Cumulative Extremism in Western-Europe: The Breivik and Enschede cases

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June 9, 2019

Cumulative Extremism in Western-Europe

The Breivik and Enschede cases

Master Thesis Crisis & Security Management Institute of Security & Global Affairs

Author: Thomas Pels – S1508881 Supervisor: Bart Schuurman

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1. Introduction: terror of fear

Various acts of terrorism have shook the world over the last few decades. The phenomenon of terrorism is not new but it has gained much attention in politics and academia over the last decades, especially since the events of 9/11 (Engene 2007: 109). Various terrorist attacks, with various perpetrators, have taken place in Europe throughout the last decades, but attacks by Islamist extremists seem to gain the most attention of politicians, academia and the public. The activity of Islamist extremists in Europe has grown over the last ten years (Nesser 2014: 449). In 2017 for example, the frequency and lethality of Islamist extremist violence was three times as high as each year in the 1990s (START 2018: 1).1_{A rise in terrorist activity has}

urged governments to focus on the mitigation and prevention of terrorist attacks. Here it should be considered that the threat of violent extremism does not just stem from Islamist extremists, but from a wide range of groups that adhere to various ideologies (Mirahmadi 2016: 129).

As the threat of violent extremism or terrorism has become a more important part of political agendas, the attention it receives has risen accordingly. Jihadism in particular receives a lot of attention, for example in research on terrorism where it is the main point of focus (Schuurman 2019: 10). A higher level of attention for the topic of terrorism, especially from the media’s perspective, but also from politicians, can effectuate a higher fear within a society (Nellis & Savage 2012: 763). Right-wing extremist organizations seem to play into this fear by blaming Muslims in general for the actions of Islamist extremists, arguing that Islam – and thus all Muslims - forms a threat to Western societies. The fear of Muslims has, combined with certain forms of policy, affected Muslim communities as they have been tyrannised (Guru 2012: 1168). A research into the relationship between a rise in right-wing extremism and the well-being of migrants in Germany has proven that the latter decreases if the first factor is indeed rising (Knabe et al. 2013: 586).

The integration of Muslim minorities in Europe, as well as the debate that surrounds it, is affected by attacks by a few Islamist extremists as processes of ‘othering’ effectuate isolation of Muslims in European societies (Mohiuddin 2017: 406). Movements on the far-right of the political spectrum could then indeed use the phenomenon of Islamist extremism to label all members of Muslim communities as a threat, in turn legitimizing certain actions in the name

1_{The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is based at the}

University of Maryland and supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Report accessed via the Global Terrorism Database: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ on the 16th_{of February 2019.}

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of security. Furthermore, it seems that radicalization of Muslims might occur less if identity-based inequality is lower (Murshed 2011: 46).

This points towards a certain extent of polarization, as right-wing extremists and Islamist extremists seem to find themselves at both ends of an opposition. Moreover, actions or perceived sentiments of the other can affect groups. Then, if right-wing ideologies hinge, to some extent, on their antipathy towards Muslims, questions rise about the consequences this might have. The Dutch government for example has warned for the possibilities of conflict between right-wing extremists and Jihadists in the Netherlands (NCTV 2019: 8). In essence the polarization raises questions in particular about the possibilities of conflict: can a certain extent of social struggle between groups lead to violent conflict and can the violent extremism of Muslim extremists that we have seen over the last decade lead to violent reactions from right-wing extremists as well?

1.1 Relevance & research question

As a consequence of various Jihadist terrorist attacks that have happened over the past few decades in Western-Europe, taking their impact into account, there is a fear of Islamist

extremists and, in some cases, a fear of Islam in general in Western-European countries. Some academics call this fear Islamophobia (Fadil, 2011; Dalrymple, 2004), which entails the fear of both Muslims and Islam. This fear can not only be seen as a result of terrorism or perceived differences as it is created as well by certain actors: Nadia Fadil for example argued that Islamophobia offers the possibility to maintain Western superiority over Islam on a cultural, economic and political level (Fadil 2011: 11).

Not only terrorist attacks that happen ‘close to home’ can effectuate a certain level of fear: a study following attacks in Mumbai concluded that these attacks raised fear of terrorism in Europe as well (Finseraas & Listhaug 2011: 219). The fear of terrorism implies a fear of terrorists, a fear that is partly influenced by the media in their presentation of terrorists as monsters, that aims at keeping patriotism and ‘othering’ in place (Puar & Rai 2002: 130). This raises the question to what extent fear might effectuate a certain level of polarisation within societies as groups of people might become diametrically opposed. For example, terrorist attacks have linked refugees in general with terrorism in the western world (Volkan 2018: 352). Terrorist attacks, of which the most lethal have mostly been claimed by Islamic extremists, have had an impact on Western-European societies. The attacks in Paris for example have caused the government to develop certain policies, such as security precautions

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and the presence of the military in some places, that affect the daily lives of Parisians. The same goes for other areas in the world that have seen similar historical events in the form of terrorism.

The most well-known act of terrorism are the events of the 11th of September 2001 that took place in the United States and caused a lot of commotion on a global scale. On this day, four planes were hijacked, two were flown into the World Trade Center in New York, another into the Pentagon and the last one crashed into a field after the passengers overpowered their hijackers. This was one of the first times an act of terrorism was broadcasted live on television, on an almost-global scale. The subsequent so-called ‘War on Terror’ urges questions, such as the consequences of the discourse that it entails. The ‘War on Terror’ discourse has shaped an interaction between America and Muslim populations, sometimes in the form of confrontation (Sides & Gross 2013: 596). The then president of the United States, George Bush, addressed Congress nine days after the attacks on 9/11, declaring war to every terrorist group of global reach and called on other nations to help as well as he made the following statement: “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”.2_{Similar language}

has been used by other politicians elsewhere, pointing to the presence of a certain dichotomy: the terrorists, in the form of Islamic extremists, versus the rest of the world.

This dichotomy has been put to use by various actors. The fear that terrorists want to create has caused several right-wing politicians all over the world to utilize this fear, as fear can get an audience’s attention, speed up their processing of information and make the audience an easier target for persuasion (Nai & Maier 208: 81). In some Western-European countries this has arguably led to a political polarisation regarding issues such as integration and migration of Muslims (Oosterwaal, 2009; Sides & Gross, 2013). However, the definition of terrorism includes that it is aimed at political change, thus implying a difference of opinion on a

political matter. Political struggle is often visible for a great audience and can have an impact on social life.

Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism are, to some extent, opposing movements as their ideologies oppose each other. As support for right-wing extremism is on the rise (Stevkovski, 2015; Stavrakakis et al., 2017; Caiani & Kröll, 2015; Eatwell, 2000), and the numbers of terrorist attacks by Jihadists have risen, conflict seems to become more likely. An

2_{Transcript of President Bush’s address to Congress on September 20, 2001,}

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important factor in this possibility is that many actors in right-wing extremism often mark ‘the others’ as the guilty party in perceived socioeconomic decline (Stevkovski 2015: 54).

Nationalism is one of the pillars of right-wing extremist ideologies, which entails the defining of the ingroup based on national identity, which is effectively based on racial, ethnic and cultural aspects (Carter 2018: 171).

It has thus been established that there is a certain hostility between members of right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism, yet its consequences have not yet been studied to a great extent. However, there have been academics (to name a few: Busher & Macklin, 2015; Carter, 2017; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2009; Feldman, 2012) who have argued that there is a certain interaction between both right-wing extremists and Islamist extremists. This dichotomy, the hostility, involves interaction between both parties, as their ideologies and actions are (partly) based on each other’s ideologies and actions. Roger Eatwell (2006) has defined this process as ‘cumulative extremism’, a process in which opposing groups feed of and magnify each other. While the concept of cumulative extremism has gained interest over the last ten years, its mechanisms are not yet fully understood (Busher & Macklin 2015: 885). The aforementioned concept of cumulative extremism however suggests that both ideologies affect each other, in a sense that radicalisation of one group might speed up the other radicalization of the other group. There has been a rise over the last decades in the attention that is given to both right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism, in academics as well as the public and political discourse. If support for both are on the rise, if there is a certain extent of polarisation between both parties and, in a more general sense, within Western-European societies, questions arise on the possibility of conflict and escalation. While the concept of cumulative extremism has been studied and discussed to a certain extent by academics, this work has mostly been theoretical. A call for more empirical research on the topic of cumulative extremism has been uttered by several academics (Bailey & Edwards, 2017; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2009; Busher & Macklin, 2015; Carter, 2017) but it seems that, so far, empirical evidence of the phenomenon is missing. To research the validity of the concept of cumulative extremism and to study the possible relationship between Jihadism and right-wing extremism, this thesis focuses on two cases. The research question is as follows:

‘To what extent have Jihadist terrorist attacks in Europe enabled the radicalization of Western-European right-wing extremists between 2011-2017?’

This specific period of time has been chosen because of the activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, an organisation that has been labelled as ‘terrorist organization’ by most

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countries. This group has drawn many foreign fighters towards Syria, Iraq and surrounding countries that have seen ISIL activity.3 This organisation had been active for over a decade already, but started to expand its territory after 2011 in Syria and Iraq, declaring to be a khalifate and a safe haven for all Muslims. Their calls to join their cause appealed to many. The phenomenon of foreign fighters has gained much attention in this decade and although the number of departures has declined greatly, the rise in departures of foreign fighters at the start of this decade caused great concerns (Hegghammer 2010: 54). Moreover, as has been discussed at the start of the introduction, there has be a significant rise in the number of terrorist attacks over the last decades, with some that took place between 2011 and 2017. The specific locale of the research question has been chosen because of the terrorist attacks by Muslim Extremists that have taken place over the last couple of years in Europe, as well as the perceived rise of support of right-wing extremist ideologies in Europe. These

developments could have led to a shift in right-wing extremists’ focus towards the perceived threat of Islamist extremism. Western-Europe offers various cases that can be researched using this research question, but two cases in specific have been chosen.

To be able to analyse the relationship that the question poses, two different case studies will be analysed. Firstly, the case of Anders Behring Breivik, who performed terrorist attacks on the 22nd of July, 2011, in Norway. While his attacks had not specifically targeted Muslims, Breivik saw Muslims as enemies (Syse 2014: 395). More specifically, Anders Breivik feared a Muslim takeover of Europe, which he called ‘Islamization’. Secondly, the attack on a mosque in Enschede in the Netherlands will be discussed. In February 2016 a man threw a Molotov-cocktail at a mosque in the Dutch study of Enschede.4 The attack happened during a time in which the debate on immigration had flared up in the Netherlands as a result of the perceived refugee-crisis that spiked in migration numbers in 2015. After studying both cases separately, the results will be compared and discussed.

The hypothesis for the research question of this thesis is that the actions of the right-wing extremists in both cases have been heavily inspired by the terrorist attacks by Islamist

extremists. Right-wing extremist ideologies and actions might quite possibly be motivated, in part, and affected by specific triggering events, such as terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists. While it seems that there are not many cases of violent extremism from the right-wing corner,

3_{ISIS (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is also a name commonly used for this organization.}

4_{https://www.rtvoost.nl/nieuws/238998/Man-gooit-molotovcocktail-tegen-gevel-van-moskee-in-Enschede,}

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the case of Breivik for example could suggest that an opposition of right-wing extremists and (extremist) Muslims is at play that could result in violent behavior and terrorist attacks. If both parties perceive each other as enemies, this could lead to violence. This violence could not only be aimed at actual members of these groups, but also others that might be perceived to be members of the group: for example violence that is aimed at Muslims in general as they are perceived to be a violent and dangerous group altogether.

1.2 Methodology

This thesis will utilize a literature review, in combination with a comparative case study analysis. The literature review focuses on the concept of cumulative extremism. The review discusses the main published work concerning the subject to be able to understand the topic. It is aimed at providing a context in which the two different case studies can be analyzed by providing a historical perspective and by discussing existing knowledge concerning the matter. As has been mentioned earlier, the concept has not been gaining much traction until recently, but there is over a decade’s worth of material that can be used here, which should provide us with a clear idea of what cumulative extremism entails.

The research question will be applied to two different cases, that of Anders Behring Breivik and the mosque attack in Enschede. Both these cases concern actions of right-wing extremists who performed an attack in their own countries of birth. Breivik killed 69 people in a shooting and bombing, in Enschede five men threw Molotov-cocktails at a mosque. These case studies are both analyzed, in particular the perpetrators’ stance on Muslims and Islam in general and their views on Islamic extremism. The cases are studied intensively to be able to place them in a larger context of similar cases.

The cases have been specifically selected as they show some similarities, however there are differences too. The main difference is the form of violence, which has, in the case of Breivik, led to many deaths, while everyone involved in the Enschede attack remained unharmed. Both cases do, however, entail right-wing extremism and can be placed into a larger perspective with similar cases. Right-wing extremism is arguably gaining support in Western Europe: PEGIDA for instance, has gained followers over the last decades in several countries in Western-Europe (Berntzen & Weisskircher 2016: 556). Right-wing extremism has not led to many instances of massive violence, of which Breivik’s case is an example. This case can thus be seen as an extreme case, as there have been other outbursts of violence, but not to the same extent. The case of the attack at the mosque in Enschede thus serves as a typical case,

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while that of Breivik serves as an extreme case that tests the hypothesis. If both right-wing extremism and Islamist extremism are on the rise and cumulative extremism indeed plays a role, violent outbursts such as the cases studied might become more frequent.

Possible limitations of these methods are that cumulative extremism is a fairly new concept and has not been studied to great lengths yet, which might give some difficulties while conducting a literature review. There should however be sufficient literature to analyze the concept to the extent that it can be applied to the selected cases. The case studies might furthermore prove to be difficult to analyze as they represent fairly different cases, which might raise some issues in a comparison between the two. Furthermore it might prove to be difficult to find the specific motives for the attacks, as the perpetrators might have kept their motivations to themselves. The amount of attention that both cases have received could however help in this instance. The answers should thus provide us with a certain amount of replicability.

1.3 Reading Guide

This thesis continues with a theoretical framework, in which important concepts are defined to provide a conceptual base on which to build. Furthermore, this sub-chapter contains a short overview of consisting knowledge and theories on the subjects of right-wing extremism, cumulative extremism, polarisation, radicalisation and terrorism. Then a short history of terrorism in Western-Europe is provided to serve as a groundwork and a basis of the historical setting that the cases have taken place in. It’s aim is to give the reader a short overview of the terrorism that Western-Europe has seen and what it has meant in Europe. It specifically aims at providing a basal framework of terrorism in which right-wing extremism might have grown. The next chapter contains a literature review on the subject of cumulative extremism. This concept will be discussed and analysed to be able to research its mechanisms. The next chapter entails an analysis of the two case studies, those of Breivik and the attack on a mosque in Enschede. Then the last chapter, the conclusion, applies the findings of the literature review on cumulative extremism to the two case studies to see to what extent cumulative extremism has played a role in both attacks.

1.4 Conceptual Framework

As a solid foundation for this thesis, several important concepts have to be identified and defined. Hereafter, existing theories that include some of these concepts will be addressed. The concepts that are of importance to this thesis are: ‘right-wing extremism, ‘polarisation,

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‘radicalisation’, and ‘terrorism’. As we will soon see, some of these concepts have been highly disputed because of their vague definitions. Therefore, it is important to clearly mark these concepts. This sub-chapter demarcates the most important concepts and sums up the definitions that will be used throughout the rest of this thesis.

1.4.1 Right-Wing Extremism

Right-wing extremism is defined as an ideology that entails anti-democracy, authoritarianism and holistic and/or exclusionary nationalism (Carter 2018: 174). Throughout (modern) history the most well-known example of right-wing extremism has been that of National-Socialism, which gained great support in Germany in the ‘30’s. While it has been demonised to some extent after the Second World War and its Holocaust, it seems to be on the rise once again. There are different parties that are seen as right-wing extremist, with PEGIDA serving as one of the best examples in Western-Europe. However it should be considered that there is a great variety of right-wing movements in Western-Europe, who sometimes interact with each other but do not do so necessarily.

The roots of right-wing extremist ideologies are often perceived to lie in xenophobia, closely linked to a hatred towards and acts of violence against minorities on the basis of their origin (Stevkovski 2015: 44). This implies that right-wing extremists actively take part in processes of ‘othering’, in which they target refugees, minorities and people with a migration-history and label them as different based on ethnicity, race and perceived insurmountable differences in culture. This ideology implies that these others, the people that are perceived to be

different, do either not belong in a country or should be treated differently, often as a result of a perceived danger that these people pose to the identity, culture and safety of a society..

1.4.2 Polarisation

The concept of polarisation is defined as a conflict of two groups of opinions that are

diametrically opposed (Oosterwaal 2009: 370). Here it should be considered that polarisation can either be social or political, but both forms stem from differences of opinion on various subjects. The subject of possible polarisation in this thesis is Islam, as it is the question what polarisation of related topics might effectuate. Several authors have argued that a higher level of polarisation effectuates a higher risk of social unrest (Engels & Smelser 1973; Esteban & Ray 1994). Furthermore, certain events and political changes can effectuate social unrest, raising the level of polarisation. While Islam and the integration of Muslims have been highly debated in Western-European countries, this debate is not entirely new. Samuel Huntington

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(1996) argued, in his book ‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’, that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a new era in which the cultural and religious identity of groups of people would become the largest source of conflict. He specifically mentions the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the chapter ‘Islam’s Bloody Borders’, arguing that no one can deny the aggression and violence of Muslims near the end of the 20th Century (Huntington 1996: 25). Similar claims have been made by politicians and in public debate as well, but most dramatic and violent events have, for example, not influenced the debate about religious rights for and accommodation of the European Muslim population (Vanparys et al. 2013: 224).

Polarisation should be seen as a diametrical opposition of opinions on certain matters in political or social life. A state of polarisation can lead to a perception that differences with the ‘Other’ are too great. This can be a result of an essentialisation of cultures and identities. Furthermore, polarisation is influenced by the socio-historical context of a society. This thesis focuses on the polarisation between right-wing extremists and (extremist) Muslims and the effects of this polarisation. An example of such an effect can be seen in a German study, conducted by using data that had been collected from 1984 to 2006, which showed that a rise in right-wing extremism can lead to a decrease in the life satisfaction of immigrants (Knabe et al. 2013: 586).

1.4.3 Radicalization

The concept of radicalisation has often been defined as a social construct, as it can entail either a collective or individual process in which conventional practices of tolerance,

compromise and dialogue are abandoned in a conflict dyad (Schmid 2013: 18). In essence this describes a shift towards practices that could be seen as extremist. It should be considered that the use of violence is not always implied, as the choice to partake in violent activities is only taken by a few of the individuals that radicalise (van Buuren & de Graaf 2014: 175).

However, as Schuurman and Taylor (2018) have stated, discourse on terrorism has often involved radicalization as a key factor in involvement in terrorism.

The essence of the concept is that the ideology of the individual that is labelled as radicalised is not compatible with what is perceived as normal within a society; radicalisation entails adherence to an ideology that opposes a society’s traditional norms and values. This, in combination with radicalisation being a social instruct, implies that power relations play a role: the majority of a society adheres to its traditional norms and values, while the people that

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radicalise tend to stand out against the majority. Radicalism needs to be judged in relation to a certain benchmark (Schmid 2013: 11).

The process that radicalisation entails can thus be described as a path that leads individuals or groups away from the core norms and values of a society, towards an extreme ideology that makes the individual or group incompatible with the rest of society. The factors that influence this process are various and numerous, yet there is some consensus on the most important amongst them. Socio-economic factors are perceived to be the most important factors when it comes to radicalisation (de Koning 2016; Koomen & van der Pligt 2011). As these conditions can differ between individuals, the process of radicalisation should be seen as a personal experience. The conditions that enable political grievances or an economic and social

disadvantage to shift into a willingness to partake in violent activities are still quite unknown, as primary data is scarce.

While theories on radicalisation are an important aspect in the programmes that aim at halting terrorist activities in Western-Europe, the underlying processes that radicalisation adheres to are still quite unknown. However, more and more research has been done on the process of radicalisation, mainly to be able to shape this knowledge into policies that might be able to mitigate the threat that terrorism poses. An interesting point to note here is that of Monaghan and Molnar (2016) in an article they wrote on theories of radicalisation and policing practices. They argue that the search for explanations of the radicalisation process have often been aimed at a specific target-group, namely Muslims. This is an interesting conclusion, as we have earlier defined terrorism without making mention of a specific group, but according to Monaghan and Molnar (2016), the ‘War on Terror’ has caused many counter-terrorism agencies to focus on Muslims in particular in their practices and policies. This fits with the earlier finding that terrorism research is mainly focuses at Jihadism.

1.4.4 Terrorism

The concept of terrorism has been a much disputed and politicised term as there are hundreds of various definitions in governments and academia (Schmid 2013: 15). One can easily imagine the issues this may give as different institutions or governments entertain different ideas of what terrorism entails. These definitions are often subject to the bias or the

perspective of who defines terrorism because they have different agendas, which will have political and social consequences (Bruce 2013: 29).

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Terrorism is defined as both a practice and doctrine: on the one hand it entails an act of violence without restraints with psychological and propagandistic aims, on the other it is a doctrine about the presumed consequences that fear-generating political violence has (Schmid 2013: 16). The exact goal a terrorist organisation might have can influence the sort of

violence that is used (Dechesne 2009: 416). As the subjects of this thesis are jihadists, the focus that is appropriate here is that on Islamic extremist terrorism, which might be aimed at opposing a government and at causing friction in the public debate, the media and in politics (Demant & de Graaf 2010: 408). Violent extremism in general is thus aimed at achieving political change through the use of violence and fear, but the specific goals of various terrorist organisations or individuals differ greatly.

The focus of European counter-terrorism agencies seems to have shifted over the last decades, from right- and left-wing extremists to Islamic extremists. This has been a result of historical events, such as 9/11, but also events in Western-Europe, as has been described in chapter 1.1. Another change has been the rise of ‘homegrown’ terrorism, which has been a cause of concern for many counter-terrorism agencies and governments throughout the world.

Homegrown terrorism is defined as acts of terrorism that have been performed by individuals that were born and raised in Western countries and are not tied to foreign terrorist

organisations (Crone & Harrow 2011: 522). This has raised new issues for counter-terrorism agencies as terrorists were often perceived to be outsiders or foreigners. The fact that some terrorists are born in Western-European countries raises the threat that terrorism poses in these countries. Furthermore, a rise in the number of Western-European foreign fighters has led to concerns as well, especially because of the possibility of their return and possible plans to partake in terrorist activities in their home-countries in Western-Europe.

It can thus be concluded that an audience, in the form of a society, a group of people or a government for example, play an important role in terrorism as the act of terrorism itself is a message that has to be received by a certain audience. Terrorism often serves both as a threat and as a message because of its shock-value. This thesis assumes that terrorism entails acts that are aimed at political change, either through violence or the threat of violence.

1.5 A short history of terrorism in Western-Europe

As this thesis aims at finding out to what extent Jihadist terrorist attacks can play a role in counter-violence, a short history of these attacks might prove to be useful in explaining right-wing extremist sentiments. Throughout the last couple of decades hundreds of people fell

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victim to terrorism in Western-Europe according to the Global Terrorism Database. After the events of September 11th 2001 in the United States, the most notable (in the sense of the level of attention that they were given and the number of casualties) acts of terrorism in Europe were that of the attacks in Barcelona in 2017, the Manchester bombing in 2017, the attacks in Brussels and at its airport in 2016, the attacks in Nice that same year, the attacks in Paris in 2015, the attack by Anders Breivik on the Utoya island in Norway in 2011, the public transportation bombings in London in 2005 and the attacks in Madrid in 2004. Most of these grand-scale attacks, out of the aforementioned with the exception of the events in Norway, have either been attributed to, or claimed by Muslim extremists, such as Al-Qaida or ISIL.5 A research into the targeting preference of Islamist extremists in Europe by Cato Hemmingby (2017) has proven that Islamist extremists have increasingly focused on ‘soft targets’, i.e. targets that are not (adequately) protected against attacks. Furthermore a significant number of plots and attacks were focused on indiscriminate targets and the general public, in public areas and transport (Hemmingby 2017: 33). The number of attacks in the period between 2011 and 2016 has significantly been higher than the two previous decades. Furthermore, what seems to be the most striking, the focus on soft targets has increased greatly between 2011 and 2016 (Ibid: 30).6 These soft targets are often not the “real targets” that terrorists aim at.

As mentioned before, terrorist attacks can have a lasting impact on a society. For example, research after bombings in France in 1995 and 1996 showed that PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) can be caused by physical trauma but also by the threat of death or

distressing sights (Lamping et al. 2004: 1387). Fear can impact the way we see the world, and with technological advancement, fear has become an easily distributed emotion. Globalisation and the Internet have created limitless possibilities to communicate and share images and videos, which means that news and footage of shocking events travel the world rather quickly. An American study has established that there is a relationship between the frequency of exposure to news reports on terrorism and the fear of terrorism: the larger the first, the larger the second (Nellis & Savage 2012: 763). Terrorism and the fear it creates can thus not only

5_{According to numbers and information found on the Global Terrorism Database:}

https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?page=1&casualties_type=b&casualties_max=101&dtp2=all &region=9,8&expanded=no&charttype=line&chart=overtime&ob=GTDID&od=desc#results-table, accessed on the 16th_{of February 2019. The Global Terrorism Database provides data of Terrorism attacks that have taken}

place between 1970 and 2017.

6_{This study has analysed 246 registered and documented plots and attacks by Islamist extremists in Europe}

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affect its direct victims, but also the wider population. The aforementioned bombings in London on public transportation in 2005 for example resulted in 32% of the Londoners to alter their travel intentions and a rise in stress among 31% of London’s population (Rubin et al. 2005: 7).

Terrorist attacks can however have other implications as well, as they not only create and heighten the level of fear in a society or within a community, but can also cause anger, in the form of political struggle or social conflict. The definition of terrorism by Bruce Hoffman (2006) takes this into account to some extent, as it presumes that acts of terrorism are aimed at political change. This does however not explicitly mention the possibility of social conflict, but the latter is often implied when it comes to political struggle and a variety of historical events, such as terrorist attacks. After the London bombings in July of 2005 for instance, Muslims have become a major target of racially motivated attacks (Eatwell 2006: 204). In a sense, terrorist attacks can thus feed polarisation, where possible differences are perceived to be greater as a whole group is seen as guilty of a certain act of a sub-group or single member of the group, in this instance Muslims. It seems that the public discourse on terrorism almost exclusively involves the adjective “Islamic” (Gardell 2014: 130).

The relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe has been a subject of debate in recent decades, as changes in Western-European societies, amongst others through processes of migration, have brought various perceived differences to light when it comes to culture and identity. This sort of thinking is often accompanied by the idea that every culture is an

individual entity (Weiguo 2013: 148). If cultures, or groups of people, are to be seen as single and separate entities, perceived differences can easily appear. Moreover, if the differences are perceived to be greater, people experience a higher level of polarisation (Van Boven et al. 2012: 93). According to Oosterwaal (2009) for example, debates on processes of integration have hardened over the last few decades in the Netherlands. This development should mostly be seen as a result of the migratory patterns and a rise in immigration in the Netherlands, but it might also have been affected by terrorism. If the attacks by a few Muslim extremists could effectuate a certain level of polarisation, questions arise about the possible effects of this development. Eatwell (2006) has for example argued that extremist animosities fuel each other, coining the definition of ‘cumulative extremism’.

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2.

Literature Review: Cumulative Extremism

Cumulative extremism is a concept that has been discussed to great lengths by academics. This chapter aims at providing an overview of the conceptualization of cumulative extremism and its focal points. It does so by analysing different perspectives on the concept, as discussed by academics. As a starting point this chapter should include a short conceptualization of extremism in a more general sense, which differs from the conceptualization of right-wing extremism in the last chapter. Extremism entails an ideology of political actors who ‘disregard the rule of law and reject pluralism in society’ (Schmid 2013: 8). The political aspect is

important, as it assumes that the perceived extremists are opposed to their country’s political system and aim at making changes to this system. While their goals may differ, as extremists can be both on the political right and left or of a religious-fundamentalist orientation, their practices are often similar, as they would for example rather use force than persuasion

(Schmid 2013: 9). Furthermore, this preference of violence over persuasion implies that these political actors, who can organise themselves in a group, not only oppose the mainstream political system in a country, but all who oppose their ideology. Extremists are thus perceived to have an ideology that opposes the mainstream, which they aim to impose through use of force, rather than dialogue. Extremists are perceived to be ‘close-minded’, as they adhere to a interpretation of the world in which people are either against or with them (Schmid 2013: 10).

2.1 Conceptualization

This close-mindedness poses a dichotomy, an ‘us versus them’ of the extremist group against all others that oppose their ideology. It is important however to note that, while extremists are thus perceived to rather use force than persuasion, violence is not always implied. In the discourse that surrounds cumulative extremism, Busher and Macklin have noted that it is important to clarify, when making use of the concept of cumulative extremism, if people refer to an escalation of forms of action or processes of ideological radicalisation (Busher &

Macklin 2015: 887). This implies that, when studying cases of cumulative extremism, a distinction needs to be made. Cumulative extremism does not immediately imply the use of violence, but can also entail a symbiotic process of ideological radicalization. Here the distinction between ideological radicalisation and an escalation of actions is made, the latter being a possible pathway towards terrorism. While the concepts of terrorism and extremism can partly overlap each other, they are in fact different (Schmid 2013: 11). It is important to properly demarcate such concepts, so they can be defined and used in their own respective

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matters, for example in the development of policies that aim at countering the threats that extremism and terrorism pose.

According to Schmid, extremists oppose democracy and do not tolerate diversity (Schmid 2013: 10). This implies that different groups of extremists oppose each other as well, which raises questions as to what extent these groups might feel inclined to use force against perceived opposing groups in obtaining political power. The way in which different forms of extremism can magnify and feed off each other has been coined as cumulative extremism (Eatwell 2006: 205). This involves a certain level of interaction between opposing groups, groups whose values and ideologies are incompatible. According to Eatwell this interaction can take different forms but entails a certain construction in discourse (Eatwell 2006: 213). Carter (2017) defines cumulative extremism as a confrontational relationship between social groups that oppose each other, which can result in violence and social polarization (Carter 2017: 37). This relationship thus involves an interaction to an extent, a dynamic process between groups. This can, depending on the actions of both groups, result in a cycle of violence and terrorism, as groups can mirror each other in their tactics and ideologies (Fekete 2014: 32). Furthermore, the process of cumulative extremism involves a certain extent of radicalization. More specifically, the way in which groups respond to each other’s actions by moving towards conflict is called reciprocal radicalisation (Bailey & Edwards 2017: 257). Both reciprocal radicalisation and cumulative extremism are often used interchangeably. Radicalization is thus understood here as a process that is influenced by various dynamics in the form of internal and external factors. More specifically, reciprocal radicalisation takes place within the dynamics of intergroup interaction. Cumulative extremism, as well as reciprocal radicalization, should be understood as a process rather than a state. A certain dynamic is involved, an interaction that takes place over time and is subject to change as a result of internal and external influences. The actions of one group can provoke reactions by an opposing group as some groups mirror each other as well. This process that then takes place however, does not have an implicit end-goal, as radicalisation should be seen as part of a journey rather than the moment a group moves from legal to illegal activity (Bailey & Edwards 2017: 255). In an extensive work on the mechanisms of political radicalisation, by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008), the writers argue that out of twelve possible

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mechanisms of radicalisation, ten are more or less reactive.7 The pathways of radicalisation can differentiate between groups and individuals, making each process unique. These processes can be influenced by a variety of factors, some of which invoke a reaction by an individual or group that can lead to radicalisation. The process of radicalisation, or the mechanism, stems from and relies on a dynamic of opposition, in which the actions of others are the most important events (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008: 430).

As radicalisation has to be understood in relation to a certain benchmark, it is important to understand that these benchmarks can differentiate between different groups, parts within society and between individuals. Radicalisation, and reciprocal radicalisation, are thus not just based in state-centred understandings, but in societal understandings of terrorism, extremism and so on, as well (Bailey & Edwards 2017: 275). In the case of cumulative extremism, where groups mirror each other’s ideologies, the ideology of a perceived opposing group is the benchmark for another group to some extent. A certain need for action is felt when a group interacts with an opposing group, which can therefore result in violence. The other group might be seen as a threat or obstacle in a group’s aim at political power, in which case some groups might see the use of force as a solution to their problems. Pamela Oliver and Daniel Myers (2003) argued that social movements and their dynamics are shaped by interactions with other social movements.

The research that has been done in the field of cumulative extremism seems, however, to be mostly theoretical: empirical research into the idea of cumulative extremism has not been conducted to a great extent (Carter 2017: 37). This raises certain questions, for example if the concept can actually be applied to real situations, does cumulative extremism really take place? Various academia (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2009; Bailey & Edwards, 2017; Busher & Macklin, 2015; Carter, 2017) raised similar questions in their works on cumulative

extremism, arguing that more (empirical) investigation of the subject is needed. It should be noted that empirical research could provide certain findings that can provide additions or alterations to the conceptualisation of cumulative extremism. All of this needs to be considered, which can result in a more detailed understanding of the phenomenon of cumulative extremism, which can in turn possibly effectuate alterations in counter-radicalisation policies (Bartlett & Birdwell 2013: 12).

7_{Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko acknowledge that the mechanisms of radicalisation that they}

identified are not the only important ones and argue that there might be more (McCauley & Moskalenko 2008: 429).

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An interesting pattern in the discourse that surrounds cumulative extremism is that of a certain sense of admiration for the fanaticism and actions of perceived opposing groups (Eatwell 2006; Abbas 2017). The ferocity of certain acts of violence by one group can thus not only rise the level of antipathy towards that group, but also invoke a certain sense of admiration. This implies a certain struggle for power, which can result in an escalating cycle of violence. This poses various problems for a government, as the prevention of violence and terrorism can cause great difficulties. Questions that might rise are, for example, how the threats of cumulative extremism might be mitigated. An understanding of the extremist views is important, and we have seen before that there are similarities in various and even opposing extremist ideologies. Once again, external factors are perceived to play a role, as issues of identity politics and social structure play an important role when one tries to grasp the

dynamics of radicalisation and extremism (Abbas 2017: 60). Other academics have noted the importance of taking external factors, outside of the two opposing groups, into account as well. For example, Joel Busher and Gary Macklin (2015) noted that focusing on the wider social, political and cultural environment is important to be able to understand the dynamic between two groups.

2.2 Empirical research into cumulative extremism

Before going into the movement-countermovement dynamics of extreme right-wing or anti-Muslim groups and Islamist extremist groups, we will take a look at the empirical research that has been done on the subject of cumulative extremism. Various academics have

researched events and socio-historical developments to look for evidence of the existence of mechanisms that point towards reciprocal radicalisation and cumulative extremism. Graham Macklin and Joel Busher (2015) have looked at movement-countermovement contest to engage with the concept of cumulative extremism in post-war Britain. Alexander James Carter (2017) has looked at escalation of movement-countermovement mechanisms in Northern Ireland between 1967 and 1972. Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell (2013) have reviewed evidence of cumulative radicalisation between Islamist extremists and the far-right in the United Kingdom. All of these researches are set in the United Kingdom, but focus on different cases. Analysing these different studies and comparing them could point to certain patterns of cumulative extremism, of which some have been pointed out in the theoretical part of this chapter. Empirical research into and empirical evidence of cumulative extremism is not only important to be able to understand, analyse and respond to the

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take place (Macklin & Busher 2015: 61). In other words, understanding the mechanisms of cumulative extremism can be imperative in the development of policies that aim at preventing processes of cumulative extremism.

Graham Macklin and Joel Busher (2015) have identified and analysed four different waves of movement-countermovement contest in Great Britain that took place since the Second World War. The authors discussed confrontations between fascists and anti-fascists in the late ‘40s, between extreme right-wing groups and anti-fascists in the ‘70s and ‘80s and the

contemporary contests between the English Defence League and the Al-Muhajiroun (“The Emigrants”, a now-banned extreme Islamist group). Macklin and Busher argue that, in these four cases, real “spirals of violence” are missing: while the ideologies and actions of opposing groups helped to reinforce and validate the ideologies and actions of their owns groups, no evidence of so-called spirals of violence was found (Macklin & Busher 2015: 58).8 The concept of reciprocal radicalisation could thus be applied to these cases, but to speak of a structural escalation of violence and counteractions would be unjustified because of a lack of evidence. This conclusion was supported by four different arguments: firstly, the majority of extremists from all groups based their actions on an established repertoire, instead of

spiralling into violence as a reaction to violence of another group (Ibid.). The actions of the groups that were researched were therefore mainly taken within a demarcated area, as they seemed to have established repertoires of which they did not deviate. Secondly, acts of violence did not always provoke a similar or greater act of violence in response (Macklin & Busher 2015: 59).

In the cases that the authors discussed, they could not find evidence that certain acts of violence invoked reactions in the form of actions of greater violence. Actions of opposing groups did not cause an escalation of violence in response. Thirdly, the few times that a certain extent of interactive escalation did take place, this did not take long: these were spikes of violence rather than spirals (Ibid.). The incidents in which the levels of violence escalated in an interactive manner were thus short-lived. The spirals of violence as a result of

cumulative extremism were thus missing, in these specific cases. Fourthly, the escalation of movement-countermovement contests often took place at the intersection with different, more violent contests (Macklin & Busher 2015: 60). In other words, in the instances of an

8_{Macklin and Busher argue, in their introduction, that the “spirals of violence” are often posited at the center of}

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escalation of violence in movement-countermovement contests, it was unclear if any escalation was a direct consequence of the movement-countermovement in question.

If the acts of groups that find themselves in a movement-countermovement are mostly based on a certain pre-existing repertoire of actions, if acts of violence by one group do not simply imply more violent responses of an opposing group, if the escalation of violence took place in spikes rather than spirals and if the escalation of violence could not be attributed to violent actions of other groups, issues arise regarding the concept of cumulative extremism. Macklin & Busher proposed that the process should not be reduced to a process of “tit-for-tat” violence (Macklin & Busher 2015: 61). This implies that cumulative extremism is a complex concept that involves a variety of internal and external factors, not just the ideologies and actions of the one group versus those of another group. Tit-for-tat radicalisation is defined as a situation in which different groups discover certain ideas and actions in another group that oppose their own, which in turn leads to an escalation of radicalisation (Jackson & Feldman 2011: 14). Macklin & Busher (2015) identified four different reasons for their proposal not to reduce cumulative extremism to “tit-for-tat” radicalisation or violence. Firstly, they argued that decisions of opposing groups were not entirely based on the actions of the other groups, as the movements have broader aims (Macklin & Busher 2015: 62). While the social movements might base their actions on the ideologies and actions of an opposing movement to some extent, they often have broader aims and goals, that are not entirely focussed on perceived opponents. Secondly, the mechanisms of cumulative extremism are affected by events within groups as well: the patterns of contest escalation often take place in the margins of extremist groups, as radicalisation seems to take place in the margins of the groups where their leaders have less control and as a result of a competitive strive within groups, where different factions set out to “outbid” each other in their violence (Macklin & Busher 2015: 62-63). As extremist groups might consist of a variety of factions and different-minded individuals, there might be a certain level of opposition within groups, for example as to what kind of actions to take to achieve the group’s goals. While group leaders might worry about the broader picture and the group’s messages towards the greater public, others within groups might feel compelled to act otherwise. The actions of an individual or faction of a certain extremist group might thus not entirely be supported by the rest of the group. Thirdly Macklin & Busher identify the

importance of the role of the state in movement-countermovement contest. The police might for example feel compelled to use violence as a means to stop certain extremist movement in their actions: violence to prevent violence (Macklin & Busher 2015: 63). The use of violence

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by the police, or other state-induced actions or policies, might also anger extremist groups and increase tensions. Furthermore, this could lead to questions about the perceived legitimacy of state actions within extremist groups. The fact that states are often better equipped than extremist groups could cause these groups to aim their anger at perceived opposing groups, instead of starting something they would presumably not win. Moreover, contesting the state would quite possibly not favour public opinion and thus not help the group in their broader aims and strive towards credibility, support and political power. Fourthly Macklin & Busher argue that the decisions of a group about whether to escalate violence or not heavily rely on the group’s identity (Macklin & Busher 2015: 64). While some groups might thus feel inclined to partake in violent activities, others might not, depending on their group’s culture. These four factors should be considered, according to the writers, to be able to study and comprehend situations of cumulative extremism.

Alexander James Carter (2017) studied the movement-countermovement conflict of the Troubles in Northern Ireland from the early 1960s trough to 1972. Taking into account that the processes of cumulative extremism should not be reduced to tit-for-tat violence, Carter has chosen to include relevant socio-political factors by situating the conflict in its historical context (Carter 2017: 38). The assumption that cumulative extremism is not solely a

mechanism of two opposing groups has led to several interesting conclusions. Firstly, if the interests of the wider community that an extremist group is situated in correspond with the group’s aims, this group will receive greater support in a movement-countermovement contest (Carter 2017: 42). Social movements often rely heavily on the support they receive out of the wider community, as they aim at gaining political power. If greater parts of a population favour their ideologies and actions, they gain political support. Secondly, if the aims of the extremist group and the interests of a community correspond to some extent, this can have an influence on the actions that groups take in the movement-countermovement conflict (Ibid.). The actions that an extremist group take have great influence on how they are perceived by the public. This in turn influences the extent of support they are able to receive out of a

community. For example, after the murder of an English military in Woolwich in 2013 by two extreme Islamists, support for both the extreme right-wing and anti-Muslim English Defence League and Islamists had lowered as a result of social unrest regarding the attack (Barlett & Birdwell 2013: 12).9_{In the previous section Macklin & Busher (2015) also highlighted the}

9_{Another research, an analysis of open source communications after the Woolwich attacks resulted in the}

conclusion that, in this specific case, interactions between a variety of actors that reacted to opposed actors or groups played an important role in the conflict (Roberts et al. 2018: 452).

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importance of the broader aims of an extremist movement and the leader’s wish to win over public favour. Certain acts that would be condemned by a large part of a society would thus not help a movement to gain support. Therefore, in some cases, the leaders of some extremist groups have distanced themselves from certain acts and their perpetrators (Macklin & Busher 2015: 58).

Jamie Bartlett and Jonathan Birdwell (2013) have tested four of their assumptions about cumulative extremism. These assumptions are: the ‘recruiting sergeant’ argument, which assumes that actions of one group will effectuate a rise in the support for an opposing group; the ‘spiralling of violence’ argument, which assumes that the actions of one group will trigger corresponding actions of another group; the ‘equal weight’ argument, which assumes that the dynamic relationship between groups affects both sides in an equal manner; the ‘they are both as bad as each other’ argument, which assumes that the symbiotic relationship between the groups would require tackling radicalisation of both groups (Bartlett & Birdwell 2013: 5). These assumptions were tested by focusing on events and developments in the UK over two decades, which did not lead to conclusive results. Instead, the writers argued that further study in the area is needed. Bartlett and Birdwell furthermore note that is important to take into account that other factors can determine a group’s reaction to actions that are perceived as provocations as well, for example policing tactics (Bartlett & Birdwell 2013: 12).

When combining the findings of these empirical researches, several patterns emerge. It should be noted that the researches that have been discussed here, have all been conducted in the same regional setting, i.e. in the United Kingdom. However, the researches have focused on a variety of different movement-countermovement contests, in different historical settings. The contests that have been studied concerned different groups, with different ideologies and repertoires of action. Therefore the conclusions that they provided should be applicable to similar situations in other contexts. The opposing groups were understood to be in some kind of struggle with each other to some extent, but in the cases studied this did not entail a simple tit-for-tat radicalisation or violence. The empirical evidence shows that

movement-countermovement contests should not be reduced to tit-for-tat actions, as a variety of factors need to be taken into account when analysing such a contest.

Firstly, Carter (2017) argued that a movement-countermovement should be put in perspective, regarding its historical context, to lead to a valid analysis. The wider social and political dynamics in a society play a role in the mechanisms of a movement-countermovement

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might provoke actions too, not just the actions or violence of opposing groups. An example that both Bartlett and Birdwell (2013) and Macklin and Busher (2015) gave was the role of the state, as state policies and actions might provoke extremist groups as well and serve as a stimulator in the escalation of violence. Thirdly, however, the academics argued that the interests of the wider community play an important role as well in the decisions that extremist groups might take. In their strive for political power and support, groups prefer to take

decisions that would help them in this strive, rather than take decisions that might provoke the public and create social unrest. This has sometimes lead to a distancing from certain acts and their perpetrators by key figures in extremist movements. Extremist movements do not always benefit from violence, but it should be considered that a group’s internal solidarity normally increases as a result of external conflict (Collins 2012: 2). Furthermore, there might be certain dynamics at play within a group, as the fourth factor shows: the radicalization that takes place within a group often does so at the margins of that specific group, and factions within a group might also be in some sort of competition with each other. Finally, empirical evidence has shown it is very hard to prove if acts of violence are a specific reaction to violent acts of an opposing group. Furthermore the authors stated that acts of violence are not always met with greater acts of violence.

After taking all these factors into account, the definition of cumulative extremism that this thesis will use is as follows: a movement-countermovement contest that takes place over a longer period of time, which involves an interaction between both groups in their decision-making processes regarding their ideologies and actions, as violent actions of one movement might provoke another movement into violent responses, depending on various factors: the political and social climate of the society that the contest is situated in, the broader aims and goals and the identities and organisational structures of both movements.

2.3 Extreme right-wing groups and Islamist extremist groups

While there are similarities between various extremist ideologies and actions, the attention they receive differs greatly. In the discourse on cumulative extremism, some writers (Abbas, 2017; Fekete, 2014) argue that right-wing extremism hasn’t yet received much attention in public and political debate: it can either be misreported or underreported for various reasons. However, as the support for right-wing extremism grows, the attention it receives might rise accordingly. Jihadism however, has been subject to great media scrutiny, resulting in a rising level of attention for Muslim minorities, as a whole group is deemed responsible for the actions of a few (Fekete 2009 : 55). The levels of attention that various extremist ideologies

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receive differ greatly, with Jihadism being the one to receive the most. While Jihadism might be relatively easy to pinpoint, right-wing extremism for example is not contained to a certain region and is very diverse and complicated (Fekete 2014: 30-31).

The possibility to easily pinpoint Jihadism, and blame Muslims in general, has appealed greatly to right-wing extremists. A narrative of ‘culturalist racism’ is presented, which entails a perceived ‘implacable difference and intractable conflict with European Muslims’ (Feldman 2012: 2). This presents a certain dichotomy, and a shift of the focus of right-wing extremist ideologies towards a focus on Muslims. Various terrorist attacks by extremist Muslims, amongst others the events of 9/11 and the Madrid bombings in 2004, have set in motion a shift of the focus of the radical right towards a focus on Muslims (Feldman, 2012; Fekete, 2009; Abbas, 2017). Fekete (2009) furthermore argues that this “Islamism”, or Islamophobia, has replaced the fear of communism, which she coins as a new form of ‘McCarthyism’.10_This

development has received much attention in the discourse on cumulative extremism, which has mostly focused on the interaction between extreme Right-Wing or anti-Muslim groups and extreme Islamist groups (Busher & Macklin 2015: 884).

The shift in focus that has taken place within the sector of right-wing extremism, towards a focus on Jihadism and Muslims in general, requires a closer look. Several academics argue that this shift has, to some extent, been facilitated by the current political climate (Abbas, 2017; Feldman, 2012; Fekete, 2009). A variety of terrorist attacks, perpetrated by Islamist extremists, have led to a certain extent of fear of Muslims in European countries and the United States. However, it should be considered that there has been a debate about Muslims and their integration for a longer time, even before most of the aforementioned attacks had taken place in Europe and the United States. This debate has mainly focused on perceived differences with Muslim minorities that started to migrate into Europe and the U.S. in greater numbers in the last couple of decades of the 20th Century.

Martijn de Koning (2016) has described, in the Dutch context, the process of racialisation, which at first entails the classification of a group – in this case the immigrants as Muslims. Racialisation secondly consists of generalisations about the behaviour of the subject-group, thirdly it consists of value judgments about the group and the close-related stereotyping of

10_{The concept of ‘McCarthyism’ refers to United States Joseph McCarthy, who was an American politician who}

blamed many public figures of being communist during the ‘50’s, the time of the ‘Red Scare’, where the fear of communists was at a peak level in the United States. Liz Fekete calls the ‘witch-hunt’ on Muslims by the media the ‘New McCarthyism’ as Muslims are blamed for the actions of a few Jihadists.

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their culture and finally the ideas of how this group should be treated. The debate about Muslims has mostly focused on their assimilation into their “host-culture” and in this debate the majority of a society perceivably ‘points an accusatory finger at the Muslim minority’ (Fekete 2009: 65). Muslims, their culture and their religion are perceived to be incompatible with European cultures. This idea however surpasses the fact that Muslim minorities are very diverse themselves, yet still Muslims are stigmatised on the basis of their religion (Ibid.). If different individuals are then perceived to be part of a larger group, based on their identity, it makes it easy to pinpoint them. This gives Muslims a great level of exposure, which can be negative and violent, as Muslims could become a target. This has already happened as right-wing movements seem to have shifted their gaze towards Muslim minorities in their

respective countries. In combination with a variety of jihadi Islamist attacks and the migratory processes and developments over the last decades, this has led to a social and political climate in which populist anti-Muslims sentiments could take root (Feldman 2009: 2).

These sentiments have led to a certain extent of polarisation in the social and political domain and can be put to use by opposing parties on both sides. To some extent it could be argued that the opposing groups in the anti-Islam or extreme right wing groups and Islamist groups rely on each other’s actions and discourse in efforts to keep the movement-countermovement contest alive (Feldman 2009: 5). Both groups rely on each other to some extent, as their ideology is partly based on their counterparts. Actions are often based on the actions of the opposition, as we have established in the literature review. Another actor that plays a certain role in this contest are the media as some organisations report on the threat that extreme Islamism poses to western societies (Fekete 2009: 61). This might affect public opinion on Islam and Muslims and some academics speak of a certain extent of Islamophobia (Abbas 2017; Feldman 2009).

If there is a certain level of fear of Muslims and Islam, this might indeed put Muslims at risk of being ‘othered’. Othering is a concept similar to the aforementioned racialisation that Martijn de Koning (2016) coined. This process, in which Muslims are seen as a homogenous single group makes them an easy target to point fingers at and has to some extent led to a securitization of contemporary multicultural societies, where Muslims are sometimes seen as a threat to western cultures, societies and their security (Abbas 2017: 59). Terrorist attacks by several extreme Islamists have caused states to develop policies that are aimed at mitigating the threat that Jihadism poses, but this has also arguably facilitated the securitization of multicultural societies. It is here that right wing groups have stepped in, with leaders arguing

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that Muslims are a threat to western values and societies. As right wing extremism is arguably on the rise (Stevkovski, 2015; Knabe et al., 2013; Abbas, 2017) this might lead to a growth in movement-countermovement contests and, possibly, an escalation of these very contests.

2.4 Conclusion

A review of the literature on the subject of cumulative extremism has shed a light on the conceptual issues that have been raised by academics. Clarity and agreement on the definition of the concept seemed to be missing, but some empirical research has been able to add to the discussion and has proven to be useful in determining factors that play a role in cumulative extremism. A short summary on the matter could prove to be useful moving on to the case studies.

Cumulative extremism is understood to be a process in which two opposing groups are in a conflict, often described as a movement-countermovement contest. The two groups have opposing ideologies and these are partly based on their opponents, as are their actions. This means that the process of cumulative extremism entails an interactive relationship between two opposing groups, who need each other to some extent as they are understood to feed of each other’s ideologies and actions. The – sometimes violent – actions of the one group are understood to provoke the opposing group and cause the others to react in either a similar or more violent manner. This is however not always the case. On the one hand it is hard to find evidence which shows that a specific act is a reaction to another specific act. Furthermore it has been established that not all forms of violence are a reaction to another act of violence of another group. Moreover, as radicalisation often takes place at the margins of a group, some actions cannot be ascribed to the group as a whole, which leads to a denunciation by group leaders in some instances.

When analysing a movement-countermovement contest it is important to situate the movement-countermovement contest in its historical, social and political context when analysing the conflict. Furthermore the role of the state, for example with its policing practices and its policies, should not be underestimated. A group’s actions are not just based on the ideologies or actions of the perceived opposing group, but can be triggered by other factors as well. A movement might have a vision that extends further than their opposition, as the strive for political power might force a group to take a societies broader interests into account. The ideology of a group and its identity and culture can be of an important nature when taking certain decisions.

Cumulative Extremism in Western-Europe: The Breivik and Enschede cases