• No results found

Horizontal inequalities and the colonial legacy in Nigeria : analysing the emergence of Boko Haram

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Share "Horizontal inequalities and the colonial legacy in Nigeria : analysing the emergence of Boko Haram"

Copied!
36
0
0

Bezig met laden.... (Bekijk nu de volledige tekst)

Hele tekst

(1)

Horizontal inequalities and the colonial legacy in Nigeria

Analysing the emergence of Boko Haram

By: Sophie van der Ploeg

Bachelor Thesis Political Science Supervisor: V. Marapin Second Reader: S. Rezaeiejan University of Amsterdam - 10511873

Word Count: 9525 29-01-2018

(2)

Table of Contents

i. Map of Nigeria: Geopolitical Zones ... 3

i. Map of Nigeria: Boko Haram-related violence ... 3

1. Introduction ... 4

2. Theoretical framework ... 6

2.1 Insurgency and terrorism ... 6

2.2 The connection between state fragility and insurgency ... 6

2.3 Common explanations of the Boko Haram insurgency ... 7

2.3.1 Povert y and conflict ... 7

2.3.2 Economi c motivations and opportunities ... 8

2.3.3 Relative Deprivation Theory ... 8

2.4 Horizont al inequalities ... 9

2.5 Causal mechanism: from HIs to grievances to conflict ... 10

3. Methodology ... 12

3.1 Qualitative cas e study: ‘Thick des cription’ ... 12

3.2 Operationalis ation and data collection ... 12

4. Background to the conflict ... 15

4.1 Nigeri a: a brief historical overvi ew ... 15

4.1.1 Nigeria’s diversit y ... 15

4.1.2 The colonial era ... 15

4.2 Evolvement of Boko Haram ... 16

5. Analysis ... 17

5.1 Identifi cation of relevant groups ... 17

5.2 Economic HIs ... 17 5.2.1 Findings ... 18 5.3 Social HIs ... 19 5.3.1 Findings ... 20 5.4 Cultural HIs ... 20 5.4.1 Findings ... 22 5.5 Political HIs ... 22 5.5.1 Findings ... 23 5.6 Historical context ... 23

5.6.1 Education: social and economi c progress ... 23

5.6.2 Cultural and political tensions ... 24

5.6.3 Falsification and causal mechanism ... 25

6. Conclusion ... 27

References ... 29

(3)

i.

Map of Nigeria: Geopolitical Zones

Figure 1: The Six Geopolitical Zones of Nigeria (Hoffman 2014: 2).

ii.

Map of Nigeria: Boko Haram-related violence

Figure 2: Total Causalities by State Related to the Boko Haram Insurgency (2009-2013) (Mahmood 2013: 3).

(4)

1. Introduction

Nigeria is often seen as the country of paradoxes and extremes. Many Nigerians live in poverty, but a few, often living in the big cities, are extremely rich. The country is known for its abundance of natural resources. In particular, the high rates of oil production have led to Nigeria’s strong economic growth (Ahokegh 2012: 49). Inequality levels however remain high. Nigeria is a plural state with a diverse ethnic, religious, and cultural population (Attah 1987: 393). Premier of the Western Region of Nigeria, Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1947: 48), once stated that “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English, Welsh, or French’. The word Nigerian is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not”. Since achieving independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced various economic, social and political challenges which threatened the unity of the Nigerian state (Otoghile and Igbafe 2014: 96). More recently, Nigeria has become home to one of Africa’s most deadly insurgent groups: Boko Haram.

Much has been written about Boko Haram. However, little attention has been given to the underlying drivers of the conflict. Why does Boko Haram rebel? Unravelling the causes of the insurgency is an essential part of the counter actions and finding a solution. A misdiagnosis of why the conflict erupted in the first place can result in ineffective government intervention strategies that aim to solve the conflict. In order to understand why Boko Haram persists, it is necessary to move beyond the mainstream counter-terrorism activities and examine the conditions that led to the establishment of Boko Haram in the first place. The drivers behind insurgencies and terrorism are multi-faceted, which leads to a wide array of factors that can be taken into account when examining the emergence and persistence of militant groups (Vike-Freiberga and Neumann 2015).

In an interview with the BBC in December 2015, President Buhari stated that Nigeria has ‘technically’ defeated Boko Haram. To quote Buhari: “Technically we have won the war because people are going back into their neighbourhoods. Boko Haram as an organized fighting force, I assure you, that we have dealt with them” (BBC 2015). Only a few days later, Boko Haram showed Buhari otherwise when two female suicide bombers killed at least 30 people in a town in Borno State Madagali (Utietiang 2015). Again, in July 2017, Nigeria’s army chief Buratai, claimed that Boko Haram has been defeated militarily. Recent research from SBM Intel however provides a different narrative. It is true that Boko Haram has been losing territory since 2015. However, the group changed its strategy towards a more ‘guerrilla type’ of warfare,

(5)

often including suicide bombings and attacks on communities in local areas (SB Morgen Intelligence 2017: 8). The continued attacks and bombings show that despite counter-terrorism attempts, Boko Haram still poses a threat (ibid.). The resilience of Boko Haram shows the relevance of discovering the underlying causes of the insurgence.

Western Media generally portray the Boko Haram insurgency as solely an expression of extremist Islam, ignoring the underlying socio-economic context. Contemporary terrorism research in general has been increasingly focused on religion, and Islam in particular, as a driver of terrorism (Dalacoura 2009: 128). 9/11 heated the discussion about ‘religious terrorism’, a term used to describe political violence executed in the name of religion by religiously motivated actors (Gunning and Jackson 2011: 369). According to Gunning and Jackson, religion is not a sufficient explanation for the establishment of terrorism. Religion should not be abandoned; within research, it should be problematized and historicised in order to unfold the role of religion in a broader context (idem: 383). This thesis follows this line of reasoning: religion is not necessarily the cause of ‘religious conflict’ but it provides a foundation for social identity and is used to legitimate actions (ibid.).

In an essay on the national question in Nigeria, Mustapha identifies eight cleavages that are sometimes overlapping. These include: Nigeria versus imperialism; the contradiction between the major nationalities the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba; The North-South divide; the major nationalities versus the minor nationalities; inter-state rivalry between the different federal states; ethnic rivalries; sectional rivalries within ethnic groups; and inter-clan rivalries within a province or district (Mustapha 1986: 83). The national question concerns the relationship between Nigeria and imperialism and the relationship between the various nationalities and political units within society (ibid.). This thesis will mainly involve the North-South divide, specifically focusing on horizontal inequalities (HIs). Accordingly, the following research question is formulated:

To what extent can the existence of Boko Haram be explained by deep-rooted inequalities in Nigeria?

Using theory on HIs and how through a causal mechanism they can evolve into conflict, this thesis analyses the different dimensions of HIs present in Nigerian society and its historical context to draw conclusions about the emergence of Boko Haram. The starting point of finding a solution to the conflict is a better understanding of the context. Through ‘thick description’

(6)

2. Theoretical framework

2.1 Insurgency and terrorism

According to Kilcullen (2005: 603), the phenomenon of insurgency can be defined as “a popular movement that seeks to overthrow the status quo through subversion, political activity, insurrection, armed conflict and terrorism”, whilst terrorism is “politically motivated violence against non-combatants with the intention to coerce through fear”. The concept of terrorism fits the idea of Gallie’s ‘essentially contested concept’ (Weinberg et al. 2014: 778). In other words, there are difficulties involved in articulating a single definition that can gain wide agreement from scholars (idem: 777). From Kilcullen’s definitions, terrorism can be seen as a popular strategy employed by insurgent movements (ibid.).

Boko Haram has expressed its rejection to the status quo and actively uses violent tactics in order to provide an alternative (Forest 2012: 75). Following Kilcullen’s distinction between terrorism and insurgency, Boko Haram can clearly be categorised as an insurgent movement that uses violent tactics as a politico-military strategy (Kilcullen 2005: 606). Classifying Boko Haram as an insurgent movement instead of a terrorist organisation, has a number of important consequences for the analysis. Firstly, terrorists are seen as misfits within society with psychological or moral problems (idem: 605). Both the methods as well as the objectives of terrorists are unreasonable and irrational (ibid.). Following this perspective, terrorism therefore is a law-enforcement problem. In contrast to terrorism, insurgencies are seen to represent grievances and important issues within society (ibid.). Whereas the violent methods are unacceptable, the objectives of insurgent movements based on grievances can be legitimate. Following this perspective, insurgency is a problem of the government in which insurgent movements aim to overthrow the established order (ibid.).

2.2 The connection between state fragility and insurgency

Since 9/11, the idea that weak or failed states are more susceptible to violence has become more prominent (Marshall 2008: 1). Former U.S. President Bush once stated that “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones” (The White House 2002: 1). State weakness can be defined as “when countries lack the essential capacity and/or will to fulfil four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from violent

(7)

(Rice and Patrick 2008: 3). The failed state thesis explains that when a state is unable to fulfil the above-mentioned responsibilities, this can lead to politically motivated violence. According to Fearon and Laitin (2003: 77), ‘financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments’ favour insurgency and civil war. Weak states also provide large number of potential disaffected and unstable recruits (Underhill 2014: 28). The situation of a political vacuum that characterises the weak state, creates a stimulating environment for insurgent groups. In this vacuum, insurgent groups can provide security, economic support and other forms of protection to citizens that are usually offered by the government (ibid.).

The categories of the failing and failed state follow from the idea of state weakness. Failing states are similar to weak states, however the issues that the failing state is facing are more pressing (Underhill 2014: 20). Studies on state weakness often place states along a continuum of consolidated, fragile/weak, failing and failed/collapsed statehood (Lambach and Debiel 2010: 160). It is important to acknowledge that the concept of the failed state brings with some conceptual and operational problems. There is no agreed upon definition of the failed state and it contains specific assumptions on what a successful state should look like (ibid.). Therefore, this thesis uses a different, more comprehensive theory. Nevertheless, the inability of the government to include different subgroups in society is taken into account, which is why the concept of state fragility is examined in the theoretical framework.

2.3 Common explanations of the Boko Haram insurgency

There are many explanations and theories for why people join extremist groups; the causes are multi-faceted (Vike-Freiberga and Neumann 2015). Insurgency cannot be attributed to a single grievance or causative factor (Underhill 2014: 29). Due to the interrelatedness and complexity of various explanations, this thesis aims to put the conflict in historical perspective and provide context to the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency. Besides the ‘religious terrorism’ argument and the ‘failed-state theory’, there are a few more arguments that need to be addressed when assessing the rise of Boko Haram.

2.3.1 Poverty and conflict

Poverty is often assumed to be a root cause of terrorism. Former U.S. President Obama once argued that “extremely poor societies (…) provide optimal breeding grounds for disease, terrorism and conflicts” (The Economist 2010). In this view, poverty is related to underdevelopment and weak governance, which together can potentially provide a breeding space in which conflict can emerge (Newman 2007: 466). However, to see poverty as a direct

(8)

cause of terrorism is too simplistic. Research has frequently pointed out that active supporters of terrorist organisations are often not uneducated or poor (Meotti 2016). On contrary, terrorist leaders tend to be relatively wealthy and well educated (O’Neill 2002: 7). Furthermore, many poor countries do not experience terrorism, whereas there are wealthy democracies that suffer from terrorism (ibid.). To conclude, the relationship between poverty and conflict is complex. Terrorist organizations need management and technological skills that are found in the upper and middle classes, but also require soldiers that usually come from poorer backgrounds (idem: 8). Poverty in itself is thus not a sufficient explanation for conflict.

2.3.2 Economic motivations and opportunities

The greed vs. grievance dichotomy, juxtaposing ‘loot-seeking’ with ‘justice-seeking’ (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003: 2), is well-known within conflict studies. Especially Collier and Hoeffler have emphasised the explanatory power of economic variables, which they relate to as opportunities. According to Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 588), civil wars start when rebel groups are financially viable. These findings are based upon narrowly defined proxies for greed and grievances. For example, the indicator ‘male secondary education enrolment’ is used to examine the cost of rebellion. However, the inability to access education can also be related to grievances. The distinction between greed and grievances is not so stark and neither can fully account for the emergence of conflicts. Economic aspects will be taken into account, but through a different theory discussed later in the theoretic framework.

2.3.3 Relative Deprivation Theory

Scholars have repeatedly researched the connection between inequality and conflict but failed to find whether there is a relationship and if so, what the underlying causal mechanism is (Østby 2008: 145). A more traditional theory about the inequality-conflict nexus is the relative deprivation theory developed by Gurr. Relative deprivation can be defined as “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970: 13). In other words, people become dissatisfied if they feel they have less than they should and could have, which can lead to frustration and rebellion against the source of this deprivation (Agbiboa 2013: 150). According to Gurr (1970: 12-13), “the primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors”. The notion of relative deprivation is in line with the idea that inequality is a root cause of conflict, but fails to take the collective aspect of deprivation into account and lacks focus on intergroup inequalities (Cederman et al. 2011: 479). Although the relative deprivation theory

(9)

lacks empirical evidence, it remains one of the most important theoretical explanations that links deprivation grievances to violent conflict (ibid.).

2.4 Horizontal inequalities

Collier and Hoeffler (2004) have expressed criticism towards the relative deprivation theory and stress the ubiquity of grievances (Cederman et al. 2011: 479); all over the world grievances are present, however this does not always lead to conflict. Fearon and Laitin (2003) have also presented findings that are not in line with the relative deprivation theory. Both of the above mentioned studies are based on individual-level statistical proxies for inequality such as the Gini coefficient (Cederman et al. 2011: 480). The idea from these studies that inequality does not increase the risk of civil war, might be based on false assumptions and indicators. Østby for example argues that these large-N studies that show that inequality has no relationship with civil war, neglect the group aspect of inequality (ibid.). Inequalities that overlap with other cleavages may result in intensified grievances and group cohesion among the relatively deprived (ibid.). According to Cederman et al. grievance-based arguments have found little support because vertical inequalities, instead of horizontal inequalities, are measured (2013: 3).

Inequality can be conceptualized as a “structural, asymmetric condition governing social relations among actors” (Cederman et al. 2013: 20). Stewart, Østby and other scholars have developed the concept of horizontal inequalities (HIs). HIs occur when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways, for example by culture, race, religion or language (Østby 2008: 143; Stewart 2008: 3). HIs can be differentiated from vertical inequalities, which are disparities on the individual level (Langer and Stewart 2013: 2). There are four different dimensions of HIs that are relevant to every society: economic, social, cultural status and political HIs (Stewart 2008: 13).

Economic HIs refer to inequalities in the ownership of assets and inequalities of incomes and employment opportunities (Langer et al. 2007: 3). The unequal distribution of assets can take place in various forms such as: unequal ownership of land, privately owned capital, government infrastructure, aid and natural resources (Stewart 2008: 15). Furthermore, economic HIs can be recognised in the form of unequal incomes, government employment, private employment, ‘elite’ employment and unemployment (ibid.). Social HIs refer to inequalities in access to social services. Social HIs can be assessed by looking at education opportunities, access to health services, safe water and housing (ibid.). HIs related to cultural

(10)

status refer to differences in recognition and hierarchical status of cultural norms, customs and practices of different groups (ibid.). Elements of this dimension are national holidays, respect for cultural sites and respect for cultural behaviour (Stewart 2008: 15). The political dimension of HIs refers to inequalities in the distribution of political opportunities and power (Langer et al. 2007: 3). Political HIs are expressed in the participation within government and the representation of groups in the army or police (ibid.). The different dimensions of HIs are causally connected to each other. Inequalities in political power for example often lead to socio-economic inequalities (idem: 13). How grievances can eventually lead to conflict will be discussed in the subsequent section.

2.5 Causal mechanism: from HIs to grievances to conflict

Figure 3: Causal Mechanism: The Process through which Conflict emerges from HIs via Grievances. Adapted from Cederman et al. (2013: 36).

HIs can be measured objectively, whilst grievances are intersubjective experiences which are difficult to measure (Cederman et al. 2011: 481). But through what mechanism do HIs lead to conflict? For inequalities to convert to grievances, they have to be politicized (Cederman et al. 2013: 37-51). It is important to note that this is not a deterministic model: not all inequalities lead to grievances and not all grievances result in violent conflict (idem: 37). The explanation from Cederman et al. shows a likely causal mechanism between HIs and conflict, which is valuable for this analysis. The following section will shortly discuss the causal path underlying the empirical link between HIs and conflict.

There are four essential steps in the transformation process from HIs to grievances. Firstly, there has to be some kind of group identification process. Group-level inequalities will not develop into grievances unless the groups themselves are perceived by, and identified with,

(11)

a considerable part of the affected population (Cederman et al. 2013: 37). Secondly, the process to grievances involves a relational setting in which members of groups compare their status and power to other groups (idem: 39). Both real or imagined inequalities in group position or economic status will make grievances more likely (ibid.). After that, there has to be some sort of evaluation of the injustice by the deprived group. Inequalities can either be accepted or identified as unfair. The last step is framing and the attribution of blame, concerning who can be held responsible for the mistreatment. Often, an irresponsible government can be held accountable, especially when it concerns the unequal distribution of natural resources or other economic HIs (idem: 43).

The politicized HIs can spread to such an extent that conflict is triggered. Cederman et al. explain that grievances in society become an important factor in the mobilization and recruitment process (2013: 46). Organizational and cognitive factors are central to mobilization, but emotions and grievances also play an important role (ibid.). If the government subsequently fails to respond to the demands of the deprived group or repress the group violently, this political mobilisation is likely to become more violent (Stewart 2008: 13-14). Furthermore, rebels need to turn the blame on the government into actions and demands to reform the status quo (Cederman et al. 2013: 48). Regime types that continually exclude certain marginalised groups and are willing to pursue violent behaviour, tend to create situations in which grievances are deepened and radical groups can thrive (ibid.).

(12)

3. Methodology

3.1 Qualitative case study: ‘Thick description’

To explore the underlying root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency, this thesis will take a qualitative case study methodology. A qualitative case study design allows the researcher to explore a phenomenon in context. According to Bromley, case study research begins with the desire to derive an in-depth understanding of a single or small number of ‘cases’ set in their real-world contexts (Bromley 1986: 1). Yin (2012: 4), a scholar who wrote extensively about case studies, argues that context is integral to the understanding of the case and that case study research often goes beyond the study of isolated variables. The case study design brings with it some methodological weaknesses. Because this thesis is a study of a single case, it poses some difficulties with the external validity. In other words, the results from this thesis cannot easily be generalised to wider phenomena (Bryman 2012: 69). Case study research is however able to connect theory with observations and context which provides high internal validity and make an intensive examination of a single case (idem: 71).

The term ‘thick description’ was first coined by Ryle in 1968 and later popularized by Geertz (1973: 6). The term has been widely used as a qualitative method, especially in anthropology and sociology research. Thick description is a research method that (1) gives the context of an act; (2) states the intentions and meanings that organize the action; (3) traces the evolution and development of the act; and (4) presents the action as a text that can then be interpreted. A ‘thin description’ simply reports facts, independent of intentions or circumstances that surround an action (Denzin 1989: 33). Terrorism and insurgencies are often a symptom of a wider social, economic and political discontent as opposed to a single problem to be solved (Dalacoura 2009: 133). Therefore, ‘thick description’ is used to answer the research question and show that context and history matter to the emergence of Boko Haram.

3.2 Operationalisation and data collection

In order to answer the research question, the theoretical considerations from the framework have to be complemented with empirical evidence. Since HIs are multidimensional, it is important to capture all four dimensions (Langer et al. 2007: 3). Studies of conflict and inequality are often hampered by the lack of available data (Cederman et al. 2013: 100). In the case of Nigeria and Boko Haram, it can be difficult to find specific data on HIs, especially data that includes ethnic or religious variables. In Nigeria, the geopolitical zones are defined by

(13)

specific ethnic and religious features. Therefore, this thesis uses a variety of data sources that are classified per geopolitical zone.

To measure economic HIs, the variable ‘GDP per capita per zone’ is used from the UNDP Human Development Report Nigeria (UNDP 2009: 38). Added to that, two poverty measures are used: ‘the dollar-a-day’ measure, including all individuals whose daily expenditure is less than a dollar using the exchange rate of naira to dollar in 2009, and ‘the absolute poverty’ measure, which considers a standard of minimal requirements necessary to afford minimal standards of food, clothing, healthcare and shelter (NBS 2010: 10). The data from these two poverty measures is taken from the Poverty Profile Nigeria from the NBS (2010). The last variable is ‘unemployment’, using data from the CWIQ Survey (NBS 2006: 4) and from the Social Statistics in Nigeria Report (NBS 2012: 41)1. For the social dimension of HIs, the variables of ‘education’ and ‘literacy’ per geopolitical zone are investigated using data from the Demographic and Health Survey (NPC 2013: 23-25). Furthermore, the health variables ‘non-vaccinated children’ and ‘maternal mortality’ are included based on data from the CWIQ Survey (NBS 2006: 4) and Mustapha (2007: 5). Lastly, the all-round poverty measure MPI is added to the analysis because it encompasses data on education, health and living standards, which are all elements of social HIs. This data is retrieved from the OPHI (2017: 6). For the investigation of the cultural dimension, a different approach is taken due to the lack of numerical data. First of all, certain parts of the Constitution are analysed in order to determine whether Nigeria is a secular state and if any religious or cultural groups are systematically oppressed. Subsequently, the official public holidays are examined and data on media attention for the different cultural groups is used from CRISE (Langer et al: 2007: 9). This data is supplemented with historical facts. Lastly, the political dimension is investigated using variables that are slightly outdated. However due to lack of recent data, the available data was still pursued. The used variables ‘ethno-regional tendencies in the staffing of all bureaucracy (mid 1990s)’, the ‘ethnic composition of various cabinets (1960-2004)’ and the ‘ethnic distribution of important portfolios (1960-2004)’ originate from a CRISE research written by Mustapha (2007: 7).

1 The data for single states from the Social Statistics in Nigeria report (NBS 2012: 41) had to be converted into data for the geopolitical zones. This was done by adding the percentages of the states within the zone and divide them by the number of states per zone for the average. The averages of the zones are compared with the national average. The calculations can be found in Appendix A. The zones with unemployment rates above national average are highlighted in blue.

(14)

The last paragraph of the analysis will link the discovered HIs to the historical context of colonialism and link the various steps of causal mechanism from Cederman et al. to quotes from Boko Haram members. These quotes are retrieved from three online news outlets: The Vanguard (2012), VOA news (Murdock 2012) and Sahara Reporters (2012). One quote is taken from an academic article written by Cook (2011: 15).

(15)

4. Background to the conflict

4.1 Nigeria: a brief historical overview

4.1.1 Nigeria’s diversity

The Federal Republic of Nigeria is one of the most ethnic diverse countries in the world. There are limited reliable statistics on the number of ethnic groups in Nigeria (Mustapha 2006: 1); it is often said that Nigeria has 250 ethnic groups, whilst some have estimated that there are over 400 different groups (ibid.). Sociologist Otite composed a list of 374 different ethnic groups (ibid.). Despite the lack of consensus about the specific number of ethnic groups, it is clear that Nigeria’s ethnic diverse population can be separated into majority and minority groups (ibid.). There are three main ethnic groups that make up the majority of the population: the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the Southwest and the Igbo in the Southeast (Anugwom 2000: 66.). These geographic areas are however not solely occupied by the three major ethnic groups: there is a plethora of smaller ethnic groups that are living next to each other (ibid.). Since the independence from Great Britain, English has been the official language in Nigeria, though there are over 250 different indigenous languages spoken by Nigerians (Falola and Heaton 2008: 4).

4.1.2 The colonial era

The borders of the contemporary nation of Nigeria were established when the British colonialists unified the northern and southern protectorates of Nigeria (Falola and Heaton 2008: 6). Great Britain ruled the country from roughly 1900 to 1960 through indirect rule (ICG 2010: 4). The pre-colonial territory contained several politically autonomous societies such as the Sokoto Caliphate in the North, the Oyo and Benin Empires in the South and the Kanem-Borno Empire in the Northeast (Mustapha 2006: 1). These societies ruled themselves as independent states, whilst some other states were governed by decentralized political structures of chiefs and local councils (Falola and Heaton 2008: 6). The British system of indirect rule allowed local elites and chiefs to maintain their authority while under the condition of obeying the authority of a central apparatus of Great Britain (idem: 7).

The colonial rule has resulted in lasting impacts on the structure of contemporary Nigeria. Firstly, the British colonialist merged what had before been a myriad of autonomous and diverse groups under one single administration and by this formed the basis of the diverse nation of Nigeria (Falola and Heaton 2008: 7). The British often misunderstood the existing traditional structures in society. Added to that, uneven development in the North and the South,

(16)

mainly in education, characterizes the British domination in Nigeria (Stokke 270: 18). When the British colonial rule ended in 1960, Nigeria’s future looked bright (Falola and Heaton 2008: 158). At the time, Nigeria was already the most populous country in Africa and the economic prospects were promising because of the discovery of oil reserves (ibid.). However, the first decades after Nigeria’s independence in 1960 were characterised by violent conflict over the control of state resources between the different regions (ICG 2010: i).

4.2 Evolvement of Boko Haram

The name Boko Haram can be roughly translated to: ‘to forbid everything western and western education’ (Adegbulu 2013: 266). Although Western media often portray Boko Haram as solely against Western education, the insurgent group has proclaimed that Boko Haram means “Western civilisation is forbidden”. Following the same statement, Boko Haram “believes in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is broader and, it includes education but not determined by Western education” (Vanguard 2009). There is some dissent about the exact time the group was formed and by whom. Some state that Boko Haram was founded in the mid-1990s by Abubakar Lawan from Kano in northern Nigeria (Otoghile and Igbafe 2014: 99). Many others appoint the establishment of Boko Haram to Muhammad Yusuf in the early 2000s in Maiduguri. Boko Haram was then often referred to as the ‘Yusufiyya’, named after Yusuf (ibid.). Boko Haram’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati

wal-Jihad meaning ‘people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and Jihad’

(Sergie and Johson 2015). The mission of Boko Haram is to establish an Islamic state where an orthodox version of Islam is practiced following strict Sharia law (Onuoha 2012: 2).

Violent uprisings started in 2009 after members of the group refused to adhere to a motorbike helmet law. This refusal led to strong police tactics that resulted in armed uprisings in the northern states. Yusuf and other group members were arrested and shot (Sergie and Johnson 2015). After the extrajudicial murder of Yusuf, the group became more violent under the lead of Yusuf’s successor Abubakar Shekau (Olanyin and Asuelime 2017: 87). In September 2010, Boko Haram members attacked the Bauchi prison, liberating 721 prisoners including roughly 100 members of their group (Cook 2011: 12). Boko Haram attacks continued more violently, often aimed at innocent civilians (Sergie and Johnson 2015). Although since 2015 Boko Haram has been increasingly denied territorial control, guerrilla-based attacks continue to take place (Foucher 2016). Boko Haram remains to have an enormous influence in the north of Nigeria (Sergie and Johnson 2015).

(17)

5. Analysis

5.1 Identification of relevant groups

To examine whether HIs contributed to the establishment of Boko Haram, first the relevant deprived groups have to be identified. The sharp North-South divide often plays a central role in discussions about disunity in Nigeria. Perceiving Nigeria as two monolithic blocks however ignores the enormous diversity within the North and South (Hoffman 2014: 5). Despite that, broad differences based on ethnicity and religion between the North and South are detectable and can therefore provide a fundament for this analysis. The 19 states located in the North-East, North-West and North-Central zone are currently classified as ‘northern’ (ibid.)2. Boko Haram is mainly active in the North-East, and to a lesser extent in the North-West and some states in the Middle Belt (Mahmood 2013: 3)3. The examination of HIs in Nigeria will be focused on a comparison between the northern and southern states in relation to the colonial era. The North-East zone will be paid particular attention as this is where Boko Haram originates from. The subsequent paragraphs analyse the different dimensions of HIs between the North and South. After that, a paragraph will give the historical context of the British colonial legacy and connect this to HIs come to construct the causal mechanism.

5.2 Economic HIs

Nigeria’s recent economic gains have gone hand in hand with rising inequalities and high unemployment rates across the country. It seems that the Nigeria’s contemporary wealth is not reaching the poor (Hoffman 2014: 16). Data on geographic economic prosperity are limited. According to research from UNDP, there is a wide spatial variation in GDP per capita among the geopolitical zones (2009: 38). In 2009, The South-South4 zone had the largest GDP per capita of $3,617.4, followed by the North-Central with $1,898.9, the North-West with $1,320.3 and the South-West with $1,309.9. The North-East and the South-East rank at the bottom if it comes to GDP per capita with $343.3 and $297.2 respectively (ibid.). These two zones can be regarded as underdeveloped. Following data on GDP per state it shows that especially Rivers State and Lagos state have high economic activity (ibid.). More than 65% of all commercial

2 The history of Nigeria’s states is complex. The inclusion of the states in the North-Central zone to the ‘northern’ area is often debated and resisted by communities living in the area.

3 For a clear visual representation of the six geopolitical states of Nigeria and the geographical spread of Boko Haram related violence, see figure 1 and 2 on the first pages of this thesis.

(18)

activities and approximately 60% of non-oil economy take place in Lagos (Adelekan 2010 433). The distribution of wealth within Nigeria is closely related to oil: revenues from oil compose 75% of budgetary revenues and 95% of exports in Nigeria, and the oil reserves are mainly located in the South (World Bank 2013: 17).

The economic regional disparities also become apparent when examining different poverty measures. In 2010, 70.4% of the population in the North-West and 69.1% of the population in the North-East live on less than a dollar a day (NBS 2010: 8). Although there is a difference between the northern and southern zones, the percentage of the population that lives on less than a dollar a day are also shocking. In the more developed South-South zone, 56.1% live on less than a dollar a day (ibid.). The absolute poverty measure again shows regional disparity; the North-West and North-East zones have the highest rates at 70% and 69% respectively, whilst the South-West has the lowest rate of 49.8% (idem: 5).

The last measure that will be used is unemployment within the different geopolitical zones. According to data from 2006, the South-South zone has the highest unemployment rate with 8.8%, followed by the South-East with 6.8% and the South-West with 5.5% (NBS 2006: 4). The North-Central zone has an unemployment rate of 5.1%, the North-East 3.9% and the North-West 2.2% (ibid.). Besides unemployment, there is also under-employment5 (idem: 2). The southern states have an average of 22.3% whilst the northern states have an average of 17.8% under-employed citizens. More recent data from the NBS of unemployment in the years 2007-2011, show that in all the years except for 2008, the unemployment rates in the North-East are higher than the annual average (NBS 2012: 41; Appendix A). The South-South zone also scores above the national average in the years 2007-2010.

5.2.1 Findings

The data on GDP per capita and poverty point towards regional economic disparities within Nigeria. In particular, the North-East has a relatively low GDP per capita compared to other geopolitical zones. The other northern states have a higher GDP per capita and the South-South has the largest GDP per capita. The economic regional disparities become more apparent when examining poverty: the North-West and North-East zones both score high on the absolute poverty measure and the dollar-a-day measure, revealing the discrepancy between the North and South. The variable ‘unemployment’ seem to be less relevant for the analysis of HIs because it is a problem in different states across the country. The detected economic

(19)

inequalities can lead to strong feelings of deprivation and grievance in the North, which can consequently lead to conflict following the causal dynamics from Cederman et al. (2013). Unemployment can still in other ways contribute to the persistence of the conflict, for example through the wide availability of unemployed youth that are recruited by Boko Haram.

5.3 Social HIs

Access to education is an important element within the social dimension of HIs. The Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey of 2013 presents data on educational attainment per geopolitical zone but also separate women and men age 15-49. Both women’s and men’s educational attainment differs among the zones. In the North-East zone, 64.4% of women and 44.7% of men have not attended education. In the North-West zone, 69.4% of women and 39.0% of men have not attended education. In the Middle Belt zone, the rates are a little lower; 31.6% of women and 12.5% of men have no education (NPC 2013: 23-25). These rates of ‘no education’ contrasts stark with the southern states; the lowest percentage of ‘no education’ is in the South-South zone (women 5.0%; men 1.1%), followed by the South-East (women 5.3%; men 1.3%) and the South-West (women 8.4%; men 5.3%). The educational imbalance also appears in the adult literacy rates6. The North-East zone has the lowest adult literacy rate with 42.2%, followed by the North-West with 54.5% (NBS 2006: 4). The southern states have a significant higher literacy rate with an average of 77.6%7 (ibid.). The educational inequalities have also led to lower economic activity and inequalities in manpower in northern zones. For example, in 2003, the North had 10% of all engineers, 15% of all professors, and 8% of all bank executives (Adamu 2003: 15).

The healthcare aspect of social HIs is based on the percentage of non-vaccinated children and maternal mortality numbers. The North-East and North-West zones have a relative high percentage of non-vaccinated children, 24.5% and 30.2% respectively. These percentages contrast sharply with the 9.0% in the South-West and 5.2% in the South-East (NBS 2006: 4). Conflict can have devastating effect on the healthcare facilities. However, when examining data from before the Boko Haram conflict, the discrepancy between the North and South was already present. In 1995-1996, 60.7% of the children in the East and 65.9% in the North-West was non-vaccinated. The percentages of non-vaccinated children in the South-East and

6 Following the definition from the CWIQ Survey, adult literacy is defined for persons aged 15 years and above who could read and write in any language (NBS 2006: 2).

(20)

South-West were lower, with 29% and 29.1% respectively. The South-South presents an exception with a high percentage of 56.9% of non-vaccinated children (ibid.). Maternal mortality numbers also show regional disparities between the North and South: on 100,000 births, the maternal mortality rate of the North-East is the highest with 1549 deaths, followed by the North-West with 1025 deaths (Mustapha 2007: 5). This whilst the maternal mortality in the South-East and the South-West is much lower, respectively 286 and 165. These numbers reveal that the maternal mortality rate in the North-East is 9 times as high as the South-West (ibid.).

5.3.1 Findings

The data on educational attainment, literacy, maternal mortality and non-vaccinated children, reveal the presence of social HIs. The numbers on educational attainment as well as literacy in the North-East and North-West zones show a stark contrast to the southern states. The data on healthcare also present disparities between the North and South. In comparison to the southern zones, the North-East and North-West zones both have high percentages of non-vaccinated children, as well as high maternal mortality rates. The findings in the section above can be confirmed with data from the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). The MPI measures poverty in three dimensions: education, health and living standards (OPHI 2017: 1). According to the MPI, those identified as ‘vulnerable to poverty’ are deprived in 20%-33% of the weighted indicators, and those identifies as ‘severe poverty’ are deprived in 50% or more. According to this indicator, the North-East and the North-West zones can both be identified as severely poor. The disparities between the North and South become very evident when analysing the MPI per state; all states in the North-East and North-West, except for Adamawa, have high MPI values and are classified as poor. The southern states are substantially less poor according to the MPI (ibid.). The MPI validates the earlier findings of strong social HIs between the North and South.

5.4 Cultural HIs

By declaring a state religion, practices and traditions of cultural groups are inherently recognized differently by the state. Therefore, state religion is an important aspect to examine within the cultural dimension of HIs (Langer and Brown 2008: 42). Although the 1999 Constitution does not literally mention secularity, indirectly it seems that the Constitution indicates no specific state religion. Art. 10 of the Constitution states that “the Government of the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State religion” (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999: 8). Art. 38 strengthens the secular position of the state which states that “every

(21)

person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (…)” (idem: 22). The secularity of the Nigerian state is nonetheless subject of an ongoing debate: some claim that because ‘secular’ is not directly mentioned, Nigeria is not secular (Adimekwe and Ziebertz 2018: 184). Also, Art. 275 and Art. 280 complicate the debate; respectively, these provisions support the creation of both Sharia Courts and Customary Courts of Appeal in the federations (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999: 103-105). Though the Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, Art. 275 and Art. 280 have resulted in a judicial divide in Nigeria: common law in the South and Sharia-based penal code in the North (Adimekwe and Ziebertz 2018: 184).

Jama’atu Nasril Islam, an umbrella organization for the Muslim community, once

argued that the political system of Nigeria is based on Western civilization ideas, which are predominantly Christian (Ogbu 2014: 18). Furthermore, the national legal system is based on the English common law and is loaded with Christian ideals and traditions (ibid.). According to Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Nigeria needs to be ‘de-Christianized’ in order to be secular. One example given by the organization was that Sunday in Nigeria is work-free and known to be a rest day, whilst Friday, which for Muslims is a day for special prayers, does not have the same status (Eze and Ezedikachi 2016: 4). When examining the public holidays, which represent recognition and support of ethno-cultural practices, it seems that both some Islamic and Christian holidays are public. Easter and Christmas, as well as Id el Fitri and Id el Kabir, are declared as public holidays (Public Holidays Global 2017). Despite that, tensions about the designated public holidays remain. For example, New Year’s Day is a national holiday, whilst the government does not recognize the start of the Islamic New Year, which is a local holiday only celebrated in a few states (ibid.).

Amongst many of the Muslim community, there is a shared feeling of marginalization of Islamic law and traditions in the Western-oriented construction of the Nigerian state (Ogbu 2014: 18). To add another layer to this feeling of oppression, there are many minority groups that experience a deep sense of cultural marginalization. Most Boko Haram recruits are from the Kanuri ethnic group (ICG 2017: 9). Kanuri practice Islam but have their own language: Kanuri language (idem: 3). Many minority groups within Nigeria believe that their languages and culture could become extinct in the near future (Langer et al. 2007: 9). According to CRISE studies, ethnic minority issues are not often given media attention except when something negative happens: the three major ethnic groups, Yoruba, Igbo and Fulani, account for 95% of the media coverage whilst the hundreds of other groups share 5% of the coverage (idem: 8).

(22)

5.4.1 Findings

The data on cultural HIs shows that although there is no explicit cultural oppression towards one ethnic group, there is a deep feeling of cultural marginalization amongst the Muslim community and ethnic minorities within Nigeria as a result of the Western-oriented political system and the tripodal Yoruba-Igbo-Fulani domination. This feeling of marginalization follows the geographical dimension of inequality: the North-South divide. Cultural tensions are defined by the on-going debate about the secularity of the state and the designated public holidays. Direct cultural oppression is not always required. In this case, perceived Western-dominated culture and the fear of being marginalised provides enough basis for grievances to develop.

5.5 Political HIs

Nigeria introduced specific formal measures and institutions to manage its plural society and address issues of ethnic representation in the public sector. The Federal Character Principle became officially recognised in the 1979 Constitution and is purposed to address the challenges of inequity (Joshua et al. 2014: 1). The principle is defined as “the distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion (…)” (Federal Ministry of Justice 1999: 121). The Quota System is another formal measure, which is often confused with the Federal Character Principle, and aims to facilitate equal representation of different ethnic groups within the public sector (Joshua et al. 2014: 3).

There is limited data available for recent ethno-regional tendencies within federal institutions. However, the Quota System was already used before Nigeria’s independence in 1960, therefore data from the mid 1990s is still relevant for the analysis. In this period, the North-East (with 13.6% of the total population) had 8.6% in all bureaucracy, followed by the North-West (with 25.6% of the total population) that had 10.4% in all bureaucracy (Mustapha 2007: 7). This whilst the South-West (with 19.7% of the total population) had 24.9% in all the bureaucracy and the South-East (with 11.7% of the total population) had 16% in all the bureaucracy (ibid.). Comparing the percentages of the northern and southern states in the federal bureaucracy, it seems that the Quota System is not strictly followed. According to Mustapha, this ethno-regional structure of the federal bureaucracy was not easily changed,

(23)

which is why the northern strategy included the aim for supremacy in the executive divisions (ibid.).

Data from the ethnic composition of Nigerian cabinets and the distribution of important and less important portfolios in the period from 1960 till 2004 shows the dominance of the Hausa-Fulani and northern minorities. The Hausa Fulani, making up for 29% of the population (CIA 2017), had 60% of the ministers in the cabinet in 1960 (Mustapha 2007: 7). This number decreased but still remained high; in the cabinet of 2004, the Hausa-Fulani accounted for 30% of the ministers. In the period 1960-2004, the Hausa-Fulani ministers were responsible for 33% of the important portfolios (ibid.). In 2004, 15% of the ministers were Igbo (ibid.), whilst the Igbo group accounts for 18% of the population (CIA 2017). The Yoruba, accounting for 21% of the population (ibid.), had 18% of the ministers (Mustapha 2007: 7). Northern minorities are also present in the executive arm of the Federal government. In 1960, the northern minorities did not have any ministers in the cabinet, but the number increased and in 2004, 18% of the ministers where from northern minority groups. Over the period of 1960-2004, the northern minorities took care of 37% of the important portfolios (ibid.). This data is paradoxical with the earlier examined data on ethno-regional tendencies in the Federal bureaucracy.

5.5.1 Findings

Nigeria’s formal measures of federalism have to some extent been successful in ensuring representation of larger ethnic groups. Small ethnic groups have however not been given access to the political arena (Langer et al. 2007: 7). Added to that, many critics state that the Federal State System emphasises Nigeria’s differences instead of enforcing national unity (ibid.). The numbers from the ethno-regional tendencies and the presence of minorities in executive government give some insight but need to be assisted with contextual data about political situation. The subsequent section will provide this context, and that of the other dimensions of HIs.

5.6 Historical context

5.6.1 Education: social and economic progress

Certain elements of the economic and social dimension of HIs can be traced back to the colonial period. The British had the primary goal of extracting natural resources, rather than encouraging local development (Scacco 2013: 326). Nigeria was ruled as two separate protectorates by the British; in the North, the British ruled through the Hausa emirs who kept political power and convinced the British to limit the spread of European culture in the northern

(24)

region. The North was cut off from the spread of Christian, Western education. In contrary to the South, where Christian education and English schooling was permitted (ibid.). The changes in education in the South stimulated the modernization process (Stokke 1970: 18). For example in 1926, northern Nigeria had 125 primary schools whilst the South had 3828 primary schools. The development of secondary education was also hampered in the North: southern Nigeria had 18 schools by 1926, whilst the North had none (ibid.). The number of primary and secondary schools in 1957 increased in the North, but there is still a stark difference between the North and South. The different approaches to colonial rule in regard to education and religion, led to uneven social, economic and political development in the North and South. The distribution of Western education was a crucial factor and is correlated with many other sectors of development (Stokke 1970: 18). For example, by the 1950s, there was only one northerner with a university degree whilst in the South there were substantially more and a few hundred had obtained completed university degrees (Scacco 2013: 327). This in turn resulted in a larger percentage of southerners working within the colonial administration and taking an active role in politics (ibid.). Added to that, investments in infrastructure by the British were primarily to facilitate the exports of local natural resources (idem: 336), and because the oil is concentrated in the South, this area received relatively more investments in infrastructure. Altogether, the North-South divide can partly be attributed to the disparities in development and education under colonial rule.

5.6.2 Cultural and political tensions

The tensions between the northern minority group Kanuri and the Hausa-Fulani can be traced back to the famous Sokoto Caliphate, a large empire formed in 1804-1808 (ICG 2010: i). The Kanuri now live on the lands of the former Kanem-Bornu empire, that resisted the supremacy of the Sokoto Caliphate (Hoffman 2014: 6). This shaped the relationship between the Hausa-Fulani and northern minorities. When in 1903 the British defeated the Sokoto Caliphate, the well-grounded administrative structures of the empire were re-used for indirect rule and local traditional elites were given formal authority by the British (ibid.). This led to the further oppression of northern minorities. A key feature of post-colonial Nigerian politics is the struggle for greater influence and inclusion by various groups that feel deprived. The beginning of the democracy in 1999 brought about important changes in politics and the balance of power between the North and South. The election of Olusegun Obasanjo, from Yoruba in the South-West, characterises the shift of power from the North to the South (Hoffman 2014: 3). This loss of influence in the North can be seen as the context for the revival of demands for an

(25)

expanded role for Islamic law (ibid.). Obasanjo was President from 1999-2007 (Amuwo 2009: 37). Meanwhile, the failure of northern politicians to stay in power for a single four-year term since 1999 fuelled a sense of frustration and discrimination in the North. In 2010, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, Obasanjo’s successor from Katsina state in the North-West, passed away and was succeeded by Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian. This again encouraged the sense of deprivation and political exclusion of the North (Hoffman 2014: 3).

5.6.3 Falsification and causal mechanism

The conflict itself has undoubtedly contributed to worsening the economic situation for many in the North. However, by providing the historical colonial context, the analysis showed that the contemporary HIs are part of a longer-lasting process of marginalisation. Inequalities precede the conflict and not the other way around. Furthermore, certain present-day problems can be connected with the colonial legacy in Nigeria. The merger of the North and South has brought together a divided and ethnically diverse population. Added to that, the construction of the Nigerian state is still determined by Western, colonial influences (Ogbu 2014: 18).

Now the analysis has provided evidence for certain HIs between the North and South, the four essential steps within the causal mechanism will be confirmed through statements from Boko Haram speeches. The first step is ‘group identification’. Boko Haram clearly holds on to the North-South and the Islam-Christianity dichotomy, often using these terms in speeches (Vanguard 2012). Boko Haram also refers to “fellow Muslims” and “protecting our brothers” (ibid.). Secondly, the relational setting in which members of Boko Haram compare status and power to other groups can be confirmed by the statement from 2012: “Christians should convert or they will not know peace again” (Murdock 2012). Thirdly, there has to be some sort of evaluation of the injustice by the deprived group which is clearly outspoken in speeches of Boko Haram. In 2012, Shekau said that “everyone knows what happened to our leader”, referring to the extrajudicial murder of Yusuf (Sahara Reporters 2012). Furthermore, spokesperson Qaqa stated that “poor people are tired of the injustice, people are crying for saviours and they know the messiahs are Boko Haram”. The last essential step in the causal mechanism is ‘framing and attribution of blame’. Boko Haram repeatedly blames Christians and the government. In an ideological statement just after Yusuf’s death, temporary leader Umar stated that “we shall make this country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible leaders of all learnings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria” (Cook 2011: 15).

(26)

Following the causal mechanism from Cederman et al. (2013: 46), the politicized HIs can trigger conflict and form an important factor in mobilization process. The fact that the government responds violently and ignores to listen to the demands of Boko Haram, can account for Boko Haram turning more violent. The continuous exclusion of marginalised groups creates a breeding ground in which radical groups can thrive (idem: 48). Boko Haram essentially aims to reform the status quo by establishing a pseudo state: the Caliphate.

(27)

6. Conclusion

The Boko Haram insurgency is a complex, locally rooted conflict with multiple underlying explanations. The various conflict theories that are incorporated within the theoretical framework, can partly explain why Boko Haram arose. However, many theories do not incorporate the importance of historical context, fail to include inter-group dimensions or take-on a deterministic standpoint. For the examinatitake-on of the emergence of Boko Haram, the Nigerian context is highly relevant. This thesis therefore intends to include the crucial context of inequalities by focusing on to what extent the current inequalities have contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram. To return to the research question ‘To what extent can the existence of Boko Haram be explained by deep-rooted inequalities in Nigeria’, this research concludes that a specific type of inequalities, namely horizontal inequalities, have played an essential role in the emergence of Boko Haram by providing a breeding ground for extremism in the North, and that the origin of HIs can be traced back to the colonial era.

This conclusion is based on the following findings. The North-South divide is characterised by the four different dimensions of HIs. The economic HIs between the North and South are manifested in wide spatial variation in GDP per capita. Data on poverty also show regional disparities; the North-East and North-West have the highest percentages of people living on less than a dollar a day. The analysis also finds that there are stark social HIs. Uneven educational opportunities and access to healthcare characterize the Nigerian society. In addition, there appears to be a deep sense of cultural marginalization amongst the Muslim community and ethnic minorities. Although on paper there is no explicit marginalization, the secularity of the state has been subject of debate. Furthermore, the Constitution supports the creation of different religious courts, creating judicial divide within Nigeria. Lastly, the findings on political HIs show that although the formal measures of federalism have to some extent been successful in ensuring representation of larger ethnic groups, smaller ethnic groups are not represented in politics. The Nigerian state is characterized by complex political tensions between different ethnic groups in the North and South. Furthermore, the contemporary HIs and the North-South divide in Nigeria can be connected to the colonial legacy. It is against the background of the amalgamation and the different colonial policies in northern and southern Nigeria that the current disparities within the country emerged. The findings of this thesis can be illustrated by a quote from Kirk-Greene (1975: 19-20), who describes that “fear has been the constant in every tension and confrontation in political Nigeria. (…) At the economic level,

(28)

as uneven distribution. At the social level, as a threat to traditional values. At the education and manpower level, as inequality of opportunity. And at the level of political leadership, as discrimination and penal measures to coerce and convert”.

The theory of HIs proved to be an all-round model that is suited to tie in the historical context and a range of important contemporary issues. The theory of HIs is however not deterministic: the conflict in Nigeria is complex and cannot be completely unraveled by using a single theory. Further research from a different angle of observation could for example include an emphasis on the post-colonial era and the agency of the Nigerian state in the response to Boko Haram. This thesis undoubtedly shows the importance of the colonial historical context and the four dimensions of HIs for the emergence of Boko Haram. Uncovering the root causes and the country-specific dimensions is an essential part of every conflict resolution effort. Therefore, the methodology of ‘thick description’ is valuable when examining the causes of conflict. In this thesis, finding a way to resolve the Boko Haram insurgency was not the objective. Yet, it shows the importance of unravelling conflicts on a deeper level, and with that the relevance of this thesis becomes apparent. Because only when important political actors understand the origins and the grievances of those who rebel, conflict can be resolved.

(29)

References

Adamu, F. (2003). Globalisation and Economic Globalisation in Northern Nigeria. Sokoto: Usmanu Dan Fodiyo University.

Adegbulu, F. (2013). “Boko Haram: the emergence of a terrorist sect in Nigeria 2009–2013”,

African Identities, 11(3): 260-273.

Adelekan, I.O. (2010). “Vulnerability of poor urban coastal communities to flooding in Lagos, Nigeria”, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 22(2): 433-450.

Adimekwe, M. and Ziebertz, H. (2018). “Attitudes Towards Freedom of Religion Among Nigerian Students”. In: Ziebertz, H. and Sterkens, C. (eds) Religion and Civil Human

Rights in Empirical Perspective, 177-214. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Agbiboa, D.E. (2013). “Why Boko Haram Exists: The Relative Deprivation Perspective”,

African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review, 3(1): 144-157.

Ahokegh, A.F. (2012). “A 21st Century Challenge in Nigeria”, European Scientific Journal, 21(8): 46- 55.

Amuwo, A. (2009). “The Political Economy of Nigeria’s Post-Military Elections, 1999-2007”, Review of African Political Economy, 119: 37-61.

Anugwom, E.E. (2000). “Ethnic Conflict and Democracy in Nigeria: The Marginalisation Question”, Journal of Social Development in Africa, 15(1): 61-78.

Attah, M. O. (1987) “The National Language Problem in Nigeria”, Canadian Journal of

African Studies, 21(3): 393-401.

Awolowo, O. (1947). Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber & Faber.

Ballentine, K. and Nitzschke, H. (2003). Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons from

Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict. London: International Peace

Academy.

BBC (2015). “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants 'technically defeated' – Buhari”,

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618. Consulted on December 1 2017. Bromley, D.B. (1986). The case-study method in psychology and related-disciplines.

Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods: 4th edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cederman, L., Weidmann, N.B., Gleditsch, K.S. (2011). “Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison”, American Political Science

(30)

Cederman, L., Gleditsch, K.S., Buhaug, H. (2013). Inequality, Grievances and Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(CIA) Central Intelligence Agency (2017). “The World Factbook: Field listing: Ethnic groups”,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. Consulted on January 4 2018.

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). “Greed and grievance in civil war”, Oxford Economic

Paper, 56: 563-595.

Cook, D. (2011). Boko Haram: A Prognosis. Houston: James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy Rice University.

Dalacoura, K. (2009). “Middle East area studies and terrorism studies: establishing links via a critical approach”. In: Jackson, R., Smyth, M.B. and Gunning, J. (eds) Critical

Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, 124-138. London/New York: Routledge.

Denzin. N.K. (1989). Interpretative interactionism. Newbury Park: Sage Publications Inc. Eze, M. and Ezedikachi, N. (2016). “A Critique of Nigeria Federal System of Government

and Particularly its Implication in the Country as a Secular State”, Journal of

Research in Humanities and Social Science, 4(12): 1-6.

Falola, T. and Heaton, M.M. (2008). A History of Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, J.D. and Laitin, D.D. (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, American

Political Science Review, 87(1): 75-90.

Federal Ministry of Justice (1999). Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Justice.

Forest, J.F. (2012). Confronting the terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Tampa: JSOU. Foucher, V. (2016). “Boko Haram is losing ground – but will not be defeated by weapons

alone”, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/may/13/boko-haram-losing-ground-will-not-be-defeated-by-weapons-alone-lake-chad-basin-summit. Consulted on December 20 2017.

Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.

Gunning, J. and Jackson, R. (2011). “What’s so ‘religious’ about ‘religious terrorism’?”,

Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4(3): 369-388.

Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hoffman, L.K. (2014). Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern

(31)

(ICG) International Crisis Group (2010). Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict. Dakar/Brussels: ICG.

(ICG) International Crisis Group (2017). Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond

Counter-insurgency. Brussels: ICG.

Joshua, S., Loromeke, R.E. and Olanrewaju, I. P. (2014). “Quota System, Federal Character Principle and Admission to Federal Unity Schools: Barriers to Learning in Nigeria”,

International Journal of Interdisciplinary and Multidisciplinary Studies (IJIMS), 2(2):

1-10.

Kilcullen, D.J. (2005). “Countering Global Insurgency”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(4): 597-617.

Kirk-Greene, A.H.M. (1975). The Genesis of the Nigerian Civil War and the Theory of Fear. Uppsala: Nordic African Institute.

Lambach, D. and Debiel, T. (2010). “State failure and state building”. In: Cavelty, M.D. and Mauer, V. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies, 159-168. Oxon/New York: Routledge.

Langer, A. and Brown, G.K. (2008). “Cultural Status Inequalities: An Important Dimension of Group Mobilization”. In: Stewart, F. (ed). Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict:

Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies, 41-52. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan.

Langer, A., Mustapha, A.R., Stewart, F. (2007). Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana

and Côte d’Ivoire: Issues and Policies. Oxford: CRISE, Department of International

Development.

Langer, A. and Stewart, F. (2013). Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: Conceptual

and Empirical Linkages. Leuven: Centre for Research on Peace and Development

(CRPD).

Mahmood, O.S. (2013). HSPI Issue Brief Series Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria: No Easy

Fix. Washington D.C.: Navanti Group.

Marshall, M.G. (2008). Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing Sources of

Systemic Risk. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Murdock, H. (2012). “Boko Haram Warns Christians to Convert or ‘Not Know Peace Again’”,

https://www.voanews.com/a/boko_haram_warns_christians_to-convert_or_not_know_peace_again/1382033.html. Consulted on January 8 2018. Mustapha, A.R. (1986). “The National Question and Radical Politics in Nigeria”, Review of

Referenties

GERELATEERDE DOCUMENTEN

sediment transport patterns of varying water levels, SPAW size and location, and nearshore bar geometry.. Due to computational time limitations only initial sedimentation and

However, research indicates that individuals have a tendency to present themselves favourably with respect to social norms and standards (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). This means

The research therefore submits that reading 2 Samuel 11:1-27 in the context of the theology of the Deuteronomistic History raises an awareness and understanding of why patriarchy,

32 See Rautenbach and Goolam (eds) Legal Pluralism 67. 33 The wife tried to negotiate a khula agreement, and also approached various Muslim authorities, such as the

Models 1 until 6 provide the results of the regression estimation of winsorized (at the 5% level) Return on Equity (W_ROE), winsorized (at the 5% level) Return on

No other information about internal governance structures, Audit Committees or responsibilities of the state-level governing body or the Board of Trustees is available on

[r]

April and early May, the high peaks in the late afternoon in- dicate missing primary emissions, which also contribute (or their oxidation products) to the missing reactivity in the