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‘The War in Brabant!’: The Pillarized Press and the Dutch
Interwar Army Exercises 1924-1935
Student: Thomas Wijnaendts van Resandt
Supervisor: Mr. dr. S.F. (Samuël) Kruizinga
Date: 28-02-2021
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Contents
Foreword………...2 Introduction………4 1. Historical Factors……….12 1.1 Army………12 1.2 Politics……….16 1.3 Foreign Relations……….23 1.4 National Characteristics………...25 1.5 Broader Movements……….272. The Fall Exercises and the Dutch Press………30
2.1 The Fall Exercises………30
2.2 The Press………..32
2.3 De Standaard………...35
2.4 De Tijd & De Maasbode………..36
2.5 Algemeen Handelsblad & Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant….38 2.6 Het Volk & Voorwaarts………40
2.7 De Tribune………41
3. The Newspaper Reports………...43
3.1 The Exercise Debate……….43
3.2 Coordination and Involvement……….52
3.3 Organizational Cohesion and Reserve officers & NCOs….55 3.4 Discipline, Spirit, and Pro-disarmament subversion………59
3.5 Gradual Improvements……….70
3.6 Conclusions………..74
4. Conclusion………79
4.1 The Dutch Army at the End of an Age……….79
4.2 Final remarks………86
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Introduction
The interbellum marked a period of profound uncertainty for the Dutch army. During this time, the army found itself torn between various competing ideas about the nation's future, the world, and the army's place within it. On the one hand, this period was characterized by the rise and fall of internationalist idealism and disarmament antimilitarism. Fueled by sheer disgust for the horrors of the Great War and emboldened by the League of Nations' (LoN) subsequent establishment, many became convinced that militarism was a threat to modern civilization's survival. From now on, the danger of armed conflict was to be defused through international oversight and disarmament.
On the other hand, the interbellum was also marked by a stubborn continuation of tried and trusted political and military maxims. In the Netherlands' case, this manifested itself in the dogged adherence to its 19th-century neutrality politics. This foreign policy approach had
seemingly kept the country out of the war and had consequently managed to spare its citizens the worst of the postwar economic fallout. For many, the key to the success of this strategy was a strong, defensive army. Therefore, the formation and maintenance of a credible army were of vital importance to the country’s survival. Utopian visions of a world without war and notions of unilateral disarmament were not to be taken seriously.
In ways, this polarization over the military question also reflected the character of the ‘pillarized’ Dutch nation. The process of democratization had both generated and perpetuated social divisions within society, as Protestants, Catholics, socialists, and liberals seemingly retreated into ‘pillars’: social ingroups replete with social-, educational- and cultural institutions, which at their most extreme essentially functioned as societal echo chambers. This fragmentation was partly borne out of a latent anxiety and disagreement over the nation's identity, which slowly grew during the first half of the 19th century in the wake of Waterloo and the Belgian secession. The question that arose was whether the Netherlands, with its glorious history, was still a great nation on the geopolitical stage, or merely a small power kept alive by the graces of its powerful neighbors? Moreover, was this a nation which ought to maintain a powerful military, as many (confessional-)conservatives argued, or was the Netherlands to give up on this futile endeavor and become the moral beacon of Europe, as most left-liberals and socialists believed?
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During the interbellum, this, at times, schizophrenic identity crisis resulted in a politics of anxiety, distrust, and indecision, which heavily informed the Dutch army's development up to the mid-1930s. Much has already been written on these fronts; the classic series Het Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog by Louis de Jong laid the groundwork for the
historiography on the technical and organizational development of the interwar army, as well as the (social-)political movements in the Netherlands leading up the Second World War.1
Subsequent works by historians such as Amersfoort, Kamphuis, Schulten, and De Koster have expanded mainly on the former,2 whereas studies by historians like Beunders, Teitler, Von der Dunk, and Blom, have focused on the latter.3 Although some disagreement exists over who or what was principally to blame for the weak state of the army in May 1940 – ranging from halfhearted leftist or rightist politicians, to economic hardships, to the lack of room for an alternative (geo)political strategy – the general consensus is that the army was systematically depleted between the end of the Great War, and the ratification of Prime Minister (PM) Hendrikus Colijn’s ‘Defense Fund’ in February 1936.
1 Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog Deel 1 Voorspel (The Hague:
Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1969); Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede
Wereldoorlog Deel 2 Neutraal (The Hague: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1969).
2 Herman Amersfoort, “De proef op de som”, in Mei 1940: de strijd op Nederlands grondgebied, ed. Herman
Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012), 380-400; Herman Amersfoort, Een harmonisch leger
voor Nederland. Oorlogsbeeld, strategie en operationele planning van het Nederlandse leger in het Interbellum
(Breda: Nederlandse Defensie Academie, 2007); Herman Amersfoort, “Chapter Eleven. Give US Back Our Field Army! The Dutch Army Leadership and The Operational Planning During The Interwar Years,” in Small Powers in
the Age of Total War, 1900-1940, ed. Herman Amersfoort and Wim Klinkert (Brill, 2011), 251–279; Jan Schulten,
“Gewapende neutraliteit en Tweede Wereldoorlog (1870-1949)”, in Met man en macht. De militaire geschiedenis
van Nederland 1550-2000, ed. Jaap R. Bruijn and Cees B. Wels (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Balans, 2003); C.M. Schulten
and P.M.J. de Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees: De Nederlandse Krijgsmacht in het Interbellum”, in Mei 1940: de
strijd op Nederlands grondgebied, ed. Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012), 60-105.
3 Henri J.G. Beunders, Weg met de vlootwet! De maritieme bewapeningspolitiek van het kabinet-Ruys de
Beerenbrouck en het succesvolle verzet daartegen in 1923 (Bergen: Octavo, 1984); G. Teitler, “Anglo-Dutch
Relations, 1936-1988. Colonial and European Trends”, in Navies and Armies: The Anglo-Dutch Relationship in War
and Peace 1688-1988, ed. G.J.A. Raven and N.A.M. Rodger (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1990); G. Teitler,
“De Krijgsmacht als Cassandra. Toekomstverwachtingen van Nederlandse militairen”, in Tussen crisis en oorlog.
Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, ed. G. Teitler (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), 70-84; H.W. von
der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie, Het dilemma in de jaren dertig”, in Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en
krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, ed. G. Teitler (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984); J.C. H. Blom, “A Necessary Evil. The
Armed Forces and Society in the Netherlands”, in Navies and Armies: The Anglo-Dutch Relationship in War and
Peace 1688-1988, ed. G.J.A. Raven and N.A.M. Rodger (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, 1990), 84-104; J.C.H.
Blom, “‘Durch kamen sie doch”. Het Nederlands defensiebeleid in de jaren dertig opnieuw beschouwd”, in Tussen
crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, ed. by G. Teitler (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984),
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Yet, as much as has been said about the military debate in Dutch politics and how it directly impacted the army's organizational development, comparatively less attention has been paid to how this discussion played out in the arena of public opinion, namely in the press. Similarly, although considerable histories have been written about the Dutch pillarized press,4 with the notable exception of Frank van Vree’s De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland 1930-1939,5 few have focused directly on the contents of their writings, nor on their relationship with the army;6 A surprising absence, as the press was not only at the height of its social and cultural power during the interbellum,7 its most prominent newspapers also published extensive reports about the state and the performance of the army during its yearly field exercises. These exercises, also known as the ‘fall exercises’, as they usually took place during the autumn season, were the only time during the year when the army simulated combat in the field. Besides its training purposes, the exercises also constituted an opportunity for the army to interact with the public. Accordingly, correspondents of the Dutch press were invited to cover the exercises as ‘embedded journalists,’ resulting in often highly elaborate and opinionated articles about what they had witnessed in the field. Their consistent presence at these events meant that the press essentially had a permanent finger on the army's pulse. In brief, the press acted as the primary link between the public and the army, with the exercises functioning as the principal avenue which shaped and informed discussion (or how and what people thought about the institution), which in turn
influenced the latter’s development. Significantly, these unique reports also illuminate how both correspondents, as well as soldiers, officers, and non-commissioned officers (NCO) thought about the army from a qualitative perspective (in terms of skill, discipline, spirit, and cohesion), the discussion of which has arguably been relatively undervalued by historians. Their writings provide a unique look into the experiences and thinking of the men who composed the field army. In sum, the exercise reports not only illuminate what the press thought about the army,
4 Notable examples: Huub Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 1850-2000: Beroep, Cultuur en Organisatie
(Amsterdam: Boom, 2004); Hans Vermeulen, De Maasbode: de bewogen geschiedenis van “DE beste courant van
Nederland” (Zwolle: Waanders, 1994); Maarten Schneider and Joan Hemels, De Nederlandse krant 1618-1978: van ʹnieuwstydingheʹ tot dagblad (Baarn: Het Wereldvenster, 1979); Mirjam Maters, Van zachte wenk tot harde hand: persvrijheid en persbreidel in Nederlands-Indië 1906-1942 (Hilversum: Verloren, 1998); Pien van der Hoeven, Het succes van een kwaliteitskrant: de ontstaansgeschiedenis van NRC Handelsblad (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2012).
5 Frank van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland 1930-1939: een studie over de vorming van de publieke
opinie” (PhD diss., Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, Amsterdam, 1989).
6 Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 5.
7 Ibid, 5, 42-48; Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 144, 158-161; John Lukacs, The Last European War: September
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they also provide valuable insights into the army’s performance, state, and character throughout the years. Therefore, to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the military debate and the army’s subsequent development, one ought to consider the factor of the press. As such, the near-complete absence of these reports in the literature marks a considerable historiographical blind spot, which, as this thesis will argue, has led to several misconceptions and
overgeneralizations.
Having examined numerous reports from some of the principal Protestant, Catholic, liberal, socialist, and communist newspapers, this work will endeavor to bridge this lacuna by uncovering what the press thought about the state and performance of the army during the exercises of 1924 to 1935. In other words, this thesis aims to pinpoint what the press believed to be the army’s principal qualities and deficiencies, to uncover what their observations can tell us about the qualitative development of the army throughout the years. To answer these queries, it will tackle several subquestions, such as: What were the principal historical factors at play during the interbellum that informed the development of the army? What exactly were the fall exercises, how did they work, and what was their purpose? What was the character of the Dutch pillarized press in general, and the examined newspapers in particular? What were their views of the army, and to what extent did they align with those of their political representatives? How did military correspondents go about covering the exercises, and how free were they to do so? What are the main recurring themes and the principal differences in their reporting?
Findings in this thesis both challenge and complement several broadly held viewpoints. Firstly, it questions the notion that Catholics and liberals were but lukewarm in their support for the army. On the contrary, an examination of the reports reveals how some of their principal newspapers were (far) more pro-army than the literature has suggested. Both consistently aimed to increase support for the army, while especially the Catholics were critical of excessive budget cuts. Consequently, the opinions of these newspapers did not always line up with the official viewpoints of their political representatives’. The Protestant, socialist, and communist papers, on the other hand, generally echoed their party’s (leader’s) views. Additionally, the reports also reveal how, contrary to what has been suggested, conservative confessionals were far from blind to geopolitical movements. Captain Alting von Geusau (the military correspondent of De Tijd), a member of the prominent Von Geusau family, already felt the tides of the Second World War swelling as early as 1924.
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On the military level, this research aims to expand and realign the debate about the Dutch interwar army’s principal deficiencies. It will emphasize that a chronic lack of cohesion was the main issue plaguing the institution during this time, and that this problem was compounded and perpetuated by lackluster leadership, subversive anti-army propaganda, and the absence of a true martial spirit. Accordingly, this thesis will argue against the literature which has arguably
downplayed the influence of the pro-unilateral disarmament movement in the degradation of the army, and overemphasized the role of the conservative-confessional establishment. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this work breaks new ground by arguing partly against the consensus that the army was systematically depleted over the years. On the contrary, findings strongly indicate that, despite numerous budget cuts and several haphazard reorganizations, the army remarkably improved on several qualitative fronts, such as discipline, morale, leadership, and cohesion. As such, the army of 1935 was arguably of superior, not inferior, martial quality to its 1924 counterpart.
However, this work will not primarily focus on the military-technical dimension, such as developments in tactics, nor will it provide play-by-play descriptions of the exercises. Although examining these topics could be fruitful, focusing on how the press assessed the army brings forth a more comprehensive array of new findings more directly relevant to lacunae in the existing literature. Furthermore, a focalization of recurring themes across the reports over a strictly chronological approach has been chosen as the newspapers show an overall consistency in their writings. This would make a chronological approach excessively redundant and,
therefore, potentially less illuminating. Nonetheless, a brief chronological overview will be utilized in summary to assess the development of the army over the years.
Additionally, although a handful of marginal retraining exercises were held between 1919 and 1923, and exercises continued until 1938, the 1924-1935 timeframe is specifically relevant for our purposes. For one reason, 1924 marked the first year since the outbreak of the war during which army maneuvers were held, and was, therefore, the first real opportunity for commanders to test the lessons and innovations of the Great War in the field. Additionally, the maneuvers arguably marked the first time during which the effects of the army’s radical reorganization under Minister of War J.J.C. van Dijk's Conscription Act (1922) could be observed on a large scale. Even more significantly, the years 1924-1935 closely correlate to the rise and fall of disarmament idealism and the debate surrounding the military question. In 1923, the Dutch
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parliament had narrowly turned down a controversial Fleet Law that would have significantly strengthened the Dutch Navy if ratified. Emboldened by the momentum of this victory,
proponents of unilateral disarmament felt like they were riding the political wave of the future. In the following months, the army was faced with additional budget cuts, more of which were to follow in subsequent years. The year 1924 thus marks the crucial starting point of a new era for both the nation and the army, which would end roughly eleven years later, when PM Colijn began composing the Defense Fund. This fund, which would significantly increase the Defense budget, was ultimately approved by even left-liberals and socialists, who felt compelled to drop their viewpoints in the face of rising geopolitical tensions. As such, the year 1935 arguably marks both the end of the military debate, and the start of the final climactic phase of the
interbellum, and serves, therefore, as the natural endpoint of this examination. Most importantly, however, the broadness of the chosen timespan enables us to track how the army developed in the eyes of the press during this turbulent decade of systematic budget cuts and reorganizations.
As to utilized sources, due to the scope of this assignment, this thesis has been limited to the examination of some of the leading, available,8 pillarized newspapers in Dutch interwar society; Protestant (De Standaard), Catholic (De Maasbode and De Tijd), liberal (Algemeen
Handelsblad and the NRC), socialist (Het Volk and Voorwaarts), and communist (De Tribune).9
Although hardly exhaustive in scope, the thoroughness of the research, totaling roughly 500 examined articles, is sufficient to posit a set of general conclusions. Notably absent is the so-called ‘neutral’ press, which, although accounting for nearly 50% of the Dutch press’ total circulation,10 was excluded for both the reason mentioned above and the fact that ‘neutral’ newspapers naturally shied away from giving overt opinions.11 As such, these papers were deemed ill-suited for the purposes of this work. Finally, the examination of the Protestant pillar’s newspapers has been isolated to De Standaard. Besides being the largest Protestant paper during the interbellum,12 neither of the other main available newspapers, De Nederlander and De
Banier, wrote extensive, opinionated reports about the exercises.
8 ‘Available’ not only in terms of newspapers, but also in terms of reports. The delpher.nl archives are still
incomplete, missing both single issues as well as entire years from its collection. The archives of the NRC,
Voorwaarts, and De Maasbode (at the time of writing) only reach as far as 1929, 1931, and 1932, respectively.
9 Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 193, 358. 10 Ibid, 48.
11 Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 148-149. 12 Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 358.
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To arrive at its findings, this thesis has been separated into three chapters. The first chapter will provide the necessary historical context of the interbellum in the Netherlands. It aims to pinpoint the principal historical factors which informed the development of the army during this time, namely: the organizational development of the army, the movement of politics, the movement of foreign relations, the persistence of national characteristics, and the broader movements of thought in the Western world. Moreover, it aims to introduce relevant findings of the literature. These include the view that the army was systematically depleted during the 1920s and early 1930s; the notion that Catholics were but hesitant supporters of the army; that the pro-unilateral disarmament movement had but little influence on the institution's degradation; and the observation that the Dutch national character can be described as non-militaristic.
The second chapter provides a summary description of the fall exercises; what they were and how they worked. Additionally, it will give a brief historical overview and description of the Dutch interwar press, with the aim to illuminate the relationship between said press and the exercises. It will argue that besides being at the height of its social and cultural power, the press also retained a significant degree of freedom to move about the battlefield and write about the army what they pleased. The chapter concludes with overviews of each of the examined newspapers; namely their character, circulation, editors, audience, and their respective relationships with the army.
The fourth chapter features an in-depth examination of the central recurring themes in the reports about the exercises: the exercise debate, coordination and imagination, organizational cohesion and reserve officers & NCOs, discipline, spirit, pro-disarmament subversion, and gradual improvements. Findings from these case studies show how the exercises were at the center of the debate surrounding the military question. Confessional and liberal papers defended their necessity, whereas socialists and communists deemed them a useless waste of money. Additionally, they showcase how, after the implementation of Van Dijk's Conscription Law, the army struggled with a chronic lack of cohesion, resulting in lackluster discipline, coordination of movement, and imagination during the exercises. The reports also strongly indicate that reserve officers and NCOs were generally ill-prepared to instruct and lead men in the field. Moreover, findings reveal how the confessional and liberal press were sufficiently suspicious of the anti-army press’s motives, whom they accused of deliberately seeking to subvert the stability within the army. On the other hand, the latter remained convinced that they were merely evoking a
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preexisting sentiment within Dutch society. The problems within the army merely proved their point. This debate also reveals how Catholic and liberal newspapers positioned themselves as the army’s most staunch defenders. Most importantly, however, this chapter evidences how the newspapers nearly unanimously agreed that the army's marital qualities had improved over the years.
The final chapter concludes by complementing and challenging the existing
historiography on the beforementioned points. In doing so, it will assess the interwar army’s character, and attempt to paint a broad picture of the army's qualitative development between the years 1924 and 1935. Finally, it will position this thesis' findings in the broader context of Dutch national and European history, and argue that the story of the Dutch interwar army was
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1. Historical Factors
Figure 1. Machine gun team in action during exercises in the Veluwe, 1934.13
1.1. Army
After the Great War, the Dutch army entered a long period of uncertainty marked by several budget cuts and reforms. Although the army had seemingly managed to keep the Netherlands out of the war, the military's popularity was in decline.14 For one reason, gradual demoralization
caused by mental, moral and economical exhaustion had taken its toll on the army.15 More
importantly, the horrors and exorbitant costs of modern war had made the military fall out of favor with many. The question arose whether a small nation like the Netherlands could realistically hope to maintain a viable military amidst industrial giants like France and
Germany.16 As Amersfoort put it: ‘Military stamina had become increasingly intertwined with the financial strength of the society and the willpower of the population to hold out.’17 When the
economy took a turn for the worse around 1920, the armed forces were among the first on the
13 De Tijd, 18-08-1934.
14 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 93.
15 Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 323-324; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 72-73. 16 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 93.
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budgetary chopping block.18 Minister of War J.J.C. van Dijk's Conscription Act (1922)
essentially transformed the army into an educational institute. Without a standing army, the country would have to mobilize and reorganize into wartime-formations from scratch in the event of war.19 In theory, this force would consist of around 250,000 men, down from 450,000 in 1918.20 A class of 19,500 (down from 23,000) conscripts would be called up each year.21 This decreased number would require fewer instructors and a smaller infrastructure to maintain. Similarly, after the Army Law (1920) had already decreased the initial infantry instruction period from 12 and 8.5 months to 6 months, the service term was shortened to just 5.5 and even 4 months if the soldier had participated in preliminary exercises.22 This meant that a conscript could fulfill part of his training in his own time. Two retraining exercises, totaling 2.5 weeks, were instated to compensate for this shortened instruction period.23 These were to be fulfilled in the 20 years following the initial training.24 Moreover, the new army system would gradually phase out part of the career officers and NCOs and replace them with reservists. These reserve officers and NCOs would take up some of the training and leadership roles within the
institution.25
In return, the army would modernize its artillery and create new formations for a mobile field army such as the Light Brigade.26 Mainly composed of cyclists, cavalry, and a handful of
armored cars, the Light Brigade was to be the Field Army’s showpiece. Fast and mobile, this unit was to move ahead of the main force to provide reconnaissance, protect its flanks, delay enemy advances, and exploit weaknesses in their lines.27 These abilities aligned with the vision of
Minister of War J.W. Bergansius, who in 1889 had proposed the formation of a robust mobile
18 H.W. van den Doel, “Het ontstaan van de Duitse dreiging”, in Mei 1940: de strijd op Nederlands grondgebied, ed.
Herman Amersfoort and Piet Kamphuis (Amsterdam: Boom, 2012), 44; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 68-69.
19 J.P. Stoop, “Om het volvoeren van een christelijke staatkunde’: De Anti-Revolutionaire Partij in het interbellum”,
(PhD diss., Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, 2001), 226-229; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 70-71.
20 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 256-257; Schulten, “Gewapende neutrlaiteit”, 324-325.
21 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 226-229; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 70-71. 22 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 65-66.
23 Ibid, 66.
24 Ibid; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 70-71. 25 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 256-257.
26 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 67; Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 326; Stoop, “Om het
volvoeren”, 228-229, 232; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 70-71.
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force modeled after the great European powers, capable both of deterring sudden foreign aggression, as well as going on the strategic offensive and fighting a decisive battle through the envelopment of the enemy force.28
Figure 2. The Light Brigade in action during maneuvers around Gorssel, 1935.29
However, additional budget cuts throughout the 1920s obstructed the realization of this ideal. The complete modernization of the army’s guns was never realized, and even more career officers and NCOs were forced to leave as reserve officers and NCOs were ordered to take on increasing responsibilities.30 From 1918 to 1936, careerist staff decreased from 1050 to just 625 officers.31 The Great Depression called for still further austerity. Modernization of equipment
was delayed, salaries were lowered, retraining exercises shortened, and the maneuvers of 1932 canceled altogether.32 A research commission was forced to conclude that systemic budget cuts had finally strained the army to its limit. Between 1920 and 1935, Defense expenditures had
28 Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 313-314; Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 260-261; Schulten and De Koster,
“Tussen hoop en vrees”, 63-64.
29 De Tijd, 21-09-1935.
30 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 233-235, 242-243; Van der Doel, “Het ontstaan van de Duitse dreiging”, 44; Schulten
and de Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 72.
31 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 67.
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dropped from 127 million to just 76 million Guilders.33 Only after the ratification of PM Colijn's
Defense Fund in 1936 did the army’s budget see a dramatic influx of funds (31 million Guilders), which lasted until the German invasion in May 1940.34 In theory, the Chief of the General Staff Izaak Reijnders, and the Commander of the Field Army W. Röell, now finally had room to build a ‘harmoniously composed army,’ which would be able to defend the homeland, as well as participate, together with its future allies, in an expected war of movement.35 In the following years, more new equipment was ordered abroad, the yearly conscription was expanded to 32,000 men, and the initial training period to 11 months.36
In reality, however, as Amersfoort has argued, the field army ‘was only suitable for position warfare.’37 Without standing units, it simply lacked the necessary cohesion to pull off complex coordinated movements.38 The Dutch interwar army was essentially a hybrid force, a citizen-militia which acted like a modern field army.39 J.C.H. Blom summarized its three most striking deficiencies as observed by the literature as follows:
1. the army suffered from manpower deficiencies (especially in terms of staff); 2. its equipment was lacking both in quality and quantity;40
3. it suffered from the absence of a strong military tradition.41
In brief, historians' main takeaway was that the army had been systematically weakened during the first three-quarters of the interbellum.42 The much-needed infusion of capital proved
to be too little too late. Due to rising demand, much of the new equipment never arrived, and the army arguably failed to fully recover from the organizational damage done by the new army
33 J.A.M.M Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum.” in Tussen crisis en oorlog. Maatschappij en
krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, ed. G. Teitler (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), 54; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 64, 67-68, 70.
34 Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 326-327; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 255-258; Schulten and De Koster,
“Tussen hoop en vrees”, 75-77.
35 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 274. 36 Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 327. 37 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 274-275.
38 Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 70-71; Amersfoort, “De proef op de som”, 398. 39 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 277-278.
40 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 66-67, 604. 41 Blom, “Durch kamen sie”, 128-129.
42 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 88; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 269-270; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 54; Van
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system and the systemic budget cuts. Moreover, the ‘Exercise Country Defense’, a staff map-exercise held in 1938, indicated that a well-equipped and mobile enemy force could envelop and destroy the Dutch field army in a matter of days.43 Regardless, it would take until September 1939 for the commander-in-chief to resign to this reality and adopt a more static defensive approach.44
1.2 Politics
The principal characteristic of Dutch interwar politics was its pillarization.45 During the 19th and early 20th century, society gradually fragmented into so-called ‘pillars’. These pillars functioned as social ingroups based on worldview or political-economic beliefs, replete with institutions like political parties, schools, newspapers, unions, and radio channels. In the popular view, these pillars could be broadly separated into a Protestant, Catholic, socialist, and liberal pillar. However, historians like Van Vree and Vermeulen have pointed out that this distinction is too reductive.46 Whereas Catholics were actively pressured to stay within their own pillar,47 liberals often rejected pillarization altogether.48 Furthermore, it has also been argued that the Protestants were too fragmented to be accurately called a pillar, while both socialists and communists could arguably only be seen as pillars based on political beliefs.49 Regardless, a certain degree of
tribalism seems to have existed in all cases. Protestants generally voted for the
Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP) or the Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU), Catholics for the Roomsch-Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP), liberals for the Vrijheidsbond or the Vrijzinnig-Democrtische Bond (VDB), socialists for the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (SDAP),
and communists for the Communistische Partij in Nederland (CPN). Although these were the largest parties, they were hardly the only ones. In fact, societal fragmentation also occurred on
43 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 276-277. 44 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 278.
45 Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 144; Vermeulen, De bewogen geschiedenis, 132. 46 Vermeulen, De bewogen geschiedenis, 133.
47 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 76; Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 39-40, 216;
Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 148.
48 Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 148.
49 Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 49, 218-219; Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland, 148; Vermeulen,
16
the political front. If one could vote for 32 parties during the 1918 elections, by 1932, the amount had risen to the maximum of 54.50
However, during the interbellum, only a handful of parties would come to dominate the political arena. The first years after the end of the Great War marked what Beunders called, ‘a period of apathy, distrust, and fear of civil unrest.’51 The socialists had suffered a severe blow to their credibility in the wake of SDAP-leader Pieter Troelstra’s failed call to revolution in
November 1918. Consequently, as was to be the case in much of Europe, the general movement of politics was to the Right, not to the Left.52 Although the popularity of the SDAP and the VDB would gradually grow, it was their conservative-confessional counterparts, who – having joined hands in a 'Coalition' against socialism and the liberalization of society – would become the dominant force in Dutch interwar politics.53 Each of the ten interwar cabinets was led by, and filled with, men from the three main confessional parties. who also held a majority of
parliamentary seats.54 When it came to the military, it was these parties who officially continued to stand behind the necessity of a capable, defensive army.
The Protestants had historically been staunch supporters of a strong military as a symbol of national pride and as an instrument to fight cosmopolitanism.55 The Protestant ‘Father of the Fatherland,’ William of Orange, had successfully led the 16th century Dutch Revolt for
independence against the Catholic Habsburgs, which had forged a strong connection between the royal house and the armed forces. More so than Catholics, conservative Protestants held on to a combative Christian ethos of a cosmic battle against evil.56 Unsurprisingly then, Protestants were
generally the most outspoken in their support for the maintenance of the military to safeguard Dutch sovereignty, the defense of which it saw as a holy duty.57 Even though the horrors of the
50 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 83.
51 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 71, 203; Peter Jan Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie: de SDAP tussen
klasse en natie, 1929-1939 (Amsterdam: Stichting Beheer IISG, 1989), 10-13.
52 John Lukacs, Historical Consciousness or The Remembered Past (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), 296-297;
Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 283.
53 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 88; Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 16-17; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 20,
65-66; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 283; Van Vree, “De Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 220; De Jong, Het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 84.
54 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 283, 292; “Periode 1918-1939: Interbellum”, Parlement.com,
https://www.parlement.com/id/vh8lnhrp1wzs/periode_1918_1939_interbellum
55 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 12; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 217, 224-225. 56 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 224-225.
17
Great War did give rise to a degree of antimilitarist sentiment within the Dutch Reformed Church and its magazine Kerk en Vrede,58 the main Protestant political parties, the CHU, and
especially the ARP, continued to view war as a natural consequence of sin, which would inevitably continue to manifest in the world.59 An increasing pessimism about the developing modern world affirmed this sentiment.60 Although sympathetic to the aims of mutual
disarmament and the necessity of budget cuts, notions of unilateral disarmament were not to be taken seriously.61
The Catholic establishment, on the other hand, retained a more apprehensive attitude towards the armed forces, despite understanding the necessity of the military to safeguard Dutch sovereignty.62 This halfhearted enthusiasm stemmed partly from the military’s historical
relationship with the House of Orange. Moreover, many Catholics still felt disinclined to support Protestant causes after a long period of prosecution and scorn.63 Similarly, Catholics were less than enthusiastic about the military culture, notorious for its alcohol abuse and crass language.64 As such, in the wake of the Great War, most Catholics followed Popes Benedict XV’s and Pius XI’s peace-programs, which sought to promote world peace through mutual international disarmament, arbitrage, the use of sanctions, the abolishment of the military draft, and by living life according to the Christian commandments.65 According to Beunders, most Catholics even
believed that the Netherlands should be in the vanguard of the strive for international
disarmament, although only a marginal minority actively favored unilateral disarmament.66 Even
so, Catholic leadership remained anxious about losing their urban working-class voters to the pro-unilateral disarmament socialists.67 In light of these motives, the RKSP generally conducted what Janssen coined, ‘sober defense politics.’68 In practice, this meant that the party was often
58 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 44-47.
59 Ibid, 47, 50-51, 53; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 109. 60 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 65.
61 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 50-51; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 233. 62 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 20, 120; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 44. 63 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 65-66.
64 Ibid, 20, 65-66.
65 Ibid, 118-119; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum”, 43-44.
66 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 120; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 44, 49; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”,
229; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 74; Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 19.
67 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 123-128; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 75; Van Vree, “De
Nederlandse pers en Duitsland”, 216.
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somewhat hesitant to support proposals for military development.69 The most infamous example
of this was the climactic rejection of the Fleet Law in 1923. This law, proposed by ARP-leader Colijn, would have significantly increased the strength of the colonial fleet. However, it ultimately failed to pass due to last-minute Catholic dissent which narrowly flipped the vote in favor of the opposition by one vote, leading to the resignation of the cabinet.70 However, it should be noted that this did not mark a general anti-military sentiment among Catholic
leadership, but rather evidenced a specific aversion to the ‘red and heathen’ Navy, and a general lack of interest in the Protestant Dutch East-Indies.71 The RKSP continued to believe in the necessity of an army as long as mutual disarmament had not been achieved. Regardless, during the interbellum, the RKSP consistently favored retaining party unity and voter loyalty over maintaining a credible defense.72
The liberals, on their part, were divided over the military question. Although both sides had historically opposed significant defense expenditures for a variety of financial, moral, and pragmatic reasons, the rift between rightist-liberals of the Vrijheidsbond, and leftist-liberals of the VDB, widened following the end of the Great War.73 Although finding war to be a
reprehensible relic of an uncivilized age, rightists generally continued to believe in the army as a ‘school of the nation’ and as a viable instrument to protect the country.74 Unilateral disarmament
was, therefore, out of the question. Only multilateral disarmament under the auspices of the League of Nations was deemed acceptable.75 Consequently, the Vrijheidsbond accepted
necessary budget cuts and put their hopes on the League's success.76
The leftist-liberals were both less nationalistic and more internationalist than their
conservative bedfellows. Horrified by the Great War's destructiveness and having become deeply disillusioned with the military prospects of small states in future conflicts, the VDB adopted a pacifist, pro-unilateral disarmament stance.77 The Dutch military as an independent organism had
69 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 120.
70 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 12; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 203. 71 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 118-121.
72 Ibid, 221; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 49. 73 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 19.
74 Ibid, 130; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 11-12. 75 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 137.
76 H.J.L. Vonhoff, “Defensiepolitiek van Liberalen en Vrijzinnig-Democraten in de jaren dertig”, in Tussen crisis en
oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’30, ed. G. Teitler (Dieren: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1984), 66.
19
essentially become obsolete as the country simply could not put up with the demands of modern warfare.78 As VDB-politician Pieter Oud put it during the defense budget debates of 1924: 'I have
to admit, it has not been easy for me to resign myself to this fact. It is most unpleasant, to realize that: we are defenseless; when we are attacked, we are incapable of defending ourselves, but that is the reality of our situation.’79 Moreover, modern warfare's sheer destructiveness would make
future conflicts untenable; in a heated debate with ex-commander-in-chief Snijders in 1924,
VDB-politician Pieter van Embden predicted that only a few bombers would level entire cities
within the first few days of fighting and kill hundreds of thousands with lethal gas.80 The only way forward was for the army to drastically reduce in size and convert into a small-scale police force in the service of the League.81 Instead of focusing on national defense, the Netherlands only had ‘rights’ to fight for now.82
Like the VDB, the socialists of the SDAP were staunch opponents of the military.83 Having distanced themselves from revolutionary antimilitarism after Troelstra’s failed revolution, the SDAP embraced a reformist radical-pacifist stance.84 The horrors of the Great War had similarly convinced them that militarism had become a threat to the nation and human civilization in general. In the words of party leader Willem Albarda: ‘The SDAP considers armed defense of the nation to be national suicide.’85 They also agreed with the VDB that
modern war's enormous financial and industrial demands would be too much to handle for a small nation like the Netherlands, especially when economic downturns demanded budget cuts.86
Finally, the socialists, influenced by Karl Marx, viewed war as a specifically capitalist evil, a means through which the bourgeoisie could oppress the proletariat, who were forced to fight against their class-brothers and make up the brunt of the war machine in the name of phony
78 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 132; Vonhoff, “Defensiepolitiek van Liberalen”, 66.
79 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 62 (‘Ik wil eerlijk bekennen, het is ook mij niet gemakkelijk gevallen,
mij bij deze gedachte neer te leggen. Het is zeer onaangenaam, te moeten gevoelen: wij zijn weerloos; wanneer wij worden aangevallen, zijn wij niet in staat ons te verdedigen, maar die gedachte is nu eenmaal de realiteit.’).
80 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 203; Lukacs, The Last European War, 255-256; NRC, 01-10-1924. 81 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 243.
82 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 131; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 16. 83 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 20, 154.
84 Weg met de Vlootwet!, 73, 153-154; Socialisme en Democratie, 13-15, 32; Voorwaarts, 28-09-1926. 85 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 64 (‘De SDAP . . . beschouwt gewapende landsverdediging als
nationale zelfmoord’); Wim Klinkert, Defending neutrality. The Netherlands prepares for war 1900-1925 (Leiden 2013), 282.
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nationalism.87 Peace was seen as a prerequisite of socialism.88 Unilateral disarmament was,
therefore, the only logical way forward.89 World peace was to be achieved through the LoN,
which it saw as being part of the inevitable democratization of Europe.90 As such, it agreed with the VDB that the only alternative for the Dutch military would be in the form of a small police contingent.91
The communists, on the other hand, considered the newly non-revolutionary socialists and leftwing-liberals ‘social-fascists’; wolves in sheep clothing, lulling the proletariat with ‘pacifist lullabies.’92 To them violence was the only way to overthrow the capitalist-bourgeoisie
in the coming global class revolution.93 As such, the CPN was not in principle pro-disarmament. It was more so against the army being utilized as an instrument of oppression.94 Through
agitation, the military was to be infiltrated and subverted into a weapon of the proletariat, which would then have the means to seize political power forcibly; ‘Comrades, remember: instead of “lay the weapons down”, the “weapons here!” until the destruction of capitalism’, reminded De
Tribune.95
Although the leftist parties, and especially the SDAP, represented a significant section of the electorate (peaking with 24 parliamentary seats in 1925),96 some historians have pointed out that their anti-military viewpoints were relatively inconsequential to the interwar army's
development.97 Notwithstanding the SDAP’s initial surge in momentum after successfully
organizing mass protests against the Fleet Law,98 in which over 70.000 people participated,99
political support for the party grew less than expected; growing from 19,4% of the total vote in
87 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 63; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 12. 88 Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 31-32.
89 Ibid, 32; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 153-154; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 243.
90 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 152; Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 31-32; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme
en defensie”, 16.
91 Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 32; Het Volk, 04-11-1924.
92 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 112; De Tribune, 23-09-1926, 02-10-1924, 25-08-1926. 93 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 144, 148; De Tribune, 05-09-1925; Voorwaarts, 28-09-1926.
94 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 12; Schneider and Hemels, De Nederlandse krant, 249; De Tribune,
25-08-1926.
95 De Tribune, 28-08-1929 (‘Kameraden, denk er aan: inplaats van “de wapens neer”, de “wapens hier!” tot
vernietiging van het kapitalisme.’); De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 108-109.
96 Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 26.
97 Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 75.
98 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 151; Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 26, 30. 99 Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 32.
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1918 to 23,8% in 1929.100 Moreover, its 1925 Disarmament Law, which aimed to disarm the
military unilaterally, was utterly rejected.101 After Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Albarda
declared that he would resist if the Nazis were to invade.102 He realized that unilateral
disarmament was on its last legs: ‘This good draft horse… seems to have become crippled.’103 In
1937, the SDAP finally conceded defeat.104 Significantly, it was not until the haphazardly formed Cabinet De Geer II in 1939 – long after any serious notion of disarmament had been abandoned – that the SDAP finally attained a seat in the government. Similarly, the VDB remained a modest factor in Dutch politics, generally obtaining around six seats in parliament.105 In 1933, it did manage to attain two seats in the Cabinet-Colijn II. However, by this time, the VDB was beginning to move away from unilateral disarmament, which it dropped altogether in 1936.106 Ultimately, neither the SDAP nor the VDB opposed Colijn’s Defense Fund.107 The CPN, in turn,
never had a seat in the cabinet and remained on the fringes of Dutch politics. Its violent goals, internal divisions, and political ties with the Soviet-Union bought them little support.108 If at the end of 1918 the party had 1000 members, in 1930 it had but a hundred more.109 Only during the Depression did the party briefly make considerable gains, receiving 118.222 (3.2%) votes in the 1933 general elections, more than three times the number it had received in 1929.110
In practice, however, it was the dominant conservative-confessional parties who ultimately decided to slash the army's budget. The army’s most extensive budget cuts and reorganizations were done under the auspices of two RKSP-Defense ministers, J.M.M. H. Lambooy (1925-1929) and L.N. Deckers (1929-1935).111 Only after Hitler's ascendancy to
power in 1933 was Catholic defense policy slowly beginning to be revised, but calls for further cuts continued until 1935.112 Even more significant is that the ARP and CHU's interwar leaders,
100 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 113-114; Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 14, 26. 101 Knegtmans, Socialisme en Democratie, 14, 26.
102 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 207-208. 103 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en Defensie”, 16-17.
104 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 207-208; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 68. 105 Knegtmans, Socialisme en democratie, 17; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 203.
106 Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 68. 107 Ibid, 75-77.
108 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 144; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 110. 109 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 108, 112.
110 Ibid, 112-113.
111 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum”, 49-50. 112 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie in het Interbellum”, 50, 55.
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Colijn and De Geer, were more sober in their Defense visions than their respective parties.113
Despite supporting the Fleet Law in 1923, both men led the army budget cuts in their respective roles as Prime Minister (Colijn: 1925-1926, 1933-1939; De Geer: 1926-1929).114 Although initially shocked by their leader's unorthodox vision, the ARP ultimately felt similarly compelled to lower their expectations due to the economic downturns.115 By 1934, however, Colijn had read the geopolitical writing on the wall and began drafting his Defense Fund proposal. Even so, budgetary concerns continued to hamper the strengthening of the army in the following years.116 Furthermore, a certain indecisiveness had taken root in the government’s vision of the army. Some confessionals returned to the idea of the Nieuwe Hollandse Waterlinie, a set of static defensive lines based on the traditional inundation strategy, but simultaneously continued to believe in the viability of a mobile field army.117 According to J.A.M.M. Janssen, this political inertia made it impossible for the army to maintain the necessary skill and catch up on its backlog of equipment during the final years before the war.118 Consequently, historians have argued that, rather than pointing the finger at the anti-army leftists, the dominant confessional parties are ultimately to be blamed for the interwar army’s depletion.119 Although these parties officially supported the army, their policies seemed to say otherwise. To fully explain this incongruence, we need to consider the movement of foreign relations.
1.3 Foreign Relations
The nation's foreign relations heavily informed Dutch political opinion of the army. Ever since the Belgian secession in 1839, the latent idea that the Netherlands was no longer a great power was slowly becoming more apparent.120 The state consequently adhered to ‘neutrality politics’ to
113 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 113; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 234-235.
114 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 109; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 51-52; Knegtmans, Socialisme en
Democratie, 19.
115 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 51-52; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 229. 116 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 52.
117 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 23.
118 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 56; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 21-22; Schulten, “Gewapende
neutraliteit”, 315-316.
119 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 88; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 269-270; Van den Doel, “Het ontstaan van de Duitrse
dreiging”, 44; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 73, 75.
120 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 92; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 1, 11; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en
23
protect its commercial and colonial interests.121 This foreign policy approach was believed to be
in the interest of the European balance of power, as a neutral Netherlands acted as a buffer state between France, Germany, and the UK.122 Its strategic geographical position also meant that, if provoked, it could rely on the support of other large powers.123 To many, the Great War had proven the correctness of this approach. By posing as a true neutral, the Netherlands had managed to come out of the war relatively unscathed. The army had acted as a deterrent to the belligerent nations.124 As such, a continuation of this tried and tested foreign policy approach was only logical. Besides, commercial interests, colonial considerations, and split pro-German and pro-English sentiments in an already divided country made abandoning neutrality an unpopular political stance.125 For army proponents, this meant that the Netherlands ought to maintain a credible defensive army meant to deter potential invaders, and capable of holding the line until foreign reinforcements arrived if the former failed.126 However, skeptics from the mostly leftist parties believed that the country had merely gotten lucky during the last war as neither belligerent party would have benefited from a non-neutral Netherlands. The belief that the weak Dutch army had acted as a credible deterrent was thus highly naïve.127 Any future conflict would see the army utterly outclassed by a materially and numerically superior force.128 As such, the high costs of maintaining a modern army were wasted on a useless institution which would inadvertently come to increase, rather than decrease, the threat of war. Therefore, the only viable option was to either put up a symbolic defense with a token force to allure potential liberators or disarm and hope that an aggressor would not attack a ‘moral people’.129
The idea of ‘armed neutrality’ ultimately proved more appealing than disarmament and symbolic resistance. Amersfoort argues that the Dutch political-military establishment saw the
121 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 10-11; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 8, 11; Schulten and De
Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 61.
122 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 2, 45.
123 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 92; Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 252-253; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en
vrees”, 62.
124 Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 50-51, 53; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 22-23; Schulten, “Gewapende
neutraliteit”, 314; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 65.
125 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 92; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 2, 15-16, 18.
126 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 11-12, 130; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 53; Stoop, “Om het
volvoeren”, 218, 230, 233; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 11-12.
127 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 154.
128 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 92; Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 257.
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latter as incongruous with a medium-large power position, which many still perceived the Netherlands to be.130 In any case, lacking a realistic alternative, most people from both sides
believed that neutrality politics remained a viable foreign policy approach and that Dutch sovereignty would once again be respected in a future conflict.131 To Colijn, the military existed solely to maintain Dutch neutrality, and as such needed only be just strong enough to achieve that goal.132 Therefore, faced with economic downturns and relative continental tranquility in the 1920s, armed neutrality proponents aimed to minimize expenditures and maximize army
efficiency.133 The military leadership, on the other hand, was generally less convinced of this optimistic vision, yet their concerns were to be drowned out by overbearing political
considerations and national sentiment.134
1.4 National Characteristics
We have seen that considerations of national politics and foreign relations played crucial roles in the development of the army. However, we must also consider how long standing national characteristics, in turn, informed these views. Unlike other nations, the Dutch have never had a strong military tradition. The armed forces had always been subordinated to politics, and have subsequently played but a marginal role of importance in Dutch society.135 Historically, the
military has reluctantly been accepted as, what Blom coined, a ‘necessary evil’ to protect the nation's sovereignty.136 As such, historians have claimed that the nation was neither militarist nor
antimilitarist but rather non-militarist.137
According to Blom, part of the reason for this can be traced back to Dutch wariness of centralized government power, going as far back as the Republic’s rebellion against the
130 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 254-255.
131 Blom, “Durch kamen sie”, 118-119; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 58-59; Beunders, Weg met de
Vlootwet, 15-16, 19; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 57.
132 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 108-109; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 51; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”,
230.
133 Schulten, “Gewapende neutraliteit”, 329; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 62; Teitler,
“Anglo-Dutch Relations”, 70; Jansse, “Kerk, coalitie en defensie”, 51-52; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 233.
134 Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 257-258; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 18; Janssen, “Kerk, coalitie en
defensie”, 57.
135 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 100-101.
136 Ibid, 87, 103; De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 611; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 8. 137 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 102-103.
25
centralized monarchy of the Habsburgs.138 An additional factor was the significant and consistent
influence of the middle-class bourgeoisie, which generally favored expanding financial and commercial interests over military investments. This concern only grew as modern war became increasingly destructive and burdensome on the economy.139 On his part, Von der Dunk argued that Dutch non-militarism was also reflected by the fact that most of the army's well-known martial feats were defensive rather than offensive in nature.140 Besides, the country's
geographical layout did not lend itself well to the deployment of a large army in the first place.141 This bourgeois non-militarist attitude, combined with the unique nature of the
decentralized Republic within Europe, subsequently gave rise to a certain sentiment of latent moral superiority in the Dutch national character. As the 19th-century historian W.J. Hofdijk, concluded: ‘It is better to be the most moral, rather than the most powerful nation in the world.’142 Affirming this desire, De Jong and Rüter have noted that the principal Dutch
characteristic qualities were the spirit of liberty, international law, humanism, and tolerance.143 As such, many took pride in the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in The Hague in 1920.144 However, despite these characteristics, Amersfoort has argued that the military nonetheless retained at least some level of appeal and prestige due to its historical ties with the House of Orange. According to him, this was especially true in the 19th and early 20th
century, ‘when the process of conscious nation-building was in the full swing.’145
Regardless, traditional non-militarism remained a significant factor during the
interbellum as the nation rejected calls for unilateral disarmament, but at the same time moved to cut army expenses to the bare minimum. Furthermore, disparaging beliefs about the Dutch national identity compounded into a type of existential crisis, which, at its extremes, manifested itself in feelings ranging from fatalism to blind overconfidence. For some, a realization of military weakness combined with a doubling down on the Netherlands as a moral nation. For
138 Ibid, 90; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 8-10. 139 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 91-93.
140 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en Defensie”, 8. 141 Ibid, 9.
142 Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 93; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 7.
143 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 59-61; Blom, “A Necessary Evil”, 87. 144 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 59-61.
26
others, a continued belief in the nation’s glorious past and its defensive strengths provided a sense of false security.146
1.5 Broader movements
The final factor we need to examine is also the broadest and most abstract. It pertains to the movement of thought in the Western world. For many nations, the end of the Great War marked the beginning of a budding pacifist sentiment. The brutality of the war had shocked the world, and many felt that warfare had simply become too destructive. Another world war could never happen again.147 Additionally, the senselessness of the conflict had exposed the dangers of aggressive nationalism. The necessity of international collaboration was becoming apparent. Besides efforts by the Vatican, this ideal was kickstarted with the establishment of the League of Nations in January 1920. The League’s goal was to prevent, and if necessary, intervene in future conflicts and act as an arbiter of international law. Consequently, member states were to focus on multilateral disarmament and the conversion of national militaries into a multinational
peacekeeping force.148 Agreements such as the Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922), the Geneva Protocol (1924), and the Kellog-Briand-pact (1928) aimed to limit armaments, set up international arbitration, and abolish wars of aggression.149 Moreover, the Dawes-Plan (1924),
the Treaty of Locarno (1925), and the German entry into the League (1926) eased Continental tensions and seemed to indicate that Europe was entering into a period of peace.
On the other hand, the continuing democratization of nations came hand in hand with a growing national consciousness.150 As Lukacs has pointed out, Europe ultimately became more, not less national throughout the interbellum.151 National politics were no longer only between Left and Right, but also between internationalist and nationalist.152 In the same vein, the
Netherlands struggled between neutrality politics and a more internationalist approach to foreign policy.153 Ultimately, the appeal of the former proved more decisive. The Dutch interwar
146 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 10.
147 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 59; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 73-74. 148 Von der Dunk, Neutralisme en defensie, 14.
149 Ibid, 15; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 61, 214; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 242-243; Van den Doel, “Het
ontstaan van de Duitse dreiging”, 43-44.
150 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 16. 151 Lukacs, The Last European War, 172. 152 Lukacs, Historical Consciousness, 187-188.
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cabinets, dominated by the confessional parties, remained predominantly nationalist in
outlook.154 Antimilitarist idealism was rejected as being utopian.155 The state reluctantly became
a member of the League of Nations in February of 1920, but more out of pragmatic necessity than out of genuine enthusiasm.156 Colijn had become disillusioned about the future of the nation and the world in general. As such, he came to believe that a collective defense under the auspices of the LoN would in the future become the only viable way for the Netherlands to safeguard its sovereignty.157 He conceded that modern warfare’s financial and organizational burdens would indeed make it impossible for the Dutch army to put up an effective long-term, independent defense if it were to be attacked.158 In practice, however, the Dutch government maintained its neutrality politics, aimed to reduce its supranational commitments, and sometimes rejected attempts (like the Geneva Protocol) by the LoN to push its agenda forward.159 On the other hand, the Dutch people gradually became more enamored with the ideas of internationalism and
antimilitarism, which complemented their self-image as a ‘moral’ and ‘peaceful’ nation.160 Consequently, internationalist sentiment and LoN pressure helped vanquish national concerns in the rejection of the 1923 Fleet Law.161 However, the confessional parties' dominance reveals that nationalism ultimately weighed heavier for the majority of people than international idealism. Even the socialist SDAP, as Von der Dunk has pointed out, gradually adopted a more national orientation during the interbellum.162 Many gave the LoN the benefit of the doubt, but the nation
would always come first.163
Regardless, these fashionable ideals did impact the worldviews of internationalists and nationalists alike. For true believers, internationalism marked the inevitable path towards a global liberal or socialist order.164 For skeptics, international efforts gave them the impression
154 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 59. 155 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 7.
156 Ibid, 14, 16; Amersfoort, “Give Us Back”, 257; Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 221-222, 226; Schulten and De
Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 66-67; Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 8, 47-48, 50, 60-62.
157 Stoop, “Om het volvoeren”, 234-235. 158 Ibid.
159 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 14; Schulten and De Koster, “Tussen hoop en vrees”, 66; Beunders,
Weg met de Vlootwet, 50, 60-61.
160 Beunders, Weg met de Vlootwet, 61, 73-75. 161 Ibid, 59-62, 75, 222.
162 Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 17.
163 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden I, 50-51, 53-54. 164 Ibid, 71; Von der Dunk, “Neutralisme en defensie”, 16.
