Space Age 2.0: Europe and the Militarization of Outer Space

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Space Age 2.0:

Europe and the Militarization of Outer Space

European Policy Master’s Thesis

University of Amsterdam, 2018-2019

Student: Carlos Sala Franch (12184144)

Thesis Supervisor: Prof. dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz

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List of Abbreviations

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile ASAT: Anti-Satellite

CASC: China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation CASIC: China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation CEE: Central and Eastern European (countries)

CEU: Council of the European Union CFI: Call for Ideas

CFSP: Common Foreign Security Policy COM: Communication

COMECON: Council of Mutual Economic Assistance COPUOS: Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space CNSA: China National Space Administration

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy DG: Directorate General (European Commission

DG ECHO: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations DG GROW: Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs DG MARE: Maritime Affairs and Fisheries

EASA: European Aviation Safety Agency EDA: European Defence Agency

EEAS: European External Action Service EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency ESA: European Space Agency

ESP: European Space Policy EU: European Union

FAST20XX: Future High-Altitude High-Speed Transport 20XX FR-1: France 1 Satellite

Frontex: European Border and Coast Guard Agency GNSS/GLONASS: Global Navigation Satellite System GRAVES: Grand Réseau Adapté à la Veille Spatiale GSA: European GNSS Agency

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INI: Own-Initiative (European Parliament) IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ISS: International Space Station

IT: Information Technology

KU Leuven: Katholieke Universiteit Leuven MID: Militarized Interstate Dispute

MS: Member State/s

NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFP: No First Placement OST: Outer Space Treaty

PAROS: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space PPP: Public-Private Partnership/s

PNT: Positioning, Navigation and Timing

SAR-Lupe: Synthetic Aperture Radar-(magnifying glass)

SASTIND: State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense SATCOM: Satellite Communication

SATCOM Bw: Satellite Communication Bundeswehr SS-6: Soviet Intercontinental Missile

SSA: Space Situational Awareness SST: Space Surveillance and Tracking

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union TIRA: Tracking and Imaging Radar

UK: United Kingdom UN: United Nations

UNOOSA: United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs UNISPACE: United Nations International Space Conference US: United States (of America)

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ZIMLAT: Zimmerwald Laser and Astrometry Telescope

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Abstract

Since the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957, space exploration has transformed the nature and goals of contemporary geopolitics. Early 20th_{century geopoliticians aimed their studies at} territories on Earth, and their strategic location, culture or resource availability. Today, there is a location that can allow international actors to reach the entire globe: outer space. Thanks to satellites and space stations, outer space is very much a reality as states can utilize the infrastructure to transmit information instantaneously all over the world. The increasing investment of states in space activities, the increasing military interests and the continuous growth of the industry make the current decade a breakthrough time in science and technology development towards a new frontier humanity has fantasized about for centuries.

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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Outer Space

The question of outer space is becoming an increasingly important topic within European policy because of its applicability in any field of policy that requires communications. Much like in the Cold War space race, the military applicability of space assets and activities is becoming increasingly relevant, and earth’s orbit is becoming militarized. Nevertheless, the militarization of outer space as a concept is more ambiguous than a priori it may seem. The original hypothesis around which this thesis was framed conceived of to militarization as bound to the deployment of weapons. However, in the course of the research, I found that militarization does not necessarily include the placement of weapons, and more actors are getting involved in it. In this context, I decided to investigate European space policy (ESP) to answer the question: “What is the present and future role of Europe in the militarization of outer space?”

Given that the militarization of outer space is quite interdisciplinary considering the different applications of military and/or space activities, the militarization of outer space can be contemplated as an overarching goal a spacefaring actor may have. As the militarization of outer space is a goal and space policy is the process to achieve it, this thesis also aims to analyze the three political factors that compose an actor’s militarization of outer space: space as a domain, space defense, and space dominance. First, the term domain can have different connotations, as generally it can be defined as an area of interest or an area over which an entity has control. Nevertheless, because this thesis is focused on military capabilities, I decided to take NASA policy analyst Laura Delgado-Lopez’s definition: an area where warfare may occur (Lopez, 2012, P. 50). Nevertheless, as it will be addressed in chapter 3, space as a domain has a difference connotation for each actor. Second, space defense refers to an actor’s defensive plan for space activities. As examined further on, each actor has different goals and processes to carry out military policy and implement defensive capabilities in space. More specifically, the non-violent applications of space defense, as disclosed by EDA policy office Maarten Adriaensen are: Surveillance and recognition; the assessment of hybrid threats such as communications, espionage and cyber-threats; space risk, or more specifically, space debris; and overarchingly, Space Situational Awareness (Adriaensen, 2019, Interview). Third, space dominance is also an ambiguous term. Mainly

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this is due to the originality of it, as it is a term that while used in US space policy, it has not been adopted by ESP considering the differences in policy goals. Nevertheless, Milowicki and Johnson-Freese define it as “the degree of dominance in space of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations without interference” (Milowicki and Johnson-Freese, 2008, P. 6).

The actors that carry out the process towards the militarization of outer space work at different levels depending on whether the focus is policy or legal framework. As it will be addressed throughout the thesis, policy is carried out an international level (international cooperation), a European level (EU and ESA policy), a national level, and a corporate level (private/industrial actors). Legal framework is also prepared at an international, European and national levels (not corporate). However, because national law is the highest authority, legal framework represents the largest issue in space policy.

In this thesis, I compare the European policy and legal framework towards the militarization of outer space with that space policy carried out by other international actors. In order to address the different areas that compose ESP and contrast it with its worldwide competitors, I have laid out this project in the following way: First, chapter 2 looks at the lessons learned from the Cold War’s space race in order to see how space activity differentiates from the one during said era, and what infrastructural legacy continues to exist and function. Then, chapter 3 looks at the current space policy being carried out by the leading actors in space policy and how each actor’s goals reflects the competitiveness of space. Then, chapter 4 reflects on how legal framework is an issue for the previous actors and how they choose to address it. Chapter 5 takes a close look at the industrial actors involved in today’s space activities, their political and business interests, the billion euro business that is space defense and what legal frameworks they respond to. Furthermore, after describing each actor’s involvement in space policy and legal framework, I analyze how it affects international relations to understand whether ESP’s stance is positive or negative for a balanced future. Ultimately, the goal of this study is to highlight how Europe is and will be committed to uphold the UN values of refraining from introducing weapons in space, but will nevertheless continue to be active by means of the European space actors in improving Space Situational Awareness, thus maintaining a competitive position in the international market and a non-hostile, cooperative external relations policy.

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The research carried out for the thesis relied upon a range of both primary as well as secondary sources, complemented by expert interviews. The sources consulted included a range of both academic papers and books on the topic, as well as news articles, policy papers, legal documents and key speeches on the topic. The information gleaned from these sources was supplemented by a number of first-person interviews with key European experts on the topic, including policy officers from DG GROW, the EDA, the EEAS and the ESA. A full list of interviewees is provided together with the bibliography, and a full set of transcripts is included in the Appendix to the thesis.

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Chapter 2: Lessons from the Cold War

The importance of this chapter lies in the conceptualization of the term ‘space race’. This chapter, thus, attempts to offer an in depth analysis of the origin of space policy and exploration and how they were politically and scientifically motivated. In order to do this, I have decided to explore several aspects of the first space race between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War to give an insight on the beginnings of space policy and how it has shaped not only modern space policy, but also offered a completely new field for law, business, and international relations.

In this chapter, I begin by exploring the concept of space race and how it was shaped in the 1950s – 60s through scientific and geopolitical means. I then focus on something that is currently considered both helpful and problematic: Cold War satellite orbit placement and navigation. Many of these satellites and stations continue to be active, but most of them are considered to be space debris and are a risk for modern satellite navigation as they are simply inanimate objects in orbit around the earth. Lastly, I apply a comparative approach to the legislative and international relations approach to introduce the differences between that first space policy and the current situation.

2.1 The Historical Concept of Space Race

Figure 2.1 JFK’s Speech at Rice University

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In order to understand the reasoning behind the space race and space policy in the Cold War, we must understand why world leaders thought it was important to develop technology with space-exploring capabilities. It is commonly understood that the space exploration that begun in 1957 with the launch of Sputnik 1 was only possible thanks to the competition between the US and the USSR in technological advancement. Perhaps, it was part of the motivation, but looking back at the speech pronounced by former US President John F. Kennedy at Rice University Stadium on September 12th_{, 1962 there can be other plausible} motivations.

Despite the striking fact that most of the scientists that the world has ever known are alive and working today, despite the fact that this Nation¹s own scientific manpower is doubling every 12 years in a rate of growth more than three times that of our population as a whole, despite that, the vast stretches of the unknown and the unanswered and the unfinished still far outstrip our collective comprehension (Kennedy, 1962).

This section of Kennedy’s speech vouches for the adequacy of the situation to further space exploration. Later on in the speech he addresses the topic by drawing a metaphor that later on became quite famous, as he condensed the 50, 000 years of human history into the time-span of 50 years. To conclude said section, he states:

Last month electric lights and telephones and automobiles and airplanes became available. Only last week did we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America's new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the stars before midnight tonight (Kennedy, 1962).

With these words, Kennedy meant to say that in human history, the time interval between technological breakthroughs shortens exponentially after each one. Thus, he believed that the next breakthrough, fueled by the competition not just with the USSR but by the American feeling of self-overcome as well, was to send astronauts to the moon. Of course, Kennedy’s purpose with this speech was to increase NASA’s budget and bring public opinion on his side, but little did he know, space exploration would so shortly after, become a necessity of civil characteristics. In fact, Andrew Erickson, from the US Naval War College argues that thanks to Kennedy’s campaigning, in 1965 the American space program became a national

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priority. The Apollo program leadership enjoyed “a clear goal, a powerful mandate, and a unified team...” (Erickson, 2018, P. 383).

At the time, technology was not only developing for space capabilities, but also for nuclear destruction. Dr. Michael Krepon, who is currently a professor in political science/international relations at the University of Virginia, became most known by co-founding the Stimson center for international security studies and has built a strong reputation as an expert in nuclear weapons. Therefore, his article “Lost in Space” discusses the relevant connection of space application for nuclear weapons. According to Krepon (2001), “An arms race in space was avoided during the Cold War, due in part to the assumption that the Kremlin would compete with and nullify American moves” (para. 2). This meant that much like on earth’s surface, the US and the USSR did not directly interact in a MID (Militarized Interstate Dispute) because of the fear of each other’s nuclear capabilities. However, Krepon also argues that since very early on, The US has worked on developing space defensive capabilities to avoid a “Space Pearl Harbor” (Krepon, 2001, para. 4). In other words, as the US increased its dependence on satellites so did its need for capabilities to avoid a ‘sneak-attack’, such as antisatellite weapons and radar tracking enhancement. Even if both superpowers never engaged in direct conflict, the preparation for such a situation staged the beginning of mankind’s vertical expansion. Therefore, we can see how space is not only important for the sake of technological applications and exploration, but because it also has an effect on international relations.

In addition to Krepon’s argument, Fraser Macdonald, a professor at the University of Edinburgh and known expert in cultural and historical geography employed a more particular example to address why a nuclear war never happened. His example introduces the ‘Corporal missile’, a US tactical missile with a 75 nautical mile range (Macdonald, 2008, P. 613) that became the crown jewel of national, antisatellite defense in the early years of the Cold War. According to Macdonald (2008), the Corporal was never used because of its low target accuracy, despite its ability to leave the atmosphere (P. 614). Nevertheless, the technology used for the Corporal was also used for other rockets with scientific purposes, which signifies the accordance between Macdonald and Krepon in that despite the lack of a nuclear war, the

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technology built for that purpose allowed for civil, space exploration infrastructure to be developed.

Beyond the competitiveness that fueled space conquest in the Cold War, there is a more purely geopolitical reasoning. In other words, it is no secret that oil is (and was at the time) the most precious raw material. Bearing in mind that oil is a finite material, Geoffrey Kemp, director of regional strategic programs at the Center for the National Interest and expert in foreign relations, argues in his paper “Geopolitics, Remote Frontiers, and Outer Space” (Kemp, 1981, P. 115), that “Over time, new sources of raw materials and the consequent new lines of communication can be established. New technologies can reduce existing dependencies upon particular materials”. In essence, raw materials and their scarce nature fuel the need to find new sources of these. Given that earth’s raw materials are already being over-exploited, Kemp (1981) explains that the demand/supply for scarce resources is one of the major reasons behind geopolitical expansion (P. 116). As aforementioned, considering that resources on earth are scarce, space becomes the new frontier in the search for resources.

Considering the scarcity of resources, it is important to note that geopolitical actions have an effect both on international relations and national policy/public opinion. In order for vertical expansion to be possible, the public opinion had to be aware of it and its importance (Reichstein, 1999, P. 113). Thus giving reason to the aforementioned President Kennedy’s speech at Rice University in 1962. In order to maintain public opinion on board, NASA needed the greatest stage possible. As stated by Andreas Reichstein, Professor at the University of Hamburg and expert in American History, 528 million people all over the world watched the Apollo 11 mission launched into space (Reichstein, 1999, P. 113). This staging gave not just American public opinion, but the rest of the civilized world the sense the sense of the US being geopolitically dominant over the other nations, and allowed government space programs to continue developing. As explained by Reichstein,

It was the Cold War that made Congress and the White House take up this challenge, and it also set the timetable [...] space was an ideal arena for demonstrating national superiority [...] both sides knew that space in the Cold War stood not as the last but rather as the ultimate frontier (Reichstein, 1999, P. 136).

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Essentially, this explains the real meaning of space geopolitics as established in the commencement of space policy: portraying national supremacy over others in the search for new sources of raw materials and the exploration of the ultimate frontier. In contrast, Fraser Macdonald explains that space geopolitical expansion is not as linked to national supremacy, but rather has a stronger link to technology (Macdonald, 2008, P. 630). More specifically, he argues that much like the exploration of the sea and the poles, space geopolitics is tied together to the development of rockets, and therefore follows similar patterns to past, earth surface geopolitical expansions. Despite their essentially different reasoning as to the origins of space geopolitics, I believe they do not oppose each other. The staging of actions to show national superiority was only possible thanks to the developments in rocketry (Macdonald, 2008, P. 630). Otherwise, there would have been nothing to stage. Therefore, the portrayal of technological advancements by the Americans and the USSR provided existence to the term space geopolitics and provided general interest for it to be continued.

Posterior to the reasoning behind space policy are the priorities of itself. Deborah R. Stine, a freelance consultant dedicated to translating science and technology into policymaking, discusses space policy priorities from a historical perspective in her article “US Civilian Space Policy Priorities: Reflections 50 Years After Sputnik”. According to her, there are four fundamental factors that derive space policy priorities: “The compelling need to explore and discover; national defense; prestige and confidence in the US scientific, technological, industrial and military systems; and scientific observation and experimentation to add to our knowledge and understanding of the Earth, solar system and universe” (Stine, 2009, P. 3). Even today, these four factors continue to determine the actions taken in regards to space policy and they will shape the future of it. Stine also reflects on how the Sputnik launch protocols are still influential today, as it gave the US the urgent need to establish satellites of similar launch and orbit characteristics to keep up with the USSR (Stine, 2009, 2). This meant that at the time, the national defense factor of space policy was perhaps the most influential one, taking into account the fear of a possible attack from a missile with the capabilities of being launched into orbit. The consequences could have been devastating. Therefore, it served as motivation for the US Government to supply NASA with a larger budget and manpower to work faster. Essentially, it can be said that although the basic space policy priorities continue to be the same today as they were originally in the late 1950s, the

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motivation then was much different. The war atmosphere accelerated the process significantly, and even though today’s motivation has a much more peaceful nature, perhaps it would not be as advanced had it not been for the US – USSR space race.

Similarly, Dora Holland and Jack O. Burns, two experts in international affairs from the University of Colorado, Boulder make a rundown of American space exploration ranging from the Cold War to the Obama administration. In order to organize their paper, they use different themes to explain the narrative of American space exploration: competition with the Soviet Union, American prestige, international collaboration and a new paradigm (post-Cold War) (Holland & Burns, 2018, P. 11-13). Holland and Burns, and Stine agree that American prestige and national defense/competition with the Soviet Union were key factors to developing Cold War space policy. However, Stine puts much more emphasis on the scientific and technological aspect. In my humble opinion, the prestige and defense factors were of higher importance during the Cold War. Nevertheless, as it will be explained in chapter 3, space policy priorities have shifted towards the latter in recent years.

The higher importance of the prestige and defense factors are explained by the inherent bellicism in the space race. The devices launched into space during the Cold War were of major importance for both Eastern and Western militaries. In fact, in his review of The Other

Space Race, by historian Michael Sambaluk, history professor at Auburn University, Alan

Meyer draws that President Eisenhower purposefully grounded long-term space policy in national defense. In fact, he states that Eisenhower’s original satellite ideas, long before the launch of Sputnik, were to gain intel on “Soviet military preparedness” (Meyer, 2017, P. 597). For Eisenhower, manned spaceflight, and spy satellites were the ultimate goal of his space policy. In the context of the Cold War, the US Air Force was the most interested in carrying out this project, but in order to placate the public, and perhaps to avoid a fiasco if the USSR was not building missiles (which was later proven to be so), the task was delivered to NASA (Meyer, 2017, P. 597).

2.2 Cold War Legacy: The Satellites

Along with military space policy, launch and orbit protocols and some legal framework, the most significant legacy received from the Cold War was the infrastructure built: the

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satellites. Today, these satellites have their positive and negative side. Many of the satellites built in that era continue to be in use and serve as infrastructural base for improvements and new designs of space programs. However, a large portion of those satellites and space shuttles have become a risk for new launches. Essentially, broken parts, shut down stations, and released shuttle pieces are now considered space debris and hazardous for functioning space devices. Moreover, James C. Moltz, a professor in the Naval Postgraduate School provides data on the existing satellites in orbit (as of 2014), and those placed during the Cold War. According to Moltz (2014), not only are the satellites and objects themselves creating a more crowded orbit, many of those launched during the Cold War were liquid fueled. This means that the hazardous leaks from those satellites and rocket parts are quite dangerous for new infrastructure placed in orbit (Moltz, 2014, P. 24-25). In this section, I explore the differences between the American and Soviet space programs and how their outcomes have affected today’s space infrastructure.

It is quite noticeable how many scholars refer to the Cold War space race as a United States victory over the Soviet Union, despite the early advancements of the latter prior to the moon landing: “the first rocket to the moon (1959), the first interplanetary rocket (1960), the first man in space (1961), the first woman in space (1963), and the first spacewalk (1965). Accordingly, the Soviet Union jumped out to an early lead in its epic rivalry with the United States for power and prestige in the cosmos” (Brown, 2011, P. 177). The aforementioned scholar, Trevor Brown, an Auburn University professor and expert in American space policy (from a political science perspective), mentions such Soviet achievements, but yet believes the US was the victor of the space race. According to Brown, the reason for it is that:

Although the Soviets met with initial success in their early string of space firsts, [...] the United States matched and exceeded all Soviet space feats, possessed far more sophisticated applications satellites, and landed men on the moon numerous times in the face of a Soviet inability to do the same (Brown, 2011, P. 177).

Fundamentally, Brown argues that due to the economic input of the American space program, the state interest in it, and the technological superiority of the western superpower gave it the win over the USSR in the space race.

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Figure 2.2 Timeline Overview of Space Exploration

http://www.spaceopedia.com/space-exploration/exploration-timeline/

Paul Stares, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations and an expert in conflict prevention, gives a much more descriptive perception of the space race by comparing the military space assets of both programs. Stares argues that in the earlier stages of the US space preparations, the program showed itself as underdeveloped in comparison to the Soviet, as the Vanguard project, a small launch vehicle, was a disaster and already outdated compared to the introduction of the SS-6 (Soviet intercontinental missile) and the Sputnik satellite (Stares, 1985, P. 131). Nevertheless, American preparedness evolved with the fear of a Soviet attack. Proof of it is Macdonald’s story of the Corporal missile, which although never used in combat, was the first rocket to carry a nuclear warhead, and therefore a major breakthrough the Americans made before the USSR (Macdonald, 2008, P. 614). Posteriorly, its early significant achievements reside in the creation of the Nike Zeus ABM and the Thor IRBM, two ground-based, anti-satellite missiles built specifically to protect the territory against possible Soviet orbital bombs (Stares, 1985, P. 133). In contrast to Brown, who considers that the US victory in the space race came thanks to the civil achievements such as the manned flights in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Stares considers that the victory came thanks to the rapid improvement of the military space assets in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was due to the national defense routine improvement, which decreased the cost of the

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programs and allowed for a reduction of the budget, which led to the construction of the KH-9 and KH-11 intel-acquiring satellite systems (Stares, 1KH-985, P. 136).

On the other hand, Stares also discusses why the Soviet Union achieved a comfortable and early lead over the United States in the space race. The simple, political explanation is that the USSR was a much more centralized state than the US, thus, the government missile development programs received much support from the public opinion in the early 1950s. In addition, Stares believes that because the US’ military capabilities that provided them with the victory were not so until the late 1970s, the lead was still maintained by the USSR when the Apollo 11 mission was launched. The reason for it, according to Stares, is that because Soviet missile development became so fruitful and it struck fear to American citizens, it made the US feel the need for satellite surveillance systems. Therefore, in order to prosperously continue with the missile development, the Soviet Union introduced United Nations General Assembly resolution 1802 (XVII) of December 14th_{, 1962 to outlaw space espionage (Stares,} 1985, P. 133). This allowed them to place satellites in orbit more frequently and deploy satellite interceptor systems and ASAT (space reconnaissance) systems (Stares, 1985, P. 133-134). However, Erickson (2018) argues that the US became more successful because thanks to the Soviet sense of urgency to keep ahead, the American space program constructed more advanced rocket technology and more importantly, more affordable infrastructure (P. 377). Therefore, despite the anti-espionage resolution, the Soviet Union ended up behind in the race to the moon.

In contrast, Dominic Phelan, a professor at the University of Wollongong, Australia, and an expert in civil and materials engineering addresses the Cold War, space race, Soviet behavior from a scientific and exploratory perspective. In Phelan’s opinion, most of what was going on during the space race occurred ‘behind closed doors’. “A figurative space curtain” (Phelan, 2013, P. 1), are the words he uses to describe how civil awareness of this issue was only hinted the first time through a short, 1951 newspaper article by Mikhail Tikhonravov, after which, the west began to speculate on Soviet rocket technology. For the following years, civilians could almost exclusively only access informal information picked up by other civilians and ‘leaks’ about Soviet technological advancements. These clues that were picked up by amateur radio trackers and academics would only account for the civil

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spaceflight assets in the USSR, which resulted to seem like propaganda. However, when most of the information became public, these amateur Soviet-spaceflight enthusiast realized how much they had been correct about in regards to soviet scientific, space assets (Phelan, 2013, P. 8, 28). Laurence Nardon, a history expert for the Institut Français des Relations

Internationales (IFRI) supports this argument in his article “Cold War Space Policy and

Observation Satellites “ as he mentions that military space systems were classified from 1962 onwards, but many observation satellites, civilian data-gathering and scientific missions were easily made available to the public. According to Nardon (2007), this was done in order for the US government to ensure it could assert its leadership in data-gathering tools (P. 33).

Summarizing the comparison between the US and the USSR space programs, it is important to mention that Brown’s argument on the US being the victor of the space race is a compelling argument. The reason for it, as will be better explained later, is that American technology, systems and protocols have been the most influential in the development of space capabilities in the western hemisphere, especially in Europe. Rationalizing the argument, Despite the higher political support the Soviet military space development had, the American space program proved to be superior both in civilian space technology and in quality of the military, intel-gathering systems and satellites launched at the time. Information on the activity and location of the Soviet space assets is more unclear. However, Phelan does mention many Soyuz devices and missions that were easier to track over the 1970s and 1980s, especially since many human deaths were involved, and thus photographed (Phelan, 2013, P. 12). The American space infrastructure, especially the intel-gathering devices, both military and civilian, continued to be of use as most of the western hemisphere has relied on its data.

2.3 The Space Frontier Over Europe

Alongside the space race occurring between the US and the USSR, space policy in Europe developed otherwise. As described by Roy Gibson, former and first Director of the European Space Agency,

We in Europe owe a lot to a few fanatics who persuaded politicians that it was worth putting government money into their scientific projects; first by financing the hitchhiking

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of their experiments on other people’s satellites, and later through the development of Europe’s own satellites (Gibson, 2007, P. 155).

This makes reference to the Dominic Phelan depiction of the “space sleuths” or amateur space technology enthusiasts, who associated with the academics, began the European space experimentation. William Pelz, Director of the Institute of Working Class History and expert in European History, describes the situation of post-WWII Europe where East Germany and Eastern Europe were subject to the communist, Soviet rule; and Western Europe was influenced by capitalist propaganda (Pelz, 2016, 173). Thus, in the mutilated territory that was post-war Europe, space capability development was perhaps not the main priority of sovereign states. For this reason, as Europe was recovering and the two Cold War superpowers began testing their space assets and devices, curiosity sprouted in some civilians across the continent.

The beginnings of European space policy are perhaps less isolationist than the American’s or the Soviet Union’s. In fact, Thomas Hoerber, an expert in European Integration from the École Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales d’Angers, states that “In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War it was clear that no continental European state could seriously contemplate the development of a world-leading space program” (Hoerber, 2009, P. 405). However, in the late 1950s and 1960s and in the context of the flourishing European economic integration, France and Britain began to explore and cooperate in space navigation with scientific research purposes until in 1975, 10 states decided to for the European Space Agency (ESA) (Hoerber, 2009, P. 405). Furthermore, Gibson states that it was possible thanks to “substantial international cooperation [...] The creation of the European Space Agency was itself a significant exercise in international cooperation” (Gibson, 2007, P. 156). In order for this to occur, the inequalities between European states (mostly due to the war) had to be reduced. This meant that although there had been space agencies created in 1958, they were not able to carry policy until the late 1960s (Gibson, 2007, P. 156).

There was a good deal of altruism in the air in the 1960s and early 1970s [...] because of the large amounts of money involved, these giant programmes inevitably necessitate a strong political involvement [...] In Europe, at least there was a 4-5 year period where

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the space agencies had difficulty in persuading the traditionalists... (Gibson, 2007, P. 156).

This gives reason to why the involvement of Europe in space policy was so much more prolonged and less historically relevant than the superpowers’, as the international nature of the program required much negotiation, preparation of legal framework, and reduction of economic inequalities. Furthermore, because of that lack of economic power, European space research was purposed to be used in collaboration with the US and the USSR Daniel Sagath, a professor at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Maarten Adriaensen (EDA), and Christina Giannopapa (ESA) explain how Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries were involved in space activity before Western Europe. However it was not thanks to their economic power, but they were led by the USSR which provided facilities and capabilities to those interested (Sagath, Adriaensen & Giannopapa, 2018, P. 133). Thus, in 1965 and under Soviet leadership, Bulgaria, Hungary, Democratic Republic of Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia created the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) through which they achieved a deeper integration of space activities (Sagath, Adriaensen & Giannopapa, 2018, P. 134). Furthermore, there is evidence of an agreement between the UK and the Soviet Union to share space activities in 1987: “A 10-year cooperation agreement on the study, exploration and use of outer space was signed in Moscow on 31 March 1987 by British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, and Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze” (Anonymous, 1987, P. 267).

European collaboration with the US in space activity matters is harder to find in the early years of the Cold War. However, Krige and Russo discuss the existence of a UK/US agreement. John Krige is a professor at Georgia Institute of Technology, and expert in history of science and technology; Anthony Russo is the Chief Program Engineer for Space Communications and Navigation Division at NASA. Together, they published “A History of the European Space Agency 1958-1987” in which they explore the origins of the intergovernmental organization. According to them, in 1959, NASA offered to share scientific (not military) equipment with the UK, thus they established a series of contracts, and the UK was participant in building the Ariel 1 in 1962 (Krige & Russo, 2000, P. 9). Later on, according to Helen Wallace, an expert in European studies from the Royal Institute of

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International Affairs (at the time), argues that negotiations over the International Space Station brought the US and the ESA closer together (Wallace, 1988, P. 117).

It is rather important to note that the main agency in charge of space policy in Europe, not just during the Cold War, but currently as well, together with the European Commission is the European Space Agency. The creation of the ESA is the result, first of all of the agreement between the MS’ governments and space agencies, but also of Hermann Oberth’s fascination with rockets, as expressed by Krige & Russo (Krige & Russo, P. 9). Oberth published Die Raketen zu den Planetenräumen (The Rockets to the Planetary Spaces), which inspired European people to explore space capabilities. In Europe, the United Kingdom became the leading country in space capabilities development, and began by creating a Controlled Weapons Department as part of the Royal Aircraft Establishment. As the French program, which was developed after the British, was military financed, the original aim of the Veronique and Asterix were for the development of ballistic missiles. However, the first satellite launched, the FR-1 was scientific (Krige & Russo, 2000, P. 10). Following the French efforts came Italy and then western Germany, which completed the list of the first countries to carry out space policy. These agencies lobbied in international meetings to convince other European states to finance space capabilities as an industrial investment. However, according to Wallace, prior to the ESA, there was more separated collaboration in specific matters in Western Europe.

In the early 1960s a group of European governments concluded that their only serious hope of entering what was then a space race between the USA and the USSR was through a pooling of effort: in the European Launcher Development Organization (ELDO) to develop the Europa rocket; and in the European Scientific Research Organization (ESRO) to achieve a joint expertise in space science (Wallace, 1988, P. 115)

Even though ELDO and ESRO were not enough for the first European states with space interests to enter the space race, it proved useful as they served as framework for the ESA to be born. In chapter 3 I discuss the shift from space race to space age and explore the current developments of global space policy.

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Chapter 3: European Space Policy in the New Space Age

Space is a matter of international importance, not only for its industrial applicability and scientific interest, but for military purposes too. In this chapter, I intend to provide the setting and the policy situation in which a new space age is developing. With this in mind, this chapter is key to understanding the current actors’ (states and institutions) perceptions and purposes in space, and most importantly, understand the current aim of ESP. To understand the exponential growth of space activities over the past 20 years, Elizabeth Quintana, an expert in science and technology policy at the Royal United Services Institute, explains how civil expansion in space creates new defense challenges for the military (Quintana, 2017, P. 90). Laura Delgado Lopez, a policy analyst at NASA, pictures this concept in a more technical manner:

The space weaponization debate features the interplay among complex technical, economic, and political components that have been discussed at length since space weapons were first envisioned during the Cold War. What has arguably remained unchanged is that ‘‘political factors are probably most important of all’’ for an issue with such deep-rooted national and international implications. The political rationale, justifications, and implications of the arguments proposed in favor of specific policies may prove to be the determining factors in the outcome of this debate (Lopez, 2012, P. 50)

. As Lopez mentions, space as a domain of warfare and the concept of space domain are a key aspect of current space national policies. Therefore, in this chapter I seek to look at how these political factors are addressed by the leaders of the new space age: the US, China and Russia, and then look at how European actors address security and defense in their respective space policies and strategies.

3.1 The Leaders of the Space Age

As aforementioned, in this chapter I analyze the three leaders of the space age prior to an in depth analysis of ESP in order to compare and contrast the different actors.

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The US, victor in the Cold War space race, has been the first to introduce a special section of the army dedicated to space military actions, the Space Force. Considering the American leadership and therefore, example of space policy to the rest of the world, Lopez (2012) offers a reason why even though a Space Force is being created, launching weapons into space is not a viable option: “US deployment of space weapons will inevitably produce a globalized arms race in space” (Lopez, 2012, P. 50). This would mean that the Space Force would be limited to the launch of troops and/or infrastructure, and would still be committed to the values upheld in the Outer Space Treaty of 1966 (see chapter 4). Therefore, Stine (2009) considers that there are three priorities for American space policy: national prestige, scientific exploration, and international relations, which shape the focus of NASA’s activities in technological development (P. 14). Following that criteria, Stine and Lopez agree that the US has delivered in providing business and industry with the possibilities of investing in space activities as well as an opportunity for military operations to expand. Thus, it is possible to say that the American perspective of space as a domain is an area for business development and non-violent military activities.

Figure 3.1 Space Force

https://futurism.com/the-byte/trump-administration-space-force-cost

In order to consider American space policy towards space defense, Vishnu Anantatmula, an expert in US national security addresses the possible vulnerabilities of space assets and ensuring stability and sustainability.

Space is vital to US national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable

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global economic viability [...] As nations and non-state actors develop counter-space capabilities, they pose a direct threat to US space systems that could disrupt world-wide services depended on by the civil and commercial sectors [...] Access to these capabilities must be assured for preserving national security in space (Anantatmula, 2013, P. 133).

In his paper, Anantatmula aims to portray space as a threat to national security given its congested and competitive nature. Contrary to Lopez’s argument, Anantatmula believes the US should be the first in weaponizing space (Anantatmula, 2013, P. 152), and thus breaking the Outer Space Treaty. In contrast, Gene Milowicki and Joan Johnson-Freese, two military officers from the US Naval War College, wrote an article to address the possible reactions to a Chinese anti-satellite test that occurred in 2007. They believe that weaponizing space could place the US as a “bad actor” within the international relations and it is perhaps more productive to reconduct this policy towards a more constructive perspective, not by placing weapons in orbit, but by improving the defensive technologies available for satellites as well as preaching non-violent activities (Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, 2008, P. 11, 14). As different as these two approaches are, I believe Anantatmula did not account for a rather important aspect that Milowicki and Johnson-Freese did: space is a common area and the US does not own it (Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, 2008, P. 17).

Therefore, placing weapons in a common area could be considered an offensive action and would most likely create repercussions in its external relations. Following Stine and Lopez’s idea of space as a non-violent, business-productive environment, the US’s space defense policy should be to follow the constitutional dream: to ensure and promote freedoms and liberties. In this case, this should be done by protecting existing and upcoming space infrastructure, not only American but international as well, against threats and risks.

Regarding the concept of space dominance in American space policy, Milowicki and Johnson-Freese share the definition I decided to consider right to define this term. They also provide a depiction of what they believe should be the US approach to space dominance as the main actor currently in space. As stated by them, “Space control (the ability to use space when needed and deny the use of space to the adversary), and force application (offensive counterspace such as space weapons) are viewed as essential to maintain US superiority” (Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, 2008, P. 6). However, they argue that this is not precisely so. While exploring the idea of a “Space Pearl Harbor”, they mention that the US should take

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into account the possibility of an attack on US space systems and should invest in protecting them. Hence giving reason to the creation of the Space Force, not to launch space missiles against China or Russia, but to build better protections for American satellites (Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, 2008, P. 7). Furthermore, Quintana elaborates on “multi-domain warfare”, which means that an offensive attack in space may affect more than one domain of space systems (Quintana, 2017, P. 94). Thus, by applying the international relations theory she concludes that American space dominance was achieved by the end of the Cold War, because of its military power on the earth’s surface and its civil space capacities, it became rather uncontested, and even though the space domain is becoming quite the opposite, the defensive treaties such as NATO and the American provision of space services to other states such as SATCOM may maintain its space dominance (Quintana, 2017, P. 94). Therefore, the US will maintain space dominance not by placing missiles in space, but by showing a collaborative and compliant approach for its international agreements and maintaining a positive economic balance in the provision of space services. The American weaponization of space will only lead to a global arms race.

3.1.ii China

Chinese space policy is together with Russia the great upcoming power in space policy. Yanping Chen, an expert in Chinese space policy from the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University offers a great historical review of Chinese space policy. According to her, China’s space policy has been largely affected by political and economic turmoil. In fact, it was not until the Long March launch services installment in 1986 that Chinese space policy was taken seriously internationally (Chen, 2016, P. 171). Because Chen offers such a descriptive perspective of the history of Chinese space policy, her placement of the space domain as a science and technology development field is quite valid. According to her, because the Chinese space program began in a civil way, it has maintained that stable, civil aspect to it despite the political ups and downs and the military take-over of all civil space assets in the 1970s (Chen, 2016, P. 172, 177). Furthermore, Fabio Tronchetti, an expert in space law and policy from the Harbin Institute of Technology discusses the Chinese early and constant involvement in international treaties regarding the non-weaponization of outer

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space. According to Tronchetti, China has showed eagerness in the prevention of the use of force in outer space since the late 1990s, especially in United Nations forums (Tronchetti, 2011, P. 84). However, pro-American authors such as Milowicki & Johnson-Freese and Anantatmula, believe China has not been compliant with this policy and consider it a threat to American hegemony in space (see Milowicki & Johnson-Freese, 2008, Anantatmula, 2013). Nevertheless, the early Chinese initiative to prevent the weaponization, despite the political and economic rollercoasters China has suffered, I believe the Chinese perspective of the space domain is inherently an area for the development of science and technology.

China’s space defense policy is quite influenced by the military. However, Scott Pace, an expert in science and technology policy from the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University, argues that the building of military assets with space capabilities such as anti-satellite missiles is not precisely with the purpose of using it, but rather for business promotion. According to him,

Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities, including ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons and in-space rendez-vous and proximity demonstrations, seem to be part of broader national strategies to unilaterally advance regional hegemonic ambitions [...] Debates over dual-use capabilities such as launch vehicles, remote sensing, and satellite navigation, reflect challenges created by globalization and technical changes [...] Modern military capabilities are increasingly reliant on having competitive and innovative commercial capabilities (Pace, 2016, P. 24-25).

Essentially, this means that Pace’s assessment of the increase in construction of Chinese military capabilities is mainly for economic and business purposes, which considering the growth of China as an economic power and the fact that the state military continues to have control over civil space engineering would create a large revenue for the Chinese state. Quintana also concludes that the economic growth of the Asia-pacific region promotes this view of the militarization of space for business purposes. According to her, the commercial growth in this region has allowed for the reduction of production costs and new capabilities the militaries are eager to exploit, such as space debris removal, on-orbit servicing and space mining (Quintana, 2017, P. 90). Therefore, I have to conclude with the idea that China continues to embrace the perception of space as a business area and approaches its space policy with an economic perspective. In other words, China’s space

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defense sector is dedicated to the military industry and its relationship with space applications.

Unlike the papers related to American space policy, Chinese space policy authors don’t talk about space dominance or the superiority of the space program, but rather the success of the policy carried out. In other words, authors like Tronchetti and Pace conclude that preventing the weaponization of outer space through the efforts made in international relations are the main goal of Chinese space policy, considering the large amount of proposals and initiatives led by China in this matter (see Tronchetti, 2011, Pace, 2016). Others, like Quintana and Chen, focus on the science and technology aspect of the Chinese space program as the aim of its policy. They believe the economic pay-offs from space assets with military applications and the placement of China as the leader in the technology market are the ultimate goals of Chinese space policy (see Chen, 2016, Quintana, 2017). Essentially, China’s space policy does not seem to aim for space superiority or dominance, but simply to its space policy being a reflection of successful international relations, technological development and market revenue on earth.

3.1..iii Russia

Russian space policy, even though it developed together with American space policy during the Cold War, has suffered changes and tensions. Despite the inner corruption scandals and funding crises mentioned by Quintana (2017), the Russian space program is constantly compared to the Chinese as the challenger to US hegemony in space (P. 95). It is noticeable how authors tend to mention China and Russia together when talking about space policy. Especially in the case of Pace and Tronchetti, Russia and China are depicted as the main actors involved in the prevention of space weaponization. However, Pace (2016) argues that the space domain is a reflection of Russian national interests as an increasingly relevant regional power (P. 25). As aforementioned, the Russian space program has suffered changes and tensions. As Bertrand de Montluc, an expert in space and EU governance from the Centre

d’études des relations internationales at Sciences Po mentions, “The loss of their country’s

status as an imperial power has been the major trauma for Russians since the dissolution of the USSR and they clearly find it difficult to give such status up” (de Montluc, 2010, P. 16).

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Nevertheless, this does not trigger a wish for military offensive maneuvers, but rather it seems like Russia is adapting to globalization and embraces the perspective of space mentioned by Tronchetti as a domain for a non-military atmosphere, industry and technology development friendly (Tronchetti, 2011, P. 83).

Much like the Chinese space program, the Russian space program is quite militarized. As stated by Quintana:

Russia’s space programme has suffered from a funding crisis and internal corruption scandals, but has prioritized military programmes including global PNT constellation, GLONASS, SATCOM, and earth observation capabilities to support operations in Syria [...] counterspace capabilities including ground-based lasers to dazzle or blind satellites, direct-ascent missile systems, manoeuvrable satellites, satellites with grappling arms, and electromagnetic and cyber weapons systems (Quintana, 2017, P. 95)

Again, much like the Chinese space program, de Montluc argues that the manufacturing of military assets with space capabilities is done with industrial and business purposes. In fact, according to de Montluc, the significance of state-controlled companies and the involvement in conflicts have provided Russia with an increased revenue from military assets with space capabilities (de Montluc, 2010, P. 17-18). The goal of the space defense sector in Russia is derived from the increase in the political interest on space activities. As Pace and de Montluc argue, the Russian goal is to recover the regional powered obtained during the Cold War (see Pace, 2016, de Montluc, 2010). Therefore, Russia seeks for the victories proper of a globalized world: industrial/business goals and leadership in international relations. This is reason for the growth of the space industrial sector and the advancement, together with China, in the prevention for the weaponization of space, as expressed by Pace and Tronchetti (see page X).

Bearing in mind the similarity between China and Russia on the concepts of space defense and space domain, it is arguable that their goals are quite alike as they usually appear together as the challengers of the US on space activities. Therefore, most articles do not consider Russian or Chinese space policies as seekers of superiority or dominance, but as leaders in space industry and international relations. Furthermore, Pace states:

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The rules and norms for these domains will be created by states committed to being order-building powers. Space capabilities can provide important tools for creating the transparency and accountability needed to build societies and an international order based on the rule of law. Communication, navigation, remote sensing, and the fusion of data from multiple, overlapping sources can help create predictability in an otherwise chaotic environment (Pace, 2016, P. 27).

In his article, Pace makes a rather good case for why China and Russia pursue these goals, as the involvement in industry and international norms will classify them as regional and world leaders. In contrast, de Montluc steps aside from this ideal of concord and argues for a “hardening of Russia’s foreign policy” (de Montluc, 2010, P. 16). The reason for it is that given the sense of patriotism and wish to become a regional power, the Western model of liberalism does not serve as an example for Russia. This has cause deceleration in EU-Russia relations on non-space matters and exacerbated the rivalry with the US (de Montluc, 2010, P. 17). Despite de Montluc’s argument, I believe it does not make the case for a space dominance-seeking Russian space policy as it does not show the possibility of a militarized dispute on earth or space given the industrial and rule of law goals of Russian space defense policy.

3.2 European Space Policy

Since the early 2000s, European actors have been increasingly involved in space, its industry, its scientific factor, and lately, its military applications. Unlike the other key actors of the space age (the US, China and Russia), ESP is composed of a various number of actors: the EU (Commission, Parliament, Council of the EU), the ESA, and their respective MS (including Switzerland and Norway). The diversity of actors for a common ESP complicates the intricacies of European integration and common foreign policy. For this reason, I have chosen to analyze each European actor separately, and assess the coordination between them to carry out a successful space policy based on the political factors: space as a domain (in military perspective), space defense, and space dominance.

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Figure 3.2 The Structure of European Space Policy

(Machay, 2013, P. 205)

3.2.i EU Space Policy

EU space policy is majorly undertaken by the European Commission the European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Defence Agency (EDA). Nevertheless, European Parliament, Council of the EU, the European GNSS Agency (GSA), the European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen) are very much involved as well among other stakeholder agencies (FRONTEX, DG MARE, DG ECHO, EMSA, EASA). Much like the other actors, the EU’s space policy must be analyzed according to the political factors that determine space policy: space as a domain, space defense and space dominance. It is particularly complex to define space as a domain for the EU, because given there are several committees and institutions with competence on space policy, it is unwise to portray a single interest as the main focus of EU space policy. Maarten Adriaensen, policy officer at the EDA, emphasizes the role of space as a provider of services. He mentioned that:

Space systems are indispensable for many services that are critical to our economy and government functions, including those related to security [...] a shut down or loss in services would affect an enormous range of commercial and civil activities, including commercial land, air and sea travel, maritime navigation, telecom, IT networks, broadcasting, climate monitoring and weather forecasting [...] military users heavily depend on space based assets and services for instance, for command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (Adriaensen, 2019, interview).

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This description of space as a domain brings together the different applications of space for the EU institutions as it includes those functions related to commercial and civil interests and those related to security and the military. As evidence behind this claim, the European Parliament resolution 2016/2325 (INI) regarding the space strategy for Europe, mentions that:

The benefits of space for society are manifold and can lead to a more competitive economy for Europe by stimulating the development of many new products and services, and by promoting agriculture, forestry, fisheries and maritime transport; whereas satellite technology can lead to better access to communication technologies, high resolution Earth observation systems that allow for the exchange of information in real-time, a rapid response to natural disasters, and more effective border controls [...] space technologies, data and services can support a variety of EU public policies and key political priorities, such as boosting the Digital Single Market, stimulating the European economy and tackling climate change [...] space is not a cost for European citizens but an investment, and whereas an ambitious space strategy can ensure the EU’s autonomy and positioning in the strategic area of space, while also boosting growth, competitiveness and the creation of jobs in space-related manufacturing, operations and downstream services (European Commission, 2017, Clauses a, b & c).

Furthermore, Patricia McCormick, a professor at Wayne State University and expert in space, global governance and telecommunications, argues not only on the wide range of applications for European space assets but also on the necessity to reduce the dependence on US assets (strategic autonomy). According to her, in order for the EU to grow as a space power, it must reduce this dependence on US satellite information, especially in the field of military intelligence and operations to increase its competences in each area of space policy (McCormick, 2015, P. 44). Nicolas Peter, an expert in space geopolitics at the European Space Policy Institute insists on the urgent need for Europe to end, or at least reduce its dependence on US space assets, as according to him, information supplied by satellites is an important asset to carry out conflict prevention and crisis management and that autonomy would play in favor of European integration and geopolitics (Peter, 2005, P. 266). It is clear then that the space domain covers many areas of civil and military ESP. I believe this ability to create such interdisciplinary competences is the reason why the EU is such a rapidly emerging space actor.

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In the context of the militarization of space, we must take a closer look at the defensive programs carried out by the EU.

COM (2016) 705 from the European Commission establishes 5 policy priorities for EU space policy to continue with its growth: the benefits for the economy by up taking space services, data and user needs; fostering competition and innovation through research and entrepreneurship; reinforcing strategic autonomy for a safer environment through better launch infrastructure, access to radio frequency spectrum and protection of satellites against space debris; promoting international cooperation and effective delivery (European Commission, 2016, P. 3-12)

The assessment of these is what characterizes the European space defense programs (especially in MS for the time being). Furthermore, the Space Strategy for Europe seeks not only the enhancement of SST capacities but to increase involvement in international negotiations on the topic as space debris is one of the greatest emerging threats in space (European Commission, 2016, P. 9). In addition, Michael Gleason, a US Air Force expert in space strategy analysis, reiterates that the space plans for defense are ‘non-aggressive’ and ‘inherently peaceful’. One of Gleason’s main arguments is that the need for a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in space matters and the eagerness of MS to invest in technology development led to a peaceful military space program developed by the ESA and EDA in an intergovernmental manner (Gleason, 2006, P. 15).

However, this is a rather political issue, and the actions of other space actors provokes the need for political actors in the EU to assess these issues in perhaps more radical ways. An example of this is Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska’s statement given in January, 2019 regarding European, space security policies. In this statement, Bieńkowska insists on the need for the EU to become a stronger provider of security given the strategic and geopolitical evolution the space domain is undergoing, by turning into a “dimension of warfare” (Bieńkowska, 2019). Her ideas include the implementation of a European Defence Fund to increase military activity and research at a European level in order to increase European cooperation in defense matters, especially in order to provide protection to the two main space programs: Copernicus and Galileo. Bieńkowska also emphasizes on the need to innovate on Space Surveillance and Tracking systems (SST) in order to increase Europe’s competitiveness in the market (Bieńkowska, 2019). Lastly, she introduces the sweeping idea

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of a European Space Force much like the one prepared in the US. In contrast to other policy papers and academic assessments on ESP, her groundbreaking statement mentioned European combat aircraft, battle tanks and cyber-defense capabilities (Bieńkowska,, 2019). Despite the political debate on this matter, the ESP agenda continues to aim towards peaceful purposes. In fact, an interviewed DG GROW policy officer, disclosed that:

Programs like Copernicus and Galileo are basically civil programs managed by civil operators. We can try to find synergies with defense, we can look at what the defense users need and maybe we can tap into a potential of these space programs, but that doesn’t mean it becomes a military program [...] 95% of military platforms require or depend on space applications. The connection is there, it’s difficult to neglect, but we have to make sure we keep this line. These programs are civil programs, but they can contribute, of course, to security and defense (DG GROW Anonymous, 2019, interview).

Figure 3.3 ESP: Galileo and Copernicus

https://ec.europa.eu/belgium/events/170506_grow_en_en

This quote adds on to the evidence behind the idea that ESP is inherently peaceful, as there is not enough evidence to think otherwise. Europe has achieved or is achieving autonomy in multiple space are including Satcom, Earth observation and global positioning, navigation and timing. Europe remains however dependent on international partners for SSA. In fact, COM (2016) 705 states that SSA builds on existing activities of MS and ESA to develop international cooperation frameworks (particularly with the US, but lately seeking