The incentives behind development policy : a case study of Norway

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The incentives behind development policy: A case

study of Norway

Master thesis Political Science

International Relations

Author: Sophia Charlotte Andersen Student number: 11720565

Instructor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan Second reader: Vidya Marapin Msc

Date: 25 January 2019

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Said Rezaeiejan, for his guidance and knowledge throughout this writing process. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their encouragement, support and helpful feedback.

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Abbreviations

AP Norwegian Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) CDA Critical Discourse Analysis

CI Categorical Imperative

FRP Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) GDP Gross Domestic Product

GNP Gross National Product

H Conservative Party of Norway (Høyre)

KRF Norwegian Christian Democratic Party (Kristligfolkeparti) MDC Ministry of Development Cooperation

MDG Millenniums Development Goals MFA Minister of Foreign Affairs

MID Minister of International Development NMFA Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs SDG Sustainability Development Goals SP Norwegian Centre Party (Senterpartiet)

SV Socialist Left Party of Norway (Sosialistisk venstreparti) UN United Nations

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Introduction

In the aftermath of the Second World War, following the economic reconstruction of Europe and the withering of colonial rule, “a vast development enterprise was born” (Yergin & Stainslaw 1998, p. 79). From testimonies of the recent success story of the Marshall plan and the dominant Cold War imperative to establish allies in newly independent areas of the world, sprung the initiative of long-lasting flows of funds from the North to the South.1_{More recently,}

this initiative has sparked an enduring debate among academics and policy makers about the effectiveness of development aid.2_{On the one hand, some of the most optimistic among}

academics believe that development aid can potentially eradicate poverty (e.g., Sachs 2006). On the other hand, others have challenged the effectiveness of aid for a wide variety of reasons, and argue, among other things, that development aid encourages corruption, creates dependency, stokes up inflation and builds debt problems in the recipient countries (e.g. Bräutigam & Knack 2004; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009).

Indeed, much attention has been on the effectiveness of aid and successful implementation of resources to developing nations. Nevertheless, whether these contributions from the theoretical sphere are applied to the real world is dependent on the donor countries and their development and foreign policies that drive development aid forward. An equally significant debate to the aforementioned discussion therefore invites a division between those who see development aid as the end goal itself and those who see it as a means towards donor countries’ independent objectives (e.g., Hook 1995; Fuller 2002; Neumann & Cavalhos 2015). Development aid may in other words inhabit an idealist notion where aid is given for the greater good of the global community and to create an ideal world built on mutual cooperation, or it may be viewed in realist terms where aid is used as an instrument of foreign policy to maximize the power and gains of the donor state at the expense of the recipient countries’ interests.

1_{The distinction between the North and the South is here considered broadly as a socio-economic and political divide. Thus}

the North usually include those countries that are recognized as developed, characterized by economic- and technological advances and political stability (e.g., North America, Europe, parts of Asia and Australia and New Zealand), whilst the South usually encompasses developing countries, characterized by the lack of such advances and political stability (e.g., Africa, Latin America, developing Asia and the Middle East; Mimiko 2012). However, the divide between the North and the South increasingly “corresponds less and less to reality and is increasingly challenged” (Therien 1999, p. 724). This distinction is therefore only made to emphasize the flow of development aid as oppose to an endorsement of any sort of strong social classification.

2_{This thesis will use the term ‘development aid’ when referring to development in particular and ‘foreign aid’ and ‘aid’ when}

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In reference to development aid, the Nordic countries are often regarded as donors that are strongly motivated by altruism and the needs of the recipients (Selbervik 2003; Stokke 2005; Selbervik & Nygaard 2006).3_{Academics have argued that the Nordics have acted, and are}

perhaps still acting, as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the international realm, as they are viewed as operating without considerations of material interests (Lawler 1997; Ingebritsen 2002; Browning 2007; Lawler 2007). Hence, the term ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ is often used to sum up the idealistic approach of the Nordic countries towards development issues and their willingness to make a change that can benefit the world’s poor (Selbervik & Nygaard 2006).

As one of the Nordic countries biggest contributors of aid, Norway has been perceived as an actor that “punches above its weight” with its global initiatives within climate, health and foreign aid (OECD 2013, p. 16). Its long record of contributions of aid to developing countries has for a long time developed its national identity and reputation in the international realm through this bequest. The Norwegian self-perception has evolved throughout history and has become decisive for which expectations are being made for Norwegian political practice. For instance, in 2005, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Jonas Gahr Støre, held that Norway should be able to recognize itself, meaning that foreign political practice should reflect values that are central to the Norwegian society (Dagensnæringsliv 2005). However, this traditional self-perception has been challenged by increasingly overlapping practices of Norwegian development aid and foreign affairs, and reports of inconsistent results of aid (e.g., Norad 2014; Norad 2015).

More precisely, the dissolving of the Norwegian Ministry of Development Cooperation (MDC) in 1989 and the decision to remove the Minister of International Development (MID) in 2013, has resulted in a gradual transfer of responsibility of the distribution of foreign aid to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA).4_{This has put the Norwegian embassies in the}

middle of conflicting interests. Kristin Dypedokk (2011) argues that the combination of serving Norway’s international interests and having the responsibility of managing Norwegian aid is highly problematic. She further reasons that this dispute of interest puts Norway in a position that makes it difficult to be perceived as a serious actor in foreign aid in the international realm, and that there are several indications of Norway using aid as a strategic instrument towards self-serving interests (Idem). This is also supported by Simensen (2007) who agrees that aid is often

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used as an instrument of foreign policy and of national image-building, also in the Nordic countries. Yet, public discussions surrounding this matter have been minimal.

This line of reasoning illuminates conflicting patterns, not only between the continuous flow of development aid and its arguable lack of positive results in developing countries, but also between the self-perception of Norway as a donor and the accusations that Norway is on a quest for material ends, as opposed to the idealist goal of development growth. Hence, Norway is a particularly interesting case to study due to the seemingly paradoxical entanglement of its idealist national identity linked to their image as a donor of aid and the fusion of Norwegian development aid and foreign affairs, pulling the political practice between idealist values and material interests. It will thus be argued that rather than focusing solely on external factors as contributors to Norway’s aid regime alone, Norwegian incentives can be better understood through domestic factors and the tension between post-materialistic idealist values and materialist interests, in order to investigate whether development is the goal in itself or if aid is used as a means to achieve something else. This thesis therefore aims to answer the research question:

How is development aid policies shaped in Norwegian politics and to what extent is there a clash between the idealist dimension of development aid and the more realist self-interest criteria of foreign policies in the period between 2005 and 2017?

In order to answer this research question I will first review two opposing views on development aid effectiveness, namely economical effectiveness an institutional effectiveness. This is to highlight conflicting opinions of why and how development aid may not work as it is intended or presumed, and further to create two variables that will aid the upcoming analysis to look for a possible shift from one government to another in terms of how they approach issues of development. Second, the following theoretical framework will function as two poles to investigate donor incentives. Idealism will represent an approach to development policy that stresses the moral imperative behind aid and the goal of poverty reduction. In contrast, realism will represent the self-interested donor objectives that are security, economic or status oriented. Third, a qualitative methodological approach will be introduced and justified with an emphasis on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The time frame in this research project constitutes the Stoltenberg II government and Solberg government’s electoral periods that both held for two consecutive periods. As both exist at different ends of the Norwegian political continuum, they may indicate whether Norway has a consistent approach to aid or if it varies dependent on

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political positioning. Forth, an analysis of two white papers will be conducted concerning the development policy approach to Stoltenberg II and Solberg. Lastly, this thesis will conclude the research project by arguing for the existence of self-interested incentives within Norwegian development policy which are legitimated through idealist conceptions.

By establishing the premises that have created the foundation for Norwegian idealism and legitimation for a system of aid that supposedly does not work as it is intended or perceived, this author hopes to shed light on domestic socio-political factors that affect the formation of development policy, and hence contribute to a more holistic understanding of the incentives of development aid. There is, to this author’s knowledge, an existing gap in the literature regarding whether the incentives of development aid are based on the goals of the donor or the recipient and thus regarding the tension between idealist and realist interests of the donor country. This problematization of development aid therefore possesses scientific relevance and can assist future research in the field.

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1 Literature Review: Theories of aid

effectiveness

This section will present and review some of the literature relevant to the debate concerning the effectiveness of development aid. There are several arguments regarding aid effectiveness and different scholars have focused on different aspects of aid. Yet for the purpose of this thesis, particular arguments have been selected and divided into two; economical effectiveness and institutional effectiveness. The former argues that all aid is insufficient and should thus be discontinued, as the focus should rather be on developing good market policies and private initiatives in recipient countries. The latter believes that aid may be beneficial to the recipient states, but that it is dependent on ‘good governance’ in order to be efficient.5

1.1 Economic effectiveness

The economic arguments can be summarized into three main points; the first reasons that development aid in terms of funds encourages corruption, the second claims that initiatives to assist democratization processes may undermine economic progress, and the last argues that development aid creates dependency on donor countries. Before moving on to discuss the aforementioned points, it is important to note that development aid is only part of the policy pursued towards developing countries, as there also exist policies concerning trade and customs, international tax and non-aid investment in private business. These other topics are also often discussed when it comes to developing poor countries, especially during the last decades as more academics and politicians have begun to talk about a broader development policy rather than isolating development aid as the main contributor to a nation’s progress and economic growth. Many believe measures in these areas can be as important or even more effective than development aid, such as those authors reviewed in this section.

Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian-born international economist, challenges the long maintained view of aid effectiveness in her book ‘Dead aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better

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way for Africa’ (Moyo 2009). Moyo is overall skeptical about traditional aid and stresses that too much aid is given (Idem). She argues, among other things, that the lack of monitoring of funds keeps a small elite in power and encourages corruption (Idem). This is consistent with a study by Asongu and Nwachukwu who found that development aid to Africa “decreases the political stability, voice and accountability, regulation quality and the rule of law, as well as control of corruption and government effectiveness” (2016, p. 78).

Furthermore, Moyo is also unconvinced when it comes to donor countries efforts to aid democratization processes in developing countries, and argues that democracy may in some instances obstruct development (2009, p. 42). She reasons that this is because it is more problematic for a democratic regime to implement economically beneficial legislations amongst rival parties and competing interests as opposed to in autocratic regimes where the leader(s) can push through such changes (Ibid). In other words, Moyo believes that

democracy is not the prerequisite for economic growth that aid proponents maintain. On the contrary, it is economic growth that is a prerequisite for democracy, and the one thing economic growth does not need is aid (Idem, p. 43).

This is founded on the imperative that foreign aid interventions, may it be through the transfer of funds or institutional practices, are both invasive and harmful for economic growth in developing countries. This argument is supported by Booth and Cammack, who claim that democratic governance in many cases leads to a more short-term and populist policy at the expense of a more unpopular and long-term development-friendly policy (2013, p. 84-85). Democratic elections may lead to short-term self-utilization of positions as state leaders, as well as far more widespread use of client networks due to the need to win the loyalty of different domestic groups (Ibid).

Lastly, Bräutigam and Knack (2004) claims that aid creates dependency on western countries, stokes up inflation and builds debt problems in the recipient country. They reason that this is due to how aid undermines local initiatives and institutional progress (Idem, p. 277). For instance, donor funding can form half of the government budget for prolonged periods of time and can hence weaken local accountability (Uvin 2004). This is particularly the case in some African countries. For example, Easterly notes that

$568 billion in today’s dollars flowed into Africa over the past 42 years, yet per capita growth of the median African nation has been close to zero. The top quarter of aid recipients […] received 17 percent

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of their [Gross Domestic Product (GDP)] in aid over those 42 years, yet also had near-zero per capita growth. Successful cases of development happening due to a large inflow of aid and technical assistance have been hard to find (2007, p. 329).

He later adds that the recent success stories of China, India, and Vietnam received only a small percentage of aid relative to their GDP (Ibid).

In sum, what binds all of these arguments together is the disbelief in the effectiveness of traditional aid and their emphasis on good market policies and private investments in the recipient country as a better option to proliferating financial and developmental growth, as opposed to development aid (Easterly 2006; Easterly 2007; Moyo 2009). Easterly (2006) critiques aid for displacing good market-promoting policies and private initiatives that may reduce poverty by encouraging bad government and counterproductive policy. He argues that, what is required is ‘searchers’ that are willing to work and experiment locally in the recipient country to assess what the needs are on a small scale (Idem, p. 3-4).6_{That said, Easterly does}

suggest that in certain areas, such as public health, there may be room for modest interventions (Idem, p. 55). This is in reference to vaccination programs, as well as antibiotics and supplements, as one of the basic needs to enable development. In other words, “[o]nly the self-reliant efforts of poor people and poor societies themselves can end poverty, borrowing the ideas and institutions from the West when it suits them to do so” (Idem, p. 382–83).

1.2 Institutional effectiveness

Whereas the aforementioned arguments regarding aid effectiveness suggest that aid often does not work, the authors in this section usually believe that aid may be effective dependent on the political environment and institutions in the recipient country. Here, development aid is not fundamentally flawed as it may work if it is implemented as intended. These arguments are divided into three main points; the first views corruption as an obstacle to effective aid, the second emphasizes the role of good institutions and policies, and the last argues that the state’s absorptive capacity is significant to see a positive effect of aid on a nation’s development and growth.

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Some of those who view aid as an instrument that can solve poverty claim that it is the difficult domestic political and social territory in most recipient countries that limits the control aid has (Collier 2007). For example, Karsenty and Ongolo argue that more corrupt states will deem foreign aid less effective as governments of fragile states are often dominated by ‘private agendas’ and will therefore seek to negotiate the most favorable rules in order to receive money without having any intentions of adjusting to its instructions (2012, p. 44).7_{They are therefore}

unlikely to deliver the expected positive outcomes that underpin the donor countries’ incentives.

This argument may also be turned on its head. Alesina and Dollar (2000) propose that aid may be effective dependent on how the recipient state is governed, and that better governed states will see more overall benefits of development aid. Indeed, scholars have found a positive effect of aid on growth when combined with the right policy and institutional environment (e.g., Svensson 1999; Burnside & Dollar 2000). Yet others have argued that it is in fact the weak institutions and bad policies that characterize developing countries and are contributing to why they are poor (e.g., Leeson 2008). Foreign aid will therefore be unhelpful where it is needed the most, as the right conditions are lacking. Put differently, in countries that already have good policies and the right institutions in place, foreign aid is not needed.

A similar argument against increasing aid refers to a country’s ‘absorptive capacity’, which is “the ability to absorb effectively an increase in investment made possible by financial aid” (Hunt 1989, p. 105). Haan and Warmerdam argue that “recipient governments lack the administrative or policy capacity to effectively use increased aid flows, particularly when these are disbursed in a short period of time” (2012, p. 8). The recipients are thus dependent on building institutions before aid can become beneficial for development.

To summarize, those authors who subscribe to the institutional effectiveness of aid believes that development aid can alleviate poverty as long as the right institutions are in place. However, the notion that the effectiveness of aid is conditioned by how democratic, clean and transparent the governmental processes of the recipient states are has sparked an increased focus on the implementation of good policies and institutions (Svensson 1999; Doornbos 2001). Nevertheless, whether democratization has a positive effect on economic growth has shown difficult to measure due to the existence of a diverse range of democracies and autocracies, and as these democracies all vary greatly in the economic strategies they implement (Cornell 2013).

7_{The term ‘private agendas’ is used by Karsenty and Ongolo (2012) as referring to the motivation of and information held by}

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1.3 Summary: Literature review

Based on literature study, this chapter has reviewed two opposing sides to development aid. The first doubts the overall effectiveness that aid has on development, as they believe that economic growth is rather dependent on correct market strategies. Moyo (2009) and Booth and Cammack (2013) even claim that democratization efforts in developing countries may actually bring more harm to these countries than good, as growth is first and foremost dependent on economic efforts before democratization may take form. By contrast, the second side believes that the effectiveness of development aid is dependent on how the recipient country is governed in order to be effective. Here, democratization is viewed as a springboard for economic growth.

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2 Theoretical Framework: The place of aid in

foreign policy

This chapter will look at how development aid is tied to foreign policy within the theoretical framework of idealism and thereafter realism. The former will represent an approach to aid based on moral considerations and the goal of poverty reduction, whilst the latter will represent more self-centered incentives of aid as a means within foreign affairs.

2.1 Idealism

This section will begin with a brief introduction to idealism. This is entwined with Norway’s assertion as an idealist contributor of aid, founded on Scandinavian humanitarian internationalism and its national-liberal ideology. Next, the overarching moral imperative will be discussed as understood in both idealist terms and through Emmanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative (CI) which emphasizes a more liberal view of morality and foreign aid. Lastly, the goal of poverty reduction as the main incentive and interest of the donor country as argued by idealists is assessed.

In idealism, the normative aspects of development aid are momentous, as development is vastly seen as the end goal, instead of a means towards self-centered donor objectives. Proponents of this theory seek what the world ought to be and has a strong belief in the international community’s ability to solve global poverty. At such, idealism values mutually beneficial dependency and multilateral cooperation and claims that this is something that should be strived for in a globalized society. This is founded on a confidence in universal human rights and international law, and the liberal idea that a more developed world would be in everyone’s best interest in the long-run (Stokke 1989; Engh & Pharo 2009). For instance, it is assumed that human cooperation may achieve peace if the developed nations meet the moral obligation that is to fulfill the social and economic needs of the developing countries. Therefore, due to the (social) cooperative nature of human beings, development aid should be able to promote

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mutually supportive and beneficial relations, increase understanding, and liberate societies from the scourge of poverty […] narrow international interests can be overcome by contributing to greater international cause through foreign aid (Hasan 2012, p. 175).

Representatives of the idealist approach would argue that aid is based on humanitarian motives with the goal to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. Similarly, Norway has for a long time been a generous donor of foreign aid and its contributions are often perceived as being a product of ‘Scandinavian humanitarian internationalism’ (Stokke 1989). This is characterized by the desire to promote economic growth, as well as social and political rights on the basis of humanistic values with respect for individuals, and the wish to minimize human suffering (Idem, p. 11). The humanitarian internationalism feature suggests high moral responsibility, accepted by Norway as a developed country rendering assistance to less developed states. This feature is one of the most distinctive characteristics of Norway’s development policy, which emphasizes the exceptional priority of social development objectives in Norwegian foreign policy. The Norwegian political scientist, Øyvind Eggen (2013) relates this to how this particular policy area is characterized by a consensus based on idealist and humanitarian concerns, and thus has been detached from domestic political debate.

Olav Stokke, a Norwegian researcher of North-South relations and development aid, believes that the Scandinavian approach to aid differs from that of others, as the socio-political values in the Scandinavian welfare states affect the country's aid policy (Idem, p. 284). The Norwegian welfare model, like the Nordic countries, ensures a minimum of welfare for the population as a whole and is characterized by extensive public responsibility for basic welfare tasks (Nordens Välfärdssenter 2012, p. 10). Norway has traditionally been an equality-oriented society and the principles underlying the Norwegian welfare model can also be characterized as their common collective values (NOSOSCO 2009). These are the same values Knutsen, Leira and Neumann (2016) designate as an important part of the Norwegian national-liberal ideology, where Norwegians learn that they should act locally but think globally and do what they can to help the world become a better place.

Furthermore, in the 1990s it became more common to talk about Norway as a ‘humanitarian great power’, and with that a growing number of Norwegian self-images surfaced (Tamnes 2009, p. 259).8_{For instance, throughout the last decades, it has become common to speak of}

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Norway as an environmentalist and peace nation, and the country has gained a reputation as a neutral aid donor who willingly commits itself to combating poverty and promoting human rights and democracy. Others have even referred to the Nordic countries as rolemodels as they seem strongly motivated by altruism and the needs of the recipients, and due to their generous contributions and lack of geopolitical interest tied to aid – such as their absence of colonial roots (Ingebritsen 2002; Selbervik 2003; Stokke 2005). Norway has built this profile through being a strong contributor of foreign aid, human rights work, environment and participation in international cooperation. Norway's self-image as a peace nation is perhaps one of the oldest, consistent elements of Norwegian foreign policy and dates back more than 100 years (Leira & Borchgrevink 2007, p. 11). This shows how the national-liberal tradition is echoed in Norwegian identity and self-perception, and how it is perceived internationally (Knutsen, Leira & Neumann 2016).

Thus, the optimistic view that aid can help to solve poverty, as well as spread good governance and human rights can be combined with the national-liberal ideology – the foundation of the Norwegian foreign policy idea tradition (Idem). Norway's foreign policy has been characterized by the belief that Norway can play an important role internationally. The liberal philosophy is optimistic and has faith in democracy and peaceful conflict resolution (Leira 2012). This also shows how the merger of the NMFA and MDC may be explained by an idealist motivation. These ideas are strong roots in the Norwegian population as noted by Knutsen, Leira and Neuman, who claim that Norwegians have a belief that the world can be a better place and that Norway and Norwegians can not only help to realize this, but that it is their duty to do so (2016, p. 243). This will be further discussed in terms of the moral imperative and poverty reduction goal in relation to Norway in the following two sections.

2.1.1 Moral Imperative

Representatives from the idealist approach would argue that aid is based on humanitarian motives with the goal to meet the needs of the beneficiaries. This argument is founded on the moral imperative that rich countries, such as Norway, have a duty to help those that are less fortunate (Singer 1972; Lumsdaine 1993; Sachs 2005). The philosopher Peter Singer (1972) argued early for a moral perception of foreign policy, and believes suffering and death as a result of the lack of food, access to medications and shelter is possible to prevent. Similarly, the American economist Jeffrey Sachs (2005) believes that rich countries have a duty to help poor countries out of poverty. In Norwegian aid policy, idealistic and moral motives have for a

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long time been dominant. For instance, Norwegian politicians have continuously referred to principles of “human equality and a feeling of solidarity toward all countries and races” (Engen committee’s recommendations to Parliament, cited in Eriksen 1987, p. 35-36), and that “Norway has a responsibility, together with the other industrialized countries, to help solve these problems” (st. prop. 109 (1966-1967), p. 3).

Furthermore, Stein Eriksen (2007), a Norwegian researcher of political science, stresses the need to distinguish between morally motivated interest-based behavior and interests identified as preferences. He identifies a moral act as something that is recognized as an obligation and where this obligation is viewed as binding regardless of whether it coincides with the actors preferences or not (Idem, p. 113). Eriksen argues that this is the Kantian insight – where the principle of acting morally is founded on the obligation and not on whether it is the actor’s preference to do so (Ibid).

This is what Immanuel Kant dubbed the ‘Categorical Imperative’ (CI), which he proposed to be the supreme principle of morality (Allison 2011). Here, acting morally is viewed as rational, thus immoral acts are irrational as they violate the CI. More precisely, moral acts are rational to the extent where any sane adult human would accept it as moral, as a result of their individual rational reflection. Similarly to the moral imperative discussed above, the CI “provides the conceptual space that allows for the possibility of speaking of acting with an inclination but from duty” (Idem, p. 119). It may be argued that Kant was somewhat exceedingly optimistic regarding this moral agreement, yet his concept does draw on views of morality that are, and have been, widely held.

This line of reasoning may for example be tied to the Christian imperative of morality, where actors are taught to behave in a manner that they themselves would prefer to be treated. This train of thought is also widely recognized in the Norwegian foreign aid industry as it too draws on previous Christian missionary work and ensuing ideals and values. Evidently, this is coherent with the humanitarian internationalism feature discussed above. The high moral responsibility accepted by Norway as a developed country rendering assistance to less developed states, emphasizes the exceptional priority of social development objectives in Norway’s foreign policy, and the traditional equality-oriented society and the principles underlying the Norwegian welfare model as their common collective values.

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That said, it is important to note that idealism does not disregard the importance of interests, it rather preaches that there are overarching goals that need to be met in order to create a better world for everyone. This is in line with Eriksen (2007) and the CI which argue for aid as a moral obligation, regardless of whether it coincides with the interests of the donor country. These goals are in the best interest of everyone, thus national interest should come as a second order priority - but a priority no less. The idealist approach advocates morality as an instrument for securing the desired objective of making the world an ideal world. It is believed that as long as nations follow morality and their moral values in their relations, they may not only help the world eliminate worldwide challenges of war, inequality and tyranny, but also secure their own development.

2.1.2 Poverty reduction

As the goal of development aid should be to reduce poverty, this should be reflected in the donor’s approach to development aid. Enough resources should thus be granted in order to reach the goal of poverty reduction. Similarly, Sachs (2005) reasons that in the instances where foreign aid does not work it is due to the donor countries not dedicating enough resources to these cases. In addition, aid should be given to the countries that need it the most (i.e., countries with a lower income per capita should be prioritized over those with a higher income per capita; Dowling & Hiemenz 1985, p. 540). There should, in other words, be a consistency between the pronounced goals of development aid and the actual goals of the donor country.

In his book, “Moral vision in international politics”, David Lumsdaine (1993) found that Western countries have increasingly given aid to the poorest countries that needed it the most and concludes that humanitarian considerations and poverty alleviation, as opposed to political and economic interests, are the main incentives behind foreign aid. He also argues that moral considerations are of importance in the creation of institutions in developing countries and that the most generous donor countries are also those that are the most concerned with implementing measures against domestic poverty.

The United Nations’ (UN) 2030 agenda for the Sustainability Development Goals (SDG) is an example of this type of ideology. The 17 goals are a reflection of three types of development dimensions that concerns economic, social and environmental issues, and the overarching goals to “end poverty and hunger, in all their forms and dimensions, and to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality and in a healthy environment” (UNGA

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2015, p. 2). The current Norwegian government has decided that these goals will be the main approach in undertaking current global issues, replacing the former Millenniums Development Goals (MDG) for 2015 (Utenriksdepartementet 2015; Utenriksdepartmentet 2017). Also, for the last decade, Norway has had an individual goal of contributing 1% of their Gross National Product (GNP) to development assistance. Knutsen (2008) argues that this sharp increase in the aid budget should be understood in idealist context, in the same manner as their contribution to poverty alleviation, strengthening of human rights, and fighting of corruption.

Furthermore, the argument that enough funds should be provided should be based on effectiveness analyses to validate the effect of aid programs in order to meet the recipients’ interests of poverty reduction. Former international director of Christian Aid, Roger Riddell (2007), sheds light on the need to focus on the way aid is provided and the necessity for better evaluations procedures. Through his development impact assessment of the ethical justification for aid, he finds that the development cooperation industry has made a positive difference, but that it could be better (Idem). Put differently, Riddel argues that aid can work but it can also do harm and therefore needs better management and evaluation.

This is also related to donor incentives and the interplay between ethical concerns and national self-interests. Some authors claim that assessing aid as if poverty reduction is the only motivation is self-defeating (e.g., Lancaster 2007). Along similar lines, Cassen (1994) states that one of the main reasons for why aid has been ineffective is that development was not included as the key factor in the multiple objectives of donor countries. In other words, donors’ self-interests, may they be commercial, geo-political or humanitarian, are argued to be a part of the problem (this will be further discussed in section 2.2).

In sum, this section has presented and reviewed two indicators of idealist considerations within the formation of development policy; moral imperative and poverty reduction. The former involves the formation of development policy out of a moral considerations and the belief that it is part of a Norwegian duty to do so. The latter covers how poverty reduction should be the main goal of an idealist approach to aid, through focusing on how aid is distributed and to whom. In other words, whether aid is given to those that need it the most, and if the donor is actively trying to fulfill these needs. The next section will go through the indicators of a realist approach to development policy.

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2.2 Realism

Whereas idealism seeks what the world ought to be, realism is concerned with how the world

really is. Here, it is argued that aid is used as an instrument in foreign affairs. This section will

draw on theories of realism to discuss how development aid may be used as a means for pursuing security, status, or economically related interests of the donor country. Before moving on to the three types of interest-based behavior, it is relevant to consider interests as power politics and how and why Norway chooses to express power in certain manners. This section will thus begin with an explanation of classical realism, before moving on to Hobbes’ theory of the ‘state of nature’ and Maull’s theory of ‘civilian power’, and finally tie the latter to Norway’s interests in relation to its development policy.

The fundamental principle of raison d’état (i.e, classical realism) is that it is the selfish nature of actors that forms the system where the primary objective of states and actors is to maximize their own interest (Holsti 1995). Due to the structural value- and moral-free anarchy which the states exist within and the absence of an overarching central authority, international politics are a result of workings of mechanisms known as the balance of power where each state acts in a manner to prevent any one state becoming the dominating power (Holsti 2004). This gives rise to the state security dilemma – the constant fear of betrayal and attack by others – as there is no one dominating force that stands above the states, and the states must therefore rely on self-help to achieve their ends (Idem). In turn, Ole Holsti, a professor in international affairs, argues this to be a lose-lose situation in the international realm, as “one nation’s search for security often leaves its current and potential adversaries insecure” (2004, p. 54). From this point of view, classical realism understands international cooperation and mutual interdependence as highly problematic as gain is seen as a zero-sum game, where any one state’s gain is another state’s loss.

However, in the book “The Leviathan”, Thomas Hobbes proposes his theory of the ‘State of Nature’ where he argues that the international order is maintained by a ‘general rule of reason’ that is founded on an overall wish for peace (Hobbes 1996 [1651], p. 89). From his point of view, this international order consists of states that are equal in strength and desires, and are therefore prone to follow this principle unless their own security becomes compromised (Idem, p. 84). Moreover, this general rule of reason is affix to all the actors in the international arena and may therefore be viewed as some international form of moral standard. This stands in contrast to what is proposed above, where states exist in a structural

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value- and moral-free anarchy. Albeit Hobbes does acknowledge the anarchical structure of the international realm and the capability of humans to act in an evil manner, he maintains that because of the absence of central authority combined with a constant desire for peace, it is in states’ favor to opt for peace and security through cooperation, and thus advocate “more stable forms of coexistence among themselves” (Williams 1996, p. 227).

Along similar lines, the concept of ‘Civilian power’ by the German political scientist Hanns Maull adequately intertwine such realist terms of international cooperation with domestic normative and value-based conceptions of the exertion of power. Whereas he used this notion in his argument about the distinctiveness of Germany and Japan, he later recognized that other states could have the ability to act like Civilian powers. Maull argues that the end of the postwar international order brought about a new direction in international power politics (Maull 1990/1991). More precisely, a country that can be characterized as a civilian power seeks to ‘civilize’ international relations by actively trying to replace politics based on hard power tactics (i.e., military enforcement) with politics based on legitimacy (i.e., soft power in terms of persuasion) through the internationalization of socially accepted norms (Idem, p. 92; Harnisch and Maull 2001, p. 3-4; Tewes 2002, p. 33-50).9_{Maull describes four features related}

to what he refers to as an ‘ideal’ civilian power: its domestic preconditions, its commitment to multilateral institutions, its normative commitments, and its power instruments (Maull 2018, p. 461-462).

Put briefly, the domestic preconditions refer to the combination of “the establishment of a civil society and especially a set of domestic socio-political learning processes that critically shape foreign policy conduct”, such as viewing interdependence as economically beneficial, as well as the partial loss of sovereignty (Tewes 1997, p. 97). Furthermore, the commitment to multilateral institutions is the belief in international cooperation and interdependence (Maull 2018). The normative commitments entail certain principles that will prolong the stability of the civilian international order. These are “legalization of social relations, the development of participatory forms of decision making, the institutional channeling of conflict resolution, and the taming of the use of force” (Tewes 1997, p. 97). The power instruments are the instruments

9_{Albeit not adhering to the realist strand, Joseph Nye’s differentiation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power is indeed relevant here.}

Nye characterizes hard power as power gained through coercion or inducements (Nye 2004). In contrast, soft power is argued to rest “on the ability to shape the preferences of others [by] getting others to want the outcomes that you want” as it “co-opts people rather than coerces them” (Idem, p. 5). These resources have “the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence” (Idem, p. 30). Soft power thus allows for obtaining a preferred outcome indirectly, as opposed to directly through hard power. That said, it may appear that soft power stands in contrast to raw power politics, yet Nye (2011) argues that soft

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at the civilian power’s disposal to prevent conflicts and ensure its own and international interests (Ibid). In relation to aid as a foreign policy instrument, Henning Tewes argues that

[i]t would […] be false for us to assume that a civilian power does not pursue a specific set of interests in the conduct of its foreign policy. The exercise of civilian power is not selfless altruism but the pursuit of an enlightened, inclusive self-interest pursued by means other than coercion and military force (Idem, p. 107).

Similarly, as mentioned in section 2.1, prolonged Norwegian traditions in international politics have fostered a political culture in the Norwegian society which embodies an idealistic mindset, often characterizing their foreign and development policies as value-oriented and based on morality and collective norms. Norway has continuously worked towards an international system that supports peace and stability through interdependence. This also creates better conditions for Norway, as it is in many settings dependent on cooperation with other actors in order to get their interest through on the global political arena (Lange, Pharo & Østerud 2009, p. 77-78). These interests will be elaborated upon in the following three sections.

2.2.1 Security interests

As Norway has kept downplaying the role of its military power, hard power seems rather unattached to Norwegian foreign policy. This may be due to the fact that Norwegian security is mostly dependent on their relation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European Union, United States of America and Russia (Riste 2001; Græger 2005; Eriksen 2007). This also makes it unlikely that hard power is a central concern in Norwegian development policy formation.

However, Hook (1995) proposes that development aid is used as a means to buy cooperation from other states in order to increase one’s own security. This is in line with the foreign policy instruments available to a civilian power where development policy may be formed to prevent conflicts (Tewes 1997, p. 97). This may be done through the strengthening of financial capabilities of the recipient, and hence increase security indirectly, or to buy friendship and cooperation for national interest (Hook 1995).

Since the beginning of the migrant crisis that hit Europe in 2015, Norway has found itself in the middle of a crossfire of criticism from both the domestic and international community for

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using its position as a contributor of aid to ensure agreements concerning the return of irregular migrants with recipient countries (Bjelland 2018). In this context, the phrase “to help the migrants where they are” has become an echo in Norwegian political space (e.g., Therkelsen 2014). This phrase relates to the Norwegian contributions of aid that are given to countries that experience a vast amount of migration out of the country, in order to make the authorities keep the migrants inside its boarders so to prevent the influx of migrants to Europe and Norway.

2.2.2 Economic interests

The economic interests are also an important explanation in realist theory for why and for what purpose donor countries decide to give development aid (Fuller 2002). It is also one of the foreign policy instruments available for a civilian power as proposed by Maull. In reference to Germany, Maull argued that the state does not merely “use economics as its power base, but also pursues primarily economic objectives” (Maull 2018, p. 469). Hence, albeit donors can use their economically privileged situation to increase their own security, it also makes way for the export-oriented domestic industry to reap the benefits of economic interdependence.

In relation to Norway, some examples of such motivations may be to attain financial influence in other parts of the world or to gain access to markets and to promote domestic export (Schraeder, Hook & Taylor 1998). Whereas this can be seen as a combination of idealist and pragmatic goals, there are cases where the donor country are the one to gain, and the process becomes more harmful to the recipient country than beneficial (Chang 2007). For example, the political researchers Strømmen, de Soysa and Vadlamannati (2011), have found that many countries use aid money to buy influence in countries with corrupt and problematic governance on the basis of views that are not founded on ethical and moral notions in general, and that Norway in particular favorites exporters of oil as recipients of development aid. This is problematic as the economic interests of the donor country overshadow those of the recipient’s civil society, by collaborating with corrupt regimes.

2.2.3 Status interests

Tewes argues that civilian power can be viewed as “means or way of influencing the international environment” (1997, p. 96). Also, as soft power of a civilian power is gained through interdependence, higher status equals a means to exercising influence internationally.

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standing, Neumann and Cavalhos reason that how countries decide to express power should be seen in relation to their size, as small and middle sized countries harvest less hard power than larger countries such as the USA. Albeit this differentiation is usually based on hard power capabilities, Neumann and Cavalhos claim that the central motivation behind the policies of small states is the quest for status (2015, p. 1).10_{This is because small states seldom have a}

great amount of hard military power at their disposal, which makes their status more insecure than that of large states that have vast military strength (Ibid).

They further claim that status-seeking is therefore generally not an option for small states but a necessity (Ibid). Hook (1995) argued that foreign aid is indeed tied to donor states interests and are used as a part of states’ diplomatic arsenal. Briefly stated, there is today no viable course of action available to small states seeking to grow territorially. To a small state, status can therefore not come from size, but must come from higher moral involvement. According to Neuman and Cavalhos, status may be an end goal of certain policies by itself, yet status-seeking may have other goals (e.g., economical or security related), that may be reached through the gain of recognition and a good reputation, and may therefore be instrumental (Idem, p. 7).11

As noted in section 2.1, Norway has gained significant recognition in the humanitarian field, both internationally and domestically (Tamnes 1997). In other words, as Norway has to abide by the institutional frameworks in global politics, the best way to influence these frameworks is to convey values that strengthen their position (Kjølberg & Nyhamar 2011). Along similar lines, Norwegian self-images have for a long time been linked to the wish that Norway will be a pioneer country when it comes to areas such as environment, aid and peace. These elements of Norwegian politics have historically been important to highlight Norway as an attractive partner for other states. Some authors have argued that the Nordic exceptionalism is considered a central component of Nordic national identities and thus should be seen in light of a particular form of nation branding, as they have a reputation as good citizens, peace-loving, conflict-resolution oriented and rational (DeLong 2009, p. 368-369; Browning 2007, p. 27-28). Foreign

10_{Neuman and Cavalhos (2015) does recognize the possibility to view Norway as a medium size power due to the fact that it}

has a vast amount of economic resources, yet they claim that, when it comes to the difference in how countries gain power, they are closer to that of small countries. They also argue that it therefore does not matter, in this particular context, whether Norway is referred to as a small or medium sized country in terms of resources, as this is not what they are primarily looking at (Idem).

11_{Neumann and Cavalhos distinguish between the concepts of status, status-seeking, recognition and reputation. Here, status}

“means the condition of filling a place in a social hierarchy”, it is based on rank, meaning how much status one country have in comparison to other countries (2015, p. 4). Status-seeking is subjective in that it refers to “acts undertaken to maintain or better one’s placement” in the hierarchy, and is a “sub-category of state identity politics” (Idem, p. 5). Recognition is what actors who are involved in status-seeking are striving to gain (Idem, p. 7). A country’s reputation “is tied to identity, to how the self is seen by others – one has a reputation for something in the eyes of someone else. This reputation may be recognized, in the sense that it may inform the actions of others” (Ibid).

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aid policies may therefore affect Norway’s position in the international realm and its influence in global politics. However, there are examples where Norwegian initiatives have gained recognition despite conflicting results. For instance, an analysis of Norway’s international climate and forest initiative found that the initiative was ineffective and poorly planned towards the goal of both poverty reduction and the effect on climate (Hermanrud & deSoysa 2016). This was notwithstanding the attention and appraisal that Norway got due to this initiative.

To sum up, this section has presented and reviewed three indicators of a realist approach to development policy. The first involves the formation of policy to be based on security-oriented interests with an emphasis on increasing Norwegian security indirectly through economic funds, cooperation and/or focus on migration. The second is related to economic-oriented interests, where the prospects to grow Norwegian business interests through access to markets in recipient counties are highlighted. The third includes Norway using aid money to gain recognition and to be able to add other issues onto the international agenda that are in its interest. The goal will be to enhance Norway’s status in a particular field of expertise or to seek other related end goals.

2.3 Summary: Theoretical framework

Overall, this chapter has aimed to convey that the Norwegian cooperative nature is not only bound to an idealist perception of policy formation but also ties to realism and the quest for self-centered interest. Another element of similarity is morality, yet whilst idealism speaks of morality as working both from inclination and from duty to the benefit of the recipient, realism considers morality as part of a state’s diplomatic arsenal – as a means towards a goal that exists beyond that of poverty reduction. For the latter, morality aids change in how a country behaves in the international realm – seeking peace, interdependence and soft power to avoid conflicts and the unnecessary display of hard power. However, whilst realism argues that foreign aid is used as a means to pursue donor state’s interests, idealism believes that aid will – and is meant to – contribute to poverty reduction. There is thus a difference between acting morally in order to meet the recipient countries interests and doing so to meet one’s own. It is plausible that priorities in Norwegian development aid are more closely connected to either idealism or realism. If it is closer to realism, then development aid will to a greater extent be used as an instrument in foreign affairs. The actual goals in the Norwegian development aid should in that case be a reflection of domestic interests. If it is more related to idealism, then the stated goals

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and the actual goals to development aid should coincide. This will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter.

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3 Methodology

This chapter will outline the methodology applied in this thesis. First, the case study approach will be introduced before moving on to the case selection. The latter section will go more in depth regarding the current hypotheses and indicators used in the analysis of the two most recent governments in Norway. This will be done in order to tie together chapter 1 and 2 with the upcoming analysis. Next, as the current thesis will analyze two white papers, a critical discourse analytical method will be applied as a tool to examine these documents in relation to the mentioned hypotheses and indicators. Following, the data collection will be portrayed with an emphasis on a qualitative and discursive approach to the current study. Lastly, this chapter will shed light on the limitations of the current study.

3.1 Case study

This thesis will apply a qualitative single-case study as the research design in order to gain a comprehensive and detailed view of how development aid policies are shaped in Norwegian politics and to what extent there is a clash between the idealist dimension of development aid and the more realist self-interest criteria of foreign policies. A case study research method is defined as

an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin 1984; cited in Zainal 2007, p. 2).

This method allows for close examination of the data of a smaller area of research within a specific context (Ibid). The fact that this method enables a holistic exploration of the process and outcomes of development policies over a longer time period is significant to this thesis, as there is little prior research that have investigated the space between idealism and realism in relation to Norwegian development policy. In addition, case studies are often used to explore the why and how of a phenomenon where one cannot change the actors or their actions (Yin 2003). This is a strength when one shall investigate how policies are made and for what purpose different policies are implemented; whether development aid is the goal in itself or if it is a means to achieve something else.

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3.2 Case selection and hypotheses

As the main object of analysis in this thesis is Norway and the contemporary internal political debate on aid, the two most recent governments in Norway will be put under scrutiny; the Stoltenberg II government (2005 to 2013) and the Solberg government (2013 to present day). Due to the scarcity of previous research on this topic and the limited time for the current thesis, the time period is reduced to these two governments in order to acquire a more comprehensive understanding and answer to the research question. Another reason for choosing these two governments is that they exist on opposite sides of the political continuum in Norway. The former adhering to the left and the latter to the right.

In relation to the theoretical framework, the analysis of these two governments may show one of two things; (1) we may find that there are more similarities than differences between the two governments in terms of their approach, or (2) we may find that the difference between the two governments in terms of ideology has impacted how they device policies concerning development aid leading to differing objectives from one government to another. Both of these findings may be expressed in a more idealist or realist manner leading us to the two main hypotheses in focus:

H1 _{Norwegian development policy is framed by idealist considerations (see table 1} Idealist values indicators).

H2_{Norwegian development policy is framed by realist considerations (see table 1} Realist values indicators).

Moreover, in regard to number (2), the theories of aid effectiveness function as intervening variables and are used in order to investigate whether there has been a strategic shift, from one government to another, in terms of how they frame development policies or if the formation of Norwegian development policy is characterized by consensus and stability (see table 1. Indicators of intervening variables).

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Table 1: Indicators of approaches in Norwegian development policy

Idealist values indicators: Realist values indicators: Indicators of intervening

variables:

(1) Moral imperative: focus on the moral considerations and on the duty to help those less fortunate, with a basis in proclaimed Norwegian traditions (e.g., Scandinavian humanitarian internationalism, and Christian values).

(2) Poverty reduction: goal to solve poverty, granting aid to the poorest, and conducting and considering evaluations of

management (i.e., the needs of the recipients in focus).

(1) Security interests: increasing Norwegian security indirectly through economic funds,

cooperation and/or focus on migration.

(2) Economic interests: the prospects to grow

Norwegian business interests through access to markets in recipient countries are highlighted.

(3) Status interest: using aid money to gain

recognition and to be able to add other issues onto the international agenda that are in their own interest. The goal will be to enhance Norway’s status in a particular field of expertise or to seek other related end goals through increased status.

(1) Economic

effectiveness: emphasis on private market and investments.

(2) Institutional

effectiveness: emphasis on democratization and institution building.

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3.3 Critical Discourse Analysis

Now that the theoretical aspects and the case selection in this thesis have been identified, we need a tool to assist the analysis of the official documents. The data collection in this thesis is largely qualitative and consists of written text (see 3.4), which is why the preferred method is document analysis with a discourse analytical approach. Discourse analytical methods are different approaches that can be used to investigate how meaning is created or constructed in various contexts. These are used to examine incentives behind manners of thinking (i.e., perspectives, attitudes, values, ideological assumptions) that we take for granted when we express ourselves and therefore appear indirectly in text.

Moreover, this thesis will draw on Norman Fairclough’s approach to CDA as he is interested in not merely the academic aspect of discourse but also the political, such as increasing social inequalities, weakening of democratic rights and vast environmental destruction (Skrede 2017, p. 39). Fairclough asserts that the aim of CDA is to study the relationship between discursive and non-discursive components of reality and their meanings (2005, p. 924). Hence, CDA is useful to investigate how discursive components relate to changes in the decision-making processes and in discourse itself (Bryman 2012, p. 537).

CDA differs from other types of discourse analyses primarily by its detailed analysis of linguistic choices and its power-critical perspective on the social function of text. Every text establishes different understandings of the world, certain social relationships and particular relationships between text components and their context (Fairclough 1992, p. 64). In other words, CDA helps to explain how language and communities affect each other, while the approaches and methods are used to investigate specific areas of society where the language helps to maintain or worsen biases in the political, economic and social power conditions (Grue 2011, p. 113). Fairclough argues that the goal of CDA is to improve the understanding of how society works – how it produces both beneficial and unwanted effects – at the same time as it tries to propose how the latter effects may be eliminated (2003, p. 202-204). In turn, such analyzes can strengthen the critical language awareness among both producers and consumers of text. The current topic of development aid is indeed relevant here, as it may help to illuminate aspects of the Norwegian development approach that may be, or turn, ineffective or even harmful for the recipients.

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Fairclough defines discourses as manners of representing (2010, p. 232). Discourses are tied to different positions or perspectives that different groups of social actors have (Ibid). Discourses are (semiotic) elements of the relations between humans, as discourses is both a reflection of how the world is, or seemingly is, and how it may become as it coopts in moving the society in certain directions (they may compliment, compete or dominate each other; Skrede 2017, p. 35). This also relates to social semiotics, which is how people utilize semiotic resources and the social implications of language use (Idem, p. 24). According to this train of thought, language is a social practice that is both constitutive and constituent at the same time. CDA claims that the language is created through the use of it, but that all actors do not have the same resources to draw from. Individuals’ discursive possibilities are subject to structural constraints that do not come from discourse, but from power relations outside. The fact that languages are both constituent and constituted means we need to analyze the texts on several levels. Fairclough analyzes social interaction at three levels consisting of the text, discursive practice and social practice as shown in Figure 1 below. The goal is to show how representations in the text are embedded in social processes that are again characterized by the context. However, this relationship is dialectic, as discursive practices are characterized by the specific text, and the social practice can again be changed by new discursive practices (Fairclough 2001, p. 21).

Figure 1: Fairclough’s three dimensions of discourse

Hence, one of the key facets of CDA is how it can be used as an ideologic instrument, as the ideology in texts may be communicated implicitly (Idem, p. 20). Fairclough defines ideology as representations of the world that assist in the establishment and maintenance of power relations, domination and exploitation (2003, p. 218). He claims that the discourse is ideological in the sense that it either aids or opposes such power relations (Fairclough 1992, p. 91).

Discursive practice Process of interpretation Text Social event Social practice

Situational, institutional, societal context

Description (text analysis)

Interpretation (processing analysis) Explanation (social analysis)

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representation is so unchallenged that it appears as ‘natural’ (Fairclough, 2008, p. 52). Hegemony is thus not merely a form of dominance but also a negotiation process that creates consensus on meaning (Ibid). He further proposes that when power is exercised in a manner that has unfortunate consequences for certain groups, it becomes the subject for critical analysis (2015, p. 26-27). This is in line with what has been argued in the literature review, where development aid may in the most extreme, worsen the conditions for growth in developing countries (see 1.1).

As mentioned, Fairclough stressed the significance of discussing the relation between language, power and ideology. This concerns the questions of why and how text is produced. Along similar lines, Hilary Janks explains that

[a]ll social practice are tied to specific historical contexts and are the means by which existing social relations are reproduced or contested and different interests are served. It is the questions pertaining to interests - How is the text positioned or positioning? Whose interests are served by this positioning? Whose interests are negated? What are the consequences of this positioning? - that relate discourse to relations of power (2006, p. 1).

When analyzing key texts, this concerns the interest related to the initiatives in development aid – whether they reflect the recipient countries’ interests or Norwegian interests. Moreover, Skrede argues that CDA can help to shed light on whether a particular field in politics has become destabilized or if there have been incorporated new aspects that are given more emphasis than other (2017, p. 54). For instance, a field that has previously been characterized by stability and primarily managed by the government starts to incorporate discourses associated with the private market may tell us something about an ideologic shift towards more capital, profit and market liberalism. This is related to shifts from an institutional to a more economical approach to development policy, and to shifts from one government to another in terms of donor and recipient interest – such as from idealist to realist concerns.

The analysis will follow Fairclough’s three dimensions, yet with an emphasis on idealist and realist discourse. First, the two key texts will be presented. Second, idealist and realist discourse will be analyzed within the texts. This is also the link between the text and the social practice. Last, the social practice will reveal the discursive ideology, which discourse is leading (hegemonic) and the relation to the production of power. For this final part I will use Van Leeuwen’s (2007) four main modes of legitimation (see table 2); authorization, rationalization, moral evaluation and mythopoesis (or legitimation through narratives). These are also

The incentives behind development policy : a case study of Norway