A failure to cooperate : the United States and the European security and defense policy

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A failure to cooperate:

The United States and the European Security and

Defense Policy

Course: Research Project – Grand Strategy in the 21

st

_century

Supervisor: Dr. Paul van Hooft

Second reader: Dr. Sebastian Krapohl

Student: Wessel de Heus

Number: 5681286

University of Amsterdam

Date: 26 June 2015

Master thesis International Relations

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Abstract

The United States has been dismissive of the European Union’s aspirations to develop military capabilities through the European Security and Defense (ESDP) policy since its inception. After the economic crisis in 2008, and renewed structural pressures, the Obama administration however repeatedly insisted that its European allies increased their military capabilities. This behavior is contradictive. This thesis researches why the US has never encouraged the development a strong European Union defense policy by using a combination of four theoretical approaches: defensive realism, offensive realism, neoclassical realism and liberalism. The findings show that in order to prevent ESDP to compete with the primary role of NATO, the US structurally opposed any military autonomy for ESDP.

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1 Introduction

The United States are moving away from Europe. In his valedictorian speech the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of a “dim and dismal future (Gates, 2011)” if the member states of NATO would not stop the trends of declining European defense budgets. Gates warned that future United States (US) leaders may not find the return on US investments in NATO worth the cost. These warnings came a couple months after the US, for the first time in the history, of NATO had not been in the lead of an intervention. The Obama administration under severe economic pressures had decided to “lead from behind (Lizza, 2011)” during the intervention in Libya. This strategy of relative restraint was followed up by the publication of the Defense Planning Guidance, wherein the US announced to rebalance to Asia, especially China. All these events indicated that the US in the future would no longer primarily focus on Europe. The international political playing field was changing and the European Union (EU) would increasingly have to provide its own security. Europe however, did not seem to be ready for this responsibility. The EU security policy was not capable of performing any serious task (Mix, 2013) and the main cause of this incapability was the US. Because contradictory to the image of US’ calls for more military capabilities, the American foreign policy had structurally opposed military aspirations by the EU for years.

Since the establishment of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1998, the US was predominantly dismissive of its development. Although the US had encouraged the EU for years to develop more military capability in order to solve disputes within the region, the possibility of a EU security institution that could compete with NATO and balance against the US was not well received (Albright, 1998). Throughout the period that followed its establishment, ESDP has been called one of “the greatest dangers for the transatlantic relationship (Nicholas Burns in de Wijk, 2004)” and has been critically viewed as an attempt to balance against the US. However, after limiting the playing field of ESDP and integrating military capabilities of ESDP within NATO structure, thus limiting the overall power of ESDP, the US has been repeatedly requesting the EU-members to increase their military capabilities.

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These actions seem contradictive. Why has the US not supported a strong EU defense policy? The EU taking military responsibilities to provide for its own security would relieve the US of a costly burden in addition to having a more powerful ally. Throughout the development of ESDP, the US criticized the EU for developing military capabilities. But since the beginning of the economic crises, the US has been requesting the member of the EU to do exactly what they have been trying: develop military capabilities. The response to this request has however been feeble. The goal of this thesis is therefore to research why the US has been so critical of ESDP. To research this problem, this thesis will try to answer the following research question: Why has the United States not strongly encouraged the development of the European Security and Defense Policy?

This will not be the first of study on this subject. The topic of transnational relations concentrated on the American attitude towards ESDP has been the target of a large amount of research. The body if literature ranges from descriptive works on the relation between NATO and ESDP (Howorth, 2003; Howorth, 2013; Keohane, 2011; Sloan, 2010), to scholars who argue that ESDP is a balancing instrument against the US (Posen, 2007; Art 2004, Paul 2004), and those that think it is not (Howorth & Menon, 2009). This thesis adds to the literature by providing an overview of the US position to ESDP during the fifteen years since its establishment and analyzing these period using a broad theoretical framework consisting of offensive realism, defensive realism, neoclassical realism and liberalism.

This thesis also aims to elaborate on the extent to which future EU leaders can and should count on the US for support. The changing political playing field will have implications for the position of the EU in US foreign policy and the level of resources and material the US will be willing to spend to secure the European continent. The findings of this thesis can assist in the general thinking of security in EU.

In order to formulate an answer to the problem stated above this thesis will analyze the attitude, rhetoric and actions of the US administrations from the establishment of the ESDP until the end of the first term of President Obama: 1998-2013.

This thesis consists of five chapters; The first chapter introduces the topic of the thesis, states the research question and the scope of the thesis. The second chapter consists of a theoretical framework. This chapter starts with a synopsis on the possible of US Grand Strategies after the Cold War, then proceeds to give an overview of the

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debate between offensive and defensive realism, in order to elaborate the behavior of the US in relation to ESDP and ends with an examination of the debate between neoclassical realism and liberalism and the role of domestic pressures in state behavior. Each theoretical discipline will be tested via at least one hypothesis.

The third chapter elaborates on the methodological approach and outlines the qualitative tool of process tracing and clarify the scope and sources used during the research.

The fourth chapter consists of the empirical findings on the relation between US an ESDP. This chapter will elaborate on key decisions and events during the fifteen years that will be researched and is divided into four subchapters: the four administrations dealing with ESDP. Each subchapter will provide findings to test the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical chapter and conclude with suggestions for rejecting or accepting these hypotheses.

The fifth chapter will provide a conclusion of the thesis, discuss the findings, elaborate on the limitations of the research and provide suggestions for future research.

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2 Theory

2.1 Introduction

The establishment of ESDP was a problem for American policymakers. Some had expected that the US would pull back out of Europe after the Cold War and NATO would disintegrate (Mearsheimer, 1990). But, the US are still the predominant military power in Europe today and NATO lies at the heart of this American position on the continent.1_{The establishment of a EU military actor therefore represented a}

challenge to the US foreign policy makers. Dependent on the perception of the international system by the US policymakers, and whether ESDP either represented a threat or a logical next step in the EU integration project, the US policymakers had a couple of foreign policy strategy options, which will be in the next subchapter.

While the US position to ESDP would always be set within a broader policy of the role of the US within the world, it is useful to set apart the different options for long-term strategies, or grand strategies, that the US had after the Cold War. These long-term strategies, or grand strategies, will be discussed below, followed by a framework of theories that elucidate the options that foreign policy makers had. 2.2 Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is a concept that describes the long term goals of a state and the measure of military, economic, and political resources that it is willing to spend to realize those goals. It furthermore encompasses the interests of a state and analyses future threats that arise when executing a certain strategy. The debate on different grand strategies is relevant for ESDP for they depict the long-term behaviour of the US to ESDP.

In their article ‘Competing visions for US grand Strategy’, Barry Posen and Andrew L. Ross (2006) depict four strategies that the US could pursue after the end of the cold war: neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security and primacy. These policies encompass the role of the US in the international political system in the broadest sense. They include the perspectives on the threat of competing military institutions and visions on the military presence abroad. This synopsis can

1_{The
importance
of
the
NATO
for
the
US
position
in
Europe
was
already
clear
to
American}

foreign policymakers in both the Bush senior as the Clinton administration (Zelikow & Rice, 1995; Holbrooke, 1995).

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therefore help place the debate on ESDP by providing a range of insights to the different perspectives on the role of the US in the world.

The grand strategy of primacy “holds that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensures peace (Posen & Ross, 2006).” Primacy suggests that it is necessary for the U.S. to maintain a position as the major and most powerful actor so it can “cow all potential challengers and comfort all coalition partners (p.30).” Primacy is concerned with the rise of possible competitors and suggests that the U.S. should prevent the international system to return to a system of bipolarity like in the Cold War or even multipolarity. This strategy is especially related to the post-Cold War US foreign policy. A document leaked to the press called the ‘The Defense Planning Guidance of 1992’ spoke of preventing the reemergence of a future rival wherever in the world (New York Times, 1992). As the findings will show, the US executed a primacy strategy throughout most of the fifteen-year period. This meant that ESDP was perceived as a possible peer competitor and therefore structurally opposed. The ideas of primacy are related to the theoretical discipline of offensive realism, which will be discussed in subchapter 2.4. The actions of president Obama however suggested another strategy: selective engagement.

“Selective engagement endeavours to ensure peace among powers that have substantial industrial and military potential – the great powers (Posen & Ross, 2006, p.15).” The relevant great powers for the US in this thesis are the EU and eventually China. For selective engagement “(…) any great power war in Eurasia is a danger to the United States (p.15)”. The long-term goal of the US is to stabilize regions where there is a large concentration of power, for a war between these states would endanger the US. The primary instrument to achieve this goal is NATO and the proponents of this theory would look sceptically towards an increase of military capabilities by the EU. The main focus is to keep the American homeland secure by preventing a large-scale war between great powers (Ibid, 2006), this ability would be undermined by the establishment of ESDP. The arguments of selective engagement are related to the theory of defensive realism, which will be discussed in subchapter 2.3

In addition to primacy and selective engagement Posen and Ross describe two other strategies: neo-isolationism and cooperative security. Both enjoy limited attention amongst policymakers, but are still present within the debate of American grand strategy (Ibid, 2006). Neo-isolationism is the least popular strategy and focuses solely on the security of the US homeland. This strategy presumes that the nuclear

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force protects the US from any attack and that because of this secure position it is never necessary to intervene abroad (Ibid, 2006, p.11). This strategy would leave the Europeans to the Europeans and would not lead to support for ESDP, nor opposition. Activity in international disputes would only cause negative consequences and should be avoided. Although there are proponents of this strategy in the US, this is not a feasible option. One could argue that this position resembles an extreme form of defensive realism, focused only on maintaining a secure position in the system. Defensive realism will be treated in subchapter 2.3.

The fourth grand strategy ‘cooperative security’; is focused on achieving peace through cooperating with international institutions. This grand strategy does not view the great powers as a security problem. Instead, the cooperation between states through institutions like NATO and the UN play an important role in this strategy to actively keep world peace (Ibid, 2006). This strategy would perceive ESDP as the next logical step in the integration project of the EU and because all EU member states are relatively similar western democracies, ESDP would not pose a threat. This strategy is related to liberal institutionalism, which emphasises the importance of international institutions to ensure peace (Dunne, 2006). Liberalism will be discussed in subchapter 2.6, but the focus in that subchapter will be on the role of domestic actors on foreign policy development, not on liberal institutionalism.

When broadly looking at the actions and policies of President Bush and President Obama concerning their actions in violent conflicts and their respectively unilateral and multilateral approaches, one notices a clear difference. Former President Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 with the intention to remove the threat of Saddam Hussein to install a democracy that was favorable to the United States. During his ruling, he acted unitarily and had little patience for multilateral cooperation, let alone for EU plans of developing a military pillar. In contrast to those actions, president Obama has been reluctant to continue this grand strategy. His actions, pulling back forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, leading from behind in Libya and pragmatically cooperating with other states, suggest a different grand strategy: selective engagement.

As noted in the introduction, the debate on different grand strategies are relevant for ESDP for they provide insights to long term American behaviour towards ESDP. They are developed and matched in response to visions of policymakers on the international system and its threats and opportunities. They are however very broad

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policies and do not provide answers to a specific situation like the development of ESDP. Therefore, in order to understand the options and choices that the policymakers face when developing a response to ESDP within the Grand Strategy it is necessary to look at theory. Theory offers both explanation and prediction to different complex issues of international relations. Through looking at theory, one can asses the possible outcomes and consequences of a certain action in relation to ESDP. The following section therefore sets out to elaborate on the theoretical debates relevant to the American position towards ESDP and to illustrate the restraints and possibilities within the international system, concluded by a hypothesis that will test the respective theory.

The behavior of the US in reaction to ESDP, touches upon concepts as relative and absolute gains, international cooperation and the struggle for peace. It therefore can be placed within the debate between offensive and defensive realism. These theories work with the same basic premises, but are divided on the concepts mentioned above. The following subchapter will elaborate on defensive realism, followed by a subchapter on offensive realism.

2.3 Defensive Realism

States are not intrinsically aggressive, “the first concern of states is to maintain their position in the international system (Waltz, 1979, p.126).” In his book ‘Theory of International Politics’, Kenneth Waltz updates theory of classical realism by Hans Morgenthau (1948). Waltz describes a system characterized by anarchy, where states have to look to themselves for survival (Waltz, 1979). In this self-help system, states struggle for security and survival and they do this by balancing their power and capabilities against other states in the system. The hierarchy of states is determined by their capabilities. It is this distribution of power that determines the behavior of states. The structural realist’ view on cooperation and relative gains is pivotal in the relation between ESDP and US. ESDP offers both the possibility for the US to cooperate with allies on the topic of security, and the possible threat of ESDP developing into a balancing actor against the US. Although Waltz is skeptic of cooperation between states (p. 105), he argues that preservation of the state is most important and seeking alliance or balancing externally to a threat is a viable option to assure security.

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According to Kenneth Waltz, defensive realists argue that security is plentiful in the international system. For defensive realists it is therefore not necessary to try to accumulate as much power as possible. Although the anarchic system drives state to compete for power and security, defensive realists argue that a relentless strive for power even when a state is relatively secure, is counterproductive. Layne states in his book “The Peace of Illusions” (2006): “Defensive realists claim that great powers that adopt power maximizing grand strategies end up being less, not more secure.” Examples of states’ demise due to power maximizing are Germany in the First and Second World War and the coalition of forces ending the reign of Napoleon. According to Kenneth Waltz, states should therefore strive for “appropriate amount of power (Waltz, 1979, p. 40).”

Defensive realists are proponents of the balance of power theory. The principle of the balance of power theory is that states will either balance or bandwagon their capabilities against a great power to ensure their security and to “preserve their autonomy as sovereign units (Schweller & Wolfworth, 2000, p. 74).” States have two balancing options. They can either balance internally by increasing their military capability: internal balancing. Or states can form alliances against the great power: external balancing. These options for balancing against a greater power are usually associated with relatively big powers. Small and weaker states do not have the possibility to balance and often chose to bandwagon, which means to align with the powerful state. Throughout the Cold War, the behaviour of the European states can be categorized as bandwagoning, aligning with a great power instead of opposing it. The EU aligned with the US through NATO, but the plans for developing ESDP separately from NATO can be interpreted as EU members externally balancing against the US. There is however a debate between scholars who argue that the EU is balancing against the US (Art, 2004; Paul, 2004; Posen, 2006) and those who think that the EU is not (Howorth, 2009; Menon, 2009).

When analysing the development of the ESDP, Barry Posen argues that the investment in military capability through ESDP instead of NATO is balancing instead of bandwagoning. To the US, this perception of ESDP and its relative power position is important because a decrease in relative power would mean fewer capabilities to secure US interests in Europe and in the world. The United States will therefore try to prevent the EU from increasing their military capabilities through the ESDP. Instead the US will try to convince the EU members to, if needed, to increase their

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capabilities through NATO. This will be seen as bandwagoning, which is not perceived as an action that threatens the power position of the US. The US has been requesting the EU member states to increase their military spending and capabilities for years, while emphasizing the primary role of NATO. Defensive realists therefore could argue that if the ESDP is incorporated within NATO structure, the US would approve. To test this line of thought I have developed the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 1: The US is in favor of a well-developed EU security policy as long as it is not at the expense of NATO.

2.4 Offensive Realism

Unlike defensive realists, offensive realists argue that the organization of the international system provides no incentive for cooperation. Scholars such as John Mearsheimer believe that security is not in abundance in the international system. States therefore have to constantly battle another in the struggle for power, or as Mearsheimer writes: “States quickly understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.33)”. This thought is contradictory to the statement made by the defensive realists on the effect of maximizing power. Christopher Layne elucidates the two schools: “Offensive realists and defensive realists alike agree that attaining security is the goal of the great powers’ grand strategies, which means that the real difference between them is not about whether great powers are “power maximizers” or “security maximizers” but about how much power a state needs to be secure (Layne, 2006 p. 17).”

According to the offensive realists the best way to secure the state is to pursue hegemony, which Mearsheimer defines as. “A state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system (Mearsheimer, 2001, p.33).” This position of hegemony provides the highest order of security in the anarchic system. According to offensive realists, states constantly strive to become the hegemon and that is why great powers “maximize their relative power” (Mearsheimer, p .21).” Because of the aggressive competition for power in the international system, the hegemon must prevent other powers from developing capabilities that could rival theirs (p.41). This line of thought implies that the US is structurally against the development of ESDP and any military

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capabilities in the EU, for the EU might develop into a rival in the future.

US behavior can be seen as offensive realist behavior (Layne, 2002). The US is regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and the military leader in Europe due to NATO. NATO was essentially developed by the US as an organization to contain the Soviet Union, but when the socialist state collapsed NATO did not disintegrate. On the contrary, NATO expanded twice and with it the US increased its power in former Soviet territory. According to Layne these enlargements of NATO “confirmed America’s post-cold war role as Europe’s stabilizer (p. 112).” According the offensive realists, a strong NATO is important in Europe. In his article ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, Mearsheimer predicted that if NATO was to dissolve, conflict would break out and Germany, France, Russia and Italy would develop to become major powers on the continent (Mearsheimer, 1990). These developments would be problematic for the US’ power position and interests. It is with this in mind that the US constantly will try to secure Europe through NATO, and why ESDP a challenger to this power is perceived as very dangerous.

The big powers in offensive realism are however not structurally aggressive. In cases of threat the big powers chose to pass the buck of balancing against a rival to other states and this is what the US could do to the EU. The concept of buck passing and or burden shifting is the most favorable action for big powers according Mearsheimer. Three reasons why: first, it is cheap to pass the buck, no costs are inflicted on the state passing the buck, which can free ride. Second, the state accepting the burden of balancing can end up in a long struggle with the rival state and this situation can increase the relative power of the buck-passer. Third, consequently this strategy can weaken the international playing field if the powerful state is able to pass the buck to multiple competing states (Mearsheimer, 2007). A pitfall of passing the buck is that the state now responsible to balance against the rival state is not capable or willing. This happened during the Second World War when Britain and France were not able to “catch the buck” that the Soviet Union passed them in 1939, which causes the rise of Nazi Germany.

In relation to the US and ESDP one would expect the United States to be positive towards European initiative to secure the continent and take up the task of balancing against possible threats. With the development of the ESDP the US would have the ideal partner to pass the buck in case of a threat for a couple of reasons. First, The EU has been developing their own security institution to catch the buck. Second,

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by taking over the responsibility for balancing against Russia, the EU military would share the burden in Europe, which would mean that the US would have to spend less in securing Europe. Third, the US is a hegemon in the Western Hemisphere and because of its location; the rise of a rival state would not endanger the security of the US. Therefore the risks of passing the buck are also low, for the implications of a situation where the buck will not be caught are not catastrophic.

Given the developments of the economic crisis, the rise of China and the pivot to Asia and the growing aggression of Russia in the later period of 1998-2013, the incentives for passing the buck have grown for the US. Up until that moment, the offensive realist theory would predict the US to strongly reject the development of ESDP on all fronts, but from the moment of the threat and the massive economic restraints, the US could pass the buck to the ESDP. Summarizing, offensive realism predicts the US will principally oppose the development of ESDP as it is perceived as a possible peer competitor and balancer. The US will however, when faced with a threat and restraint by economic limitations, try to pass the buck of balancing to the EU. The following hypotheses will be used to examine whether the US behaved conform offensive realism.

Hypothesis 2a: The US in principle opposes the development of a European military institution.2

Hypothesis 2b: The US will try to pass the buck under Obama due to an increased Russian threat in Europe and reduced US capabilities due to economic restrictions.

2.5 Neoclassical Realism

The development of grand strategies, the policies that flow from those strategies, and the perceptions of threats and possibilities for cooperation are influenced by domestic politics in the US. When analysing these factors, structural realism however falls short because the theory does not include domestic actors. A realist theory that argues that domestic factors while interacting with structural pressure determine state

behaviour is neoclassical realism

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Neoclassical realism is the successor and next logical step in realist theories (Rathbun, 2008). The theory builds upon the same premises as structural realism: the international system is anarchic and a self-help system, but includes domestic variables in order to explain state behavior. Neoclassical realism “uses domestic politics and ideas to fill out the incomplete picture begun by structural realism (Rathbun, 2008, p.307)”. Ideas, norms and values and other concepts related to agency that are generally associated with the theories of liberalism and constructivism to explain the translation of systemic pressures to foreign policy (Rose, 1998). “It connects the system-level variables with the intervening variables of domestic principles and elite perceptions (Marsh, 2012).” An example of this interaction is the effect of elite consensus on balancing behavior called underbalancing (Schweller, 2004). 3

“Elite consensus/disagreement is the most proximate cause of a state’s response or nonresponse to external threats (Schweller, 2004, p.170).” Elite consensus measures the similarities and differences amongst the political elites regarding the actions and strategies of a state. In relation to the US and ESDP the question is, how within the administrations the perceptions on and preferred approaches to ESDP differ. When there is elite consensus, a government is able to formulate a cohesive foreign policy to react to threats (Schweller, 2006). Therefore if elite consensus is reached on the threat of ESDP we will expect a cohesive opposing strategy from the administrations. Questions regarding the elite consensus are: how does the American elites perceive ESDP, as a threat or as an allied force? Do they agree on this perception of ESDP and do they agree on the appropriate policy that deals with ESDP and do they agree on the domestic political risks associated with the policy concerning ESDP (Schweller, 2004, p. 171).

A research related to elite consensus by Trubowitz & Mellow has shown that bipartisanship, a situation two opposing political parties find consensus over a certain topic (in this case foreign policy), is related to both domestic economic electoral conditions as well as the international security environment (Trubowitz & Mellow, 2011). These scholars show that an international threat alone is not sufficient for bipartisanship. Economic growth and certainty over the economy and jobs is a necessary condition for bipartisanship to work. This shows the mechanism of

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occurs
when
the
state
does
not
balance
or
does
so
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in
response
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a}

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interaction between domestic and international pressures that shapes the domestic political environment in the US, which in turn shapes foreign policy. This goes against the assumption by structural realists that an increase of capabilities by another state alone is enough incentive for a state to react.

Neoclassical realism predicts that the interaction between the systemic threat: the establishment ESDP and the domestic political actors: the decision makers within the administration, will determine the American position on ESDP. In order to test this prediction this thesis will research the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3a: The level of elite consensus/disagreement on the perceived threat of ESDP within each administration determines the position on ESDP.

The expectation is be that a high level of consensus on the threat of ESDP will determine a cohesive foreign policy towards ESDP. If however there is disagreement on the perceived threat of ESDP, the policy on ESDP will become ambiguous.

As mentioned, the addition of domestic variables resembles the characteristics of other theories in international relations Where structural realism focuses solely on states in the international system and neoclassical realism focuses on the interaction between domestic variables and systemic pressures, the theory of liberalism argues that state behavior is predominantly driven by domestic pressures. In order for this thesis to truly determine the causes to why the US has not strongly encouraged the EU security and defense policy, it is necessary to include this last theory. This last subchapter will elaborate on the importance of domestic groups within the US and conclude with a hypothesis.

2.6 Liberal theory

Liberalism is a bottom up theory, arguing that domestic actors drive foreign policy and the behavior of states. Where Realism focuses on capabilities of states and the shifting balance of power, Liberalism is focuses on state preferences, cooperation and peace (Snyder, 2004; Dunne, 2006).4 Liberalists do share the premise that the

4_{Liberal theory is known for its many sub theories like the democratic peace theory, institutionalism}

and commercial liberalism. These theories focus respectivelyon the spread of democracy, the importance of international institution and the role of economic interconnection and free trade. Given

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international system is anarchic, but this does not predominantly determine state behavior. Liberalists argue that state behavior, or state preference, is derived from the preferences of groups within the state. Different groups, with varying amounts of domestic power exert pressure through domestic institutions or politicians to shape the goals of the state (Moravcsik, 2010; Moravcsik, 1997; Putnam, 1998). “These social pressures, transmitted through domestic political institutions, define "state preferences" –that is, the set of substantive social purposes that motivate foreign policy. State preferences give governments an underlying stake in the international issues they face. Since the domestic and transnational social context in which states are embedded varies greatly across space and time, so do state preferences

(Moravcsik, 2010, p.2).” Liberalists thus argue that a foreign policy and the actions of the state in the international system are a representation of domestic preferences and pressures.

This line of thought implies that the social groups within the US and their respective preferences determine the attitude of the US concerning ESDP. Within the American political system, the two most prominent social groups are the two political parties: the Republicans and the Democrats. These political parties exert power through their representatives to make their specific interest the national interest and develop policies that serve that interest. Liberalists expect that the different preferences of both political parties lead to different political outcomes. “The precise preferences of social groups, weighted by their domestic power, shape the underlying goals (“state preferences”) that states pursue in world politics (Moravcsik, 2010, p.3).” In the US, unless there is bipartisanship, the most likely foreign policy outcome will be that the preference of the ruling party becomes the national interest. Given the different views and approaches of the two parties, Liberalists would therefore expect the US’ position on ESDP vary between the Clinton, Bush and Obama administration.

An example of the state behavior defined by the preferences of a powerful social group is the departure from multilateralism by the Republican Bush Jr. administration. His deviation from the multilateral institutionalism of Clinton can be attributed to the preferences of the Republicans at the time. The Republican voters were in favor of investing in military, in contrary to than the Democrats. In addition

the topic of this thesis, the US response to a military institution, the emphasis of this subchapter will however be on the that domestic actors play in shaping the foreign policy of the US.

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the Republicans also favored military strength over diplomacy when it came to foreign relations (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007). These preferences translated into unilateral military behavior by the US and the foreign policy and actions of the Bush administration thus resemble the preferences of his social group. The change in policy by the Bush administration and its effects on US’ the attitude of ESDP will also be analyzed in the findings chapter.5

The political parties of the US have also grown apart on the topic of foreign policy. There has been little bipartisanship since the Cold War, and this suggests that both parties have different preferences concerning the US position in the international system (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007). Because the preferences of the social groups in the US are distinct, liberalists expect the Republican and Democratic administrations have a distinct foreign policy and thus a different position towards ESDP. The following hypothesis will be used in order to examine the prediction of the liberal theory:

Hypothesis 3b: The Democratic and Republican administrations will have distinct policies for ESDP.

According to this hypothesis, domestic pressures will determine the foreign policy and the American position towards ESDP. The clearest sign of domestic preferences in a democratic society like the US are the outcomes of the presidential elections. The elections provide the possibility for Americans to exert their influence and decide which social group will be most powerful. In addition to presidential elections there are Congressional elections, these offer the possibility to exert influence during the terms of the administrations. Liberalism also predicts that the level of consistency and cohesion of the foreign policy will suffer when the administrations lose the majority in Congress. This line of thought suggest that after 2006 and 2010 (Bush and Obama both lost the majority in the Senate) the foreign policy will become more ambiguous.

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the
liberal
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was
put
aside
for
a
more
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oriented}

strategy might suggest that liberalism is less relevant than realism. The basis for this argument is however that the driving force behind this change in policy are domestic preferences and this is why it precedes liberalism over realism

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In both these cases the ruling party will have to bargain for their foreign policy with a strongly oppositional counterparty.

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3 Methodology

3.1 Process Tracing

This chapter will discuss the methodology of the research and the research design. The tool of process tracing will be used to analyze why the US has not supported ESDP and develop a line of thought to answer the research question.“The general method of process tracing is to analyze data on the casual mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects (Bennet & George, 1997, p.4).”

According to Beach and Pedersen (2011), there are three distinct versions of process tracing. First, theory testing process tracing, which is meant to deduce a certain theory from the literature and to test it against a given case. Second, theory building process tracing, which attempts to develop a theoretical explanation from a particular case. Third, explaining outcome process tracing, which is a case centric method, meant to develop an explanation of an outcome using a range of theories (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). This thesis will be analyzing the behavior of the US towards ESDP, while trying to answer the question: Why has the United States not strongly encouraged the development of the European Security and Defense Policy? Given the fact that this thesis researches a particular outcome, the most appropriate type of process tracing is outcome process tracing.

As mentioned above in the theory section a range of theoretical explanations will be used for this research. According to Beach and Pedersen, the usage of several mechanisms to explain a certain outcome using this method is almost always necessary due to the complexity of providing a logical answer to a complex outcome (Beach and Pedersen, 2011). According to Beach and Pedersen: “given that the ambition is to craft a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome instead of developing a generalizable mechanism, it is usually necessary to include non-systematic mechanisms; i.e. mechanisms that can be understood as case-specific mechanisms in our explanation (Beach and Pedersen, 2011).” In order to include non-systemic mechanism do so I have included the theory of neoclassical realism and liberalism which, take into account specific domestic variables.

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3.2 Case selection

The scope of this thesis is limited to fifteen years of transatlantic relations concentrated on the American position to ESDP. The research starts with the establishment of ESDP in 1998 and ends with the inauguration of president Obama in 2013. This period is divided into four separate cases: the Clinton administration (1997-2001), the two Bush administrations (2001-2005, 2005-2009) and the Obama administration (2009-2013). The reason for dividing these four periods is that each of these administrations has a different character, different policy making actors and experienced different structural and domestic pressures. The starting point of my research marks the beginning of ESDP and thus the start of the American response. I have chosen to limit my research period to the end of the first Obama administration because it provides the ending of his first term and provides the ability to analyze a complete ruling period.

3.3 Sources and data selection

The sources that will be analyzed to establish the arguments in this thesis widely vary. First, official statements and speeches will be used, which can be found on the respective websites of the institutions of the US, for example: defense.gov, state.gov. These speeches will give an indication of the goals and perspectives of the American high official actors and policy makers on the topic of ESDP and the EU security situation in general. Second, official reports by the administrations such as the National Security Strategies and the Defense Planning Guidance elaborate on developed policies and these give an indication of the future behavior of the US. In addition to these reports, there are other reports such as reports from the Center of a New American Security and the International institute for Strategic Studies that provide context and explanation to policies by scholars. Newspaper articles, interviews in newspapers and on television are also a valuable source. Many statements are made in the public debate and in some cases in op-ed pieces in for example the Washington Post. Newspaper articles therefore provide a very important source for my findings. The newspaper articles will mostly be found via the Lexis Nexis tool, offered by the University of Amsterdam.

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4 Empirical context

4.1 Introduction

The next chapter analyzes of fifteen years of US-EU relations concerning the development of ESDP. This chapter is divided in the four ruling periods of American presidents dealing with ESDP. Besides empirics on the transatlantic relations and the structural conditions of the international political playing field, these chapters will also contain details on the domestic political situation in the US, which will serve as the building blocks for the third hypothesis. Before the thesis starts with the Clinton administration, a small introduction to the creation of the ESDP is in order.

On November 9, 1989 the Berlin wall came down. This event would be the introduction to at least two decades of American dominance in world politics combined with the disappearance of a serious military threat on the European continent. This development however did not cause the US to pull out of Europe and focus on domestic issues. In fact the US, through NATO, expanded their power position in Europe by including several Eastern European states in the alliance in 1998 and 2004 (NATO, 2004). In the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, the US developed a grand strategy of primacy that combined military predominance with the view that possible potential competitors should be “deterred” from even “aspiring a larger regional or global role (New York Times, 1992)”. These statements became public after the Defense Planning Guide, a doctrine of American power, mostly conceived by Undersecretary of State Paul Wolfowitz, was leaked to the press.

This document depicts a US that is not willing to hand over power or military responsibility to Europe, or any state in the world. It must have therefore not come as a surprise that the US shot down French plans of dividing the structure of NATO. This separation of the structure of NATO would give Europeans more responsibility and control of operations within Europe, but Washington did not approve. This led to France not joining to NATO’s integrated military command in 1996 (Moens, 2000), and was the first sign of cracks in the transatlantic relations.

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4.2 Period one – 1998-2001

On the 4th of December 1998, France and Britain made a joint declaration stating that: “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises (Rutten, 2001).” With this statement these two states initiated the establishment of a European military institution. To many this was seen as a watershed for the military pillar of the EU (Michel, 2001; Lebl, 2004; King, 2005) and these statements would be the prelude to the ESDP to be ratified by the EU in the Treaty of Nice in 2000.6

The establishment of ESDP indicated that the EU was ready and willing to achieve more military autonomy on the continent, a development that could decrease the influence of NATO and was perceived by the US as an attempt to create a balancing institution against the US. Within a week of the joint declaration Secretary of State Madeline Albright, had formulated the reaction from Washington.

In a statement in the Financial Times, Albright said in order for the Europeans not to harm the transatlantic relations, they should avoid “decoupling, duplication and discrimination (Albright, 1998)”. These 3d’s (by which the statement became known and will be referenced to in this thesis), were meant to contain the development of ESDP as a competitor to NATO. According to Albright the EU should avoid decoupling the EU and NATO decision making process concerning military operations and hinder the alliance. ESDP should also not duplicate the structures and processes already installed in NATO, according to Albright the resources were already scarce and EU should avoid from making decisions twice. Lastly Albright warned the EU from discriminating against European members of NATO, who were not members of EU (ibid, 1998). With these statements, Albright made it clear that the US saw the ESDP as an obstruction to NATO and transatlantic relations. The US would not cooperate with the EU on its newly found military aspirations and oppose any development of further military autonomy by the EU.

Although not all official statements from American officials were this denouncing of ESDP, the main message remained unequivocal: that NATO was to

6_{The
ESDP
was
a
step
towards
a
more
active
defense
and
security
policy,
committing
the
EU}

members to the ‘Headline Goal’ or Helsinki goals of a European Rapid Reaction Force of 60.000 troops (RRF) by 2003. These forces would be deployable within 60 days all over the world and would have to be capable to perform tasks agreed upon in the earlier mentioned Peterbergs agreement (Cornish & Edwards, 2001).

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remain the primary and predominant institution. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott distanced the US position from the negative 3D’s speech by Albright and stated support for the ESDP. “There should be no confusion about America's position on the need for a stronger Europe. We are not against; we are not ambivalent; we are not anxious; we are for it. We want to see a Europe that can act effectively through the Alliance or, if NATO is not engaged, on its own (Talbott, 1999).” William Cohen, Secretary of Defense wrote in a column in the Washington Post that the EU should spend more on their budget for defense, for both for NATO and ESDP. “But in the final analysis, allies will have to spend more on defense, if they are to measure up to NATO's military requirements and establish a European Security and Defense Identity that is separable but not separate from NATO (Cohen, 1999).” He furthermore stated that a strong Europe would benefit the Alliance, underlining NATO’s importance. Alexander Vershbow, the US ambassador to NATO, commented on ESDP by stating: "Done properly, ESDP can increase the capabilities available to NATO and the EU to deter or respond to crises. Done poorly, this process can divide the trans-Atlantic alliance, lead to decreased U.S. engagement in European security matters and diminish European capacity to manage crises (Vershbow, 2000)." This comment provides ESDP with a very small margin for success and a large margin for error. Either re-organize the plans for ESDP so it becomes subordinate to NATO, or risk compromising the transatlantic relations. This statements offer two options to the EU. First, align with NATO, which will be perceived as bandwagoning and not harmful. Second, deviate from NATO, which will be perceived as balancing and will harm the transnational relations.

In the end, US pressure led to the European Council to publish a statement saying that ESDP would only be an active actor in a situation where “where NATO as a whole is not engaged (Rutten, 2000, p. 82)”, therefore critically limiting the scope of operations for ESDP.

In December 2000, at his last appearance at NATO, Secretary of Defense Cohen responded to a question concerning both the future US policy concerning NATO and ESDP. “There is going to be a continuation of the policy toward NATO. The United States is strongly committed to NATO as an institution, but much will depend upon how the Europeans, in fact, shape the ESDP, that if, as I have said before, they try to or are desirous of a separate operational planning capability, separate and distinct of that from NATO itself, then that is going to weaken the ties

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between the United States and NATO and NATO and the EU (Cohen, 2000).” The message should be clear, a move away from NATO is a move away from the US, and that will have implications. Furthermore, Cohen’s prediction of future policy did not show any ease in the US position to ESDP.

At the NATO summit, in a press Conference, Cohen stated that the security of the US is “firmly linked” to the European security and that the US “could not be secure and prosperous as long as Europe is not secure and prosperous”. He promoted integrating the defense planning process between NATO and EU as “the only logical and cost effective way in order to secure the best possible coordination of limited forces and resources (Cohen, 2000).” He stated that if NATO-EU relations would not be “cohesive”, it could lead to a security risk for both the US and the EU. With these calls for integrating ESDP into NATO and claiming a higher security risk if it fails, the US attempts to include ESDP in NATO and prevent it from developing autonomously.

Cohen furthermore, multiple times, stated that EU members should not discriminate against non-EU members while planning and discussing ESDP plans nor, should they duplicate policy-making procedures (Ibid, 2000). The use of the words discrimination and duplication brings us back to the initial US response of Albright, days after the establishment of ESDP and her 3d speech. Looking back at the years that followed that reaction, some official statements may have struck a more lenient tone, but essentially the US position did not vary.

Although the Clinton administration had lost the majority in the House of Representatives in 1998 (United States House of Representatives, 2015), the House supported the line that was set out by Madeline Albright. A resolution that was passed in the House directly quoted the 3D’s speech:

In order to preserve the solidarity and effectiveness that has been achieved within the Alliance over the last 50 years, it is essential that security arrangements elaborated under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) complement, rather than duplicate NATO efforts and institutions and be linked to, rather than decoupled from NATO structures and provide full and active involvement of all European Allies rather than discriminating against Allies that are not members of the EU (House of Representatives, 1999).

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The resolution signaled consensus and support for the administration’s policy from both Democrats and Republicans.

The attitude of the Clinton administrations can be summarized as supportive of ESDP but with severe limitations. The rhetoric between allies will rarely be very negative, but beyond the supportive remarks and notions of ‘a more secure world through a more secure Europe’, there were severe doubts and objections towards ESDP. In the first place whether this development would not derail the EU from NATO, thus decreasing the importance of NATO and the US in Europe. Second, doubt whether ESDP would actually lead to the EU spending more money on developing military capabilities and skepticism about the European project (Sloan, 2000). However, the US during this first period was in favor of an increase in defense budgets and military capability of EU members. It was the institution through which these goals were to be realized that was of concern.

The statements made by the Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen and ambassador to NATO all suggest that the US was in favor of the EU increasing their military capabilities, as long as it was not at the cost of NATO. It was clear that the US support hinged the institution that would benefit from the increase in capabilities. These findings thus suggest that the US was in favor of a well-developed EU security policy as long as it was not at the expense of NATO, as stated in H1.7

The American support for ESDP hinged upon and lack of autonomy for ESDP. Throughout the statements made by American officials, it was made clear that the possibility of the EU creating a balancing instrument would not be accepted. The efforts made to include ESDP into NATO are dedicated to removing the possibility of ESDP developing in an autonomous military actor and a balancing instrument. The US is thus in favor of a well-developed EU security policy as long as it is not at the expense of NATO. But would ESDP, integrated in the structure of NATO and without decision making processes that excluded Americans, thus without EU autonomy still be called a European military institution? The answer is yes, but a very limited military EU military institution. The critique of the American officials was very clear on this point. ESDP could not deviate from NATO, and within a week of its inception, aspirations to develop a balancing instrument and military autonomy were suppressed. As shown above, the US was never interested in a second military actor

7_{H1: The US is in favor of a well-developed EU security policy as long as it is not at the expense of}

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that could possibly challenge the status quo and change the balance of power that was in favor of the US. Alexander Vershbow made it most clear by stating that if ESDP would develop in any other way than through NATO it would damage the relations between the US and EU. These statements do not however suggest that the US in principle opposes the development of a military institution. The support hinged upon the level of autonomy and the scope of the operations. ESDP could not deviate from NATO and could only act where “NATO as a whole is not engaged (Talbott, 1999)”. If however ESDP would develop within NATO, and play a complementary role, the US would not directly oppose ESDP. This clearly leaves no room for autonomy for ESDP and severely limited the scope of the operations. But the data does suggest that the US, under very strict and limited conditions, would not principally oppose an EU defense policy. The findings thus suggest that the US is not in principle against a EU military actor, which is proposed by H2a, as long as it is either incorporated within NATO or a limited military actor with little autonomy and a small scope of operations.

The actions and statements, made by officials during the Clinton administration suggest a primacy strategy from the United States. The attempts to include ESDP in NATO structure suggests both intentions to preserve the power position of NATO as well as to prevent major powers in Europe to come together and form a balancing alliance against the US. At the same time that the US was denouncing the ESDP, NATO enlarged eastwards and was joined by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. With this expansion the US further expanded their power position within Europe by strengthening NATO and creating a strong relation with the Eastern European states.

In spite of differences within the Pentagon and the State department, Washington was able to maintain a “coherent” line towards ESDP (Sloan, 2000). Both within the National Security Council as in the Department of Defense, there were differences concerning ESDP, but they did not affect the policy (Ibid, 2000). The resolution passed in November 1999 showed that amongst Republicans and Democrats there was a consensus on ESDP and agreement on the approach taken by the administration. The univocal responses made by officials within the administration also signal consensus on the approach to ESDP, suggesting that the statement made in H3a is correct.

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4.3 Period two – 2001-2005.

It did not take long for the new republican President George Walker Bush, who was inaugurated on the 20th_{of January 2001, to continue the discourse of NATO’s as the}

primary actor and ESDP as a secondary player. During the first meeting with other heads of state of NATO members in Brussels he stated:

We agreed that NATO and the European Union must work in common purpose. It is in NATO’s interest for the European Union to develop a rapid reaction capability. A strong, capable European force integrated with NATO would give us more options for handling crises when NATO, as a whole, chooses not to engage. NATO must be generous in the help it gives the EU. And similarly, the EU must welcome participation by NATO allies who are not members of the EU. And we must not waste scarce resources, duplicating effort or working at cross purposes (Bush in Feldman, 2001).

By explicitly using the verb ‘duplicating’, Bush picked up the American position where Madeline Albright, and later William S. Cohen, had left off and continued the policy supporting ESDP, while severely limiting its possible aspirations as a balancing instrument and autonomous military actor.

On his first visit to Brussels, during a NATO summit, the new Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld signaled that under the Bush administration ESDP should not even aspire to develop autonomous capabilities and become a balancing instrument. He emphasized the primary role of NATO, and would not allow that ESDP would reduce the relative power position of NATO in Europe. “Those pursuing a European Security and Defense Policy will need to be vigilant to ensure that this project is managed and handled in a way that adds capabilities to NATO, embeds defense planning in NATO, and that activities are arranged so that NATO has the right of first refusal (Rumsfeld, 2001).” Rumsfeld thus extended the policy and strategy executed by his predecessor. This showed consensus between the parties on the perceived threat and approach for ESDP.

The year 2001 would be characterized by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on the 11th of September. This event, and the following wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, would dominate the transatlantic discourse for the years

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to come. The attacks on the World Trade Center reduced the tensions over ESDP, because these debates were of much lesser importance to the US than the ‘War against Terror’ (Brimmer, 2007). Initially the relations improved after the terrorist attacks. European states invoked NATO’s article 5 and gave the US legitimacy to respond to the attacks (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004). On October the 7th, the US started a campaign in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban. France, Germany, Italy and Spain were states that contributed campaign. But as the US response to the terrorist attacks became more and more clear, the heads of states of EU members voiced their concern on the new foreign policy of the United States as being too unilateralist (Menon, 2004). They had hoped that their immediate support and provision of legitimacy through NATO’s article 5 would lead to a multilateral approach of the US (Gordon & Shapiro, 2004).

Within the Bush Administration, the only high ranking official that was concerned with seeking allies for the inevitable response to the terrorist attacks was Secretary of State Colin Powell. In contrast to his attempts to establish a multilateral foreign policy vice-president Cheney, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz were less concerned with forming coalitions and getting support from other states (Dionne Jr, 2002; Dao, 2002). The disagreements within the administration suggest a lack of consensus on the proper approach to Iraq. This lack of consensus however was not transferred to the position on ESDP. The administration remained cohesive and unequivocal: ESDP should not deviate from NATO and should not develop autonomous capabilities. During the period that followed the US even took a more unilateralist approach to world politics. The basis of this new policy became clear when the Bush administration published the National Security Strategy.

The National Security Strategy was a doctrine that would serve as the backbone strategy for the years to come showed and the intentions of the US: “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. (…) Our military’s highest priority is to defend the United States. To do so effectively, our military must: (…) dissuade future military competition (Bush, 2002).” This signaled to the EU that the US was not prepared to engage in contest over military capabilities. The doctrine, furthermore elaborated on the rights for unilateral preemptive approaches in the case self-defense against terrorist attacks (Ibid, 2002). It would be the prelude to the invasion in Iraq.

A failure to cooperate : the United States and the European security and defense policy