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The political community and

the non-human world:

separate or one?

It matters what thoughts think thoughts.

It matters what stories tell stories.

It matters what worlds world worlds.

—Donna Haraway (2014)

Aafke Belterman

Student number: 10349332

Supervisor: Michael Onyebuchi Eze Second reader: Eric Schliesser 23 March 2017

Master Thesis Political Science, track Political Theory University of Amsterdam

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction ... 3

2. Method ... 5

3. Theoretical framework ... 8

3.1 The moral community and the political community ... 8

3.2 Defining the political community ... 9

3.3 New materialism and Ubuntu ... 13

4. The divide between the human and the non-human world ... 16

4.1 Dualisms ... 17 4.2 Agency ... 18 4.3 Individualism ... 19 5. New materialism ... 20 5.1 Monism... 21 5.2 Relationality ... 22 5.3 Agency ... 24 6. Ubuntu ... 26 6.1 Relationality ... 27 6.2 African cosmology ... 29 6.2.1 Holism as relationality ... 30 6.2.2 Animism ... 32

7. The agency of non-human entities ... 33

7.1 Agency ... 34

7.2 Relationality ... 38

7.3 Monism... 40

8. Is non-human agency political enough? ... 42

8.1 Political capacities and the institutional political community ... 42

8.2 The politics of non-human entities ... 45

8.3 The political responsibility of human entities ... 49

9. Conclusion ... 55

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3

1. Introduction

Environmental issues abound. Society is currently causing the world to enter an irreversible new stage, often referred to as the end of the Holocene and the beginning of the

Anthropocene (Dalby 2015: 1).1 Human beings pollute the environment, cause the climate to change and extract non-renewable resources on a large scale. Society tends to see the

environment as a source that can be used to facilitate and enrich human beings’ lives while not being sufficiently concerned with harmful effects and consequences for other living beings (both now and in the future). The climate changes as a consequence of human actions and this in turn has consequences for human beings. Causes and effects move between the human and non-human world, making it necessary to determine whether they really are two separate domains (Ellis 2016). A number of scholars have suggested that this separation and anthropocentric hierarchy may account for a portion of the previously mentioned undesirable practices (Gibson-Graham 2011: 2, Godrej 2016).

Political science relies on a hierarchical separation between the human and non-human world (Smith 2016). The political world is thought to comprise only human beings and

consequently, the non-human world is commonly ignored by political theory (Eckersley 1992: 2). Smith has stated that: ‘Generally, the theories used by political scientists follow economists in modeling non-human entities as a collection of inert resources that human actors can use, manipulate, and interpret at will. Humans are agents and the primary causal factors; nature is simply acted upon’ (Smith 2016). It is important to consider and question such ontological concerns for political analysis, because they shape one’s approach (Hay 2013). Nevertheless, ontological assumptions are unacknowledged and unchallenged even though political science has become more reflexive in this sense (Ibid.). According to several scholars, the scale of anthropogenic influences on the environment requires rethinking central political concepts (Rose et al. 2012: 2). Rethinking such concepts would be an adequate starting point when researching a non-anthropocentric political framework.

I examine the concept of political community because it is a basic concept of political theory. It is helpful to have a robust understanding of this concept when searching for a

1 For the references I use the Harvard-style. This is redundant information but I want to explain why in some

cases the page-numbers are missing. When possible, I add page-numbers. However, in the case of scientific articles of chapters published online, this was impossible because the articles and chapters were without page or line markers.

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4 anthropocentric political framework since how the political community is understood entails taking a stance on which political subjects exist and should be considered in an analysis. There are different ways in which one can extend the political community. One could, for example, argue that future generations should be included or even all the human beings in the world. However, I am researching arguably the largest political boundary, the boundary between the human world and the non-human world (Dryzek 1995: 23). I address the following question in this thesis: Is the non-human world part of the political community? I cannot argue that the non-human world is part of the political community. First, because I am writing a political theory thesis and thus, do not conduct any empirical tests. Second, because the use of metaphysics in my argument makes it difficult to provide conclusive evidence. Therefore, I argue that the non-human world could be seen as part of the political community (thus, I do not actually answer the research question). The idea that the non-human world is not part of the political community typically goes unquestioned. Intuitively, this is unproblematic because neither a tree nor rock are considered part of the political community. Due to the fact this belief is so strong, it can be considered a dogma. Therefore, I think it is interesting enough to show that one could also see the non-human world (not only animals and plants, but also tables and chairs) as part of the political community. This idea might seem preposterous now, but it also used to be inconceivable that women were part of the political community. They were once also seen as belonging to the ‘natural’ world (Gabrielson 2016).

First, in the theoretical framework I define the concept political community more broadly than it is commonly defined. Using a standard conception of political community would, by definition, exclude non-human entities. Subsequently, I argue that the non-human world could be seen as part of the political community because it is plausible that non-human entities have agency. This argument is supported by subsidiary arguments concerning relationality and monism. To argue thus, I use two groups of metaphysical theories: new materialism and the African philosophy of Ubuntu, which are surprisingly similar.

The main counterargument to my thesis is that even if non-human entities have agency, this type of agency is not political enough for them to be considered part of the political

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5 the capacity to organize.2 I refute this claim by arguing that the agency attributed to non-human entities is political enough to be part of the political community, for one because their agency can be demonstrated to be political enough, and also because including them reveals more forms of politics. I also argue that the differing political capacities between human and non-human entities could mean that human entities have more political responsibility.

Ibriefly recount and justify my method in chapter 2. In chapter 3, the theoretical framework is outlined. In chapter 4, I will consider the historical basis of our tendency not to consider the non-human world as part of the political community. My main argument is then outlined using new materialism and Ubuntu. First, new materialism and Ubuntu are examined

separately in chapters 5 and 6, respectively. Second, chapter 7 outlines the argument by using these theories.3 In chapter 8, the counterargument is presented and refuted. I finish by

discussing the conclusion.

2. Method

The method that I use is most similar to the ideology critique method, which is a method of critical theory. Critical theory critiques knowledge that is seen as certain, neutral, natural, evident, beyond criticism and taken for granted (Friesen 2008: 2). It views this knowledge as ideology (Ibid.). Furthermore, it aims to destabilize and problematize this kind of knowledge (Ibid.).

Friesen has a list of steps that one can follow when doing ideology critique (2008: 2). It is generally in agreement with other descriptions of critical theory like Wright’s tasks of

emancipatory social science (2010: 10) and Leezenberg and De Vries’ tasks of critical theory (2012: 207). However, this thesis does not encompass all of Friesen’s steps, only the first, second and fourth steps. I will first present the steps that I carry out and afterwards I will explain why I could not implement the third step.

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Other counterarguments to different steps in my argument are dealt with in the parts they are concerned with. However, they do not directly attack my thesis to the extent that does this main counterargument.

3 This might appear a strange way to present my argument. However, it was difficult to recount these theories

while simultaneously making my argument, because it would have required separating different elements of the theories that can only be well understood in combination. Therefore, I chose this particular structure.

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6 Friesen’s first step is the following: ‘Identifying ideas or claims that are presented as obvious, inevitable, or matter-of-fact in dominant bodies or sources of knowledge’ (2008: 2). This is the objective of chapter 4, in which I present the knowledge I am critiquing and its historic origins.

Friesen’s second step urges one to scrutinize ‘these ideas or claims in the context provided in other more marginal knowledge forms or sources’ (2008: 2). I use new materialism and the philosophy of Ubuntu. New materialism is marginal in the sense that it diametrically opposes mainstream metaphysics and is also considered a feminist science of philosophy. The African philosophy of Ubuntu is also considered marginal from a Western perspective.4 While only two theories may seem insignificant, neither are one coherent theory. It also seemed better to analyze, in depth, less theories than to use multiple theories and only conduct a surface analysis of each. Regardless, two theories are enough to prove that it is possible to consider the non-human world part of the political community.

Friesen’s fourth step is about ‘developing alternative forms of understanding and point to concrete possibilities for action’ (2008: 2). New materialism and Ubuntu present alternative forms of understanding. I also point to a way in which one can come to consider the non-human world as part of the political community.This is not treated in a separate chapter but is mentioned as part of the argument in chapter 7.

What my method lacks is Friesen’s third step: ‘Revealing through this scrutiny that behind dominant claims and ideas lay one or more politically-charged and often contradictory ways of understanding the issue or phenomenon in question’ (2008: 2). This step comprises immanent critique, which is an essential step within the methodology. One is supposed to reveal any discrepancies between pretensions and actual performance (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 207). The thesis would have been stronger if such immanent critique were included because it is easier to understand something in an alternative manner when the traditional understanding is fundamentally discredited. However, carrying out this step seemed difficult, if not impossible, for the following reasons.

4 I am aware that I did not grow up with the African worldview and that I am therefore necessarily limited in my

understanding of Ubuntu. Prejudices of which I am unaware may therefore involuntarily be present. I have done my best to keep these to a minimum and to treat the philosophy of Ubuntu as respectfully as possible.

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7 First, my thesis is that non-human entities could be considered part of the political

community. Since this challenges the mainstream worldview, I argue that an alternative worldview is possible. It is difficult to establish that one worldview is better than the other, since worldviews are subjective and objective criteria to judge them are hard to create.

Second, my main argument comprises metaphysical theories. Metaphysics are an important part of one’s worldview. Metaphysics concerns the nature of what exists, i.e. the description of things as they really are regardless of appearances (O'Brien 2006: 3, Van Inwagen,

Zimmerman 2008: 1). According to one view, metaphysics is impossible in the sense that one cannot reach important or interesting conclusions in metaphysics (Van Inwagen, Zimmerman 2008: 5). There are two versions of this view. According to the strong version of this idea (supported by logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap) all metaphysical statements are false or meaningless because there is no ‘reality’ to be described (Ibid.) All such arguments, however, are self-referentially incoherent according to Van Inwagen and Zimmerman (Van Inwagen, Zimmerman 2008: 6).There is a weaker version of this idea which claims that metaphysical statements are meaningful, but that it is beyond human capacity to determine whether a metaphysical statement is true or false (Ibid., 5). As human beings, wecould never empirically verify metaphysical statements and thus, establish one metaphysics over the other (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 63, 64). Nevertheless, Van Inwagen and Zimmerman believe that progress in metaphysical knowledge is possible, although the knowledge is often conditional (2008: 7). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to research the possibility of metaphysics in depth. However, even if I had concluded that metaphysics is possible,

providing a strong immanent critique would still have been difficult given the aforementioned difficulty in verification. Fortunately, it is not especially important for my thesis to know whether conclusive metaphysical statements can or cannot be established. My goal is to present the possibility of an alternative worldview and metaphysics.

Even with this incomplete method, I believe that I can make a strong enough case. Indeed, this method accomplishes my aim, namely that one could plausibly see the world in a different way. Had I attempted to argue that one should see the world this way or that the world is this way, some form of immanent critique would be necessary as a basis to argue in support of one worldview over another.

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3. Theoretical framework

I first briefly define the non-human world. Subsequently, I explain why I chose to discuss the political community rather than the moral community. These reasons further demonstrate the relevance of my question. I also define political community and then argue why I chose to use new materialism and Ubuntu to answer my research question. A short description of both theories is also provided.

In this thesis, the non-human world refers to all entities beside human beings, not just animals and plants, but also inanimate objects (including those crafted by human beings). However, theories differ with regard to what non-human entities they consider as part of the non-human world. I will stay as neutral as possible concerning the relevance of specific non-human entities and I will consider the non-human world as signifying all entities beside human entities.

3.1 The moral community and the political community

In this section, I explain why I chose to discuss the political community rather than the moral community. There is much debate about who and what constitutes the moral community. To the moral community belong those entities that one should take into moral consideration, i.e. those entities that have some degree of moral standing (although all are not necessarily equally morally significant). Generally, these entities are argued to have intrinsic moral value. Important positions in this debate are sentiocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism, all of which oppose anthropocentrism (Thompson 2015).

It appears more interesting to write on the political community for different reasons. First, not as much has been written about the political community as about the moral community. Second, determining whether entities are morally considerable or intrinsically valuable does not really help counter dualisms between the human and non-human world. However, this is something I intend to challenge (Thompson 2015).

Third, one could say that the debate over what is and is not intrinsically valuable remains anthropocentric because human beings assign them value (Thompson 2015). However, this

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9 kind of anthropocentrism is difficult to avoid, also with regard to the political community. It can be linked to the Kantian idea that one cannot know the noumenal world, only the

phenomenal world (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 54). The values human beings give to things are conditional.

Fourth, some have argued that politics is more effective than ethics. Even if a thing is morally valuable, it needs to be politicized to affect meaningful change (Ray, Parson 2016). This however also seems to be the case with the political community, which does not include the non-human world, unless people are convinced of that. Nevertheless, ethics generally concerns how individuals should or should not act (i.e. it is about individual ethical choices) and it contains the problematic assumption that when our values are good, our problems are solved (Smith 2016, O'Neill 1997: 22). Politics, on the other hand, concerns collective action, which appears to be more impactful (De Shalit 2016). When discussing the political

community then, change seems more within reach because changing the political

community’s conception could affect political decision-making or the structure of collective choice, and not just individual moral decision-making (Smith 2016). Moreover, collective problems (like those that concern the environment) require collective or structural analyses and solutions, rather than individual analyses and solutions (Ibid.).

3.2 Defining the political community

The answer to the question whether the non-human world is part of the political community very much depends on how one defines the political community. The political community can be defined in a multitude of ways and no one definition of the political community is commonly used. Political communities also exist on different scales, from the local to

national or even global level. However, the scale is not relevant for my argument because the argument applies to all scales. Therefore, in my thesis the political community refers to political communities in general.

A host of characteristics is associated with the standard way of defining political community. This standard conception of political community will now be referred to as the institutional political community. The following are the common characteristics of an institutional

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10 citizens have (legal, political and social) rights and duties (Chandler 2009: 115, Leydet 2014), the right to rule is claimed by political institutions (Peter 2017), the political institutions have a monopoly on the use of violence (Herborth 2009: 182), collectively binding decisions are produced (Herborth 2009: 184) and membership is a source of identity which entails a certain comradeship/fraternity/collective identity (more as a goal to achieve than necessarily as a reality) (Leydet 2014, Anderson 1983: 16).

Though usually not made explicit, it is often clear in this institutional conception of the political community that only human beings are included. The characteristics associated with the institutional political community are unlikely to be fulfilled by entities other than human beings. For example, how could animals (let alone rocks or tables) have duties or hold themselves to binding decisions? The institutional conception of the political community, by definition, excludes the non-human world from the political community. Therefore, a

different conception, one that is more open-ended with regard to whether non-human entities are part of the political community, is required.

To begin with, I assume that all political entities, i.e. entities capable of exercising politics, are part of the political community. I think this assumption is sound because to be in the

political community, one has to be capable of exercising politics. In a number of ways, this

minimum requirement to be part of the political community is too large, since several individuals within the institutional political community are incapable of exercising politics, yet intuitively seen as part of the political community (such as children). If they are indeed considered members of the political community5 then it is not problematic that the minimum requirement is too high because it will be more convincing when non-human entities still qualify. Thus, if non-human entities can exercise politics, the concept of political community can be stripped of the assumption that only human beings can be part of the political

community.

I now argue that an entity is capable of exercising politics when it can influence and have power over other entities. For this, I first establish what politics is. According to Marsh and Stoker, the majority of approaches in political science could agree with defining politics as a struggle for power (2010: 8). However, approaches differ in which struggles for power they

5 Because on the contrary, one could for example state that they are not fully part of the political community if

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11 take into account. According to Marsh and Stoker, there are two broad approaches to defining the political. The first ‘defines the field of study by reference to an arena or particular set of institutions’ (Marsh, Stoker 2010: 7). It regards politics as a formal operation (Ibid.). Not everything is political or can be political, but only that which belongs to the political (or public) domain (Van der Eijk 2001: 6). Typically, this domain or arena is denoted by terms such as state, government or public sphere (Ibid.). This approach often distinguishes between the public and the private domains (Van der Eijk 2001: 7). The second approach views the political ‘as a social process that can be observed in a variety of settings’ (Marsh, Stoker 2010: 7). Politics, in this sense, is an aspect of relations and interactions in different spheres so politics can be everywhere (Van der Eijk 2001: 4, 16). It includes more forms of politics than the ‘arena’ definition since it does not only focus on one domain. The second definition has several advantages in light of the research question, because it provides the possibility to examine politics within all kinds of institutions and relations (Ibid., 7). This can lead to surprising new insight. Moreover, it does not exclude any domains, like the first approach. That approach has already been successfully challenged by feminism, according to whom the private (or social) is also political (Randall 2010: 122).

Following this trajectory, politics would be defined as a struggle for power that can be an aspect of all relations and interactions. However, influencing is generally also included in politics because it seems to be involved in the struggle for power. Relations of power and influence overlap and, within definitions, power and influence are not separated or one is seen as a special form of the other (Van der Eijk 2001: 78). Therefore, I also consider influence to be part of politics. Exercising politics then means influencing and/or having power over other entities. This means that a political entity, i.e. an entity capable of

exercising politics, can be defined as an entity that has the capacity to influence and/or have power over other entities.

I now define the political entity more precisely, although it is not entirely necessary because I do not later use the definition with such precision. I define power as the capacity to

completely or partially fix or change other actors’ set of alternative actions and choices (Van der Eijk 2001: 77). This definition was slightly adapted from the definition of Mokken and Stokman who are cited in Van der Eijk.6 Influence, according to Mokken and Stokman, is the

6 I have been unable to find the original source to check the citation, so I have chosen to refer to Van der Eijk

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12 capacity to (partially) determine other actors’ action or choice within the set of alternative actions and choices available to the actors (Van der Eijk 2001: 78). A political entity can then be defined as an entity that has the capacity to completely or partially change other actors’ set of alternative choices and actions and/or has the capacity to (partially) determine other actors’ action or choice within the set of alternative actions and choices available to the actors.

I chose to use Mokken and Stokman’s definition because other definitions, such as that of Hague and Harrop (power as ‘the capacity to bring about intended effects’), consider intention a necessary element (Hague, Harrop 2010: 10). By definition, this excludes a number of entities from exercising power because they cannot have intention. Moreover, effects of power can be unintended while still being the effect of power (Van der Eijk 2001: 78). Mokken and Stokman’s definitions are also delineated in such a way that power and influence are not only considered a possible capacity of actors in the sense of persons or groups. This makes the capacity of power and influence less tied to human beings and it also captures non-actor bound power and influence, such as the power of norms and values (Ibid.).

Political ontology determines which entities are political and which are not. In the most basic terms (though also contested), ontology is the study of what exists and how it exists

(Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 347). Hay has defined political ontology in relation to ontology: ‘Ontology relates to being, to what is, to what exists, to the constituent units of reality;

political ontology, by extension, relates to political being, to what is politically, to what exists politically, and to the units that comprise political reality’ (Hay 2013). Political ontological choices and assumptions are about the character, nature and reality of ontological entities and their potential to act on the political stage (Ibid.). Examples of political ontological questions include: ‘What is the polity made of? What are its constituents and how do they hang

together? What kinds of general principles govern its functioning, and its change?’ (Hay 2013). Answers to these questions have further consequences for political analysis, by informing to which categories an appeal might be made (Ibid.).

Thus, the research question concerns political ontology. Political ontology itself involves politics. Which entities are political and can be seen as capable of exercising politics is itself a possible political issue, because it can be debated and one can argue in favor or against certain inclusions and exclusions (Marres, Lezaun 2011: 495). An easy example is the aforementioned history of women and politics. Women used to not be seen as political

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13 entities. It took years for them to be recognized as political entities and to be considered part of the political community. Thus, political ontology is unstable and, thereby, a potential political issue (Woolgar, Lezaun 2013: 334). A certain political reality consisting of certain political entities can be more in one’s interest than another political reality.

Thus, political communities are not stable on the dimension of inclusion and exclusion. According to Ellis, more agents are only admitted to the formal political community when people are convinced of the moral argument for expansion or when it is in their strategic interest (Ellis 2016). Boundaries change as a result of an ongoing contestation of the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Baker, Bartelson 2009: 11). This contestation potentially leads to integration. What is deemed important in the inclusion in political communities is imagination. Benedict Anderson has defined all political communities as imagined, i.e. a given community constitutes more people than one actually knows or will ever encounter and thus, these people live in one’s imagination (Anderson 1983: 15). It seems then that to form a political community, one must (be able to) imagine those in it as being part of it. Thus, to include the non-human world in the political community it must be (made) thinkable. This is not easy since current assumptions about the political community impose restrictions on the political imagination (Baker, Bartelson 2009: 3).

3.3 New materialism and Ubuntu

As I have already stated, the literature does not appear to debate whether the non-human world is part of the political community. It is therefore difficult to explain what is usually done in a theoretical framework, namely a ‘state of the art’, an exposition of the different theories and positions important in the debate. This is also difficult because I argue against the dominant way of thinking that tends to be presumed and is not actively argued for. However, while there do not seem to be any scholars that explicitly take a position on the question I am researching, I found different theories related to my question. I will set these out and show in this way why I will use new materialism and Ubuntu. While I briefly introduce both theories, I describe them without the actual content because it is used for the argument and is treated in the theories’ respective chapters.

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14 entities and systems react to what human beings do (Ibid.). In such sciences however, these insights are seen as natural processes rather than political processes. Thus, I will not use such knowledge. Furthermore, I have explained why I ignore environmental ethics when arguing why I chose to research the political community rather than the moral community.

Environmental political theory is more promising with regard to my question. Interspecies research, for example, ‘engages with the ways that material and conceptual relations between different living species are connected to ecological and political outcomes’ (Youatt 2016). However, this focuses more on how human beings are part of nature rather than the reverse (Ibid.).

New materialism goes further, by understanding politics as potentially involving everything. Therefore, new materialism is more useful when researching whether the non-human world could be considered part of the political community as a political subject (Youatt 2016). Object-oriented ontology is similar to new materialism; it focuses on the autonomy (as opposed to new materialism’s relationality) of entities in the world (Frost 2016). I use new materialism because it is more well-known and is continuously becoming more popular. Moreover, it fundamentally opposes the divide between the human and non-human world because it also challenges the underlying (ontological) individualism. Thus, I now introduce new materialism, which will clarify new materialism’s position relative to some other theories.

New materialism is relatively vague. While different names are used for similar theories, it is unclear what the differences are in content (if there are any). Several of the terms used are actor-network theory (ANT), new materialism(s), material semiotics, material

participation/politics, vital materialism and material feminism(s). However, I use the term new materialism since it appears to be the latest commonly used term.

The term new materialism (or neo-materialism) was first used in the second half of the 1990’s, by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti (independently of one another) (Dolphijn, Van der Tuin 2012: 48). New materialism is not easy to describe because it lacks a clear core and it is neither one approach nor a set of ideas (Coole 2013: 452, Krause 2011: 300). The term is therefore, sometimes used in the plural (Coole, Frost 2010: 4). It is exceedingly diverse ‘drawing on perspectives from biophilosophy to quantum physics to queer and feminist theories’ (Fox, Alldred 2017: 4).

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15 I will treat different scholars as supporters of new materialism. Although some see Bruno Latour’s actor-network theory as part of new materialism, some do not. In any case, he is an important forerunner who has provided a number of important concepts (Fox, Alldred 2017: 15). Thus, I sometimes refer to him. Two very important (feminist) new materialists are Donna Haraway and Karen Barad. Both are often mentioned in articles on new materialism. Jane Bennett is also often noted. A newer generation of new materialists includes Diana Coole, Samantha Frost and Noortje Marres.

Ubuntu is not mentioned in any of the literature I have yet referenced, likely due to the fact that it is an African philosophy and has not been often used in Western philosophical

discourses. Ubuntu is argued to be at the root of African philosophy (Eze 2010a: 123). It is an interesting perspective to consider in light of my research question because it also agrees that more than just human entities are concerned in politics. Similar to new materialism, it tackles the divide between the human and non-human world at its foundation by countering the dominant paradigm’s metaphysics. I could have used other, non-African, indigenous theories. I chose to use Ubuntu because it is similar to new materialism and therefore, the theories fit well together.

The term Ubuntu is used by the Zulu in South-Africa (Metz 2007: 323). It comes from Nguni languages (Metz, Gaie 2010: 274). It is derived from the Bantu notion of a human being (Eze 2008: 250). Ubuntu is said to offer a sub-Saharan notion of humanism (Eze 2012: 250). The philosophy of Ubuntu is not just restricted to peoples who speak Bantu, but it also includes other sub-Saharan African groups who have similar ideas to those embodied in Ubuntu (Eze 2008: 107).

Ubuntu originated in African societies a long time ago, the specific point in time is unknown (Murove 2012: 36). At first, it primarily circulated through oral tradition (Eze 2010b: 92). It is also a living tradition and therefore has different and shifting meanings (Murove 2012: 36, Dreyer 2015: 199). Ubuntu can be ideological and can be (ab)used by politicians (Eze 2012: 255, Eze 2011: 12). Different articulations of it were aimed at countering dehumanizing behavior such as colonialism (Murove 2012: 37). It has become part of the discourse of an African Renaissance that handles the crises of modernity by returning to pre-colonial roots (Eze 2012: 250, 251, Eze 2010b: 9). I, however, only research Ubuntu as defined in African

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16 philosophy. In this case as well, Ubuntu’s meaning is unclear (Dreyer 2015: 190). Scholars disagree on the specifics and Ubuntu remains open to interpretation (Eze 2010b: 91). Thus, what I have written on Ubuntu should not be taken as an attempt to essentialize it, I merely attempt to construct one coherent story, which sometimes means that I argue for one interpretation over another one.

Ubuntu is simultaneously descriptive, prescriptive and metaphysical (Metz 2007: 322, Metz, Gaie 2010: 275). I am primarily concerned here with the metaphysical side of Ubuntu, which as Ramose has stated, is ‘the wellspring flowing with African ontology and epistemology’ (Ramose 1999: 49). The normative side of Ubuntu is less important because my question does not concern the moral community, but the political community. Although it might be artificial to separate the metaphysics of Ubuntu from the ethics of Ubuntu, that is what I have done.

Combining new materialism and Ubuntu has a couple of advantages. First, they are

complementary because new materialism remains largely theoretical and Ubuntu can prove that people have already thought of the non-human world as part of the political community. Second, it is interesting to discover similarities between a Western and a non-Western (in this case African) theory, instead of over-emphasizing and essentializing the differences (which often happens) (Godrej 2016). In the next chapter, I present the position that new materialism and Ubuntu challenge, that is, the divide between the human and non-human world which underlies the idea that the non-human world is not part of the political community.

4. The divide between the human and the non-human world

‘Where did we ever get the strange idea that nature—as opposed to culture—is ahistorical and timeless? We are far too impressed by our own cleverness and self-consciousness. . . . We need to stop telling ourselves the same old anthropocentric bedtime stories’ (Shaviro 1997).

In this chapter I reveal the mainstream view on whether the non-human world is part of the political community, i.e. that it is not. I also place this view within its historical context.

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17 4.1 Dualisms

A philosophical inheritance poses multiple dualisms or dichotomies, between nature and man/society/culture (Bingham 2006: 490, Stephens 2016), between animal and human (Stephens 2016), spirit/mind and matter/body (Thompson 2015, Gabrielson, Parady 2010: 374) and between science and politics (Disch 2016). They are considered the dualistic

conceptions of modernity, or as Latour referred to it, the ‘Modern Constitution’ (Latour 1993: 13).

The dualisms originated during the Enlightenment and have since been common in Western history (Stephens 2016). They were codified by 18th century philosophers and became characteristic of Western culture for subsequent centuries (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 52). The dualisms were firmly established by Descartes’ Cogito. He provided the philosophical foundations of modern science by fixing the dichotomy between subject and object and between the subjective (res cogitans, realm of the mind) and objective (res extensa, realm of nature) (Stephens 2016, Callicott 2002: 93, 94). This also entails a dichotomy between a subjective and an objective reality (Ikuenobe 2014: 3). Thus, the self and the non-self or phenomenal world are separated (ibid.).

So on the one hand, there is the world of the human, the subjects (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 52). The human is seen as rational, conscious and self-moving (Coole, Frost 2010: 8). On the other hand, there is the world of nature, of the body and of matter, or of the objects to be known (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 52). Descartes’ definition of matter (as a corporeal inert and extended substances) was the foundation for the idea of nature as quantifiable and measurable and thus, for Newtonian metaphysics and Euclidian geometry (Coole, Frost 2010: 7). When nature is seen as other, it can be objectified for instrumental purposes (Stephens 2016). For this reason, it has been reduced to an economic resource to be technologically conquered. In the quest for true knowledge, human uniqueness and human’s otherness from nature are exaggerated (Ibid.). Thus, these dualisms are hierarchical and anthropocentric. They have become part of our intuitions (Leezenberg, De Vries 2012: 52).

This divide between human and non-human is also often tied to humanism. This is not strange, however, since humanism has much in common with Enlightenment thought, which

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18 encouraged people to think for themselves and discard religion (Law 2013). Humanism has different meanings, but is currently associated with the following characteristics: ‘emphasis on the role of science and reason’, atheist and secularist, ‘existence and importance of moral value’, ‘individual moral autonomy and responsibility’ (Ibid.).

4.2 Agency

The human exceptionalism prevalent throughout the dualisms has been defended by noting certain unique characteristics of human beings (rationality, consciousness, language,

intentionality and moral agency) (Thompson 2015). Non-human entities are said to lack those characteristics that would grant them agency and would define them as political actors. I recount the standard conception of agency because it is explains why non-human entities are not considered part of the political community.

According to Schlosser, an agent is ‘a being with the capacity to act’, and agency refers to ‘the exercise or manifestation’ of the capacity to act (Schlosser 2015). It is widely agreed that agency involves the agent’s initiation of the action. When agency is defined this broadly, agency is everywhere. However, agency is typically viewed in a much narrower sense to denote intentional actions. Intention is included within standard philosophical conceptions of agency (Ibid.). In a social thought dictionary, an action is described as follows: ‘Someone performs an action when what he or she does can be described as intentional’ (Brunkhorst 2006: 1). Action is also related to rationality because it is explained by the agent’s beliefs and desires (Schlosser 2015, Brunkhorst 2006: 1). This is morally relevant, since acting with intention or by choice is often what makes one responsible for an action (Gabrielson 2016).

Non-human entities are not included in the political community because they are defined by what they lack in comparison to human beings (language, consciousness, reason) (Bingham 2006: 490).78 Lacking agency, they are simply passive objects awaiting to be investigated (Disch 2016). Especially if politics is seen as speech and action, non-human entities are

7 Human beings have also historically been excluded from the political community at times because they were

thought to lack the necessary human characteristics, for example women and colonized peoples.

8

I want to note that religious entities can be an exception in this regard, for example theocracies. God(s) are not human (one could say they are supra-human), but can simultaneously be seen as part of the political community. It is, however, often the case that God(s) are anthropomorphized in some ways and have the human

characteristics used to distinguish human from non-human entities. One can think of Homer’s description of Greek Gods. Thus, it can be consistent to see God(s) as part of the political community.

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19 stripped of their politics (Ibid.). It is deeplyingrained in society’s presumptions of the

political that language is necessary for politics (Marres, Lezaun 2011: 492). Thus, the basic idea is that nature is not an actor but is composed of passive objects (Smith 2016).

Gabrielson has stated that the capacity for justification of an action continues to define political agency for many political theorists (Gabrielson 2016). It leaves ‘children, the cognitively disabled, future generations, animals, non-human nature, and things in the

category of “nonagents” in need of guardianship or representation’ (Gabrielson 2016). Those historically excluded (women, the enslaved, Native Americans etc.) were considered

inhuman (Ibid.).

4.3 Individualism

Individualism does not directly explain why non-human entities are not considered part of the political community. Nevertheless, it is an important element of the standard account of agency and the alternative theories I recount react to it. It is important to note that I do not use individualism in the pejorative moral sense, but in the ontological sense.

According to Gabrielson, historically the standard conception of agency has defined the ideal citizen as an autonomous, reasoning and independent agent (Gabrielson 2016). Plumwood has stated that the liberal self is a (masculine) hyperseparated disembedded self (1993: 152). The natural and the body are mere backgrounds of human agency (Gabrielson 2016).

Gabrielson has referred to this conception of agency as liberal agency, and traces it back to Lockean liberalism and its atomic, individualistic and socially disconnected conception of the self (Ibid.). Locke perceived the individual as the most basic unit, and classical liberal

thought in general focuses on the nature of the autonomous person (Buckler 2010: 157, 158). Individuals are seen as independent of collective structures, while communities need to be justified (Ibid., 158).

Different theories argue against this, such as communitarianism and postmodernism (Buckler 2010: 167, 170). Communitarianism, for example, critiques the ‘unencumbered self’ as a source of basic claims about human beings (Ibid., 168). The community is important.

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20 people live are important (Ibid., 170). New materialism and Ubuntu present their own

alternatives to this individualism.

To view non-human entities as part of the political community, these dualisms, ancillary notions and ideas need to be challenged. New materialism and Ubuntu both reject the existence of a divide between the human and non-human world and related dichotomies. In the following two sections, I describe these theories separately. Subsequently, I note the similarities and use them to prove that non-human entities could be seen as part of the political community, since they can plausibly have agency.

5. New materialism

‘Language matters. Discourse matters. Culture matters. There is an important sense in which the only thing that does not seem to matter anymore is matter’ (Barad 2003: 801).

Fox and Alldred demarcated the common propositions of new materialist scholars (2017). In this regard, they have formulated the following three propositions that new materialism supports:

--‘“nature” and “culture” should not be treated as distinct realms, but as parts of a continuum of materiality. The physical and the social both have material effects in an ever-changing world’ (Fox, Alldred 2017: 4).

-‘the material world and its contents are not fixed, stable entities, but relational, uneven, and in constant flux’ (Ibid.).

-‘a capacity for “agency”- the actions that produce the social world - extends beyond human actors to the non-human and inanimate’ (Ibid.).

I will treat each of these propositions under the headings monism, relationality and agency, respectively. These headings are not coincidentally in opposition to the headings of the former chapter. All three elements are primarily metaphysical. New materialism’s stance on agency is especially relevant within the context of my main argument. However, the other two elements are also important to understand the stance on agency. Moreover, they support my thesis by countering other aspects of the view that underlies the notion that the non-human world is not part of the political community. In this chapter and in the following

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21 chapter, in addition to presenting new materialism and Ubuntu, I also briefly mention how these theories contradict the divide between the human and non-human world. This clarifies why these are alternative to the previously described dominant view that was just described.

5.1 Monism

Materialism generally 'contends that whatever exists just is, or at least depends upon, matter. (In its more general form it claims that all reality is essentially material; in its more specific form, that human reality is.)’ (Bhaskar 2006: 386). It is commonly pitted against forms of idealism, which asserts the existence of abstract entities (such as minds, supernatural beings, ideas, duties, sense-data and the absolute) (Ibid.).

However, new materialism is not completely like the ‘old’ materialism. Contrary to the old materialism, it does not deny that the abstract entities exist or that things are (partly) socially constructed (Dolphijn, Van der Tuin 2012: 85, 98). According to new materialism, it is possible to both accept that things are socially constructed and insist that the material realm should not be reduced to culture or discourse (Coole, Frost 2010: 27).

Interestingly, new materialism is monist despite recognizing both matter and abstract entities (Coole 2013: 455). This is possible because it challenges any difference in materiality between the physical realm and the realm of thoughts, cultural products and social structures (Fox, Alldred 2017: 7). The human and natural world have a common materiality

(Gabrielson, Parady 2010: 382). Bennett has emphasized that the common materiality of human and non-human entities establishes a connection of reciprocity and kinship (Bennett 2010: 102, 112, 122).

New materialism’s monism is connected to its rejection of the distinction between the reality independent of human thought and the social world of human constructs (Fox, Alldred 2017: 14). It is more realist than constructivism allows, but not in a neo-positivist sense: ‘It takes an empirical interest in emergent materializations without being simply empiricist; it recognizes the way concepts and experience, meaning and matter, emerge historically and reciprocally as embodied actors immerse themselves in and engage with/within material and social

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22 Relatedly, new materialism contests the distinction between epistemology and ontology. Barad’s notion of onto-epistemology captures this well. She has described this as ‘the study of practices of knowing in being’ (Barad 2003: 829). The following citation is explanatory: ‘We know because “we” are of the world. We are part of the world in its differential

becoming’ (original emphasis, Barad 2003: 829). According to Barad, the distinction between ontology and epistemology assumes a difference between the human and the nonhuman and between the subject and the object, while they are actually entangled (Ibid.).

New materialism rejects the divide between the human and non-human world by rejecting the dichotomies between the natural and social realms, mind and matter, human and non-human (Fox, Alldred 2017: 7, 14, 21, 26). It is essential in new materialism to break through the dual oppositions that are prevalent in the sciences and humanities (Dolphijn, Van der Tuin 2012: 97).

5.2 Relationality

New materialism does not focus on individual entities. This is contrary to the view that underlies the divide between the human and non-human world. New materialism focuses instead on relational assemblages or networks (Fox, Alldred 2017: 15, 24). Entities do not even exist as such, they only gain integrity and ontological status through relationships with other things, bodies and ideas (Fox, Alldred 2017: 24, Haraway 1988: 595). Subject and object emerge through interactions or, according to Barad, through ‘intra-actions’ (2003: 815).

For this reason, new materialism could also be considered a material-semiotic approach. A material-semiotic approach, according to Law, describes ‘the enactment of materially and discursively heterogeneous relations that produce and reshuffle all kinds of actors including objects, subjects, human beings, machines, animals, “nature,” ideas, organizations,

inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical arrangements’ (Law 2008: 141). Material-semiotic approaches pose a Material-semiotics of materiality, not only are meanings of words

relational, but also the identities of material entities (Disch 2016). Haraway and Barad have referred to entities as material-semiotic agents (Dolphijn, Van der Tuin 2012: 109). These are

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23 agents whose ‘boundaries materialize in social interactions’ (Haraway 1988: 595).

Entities are constituted by and are constitutive of other entities within a dynamic relationality (Gabrielson 2016).Barad has used the notion of entanglement to refer to the relationality of different material-semiotic agents (Barad 2012: 69). This entanglement is, according to Barad, the very nature of materiality (Ibid.). Entities are not stable because the relations in which they find themselves can differ. They emerge as part of unstable assemblages (that consist of and are part of other assemblages) that shift and are reconfigured by encounters with other assemblages (Coole 2013: 455). Thus, matter is indeterminate, forming and reforming continuously (Coole, Frost 2010: 10).9 Coole has declared this an ‘ontology of becoming’ (Coole 2013: 452). This then rejects that matter is passive and needs an external agent to be set in motion (Ibid., 453).

The instability of entities also means that there is no singularity of the real: it is a world of ‘multiple realities, fluid and diverse in its ontological possibilities’ (Woolgar, Lezaun 2013: 326). Interestingly, the instability gives ontology a political dimension in the same way that I have already stated that political ontology is political. Because ontology can vary, what exists can become an issue rather than a given (Marres 2013: 423). This is known as ontological politics (Mol 1999: 74). New materialism can be interpreted as considering political ontology and ontology as one because all entities are political. Therefore, if an entity exists (ontology) it is also part of the political ontology.

According to Barad, relationality does not absolve entities in the sense that they are no longer distinct, because there is ‘agential separability’ (Barad 2012: 69). However, this separation is not an othering, it is about connecting and making commitments (Ibid.). Since Barad has explained this ethical implication better than I could, I provide a direct quotation. According to Barad:

Ethics is about mattering, about taking account of the entangled materializations of which we are part, including new configurations, new subjectivities, new possibilities. Even the smallest cuts matter. Responsibility, then, is a matter of the

9 The idea of stable and predictable substances is actually undermined by advances in physics (Coole, Frost

2010: 13). Forces, waves, charges, virtual particles and empty space suggest a very different account of matter than the substantialist mechanistic Newtonian and Cartesian accounts of matter (Coole, Frost 2010: 12, 13).

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24 ability to respond. Listening for the response of the other and an obligation to be

responsive to the other, who is not entirely separate from what we call the self. (Barad 2012: 69)

In summary, the abstract properties of materiality are ‘plural and complex, uneven and contingent, relational and emergent’ (Fox, Alldred 2017: 24) as well as ‘lively, vibrant, dynamic’ (Coole 2013: 453). The latter citation is clarified in the following section.

5.3 Agency

Gabrielson has stated that sovereign or liberal agency ‘severely limits the field of politically meaningful actors and obscures the varieties of agency at work in the world’ (Gabrielson 2016). This leads to an overstating of the efficacy and power of individual human beings (over a ‘passive’ environment) and extracts them from their larger contexts, which shape all action (Ibid.). The liberal conception of agency perceives intention as a component of agency (Ibid.).

Alternative accounts of agency, including new materialism, argue that the exercise of action can be initiated without prior intent and for no reason (Schlosser 2015). Krause, for example, has indicated that the effect of an action depends on those receiving the action and that an action can outstrip one’s intentions (Krause 2011: 308). Intentionality would then not be necessary for the exercise of agency, and those incapable of intentional action would be capable of agency (Schlosser 2015). This does not necessarily mean however that all instances of agency can or should be explained without the ascription of intentionality. One can simply maintain different kinds of agency, where agency with intentionality is just one type (Ibid.). The idea that intentionality is not necessary for agency corresponds to the idea that non-human entities have agency (Ibid.). I now shift to exploring new materialism’s account of agency, which supports this idea.

New materialist agency decouples the concept from humans: non-human entities can also have agency (Coole 2013: 457, Coole, Frost 2010: 7). Matter is not inert, waiting merely for human beings to mold it (Fox, Alldred 2017: 24, 25). In the ‘dance of agency’ both the human and non-human are included (Pickering 2010).

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25 According to new materialism, agency is not really something that an entity has (Gabrielson 2016). As already discussed, entities do not exist a priori as such. Like entities themselves, their agency is also only realized by their relations and interactions with other bodies, human and non-human (Krause 2011: 300, 304, 308). Agency is distributed, which means that it is an emergent property of interactions and occurs to varying degrees (Krause 2011: 300, Connolly 2013: 400). Therefore, one could say that all entities potentially have agency, but whether they actually do depends on the particular situation (Coole 2013: 458). An action then, is a ‘conglomerate of many surprising sets of agencies that have to be slowly

disentangled’ (Latour 2005: 44).

Following this conception of agency, Barad has cautioned that one should not say that entities have agency or that one grants non-humans agency: ‘The notion that there are agents who have agency, or who grant agency, say, to non-humans (the granting of agency is an ironic notion, no?), pulls us back into the same old humanist orbits over and over again. And it is not easy to resist the gravitational force of humanism, especially when it comes to the question of “agency”’ (Barad 2012: 54). I state that non-human entities have agency, since I cannot find a different way to easily formulate it. However, by this I still mean that agency is not a stable capacity of entities and only manifests itself in (certain) relations or situations.

What does this new materialist agency actually look like? According to Coole, there is a resistance to fixing what exactly agency looks like (2013: 453). To clarify the conception of agency, she has paraphrased the meaning of Latour’s ‘efficacy’ according to which entities ‘make a difference, produce effects and affects, alter the course of events by their action; they may allow, encourage, authorise, influence, block, suggest and so on’ (Coole 2013: 453). According to Bennett, entities have positive and negative powers. She states that their agency is the ‘capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with

trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own’ (Bennett 2010: viii). Thus, it is not a ‘human’ or liberal agency of intention and choice that is attributed to things (Disch 2016).

This conception of agency also results in the term ‘flat’ being used for new materialist ontology because it‘does not privilege some kinds of entity or agency over others and [it is] one in which new assemblages and unstable hybrids are recognized to be constantly emerging

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26 and dissipating across a normatively and ontologically horizontal plane’ (Coole 2013: 454). Since there are no hierarchies of existence or power, all things are placed on an equal footing (Chandler 2013: 524, 531). Indeed, all things are capable of influencing one another. For example, memories, emotions and thoughts have material effects (Fox, Alldred 2017: 25, 26). Some new materialists’ ontology is completely flat and does not acknowledge differences in agency between human and non-human entities (Krause 2011: 309). Other new materialists have stated that agency still exists in the conventional sense, but it should be traced, not presumed (Coole 2013: 458). This still qualifies as a flat ontology given the lack of a stable hierarchy.

This new materialist idea of agency entails a limitation of human agency, since non-human entities also have agency (Coole, Frost 2010: 14). Human beings do not have the ability (nor right) to dominate nature (Ibid., 10). The idea that human and non-human entities have agency is posthumanist (Fox, Alldred 2017: 7). Posthumanism is a distinctive characteristic of new materialism (Coole, Frost 2010: 7). It is also non-anthropocentric because it does not solely focus on human beings (Fox, Alldred 2017: 7). The human being is displaced from its exceptional position with respect to action (Disch 2016).

In summary, agency is conceived of by new materialists as relational, collectively produced and expressed, widely distributed, embodied and temporally emergent in material-discursive assemblages (Gabrielson 2016, Coole 2013: 457).

6. Ubuntu

‘Instead of being a lone subject, or a quantifiable and containable object, we are all “intersubjects”, fundamentally interwoven into a common cosmic identity’ (Forster 2006: 268).

In this section I present the core element of the ontology of Ubuntu, which is relationality. I subsequently focus on African cosmology to contest the proposition that Ubuntu is

anthropocentric. This provides further information on Ubuntu’s metaphysics. I do not use the same headings as in the previous chapter (except for relationality) because they are not well suited for this chapter. However, African cosmology’s holism challenges dualisms and thus, can be compared to new materialism’s monism. Furthermore, animism concerns agency.

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27 6.1 Relationality

Ubuntu is the term used to refer to the essence or quality of being a personin the Bantu language (Eze 2008: 250). Ubuntu has been defined as a certain philosophy or ethic and was later also considered an African humanism and a worldview (Gade 2011: 315, 136). Ubuntu became better known through the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa after apartheid, from 1996 to 1998 (Ibid., 313). Currently however, it is mostly

referenced by means of certain expressions (Ibid., 316). Ubuntu in the form of an expression is (in Xhosa/Zulu) motho ke motho ka batho babang; umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, meaning that ‘a person is a person through other people’ (Eze 2017a: 99). Ubuntu has also been taken to mean: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’ (Eze 2012: 251). Contrary to traditional Western thought, one is not a person or human because one has rationality (cogito ergo sum), but rather ‘I am because you are human’ (Eze 2017a: 102).

These expressions mean that one’s humanity is dependent on the other, who can complement one’s own humanity (Eze 2012: 251, 254). In other words, ‘to be is to be in a relationship with an “other”’ (Ibid., 252). The formation of subjectivity is intersubjective (Eze 2010b: 11). People are created and create each other through continuous interactions (Eze 2010b: 11, Eze 2017a: 101). The human being is a relational being, a ‘being-with-others’ (Murove 2012: 37, Louw 1998). Thus, Ubuntu entails a relational ontology andthe interconnectedness and interdependence of human beings is emphasized (Dreyer 2015: 196).

A person cannot be understood on its own because the person is always in a community: ‘Being a person is to be in a dialogical relationship in this community’ (Eze 2008: 107). This is similar to communitarianism, which is why Ubuntu is often considered an African

communitarianism that considers the community’s good as more important than individual rights (Eze 2012: 252). In Africanist discourse, the majority of scholars insist on the primacy of community (Eze 2008: 106). However, following Eze, I disagree. Eze has argued that the relationship between the individual and the community is contemporaneous (Eze 2012: 250). Otherwise, the individual’s subjectivity or autonomy in relation to the community would be denied (Ibid., 252). Neither the individual nor the community is prior, they are ontologically equal (Eze 2017a: 102). Nevertheless, this remains very much in contrast to the individualist ontology, which is part of the view that underlies the divide between the human and

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non-28 human world.

Although individuals are defined by their relationships with others and only exist in these relationships, according to Eze, this happens without the object and subject becoming indistinguishable (2008: 116). Individuality, in the non-atomistic sense, is respected (Louw 1998). This is why according to Eze, Ubuntu cannot be described with the slogan simunye (meaning ‘we are one’) since itwould eradicate the differences between persons, between subject/I and object/other (Eze 2008: 116). Moreover, it is precisely the uniqueness of the other which complements one’s own humanity (Eze 2008: 117). Thus, a better formulation of Ubuntu might be: ‘A person is a person through the otherness of the other’ (original

emphasis, Eze 2010b: 11).

The Ubuntu idea of who the other is, and thus who a person is in general, is open-ended (Louw 1998). The person is not reduced to a single state of being, but is dynamic and more adequately seen as being in a state of becoming (Ibid.). There is a constant interaction in which the one and the other learn from and are enriched by the other’s uniqueness (Eze 2008: 117). As the relations change, so do the individuals (Louw 1998).

I now briefly describe the ethics of Ubuntu’s relationality. The human quality is something to be gained in practice and thus normatively laden (Eze 2012: 251). One should participate in positive (communal) relationships (Metz, Gaie 2010: 273, Eze 2012: 251, 252). This positive relationship is generally characterized by ‘toleration, sharing, charity, respect, acceptance, hospitality, compassion, reconciliation, empathy, and reciprocity’ (Eze 2017a: 99). In such a relationship, one recognizes and also appreciates and affirms the other’s humanity and uniqueness (Eze 2012: 251, 252). One can only develop humanness by positively relating to others, it cannot be done in isolation or opposition to others (Metz, Gaie 2010: 275). If the relationship is not positive, it depreciates one’s own humanity (Eze 2012: 251).

Responsibility is a duty everyone owes to others (Murove 2012: 39). Responsibility means that one should respond to what is found in a relationship (Ibid.). This is also the only context in which responsibility exists (Ibid.).

Ubuntu is often described as (African) humanism, or as a humanistic ethic (Eze 2010b: 7, Murove 2012: 37). In the description of Ubuntu’s relationality, I have not mentioned non-human entities. According to some, African thought is anthropocentric. Horsthemke has stated that Ubuntu is speciesist for only focusing on human beings (Horsthemke 2015: 548).

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29 Indeed, several scholars are unambiguously anthropocentric (Behrens 2010: 468). Behrens has therefore acknowledged that it is reasonable to presume that African thought is

anthropocentric (Ibid.). However, he has also stated that it does not completely represent African worldviews because scholars often state as well that everything in nature is interrelated (Behrens 2010: 466). According to Murove, Ubuntu can be seen as having dimensions that surpass anthropocentrism: ‘Ubuntu cannot be simply restricted to human conduct, because it arises from an African world-view of relatedness and interrelatedness’ (Murove 2012: 43). I will now treat the African worldview because it appears to be essential to understanding Ubuntu.

6.2 African cosmology

Cosmology concerns how one understands the organization of the universe, it is one’s worldview which comprises metaphysics (Viriri, Mungwini 2010: 29). When referring to African cosmology, I do not mean to imply that there is only one African cosmology. Viriri has argued that there are many different cultures in Africa, but that in philosophy, it is

acceptable to refer to African thought or tradition when reference is made to dominant themes (Ibid.). Ikuenobe has described the African worldview in the following way:

Reality is seen as a composite, unity and harmony of natural forces. Reality is a holistic community of mutually reinforcing natural life forces consisting of human communities (families, villages, nations, and humanity), spirits, gods, deities, stones, sand, mountains, rivers, plants, and animals. Everything in reality has a vital force or energy such that the harmonious interactions among them strengthen reality. (Ikuenobe 2014: 2)

In this citation of Ikuenobe, three elements of African cosmology that I will be discussing are present, namely what the world consists of, holism and animism.

First, what does the world consist of in the African worldview? Different categorizations can be made. The world comprises both the living (present people, ancestors, unborn future people) and the nonliving (inanimate things and objects) (Eze 2017b: 7). Existing entities are

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30 visible/material/natural (such as human beings, animals and plants) and

invisible/spiritual/supernatural (ancestors, spirit beings and God) (Forster 2006: 246).

Ikuenobe has explained that for some African peoples, ontological categories are hierarchical and based on their power to strengthen harmony (2014: 2). However, according to

Binsbergen, the continuity between ontological categories is acknowledged (2001: 54). Eze has agreed that the community ‘is not just a collective of humans, it is a fluid habitation of interactive forces, beings, elements, animate and inanimate matters of the environment’ (Eze 2017b: 8). No being is superior (Ibid., 9).

6.2.1 Holism as relationality

Holism is a term used in environmental ethics to denote theories that ascribe intrinsic moral value to groups, such as ecosystems (Behrens 2010: 466). Behrens does not use this term to describe the African worldview because, as seen in Ubuntu, the community is not prioritized (Ibid., 477). However, I use the term here because scholars have often used this term to describe the African worldview. Dissimilarly, I use it without the implication that

communities or groups are ontologically prior. Holism of the African worldview could be more appropriately seen as emphasizing the wholeness of all being (Forster 2006: 243).

The wholeness of all existing things originates from relationality. Quite often, the

relationality, interdependence, interconnectedness and importance of inter-relationships are stressed as foundational aspects of the African worldview, ontology or cosmology (Murove 2012: 44, 45, Forster 2006: 253, Behrens 2010: 466). Forster’s formulation can be helpful in this case: ‘It is not just me, it is not just you, it is not just the material reality, neither is it just the spiritual reality; true reality is a sacred interweaving of all these things’ (Forster 2006: 268).

When placing Ubuntu within the context of this worldview, it is plausible to suggest that Ubuntu’s relationality not only concerns human beings. According to Metz and Gaie, the idea that one is a person through other persons suggests interdependence among all beings in the cosmos (2010: 275). Murove has argued that the worldview of relationality means that Ubuntu cannot be restricted to human beings (2012: 45). Murove and Le Grange have further used the notion of ‘Ukama’ to extend human relationality to all spheres (Murove 2012: 44,

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31 45, Le Grange 2012: 329). Thus, Ubuntu can be seen as the concrete human microcosmic form of the interdependence that also applies in the macrocosm (Le Grange 2012: 338). A dialectical subjectivism exists, and not only in the case of human beings: ‘One’s subjectivity is fully expressed only in dialogue with other beings within the ecocommunity’ (Eze 2017b: 11). Human beings are part of a wide community and relate to other kinds of beings as well because nothing is disconnected (Dreyer 2015: 197, Forster 2006: 245, Martin 2008: 964). There are no separate beings because all beings are in intimate ontological relationships of interaction and dialogue with other beings (Eze 2017b: 9). Thus, Ubuntu could be

reformulated to mean that ‘a person is a person through other (living) beings’ (Behrens 2010: 478).

According to Forster, this holism can be seen as a breakdown of dualisms and therefore, Ubuntu challenges the dualisms that underlie the divide between the human and non-human world (Forster 2006: 252). As Tangwa has argued, ‘the distinction between plants, animals, and inanimate things between the sacred and the profane, matter and spirit, the communal and the individual, is a slim and flexible one’ (Tangwa 2004: 389). According to Ojomo, these dichotomies are absent (2011: 577). It is not strange then that Ijiomah has referred to African ontology as ‘harmonious monism’ (Ijiomah 2016, Etieyibo 2017: 143).

Reality is a harmonious and unified ontological category in which visible and invisible or natural and supernatural are not distinguished (Ikuenobe 2014: 8). Reality is always experienced (Ibid., 4). Objects cannot be known objectively, only subjectively, because humans are part of reality. The following quotation of Ikuenobe is explanatory in this regard, and it also introduces the next section well:

The observed is perceived to be placed so close to the individual that it obscures what lies beyond it, and so that the observer cannot escape responding to it. The individual also appears to view the ‘field’ as itself responding to him; i.e., although it may be completely objective and inanimate to others, because it demands response, it is accorded a kind of life of its own. (Ikuenobe 2014: 4).

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