflict damage to the defender’s economic and political infrastructure, and to disrupt the defender’s offensive capabilities (Grygiel, 2015, p. 41).
The final variable is domestic power structure. Paul argues that a state is more likely to initiate war if a militaristic group assumes control of the decision-making process (Paul, 1994, p. 33). Such a group may view military means as the most attractive to obtain political objectives. When a regime lacks legitimacy and is faced with domestic instability, especially in the beginning of its tenure, diversionary wars may be seen as an effective solution. This makes such regimes more likely to have an aggressive foreign policy (Enterline, 1998, p. 402).
Classification of the variables
To avoid Paul’s faulty operationalization, this study utilizes a different design. To analyze the viability of these variables for symmetric deterrence failures, every variable will be labelled as ‘relevant’ or ‘not relevant’ in every case. A variable is ‘relevant’ if it clearly
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had a strong influence in the decisionmaker’s decision to defy deterrence. A variable is ‘not relevant’ if the decisionmakers were not influenced by this variable.
After analyzing all cases, the variables will be categorized:
- High importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts.
- Medium importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts.
- Low importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts.
- No importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts.
A variable is of ‘high importance’ if it is labelled as ‘relevant’ in five or six of the cases under study. A variable is of ‘medium importance’ if it is labelled as ‘relevant’ in three or four of the cases under study. A variable is of ‘low importance’ if it is labelled as ‘relevant’ in one or two cases under study. A variable is of ‘no importance’ if it is labelled as ‘relevant’ in zero cases under study. This distinguishes the variables regarding their value for explaining why initiators opted for military means in a situation of power parity, while avoiding Paul’s arbitrary classification scale.
12 Section 3: Case Studies
The Berlin Blockade 1948
The crisis
After WWII, relations between the USSR and the Western powers steadily deteriorated, culminating in the Soviet blockade of West-Berlin. The allies chose to prevent escalation and organized an airlift to supply West-Berlin. This was not seen as a direct confrontation as it circumvented the blockade, instead of challenging it. The blockade was eventually resolved in 1949 through a negotiated settlement which left the Western position mostly intact. The Soviet objective was to force the Western powers to abandon their plans for a separate West-Germany without Soviet control (Clay, 1950, p. 367). A secondary objective was to test Western unity and commitment to Berlin. Although the blockade is a Soviet compellence attempt, this case study focusses on the failure of US/NATO’s deterrence strategy. Therefore, the USSR is the initiator and the US/NATO is the defender.
Limited aims strategy
US views of Soviet intentions in Berlin were primarily guided by the thought that a Soviet move against West-Berlin entailed high risks (New York Times, as cited in George & Smoke, 1974, p. 121). Therefore, a blockade was not seen as a viable policy option. For the Soviets however, the blockade presented a low risk/high reward strategy (George & Smoke, 1974 p. 118). It presented an option with controllable and reversible risks, as any possible threat of Western escalation could be averted by lifting the blockade (Knapp, as cited by Spencer, 1968, p. 386). Moreover, George Kennan notes that Stalin was not in search of a military victory but intended to: “squeeze play, designed to place the Western powers before an inescapable choice: either to abandon the German capital to Communist political control…. or to abandon the London Program in favour of a new round of talks” (1967, p. 420). This indicates that Stalin sought to obtain political goals through the blockade. Since the blockade presented a low-risk option, aimed at achieving political goals, this variable is ‘relevant’ in explaining the Soviet decision to issue the blockade. Alliance support
One Soviet objective was to test Western unity (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 118). The blockade would be a costly enterprise for the West to undermine in terms of diplomatic
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concessions and military commitments. The so-called ‘baby blockade’ of April 1948 was the first test of Western commitment to West-Germany, and it could have provided an opportunity to show strength. However, there was severe disagreement among the Western powers and within the US itself (Clay, 1950, pp. 259-261). Officials were aware of the West’s precarious military position in Berlin and some were calling for a complete withdrawal. Others were eminent on absolute commitment to Berlin. This argument was still ongoing when the blockade went into force. The lack of tough response to the baby blockade assured Soviet leaders that the US was willing to accommodate to Soviet demands (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 125). Since a primary objective of the Berlin blockade was to test Western unity, ‘alliance support’ is ‘relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
The military balance of power around Berlin was overwhelmingly in Soviet favour. While the USSR had between one and 1.5 million men stationed within the Soviet sector surrounding Berlin, the Western powers had approximately 300,000 men, of which only the minority were operational soldiers (Miller, 1998, pp. 16-18). The main US deterrent was of nuclear nature, since the USSR lacked this capability. However, there was no narrow window of opportunity to exploit since US forces in Europe were only slowly adjusting to the newly unfolding situation (Miller, 1998, p. 17). Moreover, one could argue that the American nuclear monopoly would delay Soviet pressure on Berlin until they could match that capability. Since the USSR did not possess any crucial offensive short-term weapons accelerating their decision for the blockade, this variable was ‘not relevant’.
Domestic power structure
The unmistakable leader of the Soviet Union in 1948 was Josef Stalin. Although there is evidence that he personally instructed to increase pressure on the West in Berlin (Miller, 1998, pp. 10-11), Stalin had been in power since 1922. Since a recent regime change is a prerequisite for this variable, this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Conclusion
Common deterrence theory suggests that the West successfully deterred the USSR from a military engagement against Berlin, but the blockade may have been the preferred policy option. Western deterrence failed because the USSR adopted a limited aims
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strategy and because the Western powers were not in an official alliance, tempting the USSR to test their commitment. These variables are thus labelled ‘relevant’. The possession of offensive weapons was not relevant because of Soviet military dominance around Berlin and the American nuclear monopoly. The domestic power structure was not relevant because it had not undergone a recent shift to account for the decision to impose the blockade.
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The Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea 1950
The crisis
After North Korea invaded South Korea, UN forces waged a defensive war hoping to buy time for US reinforcements to arrive. When it became apparent that North Korean forces would be unable to drive UN forces off the peninsula, China became concerned with the settlement of the war. China feared that coalition forces would attempt to unify the Korean peninsula. China threatened to intervene if coalition forces crossed the 38th parallel. In response, the US offered assurances that they did not intend on attacking China. When coalition forces crossed into the North in October 1950, Chinese ‘volunteer’ forces began crossing into North Korea discreetly. When the US launched its final offensive, China launched a massive counteroffensive which sent US forces reeling back. A costly attrition war ended with a cease-fire in 1953. While some studies of deterrence classify the US as the attacker and China as the defender because of the US thrust into North Korea4, this
study focusses on the US failure to deter a Chinese military intervention during a specific phase of the Korean War. Therefore, China is labelled the initiator and the US the defender (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 184-186).
Limited aims strategy
Initial US calculations suggested that China would be unable to mount a military intervention in 1950 (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 209). As Chinese threats increased, US policymakers became increasingly concerned with the possibility that China would reject a buffer zone. (McLellan, 1968, p. 29). In fact, Chinese leadership believed that such a powerful enemy on their doorstep needed to be deterred by military means to prevent further US adventurism (Halperin, 1963, p. 19). Since this presented a direct threat to Chinese national security, major military means were employed to ensure Chinese safety (Hunt, 1992, pp. 464-465). China did not employ a limited aims strategy, so this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Alliance support
In February 1950, the USSR and China signed a declaration of friendship, starting massive Soviet military and economic assistance (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990, p. 109). After
4 See for instance Huth, P., & Russett, B. (1984). What makes deterrence work? Cases from 1900 to 1980. World Politics, 36(4), p. 507. doi:10.2307/2010184
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the war situation became increasingly grave for North Korea, Stalin agreed to send massive amounts of Soviet weapons and war materials to China and provided full air support. This was essential because China lacked an air force of its own. Since the USSR provided such massive military support; without which China would not have been able to wage war; this variable was ‘relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
China’s reliance on Soviet military assistance suggests that China lacked the domestic capability to challenge US military prowess (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990, p. 105). Chinese ground forces were equipped with WWII era weapons and they were dispersed throughout the country. The US also possessed overwhelming naval forces and China lacked an air force to challenge US air power. Another major factor was US possession of nuclear weapons. Internal proponents of a Chinese intervention argued that the recent Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons provided a deterrent against American use (Holloway, 2010, p. 6). Opponents feared that the US would deploy them to avoid defeat. Given the overwhelming US military superiority and Chinese reliance on Soviet military assistance, this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Domestic power structure
In April 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) delivered the fatal blow to the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party, ending the civil war. After his seizure of power, CCP Chairman Mao denounced the US as an imperialist power and sought Soviet support (Tse-Tung, 2014a). Since his government was only recently established, Mao saw the US as an immediate threat to his regime’s survival (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990, pp. 103-104). Mao anticipated that US presence in North Korea would require huge amounts of Chinese forces on the border, which would be expensive and politically dangerous. Domestic counterrevolutionaries could become encouraged by the US presence, and Chinese forces would be insufficient to combat them because they were stationed at the border (Christensen, 1992, p. 135). Essentially, this crisis was the new regime’s first test, and its survival depended heavily on success on the Korean peninsula. Since Mao saw this as a major threat, this variable was ‘relevant’.
17 Conclusion
Several factors have become apparent explaining the failure of US deterrence. Firstly, US presence in North Korea presented a major threat to Chinese security, warranting the use of major military forces instead of limited use of force. So, the limited aims variable was not relevant. The possession of short-term offensive weapons was also not relevant. On the contrary, China was heavily dependent on Soviet military support, making alliance support relevant. Finally, the domestic power structure was relevant in explaining the intervention because Mao feared for the survival of his newly established regime.
18 The Taiwan Strait Crisis 1954-1955
The crisis
The outbreak of the Korean war saw US support for Nationalist China (ROC) increase. The Communist Chinese (PRC) intervention in Korea further intensified US-ROC ties. US deterrence was restricted to Taiwan itself, islands closer to Chinese mainland were excluded. Gradually, US commitment to these offshore islands increased and the Nationalists strengthened their forces on the islands. This was aimed at preventing a Communist takeover of the islands but simultaneously increased the Nationalists’ leverage to drag the US into commitment. When negotiations for a US-Taiwan defence agreement were underway in 1954, China answered with an artillery bombardment of Quemoy island. This tempted Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek to attempt to include the offshore islands in the treaty. Eventually, the treaty was concluded without commitment to the islands (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 266-267). The US is the defender and China is the initiator.
Limited aims strategy
Communist China saw the Nationalist presence on Taiwan and the offshore islands as a threat for several reasons. Firstly, Nationalist incursions on Chinese mainland were frequent and destabilizing (Brands, 1988, p. 126). Secondly, it kept Nationalist hope alive of returning to the mainland (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 277). Finally, the imminent alliance treaty between the US and the ROC was seen as seriously destabilizing to Chinese interests (Matsumoto, 2012, p. 84). The PRC lacked military capability to directly challenge US commitment to the islands (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 277), but the artillery strike provided a controllable strategy without a high risk of provoking American overreaction (Chang & Di, 1993, p. 1510). Therefore, this variable was ‘relevant’.
Alliance support
Mao’s artillery bombardment of Quemoy pushed the US to the brink of using nuclear weapons (Chang, 1988, p. 97). This prospect frightened the Soviets, as they were already trudging dangerously close to conflict with the US in Korea. Previously, Stalin had even opposed the idea of militarily liberating Taiwan (Chang, 2007, p. 40). Nevertheless, the USSR supported the shelling, indicating that Chinese and Soviet interests on the Taiwan
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issue were aligned (Tubilewicz, 2005, p. 461). There is, however, no evidence that Mao was reliant on Soviet support to initiate the artillery barrage, therefore this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
The influence of short-term offensive weapons on China’s decision to bombard Quemoy is undermined by the geographic factor. Quemoy is only two miles away from Chinese mainland, positioning it well within range of Chinese artillery. In January 1954, initial plans were made to use land, naval and air forces to permanently drive Nationalist forces from the offshore islands (Goldman, n.d., p. 16). When the crisis escalated in October 1954, the US was forced to increase military aid to Taiwan. Another issue complicating China’s invasion plan was the increased activity of the US seventh fleet. To avoid a direct confrontation, China forbid its military from bombing the islands if there was US naval or air presence (Whiting, 2001, pp. 108-109). Since offensive weapons capability was not included in Chinese calculations, this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Domestic power structure
Mao had been in power for approximately four years, and he had obtained valuable experience in using controlled military pressure to obtain political objectives (Chang & Di, 1993, p. 1509). Influenced by Communist assumptions regarding imperialism, he believed that China was the defender and the US the aggressor. However, his strategy on Taiwan was not solely based on military means (Chang & Di, 1993, p. 1508). The ‘Liberate Taiwan’ propaganda campaign brought worldwide attention to the issue, and diplomatic efforts against the US were considerable. Mao even had to check his overly eager military commanders from confronting US forces (Chang & Di, 1993, p. 1513). The fact that Mao did not limit himself to military means in order to achieve his objectives and the lack of power structure change render this variable ‘not relevant’.
Conclusion
Chinese motivations for initiating the artillery bombardment of Quemoy included the continued threat of Nationalist China’s presence on Taiwan and the undermining of US-ROC relations. Simultaneously, the risk of American overreaction was to be kept at a minimum. Given the limited objectives and means of this initiative, the limited aims strategy was relevant. The other three variables were not relevant. No alliance support
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was sought, offensive weapons capability was no crucial determinant, and the domestic power structure was not overly militaristic.
21 The Quemoy Crisis 1958
The crisis
On August 23, 1958, Communist China started using artillery to bombard Quemoy island to block Nationalist supply of the islands. It succeeded until September 7th, when the US Navy intervened. The US first underestimated the effectiveness of the blockade but reassessed its position on September 4th, stressing that Quemoy could not be lost. This indicated that the US was still very committed to Quemoy, so China suggested opening ambassadorial talks to avoid an American overreaction. However, China continued the blockade because it believed that the US would not risk a major war against China. By September 21st, US skill and improvisation had succeeded in breaking the blockade. A temporary cease-fire was agreed on October 6th and the crisis gradually subsided (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 363-367). China is the initiator and the US the defender.
Limited aims strategy
Although the first Taiwan crisis was resolved, the underlying issues had not subsided. There were two reasons why China was feeling increasingly threatened by the situation in Taiwan. Firstly, China received no signals from Washington that the threat to Chinese mainland would decrease or that the Taiwan crisis would be resolved peacefully (Gurtov, 1976, p. 70). Taiwan had 600,000 military personnel in readiness for a possible return to the mainland (Kallgren, 1963, p. 35), and the US had reinforced Taiwan with nuclear capable Matador missiles (Department of State, 1957). The US was also rejecting Chinese diplomatic proposals to peacefully resolve the crisis (Gurtov, 1976, pp. 68-70). Secondly, the US intervention in Lebanon in July 1958 strengthened the Chinese view that US foreign policy was aggressive (Tse-Tung, 2014c). To address these threats, Mao opted for a low-risk, reversible probe. Military means that would have implied intent to invade the islands were avoided because he acknowledged American strength and willingness to intervene (Gurtov, 1976, p. 90). In fact, Mao never intended to invade the islands because the Nationalist presence offered Mao the option to harass them whenever he wanted (Khrushchev, 1974 as cited in Gurtov, 1976, p. 93). This indicates that Mao deliberately chose a limited aims strategy, so this variable is ‘relevant’.
22 Alliance support
During the previous Taiwan Strait crisis, the Soviets supported the shelling of Quemoy. In 1958, Mao requested military equipment from Moscow to launch an operation against Taiwan (Tubilewicz, 2005, p. 78). Moscow complied because it supported China’s cause. However, when the shelling stopped in October and no invasion followed, Khrushchev was surprised. This lack of Soviet-Sino communication occurred because Mao had become increasingly frustrated with the gap between his high ambitions and his country’s weak position (Sheng, 2008, p. 497). In his view, begging for Soviet aid illustrated his country’s inferiority and he increasingly came to see the Soviets as ‘big power chauvinists’. Mao’s increasingly antagonistic views of the USSR indicate that he was not reliant on Soviet support, making this variable ‘not relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
In their research of the Quemoy case, George & Smoke emphasize that the local military balance of power had shifted significantly in China’s favour compared to 1954 (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 374). The construction of coastal airfields and improved artillery placement had supposedly improved China’s position vis-à-vis the US. However, these gains were nullified by increased American military assistance to Taiwan (Fravel, 2008, p. 61). US troop levels stationed on Taiwan reached nearly 20,000 men, and Taiwan received many new US fighter aircraft. Moreover, the US was actively seeking to solidify its commitment to Taiwan’s defence. This resulted in US-Taiwan training exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the establishment of the US-Taiwan Defense Command in March 1958. US increased commitment and assistance to Taiwan neutralized China’s arduous attempts to strengthen its military position against the US, making this variable ‘not relevant’.
Domestic power structure
Mao’s increased antagonism against the USSR was only an indicator of his style of leadership. Moscow had begun to doubt Mao’s mental stability due to his handling of the first Taiwan Strait crisis. (Goncharenko, 1998, as cited in Sheng, 2008, p. 499). His irrational behaviour was caused by his urge to become leader of the communist world. Under Khrushchev, the USSR had administered a policy of peaceful coexistence. Mao aimed to lead the socialist countries more aggressively against the West (Tse-Tung, 2014b). However militaristic and erratic his views were, Mao exerted significant
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restrictive measures on his military to prevent a major confrontation with US forces (Whiting, 2001, p. 110). This variable is ‘not relevant’ because no recent shift in power structure had occurred and because he restricted his military’s freedom of engagement.
Conclusion
Similar to the first Taiwan Strait crisis, the employment of a limited aims strategy is the only relevant variable. Responding to the increased US and Nationalist threat, Mao opted for a low-risk probe to increase pressure. The possession of short-term offensive weapons was not relevant because increased US commitment nullified Chinese arms investments. The domestic power structure was also not relevant as Mao had been in power since 1950. Finally, alliance support was not relevant because Mao was frustrated with China’s position vis-à-vis the USSR. This resisted him from actively seeking Soviet support.
24 The Berlin Deadline Crisis 1958-1959
The crisis
Although no new crisis had manifested since 1948, Berlin was a frequent topic of negotiations and threats. In December 1957, NATO announced a plan to base nuclear-capable missiles in Europe under US control. In response, the USSR deployed nuclear warheads on East-German soil and publicized the intention to tackle the Berlin issue. On November 27th, 1958, the USSR sent identical notes to the three Western powers occupying Berlin, proposing negotiations for a treaty for a “free” Berlin, essentially putting it under East-German control. The note included an ambiguous six-month ultimatum; it was not clear if the negotiations needed to be concluded in six months or started after six months. The US reacted flexibly to the note, but Soviet demands faltered in diplomatic communication and public declarations. The Soviets eventually agreed to postpone negotiations (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 390-391). The USSR is the initiator and the US/NATO is the defender.
Limited aims strategy
In the ten years between the two crises, several major developments had occurred (Barker, 1963, p. 59). NATO had been established, Germany had been divided, and West-Germany had been rearmed. Two factors were increasingly frustrating for the USSR (Zubok, 1993, pp. 7-8). Firstly, the West-German nuclear armament program was seen as a serious threat to Soviet survival. Secondly, the discrepancy between East German-West German living standards produced a stream of high-skilled workers from East to West. West-Berlin thus stood as a capitalist beacon in the heart of communism. The deadline note comprised of a low-risk option to increase tensions in Berlin, creating a fait accompli (George & Smoke, 1974, p. 398). It consisted of a threat of a possible blockade in the future if its demands were not met, and it contained adequate ambiguity to confuse the West. Other options such as a renewed blockade and military confrontation had a high risk of American overreaction, something Khrushchev desperately wanted to avoid (Barker, 1963, p. 62). Given the limited nature of the deadline note, this variable was ‘relevant’.
25 Alliance support
The USSR did not require alliance support to initiate the escalation because of its dominant influence in Eastern Europe. The deadline note created significant disagreements between the Western powers because they had increased their commitment to Berlin due to its symbolic value (Shlaim, 1983, p. 14). The Eisenhower administration’s first objective was to create consensus in the West, but this proved difficult (Burr, 1994, pp. 178-179). The US believed that a strong military threat could deter Khrushchev and expedite negotiations, but Britain and France found this too perilous. They finally adopted a moderate approach with an option for future force initiation. There is however no clear evidence that undermining Western unity was one of the Soviet objectives, so this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
US and NATO commitment to Berlin had been centred on American strategic deterrence (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 393-394). Although Soviet conventional forces were capable of overwhelming Western conventional forces, the US strategic arsenal was more advanced and numerous than the Soviet’s. By the late 1950’s however, the strategic balance had shifted because the USSR had demonstrated its capability of launching an intercontinental missile capable of reaching the US (May, 1998, p. 154). This shift discredited the US nuclear deterrent threat. Khrushchev capitalized on this advantage because he was convinced that the West would not risk war over Berlin (Selvage, 1998, p. 201). Because this shift proved crucial in the Soviet decision to reignite the Berlin issue, this variable is ‘relevant’.
Domestic power structure
By 1958, Khrushchev had been in power of the USSR for eight years, influencing all major decisions. Some argue that the deadline note was an aggressive move, but Khrushchev was very pragmatic in finding a solution to the Berlin problem. Although he preferred to unify Berlin and include it into East-Germany, he realised that would prove impossible because of conflicting East-West interests (Harrison, 2005, p. 110). His intent on peacefully resolving the Berlin issue becomes evident from his account of a phone call with Walter Ulbricht, president of the East-German Socialist Party:
26
We can’t make any more concessions, giving up our gains and creating a unified Germany on a capitalist basis. The other side doesn’t accept socialism. We must discuss this realistically…. we must consider the existing situation together with the west. It would be smart for them to conclude a treaty with us, not creating an antagonistic conflict, not disturbing peaceful coexistence (Harrison, 2005, p.110).
Because he had been in power for eight years and his intent on resolving the issue peacefully, this variable is ‘not relevant’.
Conclusion
The crucial factor enticing Khrushchev to make a move on Berlin was the strategic balance shift in Soviet favour, making the offensive weapons variable relevant. The second relevant factor was the limited aims strategy, as the deadline note provided a low risk means to achieve Soviet policy objectives. Domestic power structure was not relevant because Khrushchev had been in power for eight years and actively sought a peaceful solution. Finally, alliance support was not relevant because undermining Western unity was no primary objective.
27 The Berlin Aide-Memoire Crisis 1961
The crisis
When President Kennedy was inaugurated, he expected a renewed crisis over Berlin and asked the Soviets time to prepare. Kennedy aimed to show his resoluteness and willingness to negotiate by inviting Khrushchev to talk. Just before the meeting in June 1961, Khrushchev launched the new crisis by delivering an ‘aide memoire’, dictating that the two Germanies should negotiate to reach an agreement. Should this have failed by the end of the year, they would sign separate agreements with the four powers, creating a “free” Berlin. Tensions rose because Kennedy reinforced his conventional forces and Khrushchev rescinded planned troop reductions. A new stage of the crisis began when East-Germany raised a border in Berlin to prevent East-Germans from escaping to West-Germany. When the West did not respond, the barrier was reinforced and extended to surround West-Berlin. Tensions were only loosened when conversations between the USSR and US started, after which Khrushchev lifted the deadline (George & Smoke, 1974, pp. 414-417). The USSR is the initiator, the US/NATO the defender.
Limited aims strategy
During the Berlin deadline crisis, Khrushchev deliberately chose a limited aims strategy to avoid American overreaction. After awaiting the election of a new American President, Khrushchev reopened the crisis because of the heightened severity of the refugee problem (Harrison, 1969, p. 5). After being unnerved by his lack of options in Berlin, Kennedy opted to increase his deterrent threat by increasing conventional US forces (Trauschweizer, 2006, p. 207). However, like in 1958, Khrushchev chose to design around this by initiating a low-risk probe. This decision was reinforced by his fear of American overreaction and a military showdown over Berlin (Harrison, 1993, p. 45). His fear of major war with the US and the low-risk nature of the probe make this variable ‘relevant’.
Alliance support
As mentioned previously, Mao had become increasingly antagonistic towards the Soviet Union in the late 1950’s. Because the Berlin issue had been lingering for such time, the Sino-Soviet dispute became increasingly embroiled. Mao was opposed to Khrushchev’s methods of negotiating to achieve a détente (Schick, 1971, pp. 138-139). Mao argued for
28
a strategy of armed struggle because he believed that the peaceful Soviet method would be undermined by the US. According to him, the peaceful coexistence policy did not apply to states adversarial to China (Fifield, 1958, p. 509). Khrushchev valued the Sino-Soviet alliance highly and crucial to the Communist Bloc (Garver, 2003, p. 135). Because of these increased pressures, this variable was ‘relevant’.
Short-term offensive weapons
A large component of Khrushchev’s effort in the Berlin deadline crisis was dependent on the missile gap between the USSR and the US in Soviet favour. This discredited US strategic deterrence and granted Khrushchev diplomatic manoeuvrability. In the intervening years, the West had discovered that Soviet missile capability was much less advanced in technology and numbers than claimed (Dylan, 2008, p. 791). Khrushchev was aware of this and he realized that his window of opportunity had narrowed (Nitze, 1976, p. 215). The reduced window of opportunity enticed Khrushchev to reignite the Berlin issue, so this variable is ‘relevant’.
Domestic power structure
Under Khrushchev, Soviet policy had taken a markedly softer tone. A significant shift that took place under his rule was the country’s policy towards disarmament. In early 1960’s, Khrushchev had transformed the Soviet perspective that disarmament was impossible. By arguing that the capitalist economy was not dependent on the arms industry, disarmament became a crucial, practical and attainable policy goal (Marantz, 1975, p. 513). This variable is ‘not relevant’ because of this change in Soviet doctrine and Khrushchev’s eleven years in power.
Conclusion
Multiple factors affected Khrushchev’s decision to deliver the aide-memoire. He deliberately opted for a low-risk strategy to evade the deterrent threat, making the limited aims variable relevant. Alliance support was also relevant because of the increased strain in Sino-Soviet relations. The West’s discovery that Soviet strategic capability was lacking narrowed Khrushchev’s window of opportunity, so the offensive weapons variable was also relevant. Finally, the domestic power structure was not relevant. Khrushchev had been in power for eleven years and he had significantly moderated Soviet policy.
29 Section 4: Analysis
The six cases serve to answer the question: what factors explain why states defy deterrence in situations of power parity? Four variables – limited aims strategy, alliance support, offensive weapons and domestic power structure – were tested on six cases of symmetric deterrence. All cases represented a situation of power parity between two states where a defending state aimed to deter the potential initiator from employing military means. Every variable was labelled ‘relevant’ or ‘not relevant’, indicating its influence on the initiator’s decision to defy deterrence. The variables will be distinguished in respective importance to explain the initiation of conflict in a situation of power parity:
- High importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts (variable is relevant in 5-6 cases).
- Medium importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts (variable is relevant in 3-4 cases).
- Low importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts (variable is relevant in 1-2 cases).
- No importance in explaining the defiance of deterrence in symmetric conflicts (variable is relevant in 0 cases).
Table 1:
As detailed in table 1, the relevance of the factors differs significantly. The first factor – The availability to employ a limited aims strategy – is relevant in all cases except
30
the Chinese intervention in Korea, where Mao used a large-scale offensive to prevent US forces from reaching its borders. Alliance support was relevant in three cases. With the Berlin Blockade, the USSR sought to undermine Western unity; Soviet military support proved crucial to the Chinese intervention in Korea; and the USSR was coping with the Sino-Soviet dispute during the Berlin crisis in 1961. The possession of offensive weapons was only relevant in two cases. During the Berlin Deadline crisis, the USSR claimed to have shifted the strategic balance in their favour, urging Khrushchev to seek a solution to the Berlin issue. In the Berlin Aide-Memoire crisis, the West had discovered the inaccuracy of that claim, narrowing the Soviet window of opportunity. Finally, domestic power structure was only relevant in the Chinese intervention in Korea, where Mao felt a significant threat to his new regime. These results allow for the following distinction:
- A strategy of limited aims is of high importance in explaining the defying of deterrence in a situation of power parity.
- Alliance support is of medium importance in explaining the defying of deterrence in a situation of power parity.
- Offensive weapons and domestic power structure are of low importance in explaining the defying of deterrence in a situation of power parity.
This delivers the following answer to the research question: the availability to employ a limited aims strategy is a major factor and alliance support is a moderate factor in explaining why states may defy deterrence in a situation of power parity. The possession of offensive weapons and domestic power structure do not explain the decision to defy deterrence in a situation of power parity.
31 Section 5: Conclusion
This research suggests that the availability to employ a limited aims strategy is the primary factor why states may defy deterrence in a situation of power parity. Table 2 shows the various limited aims strategies chosen by the initiators in the cases under study.
Table 2:
When a state chooses a low-risk, lesser option to achieve its objectives, it designs a strategy to circumvent the defender’s general deterrence posture, a posture which aims to prevent an attack by massive use of force. This limits the defender’s response to either accepting the fait accompli or escalating by massive use of force. Alliance support is of moderate influence, indicating that in some cases, the goal of undermining an alliance’s unity or the support from another power can entice a state to defy deterrence. Finally, the possession of offensive weapons and domestic power structure have little influence.
Deterrence theory’s assumption that a state will not initiate war if the potential costs of a military campaign are too high thus loses explanatory power. A potential initiator can bypass the military threat by utilizing lesser, low-risk options. Deterrence may not therefore deter the use of limited probes, merely the use of massive force. This must be recognized by decisionmakers when designing their deterrence strategy. While the value of deterrence in preventing massive use of force has not been weakened, decisionmakers must be aware of the lesser options available to states. Accordingly, they must prepare possible responses short of threatening to escalate the crisis. Paul’s framework thus seems not only applicable to asymmetric cases but also to cases of power parity.
32
While these observations are valid within the confines of this limited exploration, we must acknowledge that the framework is based on Paul’s work, which lacks transparent operationalization. This research has mitigated the impact of this error by adopting Paul’s four variables whilst developing an original operationalization, instead of using his flawed classification. Since this research is of a limited scope, a broader investigation into symmetric deterrence failure could yield additional data. It would be interesting to investigate symmetric cases not featuring a great power such as the US, China or the USSR. Additionally, more contemporary symmetric deterrence cases could shed light on the viability of these observations in the Post-Cold War era. Moreover, to ease policymakers’ task of designing a response to such limited probes, additional research into the adoption of a limited aims strategy is needed. This could detail what specific strategies are most effective and most frequently applied against general deterrence.
This thesis has managed to utilize Paul’s framework without falling victim to his flawed operationalization and adds to deterrence theory under power parity conditions. Deterrence theory generally strained to explain why equal states regularly come into conflict despite mutual deterrence postures. This study contends that a limited aims strategy is a valid and effective method for states to circumvent another state’s deterrence strategy and might explain the emergence of conflict between equal powers.
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