In the field of
civil-‐military
interaction
Ontologies of war
Ontologies of war in the
field of civil-military
interaction
Jenneke Aartsen
Jenneke Aartsen (10412115)
Master thesis Conflict Resolution and Governance June 26, 2015
First reader: Anne de Jong
Second reader: Richard Gerritsen Word count: 26601
Graduate School of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam Photo cover: © Ronald de Hommel
Table of Content
Abbreviations 6
List of tables and illustrations 7
List of tables 7
List of pictures 7
Abstract 8
Introduction 9
Research question and objective 10
1. Methodology 11
Research strategy 11
Research ethics 14
Chapter outline 15
2. Theoretical framework 17
2.1 The Changing Nature of War 18
Tradititonal warfare: Carl von Clausewitz 18
New Wars: Mary Kaldor 21
Protracted social conflict: Edward Azar 24
2.2 The security-development nexus 26
Conceptualization of Security 26
Conceptualization of development 27
Linkages between security and development 28
2.3 Changes in approaches to war 29
Counter insurgency (COIN) 29
The comprehensive approach or 3D Approach 31
2.4 CMI and CIMIC 32
Contested boundaries in the field of CMI 33 Practicalities that impede civil military cooperation 35
3. Two worlds that learned to understand each other 37
3.1 The use of different instruments to reach a shared goal 38
Different instruments 38
Interdependency 39
Financial interdependence 39
3.2 Different organizational cultures, perspectives, and mentality 41
A different horizon 41
Flexibility, cultural sensitivity vs. a can-do mentality 42
Different languages 44
Planning 45
3.3 Mechanisms to cope with organizational differences 47
Joint training 47
Joint command 48
Interaction between persons 49
3.4 Institutionalizing civil-military interaction 50 The institutionalization of knowledge 51 A guiding document: the comprehensive approach 52
4. Civil-military interaction: activities in the grey area between security and development 55
Liaison function 59
Functional specialists 62
4.2 CMI on a conceptual level 64
Stretching CMI 65
The distinction between military and civilian responsibilities 67
Successful collaboration 68
5. Integration vs. co-existence 70
5.1 Diversity of civilian partners 71
Humanitarian perspectives of CMI 71
Organizational principles vs. practicalities on the ground 73
Creative forms of collaboration 74
The diverse attitudes of NGO’s towards CMI 76 5.2 The importance of different modes of interaction 78
Different modes of interaction 79
Necessary Cohesion 81 Conclusion 82 References 85 Other sources 88 Appendices 90 Appendix 1 90 Appendix 2 91
Abbreviations
1GNC First Dutch German Corps
BIV Budget international security
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation
CIVREP Civil Representative
CMI Civil Military Interaction
End-state Military jargon for the final end-state the military wants to reach
FA Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
FS Functional Specialist
GPM Integrated police trainings mission [Kunduz] HGIS Homogenous budget for international cooperation
IO International Organization
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
MINUSMA United Nations multidimensional stabilization mission in Mali
MSF Médecins Sans Frontiers
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-governmental organization
OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OS Dutch Ministry for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation
OSAD Development Advisor
PoC Protection of civilians
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
QIP Quick Impact Project
List of tables and illustrations
List of tables
Table 1 Clausewitz, difference between war in theory and in practice p19 Table 2 Respondent Peter, overview funding QIPs and reconstruction p40 Table 3 Respondent Daniel, planning strategies FA + Defence p45 Table 4 Respondent Daniel, planning strategies FA + Defence combined p46 Table 5 Guideline Comprehensive Approach, different intensities of p80
interaction
List of pictures
Picture 1 QIPs in grey area between development and security P57 Picture 2 Liaison bridging grey areas between development and security P59 Picture 3 Functional specialists active in the grey area between P62
Abstract
This thesis aims to understand how the ontologies of war play out in the field of Civil Military Interaction (CMI). It does so by making use of an in-depth case study focussing on the Dutch missions in Uruzgan, Kunduz, and Mali, based on interviews with civilian and military practitioners and observations at a 5-day civil-military Common Effort exercise. By first assessing: the changing nature of war and its influences on the security-development nexus; new approaches to war such as counter insurgency and 3D; and Civil Military Interaction itself, a theoretical foundation for this study is laid. In the results chapters, it first becomes clear that differences in culture, principles and mentality pose difficulties for practitioners active in the field of CMI. However, by using coping mechanisms such as training, and the introduction of the guidelines on the integrated approach practitioners learn to deal with these differences. The second result chapter shows that the development-security nexus is important for practitioners, as many challenges are located in a ‘grey area’ where military and civilian responsibilities are unclear. In the last result chapter different modes of interaction are discussed; although many practitioners actively support the comprehensive approach, it does not pose a liable modus of interaction for humanitarian organizations, as they have to adhere to the principles of neutrality and impartiality, which do not support cooperation with the military. I argue that traditional ontologies of war based on prevailing perceptions of interstate conflict are replaced by a new form of ontologies centred around the security-development nexus. Civil and military practitioners share this ontology, although the right modus in which security and development actors interact still needs to be found. I argue that diverse modus of interactions, ranging from strategies of co-existence to integration, should be promoted in order to give all civilian organisations an opportunity to engage in interaction.
Introduction
Over the past years the world has been confronted with complex crises and ferocious conflicts, that have moved theorists and policymakers, military practitioners and aid workers, to develop a better understanding of the causes of, and more importantly, possible solutions to changing modes of warfare. Practitioners active in the field of civil-military interaction (CMI) are working at the heart of what is called the changing nature of warfare. Traditional interstate wars have been replaced by intrastate conflicts that ask for a different type of conflict resolution. Where in traditional warfare the focus merely lay on the dimension of security changes in both the nature as the strategies of warfare have included a developmental dimension when addressing conflicts and crises. Within CMI a wide range of actors interact in order to achieve both military as developmental goals. Actors, or practitioners, that have different mentalities, principles, and cultures are working towards shared aims such as ‘reconstruction’ and ‘stabilization’.
Before starting to work on this study, I conducted smaller research on the role of CIMIC in Uruzgan, Afghanistan within a course on conflict resolution. A literature analysis and interviews with 5 professionals from the ministries of Foreign Affairs/Development1 and Defence, gave me a first glimpse into the complex world of CMI, which I, back then, still defined as civil military cooperation (CIMIC). The general outcomes of this ‘practice report’ showed a great willingness within the Dutch ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence to collaborate; this became visible in the creation of a joint document ‘guidelines on the integrated approach’. However, in the field this collaboration appeared to be harder due to differences in organizational cultures and perspectives. For me, the willingness to collaborate but the simultaneous challenge to do so in the field, served as the starting point of my current research.
In order to gain further insights in the field of civil military interaction, and to prevent that outcomes heavily steered by mission specific mandates, I have decided to make use of a case study in which the field of civil military interaction is researched in the contexts of Dutch deployment in Uruzgan, Kunduz, and Mali.
Research question and objective
The main question underpinning this research is:
How do the ontologies of war play out in the field of civil military interaction?
Descriptive, analytic and explanatory sub-questions contributing to a rounded response to the central research question include the following
- What does the field of CMI entail?
- What is the difference between the term CMI: civil military interaction and CIMIC: civil military cooperation? And
- How does this difference influence the field of CMI?
- How is the field of CMI influenced by the changing nature of war?
- How have changing military strategies on war influenced the field of CMI? - How does the security-development nexus play out in the field of CMI? - How have the changes in the approaches to war influenced the field of CMI? - What influence do different organizational cultures have on CMI?
- How are civilian activities and military activities demarcated in the field of CMI? - What are the differences between the civilian actors active in the field of CMI? - To what extend is CMI institutionalized in Dutch – military – policy?
- In what modes of interaction do practitioners engage?
The aim of this research is to provide further insights in the ontologies of war as perceived by civilian2 and military practitioners active in the field of civil military cooperation. Do civilian and military practitioners have based their interventions upon different notions of war or do they share the same ontology of warfare? Although many studies can be found on the 3D approach or on the comprehensive approach, to the best of my knowledge there haven not been academics that have researched the field of CMI in the light of the ontologies of war. I hope to foreground the expertise of practitioners in the field and to contribute to the growing body of literature that display the field of CMI
non-1
Methodology
Research strategy
In line with its objectives this research holds a qualitative research strategy, with a case study design focussing on Civil Military Interaction in three missions in which the Dutch army has been deployed: the Dutch contribution to the NATO-lead International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Uruzgan, the integrated police trainings mission in Kunduz (GPM), and the Dutch contribution to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). I decided to include three missions – instead of a focus on one of the three - in order to capture the development that the field of CMI has been through. This proved valuable as all three missions have a different focus when it comes to interaction and highlighted aspects that I would have missed when focussing on one mission. I made use of a multimethod strategy in which interviews are central, while observations and a document analysis supplement the data collected in the interviews. As it was my objective to gain a better understanding of the challenges and opportunities practitioners active in the field of civil military interaction encountered, I conducted 17 narrative interviews with civilian and military practitioners active in the field of CMI. Additionally, I made use of the data I collected in 5 interviews conducted for an earlier study focussing on civil-military collaboration in Uruzgan. In total 22 interviews are analysed in order to gain a better understanding of the field of CMI, of which an overview can be found in appendix 1. 2o Out of the total 22 respondents have ‘on the ground’ experience with CMI while 2 respondents gave additional insights in the processes that take place at policy level in The Hague. 13 Interlocutors that I interviewed work within the Dutch ministry of defence, I refer to them as military practitioners, while 9 respondents
diplomats. I have to confirm one of the prejudices of the military, as all my military interlocutors were men. This in contrast to the civilian respondents I interviewed: 5 of them were woman, and 4 of them men. Most interviews are conducted face-to-face at the offices where respondents work, 3 interviews are conducted through Skype and 1 through telephone due to the fact that some of my respondents work abroad. Interviewing through Skype or telephone did not pose limitations on the depth or quality of interviews. All interviews are, with consent of the respondents, recorded and transcribed. The length of the interviews varies between 38 minutes and 1:32 minutes.
The interviews I conducted where narrative in character. The setting of a narrative interview encourages interviewees to tell a story about a significant event and its social context (Schütze, 1977). Essentially, a narrative interview is about telling a story that in the eyes of the interviewees is significant. I chose to conduct narrative interviews, as this gives respondents the opportunity to tell a story about something they experienced as important without me guiding or steering answers in a certain direction. In order to ensure that respondents told a story I often explained to them ‘I have to understand your story as if it were a film, I want to visualize what happened with you as the central actor in this film’. This often helped respondents to refrain from saying ‘we from the military’ or ‘we diplomats’ and supported them to speak about their own, personal experiences. As my study is focusing on the experiences of respondents in the field of CMI I did gave them some direction before starting the interviews. Prior to the interview, I asked my respondents through email if they could think about a case that they found significant, interesting, or special and that would give detailed insights into their experiences with CMI. Once the interview started they briefly summarized the chosen case and most of the time this was enough to start the storytelling. If not, we discussed some potential cases and the respondent would further elaborate on one of them. After three-quarters, the interview often developed into semi-structured interviews as this gave me the opportunity to touch upon parts of the interviews that were unclear or on the parts that where new to me and where I wanted to develop a more detailed account.
Several factors probably contributed to some similarities among my respondents: the fact that I had two contact persons, one within the ministry of defence the other in the ministry of foreign affairs, who brought me into contact with most of my respondents; the fact that I used snowball sampling to get in touch with the other 7 respondents; as well as my own
interest to understand the experiences of practitioners active in three different missions, which influenced active selection of the last 7 respondents from my side whenever I felt I did not have a thorough understanding of CMI within a specific mission. In the documentation of the data collected in the interviews, I found it important to vividly describe the experiences and impressions of my interlocutors while simultaneously ordering and structuring these experiences among more general lines that characterise the field of CMI. One of my respondents started the interview with the following disclaimer: ‘I find it very important to underscore that the story I am going to tell you is based on impressions. It only describes my counterparts in the way that I experienced them, which was in a certain context, with certain individuals active in certain organizations. This gives a very fragmented view of reality, as it only gives my view on reality’ (Oliver). This quote captures the responsibility of my interlocutors to give their personal experience of events, and captures my responsibility as a researcher to order and organize these different interpretations in a manner that respects my informant’s expertise while retaining some critical distance when distinguishing impressions that characterize the field of CMI from impressions that are too specific.
Besides interviewing, I got the opportunity, to supplement my data with observations made at a 5-day civil-military training in Berlin. Although trainings do not provide the same context as ‘real’ crisis situations do, it does give the possibility to gain a better insight in the dynamics of civil and military interaction. I participated in the common effort exercise 2015, jointly organized by military (1 German Netherlands Corps or 1GNC), the ministry of foreign affairs, and several NGO’s (Cordaid and Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeente VNG). I engaged in participating observations in which ‘interaction between researcher and research unit exists and the identity of the researcher is known (van Thiel, 2009). Within the common effort exercise I had the possibility to participate in one of the four so-called ‘planning groups’ with a respective focus on: humanitarian assistance, good governance, protection of civilians, and security sector reform. I deliberately made the decision to participate and observe in the planning group on humanitarian assistance, in order to gain a better understanding of the role that NGOs and humanitarian actors have in civil-military interaction. Observations mainly covered: the interaction between civilian and military actors; the role and principles of humanitarian organizations as a part of interventions; the differences between NATO-lead and UN-lead interventions; and friction around the comprehensive approach. I documented my observations by making field notes (for an
example see appendix 2), subsequently; I worked out the most important observations at the end of each day. Participation in the common effort exercise improved my understanding of the field of CMI, - particularly the role that NGOs and humanitarian organizations take on - to a great extent not only by observing practitioners but also through: having informal conversations; listening to panel discussions; and listening to speeches from influential speakers with experience in the field of CMI. With three practitioners I have had extensive informal talks, I have referred to them by pseudonyms as well, as can be seen in appendix 1. Data collected throughout the Common Effort exercise revealed extra dynamics of CMI, these dynamics are discussed in chapter 5.
I also supplemented and contextualised the data gathered in interviews and observations with analysis of Dutch policy documents, namely the leidraad geintegreerde benadering, hereafter guidelines on the integrated approach, and the three article 100 letters that gave the mandate for military deployment in the respective missions in Uruzgan, Kunduz, and Mali. The data collected through the analysis of policy documents mainly contributed to the validation of data as collected through interviews and observations.
Research ethics
I secured informed consent from my interlocutors by providing them with a concise explanation of the objectives of this study. This happened through email before respondents made the decision to participate in the interviews, and at the beginning of every interview this explanation was given orally. All the respondents received a draft version of the data analysis and had the possibility to comment on quotes in order to prevention misinterpretation of statements. Most respondents preferred to be cited anonymous, and for this reason I made use of pseudonyms and refrained from mentioning details that could identify them, such as function or the rotation3 in which they were deployed. I will make the effort to keep my promises and provide all respondents with a digital copy of my final thesis.
An important consideration I took into account were the sensitivities surrounding NGOs and specifically humanitarian organizations. As will be explained in the theoretical framework, some humanitarian organizations and NGOs depend on the principles of
3 Every mission consists of different rotations – identified as PTG2 or TFU6 - of 4-6 months in which practitioners are deployed. Most practitioners know among general lines which practitioners were active in
neutrality and impartiality in order to guarantee their security in conflict areas. This often has as a consequence that overt collaboration with the military is prevented. Some examples given by interlocutors describe collaboration between NGOs and military actors in detail and elaborate on the modes used by NGOs to keep these forms of collaboration covert. In these cases, examples are given but the names of NGOs or humanitarian organizations are not mentioned. In the case that names are mentioned this happened after consultation with the interlocutor who gave this example.
Chapter outline
Having outlined the research question, objective, methodology, and ethics of this thesis, the next section, chapter 2, will be the theoretical framework, which is divided into four sections. The first section draws upon the work of three important theorists on war and conflict, Clausewitz, Kaldor, and Azar, and elaborates on the changing nature of war and consequences for strategies to counter war and conflicts. In the second section of the theoretical framework and a focus on the security-development nexus is given in the light of the changing nature of warfare. The third part of the theoretical framework addresses how the changing nature of war has lead to new approaches in warfare, such as counter insurgency, and the 3D-approach. Lastly, the theoretical framework will elaborate on civil military interactions and the practical difficulties that interaction between actors with different organizational cultures, principles, and mentalities can pose on CMI. Next, the result section is divided into three parts. Chapter 3 focuses on the difficulties that both civil and military practitioners face in interaction with their respective counterparts due their different roles, cultural differences and differences in mentality, The second part of chapter 3 explains how practitioners found coping mechanisms to deal with these difficulties, and further explains how civil military interaction is institutionalized in the Netherlands through training and policy. Chapter 4 discusses the difficulties to find a fitting definition of CMI, and describes three CMI-related activities that military practitioners engage in. Central in the first part of chapter 4 is the ‘grey area’ between development and security in which responsibilities are often unclear for practitioners. The last part of chapter 4 examines how far the concept of CMI can be stretched, where civil and military responsibilities should lay and gives examples of successful interaction. Chapter five focuses on the different modes of interaction practitioners can engage in. This has a lot to do with the differences between civilian partners – diplomats, humanitarian organizations, and NGOs -, as will be described in the first section. The second section looks at the
importance of different modes of interactions. At the end a conclusion will be given in which will be explained how my findings add up to the question ‘how do the ontologies of war play out in the field of CMI’. The last chapters comprise the references and appendices.
2
Theoretical framework
In order to frame my analysis of civil military interaction in Uruzgan, Kunduz, and Mali, this chapter explores the causes that lead to changing approach in warfare, the interconnectedness between development and security, and the implications that this had on strategic approaches to war. First, the changing nature of warfare will be discussed by shedding light on the ideas of three important theorists on war and conflict: Carl von Clausewitz, Mary Kaldor, and Edward Azar. While von Clausewitz wrote his theory on the basis of ‘traditional interstate warfare’, Kaldor and Azar write about intrastate conflicts that have become more and more common after 1945. The ‘changing nature of war’ influences our conception of security and development: while pre-1945 wars were mainly fought on the basis of security, recent wars force us to include the dimension of development in our analysis. The second section of this theoretical framework will dive into the different conceptualisations of security and development, and specifically the way these concepts interrelate. The ineluctable interconnectedness of security and development has forced states and the international community to change their approaches to warfare and the solving of conflicts. Counter insurgency and the 3D approach have replaced more traditional mechanisms of warfare as described by Clausewitz. The last part of this chapter will look at the consequences of these changing approaches for both civil as military practitioners, active in the field of civil-military interaction.
2.1 The Changing Nature of War
Traditional warfare: Carl von Clausewitz
Traditional warfare has been bounded with the evolution of the modern state in Europe between the 15th and the 18th century. The development of warfare hand in hand with the development of a Westphalian state system heavily influences our thinking of war. More often than not, recent wars are not fought between states but within states. However, the stylized notion of war as an interstate affair remains. This theoretical framework will first elaborate on the origins of interstate war and on the work of Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian general and according to some the most important theorist on war (Smith & Jones, 2010).
Around the 17th century - after the decline of the feudal system in Europe - monarchs started to guarantee security of their lands and its population. First, by hiring mercenaries, who turned out to lack trustworthiness and structural commitment. Later on by the creation of standing armies in which soldiers wore uniforms. As Michael Roberts explains: ‘the soldier became the King’s man for he wore the King’s coat’ (1996: 18). By the use of the King’s cloak, a uniform, soldiers could be clearly distinguished from civilians. Eventually violence could only be used by the state: states had the monopoly on violence. This made it easier to distinguish war from mere crime, from this point in time ‘[war] was defined as something waged by sovereign states alone’ (van Creveld, 2009: 41). Around the 18th century war became a discrete event in the progressive evolution towards a secure and peaceful civil society in which rule of law and justice were honoured (Kaldor, 2012). After the Napoleonic wars of the 18th century, Von Clausewitz wrote his famous work on war. He lays the methodological foundation of his book by stating that war should be studied as a social science ‘an act of human intercourse’ (1976: 148-149), not as an exact science. One of his most important dicta is that war is used as a political instrument not as a goal in itself, an assumption that formed the cornerstone of war studies (Fleming, 2009). ‘War is the continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 7). The realist thought, that war is used as a common and legitimate instrument by states in order to protect or enhance their vital interests underscores multiple of Clausewitz’s arguments in on war, as will be explained later on in this chapter.
When reading Clausewitz’s work it is important to keep in mind the difference between theories of war and war in practice. He compares an ideal version of war with reality and extensively describes why these two worlds differ. War in theory leads to an escalation to the extreme or absolute war, because of three types of interactions in war: the maximum use of (physical) force, the aim to disarm the enemy (a zero-sum assumption), and the maximum exertion of strength by moral forces. Moral forces are intangible factors such as motivation and dedication that serve as force multipliers: a military force is never directed against a military force alone, ‘it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 137). Opposed to war in theory, war in practice is moderated by many factors such as political calculations, insufficient intelligence, and risk aversion (Table 1) (Handel, 1999: 9). In practice, political authorities determine the objectives of war, not the inherent dynamics of war.
Table 1
Besides the difference between theory and practice, understanding the nature of war is at utmost importance for the statesman and/or strategist waging war. Von Clausewitz
compares war to a Chameleon: ‘[war] should keep on changing and adapting its colours to a constantly changing environment’ (Handel, 1999: 16). Understanding the nature of war is therefore an ongoing process as every interaction in war leads to unexpected developments. Whenever conditions change, military leaders should be able to change their military doctrine:
‘the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 88).
This implies that commanders should not try to fit the circumstances to the doctrine and ‘turn it into something that is alien to its nature’ but fit their doctrine to the circumstances (Kiszely, 2007).
In order to get a better grip on the nature of war, Clausewitz introduces a conceptual framework he calls the trinity. This trinity consists of: passions, hatred, and enmity (people), probability and chance (military), and war’s subordination to rational policy (government) that form countless unique combinations reflecting the character of each war (Handel, 1999: 9). The interrelationship between these tendencies determines the way in which a country wages war. War says Clausewitz,
‘is therefore, not only chameleon-like in character, because it changes colour in some degree in each particular case, but it is, also as a whole, in relation to the predominant tendencies which are in it, a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the souls; and the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs to pure reason’ (1976: 24).
An often heard critique on Clausewitz’s work is that the type of war he describes centralizes only around the nation-state; he takes the nation-state ‘almost for granted’ and previous forms of conflict – such as rebellion or revolution - are demoted to criminal activities (Creveld, 1991). This conception does indeed not suit the ideas of Kaldor and Azar, whom perceive ‘new wars’ or protracted social conflict as a globalized, but intrastate affair. The changing nature of warfare, from traditional wars to ‘new’ wars gives rise to different forms of warfare, in which many of Clausewitz ideas are still relevant but other theoretical
concepts become more and more important. The next section will zoom in on the concept of new wars, as described by Mary Kaldor in her book new and old wars (2012).
New Wars: Mary Kaldor
Different forms of war, or ‘new wars’ (Kaldor, 2012) are replacing traditional forms of warfare blurring the line between state and non-state actors and interstate and intrastate conflict. In the years after the Cold War, war within states rather than between states is becoming more and more widespread. According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) ‘the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the proliferation of armed conflict within states’ (2001: 4). This is in line with Holsti’s statistical assessment. He argues that 75% of 164 cases of warfare recognized since the end of World War II involve intrastate armed conflict, or conflict within the boundaries of states (1996: 22). These arguments connect to the central argument that Mary Kaldor makes in her book new and old wars. She argues that during the last decades of the twentieth century, a new type of organized violence developed, which she describes as new wars (2012).
Kaldor argues that ‘new wars arise in the context of the erosion of the autonomy of the state’ (2012: 5). While traditional war developed concurrently with the formation of sovereign states around the 18th century, new wars seem to flourish under diminishing national boundaries. New wars are different from old wars in terms of their goals, methods, and financing. The goals of new wars are about identity politics, strategies of new war are about destabilization aimed at sowing fear and hatred, and new wars are financed by decentralized economies and depending on external resources (Kaldor, 2012). The next paragraphs will further elaborate on these three differences between new and old wars. According to Kaldor, the goals of new wars are not about geo-political or ideological goals, but about identity politics. Identity politics are described, as ‘the claim to power on the basis of a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic’ (Ibid.: 7). Labelling according to identity is crucial in new wars, as movements mobilize around these labels and conflicts are based on them. Identity politics have a negative connotation, unlike the politics of ideas (p80). While the politics of ideas are inclusive and embrace everyone who supports the idea, identity politics are backward looking political projects – often movements of nostalgia – that acquire meaning through insecurity and the fear of being
threatened by those with ‘other’ identities. Identity politics are inherently exclusive and lean towards fragmentation (p81). In extreme cases this can lead to forcible population expulsion, ethnic cleansing, or genocide of ‘the other’.
New war strategies try to avoid military advances and battles; just as guerrilla tactics and counter insurgency tactics did in the past. Where guerrilla tactics - as articulated by Mao Tse-tung and Che Guevara – aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population, new war strategies distinct in their objectives and focus on sowing fear and hatred. ‘Instead of creating a favourable environment for guerrilla, the new warfare aims to create an unfavourable environment for all those people it cannot control’ (Ibid.: 104). By getting rid of everyone with a different identity and instilling terror the population is controlled, and again this can happen through extreme techniques such as systematic murder, ethnic cleansing, or rendering an area uninhabitable (Ibid.: 105). Consequences of these tactics are the high level of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP’s) (Ibid.: 107). Besides, as strategies directly target civilians instead of soldiers, the civilian/military casualty ratio reversed compared with traditional warfare. In her afterword, Kaldor gives an extensive elaboration on why exact numbers of civilian casualties are disputed, but argues that 80% of the victims in current wars are civilians while in earlier wars 80% of the casualties were soldiers (Ibid.: 210).
The third difference between new and old wars is the method of funding, as new wars are perpetuated by globalized war economies. During the World Wars the economy was centralized, totalizing and autarchic – the whole population of a nation contributed to the production of arms - while economies in new wars are decentralized. Kaldor describes an extreme form of globalization in which production collapses and armed forces are sustained via stealing and looting, the black market, remittances, diaspora fund-raising, assistance from foreign governments, and the diversion of humanitarian assistance. ‘In place of the national formal economy, a new type of globalized informal economy is established, in which external flows are integrated into a local economy (Ibid.: 110).
The characteristics of new wars imply a different approach of conflict management. According to Kaldor we need a new form of cosmopolitan political mobilization that embraces both the international community as the local populations, and is based on politics of inclusion, respect for international principles and legal norms (Ibid.: 121). She
gives four practical handles that can improve international contributions aiming at the banishment of new wars. First, she argues that legitimacy should be reconstructed. Consent and support for political institutions and the notion that these institutions acquire authority based upon rule of law is critical in order rule out the break down of legitimacy. Secondly, top-down diplomacy should be complemented by cosmopolitan politics. Next to top-down orchestrated negotiations, local islands of civilization that promote cosmopolitan values instead of politics of exclusion, should be seen as a potential solution and be supported by a state or by international organizations in order to develop alternative, inclusive politics. Local cosmopolitans can provide the best advice of what is the best (international) approach; they need to be consulted and treated as partners (Ibid.: 132). Thirdly, Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement should be transformed into cosmopolitan law-enforcement that enforces international humanitarian and human rights law. The political aim is to provide secure areas in which alternative forms of inclusive politics can emerge, through a mixture between policing and soldiering. The intervention of military forces should be seen as legitimate by the local population and should be based on consent. Besides, intervention should adhere to principles of impartiality as defined by the Red Cross (ICRC) – no discrimination based on nationality, race, religion, class, or political grounds. The mentality of cosmopolitan forces should differ from the mentality of traditional soldiers - whose aim it is to defeat the enemy - as it is their aim to minimize casualties on all sides. ‘Whereas the soldier, as the legitimate bearer of arms, had to be prepared to die for his or her country, the international soldier/police officer risks his or her life for humanity’ (Ibid.: 139). Fourth and last, humanitarian assistance should be better targeted and accompanied by reconstruction, as humanitarian assistance can build in to the functioning of a war economy – serving as a form of funding – and can cause failures in the formal functioning economy – replacing a farmers job with humanitarian aid. Reconstruction should be seen as the rebuilding of formal political authorities and economic arrangements so as not to repeat the conditions that gave rise to war. (Ibid,: 145). To summarize a long paragraph: Kaldor underscores the need for a cosmopolitan political response that puts individual rights and rule of law as the centrepiece of international intervention.
These practical approaches to conflict management of new wars not only mention traditional military solutions to solve conflict, but include political, developmental and
humanitarian dimensions as well. Edward Azar also reconceptualised war, and his work has an even stronger focus on development.
Protracted social conflict: Edward Azar
In his book the management of protracted social conflict’ (1990) Azar explains that in the past, studies of war, crisis, and conflict had the tendency to explain wars according to a dichotomy between internal (intra-state) or external (interstate) war. Secondly, in these studies, frameworks of analysis mostly provided a functional differentiation. Thirdly, Azar argues that conflicts were mostly studied when they were overt and violent, ignoring covert, latent, or non-violent conflict.
In his book Azar describes a different type of conflict: protracted social conflict (PSC). In contrary to explanations of traditional warfare, the study of PSC’s suggests that: ‘many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points’ (1990: 6). Azar describes four preconditions that can lead to a high level intensity in conflict: communal content, deprivation of human needs, role of the state, and international linkages (1990). The article of Oliver Ramsbottom (2005) gives a clear insight into these preconditions, and his line of thought will be followed in the next paragraphs in which the four preconditions that can lead to high-level intensity in conflict are discussed.
The first precondition Azar describes is communal content. While Kenneth Waltz (2001) uses the levels system, state, and individual as divisions for analysis, Azar uses the identity group – racial, religious, ethnic, cultural etc. – in order to analyze conflicts. The relationship between identity groups and states or ‘the disarticulation between state and society as a whole’ (1990: 7), are at the core of the problem, as it are social groups that mediate individual interests such as security, identity, recognition and others (1985: 31). Azar argues that one cause of the disjunction between state and society is colonialism, where one communal group, unresponsive to the needs of other groups, dominates state mechanisms.
A second precondition that can lead to a high level intensity in conflict is the deprivation of human needs. Azar particularly cites security, development, political access, and identity needs, and whenever a government fails to address grievances resulting from need deprivation a niche for the cultivation of protracted social conflict is created. Conflicts are likely to become intense and vicious, as needs are, unlike interests, ontological and non-negotiable. By addressing the importance of human needs, Azar lays the focus of conflict resolution not on security, but on the reduction of underdevelopment:
‘Reducing overt conflict requires reduction in levels of underdevelopment. Groups which seek to satisfy their identity and security needs through conflict are in effect seeking change in the structure of their society. Conflict resolution can truly occur and last if satisfactory amelioration of underdevelopment occurs as well. Studying PSCs leds one to conclude that peace is development in the broadest sense of the term’ (1985: 69).
A third precondition Azar mentions is governance and the state’s role as the critical factor in the satisfaction of frustration of individual and group needs (Ramsbotham, 2005). Although Western liberal theory preaches that the government should treat all members of a state equally. However, practice differs from paper, and especially new and unstable governments are characterised by political authorities that tend to be monopolized by the dominant identity group or coalition of hegemonic groups, limiting access to other groups. (Azar, 1990). Conflict easily escalates when ruling parties mobilise group interests and identities and excluded minorities subsequently react through counter-identification. Once power is monopolized by dominant individuals and groups, the limit of access accelerates a crisis of legitimacy so that regime type and legitimacy become an important linkage variables between needs and PSC (Ibid.). Most PSC laden countries have a limited political capacity that prevent the state from responding to, and meeting, the needs of various constituents’.
The last precondition focuses on international linkages, ‘in particular political-economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system’ (Ramsbotham, 2005: 116). Due to cross border interests from clientele, global linkages influence the formation of social and political institutions and the role of state within countries and can therefore serve as the fourth precondition for the escalation of conflict.
Whenever these preconditions exist, chances that conflict is activated depend on three other determents: actions and strategies of the community, actions and strategies of the state, and the build in mechanisms of conflict. The community can, inter alia, use diverse process of identity group formation, organisation and mobilisation, political goals (access, autonomy, and secession, and tactics (civil disobedience or guerrilla war) (Ibid.). Governing individuals face a spectrum of policy choices running from different forms of political accommodation to coercive repression (Ibid.). Lastly, a variety of self-reinforcing built-in mechanisms of conflict exist, such as the ‘mutually exclusionary experiences, fears, and belief systems generate reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify PSC’ (Azar, 1990: 5). This is also known as the security dilemma in international relations, in which actions are mutually perceived in the most threatening light, and the space for compromise and agreement decreases. Depending on these factors, PSC can become overt or stay covert. To summarize PSC in one quote: PSC is signified by the ‘prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation’ (Azar: 1990: 93).
Developmental dimensions are increasingly important in the resolution of conflict according to Azar and Kaldor. The next section will dive into the interconnectedness of security and development and eventually will give more arguments that the resolution of conflict should extent further than the security dimension.
2.2 The security-development nexus
Conceptualization of Security
The concept of security is intrinsically linked to creation, maintenance, and promises of the sovereign state, as shown in the first chapter of this theoretical framework. In this light the state is understood as the foundation of freedom, democracy, and the good society (Neocleous, 2008:4) and is seen as the primary guarantor of security. However, due to the deepening and widening of security beyond control of the state – including threats such as terrorist networks – the state is not always able to take on this securing role. In order to counter the widening of security beyond control of the state, development can be used as a tool.
Duffield agrees with this, and argues that it is not only a moral right for states to engage in development, but that development can be justified as ‘a form of enlightened self-interest’ (2001: 37). Development serves self-interests of states because it is felt that the increasing interconnectedness of the global system has magnified the threat of internationalisation of instability in the south. Increasing refugee flows, the disruption of commercial activity and the spread of terrorists and criminal networks due to instability the South, will have a more direct impact on the North (George, 1992). This explains that, in the last decades development and security have become intrinsically linked.
Conceptualization of development
The term development can be conceptualized in many ways, starting with one of the broadest definitions, in which development is defined as a process of ‘good change’ (McGillivray, 2012). It gained a different connotation in post-colonial societies in need of political consolidation and economic growth and became a key strategy for state building (Simon, 2014). The state was central in securing (economic) development and countries were expected to guarantee a transition from a traditional to a modern society. Rostow (1990) explains, through different stages, how political and economic elites are the drivers of this process, and the rest of society – read the poor – can hope for ‘trickle-down’.
This conceptualization of development as modernization has been criticized from different sides. First, it is criticized by Marxist/structuralists critiques based on the world system theory (Wallerstein) and even more through theories of dependencia in which the root causes of the impoverishment of the periphery originate from the development of powerful capitalist cores. These theories ‘emphasize the structural exploitative nature of the capitalist world system and its negative impact on third world development’ (Stern & Öjendal, 2010: 11). Second, it is criticized by theories that focus on a participatory revolution, which reconnects the poor, the grass roots and the voiceless. These types of terminology shift focus from a state-centric form of development to a bottom-up and participatory form of development with durable impact (Ibid). Different conceptualizations of development can be used, and the next section will show how conceptualizations of development are linked to security.
Linkages between security and development
‘Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals’ (UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, cited in United Nations, 2004: vii).
This statement by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan shows how development and security are deeply integrated on a policy level. Also policy documents from the European Council underscore the intrinsic link between the two concepts (see for example European Council, 2003: 2). Mark Duffield underscores the intertwinement between development and security in his book Global Governance and the New Wars. He states ‘through a circular form of reinforcement and mutuality, achieving one is now regarded as essential for securing the other. Development is ultimately impossible without stability, and at the same time, security is not sustainable without development. (Duffield, 2001: 16).
Sometimes interconnections between security and development are seen as a ‘taken-for-granted point of departure’, (Stern & Öjendal, 2010). I argue however, that they can be explained in the light of the changing nature of war. When looking at Azar’s (1990) theory on protracted social contract, it becomes clear that root causes of conflict can be found in the deprivation of human needs and the inability of the state to respond to this. Azar argues that conflict resolution requires a reduction in the levels of underdevelopment (Ibid.: 69). By addressing security needs, but also developmental needs, political access needs, and identity needs protracted social conflict can be countered. For me, this serves as one of the arguments that gives a theoretical explanation for the connection between security and development, and therefore this link does not necessarily need to be seen as a taken-for-granted point of departure in policy, but as a realistic effort in the resolution of conflicts. In this light, Edward Azar would probably agree with Kofi Annan’s statement that a more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. If a mixed approach of conflict resolution - based on both security and development - is viewed as a proper instrument to counter protracted social conflict, would the same
instrument also help tackling new wars as described by Mary Kaldor? Luckily, Kaldor gives us some insights into her preferred approaches of conflict management. As explained, according to Kaldor the centrepiece of international interventions should be a cosmopolitan political response (2012). This response definitely comprises a security dimension, as she supports a cosmopolitan form of law enforcement in which forces should do more than ‘defeating the enemy’ but instead ‘minimize casualties on all sides’. Forces should protect the local population in order for them to develop ‘local islands of civilization’. I would argue that, according to Kaldor, forces should facilitate bottom-up development initiated by the local community. Therefore forces do not carry out the developmental dimension directly but enable progression of development. However, in the last section she describes how international forces do promote development through the completion of humanitarian assistance by economic and political reconstruction, which are precisely the key strategies for peacebuilding by Simon (2014), when conceptualizing development in the former section.
2.3 Changes in approaches to war
The last section has shown how development and security are intrinsically linked; the next step that should be made is to investigate how military strategies responded to this changing notion of security. Military strategies did indeed change, and the next section will show how the approaches to war have developed from traditional security-based strategies, to more holistic approaches that try to capture not only a security dimension but also a developmental, political, and humanitarian dimension.
Counter insurgency (COIN)
The changing nature of war has led to the altering of warfare strategies. Many recent warfare theories are building upon the principle of counter insurgency (COIN). Kiszely (2007) describes insurgency as ‘the use of subversion and armed conflict by an organized movement to overthrow a constitutional government’. ‘COIN attempts to confound organised armed challenges to established authority’ (Smith and Jones, 2010). COIN essentially came into being as a military strategy used to win wars, but its significance does not lie in its military aspects; the diversity and complexness of counterinsurgencies demand different – multidimensional - instruments. David Kilcullen argues that COIN operations are political struggles rather than military, in which the ultimate goal is not killing the enemy but ‘out-governing’ them (2011). In order to do so, winning the Hearts
and Minds (H&M) of a population can serve as a rightful instrument. Interesting is that this connects to Clausewitz idea that ‘not all types of war are won by war fighting; indeed, some are lost that way’ (1976: 87).
Although wars against insurgents have been the focal point of most military operations after 1945, COIN only received most of its attention after the events of 9/11. Since then two different schools of thought within the field of counter insurgency have been established: the neo-classical school and the post-Maoist school. (Smith and Jones, 2010). The former focuses on the understanding of political and military conditions and a strategy tailored to these specific circumstances while the latter explains how the local and the global interact and catalyse the development of global resistance (Smith and Jones, 2010).
The post-Maoist school centres on the interwoven character of global and local insurgents, which is reflected in transnational resistance movements such as Al Qaida (Smith and Jones, 2010). David Killcullen argues that there is no clear evidence that global insurgency movements directly control local resistance movements but that they do use ‘local actors, issues and grievances’ in order to reach their own, pan-Islamic, objectives (Killcullen, 2005; 601). Therefore, counter insurgency on a global level should concentrate on breaking the link between the local and the global, or ‘disaggregation by the attacking the intricate web of dependency at a local level’ (Ibid.: 609). The work of Kaldor reflects the link between the local and the global, especially when in comes to the external funding mechanisms of new wars. According to her, restoration of national legitimacy is crucial, which supports Kilcullen’s argument that breaking the link between the local and global - removing local dependency on global funds - could indeed strengthen conflict resolution.
Anthropologist Montgomery McFate heavily influenced the neo-classical school of COIN, linking on the ground practicalities with strategic theories on counter insurgency. Her studies in Northern Ireland and Iraq underscored the importance of understanding the social milieu from which insurgencies arise. She argues that fitting strategies cannot be build without having full understanding of the enemy (McFate, 2005). As political power is the central issue in an insurgency ‘winning on the battlefield is irrelevant against an insurgent adversary because the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no purely military solution’ (McFate, 2005). This is in line with Clausewitz and Killcullen who argue that not all wars are won by war fighting.
To conclude this section, counterinsurgency calls for different qualities than the traditional forms of fighting. In order to give a peak into the next section of this theoretical framework that focuses on the practical implications for practitioners, Kiszely discusses the difficulties that COIN can comprise for soldiers on the ground:
‘[COIN demands] features with which the pure warrior ethos is uneasy: complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty; an inherent resistance to short-term solutions; problems that the military alone cannot solve, requiring cooperation with other highly diverse agencies and individuals to achieve a comprehensive approach; the need for interaction with indigenous people whose culture it does not understand; and a requirement to talk to at least some of its opponents, which it can view as treating with the enemy… In the eyes of the warrior, counterinsurgency calls for some decidedly un-warrior like qualities, such as emotional intelligence, empathy, subtlety, sophistication, nuance and political adroitness. Armies that find difficulty with these unwelcome features tend to view counterinsurgency as an aberration, look forward to the opportunity of returning to ‘proper soldiering’, and see subsequent training as an opportunity to regain their war fighting skills rather than to learn the lessons of counterinsurgency’ (2007: 10).
Kiszely thus explains that not only personal un-warrior like qualities are asked from soldiers, but also changes in mentality such as the focus on a long-term approach, and the need for cooperation with other agencies. The next section will explain how the 3D or integrated approach responds to the demand of ‘un-warrior like qualities’ by stretching the concept of interventions and not only including military practitioners but also cilivian experts such as diplomats, humanitarian actors, or NGO personnel.
The comprehensive approach or 3D Approach
Many different terms are used to describe the comprehensive approach: the whole-of-government approach; defence, diplomacy, and development (3D approach); security governance & development; and the integrated approach. All these approaches are build upon the idea that development and security are intrinsically interconnected and that interventions therefore should be grounded in an integrated approach, that does not only look at the security dimensions but also focuses on fostering peace, economic resurgence and good governance (Cornisch, 2007).
Within the Netherlands, much support for an integrated approach can be found. The importance of multi-dimensional approaches is reaffirmed in the policy document guidelines on the integrated approach.
‘The notion that underlying causes and symptoms are to be handled in accord has grown rapidly the last decade. It has become – sometimes painfully – clear that political, ethnic, socio-economic and security factors are entwined in conflict situations. This has led to the understanding that a more cohesive approach is necessary’ (guidelines on the integrated approach, 2014: 3).
The ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Security & Justice jointly developed this guiding document that has the aim to contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of Dutch efforts focusing on security and the rule of law in fragile states and conflict zones. The integrated approach was applied in practice in Uruzgan, where the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs & Development both took part in the mission. One outcome of this approach on implementation level was a joint command structure; a military commander and a civil representative (CIVREP).
The last section elaborated on counter insurgency and the comprehensive approach, mainly on a conceptual or on a policy level – except for Kiszely’s account of un-warrior like qualities that are needed for COIN. The next section will dive into the practicalities of the field, where practitioners have to deal with the congregation of different actors that have different principles, and use diverse strategies in order to achieve a shared goal of reconstruction and stability.
2.4 CMI and CIMIC
In a broad sense civil-military interaction, or CMI, covers all kinds of relations of the military practitioner with the civil environment4. Within the military organization it forms a specific branch (J9)5, ever since it replaced civil military collaboration, or CIMIC, as a functional branch. The distinction between CMI and CIMIC within Dutch military policy is not very clear as there have not been written many handbooks or other forms of guidelines that give a clear definition of what CMI exactly contains. However, a document written by
4 Civil environment refers to: civil authorities, civil society and population of an affected country, and all other
actors of the International Community.
the Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) does provides us with a definition of CMI as used by the Dutch military:
CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning, and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises’ (CCEO, 2014)6.
Most important is that military interaction (CMI) overarches the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), as CIMIC only focuses on co-operation while CMI leaves rooms for other forms of interaction. CIMIC is defined as: ‘the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies’ (Ibid.). Although policy documents do not provide this information, one of my interlocutors explained that CIMIC has been transformed into CMI as most NGOs and humanitarian agencies do not necessarily want to cooperate with the military, but do need to interact with the military to a certain extent (Edward). CMI gives a broader basis for cooperation. The reasons why NGOs and humanitarian organizations sometimes refrain from collaboration with the military are given next sections. In order to capture the whole array of aspects related to civil-military interaction, this study defines its core research object as CMI, and not as CIMIC.
Contested boundaries in the field of CMI
Jonathan Goodhand dives further into the field of civil-military interaction and explores the civil-military interface in Afghanistan. He argues that CMI has been the site of intensive ‘boundary work’ in which NGOs and the military seek to negotiate or contest were boundaries are drawn and who has the power to draw and police them (2013: 287). He places CMI in the same light as I do in this study, namely in the light of the changing nature of war and the link between security and development:
‘In recent years there has been a growing focus in academic and policy circles on the changing roles of military and civilian actors in the context of multi-mandate peace and stabilization operations. This focus on ‘civil–military cooperation’ (CIMIC) and the
related notion of the ‘security–development nexus’ reflect changed thinking about the causes of (and solutions to) to wars and insecurity’ (Ibid.)
NGO is a catchall phrase, and before discussing which NGOs contest or negotiate boundaries, it is important to better understand which ‘NGOs’ are ‘fighting’ with the military on these borders. Norms and ideological orientations influence the operations of NGOs to a large extent. In general two types of NGOs can be distinguished: humanitarian minimalists or Dunantist NGOs, and maximalists or Wilsonian NGOs (Donini, 2010). ‘Humanitarian minimalists argue for fidelity to the Red Cross principles and draw strong Maginot lines between aid and policy (Barnett, 2005). The Red Cross principles are the principles on which humanitarian interventions are normally based, the four most important being: neutrality, impartiality, independence, and humanity. NGOs use these principles in order to maintain their ‘humanitarian space’ in which they operate and as a form of protection. As they are impartial and help all civilians struck by conflict, they often can operate in areas where other international agencies are not, or no longer welcome.
‘The fundamental principle of independence, impartiality, and neutrality not only characterizes humanitarian action’s single-minded purpose of alleviating suffering unconditionally and without ulterior motive, these principles also serve as operational tools that help in obtaining the consent of belligerents and the trust of communities for the presence and activities of humanitarian organizations, particularly in volatile contexts’ (de Torrente, 2004: 6)
Maximalists NGOs on the other hand, advocate a more expansive role for NGOs, involving the simultaneous pursuit of relief, development, human rights or justice, and peace building or stabilization (Goodhand, 2013: 290).
According to Gooddhand, the fields of humanitarian action, reconstruction, and development are becoming more and more crowded. This is due to many new actors from the military and private sector that are involved in activities previously employed under the auspices of the UN humanitarian agencies7 or NGOs. Goodhand argues that the application of COIN through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan blurred the lined between stabilization and combat missions of foreign forces (Ibid.) Despite initiatives to renegotiate boundaries ‘bleeding boundaries’ still exist:
